Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LABOR STANDARDS
1. What are the three TESTS of EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS?
a) Four-fold test (selection, payment of wages, power to discipline/dismiss and Right to Control)
Note: CONTROL - when the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control
not only the end achieved but also the manner and means used to achieve that end.)
b) Economic reality test (economic dependence of worker on employer for continued employment)
c) Two-tiered test or Multi-factor test (combination of a & b)
KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT
“Whether the project employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or
undertaking, the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the
employee is engaged for the project.”
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Project may refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or
usual business of the employer, but which is distinct and separate and
identifiable as such from the undertakings of the company. Such job or
undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. (Alcatel
Philippines, Inc. vs. Relos, G.R. No. 164315, July 3, 2009.)
(a) If commits acts constituting just causes – Here, the employer must
follow the twin requirements of due process.
(b) If fails to pass reasonable standards – Here, only one notice is required
and that is to formally notify the employee that he is terminated from
employment on the ground that he has failed to pass the standards set
by the employer known to the employee at the time of engagement.
(Davao Contractors Development Coop. vs. Pasawa, G.R. No. 172174, July 9, 2009.)
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Caution: The second mode is available only if the notice is done within the
probationary period of 6 months. Beyond that the proby is deemed a
regular employee by operation of law.
11. Jose was hired as probationary employee. After two months, the
employer observed that he did not pass the reasonable standards set by
the employer and known to the proby at the time of his engagement.
The employer did not lose time in notifying the proby of his termination
for reason that he did not pass the reasonable standards. The proby
protested on the ground that he was still 2 months in probationary
period and that it was too early for the employer to evaluate him. Is the
employee’s protest tenable?
Second, the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in
good faith, not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and
(Davao Contractors Development Coop. vs. Pasawa, G.R. No. 172174, July 9, 2009.)
NO. The fact that an employee was paid under a “no work no pay” scheme is
not significant. The “no work no pay” scheme is merely a method of computing
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compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of
employer-employee relationship.
Yes. By way of an exception, paragraph 2, Article 280 of the Labor Code also
considers as REGULAR, a casual employment arrangement when the casual
employee’s engagement is made to last for at least one year, whether the
service is continuous or broken.
Why so? Because here the presumption of regularity of employment sets in,
that is, that the “employee’s services are necessary in the overall business
scheme of the employer.”
It is an arrangement whereby both the ER and the EE have agreed from the
start that the engagement is for a specific and definite period only.
Note:
Actually, the Labor Code does not mention another employment arrangement
– contractual or fixed term employment (or employment for a term) – which,
if not for the fixed term, should fall under the category of regular employment
in view of the nature of the employee’s engagement, which is to perform
an activity usually necessary or desirable in the employer’s business.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora (G.R. No. L-48494, February 5, 1990), the
Court, for the first time, recognized and resolved the anomaly created by
a narrow and literal interpretation of Article 280 of the Labor Code that
appears to restrict the employee’s right to freely stipulate with his employer
on the duration of his engagement. In this case, the Court upheld the validity
of the fixed-term employment agreed upon by the employer, Brent
School, Inc., and the employee, Dorotio Alegre, declaring that the restrictive
clause in Article 280 “should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that the Code itself x x x singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances
where the fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and
voluntarily by the parties x x x absent any x x x circumstances vitiating the
employee’s consent, or where the facts satisfactorily show that the employer
and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms.” The
indispensability or desirability of the activity performed by the employee will
not preclude the parties from entering into an otherwise valid fixed term
employment agreement; a definite period of employment does not essentially
contradict the nature of the employee’s duties as necessary and desirable to
the usual business or trade of the employer.
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Nevertheless, “where the circumstances evidently show that the
employer imposed the period precisely to preclude the employee from
acquiring tenurial security, the law and this Court will not hesitate to strike
down or disregard the period as contrary to public policy, morals, etc.” In such
a case, the general restrictive rule under Article 280 of the Labor Code will
apply and the employee shall be deemed regular. (Universal Robina Sugar Milling
Corporation and Rene Cabati, G.R. No. 186439. January 15, 2014).
18. What is the requirement for a non-resident alien (NRA) to work in the
Philippines?
Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and
any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for
employment in the Philippines is required to obtain an EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
from the DOLE (Department of Labor and Employment).
19. What are the requisites before an ALIEN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT (AEP)
may be issued to a NRA?
The foreigner applying for AEP may file his application with the DOLE Regional
Office having jurisdiction over the intended place of work. If he will be assigned
in the different parts of the country, then he can file his application with any of
the DOLE Regional Offices having jurisdiction in any of the places of work.
21. What documents the applicant shall prepare for submission upon filing
of his application:
An alien issued with employment permit may not transfer to another job or
change his employer without prior approval of the Secretary of Labor. Article
41 of the Labor Code provides: “After the issuance of employment permit, the
alien shall not transfer to another job or change his employer without prior
approval of Secretary of Labor and Employment.”
SEAFARERS CASES
24. Are SEAFARERS who died during employment entitled to death
benefits?
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YES. The general rule is that the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the
deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during
the effectivity of his employment contract.
25. Is there an EXCEPTION to the preceding rule?
YES, the employer may be exempted from liability if he can successfully prove
that the SEAFARER’s DEATH was caused by an injury directly attributable to his
deliberate or willful act. (Great Southern Maritime Services, Inc., et al. vs. Leonila Surigao, et al., G.R.
No. 183646, September 18, 2009.)
NOTE: Here, the burden of proof rests in the employer to prove that the
SEAFARER’s injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the
SEAFARER or is caused by his willful act. (INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Alexander L.
Moradas, January 15, 2014).
26. Under what condition may a SEAFARER claim Disability Benefit under
Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA Standard Contract of Employment for
Seafarers?
A seafarer may claim disability benefits under Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA
Standard Contract of Employment for Seafarers ONLY IF HE SUFFERS A WORK-
RELATED INJURY OR ILLNESS DURING THE TERM OF HIS CONTRACT.
27. Suppose the SEAFARER has suffered or been afflicted with an illness
(e.g. diabetes) four (4) years before he was engaged by the foreign
principal, can the SEAFARER claim disability benefits under the
Standard Contract of Employment for Seafarers?
NO. It is established that he was not afflicted with the said illness only during
the term of his contract but even prior to his employment. He did not even
complain of any complications of the disease at any time during his
employment. Moreover, even assuming he contracted the disease during the
term of his contract, he was precluded from claiming disability benefits for his
failure to comply with Section 20 (B) (3) of the Contract. The provision requires
a claimant to submit himself to a company-designated physician three days
after his arrival in the Philippines for medical examination and failure to do so
bars the filing of a claim for disability benefits. Neither is he entitled to disability
benefits under Section 32-A of the Contract since diabetes is not one of the
compensable occupational diseases listed there. (Bandila Maritime Services, Inc., et al. vs.
Rolando Dubduban, G.R. No. 171984, September 29, 2009.)
Permanent Disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for
more than 120 days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his
body. (So what determines petitioner’s entitlement to permanent disability
benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days).
30. Does the SEAFARER have a right to ask for second-opinion on the finding
of fitness to work?
YES. The provision of POEA Standard Employment Contract does not preclude
the SEAFARER from getting a second opinion as to his condition for purposes
of claiming disability benefits. While it is the company-designated physician
who must declare that the seaman suffers a permanent disability during
employment, it does not deprive the SEAFARER of his right to seek a second
opinion. Thus, the Contract recognizes the prerogative of the SEAFARER to
request a second opinion and, for this purpose, to consult a physician of his
choice. (Abante vs. KJGS Fleet Management Manila, G.R. No. 182430, December 4, 2009.)
A third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the SEAFARER.
The finding of this 3rd doctor is final and binding to both parties.
35. What is the doctrine taught in the case of INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v.
Alexander L. Moradas, January 15, 2014?
In the foregoing light, the Court observes that respondent executed his
contract of employment on July 17, 2000, incorporating therein the terms and
conditions of the 2000 POEA-SEC which took effect on June 25, 2000.
However, since the implementation of the provisions of the foregoing 2000
POEA-SEC was temporarily suspended by the Court on September 11, 2000,
particularly Section 20, paragraphs (A), (B), and (D) thereof, and was lifted
only on June 5, 2002, through POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of
2002, the determination of respondent’s entitlement to the disability benefits
should be resolved under the provisions of the 1996 POEA-SEC as it was,
effectively, the governing circular at the time respondent’s employment
contract was executed. (INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Alexander L. Moradas,
January 15, 2014.)
36. What are the two requirements for the legal dismissal of a Filipino
SEAFARER?
There is just or valid cause if the dismissal is in accordance with the offenses
and penalties enumerated under Section 33 of the Amended POEA Contract;
and/or in accordance with the CBA and/or similar or analogous causes.
There is due process if the seafarer is given two notices. The first notice states
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the grounds for charges against the seafarer and the date, time and place for
the investigation and/or hearing. The second notice, which is issued after a
reasonable time from the first notice, states the notice and reasons for the
dismissal and a copy thereof is furnished the manning agent.
37. The dismissal of a THIRD ENGINEER was held ILLEGAL because the ONLY
EVIDENCE presented by employer is a TELEX TRANSMISSION, G.R. No.
148893, July 12, 2006.
“The rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal
was for just cause; failure to show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
unjustified and therefore, illegal. The two-fold requirements for a valid dismissal are as
follows: (1) dismissal must be for a cause provided for in the Labor Code, which is
substantive; and (2) the observance of notice and hearing prior to the employee’s dismissal
which is procedural.
“The only evidence relied upon by (vessel) in justifying the (Chief Engineer’s)
dismissal is the Chief Engineer’s Report dated September 10, 1997. The
question that arises, therefore, is whether the Report constitutes substantial
evidence proving that respondent’s dismissal was for cause.
38. The dismissal of a CHIEF OFFICER was held LEGAL and VALID because
the LOGBOOK ENTRY was given PROBATIVE VALUE, G.R. No. 155389,
February 28, 2005.
While the vessel was in Calcutta, India, the gantry crane operators of the vessel
intended to strike as their rate of pay was much lower than that of another
vessel. The Master asked the Chief Officer (C/O) to talk to the operators to
convince them not to proceed with the intended strike. However, the C/O
decided to join the strike. The vessel was forced to pay the higher rate.
At the next port, the C/O was terminated. The master recorded in the logbook
that the C/O was dismissed from the service for a disciplinary offense. The
managers of the vessel talked to the C/O about the incident in Calcutta and the
C/O was disembarked from the vessel.
Eight months later, the C/O filed a claim for illegal dismissal.
“We agree with the (vessel) that the (seafarer) was dismissed for a just
cause. It is not disputed that the respondent joined the strike of the gantry
crane operators in their demand for an increase of their pay despite the
request of the (vessel) for the (seafarer) to convince the striking crew
members to stop their strike and to air their grievances with management
upon the arrival of the vessel in Singapore. The (C/O) and the crew members
refused and continued with the strike. The loading and unloading of cargoes
had to be suspended.”
In addition to the acts enumerated in (Art. 34, LC, but adopted in RA 10022), it
shall also be unlawful for any person or entity to commit the following
prohibited acts:
OVERTIME PAY
40. Who are covered by the rules on overtime?
Any work performed beyond the normal 8 hours of work in one workday is
considered as overtime work. Every hour worked in excess of 8 hours earns an
additional pay of P25%. The rate is 30% if done on a rest day or holiday.
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Yes, because the law sets the maximum not the minimum. The salary will be
proportion to the reduced hours of work. EXCEPT: Voluntary practice.
45. What is the effect of the work time beyond the reduced hours?
47. Give the effect of Health Personnel working more than 40 hours
workweek.
A workday is the consecutive 24-hour period which commences from the time
the employee starts to work and ends at the same time the following day.
Overtime pay rates depend upon the day the work is performed, whether it is
ordinary working day, special day, holiday or rest day.
Assuming that the mininum wage rate is P250, how much is the overtime rate
per hour?
On ordinary day
Compute the hour rate of the employee on a rest day or special day:
Hourly rate = 130% of Regular hourly rate
= P31.25 x 1.30
= P40.625 per hour
(Note: The hourly rate on rest day and special day is 130% of the regular rate.)
Compute the hourly rate of the employee on a rest day which falls on a special day:
Hourly rate = 150% of Regular hourly rate
= P31.25 x 1.50
= P46.875 per hour
On a regular holiday
NO. Some employers have the practice of offsetting undertime and overtime.
This practice is not allowed by law.
For example, if an employee work for only 7 hours on any given day (one hour
undertime), he will be required to make up for his undertime by requiring him
to render additional one hour work on another day. This practice is prohibited
under Article 87 of the Labor Code, viz:
Article 87. Undertime not offset by overtime. Undertime work on any particular
day shall not be offset by overtime work on any other day. x x x
The exception to this rule is found in Article 89 of the Labor Code. Under the
said article, employees may be compelled to perform overtime work in any of
the following cases:
NO. Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code
on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial
employees. This includes overtime pay for overtime work. Thus managerial
employees are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of
eight hours a day. Also, supervisors are not entitled to OT Pay. Supervisory
employees are considered as officers or members of the managerial staff, and
hence are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay. (Nat’l Sugar Refineries
Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 101761. March 24, 1993).
Hours worked refer to all compensable period of work. Hours work include:
It depends.
The employer must give his employees not less than 60 minutes or one hour
time-off for their meals. This period in non-compensable, which means that it is
not to be included in the computation of hours worked.
For example, if an employee’s work is from 8:00am to 5:00 with one hour
meal break from 12:00nn to 1:00pm, the total compensable hours of the
employee is 8 hours, i.e., from 8:00am – 12:00nn and 1:00pm – 5pm. The
period from 12:00nn to 1:00pm is non-compensable.
Under exceptional circumstances, the employer may give the employee a meal
period of not less than 20 minutes, provided that such shorter meal period is
credited as compensable hours worked of the employee. Shortened meal
period may be allowed under the following cases:
2. Where the establishment regularly operates not less than 16 hours a day;
The employer may give their employees rest periods or coffee breaks during
working hours in order to beef them up or to make them more productive.
Unlike meal periods, rest periods running from 5 to 20 minutes is compensable
as hours worked. Rest period running for more that 20 minutes may or may not
be compensable depending on the situation.
NOTE: The giving of rest period, however, is not required under the Labor Code, and
is largely a management prerogative.
Under the Labor Code, every employee shall be paid a night shift differential of
not less than 10% of his regular wage for each hour of work performed
between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 am the following day.
It is the required rest period of not less than 24 consecutive hours after every
six normal workdays.
The employer shall determine the weekly rest day. However, the employer
shall respect the preference of employees as to their weekly rest day
when such preference is based on religious grounds.
The compensation is the regular wage unless Sunday happens to be the rest
day of the employee. If Sunday is the rest day, the employee shall be entitled to
the additional 30% pay.
In the case of regular holiday, the employee is paid even if he did not work. He
receives double his pay if he works on a regular holiday.
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In the case of a special day, the employee is not paid if she does no report for
work. But if the employee works on a special holiday, he is entitled to 130% of
his usual pay.
PREMIUM PAY
During rest and special days, the principle of “no work, no pay” applies.
Workers who were not required or permitted to work on those days are not by
law entitled to any compensation.
This is consistent with the definition above that premium pay is to be paid for
work performed.
The rule is different for work performed on a rest day which is also a special
day, in which case, 50% of the regular daily rate is added, instead of 30% of the
daily rate for special day.
In sum, the premium pay rates for rest days are as follows:
1. For work performed on rest days, an additional 30% of the daily rate
or a total of 130%;
Computation Samples
SAMPLE # 1 For work performed on rest day, using P250.00 as Basic pay, the
rate may be determined as follows:
Where,
Premium pay = 30% of Basic pay
= 30% of P250.00
= 0.3 x P250.00
= P75.00
Thus,
Rate on Rest day = Basic pay + Premium pay
= P250.00 + P75.00
= P325.00
Where,
Premium pay = 30% of Daily rate on holiday, and
Daily rate on holiday = 200% of Basic pay = P500.00
Thus,
Premium pay = 0.3 x Daily rate on holiday
= 0.3 x P500.00
= P150.00
= P500.00 + P150.00
= P650.00
Or,
Rate = 260% of Basic pay
= 2.6 x P250.00
= P650.00
Computation
Using P250.00 as daily rate (Basic pay), the Rate on special day may be
determined as follows:
Where,
Premium = 30% of Basic pay
= 30% of P250.00
= P75.00
Thus,
Rate on special day = Basic pay + Premium
= P250.00 + P75.00
= P325.00
Or,
Rate on special day = 130% of Basic pay
= Basic pay x 1.3
= P250.00 x 1.3
= P325.00
74. What is the Premium Pay For Special Day falling on Rest Day?
Computation
Rate for work on special days which is also the employee’s rest day entitles
him to an additional 50% of the daily rate (Basic pay).
Where,
Premium pay = 50% of Basic pay
= P250.00 x 0.5
= P125.00
Thus,
Rate = Basic pay + Premium pay
= P250.00 + P125.00
= P375.00
Or,
Rate = 150% of Basic pay
= Basic pay x 1.5
= P250.00 x 1.5
= P375.00
75. What is the Rule on NO regular workdays and NO scheduled regular rest
days?
Where the nature of the work of the employee is such that he has no regular
workdays and no regular rest days can be scheduled, he shall be paid an
additional compensation of at least 30% of his regular wage for work
performed on Sundays and holidays.
Premium pay is paid for services rendered when the EE should not work.
Holiday pay is not a premium pay because it does not require performance of
work by the employee. In case of holiday pay, the employee is entitled
payment even if he does not work.
Thus, unlike in premium pay, the principle “no work, no pay” does not similarly
apply to holiday pay.
NON-DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS
Common application
Requirements
With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been
exercised to constitute voluntary employer practice which cannot be
unilaterally withdrawn by the employer, the Court has not laid down any rule
requiring a specific minimum number of years. Sevilla Trading Co vs. Semana,
G.R. No. 152456, April 28, 2004.
1. In Davao Fruits Corporation vs. Associated Labor Unions, G.R. No. 85073,
August 24, 1993, the company practice lasted for six years.
3. In Tiangco vs. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. L-57636, May 16, 1983, the employer
carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance
from November 1976 to February 1980, or three years and four months.
4. In Sevilla Trading Co vs. Semana, G.R. No. 152456, April 28, 2004, the
employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid
leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13th-
month pay for at least two (2) years.
When the basic salary was not reduced, there is no violation of the rule against
diminution of pay. (Aguanza vs. Asian Terminal Inc., et al., G.R. No. 163505, August 14, 2009.)
A BONUS is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver which the recipient cannot
demand as a matter of right. Stated otherwise, it is the amount granted for
employee’s industry and loyalty, which is generally discretional.
Whether or not a bonus forms part of wages depends upon the circumstances
and conditions for its payment. If it is additional compensation which the
employer promised and agreed to give without any conditions imposed for its
payment, such as success of business or greater production or output, then it
is part of the wage. But if it is paid only if profits are realized or if a certain
level of productivity is achieved, it cannot be considered part of the wage.
Where it is not payable to all but only to some employees and only when their
labor becomes more efficient or more productive, it is only an inducement for
efficiency, a prize therefor, not a part of the wage.
In fine, the payment of these bonuses was not related to the profitability of
business operations. Consequently, the giving of the subject bonuses cannot
be peremptorily withdrawn by Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.
without violating Article 100 of the Labor Code, which prohibits the unilateral
elimination or diminution of benefits by the employer.
The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the
employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the
constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare and to afford labor full protection. (citing Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union,
G.R. No. 185665, February 8, 2012.
Employers and employees may agree on rate but should not fall below the
minimum wages set by the RTWPB which has jurisdiction over the place of
work.
A new law passed in 2008 exempts minimum wage earners from paying
income taxes. Because of this, no deductions will be made from their pay on
the basis of income tax.
It is the 1/12 of the basic salary earned by the employee during the year. It is
compulsory and to be given not later than December 24 of the year.
The so-called “exception clause” has the following elements, all of which must
concur:
MATERNITY LEAVE
Maternity leave benefits is found under the Article 133 of the Labor Code and
Section 14-A of “Social Security Act of 1997″ (Republic Act No. 8282). But for
purposes of benefits and procedure for availment, the SSS Law prevails.
88. Give the Checklist for Availment of Maternity Benefits under Social
Security Act
A pregnant woman member (whether single or married) of SSS who has paid at
least three monthly contributions in the twelve-month period immediately
preceding the semester of her childbirth or miscarriage shall be paid a daily
maternity benefit.
The SSS shoulders the payment of maternity benefits. But the procedure is that
the payment is to be initially advanced by the employer, subject to immediate
reimbursement by SSS.
To avail of maternity benefits, the woman employee must have paid at least
three monthly contributions within the 12-month period immediately preceding
the semester of her childbirth or miscarriage.
ILLUSTRATION
NO. Unlike in paternity leave where valid marriage is a requisite for availment,
the existence of a valid marriage is not required to avail of maternity leave
benefits.
Entitlement to maternity leave under the Labor Code and maternity benefits
under the SSS Law applies only for the first four deliveries or miscarriage.
YES. The payment of daily maternity benefits is a bar to the recovery of SSS
sickness benefits for the same period for which daily maternity benefits have
been received.
If the employer fails to remit the required contributions, or to notify SSS of the
time of the pregnancy, the employer shall pay to the SSS damages equivalent
to the benefits which said employee member would otherwise have been
entitled to.
IN LINE WITH ABOVE, the Labor Code prohibits certain terms or conditions of
employment to be stipulated on employment contracts. Any such stipulation,
even if freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, is void.
For example:
The prospective employer and employee may not validly agree that the latter
shall be paid a salary below the minimum wage prescribed by law, or that the
employee shall be required to work more than 8 hours per day without
overtime pay. Such stipulation, even if mutually consented to by the parties is
null and without force and effect.
The underlying rationale for this prohibition is the protection of labor against
discrimination, inhumane condition of work, abuses, slavery, among others.
101. Give instances of stipulations that are deemed void even if voluntarily
agreed upon by the contracting parties in an employment contract.
These are days when employees may still be paid despite their absence from
work. The employer may add (not subtract) to these leaves out of the
goodness of his heart or under a negotiated Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
Service Incentive Leave Pay is the benefit of employees to avail of leave with
pay for 5 days provided he has rendered service for at least one year.
It is that benefit whereby women victims of violence provided under R.A. 9262
of the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act are entitled to a paid
leave of absence from work up to 10 days. The purpose of the leave is confined
only to MEDICAL and LEGAL reasons.
SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
Man or Woman
(EEMSA)
1. Employer
2. Employee
3. Manager
4. Supervisor
5. Agent of the Employer
(TIPCTA)
6. Teacher
7. Instructor
8. Professor
9. Coach
10. Trainor
11. Any Other Person
Hiring,
Re-employment, or
Continued employment
Favorable Compensation
Terms,
Conditions
Promotions
Privileges
5. The above acts RESULT in INTIMIDATING, HOSTILE, or OFFENSIVE ENVIRONMENT for the
EE.
EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS
2. Between 15 & 18 years old for certain hours of the day (as determined by
SOLE)
1. Provided, not ENDANGER life safety heath & morals and not IMPAIR
normal development
2. Provided, Parents/Legal Guardians accords child BASIC EDUCATION
(Primary & HS)
121. Give the general WORKING HOURS of a WORKING CHILD (Sec 12-A RA
9231)
122. What are considered “WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR?” (Sec 12-D RA
9231)
- Undignified activities
- Abuse Exposure, Psychologically / Morally Stressful
- Underwater, underground or dangerous heights
- Power driven tools
- Physical Danger including dangerous feats of balancing, strength, heavy loads
- Unhealthy environment (obnoxious substances, radiation etc.)
- Under difficult conditions
- Exposure to Biological Agents
- Explosives/pyrotechnic products
123. Does the Secretary of Labor and Employment have power to issue
CLOSURE ORDER to violating ESTABLISHMENTS caught 3x?
The EMPLOYER must submit report to DOLE re CHILDREN EMPLOYED and a SEPARATE
REPORT re handicapped children. (PD 603. Art 108)
LABOR RELATIONS
133. What are the policy objectives of our Labor Relations Law?
135. What is the effect of a labor organization that is not registered with
DOLE?
It does not acquire the status of a Legitimate Labor Organization and thus has
no power for collective bargaining.
1. ULP
2. Termination D
3. Money claims regardless of amt if with REINSTATEMENT
4. Damages arising from ER-EE
5. Cases from viol of Art 264 (Prohibited Acts) also legality of strikes/lockouts
6. Other money claims exceeding P5,000 w/n with reinstatement except those under
EC, SSS, Medicare, Maternity.
7. Grievable Cases referred to LA by the GM per CBA.
8. OFW cases arising from ER-EE relations
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9. Wage Distortion in unorganized Establishment if not voluntarily settled by parties
pursuant to RA 6727
10. Enforcement of Compromise Agreement per Art 227 of LC
1. Certified Cases (Here, the SOLE when assuming jurisdiction in labor dispute due to imminent strike
or actual strike in industry indispensable to national interest, it has power either to assume J himself over
the case or CERTIFY the case to the NLRC Division)
2. Petitions for Injunctions
140. What is the procedure after the LA has rendered his decision?
The aggrieved party may appeal the Decision or Order of the LA to the NLRC
Division within 10 days from receipt of the Decision.
If the employer is the one to appeal and there is a monetary award against it,
the ER’s appeal must be accompanied by a Cash or Surety BOND equivalent to
the value of the monetary award except the amount of damages and
attorney’s fees. (Filing fees must also be paid). In the absence of appeal, the
Decision or Order becomes final. The ten day period is NON-EXTENDIBLE.
(a) Registration of Unions, including Denial, Cancellation & Revocation of Permit; &
(b) Supervision of Union Activities; (c) Inter-Union/Intra-Union Conflicts
2. CBA Registration
3. Labor Education
144. Where is the seat of the Labor Relations Division? Who is the head?
38
DOLE Regional Offices. Regional Director or Med-Arbiter.
It amended D.O. No, 9, Series of 1997, which comprises the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the LC. It covers the subject on Labor Relations except NLRC. The NLRC has its
own separate NLRC Rules of Procedure. Thus, the present rules now that implement Book
V of the Labor Code is no longer the Omnibus Rules but D.O. 40-03.
No. KMP vs. Trajano 134 SCRA 236 [1985]. The BLR itself has authority to
rule the expulsion of the Union Officer by DIRECT ORDER if there is
substantial ground not via REFERENDUM ELECTION. In Dayag vs.
Inciong, 98 SCRA 522 “If guilty of acts complained of mete them with
proper penalty i.e. EXPULSION.
No. (Mindoro Lumber & Hardware vs. Baay, G.R 158753, June 8, 2005).
Not all waivers or quitclaims esp if represent VOLUNTARY &
REASONABLE settlement of W’s claim are INVALID or AGAINST public
policy.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Proof that W or Q wangled from UNSUSPECTING/GULLIBLE person.
2. Facially Unconscionable
This was answered “NO” in the case of (Veloso vs. DOLE, GR 87297, Aug 5,
1991). Ratio Decidendi: (a) Absence of FORCE in EXECUTION, i.e. voluntary and
(b) Absence of PROOF of UNCONSCIONABLE CONSIDERATION, i.e. terms of
settlement not UNREASONABLY LOW.
40
160. Can the UNION OFFICERS waive the REINSTATEMENT or MONEY
CLAIMS of the dissenting minority Union Members?
No, for they are regarded as personal rights which must be exercised
personally by the workers themselves. (Jag & Haggar Jeans & Sportswear Corp vs. NLRC, GR
105710, Feb 23, 1995 citing General Rubber & Footwear Corp vs. Drilon, 169 SCRA 808 [1989]).
161. A & B are both complainants against their employer. They won the
case before the NLRC which granted them a monetary award of P50K
and P40K respectively. During pre-execution conference, A executed a
Quitclaim on his own and in behalf of B, in favor of their employer,
discharging their employer from future liabilities. Is the CA or QC valid
as to B?
No, Article 1878 of Civil Code on SPA is needed. (Loyola Security & Detective Agency vs.
NLRC, GR 113287 May 9 1995).
162. Does a CA approved by the LA have the effect of res judicata upon
persons not party to such CA?
No. (Golden Donuts vs. NLRC, GR 113666-68, Jan 19 2000). While such CA may ordinarily apply
even to another case as res judicata, it is conclusive only upon the parties
thereto and their privies.
Generally, at any stage of the proceeding, even after Final Judgment. But in
one case (Alba Patio de Makati vs. NLRC GR 85393, Sep 5, 1991), the SC
annulled a CA even though approved by the LA because the FJ was with
Reinstatement and Backwages but winning EEs accepted BW lesser than the
award. (Ratio Decidendi: FJ cannot be altered nor negotiated. Such act of
approval by the LA is contemptuous and if upheld would render the very SC
Decision meaningless. It manifested willful disregard of the SC as the final
arbiter of cases brought to It).
In one case Morales vs. SMC, GR 100133, Feb 6, 1995, the SC upheld the NLRC for applying
and awarding the original demand of REINSTATEMENT to the EEs after SMC breached the
CA.
UNION REGISTRATION
41
Under PD 442 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the DOLE is
mandated to process the application for registration of labor organizations in
order for them to acquire legal personality and to enjoy the rights given to
legitimate labor organization. Union registration refers to the process of
determining whether the application for registration of a labor union
organized for collective bargaining, complies with the documentary
requirements prescribed under Rules 3 and 4 of DOLE Department Order No.
40-03 and the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code, as amended.
All labor unions whose members are employed in commercial, industrial and
agricultural enterprises, and employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations without original charters established under the Corporation
Code, including religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not which exist in whole and in part for
collective bargaining. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a rank-and-file employee labor union but may form their
separate labor unions. Alien employees with valid working permits issued by
DOLE may exercise their right to self-organization and join or assist labor
unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country
which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Managerial employees shall not be eligible to
form, join or assist any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.
Under PD 442 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the DOLE is
mandated to process the application for registration of workers’ association
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for other
legitimate purposes except collective bargaining in order for them to acquire
legal personality. Worker’s Association registration refers to the process of
determining whether the application for registration of such organization
complies with the documentary requirements prescribed under Rule 3 and 4
of DOLE Department Order No. 40-03, as amended.
Under PD 442 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the DOLE is
mandated to process the application for registration of workers’ association
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for other
legitimate purposes except collective bargaining in order for them to acquire
legal personality.
Requirements
Indefinite
Registration fee
P70.00
Where to apply
One (1) Working Day upon receipt of complete documents and payment of
registration fee
UNION REGISTRATION
Under PD 442 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the DOLE is
mandated to process the application for registration of labor organizations in
order for them to acquire legal personality and to enjoy the rights given to
legitimate labor organization.
All labor unions whose members are employed in commercial, industrial and
agricultural enterprises, and employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations without original charters established under the Corporation
Code, including religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not which exist in whole and in part for
collective bargaining.
Alien employees with valid working permits issued by DOLE may exercise their
right to self-organization and join or assist labor unions for purposes of
collective bargaining if they are nationals of a country which grants the same
or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
Managerial employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor
union for purposes of collective bargaining.
Requirements:
3. List of Members
5. If less than 1 year, and has not collected any amount, a certification to this
effect.
Indefinite
Registration Fee
P70.00
Where to apply
Field Office
One (1) Working Day upon receipt of complete documents and payment of
registration fee.
BLR or DOLE-RO.
169. If CBA DOLE or BLR Registration has nothing to do with the CBA’s
validity, why bother to have the CBA registered with DOLE or BLR?
In order for the interested party to enjoy the benefit of the CONTRACT BAR
RULE under Article 232.
45
171. What is the extent of the phrase “the BLR is not allowed to hold a
CERTIFICATION ELECTION (CE)?”
It means the BLR should not entertain even a petition for CE. In sum, any
petition for CE filed within the period of prohibition is DISMISSIBLE motu
proprio.
172. What is the excepted situation under Articles 253, 253-A & 256 referred
to by Art 232.
Freedom Period. It means the CONTRACT BAR RULE does not apply anymore
during the FP.
173. What is the OBJECTIVE of allowing the CE only within the FP?
175. If only the economic aspect expires can the challenger Union call for
CE?
No, unless the expiration of the economic aspect of the CBA jibes with the
expiration of the political aspect.
176. Who has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for Certification Election
(CE)?
Labor Union – any union or assn of ees in private sector existing wholly or
partly for CB, mutual aid, interest, cooperation, protection or
other lawful purposes.
Exclusive BR/A – a LLU duly certified as the SEBA of all ees in the BU.
Workers Assn – an assn of W organized for mutual aid and protection or for any
legitimate purpose other than CB.
Industry Union – any group of LLO operating w/in an identified industry organized for CB
for DWER re terms & conditions of employment, or for participating in the formulation of S
& E PSP, w/c is duly registered with DOLE.
Trade Union Center - any group of registered NUs/Fs organized for MAP, for assisting its
members in CB, or organized for participating in the formulation of S & E PSP, w/c is duly
registered with DOLE. (ex. TUCP)
Yes, it can affiliate in which case it is called an “affiliate.” But it still retains its
independent legal personality.
186. What is the LEGAL PHILOSOPHY/RATIONALE of registering LO?
To acquire legal personality to demand representational and collective
bargaining rights.
No. (PAFLU vs. Secretary of Labor, L-2222, Feb 27, 69). It is a valid exercise of police power
because activities of LOUA affect public interest which must be protected.
Yes. (PLASLU, Inc. vs. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 [1953]; Cebu Seamen’s Assn vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 212 SCRA 50 [1992] ).
But such registration has the effect of giving it JURIDICAL PERSONALITY only
before regular courts. It does not grant the LO the rights and privileges of a
LLO.
190. Where to file the Registration of NUs/Fs, WAs operating in more than 1
region?
48
BLR or RO where it operates. Processed by BLR. If denied, appeal to the
Secretary of Labor. D of SOLE appealable to the CA.
191. State the Requirements for Registration of ILU.
a) Name of LU, its principal address, Names/Addresses of Officers, Approximate no. of
ees in the BU; plus a statement that such LU is not reported as Chartered Local of
any NU/F;
b) Minutes of Organizational Mtgs (OM) and List of participating ees;
c) Names of Members comprising at least 20% of all Members in the BU;
d) Annual Financial Report, if LU in existence for one year or over. Except no collection
subject to an accompanying statement in the application.
e) CBL, Minutes of its adoption/ratification, List of participating members. (Q – Can
this List of Ratifying Members be dispensed with? A – Yes, if such
ado/rati was conducted during the Org Meeting in which case this fact
must be recorded in the Minutes of OM.)
192. State the Requirements for Registration of NU/F.
a) Name of LU, its principal address, Names/Addresses of Officers
b) Minutes of Organizational Mtgs and List of participating ees;
c) Annual Financial Report, if LU in existence for one year or over. Except .. no
collection subject to an accompanying statement in the application.
d) CBL, Minutes of its adoption/ratification, List of participating members. (Q – Can
this List of Ratifying Members be dispensed with? A – Yes, if such
ado/rati was conducted during the Org Meeting in which case this fact
must be recorded in the Minutes of OM.)
e) Resolution of at leas 10 LLO (whether ILU, CL each be SEBA).
f) Names/Addresses of Companies where Affiliates operate. List of All Members in BU
of each Company)
193. State the ADDITIONAL Requirements exacted from NU/F for its CL
(Chartered Local) to acquire LP.
No. (PAFLU vs. Secretary of Labor; L-2222, Feb. 27, 1969). Valid exercise of police power,
because the activities of LOUAG affect public interest that must be protected.
This right of assembly or association may still be exercised even w/o such
registration because the registration is just to have LEGAL PERSONALITY.
No. (Progressive Dev. Corp – Pizza Hut vs. Laguesma, GR 115077, April 18, 1997.) BLR or RO has
right to look into the propriety of the documents whether the requirements
under Art 234 are duly complied with.
Ex: All R&F or All Supervisors. In Mfg, all R&F bottling crew; or in School, all
teaching staff comprise one CBU and another CBU for Non-Academic Staff.
50
It governs the relationship among the union members or between the Union
and its members.
204. Suppose the LRD –RO denies the application, what is the remedy of
the Applicant LUOAG?
Appeal to the BLR within 10 days from receipt of Denial Notice or Order. Then
from BLR to CA.
205. Suppose the BLR-DOLE denies the application, what is the remedy of
the Applicant LUOAG?
Appeal to the Secretary of DOLE within 10 days from receipt of Denial Notice or
Order. Then from DOLE Secretary to CA.
209. What are the documents that should accompany such report?
A matter of right on the part of the CL or LU, unless the CBL provides
process or specific grounds for disaffiliation or CBL imposes certain
conditions for disaffiliation.
By majority
(Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., GR
No. L-33987, September 4, 1975)
(Tropical Hut Ees Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., GR No.
L-43495-99, January 20, 1999)
- Mere technicality.
No rights of LLO. (Villar vs. Intong, 121 SCRA 444; GR 50283-84, April 20, 1984)
221. Can a J for ULP in admin proc stand as evidence in the criminal
prosecution for ULP?
1. ER-EE relationship
2. ULP done either by ER or by EES expressly defined in the LCP.
No.
Check if the ACTS are opposed to W’s right to self- organization or have
UNION connection.
a) Interference in RTSO
b) YDC
c) Contracting out Services (if impair RTSO)
d) ER Domination over Unionizing acts (Formation or Administration)
e) Discriminatory Manner re Labor Standards (Except Closed Shop Condition, Agency
Fees w/o need of Ind. Authorization.
f) Punitive Action due to Testimony
g) Violation of Collective Bargaining Duties
h) Payment of Negotiation/Atty’s Fees to Union or its Agents to settle CB issues or
labor disputes
i) Violation of CBA
54
228. Who are criminally liable?
COLLECTIVE BARGANING
AND ADMINISTRATION OF CBA
Interpretation of school CBA.
In the case at bar, the University of the East (UE) repeatedly extended only
semester-to-semester faculty appointments to the respondents Pepanio and
Bueno, since they had not completed postgraduate degrees. The
respondents, however, claimed that the 1994 CBA between UE and the faculty
union did not yet require a master’s degree for a teacher to acquire regular
status. Having rendered more than three consecutive years of full-time
service to the school, the respondents insisted that UE should have given
them permanent appointments.
The Supreme Court observed that the policy requiring college teachers to
have postgraduate degrees was provided in the Manual of Regulations issued
as early as 1992 by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
now the Department of Education. In promulgating the Manual of
Regulations, DECS exercised its power of regulation over educational
institutions, which includes prescribing the minimum academic qualifications
for teaching personnel. The legislature subsequently transferred the power
to prescribe such qualifications for teachers in institutions of higher learning
to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). However, the 1992 Manual of
Regulations issued by DECS continued to apply to colleges and universities
until 2010, when CHED issued a Revised Manual of Regulations.
The Supreme Court also overruled the respondents’ contention that UE filed
its appeal to the NLRC beyond the required ten (10)-day period. For
completeness of service by registered mail, the reckoning period starts either
from the date of actual receipt of the mail by the addressee or after five (5)
days from the date he or she received the first notice from the postmaster. In
this case, the respondents averred that, on March 17, 2005, the postmaster
gave UE’s counsel a notice to claim the mail containing the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. The respondents claimed that UE’s counsel was deemed in receipt
of the decision 5 days after the giving of the notice, or on March 22, 2005.
Thus, according to the respondents, when UE filed its appeal to the NLRC on
April 14, 2005, the 10-day reglementary period had already lapsed. The
Supreme Court, however, ruled that there must be conclusive proof that the
registry notice was received by or at least served on the addressee. In this
case, the records did not show that UE’s counsel in fact received the alleged
registry notice requiring him to claim the mail. On the other hand, UE was
able to present a registry return receipt showing that its counsel actually
received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on April 4, 2005. Reckoned
from this date, the 10-day reglementary period had not yet lapsed when UE
filed its appeal to the NLRC on April 14, 2005.
Anent UE’s failure to comply with the general rule that the Board of Directors
or Board of Trustees of a corporation must authorize the person who shall
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping accompanying a
petition, the Supreme Court held that such authorization is not necessary
when it is self-evident that the signatory is in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. The Supreme
Court declared that Dean Eleanor Javier, who signed UE’s verification and
certification, was in such a position, since she knew the factual antecedents of
the case and she actually communicated with the respondents regarding the
required postgraduate qualification. University of the East, et al. vs. Analiza
F. Pepanio and Mariti D. Bueno. G.R. No. 193897. January 23, 2013.
It is a process where the parties agree to fix and administer terms and
conditions of employment which must not be below the minimum standards
fixed by law, and set a mechanism for resolving their grievances.
Yes. Ratification of the CBA by the employees in the bargaining unit is not
needed when the CBA is a product of an arbitral award by appropriate
government authority or by a voluntary arbitrator.
The registration of the CBA will bar a certification election except within the
last sixty days (freedom period) before the expiration of the five-year CBA.
With respect to representation aspect, the CBA lasts for 5 years. However, not
later than 3 years after the execution of the CBA, the economic provisions
shall be renegotiated.
It refers to the last sixty days immediately preceding the expiration of the five-
year CBA. A petition for certification election may be filed during the freedom
period.
The application for CBA registration shall be filed at the Regional Office that
issued the certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered
local of the labor union-party to the agreement.
The application for registration of the CBA shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from the execution of such CBA.
The following are the requirements for CBA registration (original and two (2)
duplicate copies which must be certified under oath by the representative of
the employer and labor union concerned):
Yes. The certificate of CBA registration shall be issued by the DOLE Regional
Office only upon payment of the prescribed registration fee.
The application for CBA registration shall be processed within one day from
receipt thereof.
Failure of the applicant to complete the requirements for CBA registration but
such denial is without prejudice for the filing of another application for
registration.
1. Proposal by EBA
2. 10 days for ER to reply
3. After joining Proposal & Reply, if there is no AGREEMENT, request for
CONFERENCE to start within 10 days from request.
4. If no settlement, NCMB intervenes upon request
5. NCMB calls both parties to CONCILIATION MEETING/PREVENTIVE
MEDIATION .
6. Power of NCMB = Subpoena
7. No acts that Disrupt or Impede early settlement are allowed.
8. Efforts to settle amicably or go to VA.
It lays down the rules for both ER and EE Reps to Bargain Collectively in case
no CBA
58
JURISPRUDENCE ON CBA
N.B. In this case, the court awarded signing bonus because the petitioner
failed to question the original award of signing bonus despite unsuccessful
negotiation. The court held thus: “A bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of
the giver; when petitioner filed the instant petition seeking the affirmance of
the DOLE Secretary’s Order in its entirety, assailing only the increased amount
59
of the signing bonus awarded, it is considered to have unqualifiedly agreed to
grant the original award to the respondent union’s members.” (University of
Santo Tomas vs. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST (SM-UST), G.R. No. 169940,
September 14, 2009.)
237. Is the EBA guaranteed Exclusive Representation during the life of the
CBA
YES, except during the freedom period where any LLO may challenge the
majority status of the incumbent EBA.
YES, both parties may agree to create a Labor Management Council as tool to
resolve conflicts and maintain industrial peace.
240. What is the Effect of expiration of freedom period and no CE has been
filed?
GRIEVANCVE MACHINERY
60
It is a provision in the CBA which provides for the adjustment and resolution
of conflicts between M & U arising from INTERPRETATION and
IMPLEMENTATION of the CBA and INTERPRETATION and ENFORCEMENT of
Company Personnel Policies.
In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint
filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as
death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. This issue clearly
involves the interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the
specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.
CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered
into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP provides that the
Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the
61
interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or
enforcement of Company policies, the same shall be settled through
negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The provisions of the CBA
are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that for OFWs with
collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary
arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. With
respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should
be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that
parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary
arbitration. Estate of Nelson R. Dulay, represented by his wife Meddiry Jane
P. Dulay vs. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc. and General Charterers, Inc. G.R.
No. 172642, June 13, 2012.
Goya, Inc.’s contention that the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) exceeded his power
in ruling on a matter not covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary
arbitration is untenable. In a prior case, the Supreme Court has ruled that, in
general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those questions expressly stated
and limited in the submission agreement. However, since arbitration is the
final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he
has the power to make a final settlement. The VA has plenary jurisdiction and
authority to interpret the CBA and to determine the scope of his or her own
authority. Subject to judicial review, this leeway of authority and adequate
prerogative is aimed at accomplishing the rationale of the law on voluntary
arbitration – speedy labor justice.
In the case at bar, Goya, Inc. and Goya, Inc. Employees Union (Union)
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether or not the
62
company is guilty of an unfair labor practice in engaging the services of PESO,
a third party service provider, under existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence.
The Union claimed that the hiring of contractual workers from PESO violated
the CBA provision that prescribes only three categories of workers in the
company, namely: the probationary, the regular, and the casual employees.
Instead of hiring contractual workers, Goya, Inc. should have hired
probationary or casual employees, who could have become additional Union
members, pursuant to the union security clause in the CBA. The VA ruled that
while Goya, Inc. was not guilty of any unfair labor practice, it still committed a
violation of the CBA, though such violation was not gross in character. The
Supreme Court held that the VA’s ruling is interrelated and intertwined with
the sole issue submitted for arbitration. The ruling was necessary to make a
complete and final adjudication of the dispute between the parties.
Furthermore, Goya, Inc.’s assertion that its hiring of contractual workers was a
valid exercise of management prerogative is erroneous. Declaring that a
particular act falls within the concept of management prerogative is
significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise
thereof. While the VA and the Court of Appeals ruled that the act of
contracting out or outsourcing work is within the purview of management
prerogative, they did not declare such act to be a valid exercise thereof. As
repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited; it is
subject to the limitations found in the law, CBA, or general principles of fair
play and justice.
In this case, the CBA provision prescribing the categories of employees in the
company and the union security clause are interconnected and must be given
full force and effect. The parties in a CBA are free to establish such
stipulations they may deem convenient, provided that the same are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Where
the CBA is clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control. The CBA becomes the law between the parties, and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. Goya, Inc. vs. Goya,
Inc. Employees Union-FFW. G.R. No. 170054. January 21, 2013.
Cooling-off period. But if the ULP pertains to dismissal of union officer – union
busting IMMEDIATELY following submission (at least 7 days prior to strike) of
Strike Vote Results.
258. When can the DOLE SEC exercise his power of ASSUMPTION OF J?
When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an INDUSTRY INDISPENSABLE TO NATIONAL INTEREST.
260. What is the effect of those employees who do not return to work?
The officers who voted for the strike (subsequently declared illegal) may be
dismissed from service;
a) The members who commit ILLEGAL ACTS during the strike may suffer the
same fate as the officers.
b) The members who DID NOT COMMIT ILLEGAL ACTS during the strike may be
spared.
JURISPRUDENCE ON STRIKES
Illegal strike and illegal acts during the strike; distinction between union
members and union officers in determining when they lose their employment
status. The Supreme Court stressed that the law makes a distinction between
union members and union officers. A union member who merely participates
in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost
employment status. In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from
employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the employer the
option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as
having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to
terminate the union officers from service. Visayas Community Medical Center
(VCMC) formerly known as Metro Cebu Commnunity Hospital (MCCH) v. Erma
Yballe, et al.,G.R. No. 196156, January 15, 2014
Ibid.; Violence need not be continuous or for the entire duration of the
strike. That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-
consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike was on-going
does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable.
Nowhere in Art. 264 does it require that violence must be continuous or that it
should be for the entire duration of the strike. (A. Soriano Aviation vs.
Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R. No. 166879, August
14, 2009.)
No backwages for striking employees because the strike was declared illegal.
The Court, citing G&S Transport Corporation v. Infante, G. R. No. 160303,
September 13, 2007, stated that the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair
day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. An
exception to the rule would be if the laborer was able, willing and ready to
work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise
illegally prevented from working. It is, however, required, for this exception
to apply, that the strike be legal, a situation which does not obtain in the case
at bar. Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC) formerly known as Metro
Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH) v. Erma Yballe, et al., G.R. No. 196156,
January 15, 2014
Examine Financial Books of LLO upon complaint with consent of 20% its
members.
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES
AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
269. ENUMERATE CERTAIN MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES
TRANSFER
1. Security of Tenure
2. Just and Humane Conditions of Work
3. Living Wage
4. Self-Organization (Except Managerial, Confidential, Etc)
5. Collective Bargaining (Same Exceptions)
6. Strike (Same Exceptions)
7. Participate In Policy And Decision-Making
8. Just Share in Production
9. Equal Employment Opportunity
10. Basic Human Rights to Human Dignity, Privacy, Decency, Intellectual
Property
11. Due Process
68
(NOTE: These are generic terms. The technique is to read the facts seriously
and identify if the particular actions of the employee fall on any of the above
enumeration)
DUE PROCESS
Due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an
employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying
the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to
explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss
the employee. The law does not require that an intention to terminate one’s employment
should be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly apprised of
the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their defenses. It is only
during the second notice that the intention to terminate one’s employment should be
explicitly stated.
The guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases are the
following:
The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over
the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and
regulations.
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The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely
necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard. Esguerra was able to present her
defenses; and only upon proper consideration of it did Valle Verde send the second
memorandum terminating her employment. Since Valle Verde complied with the two-notice
requirement, no procedural defect exists in Esguerra’s termination. Dolores T. Esguerra vs.
Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. and Ernesto Villaluna. G.R. No. 173012, June 13, 2012.
NOTES:
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a)
it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer. Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation
v. NLRC, 331 SCRA 237 (2000), citing Molato v. NLRC, 266 SCRA 42 (1997) and
Aris Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 59 (1994).
But where the confirmatory test results were released earlier than those of
the drug test, the veracity of the confirmatory results is put to doubt.
(Plantation Bay Resort and Spa vs. Dubrico, et al., G.R. No. 182216, December
4, 2009.)
The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug
testing centers. In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic
is an accredited drug testing center nor did it deny the complainant’s
allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test
was conducted to determine if the complainant was guilty of using illegal
drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the screening test
with a confirmatory test as required by R.A. 9165. Hence, Sulpicio Lines failed
to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs and failed
to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s
employment. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of
employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter
a case of illegal dismissal. Jeffrey Nacague vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No.
172589, August 8, 2010.
Simple misconduct does not merit employee’s dismissal from service. Simple
misconduct which does not merit employee’s termination from his
employment. Although, an employer has the right to discipline its erring
employees, exercise of such right should be tempered with compassion and
understanding. The magnitude of the infraction committed by an employee
must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be
commensurate thereto, in view of the gravity of the penalty of dismissal or
termination from the service. The employer should bear in mind that in
termination cases, what is at stake is not simply the employee’s job or position
but his very livelihood. (PLDT vs. Berbano, G.R. No. 165199, November 27,
2009.)
WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE
Bascon v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 144899, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 122,
outlines the elements of gross insubordination as follows:
As regards the appellate court’s finding that petitioners were justly
terminated for gross insubordination or willful disobedience, Article 282 of the
Labor Code provides in part:
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work.
However, wilful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a just cause
for dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two
requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Badge of Gross Negligence under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code
Badge of Habitual Neglect under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances. St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc.
and Robert Kuan vs. Estrelito Nazario, G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010.
BPI vs. RAMON A. UY, G.R. No. 156994, August 31, 2005
Petitioner as Loan’s Clerk was not invested with the custody, handling, or care
and protection of the private respondent’s monies.
The allegation that he was responsible for the procurement and release of the
back-to-back loan to Evangeline Sy, the acceptance of the said check and the
issuance of the receipt to favor her despite knowing that the same amounts
to gross violation of bank procedures and loss to the bank was negated by the
fact that as a mere Loan’s Clerk and considering that the accounts involved
were considerably large, a careful evaluation, assessment and appraisals by
the bank officers such as the bank’s Branch Managers, Assistant Managers,
and Cashier was necessary. The decision to grant loans, which credit line to
use, to whom loans should be granted and how much should be granted
especially millions of pesos is a management decision and prerogative, which
the bank officers are equally responsible. In support of his defense, petitioner
has presented pieces of evidence, which to the mind of this court the
Honorable National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) might have
overlooked. In particular is the signature of bank officer Ronaldo J. Fernando
who approved the loan of Evangeline Ong-Sy. It was also this bank officer who
accepted the checks as payment when he confirmed the same as funded from
the Manager of RCBC, Allan Marbella. These pieces of evidence were indeed
enough to overturn the argument of private respondent that as Loan’s Clerk
petitioner was responsible only for the loss incurred by it.
As enunciated in the recent case of Vitarich Corporation, et al. vs. NLRC, the
guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence, are:
Loss of trust and confidence. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust.
The first class consists of managerial employees, or those vested with the
power to lay down management policies; and the second class consists of
cashiers, auditors, property custodians or those who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of
money or property. Esguerra held the position of Cost Control Supervisor and
had the duty to remit to the accounting department the cash sales proceeds
from every transaction she was assigned to. This is not a routine task that a
regular employee may perform; it is related to the handling of business
expenditures or finances. For this reason, Esguerra occupies a position of trust
and confidence – a position enumerated in the second class of positions of
trust. Any breach of the trust imposed upon her can be a valid cause for
dismissal.
Serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Dejan is liable for
violation of Section 7, paragraphs 4 and 11 of the Company Code of Employee
Discipline, constituting serious misconduct, fraud and willful breach of trust of
the employer, which are just causes for termination of employment under the
law. There is no dispute about the release of the meter sockets. Also, the
persons involved were clearly identified – Dejan; Gozarin, a private electrician
who received the meter sockets; Reyes, the owner of the jeep where the
meter sockets were loaded by Gozarin; Duenas, a Meralco field
representative; and Depante, another private electrician who purportedly
owned the meter sockets. The release by Dejan of the meter sockets to
Gozarin without the written authority or SPA from the customer or customers
who applied for electric connection (as a matter of company policy) served as
a key element in proving the private contracting activity for electric service
connection being undertaken by Dejan and Duenas.
Moreover, it was bad enough that Dejan failed to ask for a written
authorization from the customers for the release of the meter sockets as
required by company policy, but the elaborate scheme pursued by Dejan in
concert with Duenas, were all undertaken to defraud Meralco. Hence, Meralco
had valid reasons for losing its trust and confidence in Dejan. He is no ordinary
employee. As branch representative, he was principally charged with the
function and responsibility to accept payment of fees required for the
installation of electric service and facilitate issuance of meter sockets. The
duties of his position require him to always act with the highest degree of
honesty, integrity and sincerity, as the company puts it. In light of his
fraudulent act, Meralco, an enterprise imbued with public interest, cannot be
compelled to continue Dejan’s employment, as it would be inimical to its
interest. Manila Electric Company (Meralco) vs. Herminigildo H. Dejan. G.R.
No. 194106, June 18, 2012.
loss of trust and confidence. The Labor Code recognizes that an employer, for
just cause, may validly terminate the services of an employee for serious
misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or
representative in connection with the employee’s work. Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed by the employer in the former,
or simply loss of confidence, also justifies an employee’s dismissal from
employment. Willful breach of trust or loss of confidence requires that the
employee (1) occupied a position of trust or (2) was routinely charged with the
care of the employer’s property. To warrant dismissal based on loss of
confidence, there must be some basis for the loss of trust or the employer
must have reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct that renders the latter unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his or her position. For more than a month, the petitioners did
not even inform PLDT of the whereabouts of the plant materials. Instead, he
stocked these materials at his residence even if they were needed in the daily
operations of the company. In keeping with the honesty and integrity
demanded by his position, he should have turned over these materials to the
plant’s warehouse. Thus, PLDT reasonably suspected petitioner of stealing the
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company’s property. At that juncture, the employer may already dismiss the
employee since it had reasonable grounds to believe or to entertain the moral
conviction that the latter was responsible for the misconduct, and the nature
of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position. Romeo E. Paulino vs. NLRC, Philippine
Long Distance Co., Inc. G.R. No. 176184, June 13, 2012.
loss of trust and confidence. Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal
was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating
their employees. It should ideally apply only to cases involving employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the
employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s
money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the
second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those
who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property.
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is
that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and
confidence. The second requisite is that there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence. Vallota’s position as Junior
Programmer is analogous to the second class of positions of trust and
confidence. Though he did not physically handle money or property, he
became privy to confidential data or information by the nature of his
functions. At a time when the most sensitive of information is found not
printed on paper but stored on hard drives and servers, an employee who
handles or has access to data in electronic form naturally becomes the
unwilling recipient of confidential information. There was no other evidence
presented to prove fraud in the manner of securing or obtaining the files
found in Vallota’s computer. The presence of the files would merely merit the
development of some suspicion on the part of the employer, but should not
amount to a loss of trust and confidence such as to justify the termination of
his employment. Such act is not of the same class, degree or gravity as the
acts that have been held to be of such character. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance Employee Labor Union and Sandy T. Vallota vs. NLRC, Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance Inc., and/or Jocelyn Retizos. G.R. No. 185335, June
13, 2012.
Willful breach of trust. The loss of trust and confidence must be based on
willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Such
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial
evidence and not on the employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer. The Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines for the application
of the loss of trust and confidence doctrine: (1) loss of confidence should not
be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal or unjustified; (3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (4) it must be genuine, not a
mere afterthought, to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. Villanueva
worked for Meralco as a Branch Representative whose tasks included the
issuance of Contracts for Electric Service after receipt of the amount due for
service connection from customers. Obviously, he was entrusted not only
with the responsibility of handling company funds but also to cater to
customers who intended to avail of Meralco’s services. This is nothing but an
indication that trust and confidence were reposed in him by the company,
although his position was not strictly managerial by nature. Meralco’s loss of
trust and confidence arising out of Villanueva’s act of misappropriation of
company funds in the course of processing customer applications has been
proven by substantial evidence, thus, justified. Verily, the issuance of
additional receipts for excessive payments exacted from customers is a willful
breach of the trust reposed in him by the company. Vicente Villanueva, Jr. vs..
The National Labor Relations Commission, Third Division, Manila Electric
Company, Manuel Lopez, Chairman and CEO, and Francisco Collantes,
Manager. G.R. No. 176893, June 13, 2012.
ANALOGOUS CAUSES
The petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement since nothing in the
records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in
good standing in the union. Significantly, petitioner’s act of dismissing
respondents stemmed from the latter’s act of signing an authorization letter
to file a petition for certification election as they signed it outside the freedom
period. The mere signing of an authorization letter before the freedom period
is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents
inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period.
The court emphasizes anew that the employer is bound to exercise caution in
terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon
the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Picop Resources Incorporated (PRI) vs. Anacleto L. Tañeca, et
al., G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010.
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ANALOGOUS CAUSE. Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other
analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in
general or in specific detail as a cause for termination of employment. A cause
analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission
attesting to an employee’s moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee
against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is
a cause analogous to serious misconduct. Previous infractions may be cited as
justification for dismissing an employee only if they are related to the
subsequent offense. However, it must be noted that such a discussion was
unnecessary since the theft, taken in isolation from Fermin’s other violations,
was in itself a valid cause for the termination of his employment. Cosmos
Bottling Corp. vs. Wilson Fermin/Wilson Fermin vs. Cosmos Bottling Corp.
and Cecilia Bautista. G.R. No. 193676 & G.R. No. 194303. June 20, 2012.
Notes:
RETRENCHMENT
All these elements were successfully proven by petitioner. First, the huge
losses suffered by the Club for the past two years had forced petitioner to
close it down to avert further losses which would eventually affect the
operations of petitioner. Second, all 45 employees working in the Club were
served with notice of termination. The corresponding notice was likewise
served to the DOLE one month prior to retrenchment. Third, the employees
were offered separation pay, most of whom have accepted and opted not to
join in this complaint. Fourth, the cessation of or withdrawal from business
operations was bona fide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat
or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees. Waterfront Cebu City Hotel
vs. Ma. Melanie P. Jimenez, et al. G.R. No. 174214, June 13, 2012.
REDUNDANCY
Under the Labor Code, redundancy is one of the authorized causes for
termination of employment. The following are the requisites for the valid
implementation of a redundancy program:
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(a) the employer must serve a written notice to the affected employees and
to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month
before the intended date of termination;
(b) the employer must pay the employees separation pay equivalent to at
least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher;
(c) the employer must abolish the redundant positions in good faith; and
(d) the employer must set fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining which
positions are redundant and may be abolished.
The Supreme Court has also held that a company cannot simply declare
redundancy without basis. To exhibit its good faith and to show that there
were fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining redundant positions, a
company claiming to be over manned must produce adequate proof of the
same.
However, the Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding compliance with the
requirements on notice and the payment of separation pay, GMC is still
considered to have illegally dismissed Viajar because the company failed to
present substantial proof to support its general allegations of redundancy.
GMC could have presented evidence to substantiate redundancy, such as a
new staffing pattern or feasibility studies or proposals on the viability of newly
created positions, job descriptions and the approval by management of the
restructuring program, or the company’s audited financial reports. However,
no such evidence was submitted by GMC.
DISEASE
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found
to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-
employees. (Art. 284, LC)
If the disease or ailment can be cured within six months, the employer shall
not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave of
absence.
Cases
Disease as a ground for termination; Retirement under the Labor Code; Age
and tenure requirements for retirement; Financial assistance.
As regards Padillo’s claim for retirement benefits, the provision of the Labor
Code on retirement (formerly, Art. 287, but now renumbered pursuant to R.A.
No. 10151) states that, in the absence of any applicable agreement, an
employee who has served at least five (5) years in the company may retire
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upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years,
to be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year. Notably, the aforementioned age and tenure
requirements are cumulative, and non-compliance with either negates the
employee’s entitlement to the retirement pay under the Labor Code. In this
case, the Bank did not have a retirement plan or any other contract with its
employees, setting the terms and conditions for retirement. Padillo also
served the Bank for twenty-nine (29) years, far more than the 5-year tenure
requirement. Padillo, however, did not meet the age requirement,
considering that he was only fifty-five (55) years old, or less than 60 years of
age, when he retired. Thus, Padillo’s claim for retirement pay must also be
denied.
Reinstatement; Backwages.
The Supreme Court found that, of the 32 employees who filed the complaint
against AER, only 18 had been charged by AER with illegal strike, leaving 14
excluded from the employer’s complaint. As no charges had been filed
against the 14 workers, they cannot be found guilty of illegal strike. Neither
can they be considered in pari delicto. However, of the 14 employees, five
failed to write their names and affix their signatures in the Membership
Resolution attached to their petition before the Court of Appeals, authorizing
the union president to represent them. Thus, while these five employees will
also be reinstated, they cannot be granted backwages. On the other hand,
the nine workers who signed their names in the aforementioned Membership
Resolution will be reinstated with backwages plus interest at the legal
rate. Automotive Engine Rebuilders, Inc. (AER), et al. vs. Progresibong
Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa AER, et al. / Progresibong Unyon ng mga
Manggagawa sa AER, et al. vs. Automotive Engine Rebuilders, Inc., et al. G.R.
Nos. 160138 and 160192. January 16, 2013.
Order of reinstatement. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in case
there is an order of reinstatement, the employer must admit the dismissed
employee under the same terms and conditions, or merely reinstate the
employee in the payroll. The order shall be immediately executory. Thus, 3rd
Alert cannot escape liability by simply invoking that Navia did not report for
work. The law states that the employer must still reinstate the employee in
the payroll. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service could be
awarded as an alternative. 3rd Alert Security and Detective Services, Inc. vs.
Romualdo Navia. G.R. No. 200653, June 13, 2012.
NO. Clearly, the law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits to
accumulate past the date of the Labor Arbiter's decision until the dismissed
employee is actually reinstated.
The primordial consideration is the income that should have accrued to the
employee from the time that he was dismissed up to his reinstatement and the
length of service prior to his dismissal is definitely inconsequential.
Employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive
of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from
the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of
their actual reinstatement. But if reinstatement is no longer possible, the
backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to
the finality of the decision. Thus, when there is an order of reinstatement, the
computation of backwages shall be reckoned from the time of illegal
dismissal up to the time that the employee is actually reinstated to his former
position.
SEPARATION PAY
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279. What is meant by Separation Pay?
Separation pay is intended to provide the employee with the wherewithal (e.g.
fund) during the period he is looking for another employment. (Gabuay vs.
Oversea Paper Supply, G.R. No. 148837, August 13, 2004.)
280. State the Five Instances when Separation Pay is due to Employee
Article 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease
and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his
health as well as the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid
separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six
months being considered as one whole year.
3. When the termination from service of the employee has been declared illegal, but his
reinstatement to his former position is no longer feasible for some valid reason, e.g.,
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when reinstatement is rendered impossible due to subsequent closure of business, or
when the relationship between employer and employee has become strained
(doctrine of strained relations). (Gabuay v. Oversea Paper Supply, G.R. No. 148837,
August 13, 2004.)
SEPARATION PAY is the amount due to the employee where the cessation of
employment is due to causes authorized by law (or for any of the other causes
stated above).
The amount of separation pay under the Labor Code depends on the following
factors:
The employee’s last salary refers to the salary rate of the employee at the
time of his termination from service. It determines the base to be used in the
computation of separation pay.
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When there is a reduction of the employee’s salary prior to his termination,
e.g., the employee has been demoted resulting to a reduction of salary, such
reduced salary rate, which is his ‘last salary’ shall be the basis of the
computation. But, if the reduction of salary was made to circumvent the
provision of the Labor Code, that is, to avoid payment of higher separation
pay, the salary rate before the reduction shall be used in the computation of
separation pay.
For employee’s receiving salary below the minimum wage, the separation pay
shall be computed based on the minimum wage in effect at the time of
separation from service. In addition, the employee affected is also entitled to
payment of salary differential equivalent to the difference between the
employees actual salary and applicable minimum wage.
Employee’s length of service refers to the duration of time that the employee
has been under the employ of the same employer or company. It is computed
beginning from the time of his engagement up to the date of his termination.
A fraction of at least 6 months shall be considered as one whole year.
The reason for the employee’s separation from service is an important factor
in the computation of separation pay. The amount of separation pay may vary
depending on the specific ground relied upon for the termination.
An employee terminated for health reasons (disease) under Article 284 should
be paid separation pay equivalent to at least one-month salary or to at least
one-month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher.
“AT LEAST ONE MONTH” or “1/2 MONTH FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE?”;
MEANING
The phrase “at least one month salary or 1/2 month salary for every year of
service, whichever is higher”, can be quite confusing. The phrase though is
not really complicated. It simply means that the employee is entitled
whichever is higher of the employee’s: “one month salary; or 1/2 month salary
for every year of service.”
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ILLUSTRATIONS:
In the above example, the employee is entitled to P12,000, the higher amount.
Example # 2 : Following the same rule, if the length of service is only one year,
his separation would be whichever is higher of the following:
Here, separation pay is P8,000 or one month salary, the higher amount.
Actually, we will arrive at the same result even if the length of service is only
10 months or 7 1/2 months, etc., as long as it is 6 months or more. This is
because a fraction of at least 6-months is considered as 1 whole year.
Example # 3 : Now, what if the employee has served for less than 6 months,
how much separation pay will he get? Let’s see.
Take a quick look at the examples given above. You will notice that the
minimum separation pay that may be given to an employee is one month
salary. This is actually consistent with the phrase “at least one month salary”,
which simply means that the separation pay must not be less than the
employee’s one month salary.
VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION
285. What is Voluntary Resignation?
The key is that resignation must be a “voluntary act”, and that the employee
must have knowingly and voluntarily dissociated himself from his employment
for his own personal reasons. It does not cover cases where the employee is
forced to resign with the use of threats, intimidation, coercion or manipulation,
or where resignation is imposed as a penalty for an offense.
The Labor Code requires the employee to give an advance notice to the
employer of his intention to resign. The notice of resignation must be in writing
and must be served to the employer at least one month prior to the effective
date of his resignation.
286. Why is it important to state the date when the resignation is to take
effect?
Petitioner Cervantes’s claim that he did not resign but was terminated from
employment is untenable. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee
who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons
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cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, such that he has
no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.
287. What is the effect of lack of explicit words stating the employee’s
intention to resign?
Lack of explicit words stating the employee’s intention to resign is deemed not
crucial, as long as the employees intention to resign can be deduced from
letter itself.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a memorandum written by the
employee containing his deep resentment towards his superior juridically
constituted a letter of resignation. Even if the employee did not expressly
indicate his intention to resign (neither of the words “resign” or “resignation”
was mentioned), the resentful and sarcastic tone of the memorandum was
held to be sufficiently indicative of such intention.
If the employee fails to give the employer one month advance notice of his
intention to resign, he may be held liable for damages.
The employee may resign even without serving any notice on the employer for
any of the following reasons:
NO. An employee who voluntarily resigns from his work is not entitled to
separation pay. There is no provision in the Labor Code which grants
separation pay to voluntarily resigning employees.
Separation pay as a rule is paid only in those instances where the severance of
employment is due to factors beyond the control of the employee. Thus, in
case of retrenchment to prevent losses where the employee is forced to
depart from the company due to no fault on his part, separation pay is required
by law to be paid to the dismissed employee.
YES. By way of exceptions, there are at least two instances where an employee
who voluntarily resigns is entitled to receive separation pay, as follows:
In Lilia Pascua, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123518, March 13, 1998, the
Supreme Court, reiterated that:
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“The grant of separation pay, however, is inconsistent with
existing employment or voluntary resignation, for it
presupposes illegal dismissal.”
292. Special cases where Separation Pay was still awarded to Resigning
Employees
In Alfaro vs. CA, G.R. No. 140812, August 28, 2001, the Court ordered the payment of
separation pay despite holding that the employee voluntarily resigned from service, and
although such payment was not mandated under the CBA or employment contract.
Same conclusion was arrived at in J Marketing Corp. vs. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 28,
2009.
In both of the above cases, the employer agreed to give separation pay to the employee as
an incident of the latter’s resignation, but later on renege in the performance of such
commitment. The Court held that such practice should not be countenanced.
JURISPRUDENCE ON RESIGNATIONS
Under the Labor Code (Art. 287, now 301), an employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) or other applicable employment contract. In the absence of such
agreement, the employee may retire upon reaching the age of 60 or more, but
not more than 65, provided he has served at least 5 years or more in the same
establishment. The age 60 or more, but below 65, is considered as the
voluntary retirement age. Sixty-five is considered as the compulsory retirement
age.
The CBA or employment contract may also establish a retirement age based on
years of service of the employee. For example, it may provide that “the
employee may be retired after 20 years of service.”
The retirement age may also be established based on the combination of the
age and tenure of the employee. For example, the contract may provide that
“the employee may retire upon reaching the age of 50, or after 20 years of
service, whichever comes earlier”
For UNDERGROUND MINING EMPLOYEES, the voluntary retirement age under the Labor
Code is 50 years or more, but not beyond 60. The compulsory retirement age is set 60.
It is important to note that the company cannot unilaterally fix the retirement age of
employee.
Retirement age may be established only by a valid CBA or employment contract, or in the
absence of both, by the law.
The retirement age fixed by law applies only when no CBA or employment
contract setting the retirement age exists. If there is such agreement or
contract, the retirement age fixed by law won’t apply.
Under the Labor Code, the retirement pay is equivalent to “at least one-half
month salary for every year of service,” a fraction of at least six months being
considered as one whole year.
The term “one-half month salary” means 15 days plus 1/12 of the 13th month
pay and the cash equivalent of not more than 5 days of service incentive leaves.
But where the setting of retirement date is clearly under the discretion and
prerogative of the management, the exercise thereof by accelerating the
retirement date will not amount to illegal dismissal. The exercise of
management prerogative is valid provided it is not performed in a malicious,
harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or out of malice or spite.
(Magdadaro vs. PNB, G.R. No. 166198, July 17, 2009.)
JURISPRUDENCE
Article 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
barred forever. (Emphasis supplied)
Accrual of money claims. The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a
monetary claim accrues. Thus, again the general law on prescription applies.
Article 1150 of the Civil Code provides that –
Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,
when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise,
shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (Emphasis
supplied)
The day the action may be brought is the day a claim started as a legal
possibility. In the present case, the day came when petitioner learned of
Asiakonstrukt’s deduction from his salary of the amount of advances he had
received but had, by his claim, been settled, the same having been reflected in
his payslips, hence, it is assumed that he learned of it at the time he received
his monthly paychecks. (Anabe vs. Asian Construction, et al., G.R. No. 183233,
December 23, 2009).
Proof that employer acted maliciously or in bad faith not necessary for award of attorney’s
fees. In actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and thus
incur expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum of 10% of the total monetary
award by way of attorney’s fees is justifiable under Article 111 of the Labor Code; Section 8,
Rule VIII of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; and paragraph 7,
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The award of attorney’s fees is proper and there need not be
any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages.
There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid accordingly. (PLDT vs.
Berbano, G.R. No. 165199, November 27, 2009.)
Employee benefit; attorney’s fees. Lazaro must establish a legal basis – either by law,
contract or other sources of obligations – to merit the receipt of the additional 10%
attorney’s fees collected in the various foreclosure procedures he settled as the bank’s legal
officer. Lazaro has not produced any contract or provision of law that would warrant the
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payment of the additional attorney’s fees. He is only entitled to his salaries as the bank’s
legal officer, because the services he rendered in the foreclosure proceedings were part of
his official tasks. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Miguelito M.
Lazaro/Miguelito M. Lazaro vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al. G.R. No.
185346 & G.R. No. 185442. June 27, 2012.
Damages in labor suit. To obtain moral damages, the claimant must prove the existence of
bad faith by clear and convincing evidence, for the law always presumes good faith. It is not
even enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety
as the result of the actuations of the other party. In this case, Lazaro did not state any moral
anguish that he suffered. Neither did he substantiate his imputations of malice to Banco
Filipino. He only made a sweeping declaration, without concrete proof, that the bank in
refusing his claim maliciously damaged his property rights and interest. Accordingly, neither
moral damages nor exemplary damage can be awarded to him.
With respect to attorney’s fees, an award is proper only if that person was forced to litigate
and incur expenses to protect one’s rights and interest by reason of an unjustified act or
omission of the party for whom it is sought. Banco Filipino had a prima facie legitimate
defense that, because it underwent liquidation proceedings, it cannot be compelled to
credit that period in the computation of the employee’s the retirement pay and profit
shares. Considering that Banco Filipino’s refusal cannot be accurately characterized as
unjustified, Lazaro cannot claim an award of attorney’s fees. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. Miguelito M. Lazaro/Miguelito M. Lazaro vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank, et al. G.R. No. 185346 & G.R. No. 185442. June 27, 2012.
Nominal damages for failure to observe procedural due process for termination entitles
employee. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff that has
been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Thus, for respondent’s
violation of petitioner’s statutory rights, respondent is sanctioned to pay petitioner nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. (Formantes vs. Duncan Pharmaceuticals, G.R. No.
170661, December 4, 2009
Ibid.; Period or duration of the stay order. Petitioners seek to have the suspension of
proceedings lifted on the ground that the SEC already approved respondent USWCI’s SARP.
However, there is no legal ground to do so because the suspensive effect of the stay order is
not time-bound. The stay order continues to be in effect as long as reasonably necessary to
accomplish its purpose. (Tiangco vs. Uniwide, G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009)
EXTRAS
RECENT SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON LABOR LAW AND PROCEDURE
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Appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); Requisites for perfection of
appeal; Joint declaration under oath accompanying the surety bond; Substantial compliance
with procedural rules.
There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure when the respondents
PAL Maritime Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. filed, albeit belatedly,
the Joint Declaration Under Oath, which is required when an employer appeals from the
Labor Arbiter’s decision granting a monetary award and posts a surety bond. Under the
NLRC rules, the following requisites are required to perfect the employer’s appeal: (1) it
must be filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be under oath, with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond; and (3) it must
be accompanied by typewritten or printed copies of the memorandum of appeal, stating the
grounds relied upon, the supporting arguments, the reliefs prayed for, and a statement of
the date of receipt of the appealed decision, with proof of service on the other party of said
appeal. If the employer posts a surety bond, the NLRC rules further require the submission
by the employer, his or her counsel, and the bonding company of a joint declaration under
oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until the
final disposition of the case.
In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond equivalent to the monetary award
and filed the notice of appeal and the appeal memorandum within the reglementary period.
When the NLRC subsequently directed the filing of a Joint Declaration Under Oath, the
respondents immediately complied with the said order. There was only a late submission of
the Joint Declaration. Considering that there was substantial compliance with the rules, the
same may be liberally construed. The application of technical rules may be relaxed in labor
cases to serve the demands of substantial justice. Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime
Corporation and/or Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. G.R. No. 175209. January 16, 2013.
Money claims; Application to claims of overseas contract workers. Article 291 covers all
money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims
arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor
Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. (LWV Construction
Corporation vs. Marcelo B. Dupo, G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009.)
Dismissal of corporate officer falls under the jurisdiction of regular courts not NLRC . A
corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy
which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question of remuneration
involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a
matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate
controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his
employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-
corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. (Okol vs. Slimmers World
International, et al., G.R. No. 160146, December 11, 2009.)
Jurisdiction over money claims. NLRC has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by one who
served both as corporate officer and employee, when the money claims were made as an
employee and not as a corporate officer. (Gomez vs. PDMC, G.R. No. 174044, November 27,
2009.)
Corporate officers not personally liable for corporate liabilities . In the absence of malice, bad
faith, or specific provision of law, a director or an officer of a corporation cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities. (Lowe, Inc., et al., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
164813 and 174590, August 14, 2009.
LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING
Still another way of putting it is that the contractors were not independently selling and
distributing company products, using their own equipment, means and methods of selling
and distribution; they only supplied the manpower that helped the company in the handing
of products for sale and distribution. In the context of D.O. 18-02, the contracting for sale
and distribution as an independent and self-contained operation is a legitimate contract, but
the pure supply of manpower with the task of assisting in sales and distribution controlled
by a principal falls within prohibited labor-only contracting. (Coca-cola Bottlers Philippines
vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 184977, December 7, 2009 .)
Gramaje is not an independent job contractor, but a “labor-only” contractor. First, Gramaje
has no substantial capital or investment. The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only
contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it has substantial capital,
investment, tools, and the like. Neither Gramaje nor Polyfoam presented evidence showing
Gramaje’s ownership of the equipment and machineries used in the performance of the
alleged contracted job.
Second, Gramaje did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of
its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and
supervision of its principal, Polyfoam, its apparent role having been merely to recruit
persons to work for Polyfoam. It is undisputed that respondent had performed his task of
packing Polyfoam’s foam products in Polyfoam’s premises. As to the recruitment of
respondent, petitioners were able to establish only that respondent’s application was
referred to Gramaje, but that is all. Prior to his termination, respondent had been
performing the same job in Polyfoam’s business for almost six (6) years. He was even
furnished a copy of Polyfoam’s “Mga Alituntunin at Karampatang Parusa,”which embodied
Polyfoam’s rules on attendance, the manner of performing the employee’s duties, ethical
standards, cleanliness, health, safety, peace and order. These rules carried with them the
corresponding penalties in case of violation. While it is true that petitioners submitted the
Affidavit of Polyfoam’s supervisor, claiming that the latter did not exercise supervision over
respondent because the latter was not Polyfoam’s but Gramaje’s employee, said Affidavit is
insufficient to prove such claim. Petitioners should have presented the person who they
claim to have exercised supervision over respondent and their alleged other employees
assigned to Polyfoam. It was never established that Gramaje took entire charge, control and
supervision of the work and service agreed upon. Polyfoam-RGC International, Corporation
and Precilla A. Gramaje vs. Edgardo Concepcion. G.R. No. 172349, June 13, 2012.
Appeal from NLRC to Court of Appeals; Who may sign pleading. The rule (Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure) allows the pleading to be signed by either the party to the case
or the counsel representing that party. A petition and motion for reconsideration (filed
before the Court of Appeals) signed by the company in its own behalf, through its corporate
president, who was duly authorized by the company’s Board of Directors to represent the
company, cannot be considered unsigned and without legal effect. (Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 152579, August 4, 2009.)
Grave abuse of discretion; concept of. Having established through substantial evidence that
respondent’s injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20
(D) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in
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upholding LA’s decision to dismiss respondent’s complaint for disability benefits. It is well-
settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E.
Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v. Alexander L. Moradas,G.R. No.,
January 15, 2014.
Grave abuse of discretion by labor officials. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or
tribunal exercises powers granted by law capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily. Indeed, the
law grants the NLRC the power to review decisions of labor arbiters. However, the fact that
the law grants the NLRC the power to review decisions of labor arbiters does not
automatically rule out the possibility of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
may arise if the NLRC exercises such power in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic
manner. Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence. (Maralit vs. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. No. 163788, August 24, 2009.)
Special civil actions for certiorari; Authority of the Court of Appeals to receive new
evidence. In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to
receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues. The Court of
Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when it finds that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To make this
finding, the Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own
factual determination. (Maralit vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 163788, August 24,
2009.)
Rules of procedure; Relaxation of the rules in the interest of substantial justice. Strict rules of
procedure may be set aside to serve the demands of substantial justice. Labor cases must be
decided according to justice, equity, and the substantial merits of the controversy. (In this
case, the appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was filed 12 days from receipt of the
decision, or two days late.) (Maralit vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 163788, August
24, 2009.)
Rules of procedure; One day delay in filing of appeal. One day delay in the filing of the appeal
does not justify the appeal’s denial. More importantly that the appeal, on its face, appears to
be impressed with merit. (Republic Cement Corp., vs. Guinmapang, G.R. No. 168910, August
24, 2009.)
Rule 45; only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review on certiorari. It is a
settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review
on certiorari. The Court’s power of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to resolving matters
pertaining to any perceived legal errors, which the CA may have committed in issuing the
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assailed decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of the CA’s Rule 65 decision in a labor
case, the Court examines the CA decision in the context that it determined whether or not
there is grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision subject of its review and not on the
basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. Universal Robina
Sugar Milling Corporation and Rene Cabati, G.R. No. 186439. January 15, 2014.
Rule 45; the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions
of law; exceptions. The Court’s jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the
proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule, however, is not
ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA
are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the NLRC and LA, as in this case. In this
regard, there is therefore a need to review the records to determine which of them should
be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain
Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v. Alexander L. Moradas, G.R.
No., January 15, 2014.
Appeal; issue of employer-employee relationship raised for the first time on appeal . It is a
fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters
neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for
the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. The alleged absence of
employer-employee relationship cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The resolution
of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and the LA and the NLRC did
not pass upon it in their decisions. Petitioner is bound by its submissions that respondent is
its employee and it should not be permitted to change its theory. Such change of theory
cannot be tolerated on appeal, not on account of the strict application of procedural rules,
but as a matter of fairness. Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. vs. Manolito Q. Tria. G.R. No.
174809. June 27, 2012.
Burden of proof in employee dismissal;. Under the law, the burden of proving that the
termination of employment was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer.
Failure to discharge this burden would result in an unjust or illegal dismissal. The company’s
evidence on the respondents’ alleged infractions do not substantially show that they
violated company rules and regulations to warrant their dismissal. It is obvious that the
company overstepped the bounds of its management prerogative in the dismissal of
Mauricio and Camacho. It lost sight of the principle that management prerogative must be
exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of the workers in the spirit of
fairness and with justice in mind. Philbag Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Philbag
Workers Union-Lakas at Gabay ng Manggagawang Nagkakaisa. G.R. No. 182486, June 20,
2012.
Service; proof of service. Petitioners allege that no affidavit of service was attached to the
CA Petition. However, the Supreme Court noted that in the CA Resolution, the appellate
court stated that their records revealed that Atty. Espinas, petitioners’ counsel of record at
the time, was duly served a copy of the following: CA Resolution granting respondent’s
Motion for Extension of Time to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution requiring petitioners to
file their Comment on the CA Petition; and CA Resolution, submitting the case for resolution,
as no comment was filed. Such service to Atty. Espinas was valid despite the fact he was
already deceased at the time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of
pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service
upon the party is specifically ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire,
during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the
litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its
associates are still connected with the firm. Salvador O. Mojar, et al. vs. Agro Commercial
Security Service Agency, et al. G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012.
Floating Status. When the floating status of employees lasts for more than six (6) months,
they may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the service. “Floating status”
means an indefinite period of time when one does not receive any salary or financial benefit
provided by law. In this case, petitioners were actually reassigned to new posts, albeit in a
different location from where they resided. Thus, there can be no floating status or
indefinite period to speak of. Instead, petitioners were the ones who refused to report for
work in their new assignment.
In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever the
employment relationship between the security guards and their agency. Employees have the
right to security of tenure, but this does not give them such a vested right to their positions
as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change their assignment or transfer
them where their services, as security guards, will be most beneficial to the client. An
employer has the right to transfer or assign its employees from one office or area of
operation to another in pursuit of its legitimate business interest, provided there is no
demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the transfer is
not motivated by discrimination or bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause. While petitioners may claim that their transfer to Manila
will cause added expenses and inconvenience, absent any showing of bad faith or ill motive
on the part of the employer, the transfer remains valid. Salvador O. Mojar, et al. vs. Agro
Commercial Security Service Agency, et al. G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012.