1

REVISIONS AND CODIFICATION

*EFFECT OF CHANGE IN PHRASEOLOGY

G.R. No. 184861               June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in
Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22
against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction
agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings
based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal
cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause,
since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying
the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when
the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any
less prejudicial in character.10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR
COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN
CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:
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The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which
applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established
that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would
belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which
the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial
question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent
concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a
prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action
involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule
lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil
Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions
of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court
hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant
provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we
said:
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Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to
delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment
from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly
stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack
of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not

Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot
apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks
issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks
is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial
value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act
of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later
on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued
for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract,
or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or
not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of
loans that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an
obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no
longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has
severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored
for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine
whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before
us.
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WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las
Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 14129             July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently,
here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged
with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that
the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76)
where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to
dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against
the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal
or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He
submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to
exclude justices of the peace from its operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified
or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the
peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the
legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of
the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A
"judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary,
"a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726
and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its
subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made
through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen
later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which
was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

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No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at any
municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of
the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold
any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of
Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a
term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at
any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any
province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of
any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the
classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by
exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months
nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved
December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid
any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he
is a peace officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of
the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note
carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge"
which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of
the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace"
in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the
broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of
Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all
efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep.
Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is
modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is
not an officer of a province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration
for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of
Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the
prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as
provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been
intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In
the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in
nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the
government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice
Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
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The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such
omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various
courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S.
vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v.
U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S.
has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be
construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations
inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc.,
who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to
eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all
judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan
political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code
itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to
hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their
decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code,
intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)

Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the
purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31,
1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the
separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56,
justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said
House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of
said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the
proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons
expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute
(Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since
1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was
Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

REPEALS

G.R. No. L-38736 May 21, 1984

 7

FELIPE G. TAC-AN, petitioner,
vs.
CA, respondents.
Liliano B. Neri for petitioner.
Vic T. Lacaya for private respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The petitioner, Felipe G. Tac-An, is a lawyer whose services were engaged by the brothers Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximino Acopiado who were accused of
frustrated murder and theft of large cattle before the Municipal Court of New Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte in March, 1960.

On April 4, 1960, Tac-An caused a document entitled, "Deed of Quitclaim" to be thumb-marked by the Acopiado brothers whereby for the sum of P1,200.00
representing his fees as their lawyer in the criminal cases, they conveyed to him a parcel of land with an area of three hectares. The document was acknowledged
before Notary Public Pacifico Cimafranca on the same date who explained its contents to the Acopiados.

On April 6, 1960, or two days after the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-An that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents
did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services. They also said that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-An continued to
represent them.

In the case for frustrated murder, the Acopiados were acquitted. The cases for theft of large cattle were dismissed due to the desistance of the complainants.

On April 2, 1961, Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario but the latter did not take possession
thereof.

In June, 1964, Tac-An appointed Irineo Villejo, a barrio captain, as his overseer in the land. On July 2, 1964, Tac-An also secured the approval of the Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7, 1964, Tac-An filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and
Libetario in the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte. He prayed that he be declared the owner of the land; that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and owner Libetario
be annulled; and that he be paid damages, attorney's fees, etc.

The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Tac-An whereupon the Acopiados, et al. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An but held that for his services in the criminal cases he was entitled to the agreed upon amount of
P1,200.00. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. In lieu thereof, another one is rendered ordering the defendants
Acopiados to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,200.00 with interest at a legal rate from the date of the finality of this judgment until full payment
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. (Rollo, pp. 40-41.)

Petitioner Tac-An prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the Court of First Instance be upheld instead.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers fully understood the tenor of the Deed of Quitclaim which they executed. But the Court of Appeals
also found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians, more specifically Subanons, and that each is married to a Subanon. And because they are
Non-Christians, the Court of Appeals applied Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu which reads as follows:

Sec. 145. Contracts with Non-Christians requisites. -- Save and except contracts of sale or barter of personal property and contracts of
personal service comprehended in chapter seventeen hereof no contract or agreement shall be made in the Department by any person with
any Moro or other non-Christian tribe or portion thereof the Department or with any individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitants of the
same for the payment or delivery of money or other things of value in present or in prospective, or in the manner affecting or relating to any
real property, unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or auxilliary justice of the peace, or notary public, and shall bear the
approval of the provincial governor wherein the same was executed or his representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose, indorsed
upon it.

It should be stated that under Section 146 of the same Code, contracts or agreements made in violation of Sec. 145 shall be "null and void."

It should be recalled that on July 2, 1964, Tac-An secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim and that
should have satisfied the requirement of Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu. But it appears that on April 12, 1965, while Tac-An's suit was
pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte revoked his approval for the reasons stated therein.

The petitioner now asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to
the land which had already vested. But as Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, with Justices Mateo Canonoy and Ameurfina M. Herrera concurring, said:

The approval by Provincial Governor Felipe Azcuna appearing on the face of the Deed of Quitclaim (Exh. "E ") made on July 2, 1964 may no
longer be relied upon by the plaintiff in view of the revocation thereof by the same official on April 12, 1965 (Exh. 4). The revocation was based
on the ground that the signature of Governor Azcuna was obtained thru a false representation to the effect that the alleged transaction was
legal and voluntary when in truth and in fact, as found out later, the said parcel of land was the subject matter of a court litigation; and,
moreover, the non-Christian vendors were not brought before him for interrogation, confirmation or ratification of the alleged deed of quitclaim.
The fact that the revocation was made after the filing of instant action on October 10, 1964 does not vitiate the aforesaid action of the
Provincial Governor. Significantly, no attempt was made to disprove the truth of the reasons stated in the certificate of revocation (Exh. 4).
(Rollo, p. 37.)

The petitioner also argues that the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on June 19, 1965 by Republic Act No, 4252, hence the approval of
the Provincial Governor became unnecessary. Suffice it to say that at times material to the case, i.e. when the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, when the approval
by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full
force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. It should also be stated that the land in question
 8

must be presumed to be conjugal in nature and since the spouses of the Acopiado brothers did not consent to its transfer to the petitioner, the transaction was at
least voidable.

WHEREFORE finding the petition to be lacking in merit, the same is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

IMPLIED REPEAL

G.R. Nos. 60225-26               May 8, 1992

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ZAIN B. ANGAS ET. AL, respondents.
Lucio C. Badelles for petitioner.
Dimnatang Saro for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The basic issue in this original action for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Power Corporation is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of
interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank
Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. Pending consideration of this code on the merits, petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to restrain or enjoin the respondent judge of the lower court from enforcing the herein assailed orders and from
further acting or proceeding with Civil Case Nos. 2248 and 2277.

The following are the antecedents of the case:

On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which
the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private
respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and Civil Case No. 2277, respectively.
The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-
electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith.

Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After responsive pleadings were filed and issues joined, a series of hearings before court-designated
commissioners were held.

On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned
and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents
certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid."

Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner. The same were denied by the respondent court.
Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and executory.

Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that
petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per
annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as
adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), through counsel, filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion in Civil Case No.
2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly
"authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court
that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." (Brief for Respondents, p. 3)

On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. (Annex L, Petition). Subsequently, the other private respondents
filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court
issued on March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main decision had already become final and
executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209
of the Civil Code which applies.

On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate of interest at the time of the promulgation of the June 15,
1981 decision is that prescribed by Central Bank Circular No. 416 issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per annum, and that it did not
modify or change but merely amplified its order of August 28, 1981 in the determination of the legal interest.

Petitioner brings the case to Us for a determination of which legal interest is applicable to the transaction in question.

Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its
Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This has already been settled
in several cases decided by this Court. Private respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that
such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which term includes the questioned judgment of the lower court in the case at bar.

Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should
be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine,
where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or
persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 191; Go Tiaco vs. Union Ins. Society of
Canton, 40 Phil. 40; Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228)
 9

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and
the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the
lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have
used only general terms (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400).

Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans
or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. As significantly laid down by this Court in the case of Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260:

The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Any other kind of
monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of
the said law for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot
rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a
whole and not as a series of disconnected articles and phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention, words and phrases in statutes should not be
interpreted in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may
thus be modified or restricted by the latter.

Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per
annum.

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On
the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

As for private respondents' argument that Central Bank Circular No. 416 impliedly repealed or modified Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, suffice it to state that repeals or
even amendments by implication are not favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by
implication, and they will not make such an adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at another result by any construction which is just and
reasonable. Besides, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to decide that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation
leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless it is inevitable and a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. (82 C.J.S. 479-486). In this case,
Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate different situations and apply to different transactions. In transactions involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as judgments relating to such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, the Central Bank circular applies. It
is only in such transactions or judgments where the Presidential Decree allowed the Monetary Board to dip its fingers into. On the other hand, in cases requiring
the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of an obligation other than those involving loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies. For the Court, this is the most fair, reasonable, and logical interpretation of the two laws. We do not see any
conflict between Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any reason to hold that the former has repealed the latter by implication.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders promulgated on February 11, 1981, March 10, 1981, August 28, 1981 and January 25, 1982 (as to the
recomputation of interest at 12% per annum) are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the
correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents by the Government
through the National Power Corporation. The injunction heretofore granted is hereby made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur

G.R. No. L-31711 September 30, 1971

ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS as Mayor of the City of Manila and MANUEL D. LAPID, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO as Civil Service Commissioner, EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ as Secretary of Finance, JOSE R. GLORIA as Acting Asst. City
Treasurer of Manila, and HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ as Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents-appellees.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Restituto R. Villanueva for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, in this appeal from a decision of the lower court dismissing a special civil action for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus would
lay claim as the Mayor of the City of Manila to the power of appointment of the Assistant City Treasurer to which office the other petitioner, Manuel D. Lapid, was
by him named even if under its Charter1 such a prerogative is expressly vested in the President of the Philippines.2 He would invoke a provision in the
Decentralization Act to the effect that all "other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, and other local funds shall,
subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the provincial governor, city or municipal mayor upon recommendation of the office head
concerned."3 He is not deterred by the rather general and in explicit character of such statutory language as he contends for a construction rather generous, if not
latitudinarian, in scope purportedly in consonance with the avowed purpose of the Act of enlarging boundaries of local autonomy. Respondent Abelardo Subido,
who was proceeded against as Commissioner of the Civil Service,4 takes a stand diametrically opposite not only because there is no legal basis for such a claim in
the light of what is expressly ordained in the City Charter but also because such an interpretation of the provision related upon would disregard the well-settled
doctrine that implied repeals are not favored. The lower court, in a well-written decision by the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez, accepted such a view. After a
careful study of the matter, we cannot discern any error. We affirm.

The facts as found by the lower court follows: "In a letter dated June 3, 1968, respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent
Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968, vice Felino Fineza who retired
from the government service on May 31, 1968. In administrative Order No. 40, series of 1968, dated June 17, 1968, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, Mayor of the
City of Manila, directed respondent Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer,' on the ground that
respondent Romualdez "is not empowered to make such designation." On January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas, appointed petitioner Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the
cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a 1st endorsement dated February 14, 1969, respondent Abelardo
Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of Lapid, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19,
 10

1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by
Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185."5

Thereafter on February 25, 1969, to quote anew from the appealed decision: "Mayor Villegas and Manuel D. Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition, quo
warranto and mandamus, with application for writ of preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization
given by respondent Romualdez to respondent Gloria to assume the duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus be issued to
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Subido commanding him to approve the appointment of petitioner Lapid to the said office in accordance with the civil
Service Rules."6 It was not until the filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of
Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits
stipulated by the parties, the court rendered its decision on August 4, 1969 dismissing the petition. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari.

With this Tribunal, as with the court below, the decisive question is the applicable law. The Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, in express terms did
confer on the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer.7 On the other
hand, support for the petition is premised on the expansive interpretation that would be accorded the general provisions found in the Decentralization Act of 1967
to the effect that it is a city mayor who has the power to appoint all other employees paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations.8

It is understandable why the choice for the lower court was not difficult to make. What has been so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. It survives in the
face of the assertion that the additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to transfer such authority to
petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the words of the statute, even if far from searching would not justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, considering the
fidelity manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. The decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed.

1. The inherent weakness of the contention of petitioner Mayor that would seize upon the vesting of the appointing power of all other "employees" except teachers
paid out of local funds to justify his choice of petitioner Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer is readily disclosed. The Revised Administrative Code
distinguishes one in that category from an "officer" to designate those "whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not."9 Clearly, the Assistant and City
Treasurer is an officer, not an employee. Then, too, Section 4 of the Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City Mayor specifically enumerates, the officials
and their assistants whom he can appoint, specifically excluding therefrom city treasurers.10 The expansive interpretation contended for is thus unwarranted.

Nor is the case strengthened for petitioner City Mayor by the invocation of Pineda v. Claudio.11 It is not to be denied that in the opinion of the Court, penned by
Justice Castro, undue interference with the power and prerogatives of a local executive is sought to be avoided, considering his primary responsibility for efficient
governmental administration. What is not to be ignored though is that such a principle was announced in connection with the appointment of a department head,
the chief of police, who necessarily must enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive, one moreover whose appointment is expressly vested in the city
mayor. The principle therein announced does not extend as far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose functions do not require that much degree of
confidence, not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the President. Equally unavailing then is Villegas v. Subido,12 where this Court, through the then
Justice Capistrano, recognized that the choice of who the city legal officer should be rests solely on the city mayor, such an office requiring as it does the highest
degree of confidence. It bears repeating that the situation in the case before us is of a different category. The decision appealed from, then, is not to be impugned
as a failure to abide by controlling pronouncements of this Tribunal.

2. Much less is reversal of the lower court decision justified on the plea that the aforesaid provision in the Decentralization Act had the effect of repealing what is
specifically ordained in the city charter. It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so declared unless
it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision.13 It is necessary then before such a
repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former.14 There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of
the legislative purpose to repeal. 15

More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment,
unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the
special act. This principle has likewise been consistently applied in decisions of this Court from Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty,16 decided as far back as 1919. A
citation from an opinion of Justice Tuason is illuminating. Thus: "From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as
having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And this is true although
the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. ... At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in
the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of
the legislature. ... A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class while
a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. 17

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of August 4, 1969 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995

HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE ET. AL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770,1 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160,2 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition.
 11

The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said
court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.3

Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad, now resigned,4 who took the initiative in instituting this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor
Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and
Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as
amended,5 Articles 1706 and 1717 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713.8 Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in
conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to
P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS-
92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.

A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by Mandaue City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in
support of the accusations against respondent officials. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano
and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and
Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President.

In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or
otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in
any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.

In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of
the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent
component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the
Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.

In an Order,9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of
respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman.10 Respondent
officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order11 of 21 September 1992.

On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials
with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining order
directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, holding thusly:

So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of
these two laws in order that each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so
general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public
official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon
which a local elective official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an
exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such,
the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under
Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued:

1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the posting of the petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) conditioned that the latter will pay
all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court will
finally adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto, and

2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 12

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992.13 A motion for reconsideration made by petitioner was denied by the trial court.

The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court
and prays that respondent judge be directed to desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.

There is merit in the petition.

The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution,14 thus:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
 12

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:

Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of

justification.

Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman, viz.:

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to
decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by
the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section
6015 thereof, on various offices. In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities, the Code states:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any erring local elective officials shall be prepared as
follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be
filed before the Office of the President.

Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President
if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . . " under sub-paragraph (b) thereof:

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not
extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he
cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at
the time of the first suspension.

In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed
the Local Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary
authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770
conformably with a constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that should have been pursued by
respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman
Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the
other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored,16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.17 The two
laws must be absolutely incompatible,18 and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn.19 The rule is expressed in
the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence.20 The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted conflicting statutes.21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal,22 and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject.23

Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to
insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom."24

Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61
and Section 63 of the precursor local Government Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:
 13

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. — Verified complaints against local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:

(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local Government.

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so
warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time
entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under
Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change
from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.

Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-
day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In
order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against
the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive
suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days
of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough
that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the
gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence.

Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order
without any hearing.

The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their
opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it may,
we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are
brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. In the early case
of Nera vs. Garcia,26 reiterated in subsequent cases,27 we have said:

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure.
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to
prove his innocence.

Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda
vs. Flavier,28 that the evidence of guilt was strong. Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:

After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage, it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt
against the respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge against the respondents involves dishonesty or
gross misconduct which would warrant their removal from the service and there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of
veritable documents like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very foundations of duly established representative
governments. Finally, it is likewise the holding of this office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the
judicious investigation and resolution of the instant case.29

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the
findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No.
6770 reads:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.

Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative
disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the petition.
 14

WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

G.R. No. 214044, June 19, 2019

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, v. CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 214044 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by the University of the Philippines (UP) against the City Treasurer of Quezon City (City Treasurer)
seeking to annul the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 addressed to UP as well as the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014 which required
UP to pay real property tax on a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-107350 (192689), which is currently leased to Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI). The petition also
seeks to enjoin the City Treasurer, or any of his agents or representatives, from proceeding with the sale of the subject land at a public auction pursuant to the 11
July 2014 Final Notice of Delinquency.

The Facts

In their submitted pleadings before this Court, both UP and the City Treasurer admitted that UP is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-
107350 (192689). UP entered into a contract of lease with ALI over the subject land on 27 October 2006.2

UP further narrated in its petition:

xxxx

5. UP is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by and more particularly described in TCT No. RT-107530 (192689) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, with an area of 985,597 square meters and located along Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City.

6. On 27 October 2006, UP entered into a Contract of Lease with Development Obligations with [ALI] over a portion of the aforementioned parcel of land
containing an area of 380,630 square meters. The leased property is now known as the UP-Ayala Technohub.

7. In a Notice of Assessment addressed to ALI dated 23 August 2012, ALI was informed that the subject property has been "reclassified and assessed for taxation
purposes with an assessed value of P499,500,000.00 effective 2009."

8. In a letter to UP President Pascual dated 22 August 2012, the City Assessor of Quezon City informed UP that the aforementioned Notice of Assessment was
served upon ALI as the entity liable for the real property tax on the subject property pursuant to Section 205(d) and Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.

9. In a Statement of Delinquency dated 05 December 2012, addressed to the UP North Property Holdings, Inc., the [City Treasurer] demanded the payment of real
property tax on the subject property amounting to P78,970,950.00 for the years 2009-2011 and the first three quarters of 2012.

10. In another letter to UP President Pascual dated 09 September 2013, the City Assessor of Quezon City furnished UP a copy of the letter of the Bureau of Local
Government Finance (BLGF) of the Department of Finance [(DOF)] dated 01 August 2013, which opined that ALI is the party legally accountable for the real
property taxes on the subject property. It was further stated that the City Assessor's Office "will be sending the official Notice of Assessment and the corresponding
Tax Declaration for the subject property under the name of [ALI]. . ."

11. In another Statement of Delinquency dated 24 September 2013, addressed to the UP North Property Holdings, Inc., the [City Treasurer] again demanded the
payment of real property tax on the subject property in the updated amount of P102,747,150.00 for the years 2009-2012 and the first three quarters of 2013.

12. For the first time and without a prior Notice of Assessment, a Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 addressed to UP was issued by the [City
Treasurer] demanding the payment of real property tax on the subject property amounting to P106,992,990.00 for the years 2009 to 2013 and the first quarter of
2014.

13. In his letter to the City Treasurer of Quezon City dated 13 June 2014, UP President Pascual requested the postponement of any proceeding related to the
aforementioned Statement of Delinquency. He explained -
We respectfully take exception to the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 and the alleged delinquency of the University with respect to the payment of
the real estate taxes. The University of the Philippines, as the National University, has been granted tax exemptions under Republic Act No. 9500, otherwise
known as the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008, that are express, patent and unambiguous. The grant is exceedingly extensive that it provided the
University the exemption from all taxes and duties vis-a-vis all revenues and assets used for educational purposes or in support thereof.

Moreover, in the letter of the Bureau of Local Government Finance ("BLGF") dated 01 August 2013, addressed to the Hon. City Mayor, Herbert M. Bautista, the
BLGF opined on the issue as to which party shall be accountable for the unpaid real estate taxes due on the thirty-seven (37) hectares of land owned by the
University and being leased out to [ALI], the same property which is the subject of the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014. The BLGF concluded that
"[ALI], being the lessee, is the legally accountable party to the unpaid real property taxes on the government-owned UP Property." The foregoing opinion of the
BLGF confirms that the University is exempt from real estate taxes, an absolute right that the University enjoys under R.A. No. 9500.
14. On 22 July 2014, UP received the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014 from the Office of the City Treasurer demanding the payment of real
property tax on the subject property in the updated amount of P117,182,700.00 for the years 2009-2013 and the first three quarters of 2014.3
UP filed the present case before this Court within 60 days from receipt of the 11 July 2014 Final Notice of Delinquency.4

On 29 September 2014, we issued a Resolution5 which required the City Treasurer to file a Comment. We also issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
City Treasurer, his agents or representatives, from enforcing the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014 and proceeding with the sale of subject land at a
public auction scheduled on 20 November 2014.

On 20 July 2015, we issued a Resolution6 requiring the City Treasurer to show cause why he/she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to file comment before the period expired on 12 October 2014.

On 7 March 2016, we issued a Resolution7 imposing upon the City Treasurer a fine of P1,000.00 for failure to file comment, and required compliance within ten
days from notice. On 20 July 2016, we issued a Resolution8 imposing upon the City Treasurer an increased fine of P2,000.00 for failure to file comment, and
required compliance within ten days from notice.
 15

On 18 August 2016, we received an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time with Manifestation9 from Ms. Ruby Rosa G. Guevarra (Ms. Guevarra), Acting Assistant
City Treasurer of Quezon City. She alleged and manifested:
xxxx

2. That as early on [sic] April 15, 2016, herein respondent through its City Treasurer, Ms. Basilia S. Pacis and to date, through its Acting Assistant City Treasurer,
sought for the legal assistance of Atty. Christian B. Valencia, City Legal Officer of the Local Government Unit, Quezon City, to prepare and file Comment to the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, as may be evidenced by the Indorsement dated August 11, 2016 and Indorsement dated August 15, 2016 true copies
of them are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2" and made parts hereof[;]

To date, August 18, 2016, there was no prepared Comment by the City Legal Officer to be filed in the Honorable Court;

3. That to date, the undersigned, Ms. Ruby Rosa G. Guevarra is in [sic] the Acting Assistant City Treasurer of the Local Government Unit, Quezon City, as the City
Treasurer, Ms. Basilia S. Pacis retired [from] said position as Treasurer;

4. That to date, the undersigned, Ms. Ruby Rosa G. Guevarra is looking for a counsel to help her in the preparation and filing of a Comment to the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition;

5. That the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000) Pesos, as fine for the non-filing of the Comment was paid, but the said payment shall be considered payment under
protest, as the undersigned is unjustifiably failed [sic], refused and ignored to be legally assisted by the City Legal Officer of the Local Government Unit, Quezon
City, for [sic] the preparation and filing the said required Comment[.]10
On 29 September 2016, Ms. Guevarra, as Officer in Charge of the City Treasurer's Office, filed her Comment11 which reads:
1. That the relief prayed for in the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the same allegation specifically stated in its body, that:
to annul the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 and the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, not within the province of the Honorable Court to adjudicate. Truth to tell, there must be [a] full-blown trial to be conducted by a trial
court for the determination of the true facts whether to annul the said Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 and the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11
July 2014. But, time and again, it is ruled that the Honorable Court is not a trier of facts.

In APQ Shipmanagement [sic] Co., LTD, versus Casenas, 725 SCRA 108, the Honorable Court reminded us:
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and, thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to reviewing errors of law.
2. That the respondent is not the real party-in-interest in the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[.]

3. That the petitioner failed to file the Motion for Reconsideration, when it admitted the receipt of· the assailed Notice of Statement of Delinquency dated May
27,2014 and the Final Notice of Delinquency dated July 11, 2014.

Thus, petitioner filed the Instant Petition without filing the appropriate motion to give the respondent the opportunity to correct its alleged error.
In Lanier versus People. 719 SCRA 477, the Honorable Court held: Well-established is the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari.

xxxx
[7.] Most importantly, petitioner is not exempted from paying real property tax for its real property leased to [ALI] pursuant to the mandate of Section 205(d) and
Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991[.]"

Admittedly, on October 27, 2006, petitioner entered into the Contract of Lease with [ALI], subject matter of which is petitioner's parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-107350 (192689), now allegedly owned by UP North Property Holdings, Inc. Said leased [sic] of the real property belonging to the
petitioner failed to pay the real property tax from 2009-2013 and the first three quarters of 2014.

In City of Pasig versus Republic, 656 SCRA 271, the Honorable Court unswervingly ruled:
Where the parcels of land owned by the Republic are not properties of public dominion, portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are not only subject to
real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.
Moreover, respondent merely followed the legal basis of the Department of Finance, that:
ALI (Ayala Land Inc.) is the party legally accountable for the real property taxes on the subject property.
[ALI] was duly notified of the subject Statement of Delinquency and other similar notices.12
On 28 November 2016, we issued a Resolution13 that, among others, noted Ms. Guevarra's Comment, and required UP to file a reply. UP, through the OSG, filed
its Reply14 on 20 February 2017, where it addressed Ms. Guevarra's questions regarding the propriety of the remedy and the taxability of UP based on Republic
Act No. 950015 and on Section 133(o)16 of the Local Government Code.

The Issue

Petitioner UP raised only one issue before this Court:

WHETHER PETITIONER UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES IS LIABLE FOR REAL PROPERTY TAX IMPOSED ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY LEASED TO
AYALA LAND, INC.17
The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition.

This Court has the power to decide the present case. Findings of fact are not necessary as the present petition asks to determine whether UP, as a chartered
academic institution with specific legislated tax exemptions, is legally liable for the real property tax on the land leased to ALI. This issue is a pure question of law,
not of fact.

The property subject of this case refers only to the parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-107350 (192689). The improvements on this parcel of land that were
introduced by ALI are not covered by the present case.

Timeline of Events and Applicable Laws

The Contract of Lease (with Development Obligations) between UP and ALI was executed on 27 October 2006. The 4th Whereas Clause of the Contract described
the project proposal, thus:
WHEREAS, in response to the LESSOR's aforementioned invitation, Ayala Land, Inc., in September 2005, submitted to the LESSOR a Development Proposal
entitled "DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR UP NORTH SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PARK," dated August 1, 2005, and subsequently, presented to the then UP
Board of Regents such proposal which is embodied in a presentation manual, entitled "DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR UP NORTH SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY PARK," dated September 2005, both attached hereto and marked as Annexes "E" and "E-1," respectively (the "Development Proposals"),
signifying therein its interest in leasing and developing the UP North S&T Park and proposing to lease and develop the UP North S&T Park Phase I according to its
proposals, into a prestigious and dynamic science and technology park, where research and technology-based collaborative projects between technology and the
academe thrive, thereby becoming a catalyst for the development of the information technology and information technology enabled services;18
The Contract provided that ALI owns the improvements on the leased land:
3.2 PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS; LESSOR TO BECOME OWNER OF PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS AT END OF LEASE

xxxx
 16

(c) Before the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this Contract prior to the lapse of the original Lease Term, all renovations, alterations, and improvements
and the Permanent Improvements constructed during the original Lease Term shall be owned by, and shall be for the account of the LESSEE; x x x.19
As to real property taxes, the contract between UP and ALI stated:
12.2 REAL ESTATE TAXES ON LAND

Should real estate taxes be levied on the LEASED PREMISES, the LESSOR shall assume the payment of the real estate taxes on the land, while the LESSEE
shall assume the payment of real property taxes on the improvements introduced on the LEASED PREMISES.20
On 29 April 2008, Republic Act No. 9500, or the UP Charter of 2008, was signed into law. Republic Act No. 9500 addressed UP's real property and income derived
therefrom in Sections 22 and 25(a). These sections read:
SEC. 22. Land Grants and Other Real Properties of the University. -

(a) The State shall support the University of the Philippines System as the national university in the form of lump sum amount, through general appropriations and
other financial benefits, and in kind, through land grants and donations and use of other real properties. To carry out the intent of these grants, income derived
from the development of all land grants and real properties shall be used to further the end of the national university, as may be decided by the board;

xxxx

(c) The Board may plan, design, approve and/or cause the implementation of land leases: Provided, That such mechanisms and arrangements shall sustain and
protect the environment in accordance with law, and be exclusive of the academic core zone of the campuses of the University of the Philippines: Provided,
further, That such mechanisms and arrangements shall not conflict with the academic mission of the national university;

(d) The Board may allow the use of the income coming from real properties of the national university as security for transactions to generate additional revenues
when needed for educational purposes;

xxxx

SEC. 25. Tax Exemptions. - The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary notwithstanding:

(a) All revenues and assets of the University of the Philippines used for educational purposes or in support thereof shall be exempt from all taxes and duties;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A letter,21 dated 22 August 2012 and addressed to the UP President from Mr. Rodolfo M. Ordanes, Officer In Charge, City Assessor (City Assessor), informed UP
of the City Assessor's service of a Notice of Assessment to ALI This Notice of Assessment had Sections 205 and 234 of the Local Government Code as its bases.
On 23 August 2012, the City Assessor issued a Notice of Assessment22 to ALI. The notice stated that the land subject of the lease agreement with UP was
reclassified and assessed for taxation purposes with an assessed value of P499,500,000.00 effective 2009. The pertinent provisions of Sections 205 and 234
read:
Section 205. Listing of Real Property in the Assessment Rolls. -
xxxx

(d) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, its instrumentalities and political subdivisions, the beneficial use of which has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person, shall be listed, valued and assessed in the name of the possessor, grantee or of the public entity if such property
has been acquired or held for resale or lease.
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;

xxxx
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
The Local Government Code took effect on 1 January 1992.

On 5 December 2012, the City Treasurer issued a Statement of Delinquency23 to UP North Property Holdings, Inc. for the period 2009 to 2011 and the first three
quarters of 2012 in the total amount of P78,970,950.00. The total amount included the tax due and penalty.

Mr. Salvador M. Castillo, Officer-In-Charge, Executive Director of Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance (BLGF-DOF), sent a letter24 dated
1 August 2013 to Quezon City Mayor Herbert M. Bautista (Mayor Bautista). This letter also referred to Sections 205 and 234 of the Local Government Code as
bases to conclude that ALI, as the lessee, is the legally accountable party for the unpaid real property taxes due covering the "government-owned UP
property."25 The 1 August 2013 letter from BLGF DOF to Mayor Bautista also stated:
Evidently, real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from payment of the real property tax. However, if the beneficial use thereof has been
granted for consideration or otherwise to a taxable person, the subject real property shall: (1) be listed, valued and assessed in the name of the beneficial user;
and (2) becomes taxable.

It is also worthy to note that as soon as the notice of assessment is served and received by the taxpayer, an obligation to pay the amount assessed and
demanded arises (BLGF Memorandum Circular No. 04-2008, January 7, 2008)[.]

As to the argument that as stipulated in the Lease Contract entered into by and between UP and Ayala Land Inc. that UP shall shoulder the real property taxes
due on the subject property, please be informed of the Supreme Court Decision under G.R. No. 171586, dated July 15, 2009 (National Power Corporation vs.
Province of Quezon and Municipality of Pagbilao), which is quoted in part, below:
xxx

Lastly, from the points of view of essential fairness and the integrity of our tax system, we find it essentially wrong to allow the NPC to assume in its BOT contracts
the liability of the other contracting party for taxes that the government can impose on that other party, and at the same time allow NPC to turn around and say that
no taxes should be collected because the NPC is tax-exempt as a government-owned and controlled corporation. We cannot be a party to this kind of
arrangement; for us to allow it without congressional authority is to intrude into the realm of policy and to debase the tax system that the Legislature
established. We will then also be grossly unfair to the people of the Province of Quezon and the Municipality of Pagbilao who, by law, stand to benefit from the tax
provisions of the LGC.

xxx
Further, attention is likewise invited to the pertinent portion of another SC Decision (G.R. No. L-29772), in the case of the City of Baguio vs. Fernando S. Busuego,
viz:
. . . when the GSIS sold the property and imposed said condition, the agency although exempt from the payment of taxes clearly indicated that the property
became taxable upon its delivery to the purchaser and that the sole determinative factor for exemption from realty taxes is the 'use' to which the property is
devoted. And where the 'use' is the test, the ownership is immaterial. (Martin on the Rev. Adm. Code, 1961, Vol. II, p. 487, citing Apostolic Prefect of Mt.
Province vs. Treasurer of Baguio City, 71 Phil. 547). In the instant case, although the property was still in the name of the GSIS pending the payment of the full
price, its use and possession was already transferred to the defendant.' Such contractual stipulation that the purchaser on installment pay the real estate taxes
pending completion of payments, although the seller who retained title is exempt from such taxes, is valid and binding, absent any law to the contrary and none
has been cited by appellant. x x x.
 17

Similarly, therefore, we also deemed it essentially wrong being without congressional authority for UP to assume the real property tax liability of the Ayala Land,
Inc. over the subject property. Hence, we opine that the Ayala Land, Inc., being the lessee, is the legally accountable party to the unpaid real property
taxes due on the government-owned UP property.26 (Underscoring, boldfacing and italicization in the original)
On 24 September 2013, the City Treasurer issued a Statement of Delinquency27 to UP North Property Holdings, Inc. The City Treasurer demanded payment of
real property tax on the subject land in the amount of P102,747,150.00 for the years 2009 to 2012 and the first three quarters of 2013.

On 27 May 2014, the City Treasurer issued a Notice of Delinquency28 to UP for the years 2009 to 2013 and the first quarter of 2014 in the total amount of
P106,992,900.00. The total amount included the tax due and penalty. This was the first time that the City Treasurer demanded payment from UP of real property
tax on the subject land. The City Treasurer sent the Notice of Delinquency to UP without any prior issuance of a Notice of Assessment.

On 13 June 2014, then UP President Alfredo E. Pascual (UP President Pascual) wrote then City Treasurer Edgar T. Villanueva (City Treasurer Villanueva) to
address the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014. The pertinent portions of the letter read:
We write in connection with the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 issued by your office, which the University received on 3 June 2014. In the
Statement of Delinquency, the University was required to pay the real estate taxes on its property/ies, specifically on Tax Declaration E-128-00051, for the period
from 2009 to the 1st quarter of 2014, which was noted to be in the total amount of Php106,992,900.00, including penalties. The University was given a period often
(10) days from receipt of the Statement of Delinquency, or until 13 June 2014, to pay the said real estate taxes.

We respectfully take exception to the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 and the alleged delinquency of the University with respect to the payment of
real estate taxes. The University of the Philippines, as the National University, has been granted tax exemptions under Republic Act No. 9500, otherwise known as
the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008, that are express, patent, and unambiguous. The grant is exceedingly extensive that it provided the University
exemption from all taxes and duties vis-a-vis all its revenues and assets used for educational purposes or in support thereof.

Moreover, in the letter of the Bureau of Local Government Finance ("BLGF") dated 1 August 2013, addressed to the Hon. City Mayor, Herbert M. Bautista, the
BLGF opined on the issue as to which party shall be held accountable for the unpaid real estate taxes due on the thirty-seven (37) hectares of land owned by the
University and being leased out to Ayala Land, Inc., the same property which is [the] subject of the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014. The BLGF
concluded that "Ayala Land, Inc., being the lessee, is the legally accountable party to the unpaid real property taxes due on the government-owned UP property."
The foregoing opinion of the BLGF confirms that the University is exempt from real estate taxes, an absolute right that the University enjoys under [Republic Act]
No. 9500.

Finally, while maintaining the position that the University is exempt from real estate taxes, we wish to point out that the University was not furnished any Notice of
Assessment prior to the issuance of the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014.29
On 11 July 2014, the City Treasurer issued a Final Notice of Delinquency30 to UP for the years 2009 to 2013 and the first three quarters of 2014 in the total amount
of P117,182,700.00. The total amount also included the tax due and penalty.

We reiterate that UP is a chartered academic institution with specific legislated tax exemptions. These tax exemptions come from the Local Government Code, as
well as from its legislative charter, Republic Act No. 9500.

Tax Exemption from the Local Government Code

One source of UP's exemption from tax comes from its character as a government instrumentality. Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code states that,
unless otherwise provided by the Code, the exercise of taxing powers of the local government units shall not extend to levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind
on government instrumentalities.31

However, a combined reading of Sections 205 and 234 of the Local Government Code, previously quoted above, also provides for removal of the exemption to
government instrumentalities when beneficial use of a real property owned by a government instrumentality is granted to a taxable person. Stated differently, when
beneficial use of a real property owned by a government instrumentality is granted to a taxable person, then the taxable person is not exempted from paying real
property tax on such property. This is the doctrine used by the City Assessor and the City Treasurer in the present set of facts. The City Assessor and the City
Treasurer concluded that ALI is liable for the real property tax on the land that it leased from UP.

Republic Act No. 9500, however, gave a specific tax exemption to UP which covers the land subject of the present case. The City Assessor and the City Treasurer
overlooked this specific exemption awarded to UP by Republic Act No. 9500. The legislative authority given to UP by Republic Act No. 9500 is the point where the
present case differs from our ruling in National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon (NPC case)32 which the BLGF-DOF cited in its letter addressed to Mayor
Bautista.

Tax Exemption from Republic Act No. 9500

It is clear from the timeline above that the date of effectivity of UP's legislative charter lies between the date of effectivity of the lease contract between UP and ALI
and the dates of issuance of the Statement of Delinquency and Final Notice of Delinquency from the City Treasurer. Republic Act No. 9500, which took effect in
2008, was not yet enacted when UP and ALI entered into their lease contract in 2006. However, Republic Act No. 9500 was already operative when the City
Treasurer issued the Statement of Delinquency and Final Notice of Delinquency to UP in 2014. Republic Act No. 9500 was also operative when the City Assessor
issued a Notice of Assessment to ALI in 2012, a Statement of Delinquency to UP North Property Holdings, Inc. in 2012, and a Statement of Delinquency to UP
North Property Holdings, Inc. in 2013.

The enactment and passage of Republic Act No. 9500 in 2008 superseded Sections 205(d) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code. Before the passage of
Republic Act No. 9500, there was a need to determine who had beneficial use of UP's property before the property may be subjected to real property tax. After the
passage of Republic Act No. 9500, there is a need to determine whether UP's property is used for educational purposes or m support thereof before the property
may be subjected to real property tax.

In University of the Phils. v. Judge Dizon,33 we stated:

The UP was founded on June 18, 1908 through Act 1870 to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional
and technical training to deserving students. Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate
government function. It is an institution of higher learning, not a corporation established for profit and declaring any dividends. In enacting Republic Act No. 9500
(The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), Congress has declared the UP as the national university "dedicated to the search for truth and knowledge as
well as the development of future leaders."

Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State's constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a
government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the
funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP's mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.34 (Citations omitted)
In the present set of facts, both parties agree that UP owns the land subject of this case.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9500, previously quoted above, allows UP to lease and develop its land subject to certain conditions. The Contract of Lease
between UP and ALI shows that there is an intent to develop "a prestigious and dynamic science and technology park, where research and technology-based
collaborative projects between technology and the academe thrive, thereby becoming a catalyst for the development of the information technology and information
technology-enabled service."35 The development of the subject land is clearly for an educational purpose, or at the very least, in support of an educational purpose.

UP President Pascual pointed out to City Treasurer Villanueva that Republic Act No. 9500 granted extensive tax exemptions to UP. More specifically, Section
25(a) of Republic Act No. 9500, previously quoted above, provided that all of UP's "revenues and assets used for educational purposes or in support thereof
shall be exempt from all taxes and duties." Republic Act No. 9500 bases UP's tax exemption upon compliance with the condition that UP's revenues and assets
must be used for educational purposes or in support thereof. There is no longer any need to determine the tax status of the possessor or of the beneficial user to
 18

further ascertain whether UP's revenue or asset is exempt from tax.

Apart from the rule in statutory construction that a law that is enacted later prevails over a law that is enacted earlier because it is the latest expression of
legislative will,36 Sections 27 and 30 of Republic Act No. 9500 provide for rules of construction in favor of Republic Act No. 9500:
SEC. 27. Rules of Construction.- No statutory or other issuances shall diminish the powers, rights, privileges and benefits accorded to the national university under
this Act or enjoyed at present, by it under other issuances not otherwise modified or repealed under this Act, unless subsequent legislation expressly provides for
their repeal, amendment or modification. Any case of doubt in the interpretation of any of the provisions of this Charter shall be resolved in favor of the academic
freedom and fiscal autonomy of the University of the Philippines.

SEC. 30. Repealing Clause. - Act No. 1870, as amended, and all laws, decrees, orders, rules, and regulations or other issuances or parts inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Non-Applicability of the NPC Case

The facts of the present case are not on all fours with the facts in the NPC case. In the NPC case, the NPC assumed in its build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract
with Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant) ''all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the site, the buildings and improvements
thereon and the [power plant]."37 The Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon assessed Mirant's tax liabilities and furnished the NPC with a copy of the assessment letter.
The NPC filed a petition before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and objected to the assessment against Mirant. The NPC claimed tax exemptions or at
least a reassessment for lower tax liability due to depreciation allowance and lower assessment level. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, and the Court of Tax Appeals all ruled against the NPC.

We ruled in the NPC case that the NPC has no right to protest the assessment on Mirant because the NPC is neither the owner nor the possessor or user of the
subject machineries. Under the law, Mirant is liable for the said taxes based on its "ownership, use, and possession of the plant and its machineries."38 We further
stated in the NPC case that the contractual stipulation between NPC and Mirant is entirely between them, and "does not bind third persons who are not privy to the
contract x x x."39 Only Mirant can demand compliance from the NPC for the payment of the said taxes, and the Municipality of Pagbilao and the Province of
Quezon cannot demand payment from the NPC. Neither can these local government units be compelled to recognize the NPC's protest of the assessment.

We declared in the NPC case that it is "essentially wrong to allow the NPC to assume in its BOT contracts the liability of the other contracting party for taxes that
the government can impose on that other party, and at the same time allow NPC to turn around and say that no taxes should be collected because the NPC is tax-
exempt as a government-owned and controlled corporation." This was the situation set up by UP with ALI in 2008, before the passage of Republic Act No. 9500.
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 9500, it was essentially wrong for UP to assume in its lease contract with ALI the liability of ALI for real property taxes
based on its beneficial use of the land, and then turn around and tell the City Treasurer that UP is exempt from paying taxes on the land because it is a
government instrumentality.

We also declared in the NPC case that if we continue to allow what NPC did to the Province of Quezon without congressional authority, we "intrude into the realm
of policy and to debase the tax system that the Legislature established." The passage of Republic Act No. 9500 in 2008 obliterated what was essentially wrong in
the lease contract between UP and ALI The legislature established a tax system that allows UP to validly claim exemption from real property taxes on the land
leased to ALI. Republic Act No. 9500 is UP's congressional authority for this particular exemption from real property tax. Thus, when the City Treasurer addressed
to UP the Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 and the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014 and required UP to pay real property tax on the
subject land, UP was already authorized by the legislature to validly claim exemption from real property taxes on the land leased to ALI.

Considering that the subject land and the revenue derived from the lease thereof are used by UP for educational purposes and in support of its educational
purposes, UP should not be assessed, and should not be made liable for real property tax on the land subject of this case. Under Republic Act No. 9500, this tax
exemption, however, applies only to "assets of the University of the Philippines," referring to assets owned by UP. Under the Contract of Lease between UP and
ALI, all improvement on the leased land "shall be owned by, and shall be for the account of the LESSEE [ALI]" during the term of the lease. The improvements are
not "assets" owned by UP; and thus, UP's tax exemption under Republic Act No. 9500 does not extend to these improvements during the term of the lease.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. We DECLARE the University of the Philippines EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the City Treasurer of
Quezon City on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-107350 (192689), which is currently leased to Ayala Land, Inc. Accordingly, we declare VOID the
Statement of Delinquency dated 27 May 2014 as well as the Final Notice of Delinquency dated 11 July 2014 issued by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to the
University of the Philippines in connection with the parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-107350 (192689). Furthermore, the City Treasurer of Quezon City is
permanently restrained from levying on or selling at public auction the parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-107350 (192689) to satisfy the payment of the real
property tax delinquency.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26551 February 27, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA et al, appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was
alleged in the information that in December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or
without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan
(Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Sto. Domingo Branch VI).

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the commission of the offense charged. The
lower court denied their motion because they had already entered their plea.

Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is
no law punishing it, and (3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the alleged time The fiscal opposed the motion.

The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the information in its order of August 11, 1966. It held that the information is basically deficient because it does
not describe t lie circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for
the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last
normal harvest.
 19

The prosecution appealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues in his brief that the information in this case alleges all the elements of the
offense defined in section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended of Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and 57 of the same law reads as follows:

SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at
any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allow
the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share
in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and
penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.

SEC. 57. Penal Provision. — Violation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *

We hold that the order of dismissal should be affirmed because as held in People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section
99 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when the act complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this
manner:

The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share
tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code instituted the
leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not reproduced in the
Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.

Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in
section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10,
1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.

Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to
agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from
the bondage of the soil. And Presidential Decree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the promulgation of
the rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that, as
already noted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for
penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

All indications point to a deliberate and manifest legislative design to replace the Agricultural Tenancy Law with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.

As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had
ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in
force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and
pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain
in the old act and not included in the amendatory act" (Crawford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 cited in the Adillo case).

A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute" (82
C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded
therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).

The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. Tamayo,
61 Phil. 225; People vs. Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See
dissent in Lagrimas vs. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is affirmed with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

EARLIER LAW VS LATER LAW

G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA
PILIPINAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DILG, DBM, respondents.

G.R. No. 128039 April 8, 1997

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by BONIFACIO M. RILLON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their
respective offices on the second Monday of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) or five years, as contained in RA
6679? Contending that their term is five years, petitioners ask this Court to order the cancellation of the scheduled barangay election this coming May 12, 1997
and to reset it to the second Monday of May, 1999.

The Antecedents
 20

G.R. No. 127116

In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David
filed on December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the
barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On January 14, 1997, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997.

On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in
abeyance." Respondent Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February 11, 1997, the Court
issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from
notice. It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.1 to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty
days. It noted but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31,
1997 (as well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same effect, dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda. The
Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case,
his interest like those of all other barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed this petition as "president of the Liga ng
mga Barangay sa Pilipinas."

G.R. No. 128039

On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 128039, "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:

1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the
regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.

2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities
related thereto;

3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1997 intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections:2

Comelec Resolution 2880,3 promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above, adopted a "Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain
Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections." On the other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5, 1997 moved certain dates
fixed in Resolution 2880.4

Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents to submit their comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days ending on
March 7, 1997. The Court further resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Respondent Commission filed its
Comment on March 6, 19975 and the Solicitor General, in representation of the other respondent, filed his on March 6, 1997. Petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion
for oral argument and temporary restraining order was noted but not granted. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the Court without need of
memoranda.

The Issues

Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangay officials?

Petitioners6 contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved on May 6, 1988, "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ."
This is reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from "the second Monday of November 1988" to
March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such five-year term shall begin on the "first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994."
Petitioners further aver7 that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to
barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local government
units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987
constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4)
thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be no rhyme or reason for the
framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution." Petitioners conclude (1) that the
Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 because it "substituted its own will for that of
the legislative and usurped the judicial function . . . by interpreting the conflicting provisions of Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c) of RA 7160; and (2) that the
appropriation of P400 million in the General Appropriation Act of 1997 (RA 8250) to be used in the conduct of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itself
unconstitutional and a waste of public funds.

The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not repealed by RA 7160 and thus "he believes that the holding of the barangay elections
(o)n the second Monday of May 1997 is without sufficient legal basis."

Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, defends its assailed Resolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160
includes "all laws, whether general or special, inconsistent, with the provisions of the Local Government Code," citing this Court's dictum
in Paras vs. Comelec8 that "the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May
1997." Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing for a general registration of voters) both "indicate that Congress
considered that the barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA 7160, Sec. 43 (c)."9 Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more
than three years since they were elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three years. Finally, Respondent
Comelec denies the charge of grave abuse of discretion stating that the "question presented . . . is a purely legal one involving no exercise of an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion." 10

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions because (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679
and 6653 "not only by implication but by design as well"; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years; (3) the barangay
officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from
contesting the applicability of the three-year term provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under the provisions of said Code.

From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the issues can be condensed into; three, as follows:

1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay official: RA 7160 or RA 6679?

2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?

 21

3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160?.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are devoid of merit.

Brief Historical Background

of Barangay Elections

For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history of barangay elections.

An a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines The word "barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay," a boat which
transported them (the Malays) to these shores. 11 Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez 12 wrote that the
barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they
stripped the dato or rajah, of his powers. 13 Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in
the alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing
property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a "mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted
the post." 14

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as "barrios." 15 For some time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in
the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. 16 Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter,
RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations 17 by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were
"declared" or renamed "barangays" — a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names — by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization and functions
under RA 3590, which was expressly "adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the titles of the officials were changed to "barangay captain,"
"barangay councilman," "barangay secretary" and "barangay treasurer."

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Big. 222, 18 "a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay
Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively" were first elected on May 17,
1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.

The Local Government Code of 1983 19 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six years. 20 Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay
were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay
treasurer. 21 B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, 22 reiterated that barangay officials "shall hold office, for six years," and stated that their election was to be
held "on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years thereafter." 23

This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to "the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years
thereafter 24 by RA 6653. Under this law, the term of office of the barangay officials was cut to five years 25 and the punong barangay was to be chosen from
among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate. 26

But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was again "postponed and reset to March 28, 1989" by RA 6679, 27 and the term
of office of barangay officials was to begin on May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that "there shall be held a regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter Their term shall be for five years . . . " 28 Significantly,
the manner of election of the punong barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered
voters of the barangay, "(t)he candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing
of lots under the supervision of the Commission on Elections."

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, 29 several provisions concerning barangay official were introduced:

(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the
regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May, 1994 (Emphasis supplied.)

(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing its officials were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly
by the electorate, as follows:

Sec. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. — (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members,
the sanggunian kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 390. Composition. — The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as
presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large and the sangguniang kabataan chairman as
members.

Sec. 41. Manner of Election. — (a) The . . . punong barangay shall be elected at large . . . by the qualified voters in the barangay. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the qualified barangay voters actually voted for one punong barangay and seven (7) kagawads
during the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994. In other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by the electorate, and not by the
seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.

The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intent

and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
 22

In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided
under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the law. 30 And three years is the obvious intent.

First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails. 31 Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the
later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have
known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones 32 — and not the other way around.

Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on
the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall be for five
years." Note that both laws refer to the same officials who were elected "on the second Monday of May 1994."

Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the
punong barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the other hand, the
Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under
the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven
kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.

Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If
we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David cannot claim to be a validly
elected barangay chairman, much less president of the national league, of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also
that he is not the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.

Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, 33 Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay
elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held "immediately after the barangay
elections in 1997." These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with
Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.

Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, 34 this Court said that "the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
having been scheduled in May, 1997." This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the Philippines."

Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should prevail over RA 7160, all alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of generaila
specialibus non derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and definitively
provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay
officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in
alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. 35 It
is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, 36 RA 7160 states that "all general and special laws . . . which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between
the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent
law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. 37

The Second Issue: Three-Year Term

Not Repugnant, to Constitution

Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the general
provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three year term for such
officers. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.

Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term
to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. 40 The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show
clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.

There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution — limiting the term of all elective local
officials to three years, except that of barangay officials which "shall be determined by law" — was an amendment proposed by Constitutional Commissioner (now
Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was "readily accepted without much discussion and
formally approved." Indeed, a search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages 41 of actual deliberations, the portions pertinent to
the Constitutional Commission's intent being the following:

MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as provided for?

MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law..

MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section as submitted by Commissioner Davide
and accepted by the Committee?
 23

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include the barangay officials because it was then the
stand of the Chairman of the Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be determined by law. So it is now for
the law to determine whether the restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code.

MR. RODRIGO. So that is up to Congress to decide.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. I just wanted that clear in the record.

Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they nonetheless provide the exact answer to the main issue. To the question at issue
here on how long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by law"; more precisely,
"(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.

The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From

Challenging Their Three-Year Terms

We have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically, historically and commonsensically, the petitions are completely devoid of merit. And we could
have ended our Decision right here. But there is one last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy for their dubious claim to a longer term of office: the
equities of their own petition militate against them. As pointed out by Amicus Curiae Pimentel, 42 petitioners are barred by estoppel from pursuing their petitions.

Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex "A" of its memorandum, 43 a machine copy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in
the May 9, 1994 barangay elections, the authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of candidacy, he expressly stated under oath
that he was announcing his "candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay 77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for said office." The
Comelec also submitted as Annex "B" 44 to its said memorandum, a certified statement of the votes obtained by the candidates in said elections, thus:

BARANGAY 77
CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES
VOTES OBTAINED
May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS

PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED

1. DAVID, ALEX L. 112

KAGAWAD

1. Magalona, Ruben 150

2. Quinto, Nelson L. 130
3. Ramon, Dolores Z. 120
4. Dela Pena, Roberto T. 115
5. Castillo, Luciana 114
6. Lorico, Amy A. 107
7. Valencia, Arnold 102
8. Ang, Jose 97
9. Dequilla, Teresita D. 58
10. Primavera, Marcelina 52

If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of his
barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
was to be automatically elected barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the
highest number of votes among the kagawads — 150, which was much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and
not one punong barangay plus seven kagawads.

In other words, following petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.

The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is that barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were
elected to, under the law governing thie very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners' belated claim of ignorance as to
what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith."

Epilogue

It is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the laws do not support them. Extant jurisprudence militates against them. Reason and
common sense reject them. Equity and morality abhor them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthen governance without a mandate
from the governed. In a democracy, elected leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate. In this case
however, petitioners propose to extend their terms not by seeking the people's vote but by faulty legal argumentation This Court cannot and will not grant its
imprimatur to such untenable proposition. If they want to continue serving, they must get a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.

SO ORDERED

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

 24

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky
waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to understand why protecting birds,
fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.

How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other?

Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development
Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and
policies for social and economic development.

Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid
expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-
industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general public over: — the environment impact of
development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and
agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have
shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will
influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, — likewise gave
impetus to the creation of the Authority.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the
national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.1

Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:

Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l),
(m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish production and other aqua-culture
projects in Laguna de Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct studies and
make experiments, whenever necessary, with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or
amended by the procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or authorizations
remain in force;

(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose
necessary safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and
projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other government
agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may determine new areas of
fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of
water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate
such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into
consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bonafide resident fishermen whether
individually or collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen construction
and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in
hiring laborer for fishery projects;

(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other
regulatory measures necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same with the assistance of
the Authority;

(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights over public waters within the
Laguna de Bay region whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;

(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in establishing water quality standards for industrial,
agricultural and municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said existing agencies of the government
of the Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as provided for in
Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to
be enforced such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board.2
 25

To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely
effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious management to their
optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions
over such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter,
Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".

Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:

Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in
the Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San
Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of
Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and
Pateros in Metro Manila.

Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial
purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal
purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if
necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen
fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the
Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA.
However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be
modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund
and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and
shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)

It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:

Sec 41. Definition of Terms.

(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area
covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters
below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.

Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160
provides:

Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.

(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges
therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:

(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite
zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it; . . . .

(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the
municipal waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any rental fee, charges or any other
imposition whatsoever.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or
the taking or catching of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish within the municipal waters.

xxx xxx xxx

Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to
establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the
entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.

To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:

In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to
Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs
of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
 26

1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application
for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as
illegal.

2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by
the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.

3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures
be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations
of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the
discretion of the court.

All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have
one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures should not be demolished/dismantled.

One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.

Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No.
64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM
Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc.
and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP
Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon
and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields
Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-
MAR Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.

The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary
restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the
fishpens and similar structures in question.

Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-
respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-
jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:

(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;

(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal
body;

(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as
amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the
Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to issue said permits.

By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not
among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA
with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned
had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their
respective local government units concerned.

Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D.
813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN
PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development
Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority
to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or
bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.

We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
 27

The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be
conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and
expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a
special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law."3

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is
because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.4

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.

We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own
unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920
km² basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of
attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to
ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."

"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act
4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."

"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of
fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated
lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."5

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the
New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the
heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."

On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating
and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management.6 It does partake of the
nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the
charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No.
927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.

In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231
SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the
special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously
has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a
"toothless" paper agency.

there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a
"cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The
Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of
Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its
charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed
the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to
 28

issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers
as are by its charter vested on it.

Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region.
Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70,
Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set aside for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis,
Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null
and void and ordered cancelled.

The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region,
specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M.
Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM
Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish
Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing Corporation,
are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government
units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other
words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue
purposes of the local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government
units in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local government units. In other
words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue
purposes of the local government units concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PAGCOR, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this
end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as
follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF
CASINO.
 29

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be
issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment
or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.

Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of
P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and
subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel
existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of
CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99,
No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure
to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to
amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct,
maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the
court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean
"illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
 30

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing
of the issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited
the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or
publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of
chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local
government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of
casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the
authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well
as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress
gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could
have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories,
including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically
provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon
shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of
the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected,
call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the
immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to
operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
 31

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that
courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function
belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and
the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should
be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the
inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is
the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the
Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code,
but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly
speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458
of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress
gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate
or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation,
PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of
government revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions
the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing
clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112
(1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or
concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No.
5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential
Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381,
436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16,
and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,
73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
 32

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco &
Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient
revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be
imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other
the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of
funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust
punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these
two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make
the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to
reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a
conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This
is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and
indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern
concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling
would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the
City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or
stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the
contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree
allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,
from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation
on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to
grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government
units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro
City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the
workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be
stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the
father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done
in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the
touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-23964             June 1, 1966

GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., petitioner and appellee,
vs.
LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent and appellant.
D. C. Macaraeg, T. Guadiz, Jr., R. Hidalgo and N. F. Calimlim for petitioner and appellee.
Santos D. Areola for respondent and appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Registered candidates for councilors, amongst others in the eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City — in the 1963 elections — were petitioner Gregorio V.
Gaerlan, Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig. Having obtained the third highest number of votes, the City Board of Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed
respondent Catubig one of the elected 8 councilors. Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost his bid.
 33

Seasonably,1 petitioner went to Court on quo warranto to challenge respondent's eligibility2 for the office, on the averment of non-age. The judgment below gave
the nod to petitioner and held respondent ineligible to hold the office of councilor of Dagupan City, excluded him there from, and declared vacant the seat he
occupies in the City Board. Respondent appealed.

There is no quarrel as to the facts. Respondent Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on
September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he
took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether respondent's age be reckoned as of the date of the filing
of his certificate of candidacy, or the date of election,4 or the date set by law for the assumption of office — the result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still,
respondent was below 25 years of age.

With the foregoing backdrop, respondent calls upon us to resolve two questions: First, has petitioner a cause of action against respondent? Second, in the
affirmative, is respondent eligible to the office of councilor of Dagupan City?

1. The thrust of respondent's argument is simply this: Petitioner Gaerlan, Jr. placed 16th out of the 16 candidates; Gaerlan thus has no right to the office, either by
election or otherwise; and said petitioner cannot validly question respondent's right to sit.

This case calls into question the applicability of Section 173 of the Revised Election Code5 which, in part, reads:

Procedure against an ineligible person. — When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the office may be
contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after the proclamation of his
election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. ...

The language of this statute is very plain. The right of a non-eligible person elected to a municipal office may be contested by any registered candidate for the
same office. Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal precept. He was a registered candidate for the same office. It matters not that he has no claim or right to the
office of councilor in the event respondent be ousted. Because the clear-cut language — "any registered candidate for the same office" — does not require that
said candidate, if his quo warranto case prospers, himself occupy that office. Right here, we find a forbidding obstacle to any other view of the statute. To say
otherwise would empty this legal provision of its obvious contents. Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, supra, is to be read as controlling in the present. There, as here, the
office involved was that of Councilor, the statute under consideration the same Section 173, Revised Election Code. And again, there as here, petitioner would not
sit if the action be successful. This Court there expressly ruled:

That petitioner would not be entitled to the elective office even if respondent is ordered to vacate the same is likewise an invalid objection against the
institution of this suit, for otherwise, Section 173 of the Revised Election Code would clearly be rendered nugatory. Under said law, the contestant's right
to the office involved is not contemplated, and thus this Court has repeatedly ruled that respondent's declaration of ineligibility does not entitle the
petitioner to said office (Luison vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-10981, April 25, 1958; Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 727; Calano vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-
6404, January 12, 1954). Yet, in said rulings, the petitioners have never been considered to be without any legal personality to file the necessary quo
warranto proceedings. We need not conjecture into the philosophy of the law; suffice it to say that the legislature expressed its intentions very
plainly.1äwphï1.ñët

But respondent would want us to apply Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 6. When an individual may commence such an action. — A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another bring an action in his own name.

Section 6 just quoted is out of focus. Petitioner here is not "claiming to be entitled" to the office of councilor. Besides, we are unprepared to scuttle the
jurisprudence heretofore cited — which is so well buttressed upon law and reason. Moreover, distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an
office filled by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment thus —

... In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person
elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law
only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In
the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.6

The foregoing, once again, emphasizes the rule that in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, the only issue is the eligibility of the
candidate elected. In such a posture it is beyond debate that the applicable statute here is Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, the specific law on the
subject.

And, petitioner's standing in court is confirmed.

2. Respondent's presses the claim that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by the provisions of Republic Act 1707 and not by Republic Act 2259.8 For
ready reference, we present in parallel columns the two conflicting legal provisions — on the left side, Section 12, Republic Act No. 170, as amended, and on the
right, Section 6, Republic Act 2259.

Sec. 12 x x x the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be Sec. 6. No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor
qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for
not less than twenty-three years of age. x x x" one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Pertinent here it is to state that Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas,
Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 — nine years later.

The problem, cast in legal setting, is whether or not Section 12 should give way to Section 6. On this point the following reproduced in haec verba from Libarnes
vs. Executive Secretary, et al., L-21505, October 24, 1963, is an authoritative expositor of the law, viz:

Again, the question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly upon the
intent of Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend or repeal all
provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation
thereof. In fact, the explanatory note to Senate Bill No. 2, which upon approval, became Republic Act No. 2259, specifically mentions Zamboanga City,
among others that had been considered by the authors of the bill in drafting the same. Similarly, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2259 makes reference to
"all chartered cities in the Philippines", whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and
Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the
provisions of said Act — including therefor, the City of Zamboanga — are subject thereto.9
 34

The only reference to Dagupan City in Republic Act 2259 is found in Section 2 thereof whereunder voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly
precluded to vote for provincial officials. Therefore, by the terms of the Libarnes decision, the age-limit provision in the last-named statute (Republic Act 2259) is
controlling.

Indeed, we find no warrant in logic to go along with respondent. Adverting to Libarnes, supra, Act 2259 (Section 8) excludes from the operation thereof a number
of cities. Dagupan City is not one of them. We are not to enter into the impermissible field of injecting into a statute a provision plainly omitted therefrom. And until
Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained.

And, this position we take here is accentuated by the fact that by Section 9 of Act 2259,

All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.

Given the fact that Dagupan City beyond peradventure is removed from the exceptions, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. And this, because "the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the
whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute." 10

Specifically with reference to the uniform age limit of 25 years set forth in Section 6 of Republic Act 2259, we take stock of the phraseology employed. This section
starts with "No person shall be ... Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age". This specific language gives us added reason to believe that in reality —
and for the sake of uniformity — the 23-year age limit in the Dagupan City Charter must have to yield. Because in the legislative scheme, councilors are conferred
the right to succeed the City Mayor in the event the Vice-Mayor is Unavailable. 11 The City Mayor must at least be 25 years of age. 12 So it is, that in the event a
councilor 23 years of age is elected and before 25 years catapulted to the position of mayor, then we have the anomalous situation where the person succeeding
as mayor will be less than 25 years. Such a situation, it seems to us, is not contemplated by the law.

With the foregoing guideposts, we are unable to subscribe to the view that respondent's age qualification should be governed by the provisions of the Dagupan
City Charter.

We, accordingly, hold that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non-age: Because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election,
and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.

Upon the law and the facts, we vote to affirm the appealed judgment. No costs allowed. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23052           January 29, 1968

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading"
zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the
fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing
his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his
injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the
left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and
quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,

At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible
positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the
Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subjected to
humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the
welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of
P2,000.00.

On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila,
received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the
same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the
said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in
question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of
installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin
cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that
because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout
of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available.

After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing
the amended complaint, without costs.
 35

On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay
damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.

The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other
city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of
road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No.
409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to
enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2)
because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.

As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well
as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer
to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected
and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and
is under its control and supervision.

Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on
appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its
"control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx     xxx     xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places;
. . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein;
to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide
for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the
use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons
using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles,
cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the
location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to
require railroad companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and
to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent
property shall not be obstructed.

This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies.
Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of
roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning the
disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national
secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision
of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or
special appropriation Acts."

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of
negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said
Court thereon are not subject to our review.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët

G.R. No. 127708 March 25, 1999

CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA, CITY TREASURER OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA and THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF SAN
PABLO, LAGUNA, petitioners,
vs.
 36

HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City and the MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review on a pure question of law the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch
29 in Civil Case No. SP-4359(96), entitled "Manila Electric Company vs. City of San Pablo, Laguna, City Treasurer of San Pablo Laguna, and the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of San Pablo City, Laguna." The RTC declared the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 Article D of Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as
the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo as ineffective and void insofar as the respondent MERALCO is concerned for being violative of Act No. 3648, Republic
Act No. 2340 and PD 551. The RTC also granted MERALCO'S claim for refund of franchise taxes paid under protest.

The following antecedent facts are undisputed:

Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Service Company a legislative franchise to maintain and operate an electric light and power system in the City of San
Pablo and nearby municipalities. Section 10 of Act No. 3648 provides:

. . . In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay unto the municipal treasury of each municipality in which
it is supplying electric current to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to two percentum of the gross earnings from electric current sold or
supplied under this franchise in each said municipality. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of
any kind nature or description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial or insular, now or in the
future, on its poles, wires, insulator, switches, transformers, and structures, installations, conductors, and accessories placed in and over and
under all public property, including public streets and highways, provincial roads, bridges and public squares, and on its franchise, rights.
privileges, receipts, revenues and profits from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.

Escudero's franchise was transferred to the plaintiff (herein respondent) MERALCO under Republic Act No. 2340.

Presidential Decree No. 551 was enacted on September 11, 1974. Section 1 thereof provides the following:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to
generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two percent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of
electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current.

Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of his duly authorized representative on or before the twentieth
day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or month as may be provided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal
regulation and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation,
distribution and sale of electric current.

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (hereinafter referred to as LGC) took effect on January 1, 1992. The said Code
authorizes the province/city to impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year realized within its jurisdiction.

On October 5, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo.
The said Ordinance took effect on October 30, 1992. 1

Sec. 2.09, Article D of said Ordinance provides:

Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax — There is hereby imposed a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent
(1%) of the cross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year within
the city.

Pursuant to the above-quoted Section 2.09, the petitioner City Treasurer sent to private respondent a letter demanding payment of the aforesaid franchise tax.
From 1994 to 1996, private respondent paid "under protest" a total amount of P1,857,711.67. 2

The private respondent subsequently filed this action before the Regional Trial Court to declare Ordinance No. 56 null and void insofar as it imposes the franchise
tax upon private respondent MERALCO 3 and to claim for a refund of the taxes paid.

The Court ruled in favor of MERALCO and upheld its argument that the LGC did not expressly or impliedly repeal the tax exemption/incentive enjoyed by it under
its charter The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the imposition of a franchise tax under Sec. 2.09, Article D of Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the
City of San Pablo, is declared ineffective and null and void insofar as the plaintiff MERALCO is concerned for being of Republic Act. No. 2340,
PD 551, and Republic Act No. 7160 and defendants are ordered to refund to the plaintiff the amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED ELEVEN & 67/100 (P1,857,711.67) and such other amounts as may have been paid by the
plaintiff under said Revenue Ordinance No. 56 after the filling of the complaint. 4

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for records for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court. 5 the petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court raising pure question of law
based on the following grounds:

I. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACT NO. 3648, REPUBLIC ACT NO 2340 AND
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551, AS AMENDED, INSOFAR AS THEY GRANT TAX INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT, HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160.

II. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 193 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160 HAS NOT
WITHDRAWN THE TAX INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES BEING ENJOYED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT UNDER ACT NO. 3648 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2340 AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 551 AS
AMENDED.
 37

III. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FRANCHISE TAX IN QUESTION
CONSTITUTES AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.

Petitioners' position is that RA 7160 (LGC) expressly repealed Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and Presidential Decree 551 and that pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, the province or city now has the power to impose a franchise tax on a business enjoying a franchise. Petitioners
rely on the ruling in the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos 6 where the Supreme Court held that the exemption from real property tax
granted to Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority under its charter has been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC.

In addition, the petitioners cite in their Memorandum dated December 8, 1993 an administrative interpretation made by the Bureau of Local Government Finance
of the Department of Finance in its 3rd indorsement dated February 15, 1994 to the effect that the earlier ruling of the Department of Finance that holders of
franchise which contain the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" proviso are exempt from the payment of any kind of tax is no longer applicable upon the effectivity of the
LGC in view of the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges as provided in Sections 193 and 234 thereof.

We resolve to reverse the court a quo.

The pivotal issue is whether the City of San Pablo may impose a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon the Manila Electric Company which pays a tax equal
to two percent of its gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income.

It is necessary to reproduce the pertinent provisions of the LGC.

Sec. 137 — Franchise Tax — Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on
business enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent 50% of one percent 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the incoming receipts, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. . . .

Sec. 151 — Scope of Taxing Powers — Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the
province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent
(50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.

Sec. 193 — Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges — Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non- stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn
upon the effectivity of this Code.

Sec. 534 (f) — Repealing Clause — All general and special law, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamation and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Sec. 534 (f), the repealing clause of the LGC, provides that all general and special laws, act, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

This clause partakes of the nature of a general repealing clause. 7 It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to designate the specific act or
acts identified by number or title, that are intended to be repealed. 8

Was there an implied repeal by Republic Act No. 7160 of the MERALCO franchise insofar as the latter imposes a 2% tax "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of
whatever nature"?

We rule affirmatively.

We are mindful of the established rule that repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all
laws existing on the subject. A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law by mere implication unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest 9 and it must be convincingly demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. 10

It is our view that petitions correctly rely on the provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to support their position that MERALCO`s tax exemption has been
withdrawn. The explicit language of Section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other
special law" is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.

Sec. 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted
to or presently enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except 1) local water districts, 2)
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code,
the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio untus est exclusio alterius. 11 In the absence of any provision of the
Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly
intended to be withdrawn.

Reading together Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the local government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not
exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction. The
legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoy under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the language used in Sections 137 end 193 categorically
withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing
statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more
unequivocal language could have been used.

It is true that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" found in special franchises has been held in several cases to exempt the franchise holder from payment of tax on its
corporate franchise imposed of the Internal Revenue Code, as the charter is in the nature of a private contract and the exemption is part of the inducement for the
acceptance of the franchise, and that the imposition of another franchise tax by the local authority would constitute an impairment of contract between the
government and the corporation. 12 But these "magic words" contained in the phrase "shall be in lieu of all taxes'' 13 have to give way to the peremptory language of
the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemption privileges.
 38

Accordingly in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs.

Marcos. 14 this Court held that Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., the tax exemption or incentives, granted to or presently enjoyed by natural
or juridical persons are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC except with respect to those entities expressly enumerated. In the same vein, We must hold that
the express withdrawal upon effectivity of the LGC of all exemptions except only as provided therein, can no longer be invoked by Meralco to disclaim liability for
the local tax.

Private respondents further argue that the "in lieu of" provision contained in PD 551, Act. No. 3648 and RA 2340 does not partake of the nature of an exemption,
but is a "commutative tax". This contention was raised but was not upheld in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 15 wherein the Supreme Court stated:

. . . Congress could impair petitioner's legislative franchise by making it liable for income tax from which heretofore it was exempted by virtue
of the exemption provided for in section 3 of its franchise . . .

. . . Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate tax payers not expressly
exempted therein and in section 27 of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner's exemption from income tax . . .

Private respondent's invocation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is accordingly unavailing. The LGC was enacted in pursuance of the constitutional
policy to ensure autonomy to local governments16 and to enable them to attain fullest development as self-reliant communities. 17 Thus in Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, supra, this Court pointed out, in upholding the withdrawal of the real estate tax exemption previously enjoyed by the
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, as follows:

Note that as reproduced in Section 234 (a) the phrase ''and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was
excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, especially in
light of the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Section 193 and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption
from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to
ensure autonomy to local governments and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The power to
tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery
of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It
may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or
controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax
treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for these entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or
otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. 18

The Court therein concluded that:

nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government performing governmental functions
may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom. 19

The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress. However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. 20 Thus Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 5 — Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the Local Governments.

The important legal effect of Section 5 is that henceforth, in interpreting statutory provision on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to resolved in
favor of municipal corporations. 21

There is further basis for tire conclusion that the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked to uphold Meralco's exemption from the local tax. Escudero
Electric Co. was originally given the legislative franchise under Act. 3648 to operate an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby
municipalities. The term of the franchise under Act. No. 3648 is a period of fifty years from the Act's approval in 1929. The said law provided that the franchise is
granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States. 22 Under the 1935. 23 the 1973 24 and the
1987 25 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National
Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power; they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted away. 26

Finally, while the matter is not of controlling significance, the Court notes that whereas the original Escudero franchise exempted the franchise holder from all taxes
levied or collected "now or in the future" 27 this phrase is noticeably omitted in the counterpart provision of P.D. 551; that said omission is intended not to foreclose
future taxes may reasonably be deduced by statutory construction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and
the complaint of MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.