What Happened After Independence?

Political Development

Rounaq Jahan

Regime Changes, 1971-2000

The Political Rule (1971-1975)

When Bangladesh’s independence and liberation war was declared in the name of the
nationalist movement and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, hailed as Bangabandhu (friend
of Bengal), there was as yet no state. Sheikh Mujib was arrested by the Pakistani military on
the night of 25th March. The leaders of the Awami League (AL) formed a government-in-
exile, nearly three weeks after the formal declaration of independence, on April 17, 1971. But
even before the formation of the government, different groups of Bangladesh spontaneously
joined the liberation war. In the first few months the number of freedom fighters joining the
Mukti Bahini (liberation force) swelled, although they remained divided in factions. The
government in exile was also bedeviled by factional feuds.5 Despite the internal squabbles,
the government in exile and freedom fighters were able to draw support of key strategic allies
-- India, Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. They were also able to gain
considerable parliamentary and popular support in the West, even though the United States
administration was “tilting” towards Pakistan.6 External actors, particularly India, played a
decisive role in the speedy conclusion of the liberation war.

When Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh on January 10,

1972, after being freed from a Pakistani prison, his major challenge was to establish an
effective government quickly to allay fears that Bangladesh will have to depend on the Indian
army and bureaucracy for internal and external security and civil administration. Sheikh
Mujib immediately took charge. The very next day after his return, Mujib issued a
provisional constitutional order stipulating a unitary, parliamentary form of government, a
Constituent Assembly, and guarantee of fundamental rights with certain qualifications i.e.
restrictions on political parties and people who had collaborated with Pakistan. Within two
months all Indian troops were withdrawn from the country and the civilian administration
was restored in all districts. Within a year, a constitution was framed and adopted by the
Constituent Assembly providing for a multi-party parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary
elections were held in March 1973 returning Sheikh Mujib’s party, the Awami League, to
power. Later in the year elections to local bodies were also held.

Mujib’s vision was to ensure the leadership of the political elite over the civil-military
bureaucratic elite who ruled the country during the Pakistani period continuing the British
colonial tradition of a “vice regal ‘system7. Though trained in the Pakistani period with the
ethos of the ruling class, the Bengali civil bureaucracy and the military initially accepted their
subordinate roles because the nationalist movement had all along supported the idea of a
parliamentary democracy where politicians provided leadership. The bureaucracy and the
military were also institutionally weak as many senior members of the two institutions were
interned in Pakistan and could not return to Bangladesh till 1973. Additionally, the two
institutions were factionally divided between “freedom fighters” and “collaborators”.8 The
political parties, including the ruling Awami League, were also weak and factionalized. The
only arbiter in the middle of the various feuding groups within the state structure was the
Bangabandhu. He relied on his charisma and personal popular support to establish rules and
order. However, this also led to further weakening of the existing institutions and the rise of a
personality cult. A faction of the Awami League’s student wing dubbed the four principles of
state ideology -- nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism -- as Mujibbad (Mujibism).

Although the state apparatus was weak, it had to tackle massive problems:
establishing law and order, disarming civilian freedom fighters, rehabilitating refugees,
reconstructing infrastructure, managing industries left by non-Bengali owners, negotiating
with the international community for recognition and assistance, and so on. The public sector
was further expanded as the state nationalized the basic industries, banking and insurance,
taking over assets even from Bengali owners. The state’s limited capacity was seriously
challenged by these tasks of economic and political management.

Bangladesh society was also in great turmoil. There was a popular demand for
holding war crime trials of the Pakistani prisoners of war and their Bengali collaborators. At
the same time there was strong pressure from the friends of Pakistan in the international
community to drop the war crime trials. The experiences of the liberation war radically
altered the vision of different groups. Many, particularly young freedom fighters, expected a
revolutionary change in society. Within a year after independence, one faction of the student
wing of the Awami League started a new political party- Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) --
calling for the establishment of scientific socialism.9 Various factions of communist parties
engaged in class warfare in different parts of the country.10 Some freedom fighters, however,
started more peaceful initiatives establishing non-government organizations (NGOs) to raise
consciousness of marginalized groups and deliver services to the poor. The NGO movement,
which was later to emerge as a major force in society, started its existence in the years
immediately following the birth of Bangladesh.

Faced with these contradictory pressures Sheikh Mujib had to do a tight balancing
act. War crimes trials were dropped and the Pakistani prisoners of war were eventually freed.
But religion based parties and parties collaborating with Pakistan were banned and many
known collaborators were put in prison in part to save them from people’s wrath. As rightist
political forces were in retreat under the stigma of collaboration with Pakistan, Mujib turned
his attention to the radical leftist opposition. A paramilitary counter insurgency force, Rakkhi
Bahini -- composed of Awami League loyalists -- was created to tackle the militants.

However, discontent with the Awami League regime started to grow as the economy
continued to recover slowly under the pressure of massive reconstruction and rehabilitation
work. At the same time, there were allegations of corruption against many Awami Leaguers.
Two types of solutions were floated to boost the economy. The proponent of economic
liberalization pressed for a greater role of the private sector and denationalization of

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industries and services. Proponents of revolution called for implementation of true socialist
measures rather than the regime’s mixed economy policies.

Within months of winning a landslide victory in the 1973 parliamentary election

where it captured 291 out of the 300 general seats in parliament, the Awami League was
plunged in deep schism. On the one side were militant youth leaders, led by Sheikh Mujib’s
nephew Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, calling for the establishment of a revolutionary
government under Sheikh Mujib. On the other, were older moderate leaders urging
continuation of parliamentary democratic rule. The sense of crisis deepened with the famine
of 1974 and the rising voice of the political opposition. The law and order situation
deteriorated. Mujib finally decided to take the course suggested by the young militants. In
January 1975, the Constitution was amended by the Awami League dominated parliament to
provide for a one party presidential form of government with restrictions on freedom of the
press and the judiciary. Sheikh Mujib launched what he termed his “second revolution” to
ensure rights for the sarboharas (have-nots).11

The concept of second revolution introduced three untested ideas to the country:
compulsory multi-purpose village level co-operatives, a reorganized administrative structure
with decentralization, and politically appointed district governors and a one party system.
Within a month, Mujib launched his single party called Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami
League (BAKSAL) dissolving all other parties and urging people from all walks of life to
join BAKSAL. BAKSAL was to have five fronts: peasants, workers, youth, students, and
women. Breaking the long-standing tradition of the British and Pakistani periods, members
of the civil bureaucracy and the armed forces were allowed to join the party. However,
before Sheikh Mujib could fully implement his new ideas he was assassinated along with
almost all of his extended family by a group of junior military officers on August 15, 1975.
External actors were alleged to have been involved in the August 15 coup.12

The Military Rule, 1975-1990

The Coup and Counter-Coups of 1975

The younger military officers, who staged the coup by killing Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and his extended family, could not assert their control over the state. The coup
leaders made the pro-US Awami League leader, Khondoker Mushtaq Ahmad, the President.13
The other leading Awami League leaders were put in prison. All political parties were
banned; but to recruit political support the regime freed some political prisoners belonging to
the Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami and the pro-China National Awami Party of Maulana
Bhashani (NAP-B). For the first time, China and Saudi Arabia extended diplomatic
recognition to Bangladesh. The regime did not last even three months. But within that short
period, the civil bureaucracy managed to push through several measures to ameliorate their
grievances. The district governor’s scheme was scrapped. And some senior bureaucrats who
were out of favor with the Mujib government were put in key positions in the administration.

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 On November 3, some senior military officers led by Brigadier (later Major General)
Khaled Mosharraf staged a counter coup ousting Mushtaq and the junior officers, but before
handing over power, members of the military regime killed four leading Awami League
leaders inside Dhaka prison. However Mosharraf’s coup too was short lived. On November
7, Chief Justice A. M. Sayem was sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law
Administrator but Mosharraf and his allies were killed on November 7 in a soldier’s mutiny
engineered by the Biplobi Gono Bahini (People’s Revolution Army) led by retired Colonel
Abu Taher and the JSD. Major General Ziaur Rahman was the choice of Col. Taher to
assume the leadership of the military and the new regime. Though put in power by the
revolutionary group, Zia soon decided to part company with the leftists. He refused to go
along with the Gono Bahini and its twelve point demands. On November 15, 1975 a new set
of martial law regulations were promulgated stipulating death sentence to future mutineers.
Taher and the leaders of the JSD were arrested. Taher was later tried in military court and
sentenced to death.14

The Zia Regime (1975-1981)

Ziaur Rahman emerged as the military strongman after the November 7, 1975
soldier’s mutiny. For almost a year he ruled from behind the scene as one of the three
Deputy Martial Law Administrators keeping Justice A. M. Sayem as the President and Chief
Martial Law Administrator. Parliament was dissolved and political parties and civil and
political rights were suppressed under martial law. The regime, however, made repeated
promises to restore democracy. The President’s council of advisors were drawn mainly from
the ranks of bureaucrats and technocrats. Many of them had served the military regimes in
the Pakistani period and knew the art of running such regimes.

Initially Zia was preoccupied with restoring discipline in the military and ruthlessly
put down repeated coup attempts. He also took measures to redress some of the grievances of
the soldiers that led to the mutiny. Zia integrated the Rakkhi Bahini with the military,
bringing the former under the military’s chain of command. Though himself a freedom
fighter, Zia accommodated the repatriated officers from Pakistan and made Hussain
Muhammad Ershad, a repatriated officer, his deputy over the claims of Mukti Bahini officers.

While Zia attempted to unify and strengthen the military and the civil bureaucracy, he
weakened the political parties by his divisive carrot and stick policy. Though political parties
were banned the regime started dialogues with different politicians in order to identify those
who were willing to support and serve the regime and isolate others opposed to military rule.
Anti-Awami League political forces were the regime’s natural choices. Within two months, the
regime repealed the Collaborators Order of 1972 and gave a general amnesty, releasing a large
number of people convicted under the Collaborator’s Act. It also lifted the ban on religion
based parties thus rehabilitating Islamist political parties. The rightist, pro-Islamic and anti-
Indian forces thus became a major support base for the regime15. Zia was also able to pick up
the support of the ant-Awami League leftist forces e.g. the National Awami Party of Bhashani
(NAP-B). After negotiating political support from both the rightists and leftists forces, the
regime started the slow process of civilianization and restoration of political activities. In July

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1976 party activities were revived on a limited scale; 23 parties were given “license” by the
government to operate “indoors”. In November 1976, Zia stepped forward as the frontman
assuming the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator. In April 1977 Zia became the
President and immediately amended the constitution through a martial law ordinance.

Zia’s amendment gave a clear signal about the regime’s political ideology and
support base. By redefining socialism to mean “economic and social justice” and by deleting
the provision of acquisition of property “without compensation” Zia made it clear that he
would follow a capitalist path. His intention to emphasize the Muslim identity of the nation
and bring Bangladesh closer to Islamic bloc countries was evidenced by the amendment’s
dropping of “secularism” as a state principle and substituting it with “absolute trust and faith
in Almighty Allah”. The amendment also inserted a statement that the “state shall endeavor
to consolidate, preserve, and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on
Islamic solidarity.” To downplay the ethnic linguistic identity the amendment changed the
name of the citizens from “Bangalee” to “Bangladeshi”. It also narrowed the goal and scope
of the liberation struggle by substituting the term “struggle for national liberation” to “war
for national independence”. The emphasis on only nine months of the war as opposed to the
decades of struggle for national self-determination was an effort to undercut the role of the
Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Through the amendment Zia started a
revisionist process on the identity question and the liberation movement. These debates
would dominate the political discourse of the country for the next two decades.

After consolidating his hold on power, Zia started the process of civilianizing the
regime and began recruiting political leaders as subservient partners. However, Zia’s attempt
to build a party of his own had a shaky start. Within a year, the party went through various
incarnations: from Jatiayatabadi Gonotantrik Dal (JAGODAL) in February 1978 to a
nationalist front and finally to Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in September 1978. BNP
drew its members from both the rightist and leftist parties. Several retired military and civil
service officers also joined the party. A series of elections were held under martial law: a
local level election in 1977, a national referendum in 1977, a presidential election in 1978,
and a parliamentary election in 1979. Martial law was finally lifted after nearly four years in
April 1979 when parliament was convened and when it passed a constitutional amendment
validating all martial law orders and actions.

The prolonged continuation of martial law for four years under Zia helped to bring an
improvement in the law and order situation in the country. The suppression of the radical
political forces ended the clamor for socialist experiments and brought back the pre-
liberation coalition of power elite in the saddle. The military assumed the leadership position
but left day to day administration to the civil bureaucracy. At the same time, to cater to post
independent Bangladesh society’s desire for change, Zia adopted a populist style of
leadership. He engaged in dialogues with different groups of people and embarked on
participatory development activities e.g. canal digging. He emphasized Gram Sarkar (village
government). On the economic front, the regime reversed the Awami League’s policy
commitment to socialism. A process of disinvestment in the public sector started. The regime
also actively sought foreign aid. NGOs continued to grow in strength as they started to
receive a part of the increasing volume of foreign assistance. But the NGOs operated under
government control and were mainly involved with delivering services to the poor. The

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civilianized regime of Zia, however, lasted for only two years. Zia was assassinated on May
30, 1981 by a group of army officers.

Sattar Government (1981-1982)

There was no immediate takeover of government by the military after Zia’s

assassination. The army’s chief of staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Mohammad Ershad
pledged his loyalty to the BNP government. The abortive coup was crushed; the civilian
Vice-President of Zia, Abdus Sattar became President, and ordered a new election which he
won. But the factionalism within the BNP and Sattar’s old age made the government
vulnerable. General Ershad demanded an institutionalized role for the military in governing
the country. Sattar initially rejected the notion but under pressure from the military agreed to
set up a national security council with the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister and the
three services chiefs as members of the council. This, however, did not satisfy the military.
After months of rumors about an impending coup, on March 24, 1982 Ershad declared
martial law, suspended the constitution, dismissed Sattar and his cabinet, dissolved
parliament and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator with the navy and air chiefs as
his deputies. Ershad would rule the country under martial law for another four years.

The Ershad Regime (1982-1990)

The Ershad regime had the support of the same power elites as that of Zia. Ershad’s
council of advisors was drawn from the members of the civil bureaucracy and the military.
He faulted politicians for misrule as military dictators generally do, imprisoned some BNP
leaders, and brought charges of corruption against them. But though he distanced himself
from the BNP, Ershad continued the policies and politics of the Zia regime. Like Zia, Ershad
emphasized Islam and in 1988 he amended the constitution to make Islam the state religion.
He vigorously pursued the capitalist path. The economy was liberalized and most sectors
were opened up to private investment. He pushed through a massive privatization program,
returning enterprises to original owners and auctioning public enterprises. He sought and
received an enlarged foreign aid package and implemented many donors prescribed policies,
including a structural adjustment program.

On the political front too Ershad followed Zia’s policies of party building with state
patronage and organization of elections under state control. Like Zia, Ershad floated his party
twice, first as Jana Dal in 1983 and later as Jatiya Party (]P) in 1986. Similar to the BNP,
Jatiya Party was composed of retired military and civil service officials and defectors from
existing parties. The series of elections held under the Ershad regime included local
government elections in 1984, a national referendum in 1985, a parliamentary and a
presidential election in 1986 and another parliamentary election in 1988. But the elections
failed to give a sense of legitimacy to the regime. Although he pursued a policy that relied
the carrot more than the stick, Ershad faced a strong opposition, not only from the BNP led
by Ziaur Rahman’s widow, Khaleda Zia, but also the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib's

6
daughter, Sheikh Hasina. Though the Awami League and the BNP were opposed to each
other and had major policy differences, they were united in their demand for restoration of
democratic rule. The two parties mounted continuous mass demonstrations against Ershad.
BNP refused to participate in any election held under the regime. The Awami League
participated in the 1986 parliamentary election but boycotted the other polls.16

Ershad tried to strengthen his rural support. He dismantled Zia’s Gram Sarker (village
government) and made the Upazilas (sub-districts) the focus of local level governance. But
pumping development funds into the rural areas was not enough to counter the opposition of
the various urban-based groups. Protesting loss of public sector jobs under the privatization
program, trade unions called for massive general strikes. Professional and cultural
organizations demanded restoration of civil and political rights. The growing NGO
community, which in the 1980s, had started to emphasize advocacy work, called for
loosening of bureaucratic restrictions. The power and privileges enjoyed by the military
angered other groups including the civil bureaucracy who resented the lateral entry of
military officials into civilian jobs and the business community who envied the overnight
transformation of military officials into successful businessmen due to their contacts with the
regime. Indeed, allegation of corruption was a major grievance against the Ershad regime.

The movement against Ershad, which started in 1983 and gained momentum in 1987,
was intensified in 1990 by the student wings of the two leading parties, the BNP and the
Awami League. Civil society groups, particularly the professional associations, actively
joined the movement for the restoration of democracy. Reacting to a continuous political
movement which often turned violent and anti-military, the international donor community
signaled its displeasure with the regime. Ershad tried to salvage his position by declaring a
state of emergency one more time but senior leaders of the military withdrew their support of
Ershad and decided to protect the institution from the growing anti-military sentiment of the
people. Ershad resigned on December 4, 1990 promising to hand over the administration to
an acting President agreeable to the political opposition. The opposition chose Chief Justice
Shahabuddin Ahmed as the acting President to oversee a free and fair election. For the first
time, a regime was changed not through a bullet but through a citizen’s movement.

The Return of Political Rule and Democratic Elections (1991- )

Ershad’s resignation in the face of nearly eight years of continuous political

movement against military rule marked a watershed in Bangladesh’s political history. It was
perceived as a victory for democracy and constitutional rule. The transition to democratic
rule was marked by dialogue and agreement amongst contending political parties on the basic
outlines of democratic governance including ground rules for future regime changes. There
was a consensus that a democratic set up would not use assassinations and state controlled
elections, two methods of gaining and holding on to state power during military rule. Rather,
in future winning free and fair elections would be the legitimate means of gaining and
continuing in state power.

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 Organizing free and fair elections, thus, became the major challenge of the caretaker
government of Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed. Political freedoms were restored and the
restrictions on the press were removed. The perceived neutrality of the government was the
key to organizing an effective national election. Within ninety days the neutral caretaker
government of Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was able to organize a parliamentary
election, declared by all observers local as well as foreign, to be the most free and fair
election ever to be held in Bangladesh. The BNP led by Khaleda Zia emerged as the winner
with 140 seats, followed by the Awami League with 88 seats, Jatiya Party with 35 seats and
the Jamaat-i -Islami with 18 seats. With the support of the Jamaat, the BNP formed the
government.17

Khaleda Zia’s Government (1991-1996)

When Khaleda Zia campaigned for the 1991 election she was still committed to a
presidential form of government. The Awami League, on the other hand, was in favor of a
parliamentary form of government. But Khaleda changed her mind after the election. Both
BNP and the Awami League worked together in parliament and a constitutional amendment
was passed providing for a parliamentary form of government.

In economic, social, and external fronts, the new government pursued a cautious
centrist path continuing the old policies started under the military regimes of Zia and Ershad.
One point of departure was the abolition of the Upazila system. But this created a vacuum in
local level governance, as Khaleda did not introduce an alternative to the upazila system.

However, Khaleda’s main challenge was translating into reality the promise of
democratic governance. The initial constructive engagement between the Awami League and
the BNP began to evaporate within two years of Khaleda’s rule. The major contested issue
was free and fair elections. The two parties clashed, often violently, over several municipal
and parliamentary by-elections. Finally, in March 1994, the Awami League refused to accept
the results of the parliamentary by-election in Magura alleging election fraud by the BNP.
The Awami League demanded resignation of the government and a fresh national election to
be held under a neutral caretaker government to avoid election rigging by the party in power.
The BNP opposed the idea, arguing that there was no constitutional provision for such a
measure. The Awami League started to boycott parliament and for the next two years was
involved in various forms of street demonstrations outside parliament. The Awami League
was also able to get the support of the other parties in parliament, Jatiya Party and the
Jamaat-i-Islami. The country was repeatedly shut down by strikes called by the Awami
League. Finally, the opposition parties led by the Awami League resigned from parliament in
December 1994.

Civil society groups and the international donor community stepped in as referees to
break the continuing political deadlock between the two major political parties. Civil society
groups, who had been involved in various political movements upto 1990 to oust military
regimes, for the first time showed reluctance to continue to be involved in politics of the
streets. They urged both the Awami League and the BNP to settle their differences through

8
dialogue and constitutional means. The International donor community, which had already
started to play an important role in the last days of Ershad to ease his ouster, became even
more vocal in trying to mediate the conflict between the BNP and the Awami League. A
mission sent by the Commonwealth Secretariat, Dhaka based ambassadors, as well as a local
eminent person’s group failed in their mediation efforts. Khaleda dissolved the parliament in
December 1995 and announced fresh parliamentary election dates to be held under BNP rule
despite the combined opposition’s boycott of such an election.

The prolonged confrontation between the Awami League and the BNP reached a
crisis point with the voterless election of February 1996. The govern1nent’s attempt to
manipulate election results gave legitimacy to the Awami League’s claim that the BNP could
not be trusted to oversee a fair election. Finally, civil society groups and even some members
of the civil bureaucracy came out in favor of an election under a neutral caretaker
government. Khaleda Zia had no other alternative but to accede to their demands. The new
parliament, dubiously elected in the February 1996 election, met only once to pass a
constitutional amendment providing for future parliamentary elections under a neutral
caretaker government. The parliament was dissolved again; Khaleda Zia resigned and handed
over power to a caretaker government headed by a former Chief Justice Habibur Rahman.
Both Khaleda and Hasina tried to project the final outcome of the crisis as victories for their
respective stands. Hasina argued that by forcing Khaleda Zia to accept the notion of a neutral
caretaker government she had strengthened the democratization process. Khaleda, on the
other hand, posited that she saved democracy by following a constitutional process of passing
a constitutional amendment to provide for elections under a caretaker government.

Though there was an abortive coup attempt, the caretaker government was able to
hold a fresh election to parliament within ninety days. Once again the election was hailed as
free and fair by all national and international observers. In the June 1996 election the Awami
League came out as winners with 146 seats. BNP won 116 seats, and the Jatiya Party 32
seats. The Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami was all but routed winning only 3 seats.18 Though
BNP complained of vote rigging, the party accepted the election results and power was
transferred smoothly to the Awami League.

Sheikh Hasina’s Government (1996- )

The election victory of the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership
demonstrated the basic stability of the centrist ruling elite in Bangladesh. To win the election,
the Awami League had to gain the trust and support of the dominant groups in the ruling
class, e.g. the civil bureaucracy, the military and the business community. During its brief
rule (1972-75), the Awami League alienated all three dominant groups and they provided the
main support for the military rule and the BNP. To win back these groups, the Awami
League had to discard some of its past policies and images. The party dropped its socialist
stance and committed itself firmly to a free market economy. The civil bureaucracy and the
military were promised institutional autonomy. Indeed promised to further strength in the
military. Several retired officers from the military and civil bureaucracy and prominent
businessmen contested and won in the 1996 election as Awami League candidates. Some of

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them won party nominations over the claim of long standing Awami League supporters.
Sheikh Hasina also made some symbolic gestures to demonstrate her loyalty to Islam. The
transformed Awami League that won the 1996 election looked quite similar to the BNP.

Sheikh Hasina started well. She articulated the need for national consensus, rule of
law, accountability and transparency. She called all political parties including the BNP to
join a national consensus government. BNP refused but two other parties Jatiya Party and the
JSD -- joined the government. She emphasized good governance and formed several
commissions with government and non-government membership to review several sectors
including education, local government, health and civil administration to suggest reform
measures. New industrial and health policies were approved. A four-tier local government
structure was proposed and elections to union parishads were held. The civil bureaucracy
was given a relatively free hand to run the country. The economic policies encouraged
foreign private investment, particularly in the energy sector. The cultural policies emphasized
a reversal of the revisionist history of the nationalist struggle started in the Zia period. The
constitutional indemnity protecting the killers of Mujib and other Awami League leaders was
revoked and judicial inquiry and trials were started against the killers. Two significant
achievements of the Hasina government were the settlement of two long-standing disputes
through successful negotiations. In 1996, a thirty-year Ganges water sharing treaty was
signed with India, and in 1997 a peace accord was signed with the rebels in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts.

However, consolidation of democratic practices remained a continuing challenge.

Alleging government suppression of its workers, the BNP repeatedly boycotted
parliamentary sessions, engaged in street demonstrations and shut down the country with
prolonged strikes. It remained vehemently opposed to the Ganges water sharing treaty and
the Chittagong Hill Tracts accord promising their repeal if BNP was voted back to power.
The two parties could not come to any agreement about ground rules for expressing dissent.
Both parties maintained armed cadres. Rule of law remained elusive.

The BNP also refused to participate in parliamentary by-elections and demanded

organization of all local bodies elections under a neutral caretaker government and called for
the resignation of the Awami League government. At the dawn of the new millennium,
Bangladesh was again faced with a political crisis as the two major parties failed to settle
their differences through dialogue and negotiation and resorted to agitational street politics
and violence.

Political Development: Positive and Negative Trends

How should we assess Bangladesh’s political development in the last thirty years?
Has there been any “development” in the sense of progress? How do we define political
development?
One good way of defining political development for Bangladesh is to go back to the
vision of the nationalist struggle and Bangladesh constitution. The national liberation
movement was launched in the name of democracy as Pakistani rulers repeatedly thwarted

10
democratic elections. Bangladesh’s claim to statehood was legitimized when the Pakistani
military regime set aside the results of the 1970 national elections and the Bangladesh
constitution of 1972 affirmed democracy as one of the four guiding principles of the state.

So how has Bangladesh progressed in her quest for democracy? We can assess
Bangladesh’ performance by using the following selected qualitative measures.

Representative Government

In a democracy, citizens choose their government through free and fair elections
organized on a regular basis according to established rules, procedures and norms. Political
parties and individuals compete intensely for votes but they follow the rules of electoral
competition. And once the citizens have spoken i.e. exercised their vote, competing parties
and individuals have to abide by the electoral verdict.

When Bangladesh was born, there was a general expectation that free and fair
elections would become routine in the new nation. The constitution, adopted within a year,
stipulated for regular democratic elections and in 1973 both a national and local elections
were held. But between 1975 and 1990 although regimes changed regularly, governments
were chosen not through ballots but through bullets. The country was ruled by successive
military dictators for fifteen years. Elections were held under military rule but these elections
were not regarded as “free and fair”. There were repeated allegations that the regimes in
power silenced political opposition, rigged election results, and unfairly manipulated
electoral rules and processes to their advantages.

However, the people were able to reclaim their democratic rights to choose their
governments when they overthrew the military regime in 1990. In the last ten years regimes
have changed only through electoral verdicts. Two free and fair elections were held in 1991
and 1996. The routinization of democratic elections and peaceful transfer of power from one
party to another as a result of elections must be regarded as evidence of the progress of
democracy in Bangladesh.

However, institutionalizing democratic competition in free and fair elections has

proved to be a difficult project. The competing parties and politicians have demonstrated
extreme distrust of each other’s good faith in democratic practices. Though after the
restoration of democracy in 1990, citizen have legitimized both the BNP and the Awami
League by voting first the former and then the latter to power, the two dominant parties have
attempted to portray their competitors as undemocratic and unpatriotic and hence not
legitimate players in the game of democratic competition. Both parties have failed to accept
their electoral defeats graciously. In opposition, both the Awami League and the BNP have
resorted to agitational politics of the street, rather than participating in parliament to promote
their agenda. The increasing use of arms and “mastaans” (hired guns) to voice opposition and
settle political differences is a threat to the fledging democratic system of Bangladesh.
Democratic Governance

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 In a democracy, the majority party that wins the election and forms the government
rules with the consent of the minority. Rule of law, transparency and accountability are
hallmarks of democratic governance. Over the years, has Bangladesh progressed towards
greater democratic governance?

The record here is quite mixed. From the beginning, establishing the rule of law
proved to be quite problematic. Bangladesh won her independence not through a negotiated
agreement with the colonial rulers but through a war that claimed three million lives. Ten
million became refugees. The genocide, war, population movement and availability of arms
introduced an unprecedented element of violence and instability in post liberation
Bangladesh society and posed a major challenge for successive governments. Sheikh Mujib
initially attempted to run a parliamentary style democracy but faced armed resistance from
various factions of leftists, students, and trade union groups. Other armed youth gangs also
emerged. Many of these armed groups were alleged to have protectors in the ruling party. As
a result, people’s confidence in the system of law and justice started to erode.

Military rule is by definition a transgression of the rule of law and Bangladesh was
under military rule for 15 years. For the greater part of that period the country was ruled
under martial law when fundamental rights were suspended. There were assassinations of
political leaders, some even in police custody, but the killers received state protection and
were guaranteed indemnity by a martial law ordinance later translated into a constitutional
amendment. The military regimes were also adept in patronizing armed cadres to boost the
strength of their party and students and trade union groups affiliated to the parties.

When democracy was restored in 1990, all political parties pledged establishment of
rule of law as a top priority. But both the BNP and the Awami League governments have
been perceived as protectors of their own armed cadres. This had a negative effect on their
capacity to promote the rule of law. Indeed the two democratically elected governments have
not only largely failed to restore rule of law, they have also failed to maintain law and order
in the country, surely the main task of any government.

The restoration of democratically elected governments, however, has led to greater

transparency and accountability. The relative freedom of the print media since 1990 should
be regarded as a positive development. Since 1991 newspapers have been more proactive in
pursuing investigative journalism. Editorials and op-ed pages have consistently attempted to
mobilize public opinion around democratic values and practices. They have also been able to
influence policymaking. Publicly owned radio and television are still under state control but
private television channels have started to disseminate information freely.

However, parliament, the main forum of people’s representatives, has not been able
to function properly even after the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991. After
initially participating in parliamentary proceedings in 1991, the Awami League started
walking out of sessions and finally resigned from parliament in 1994. Since 1996, the BNP
has mostly boycotted parliamentary sessions though they have participated in the workings of
parliamentary committees. As a result of opposition boycotts, parliament has not been able to
develop as the major instrument of public accountability of the government.

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 Political parties have also not functioned well. They have not been able to aggregate
interests of different social groups, which is their main function in a democracy. Instead
political parties have functioned as machineries to mobilize crowds or organize
demonstrations during protest meetings and street agitation and to mobilize votes during
elections. Party meetings have not been distinguished by debates over various options for
economic and social policy. Instead party meetings have generally endorsed decisions taken
by the party leaders. In most cases they have followed the top leader.

Civil Society

The strength of civil society is one of the markers of democracy. Bangladesh started
with a tradition of civil society activism and in three decades since independence, civil society
has gained in strength and skills. In the 1970s and the 1980s the NGOs started mobilizing
millions of people in various group activities related to income, health, education and other
services. During the 1990’s NGOs began to organize people around human rights issues.

The confrontation and stalemate between the two dominant parties in the 1990s have
created a space for civil society actors to emerge as referees between the two parties. During
the final days of the Ershad regime in 1990 and again during the political confrontation and
crisis of 1995-96, civil society played an important role in championing democratic values
and practices.

However, in recent years some negative trends are noticeable in civil society
activism. Civil society actors are not only becoming politically more active, they are also
becoming more aligned to different political parties. This has limited their value as a neutral
third force articulating a position different from the major political parties.

Conclusion

Though in the three decades since independence Bangladesh has gone full circle,
starting with a democratically elected political rule (1971-75) to military rule (1975-1990)
and finally back to democratically elected governments (1991-), and though the system of
government also changed from parliamentary (1971-75) to presidential (1975-1990) and back
to parliamentary (1991-) form, we can discern one steady trend of political development
amongst these changes. Between 1975-1981 regimes changed through assassinations and
coups. Citizens had no voice in these changes. However in the 1980s citizens became more
proactive and after a prolonged movement they were successful in overthrowing military rule
in 1990. In the 1990s, Bangladesh witnessed two national elections in 1991 and 1996
regarded by all as the most free and fair elections ever to be held in the country. In 1996, for
the first time peaceful transfer of power took place from one party (BNP) to another (Awami
League) as a result of an electoral verdict. Thus the instrument of regime change and
succession changed from assassination to popular movement to elections. Since 1981, no top

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political leader has been assassinated, a major progress if we are to look at the record of the
six years between 1975 and 1981.

Though democratic elections have been restored since 1991, democratic governance
is still fragile. Nevertheless, there have been some positive developments. Citizens have
consistently demonstrated their support for democracy by rising against the military regime
and by turning out in large numbers to vote for elections. The print media, particularly the
newspapers have played a courageous role in investigative journalism and in editorials and
op-ed pages. Civil society actors have been proactive in democracy movements and in
monitoring the performance of democratically elected governments.

However, there have also been some negative developments that pose a threat to
Bangladesh’s fragile democracy. There is continuing difficulty in establishing rule of law.
Competitive politics is degenerating into violent confrontation between the two dominant
parties. All major parties patronize armed gangs to intimidate the political opposition and to
mobilize support. Decision-making is personal rather than institutional, and this inhibits
growth of institutions. Certainly, these negative developments need to be countered urgently
in order to institutionalize democracy in Bangladesh.

Notes and References

1 This article is based on the author’s earlier publication “Bangladesh: Promise and
Performance” in Bangladesh: Promise and Performance, edited Rounaq Jahan, London, Zed
Books and Dhaka, UPL, 2000.
2 The demand for Pakistan was voiced by the all India Muslim League in March 1940 which
argued that the Muslims and Hindus constitute two separate nations and Muslims needed
their own state.
3 See Jahan, Rounaq, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1972.
4 For a detailed account of genocide see Mascarenhas, Anthony, 1971. The Rape of
Bangladesh, New Delhi, Vikas; Malik, Amita, 1972. The Year of the Vulture, New Delhi,
Orient Longmans; Payne, Robert P., 1973. Massacre, New York, Macmillan; Jenkins, Loren,
Tony Clifton and Richard Steele, 1971. “Bengal: The Murder of a People”, Newsweek,
August 2, 1971.
5 Hasan, Muidul, 1989. Muldhara 71, Dhaka, University Press Limited.
6 Jack Anderson, 1973. Anderson Papers, New York, Random House.
7 For elaboration of the “vice regal” system see Sayeed, Khaled Bin, 1960. Pakistan: The
Formative Phase, Karachi, Pakistan Publishing House.
8 Jahan, Rounaq, 1980. Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, Dhaka, University Press
Limited, pp 66-75.
9 Ibid., pp.74-75.
10 Talukder, Maniruzzaman, 1980. The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, Dhaka,
University Press Limited, pp.141-174.
11 Jahan, Rounaq, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, op. cit., pp. 118-125; Talukder
Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, op. cit., pp. 178-182.
12 See Lifschultz, Lawrence, 1979. Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, London, Zed
Books, for allegation of CIA involvement in the August 1975 coup.

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13 See Lawrence Lifschultz, op. cit., for discussion of contacts between the coup leaders and
Khondoker Mushtaq.
14 Lifschultz, Lawrence, 1977. “Abu Taher’s last Testament: Bangladesh, the Unfinished
Revolution”, Economic and Political Weekly, August 1977.
15 Jahan, Rounaq, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, op. cit., pp. 202-223; Moudud
Ahmed, 1995. Democracy and the Challenge of Development: A Study of Politics and
Military Interventions in Bangladesh. Dhaka, University Press Limited, pp. 49-55, 306-327.
16 For a discussion of Ershad regime, see Baxter, Craig, 1977. From A Nation to a State,
Bangladesh, Boulder Univ. Press, pp. 107-115; Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the
Challenges of Development, op cit, pp. 249-350.
17 See Hakim, Muhammad A, 1993. Bangladesh Politics: The Shahabuddin Interregnum,
Dhaka, University Press Limited.
18 Baxter, Craig,, 1997. op. cit., pp 127-128.

[A M Chowdhury & Fakrul Alam (Eds.) Bangladesh On the Threshold of the

Twenty-First Century, PP. 43-60]

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