(Michael J. Butler) Selling A 'Just' War Framing, (BookFi) PDF

Selling a ‘Just’ War
Also by Michael Butler
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Selling a ‘Just’ War
Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military
Intervention
Michael J. Butler
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clark University, USA
© Michael J. Butler 2012
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First published 2012 by
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To Ethan and Ben
That your world may know more justice,
and experience less war
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Contents
List of Figures and Tables viii
Preface and Acknowledgments x
List of Acronyms xiii
1 Introduction 1
2 Entering the Just War Conversation 18
3 Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars 46
4 Analyzing the Just War Frame 71
5 The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 99
6 Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 141
7 Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 180
Conclusion: Selling a Just War 211
Notes 228
Bibliography 247
Index 271
vii
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1 Support for US troop use—2010 7

1.2 Support for US troop use—2006 8
3.1 The framing continuum 59
4.1 Research design and questions 97
5.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Iraq/Gulf War’—POTUS 111
November 8, 1990–April 11, 1991
5.2 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria) 116
5.3 Speech-acts—primary audience (just cause criterion) 117
5.4 Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority 121
criterion)
5.5 Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion) 122
5.6 Chronological effects, by month (all criteria) 125
5.7 Just war significations by precept—November 1990 127
5.8 Just war significations by precept—December 1990 127
5.9 Just war significations by precept—January 1991 128
5.10 Just war significations by precept—February 1991 128
5.11 Just war significations by precept—March 1991 129
5.12 Just war significations by precept—April 1991 129
6.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Kosovo’—POTUS 156
March 24, 1999–June 10, 1999
6.3 Speech-acts—primary audience (just cause criterion) 162
criterion)
6.6 Chronological effects, by month ( JW significations—all 167
criteria)
6.7 Just war significations by precept—March 1999 168
6.8 Just war significations by precept—April 1999 169
6.9 Just war significations by precept—May 1999 169
6.10 Just war significations by precept—June 1999 170
7.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Afghanistan’—POTUS 189
October 7, 2001–December 7, 2001
viii
List of Figures and Tables ix
7.3 Speech-acts—primary audience (JW criterion) 194

criterion)
7.6 Chronological effects, by month ( JW significations—all 198
criteria)
7.7 Just war significations, by precept—October 2001 200
7.8 Just war significations, by precept—November 2001 200
7.9 Just war significations, by precept—December 2001 201
C.1 Evaluating frame application 213
Tables
4.1 Operationalizing the just war frame 80

4.2 Population of eligible cases 92
5.1 Crisis profile: Gulf War 99
5.2 Mono-applications and interactions 114
5.3 Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience 115
5.4 Distribution of just war significations by month and 132
criteria
6.1 Crisis profile: Kosovo 145
criteria
7.1 Crisis profile: Afghanistan–USA 181
criteria
Preface and Acknowledgments
In the words of Yeats, we make out of the quarrel with others rhetoric,
but of the quarrel with ourselves, poetry. What follows is hardly poetic,
but every bit the product of a prolonged (and sometimes seemingly
intractable) self-quarrel. The gripping question of ‘why we fight’ has
been a preoccupation of mine since a very young age—with the encroach-
ment of moral considerations as well as justifications (which, as this
book makes plain, are decidedly not the same thing) into that intellec-
tual domain occurring in rough synchronicity with my own emergent
and evolving understanding of morality and ethics. The chief by-product
of the fusion of these two concerns has been a sustained research agenda
defined by nearly a decade of rumination, dialogue, and investigation
concerning the intersection of morality and war, and the utility, signi-
ficance, and seeming ubiquity of just war theory in the American context
in particular.
This research agenda has evolved a great deal since its inception. Indeed,
this particular installment in that agenda has itself undergone significant
alterations in pivotal details pertaining to research design, methodology,
data collection, and the like. Yet what has remained constant throughout
is my central concern with attempting to unpack the timeless and timely
question of what, if anything, makes the resort to war ‘just’—particularly
in the view of those responsible for such a decision, as well as the rest of
us who are impacted in manifold ways by it. After all, the decision to go
to war, and the rationales affixed to those decisions after they are made,
cannot be divorced from the larger political, social, and cultural context
that spawn them.
From that simple yet powerful realization, the question of how
US foreign policy decision-makers ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to
the domestic audience has come to occupy most of my waking hours
for the past few years. This preoccupation only grew as I bore witness
to the undertaking of three significant military operations by the US
(in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya) in ‘real time’ while conceiving,
researching, and eventually sitting down to write this book. The material
costs—financial, and more importantly, human—of these military opera-
tions are at once staggering and sobering. Such adjectives can also be
applied to their potential consequences for America’s credibility and legit-
imacy, especially in light of the sometimes profound gap between the
x
Preface and Acknowledgments xi
objective realities of America’s wars and the justifications associated with

them. It is to the pursuit of a better understanding of the space between,
and the efforts of political leaders to close it, that this book is dedicated.
I would like to specifically recognize the contributions of those with-
out whom this book would never have come to be. The impetus for this
project dates back several years, with the earliest stirrings occurring in
a graduate seminar on conflict and cooperation at the University of
Connecticut led by my dissertation chair, mentor, co-author, and above
all friend, Mark Boyer. From the earliest kernel of a research question to
the final stages of manuscript preparation, Mark has been a sounding
board and source of sagacity on matters great and small. My debt of grati-
tude is boundless. So too must I extend great thanks to Garry Clifford and
Betty Hanson, who each provided unique and crucial insights during the
earliest stages of the project and timely words of encouragement as it
took shape (and yes, Garry, you were right about the case studies). Two
friends and collaborators, Natalie Florea Hudson and Anat Niv-Solomon,
have also left their imprint on different components of the finished
product—no doubt all to the good. I have also benefited greatly from
outstanding research assistance from Larissa Forster and Avril Perez, each
of whom contributed support with unfailing good humor at different and
critical times in the development of the project.
I would also like to acknowledge the team at Palgrave Macmillan,
in particular Christina M. Brian and Renée Takken, for their faithful
commitment to this book. One would be hard pressed to find a more
supportive or responsive editor than Christina. I also extend my grati-
tute to those in the field and profession whom I have consulted along
the way, and who have provided valuable feedback. At the risk of
inevitably excluding someone from whose input I have benefited, I
specifically would like to thank Babak Bahador, Alex Bellamy, Scott
Brown, Melissa Butler, Toni Erskine, Fran Harbour, Rich Hiskes, Tony
Lang, Doug Little, Cian O’Driscoll, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Ernie
Zirakzadeh, and the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their
careful and constructive critiques. Two scholars from outside the field
and discipline (respectively), Erin Kirby Knight and Christopher Knight,
also provided fresh perspective as well as remaining two of my oldest and
dearest friends. Though of course the finished product remains flawed,
those flaws persist in spite of the efforts of each of these outstanding
scholars.
I would be remiss in not also acknowledging my terrific colleagues in
the Political Science department at Clark. Their uniform commitment to
excellence in scholarship is truly remarkable. This book would not have
xii Preface and Acknowledgments
been possible without generous support from the Francis A. Harrington

Public Affairs Fund as well as receipt of a Faculty Development Grant
from Clark University. I am also grateful for the perceptive insights
concerning military intervention, particularly in the American context,
of the students in my spring 2009 capstone seminar ‘Intervention in
World Politics’ as well as those in my spring 2011 US Foreign Policy
course.
Most importantly, I thank my family. My parents, Robert and Eileen,
get the credit/blame for nurturing a young boy with an abiding curiosity
in war which undoubtedly must have given them pause at times. Dad
remains ever wise on the subject; Mom remains deeply loved and missed.
My in-laws, Dennis and Sandy, have provided tremendous support to
my family in my frequent absences. My wife Melissa has not only been
the greatest partner and friend one could ever ask for, but also a con-
tinual source of constructive criticism and astute insight on matters of
both substance and design. Moreover, she is herself a moral force and a
seeker of justice. This book bears her imprint in many, many ways.
In closing, I must pay heed to the burden borne so graciously by my
sons, Ethan and Ben, while I have been whiling away at this project for
too long. That burden has been tremendous, especially in the time lost
that can never be reclaimed. I thank them for a patience and maturity
beyond their years. So it is to them that I dedicate this book, with the
hopes that they and their generation might know more of justice, and
less of the sword.
Michael J. Butler
Worcester, MA USA
List of Acronyms
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

CCGA Chicago Council on Global Affairs
CENTCOM United States Central Command
CIDCM Center for International Development and Conflict
Management
CSCE/OSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe/Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
EU European Union
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GWO Global War on Terrorism
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia
IICK Independent International Commission on Kosovo
JW Just war
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
NAR National Archives and Records Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCB National Conference of Catholic Bishops
POTUS President of the United States
SAD Special Activities Division
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventative Development Force
(Republic of Macedonia)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPI United Press International
USSOCOM US Special Operations Command
VFW Veterans of Foreign Wars
xiii
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1
Introduction
The persistent problem of war
Few if any concerns are more timeless or resonate more broadly in the
study of foreign policy than the decision by states and their leaders
to go to war. In no small part the timeless nature of this concern can
be attributed to the fact that military force has long been and remains
central to the practice of statecraft. The collective pursuit of organized
armed violence to some defined end has proven a recurring feature of
international society since the codification of the rules and practices of
a state-based system in the Treaties of Westphalia. War has maintained
its viability in the face of numerous supposed portents of its demise.
Examples of such portents include (but are not limited to) the dawn of
the Enlightenment and the birth of popular sovereignty in the latter
half of the 18th century, the founding of the ‘Concert of Europe’ in the
aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, and the convening of a series
of peace conferences beginning in the late 19th century (such as the
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907).
For its part, the 20th century featured the most extensive evidence of
war’s allegedly approaching obsolescence (Mueller, 1990). In this vein,
one can point to the persistence of war in the face of the formation of not
one but two international organizations (the League of Nations in 1919,
the United Nations in 1945) as well as numerous non-governmental
organizations dedicated to the pursuit of peace. Further evidence to
this effect includes the establishment of the so-called ‘North American
security community’ (epitomized by the founding of NATO in 1949,
and the entire European integration process beginning in the early
1950s), as well as successive ‘waves’ of democratization expanding the
liberal ‘zone of peace’ and supporting assertions of the ‘iron law’ of the
1
2 Selling a ‘Just’ War
democratic peace (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b; Levy, 1988). However, the per-
sistence of warfare despite these developments has confined anticipations
of a more stable and pacific world order largely to the realm of the ideal.1
So too did the sudden and extensive proliferation of armed conflict
unleashed with the welcome demise of the Cold War quickly expose the
fallacy of triumphal proclamations of the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama,
1989).
Despite the purported ascendance of pacific values and institutions,
then, warfare endures. Since 1990, almost four million people have died
in wars (90 per cent of them civilians), while over 18 million people
world-wide have left their homes as a direct result of conflict (Sheehan,
2008). While empirical data suggests that both the aggregate number
of armed conflicts and the incidence of traditional interstate wars are
declining (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010), since the end of the Cold
War the use of force—in particular intra-state armed conflicts or military
interventions—remains pervasive.2 As this data indicates, the use (and
threatened use) of military force is still the ultima ratio in the con-
temporary international system. It is a tool that is available to and
employed by the leaders of nearly all states regardless of regime type, level
of economic development, geographic location, population size, and any
other indicator one might employ to distinguish states from one another
(Hewitt et al., 2010).
The continuing utility and appeal of military force as an implement
of statecraft is brought into greater relief when one narrows the focus
to recent and contemporary US foreign policy. Since the end of World
War II, the US has stood apart from the rest of the international com-
munity in terms of both the frequency and magnitude of its military
commitments (Butler, 2003). While military force retains great utility
for most states, the United States undoubtedly stands alone in its capa-
city and seeming willingness to employ military force, characteristics
that remain undiminished even with the end of the Cold War (von
Hippel, 2000). As this book was completed in the summer of 2011, the
US was involved in yet another military intervention in response to a
crisis, as part of a NATO operation (‘Operation Unified Protector’) con-
tributing to the end of Moammar Gaddafi’s four decades of autocratic
rule in Libya.
War and the liberal contradiction
Such persistent realities concerning the utility of military force as an

instrument of statecraft and as a centerpiece of US foreign policy are
Introduction 3
not in and of themselves noteworthy, unless one considers them in

light of the emergence and intensification of liberal norms and values
within the international system over the past several decades. Given
their substantive content, one would be right to expect that the con-
ditioning influence of liberal norms and values on state behavior would
restrain and even inhibit the use of force in liberal societies such as the
United States. This claim has a basis in centuries of liberal thought and
decades of empirical research (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Doyle, 1986).
Taken to their logical extent, theoretical articulations and empirical
refinements in this research tradition suggest that the emphasis on the
non-violent resolution of disputes and the cultivation of a cosmo-
politan world order should make the continued practice of war increas-
ingly unpalatable in liberal societies, to citizens and leaders alike (Russett,
1993; Dixon, 1994; Weart, 1998).
Viewed from the Kantian position underpinning much contem-
porary liberal thought on questions of war and peace, the use of force
in pursuit of the national interest poses a particularly insidious prob-
lem. In the liberal view the use of military force is considered an ana-
chronistic endeavor, the utility of which—in a world characterized by
an expanding ‘zone of peace’—is in steep decline (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b).
The essential basis for this assessment stems from an alleged incompat-
ibility between the underlying norms and reinforcing institutions of
liberal democracy on one hand, and the admissibility of violence as
an instrument for resolving political and social grievances on the
other (Russett and Oneal, 2001).3 Furthermore, the principle of non-
intervention (steeped in the classical dictum cuius regio eius religio, or
‘to each prince, his own religion’) has remained a central tenet of inter-
national law in the Westphalian order, as codified in Article 2 (7) of the
UN Charter and elsewhere (von Hippel, 2000). Yet in terms of actual
practice, it is a well-chronicled fact that liberal states retain extensive
and sophisticated military arsenals that they readily employ (Gleditsch,
2008).
This is especially true of the United States, the world’s singular
military power as well as its most frequent practitioner of military force.
It is this stark contradiction between the ‘normative logic’ of the liberal
peace (Rosato, 2003) and the empirical record of contemporary American
foreign policy that is the point of origin for this inquiry. Neither this
contradiction nor its potential ramifications for the conduct of liberal
statecraft is particularly new; indeed, they are long-standing by-products
of the incompatibility between the Clausewitzian view of military force
as an extension of policy and the Kantian faith that societies governed
by liberal norms and republican institutions will evolve to adopt non-

violent methods of dispute resolution even in the conduct of foreign
policy (Clausewitz, 1984; Covell, 1998).
The central place of this fundamental contradiction within US foreign
policy in particular has been well-chronicled by realists and critical theo-
rists alike, such that it can be accepted on an a priori basis without much
hazard. Morgenthau (1946: 51) considered such Wilsonian rhetoric the
outward ‘expression of an eschatological hope deeply imbedded in the
very foundations of liberal foreign policy’; that ‘hope’ being the prospect
of bending war to the pursuit of perpetual peace. In reassessing the tradi-
tion that produced thinkers such as Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr,
Tjalve (2008) lauds their efforts at ‘cutting down the national ego’ per-
petuated by the ‘Believers’ and ‘Technicians’ of a liberal (and more recently,
neo-conservative) bent, and the contradictory position on the legitimacy
of war and imperial dominion in mainstream American liberalism that a
fusion of the two ethos abstracts away through assumption and assertion
of its own inherent virtue (Bishai, 2004; Smith, 2007).
At one time, this contradiction troubled even liberals. For his part,
Kant (1905) eschewed the idea of realizing a ‘league of nations’ through
anything other than evolutionary and non-coercive means. Mill’s classic
essay ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ (1859) underscored the incom-
patibility of the liberal goal of fostering national self-determination through
coercive means (if for no other reason than the reality that a nation requir-
ing outside assistance is not yet ready for self-determination). While more
recent appraisals by prominent liberal theorists have proven relatively
more generous in seeking to define the conditions where the use of
force can be considered consonant with liberal values, they have generally
accepted the inadmissibility of military coercion outside of strictly defined
exceptions to the ‘legalist paradigm’ (Walzer, 1977; Rawls, 1993). Yet it is
the magnification and intensification of this contradiction in the practice
of contemporary (post-Cold War) American foreign policy, borne out in
the highly idealistic nature of the policy discourse and the frequency and
magnitude of US military engagements, which makes it of pre-eminent
concern.4
Problematizing the war-decision
The starting point for this research is this profound gap between stated
norms and actual behavior with respect to the use of force in contem-
porary US foreign policy—a juxtaposition between liberal values and
illiberal policies at the very heart of contemporary US foreign policy
Introduction 5
(Desch, 2008). The decision to go to war, and the factors underlying

that decision, have been subjects of paramount interest amongst scholars
of international relations, so much so that the study of war and of inter-
national relations have been deemed ‘coterminous’ (Vasquez, 2004). The
war-decision has received extensive attention from scholars of inter-
national conflict and foreign policy interested in advancing our collective
understanding of empirical patterns and processes of conflict behavior,
not to mention foreign policy decision-making (Diehl and Goertz, 2000;
Huth, 1996; Leng, 1993; Vasquez, 1993; Levy, 1983; Bueno de Mesquita,
1981). As the empirical record indicates, the utility of military force as
well as the desire of decision-makers to retain as much sovereign authority
as possible over the war-decision are central to the practice of foreign
policy in all states with any discernable military capabilities, irrespective
of regime type (Rosato, 2003).
The ‘crisis of legitimacy’

The claim that foreign policy decision-makers in the United States wish
to possess and retain extensive decision-making authority over the war-
decision is hardly debatable. Yet as liberal states such as the United
States employ military force on a routine basis while continuing to
publicly champion the benefits of cooperation, the implications of the
aforementioned ‘liberal contradiction’ for the continued ability of US
foreign policy decision-makers to use military force have grown apace
(Ikenberry, 2006). To the extent that the use of force in the pursuit of
national interests seems at odds with the foundational precepts of pol-
itical liberalism, the continued reliance on the use of coercive military
force in the pursuit or defense of foreign policy interests and strategic
objectives by the US and other liberal democracies inevitably raises the
specter of hypocrisy. This is especially the case if that decision cannot
be grounded in conditions approximating a plausibly legitimate casus
belli.
At the heart of the matter lies a practical problem confronting decision-
makers in the US, and indeed any liberal democracy: the difficulty of
implementing a policy decision when the decision and/or its objectives
are perceived as lacking in legitimacy due to their seeming contrast with
the liberal faith in ‘progress’––in this case, a more pacific world (Buko-
vansky, 2002). In light of the proliferation of liberal norms and insti-
tutions in both the domestic and international arena, the continued
reliance on military force by liberal states constitutes a violation of the
liberal creed, evoking a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for liberal states with respect
to their foreign policy behavior (Rosato, 2003; Bukovansky, 2007;
Hurd, 2007). That such a problem might be described in crisis terms

conveys the extent to which legitimacy has become a paramount concern
in assessing US foreign policy, where the seeds of the liberal contradiction
on the use of force have in recent years come to bear bitter fruit through
‘revisionist’ norm-breaking (Hurd, 2007).
Defined by Hurd (1999: 381) as ‘the normative belief by an actor that
a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’, the subjective and perceptual
aspect of legitimacy comes to matter in behavioral terms when social
convictions about what constitutes legitimate (and, for that matter,
illegitimate) interests or actions become individually and collectively
internalized by decision-makers and citizens. This social inculcation of
what constitutes a legitimate interest, decision, or behavior is clearly
influential for foreign policy decisions and international power relations,
helping define the realm of the possible (Lake, 2009). The importance
of legitimacy in the policy domain, as well as its inherently contested
nature, itself reveals how and why the framing of decisions is crucial for
effective policy implementation in liberal societies.
The implementation problem

US military engagements are hardly infrequent occurrences. Furthermore,
as Mueller (2002) contends, Presidents do not necessarily need extensive
public support in order to initiate a military venture. Within the con-
temporary American context the commitment of military force by foreign
policy decision-makers typically confronts extensive domestic opposition
from the public, the minority party, or in the media only when efforts
on the battlefield begin to bog down, result in mounting casualties, or are
waged for under-specified causes (Holsti, 2004; Mueller, 2002; Jentleson
and Britton, 1998; Jentleson, 1992). In light of all this, does the ‘crisis of
legitimacy’ suggested above pose an obstacle to foreign policy decision-
makers seeking to go to war?
Aside from defeat (actual, potential, or perceived) on the battlefield,
a chief source of domestic opposition to the use of force in the con-
temporary American context is a latent societal ambivalence toward
war, borne of the aforementioned ‘liberal contradiction’. Perhaps para-
doxically, it is the very persistence and frequency of war-making by the
US that sows the seeds for this ambivalence. Indeed, in the view of one
of the great living historians of war, the prominence of military force
in the policy toolkit of liberal states has elicited a ‘pang of conscience’
producing a distinctively negative representation of warfare in the public
domain of modern liberal societies (Howard, 1978). In the process, the
continuing primacy of war has produced (and continues to produce)
Introduction 7
the conditions for a latent and generalized diminution in societal

support for that endeavor (ibid.).
Evidence of this growing ambivalence toward war abounds even in
the US, where the resort to war is most frequent and popular support
for war seemingly greatest. For example, the latest installment of the
‘Global Views’ survey administered by the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs offers clear evidence of a generalized diminution in societal
support for war across a number of indicators (CCGA, 2010). The most
direct evidence are prevailing attitudes toward the appropriate use of
US military force (see Figure 1.1). Presented with a number of scenarios
for the use of force, a majority of respondents oppose committing US
troops even to the highly conventional and seemingly justifiable cause
of defending important allies such as Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan
(ibid.). This seemingly surprising result was confirmed in a broad range
of findings relative to other similar questions. A majority (56 per cent)
oppose US intervention in the event of a war between Israel and Iran;
over two-thirds (67 per cent) favor completely withdrawing US forces
from Afghanistan immediately or within two years. Likewise, anywhere
from 40 per cent to 76 per cent consider any hypothesized positive
outcomes from a US military strike on Iran either ‘not very likely’ or
‘not at all likely’, and nearly half the respondents oppose long-term
military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Japan (ibid.).
While such findings might be partly attributable to war fatigue rela-
tive to campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq or the current economic down-
turn (which often corresponds with decreased support for international
Figure 1.1 Support for US troop use—2010 (adapted from CCGA, 2010)
Percentage supporting/opposing the use of US troops in each of the following

scenarios.
If China invaded Taiwan
If North Korea invaded South Korea
Favor
If Israel were attacked by its neighbors
Oppose
Part of international peacekeeping force to enforce

peace agreement between Israel and Palestinians
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Introduction 9
for unclear or debatable causes or undertaken with questionable authority or

objectives.
Effective implementation of the decision to go to war is inextricably
linked to the perceived legitimacy of that decision within American
society. Military campaigns that are accepted as legitimate and necess-
ary by society at-large are more likely to prove successful. This is far from
an idle or specious claim; none other than the 19th century Prussian
strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself stressed the importance of attract-
ing and maintaining broad societal support in order to increase the odds
of victorious military campaigns. Consequently, emergent ambivalence
towards the use of force in American society poses a significant obstacle
to US foreign policy decision-makers, both in advancing the decision to
use military force in discrete applications as well as in securing its continued
pre-eminence in the foreign policy toolkit.
War as social practice

The twinned problems of legitimacy and implementation relative to the
war-decision underscore the extent to which war should be understood as
a fundamentally social practice (Vasquez, 2004; Mann, 1993; Buzan, 1983).
Indeed, in studying the (affirmative) war-decision we can discern a great deal
not only about the choices and preferences of authoritative decision-units
(Hermann et al., 2001), but also the social bases of those choices and prefer-
ences. Prevailing conceptions of the ‘national interest’, the decisions these
conceptions precipitate, and especially the rationales affixed to those deci-
sions after they are made are all concerns which cannot be divorced from
the larger political, social, and cultural context that spawn them (Hess, 2009;
Finnemore, 2003; Hoffmann, 2003; Campbell, 1998).
As Clausewitz (1984) reminded us well over a century ago, the success of
any prominent and sustained application of military force demands that
political leaders not only draw upon the forces of creativity associated
with military strategists but also tap into and bridle the forces of passion
embodied in the nation. This dictum is no less true of contemporary warfare
(Posen, 2003). Wars which are thought to be in some sense legitimate in the
eyes of the society waging them are, from a strategic sense, wars which are
typically easier to prosecute, more widely supported at home, and accord-
ingly more likely to succeed in fulfilling their objectives. Whether in seek-
ing to amass a sufficient reserve of tangible (troops, money) or intangible
(morale) resources, the ability to effectively utilize military force as an instru-
ment of statecraft remains contingent on the ability of decision-makers
to cultivate and sustain a broad-based, enduring, and resilient reserve of
societal support—a reserve of support undoubtedly contingent on prevailing
perceptions of the legitimacy of the initial decision to go to war.
A key requisite for obtaining that support is that the society at-large
believes the initial decision to start the war to be legitimate and correct
(Gelpi et al., 2009). As was discussed earlier, the evident disjuncture
between stated societal values and actual state behavior concerning war
in the American context fosters a predisposition against war-decisions
advanced without an adequate rationale. The decision to employ military
force, while far from uncommon, is nonetheless largely understood to
be undesirable. The most basic expression of this normative position is
that war is something requiring justification, and as such is something
to be restricted rather than promoted, and undertaken carefully and
soberly (if at all).
This expressed position relative to war and the war-decision has two
major and distinctive sources, each rooted in the liberal tradition. The
first is moral-ethical; in this view, the decision to go to war is appraised
in light of a ‘categorical imperative’ in which some universal code of
conduct (often steeped in natural law) should provide the lodestar
for evaluation.5 The second source is utilitarian in nature. In this trans-
lation, war-avoidance is desirable for practical reasons; irrespective of
whether war violates any defined notion of what is ‘right’ or ‘good’ it is
costly, and those costs must be identified in full and balanced against
war’s attendant and presumed benefits.6 These considerations create
and sustain an environment of ‘norm contestation’ (Hoffmann, 2007)
bounding the practice of war in liberal societies. The chief implication
of this normative contestation in the American context is that it pro-
duces and sustains a definitive and consequential societal standard that
must be accounted for and met by decision-makers wishing to employ
military force.
While decision-makers can and sometimes do railroad the war-decision
through the political process without effectively attempting to ‘sell’ that
decision to the public, doing so jeopardizes the military operation itself,
the strategic and policy objectives associated with it, and the political
fortunes of those responsible for the decision. This seems especially the
case for liberal democracies like the United States. A decidedly public (and
occasionally doctrinaire) adherence to the notion of popular sovereignty
and the introduction of institutions of republican government have made
it increasingly imperative for American foreign policy decision-makers seek-
ing to effectively advance and implement the war-decision to justify that
decision in a way that appeals to the populace, so as to elicit a necessary
(if not sufficient) measure of societal support. In light of this, the public
presentation of the war-decision should be understood as, in fact, a matter
of vital and practical importance to the effective conduct of statecraft.
Introduction 11
Given the importance of securing broad societal support to the effective

conduct of any war and to sustaining the practice of war in general, a per-
vasive if latent societal ambivalence about the decision to go to war poses a
clear and significant problem for US foreign policy decision-makers. In a
nod to Doyle (1983b), in the American context it would seem imperative
not only that liberal wars be fought for liberal purposes, but also (and
perhaps more importantly) that liberal wars be justified on liberal grounds.
How, precisely, can the stark contradiction between the values liberal
leaders and societies profess to adhere to and the continued prosecution of
a highly militarized and self-interested US foreign policy be reconciled?
Framing a solution
The importance of effectively ‘selling’ the war-decision within the context

of US foreign policy is greatly magnified by the uneasy place of residence
of military force in the liberal imagination. In the end, the fact that the
conduct of US foreign policy rests so heavily on the ideological firma-
ment of liberal values and ideals makes the specter of betraying those
values and ideals qualitatively significant. With the American ‘national
interest’ so thoroughly infused with liberal ideals, the betrayal of those
ideals (defined as the naked use of aggression without an accompanying
justificatory rationale) would constitute a significant failure in policy
terms, relative to securing those interests. In light of this challenge, the
war-decision generates a particularly pernicious dilemma for American
foreign policy decision-makers: namely, how to ‘sell’ that decision and
its attendant risks and costs to constituent audiences who may not fully
comprehend the rationale for it, or who may oppose the use of military
force (Berinsky, 2007).
Accordingly, this research is primarily concerned with explaining how
the contradiction at the heart of liberal statecraft described here is recon-
ciled within contemporary American foreign policy and society, such that
the use of force has retained (and is likely to continue to retain) its utility
and appeal. This research advances an answer to that question, in the form
of the ‘just war frame’. Grounded in a centuries-old ‘conversation’ con-
cerning the legitimacy of war and drawing from the language and concepts
of the highly mutable set of applied ethical criteria, this frame plays a
key role in the ‘politics of signification’ concerning war in the American
context (Hall, 1997). This contention thus informs the main hypothesis
which this inquiry seeks to confirm: namely, that the just war frame is
the central mechanism employed by US foreign policy decision-makers in
‘selling’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience.
This hypothesis rests on several simple if key underlying assumptions.

The first of these is that the conduct of American foreign policy has been
and remains fundamentally dependent on and linked to military force
and its expedient projection in ‘wars of choice’. As such, foreign policy
principals with a major role in the war-decision wish to retain sovereign
agency over that decision; so much as to occasionally, or perhaps fre-
quently, prompt them to lie to the domestic audience (Mearsheimer,
2011). These are closely related objectives that I contend are endur-
ing over time and which transcend political party and ideology, at least
among those individuals who ascend to a position of significant decision-
making authority relative to the war-decision. They are also objectives
that I contend remain relatively unaffected by the pangs of the ‘liberal
conscience’ (Howard, 1978) or whatever degree of normative contestation
surround the use of force may exist within American society.
This is not to say that foreign policy decision-makers in the US are
unaffected by liberal values and ideals, or unmoved by them in terms
of charting a foreign policy course of action. Rather, the distinction of
relevance here is that the conduct of statecraft as well as the discharge of
responsibility to ensure the national security and to pursue the national
interest requires a degree of pragmatism and appreciation for maximizing
and wielding power––and there is no greater measure or translation
of power in the continued anarchy that is the international system
than military force. As a result, even leaders in liberal societies like the
US—where interests are defined in ideational terms, and where ideo-
logical crusades are advanced on a quasi-regular basis—are driven by
strategic considerations to consolidate their position atop the Clause-
witzian ‘trinity’, even through deception if necessary (Mearsheimer,
2011).
The second assumption underpinning this hypothesis is that the pangs
of ‘liberal conscience’ on the war-question, and the societal norms delin-
eating the use of force as a generally undesirable course of action, actually
matter in that they generate real political costs and operational con-
straints. In other words, the specter of hypocrisy and the crisis of liberal-
ism it reveals have ‘real world’ implications, generating political costs and
operational constraints for war-decisions that are or appear to be ill-
conceived and especially those that are under-justified or even unjustified.
Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’ again proves instructive in reminding
us of the nexus between the state, military leaders, and the populace.
A lack of broad, enduring, and resilient support within domestic society
can have damaging if not devastating effects both for the military opera-
tion and the individuals and/or political parties responsible for it, as
Introduction 13
military campaigns in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq among others have

demonstrated.
As even casual observation attests, just war language abounds in the
public rhetoric of recent US Presidents and other foreign policy decision-
makers (Lakoff and Frisch, 2006; Bellamy, 2005; Galston, 2002; Ratner,
2002; Russett and Starr, 1992). Some analysts have gone as far as to
suggest the use of moralistic language in conjunction with war reflects
a historically unprecedented ‘moralist turn’ (Flint and Falah, 2004; Craw-
ford, 2003; Bennett, 2002). This thesis has been widely circulated among
journalists and pundits (Schneider, 2005; Feldmann, 2004; Beatty, 2003)
as well as scholars (Rengger, 2002; Salter, 2002). While in recent years this
claim was most often advanced in relation to the George W. Bush Admin-
istration and in particular President Bush (Dolan, 2005; Bovard, 2004;
Singer, 2004; Zarefsky, 2004; Cienki, 2004), the tendency of American
political elites to rely on moral language to justify policy decisions of
broad social import (especially foreign policy and war) in both the public
and private sphere is a phenomenon of long-standing concern (Burke,
2004; Niebuhr, 2002; Campbell, 1998; Morgenthau, 1946).
Notwithstanding these important contributions, the central claim
advanced here concerning the importance of just war theory for US
foreign policy decision-makers speaks to a somewhat different concern.
This research does not contend with the question of whether or not
war in general, or particular war-decisions, are just or unjust. Nor do
I seek to restate the well-worn argument that the morally charged
language and concepts of just war theory are important to US foreign
policy. Rather, in invoking, operationalizing, and empirically evaluat-
ing the ‘just war frame’, I seek to examine not whether but instead
how and to what degree the language and concepts of just war theory
are utilized as instruments of meaning-making to ‘sell’ the decision to
go to war to the domestic audience. While the claim that just war
theory has long been and remains central to both US foreign policy
is firmly established (Wells, 1969), how it has been employed in the
service of generating broad societal support for particular war-decisions
is a phenomenon that is less well-understood.
The pursuit of an answer to this overarching question uncovers other
important and related considerations of concern in the process. While
the question of whether just war theory ‘matters’ for US foreign policy
and the discourse enveloping it can be more or less accepted affirma-
tively on an a priori basis, what do we know about how it matters? Do
foreign policy decision-makers employ just war language in a purpose-
ful, intentional, and systematic way to ‘sell’ their decisions to go to
war? If they do, which components of the theory matter most, and
translate the best—and in which circumstances? Do certain aspects of
just war theory and its various translations matter more, or resonate
more widely, in some types or cases of conflicts than others? If so,
which ones and in which circumstances? How do various components
of the notion of the ‘just war’ translate to different audiences? Does the
appeal of just war concepts and language differ in discernable ways
with respect to the mass public, opinion leaders, or the mainstream
media—and if so, in what ways? Do just war concepts and rhetoric
change appreciably over the span of their use by decision-makers in
conjunction with a particular conflict?
Investigating these questions requires a systematic and rigorous empir-
ical examination, one informed by a robust appreciation of framing
and frames relative to foreign policy and in particular the decision to
go to war. Several recent and noteworthy exceptions notwithstanding
(Western, 2005; Entman, 2004; Baum, 2003; Allen et al., 1994), for the
most part the construction of frames and their application to the decision
to go to war by agents of the state remains an under-examined dimension
of US foreign policy decision-making. Through introduction of the just
war frame, this research seeks to rigorously and critically evaluate just war
theory as a policy tool. In doing so, I will draw from the rich theoretical
insights of the just war literature (see Ramsey, 1968; Walzer, 1977; Bull,
1979; Falk, 2004) and related investigations of the relationship between
societal norms and US foreign policy (Tucker, 1960; Osgood and Tucker,
1967; Cohen, 1984; Payne, 1995; Glennon, 1999; Fager, 2002) while simul-
taneously aspiring to the empirical sophistication of leading studies of US
military intervention (Regan, 1998; Haass, 1999; Peceny, 1999a; Chatterjee
and Scheid, 2003; Meernik, 2004).
Many scholars of just war theory consider the theory’s power to
emanate from its potential to offer the philosopher, the statesperson,
and the citizen alike an objective standard for ascertaining the con-
ditions in which war might be considered ethically and morally per-
missible. This is accurate, to the extent that one remains in the realm
of the abstract. Yet for those who may seek to apply this (or any) theory
to the ‘real world’, and test its utility within the realm of state behavior
and foreign policy, such reification suggests a misinterpretation of the
actual purpose and power of just war theory. In seeking to distill just
war theory into a device useful for social scientific inquiry, such a view
of the theory would be wrong-headed. In an application such as this, just
war theory is better engaged from a critical vantage point, and viewed as
a subjective social construct that can be employed (to varying effect) by
Introduction 15
foreign policy decision-makers to the end of crafting inter-subjective

meaning about the fundamentally social practice of war.
In the realm of foreign policy, wars that are thought to be ‘just’ (or,
perhaps more accurately, wars made out to be just by those interested in
prosecuting them) are wars which important constituents of the society
waging them are likely to support, and wars which are more likely to
satisfy the objectives with which they are associated. It is therefore hardly
a stretch to conclude from this that wars which are thought to be ‘just’
possess something of a reflected glow, in that the society waging them are
more likely to embrace them because they are seen as legitimate. In turn it
is this ‘reflected glow’ which is important—nee, vital—not only to the
success of discrete wars or military campaigns, but beyond that to main-
taining the legitimacy and by extension the utility of the larger enter-
prise and of war.
Interrogating the just war
This book stands as a testimony to the conviction that greater heed

should be paid to framing within the realm of US foreign policy, and in
particular the framing of the most significant foreign policy decision
of all: the decision to go to war. Careful examination of the application
of the ‘just war frame’ can also shed light on whether and to what
degree decision-makers find that particular framing useful, in what cir-
cumstances, and why. Characterized in the broadest terms, this book
seeks to advance our understanding of US foreign policy decision-making
through an empirically grounded constructivist inquiry designed to demon-
strate in detail how and why the framing of foreign policy decisions entail-
ing the use of military force ‘matters’.
Exploring the construction and effects of a foreign policy frame such as
the ‘just war’ frame is important in that it helps identify the larger social
forces that establish the parameters of the possible and define the limits
of the legitimate with respect to the resort to war. In the words of Hans
Morgenthau (1945: 1), ‘It is the task of every generation to rediscover and
reformulate the perennial problems of political ethics and answer them
in the light of the experience of the age.’ As the point of departure for
this analysis, Chapter 2 (Entering the Just War ‘Conversation’), seeks to
grapple with that task by unpacking the fundamentally social basis of
war, the war-decision, and the veritable notion of a ‘just war’ in liberal
societies. This chapter provides a thorough exposition of the centuries-old
‘conversation’ concerning the legitimacy of war in the Western socio-
historical context referred to by James Turner Johnson (among others) as
the just war tradition. This conversation concerning the legitimacy of

war is of course intimately linked with just war theory itself, emanating
from while also itself shaping that theory’s internal logic and external
application. Chapter 2 thereby seeks to provide both a comprehensive
appraisal both of the origins, evolution, modification, and application
of just war theory over the centuries as well as the socio-historical nar-
rative in which that theory and its origins, evolution, modification,
and application was embedded.
Chapter 3 (Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars) begins with an
examination of frames as concepts and framing as a process, taking
into account not only what constitutes a ‘frame’ but also the particular
(if oft-overlooked) relevance of frames to foreign policy analysis. The
employment of socially and culturally resonant ideas, values, and nar-
ratives to frame the benefits of, and cultivate public support for, any
proposed policy by the proponents of that policy are crucial deter-
minants of whether or not that policy is adopted and effectively imple-
mented (at least if the polity is operating as intended and designed).
As such, frames serve as the key conduit between policy elites and the
domestic audience, constructing and conveying meaning about the prob-
lem at hand, the merits of the proposed policy solution, and the pitfalls
of alternative courses of action. In seeking to systematically investigate
the constellation of ideas, values, beliefs, and symbols that US decision-
makers rely on in order to ‘sell’ the public on the merits of the use of
force, the concept of framing provides the best and most logical entrée.
Chapter 4 (Analyzing the Just War Frame) turns directly to the task
of operationalizing the mechanism that I contend is expressly used by
US foreign policy decision-makers to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to
the domestic audience. In light of the decidedly applied nature of the
just war theory and tradition from which it is drawn, this chapter
demonstrates how the just war frame and the specific translations of
the basic criteria of just war theory (just cause, competent authority,
right intention) that comprise it can be thought of as a viable device
for assessing the representation and signification of affirmative war-
decisions in contemporary American foreign policy and society. Upon
establishing the function and form of the just war frame, this chapter
also provides a detailed explanation of the terms and parameters struc-
turing the analysis of that frame’s application to military intervention
decisions.
That analysis of the application of the just war frame to affirmative
war-decisions in contemporary US foreign policy is executed here through
employment of a multi-case study research design. The first of the three
Introduction 17
case studies of affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign

policy comprising the empirical testing ground for the claims at the heart
of this inquiry is advanced in Chapter 5 (The Gulf War: Desert Shield,
Desert Storm). This case study, like the two that follow it (Chapter 6,
Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil and Chapter 7, Afghanistan:
Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice), draws upon an array of primary
and secondary sources in crafting an analysis of the use of the just war
frame to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in response to these
three US foreign policy crises. As such, the three case study chapters (each
drawing their titles from the operational monikers of the respective mil-
itary interventions of concern) are structured around a content analysis of
the employment of the just war frame by the President to define the war-
decision as ‘just’ for public consumption, taking into account factors such
as differential points of emphasis within the frame, disparate target audi-
ences, and the dynamic evolution of the crisis itself. These case studies are
not concerned with a full profile of the crises themselves or an inventory
of the causes or triggers of the US military response, but rather with rigor-
ously examining the application of the just war frame and its utility as a
mechanism for ‘selling’ decisions to go to war on an ex post facto basis.
The temporal span of the three case studies, as well as the future
oriented nature of an inquiry concerned with assessing the claim that
the just war frame is the chief mechanism ensuring the continued appeal
of military force in American foreign policy and society, requires higher-
order consideration of the just war frame. Whereas the preceding chapters
permit in-depth consideration of the use and utility of the just war frame
in each discrete application, the Conclusion appraises the specific insights
about the frame’s application gleaned from those case studies in light of
the evolution of US foreign policy over the 20-year period since the end
of the Cold War. In drawing together the most significant empirical and
theoretical findings gleaned from the individual case studies, the con-
cluding chapter provides an opportunity to assess the tasks and attributes
of the just war frame, evaluate the just war frame’s credibility, salience,
and dynamism, and reflect on the overarching questions and proposi-
tions concerning the utility and appeal of military force in contemporary
US foreign policy that are the catalysts for this investigation.
2
Entering the Just War
Conversation
The core function of any frame is to advance a collective perception of

some problem as well as a consensus concerning its optimal solution
(Benford, 1987; Nepstad, 1997). As such, the claim that a consensus
concerning the war problématique in US foreign policy has been culti-
vated through use of the ‘just war frame’ requires one to first assess
when and under what conditions the resort to war is deemed legit-
imate in the American context, and whether that narrative exhibits
fidelity with the hypothesized just war frame (Campbell, 1988; Rudé,
1980; Gouldner, 1970). Evaluating the application of the just war frame
as an instrument of the ‘politics of signification’ (Hall, 1997) ultimately
requires one to consider the broad parameters of the social narrative
within which the signifying frame in question might be embedded.
Before turning to that consideration, however, a point of clarification
is in order. The main intention of this chapter is not to provide a thor-
ough account of just war theory. Rather, this chapter seeks to identify and
contextualize the major historical installments in the just war tradition,
defined for the purposes of this inquiry as a ‘conversation about the
legitimacy of war’ (Bellamy, 2006: 2) intended to provide a ‘cultural regu-
lation of violence’ (Johnson, 1981). In favoring the metaphor of con-
versation over that of theory, this research stakes out an ontological
position that the just war criteria are better thought of as the by-products
of a long-running and fully mutable social narrative, rather than the fixed
output of an unyielding scientific proposition defined by an unyielding
set of laws (Rodin, 2005). Given this ontological position, consideration
of the emergence and evolution of the just war tradition, and the ways in
which it informs a broader social narrative concerning the legitimacy,
permissibility, and even desirability of war is instrumental in setting the
stage for the empirical appraisal of the ‘just war frame’ that follows.
18
Entering the Just War Conversation 19
Birthing a narrative
The prevailing normative and legal perspective within liberal societies

on the question of what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ or socially acceptable
casus belli stems from and is approximated by the just war tradition
(Forsyth, 1992; Davis et al., 2001). This is not to say that just war theory
provides a complete and total account of all possible considerations that
influence decision-makers and their constituents contemplating the
decision of whether or not to use military force. Still, the theory’s para-
mount concern with outlining the circumstances in which the decision
to go to war may be justified (the jus ad bellum criteria) make it a nat-
ural and logical starting point for deliberation concerning the question
of what, if anything, precipitates a legitimate use of organized military
force.1
Antecedents
The origin of an explicit theory of a just war is most often located
in the early Roman church, beginning with the theological labors of
Augustine of Hippo in the 5th century. However, this starting point
obscures the theory’s antecedents in the ancient Chinese, Hindu and
Egyptian civilizations, among others (Christopher, 1994). Historical inquiry
convincingly reveals that these civilizations clearly grappled with moral
quandaries such as how to treat prisoners humanely, as well as how
to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (French, 2005).
Indeed, the range of considerations concerning the proper conduct of
war (ultimately embodied in the jus in bello component of just war
theory) originally gained traction through the so-called ‘warrior’s
code’ advanced to enhance the social status of warriors by distinguish-
ing them from common criminals and other purveyors of violence
(ibid.).
Relative to the focus of this inquiry, the Hebrew, Greek, and to a lesser
degree imperial Roman civilizations serve as the wellsprings of the afore-
mentioned ‘conversation’ concerning the question of what makes the
resort to (rather than the conduct of) war ‘just’.2 Perhaps the earliest
recorded narratives concerning the defining criteria for a ‘just war’ can be
found in the Torah as well as some of the foremost surviving works
of classical Greece. Within the Hebraic tradition, the inherent virtue of
the pursuit of justice in the temporal sphere stemmed from the degree
to which such a pursuit both furthered social harmony and forestalled
divine retribution. This emphasis on justice in social relations tran-
scended the Jewish nation and tended toward universality, at least in
theory; for instance, Deuteronomy (Deut. 10: 16–20) explicitly stated

that:
God does not treat one person differently from another. He loves all
people. He expects us to behave the same way. Treat everyone fairly,
even foreigners and strangers.
While relative to the nexus of justice and war Deuteronomy is much

better known for its admonitions to the Israelites (Deut. 20) to conquer
the ‘promised land’ and vanquish the Canaanites, it also endeavors to
provide a casus belli in the process. Though it may seem an absurdly
fine distinction from our contemporary vantage point, the Israelites are
not led to destroy the Canaanites because they are unbelievers, but
rather because they are seen as direct threats to the Jewish nation and
way of life. And, further to the point of the just war tradition as ‘con-
versation’, it must be pointed out that both Saul and Ahab openly
challenged what they perceived to be the ruthlessness and ‘radicalism
of the writing desk’ contained within Deuteronomy; so too, albeit
obliquely and through interpretation, did many rabbis of the time
(Weinfeld, 1972: 51; Solomon, 2005).
On an intra-national basis, the Hebrew prophet Isaiah (Is. 32: 15–18,
20) argued that the warring tribes of Israel should dedicate themselves
to just conduct even in martial endeavors, so that ‘…right will dwell in
the desert, and justice abide in the orchard. Justice will bring about
peace; right will produce calm and security’ (emphasis added). Similarly,
the book of Hosea (Hs. 4: 1–3) identifies the dangers attendant in wars
that are fought unjustly or for unjust purposes, warning ‘…injustice
and lack of mercy among people results in desolation of the land and
suffering for all creation’. Further to the emergent conversation, prom-
inent Hebrew teachings calling for limits to destruction and violence in
the conquest of Canaan (Deut. 2) as well as condemnation of atrocities
committed in war (Amos 1–2) were buttressed by the lamentations of
the Psalmists concerning the resort to war, as well as appeals for inter-
diction to the God who can bring war to an end and destroy its imple-
ments (Ps. 46, 120). Such appeals served to highlight the degree to
which what we would now consider jus in bello concerns were linked to
considerations of the legitimacy of the initial resort to war in early
Hebrew thought and discourse.
Further nuance was added to the conversation through rabbinic inter-
pretations of Scripture, as reflected in the evolutionary composition of the
Talmud wherein distinctive categories of war were identified: milhemet
hova (obligatory war); milhemet reshut (optional war); and pre-emptive

war. As Solomon (2005) notes, there is some resonance between the
Talmudic schema and the (later) Roman notion of just wars, though the
chief distinction is obligatory/optional rather than just/unjust. Never-
theless, extensive debates over the ‘obligatory’ (just) character of pre-
emptive war or the morality of the expansionist wars of David within
the Jewish tradition underscore the degree to which the constitution of
a ‘just’ or permissible war was something that has remained subject to
interpretation over subsequent millenia.
Given the profound influence of the Hebrew prophets on Judeo-
Christian philosophy and by extension the development of Western pol-
itical thought, it is not surprising that these meditations and laments on
justice and war proved enduring. A similarly enduring influence stems
from classical Greek thought concerning the war-decision. In particular,
Plato stands apart in the degree to which he exalts the philosophical and
practical virtues of justice-seeking. In the Platonic conception justice should
govern not only the conduct of the individual but also that of the social
organism and that organism’s relations with other societies (Plato; tr. by
Grube, 1974). Plato’s dissatisfaction with what he viewed as the degenera-
tion of Athenian civic life (reflected in the unraveling of the Hellenic
society amidst the Peloponnesian wars chronicled by Thucydides; see
Price, 2001) led him to conclude that Athens, and by extension Greek
civilization, could only be saved by turning from the moral bankruptcy
of imperial conquest to a primary emphasis on justice and fairness in all
individual and collective dealings. Though this concern was chiefly rel-
evant for governing social relations among Greeks, it was advanced (albeit
to a lesser extent) to govern intercourse with ‘barbarians’ as well (Pappas,
1995).
Plato identified justice as a cardinal virtue; e.g., a good upon which
all aspects of human life must and necessarily does hinge (Plato, 1974:
427e). Aristotle further refined the Platonic concern with justice as
social ideal, arguing that it could only be perfected by habit or practice
and in relation to others. The faith in rationality that underpins this
approach is evident in the notion that it is possible to not only discern
but also to protect and promote justice even within the midst of war.
In light of the just war tradition, the Aristotelian emphasis on praxis
proved especially crucial to his efforts to advance five pretexts for a
‘just war’, including amongst those conditions that of self-defense and
the defense of allies.3
For both the Hebrews and the Greeks, justice was to be actively pro-
moted and would ideally prevail, even amidst the most destructive of
all social endeavors—namely, war. That the quest for justice even in the
midst of war should be taken up and sustained by these ancient societies
speaks to a vitally important thread running through and connecting the
Hebrew and Greek traditions with modern liberal sensibilities. What is
reflected even in these earliest installments of the just war ‘conversation’
is the emergence of belief in the possibility of securing justice amidst war
through the cultivation of, and adherence to, a collective morality or
common set of moral standards. While the Hebrews and Greeks differed
in their conception of how such an outcome might obtain (with the
Hebrews relying heavily on the prospects of divine retribution, and the
Greeks appealing to rationality and discourse), they shared the idea that
pursuing justice in any and all circumstances, even (if not especially) in
war, is a vital duty of the warrior that must not be neglected.4 This time-
less proposition originating in the West with the Hebrew and Greek civ-
ilizations has had preponderant influence on the development of norms
and law pertaining to conduct in wartime, from The Republic and the
Talmud to the Geneva Conventions and beyond.
Augustine and Aquinas

As even this cursory portrayal of Hebrew and Greek thought and dis-
course on the question of war suggests, the ‘conversation’ at the heart
of the just war tradition has long been punctuated by common con-
cerns including (but not limited to) that of when and under what con-
ditions war is acceptable, if and to what degree war should be restrained,
and to whom these and other considerations pertain. Beginning with the
formative contributions of Augustine of Hippo (354–430), and taken up
in full by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), attempts at formulating a set of
criteria defining a ‘just’ war originating from the idea of some ‘categorical
imperative’ predominated in Europe at least until the 17th century. It was
in the midst of this turn in the just war tradition that medieval and classi-
cal just war theory was advanced and modified, seeking to outline with
some clarity and authority the conditions that make a war ‘just’, such
that a believer could embark upon and conduct war with a clear con-
science. In the main, this installment of the conversation adhered to the
concept of war as a last resort, permissible in advancing the cause of the
Church against heretics, infidels, and the like (Howard, 1994).
Antecedents to the theory of the just war within the Christian tradition
can be located long before Augustine or Aquinas (Johnson, 1987). How-
ever, it is undoubtedly these two theologians and the common theme
that binds them across the centuries (e.g., that a fallen humanity is none-
theless worth preserving through an attempt at establishing and main-
taining peace and order according to the dictates of the divine and
eternal law) that catalyzed just war theory. Indeed, the origins of what
we would today recognize as a theory of the ‘just war’ can be located in
Augustine’s notion of ‘the Two Cities’, in which justice can only be
gained in the temporal sphere through the measured and ethical conduct
of statecraft (Phillips, 1984). Aside from providing the first tangible ele-
ments of just war theory, Augustinian thought on the morality of war
represents an important new direction in the just war tradition. Because,
as Augustine stated, ‘we can make use of the peace of Babylon to steel
ourselves in the pursuit of the City of God’, justice in civic life remains
worth pursuing (Augustine, tr. Walsh et al., 1958). However, Augustine
also contended that justice in the midst of war, or in any other social
endeavor, must be seen as an ideal rather than something that is truly
attainable. So it was that the father of classical just war theory operated
from a basic presumption that justice in war is likely to be elusive.
In the Augustinian tradition, while justice is an objectively discern-
able virtue, it is also in practical terms a state of affairs that is imperfect
and incomplete at best. In seeking to reconcile the apparent contra-
diction of a simultaneous adherence to a discernable objective standard
of justice with a recognition of the impossibility of meeting that stan-
dard (a contradiction which has remained central to the just war ever
since), Augustine proffered a formula for the just war as one expressly
limited by purpose, authority, and conduct. In spite of the apparent
contradiction noted above (or perhaps because of it), Augustine crafted
a set of criteria that at once were definitive and clear, yet also allowed
for room for interpretation on the part of those in a position to imple-
ment them. Augustine stressed that war properly conducted must be
led by rulers of nations, who by virtue of their position are obliged to
maintain peace and pursue justice (Augustine, tr. Walsh et al., 1958).
Such rulers may prosecute war to revenge wrongs and undo injustices,
but never in the spirit of vengeance (ibid.). In this sense it is possible to
interpret Augustine not only as an important figure in the promul-
gation of a set of definitive proscriptions related to the conduct of war
(e.g., the ‘just war theory’), but also as an important contributor to the
decidedly more nebulous ‘conversation’ that is the just war tradition.
In taking up and advancing Augustinian thought, Aquinas offered a
degree of clarification and elaboration befitting his prominent association
with just war theory. Under the heading ‘Of War’ in Part II, Question 40
in his 13th century masterwork Summa Theologica (Aquinas, tr. Sullivan,
1952), Aquinas specified three clear and irrefutable conditions for waging
a just war that would not only remain the central tenets of just war
theory, but a lodestar for the just war tradition. In order to possess any
such claim, a ‘just war’ must: (a) stem from legitimate authority received
from the sovereign; (b) originate from a just cause; and (c) be guided by a
rightful intention, so that the advancement of virtue is the sole purpose
of going to war. Further to these criteria, Aquinas exhausts the poss-
ibilities of what might legitimately fall under each heading, as well as that
which should be expressly excluded, providing a clear and expansive
blueprint for the conduct of a virtuous and divinely sanctioned war
(ibid.). It is chiefly the latter of these three criteria (right intent) that
represented a major point of departure from Augustinian thought,
through the doctrine of ‘double-effect’; e.g., the idea that acts may have
two sets of consequences, both intended and unintended, both of which
should be accounted for within any calculus pertaining to the war-
decision (Aquinas, 2002).
In stating these general precepts of the just war and fleshing out
their underlying propositions, Aquinas was seeking to explore the
possibilities of his distinction between Human and Natural Law on the
one hand and Eternal Law on the other. Though the resort to war if
not its very existence reflects humanity’s fallen condition, the poss-
ibility that a war can be conducted justly is consistent with Aquinas’
scholastic belief that humans can and should strive through the use of
reason and intellect to discipline Human Law (laws enacted by govern-
ments) to the strictures of Natural Law (humanity’s best attempt at
replicating Eternal Law in the temporal sphere). To that end, Aquinas’
contribution to the just war tradition was pivotal not only for the speci-
ficity it leant to just war theory, but also for the degree to which it incor-
porated into the just war conversation a philosophical consideration of the
possibility for human rationality to discern universal normative and legal
standards relative to the conduct of war.
Though Aquinas’ unique contributions to both the theory of the just
war and the social conversation enveloping it should not be over-
looked, it is also important to acknowledge the extent to which the
narrative he advanced was faithful to that which he had inherited from
his forebears within the Roman church. Like Augustine, Aquinas labored
intensively to sustain the notion that the pursuit of justice in social
relations including war is a worthwhile endeavor. To the extent that
Aquinas was able to deliver an explicit set of criteria dedicated to that
end, in which a just war is one waged as a last resort, he largely suc-
ceeded. At the same time, Aquinas categorically rejected the idea that
any perfect or complete attainment of justice in concert with the pros-
ecution of war was possible; in modern lexicon, when it comes to war
some form of (moral) ‘collateral damage’ is always an attendant poss-

ibility, if not likelihood. In the end, Aquinas’ contribution to the just
war ‘conversation’––which accepts with resignation the likelihood of
‘satisficing’ behavior (Simon, 1957) on the part of the agents to whom
the objective standard he advances is directed—is noteworthy for the
extent to which it recognizes an inversion between the precise criteria
of the just war theory and the ‘gray area’ surrounding its application.
A maturing conversation
The neo-scholastics
In seeking to advance a clear and irrefutable set of conditions defining
a ‘just war’, Augustine and Aquinas greatly advanced just war theory.
Yet it was only through the subsequent contributions of the medieval
theorists such as Francisco de Vitoria (1492–1546) and Francisco Suárez
(1548–1617) that a comprehensive theory of a just war defining and
extending the parameters of legitimacy relative to the war-decision emerged.
Neo-scholastics such as Vitoria and Suárez sought to encapsulate and
refine the work of Augustine and Aquinas in light of the sweeping social
transformations wrought by the Reformation and, later, the Enlighten-
ment. Their efforts were primarily aimed at further edification of the
moral and ethical duties attendant in commissioning various forms of
war, development of the ‘prudential’ aspects of the jus ad bellum con-
vention for use (with some discretion) by decision-makers, and acknow-
ledgement of the dilemmas associated with war’s initiation (and, later, its
conduct) within a changing social environment (Johnson, 1975).
One embodiment of this important turn in the just war tradition was
the moral distinction drawn between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ wars.
Reflecting the iterative nature of the just war conversation, this dis-
tinction was not new, receiving attention in both Hebrew and Roman
thought; what was new was the extent to which the medievalists
openly acknowledged and contended with the moral indeterminacy
associated with each. On the former score, defensive wars were defined
as military responses prompted by an armed attack against a pacific and
innocent society; these, medieval just war theorists contended, require no
special moral justification, as their legitimacy was self-evident (Vitoria,
1991). The practical implications of this conclusion were nothing less
than revolutionary, since the logical extension, writ large in Vitoria’s
De Indis et De Jure Belli, was that non-Christian sovereign authorities (such
as the indigenous peoples of the Americas) could wage ‘just wars’ they
were prompted by self-defense (Vitoria, 1917). Suárez’s reaffirmation that
all peoples and nations had a basic right to defend themselves furthered
this unprecedented recasting of the just war tradition towards a con-
cern with the pursuit and conduct of war even relative to those peoples
generally considered ‘beyond the pale’.5
No less problematic was the subject of ‘offensive’ wars, defined by
the medievalists as an armed response to some perceived (rather than
actual) injury. It was through the introduction of the notion of ‘offen-
sive’ wars that medieval theorists ushered into the conversation the
possibility that a pre-emptive war launched by ‘legitimate’ authorities
is not ipso facto just, as was alleged relative to the Crusades.6 In defining
‘legitimate’ offensive wars as those representing an extension of self-
defense, the neo-scholastics infused into the just war tradition height-
ened debate over the notion and relative merits of retributive justice as
well as that of the ‘punishment of evil’ (or of non-believers) as a legitimate
casus belli.7
The distinction drawn by the neo-scholastics between defensive and
offensive wars highlights the degree to which they sought to confront
the trend of ecclesiastical authorities appropriating just war theory for
the purposes of justifying ‘offensive’ wars against opponents outside
Christendom, and to reclaim the original, restrictive orientation of just
war theory in the process. While they retained the Augustinian con-
ception that the only just cause for war was righting a previous wrong,
the neo-scholastics also drew from the philosophical complexity of Aquinas
in contending that not all wrongs provided sufficient grounds for war.
Further, while retaining the Augustinian contention that sovereigns rather
than subjects are responsible for ascertaining what constitutes a ‘just’
cause for war, they asserted that sovereign authorities are not and cannot
always be certain of what is just or unjust (Johnson, 1975; Norena, 1975).
These efforts by medieval just war theorists to contest the appro-
priation of the just war tradition to support military adventurism were
not rooted in a concern with theological or theoretical purity, but rather
pragmatism. In the end, the goal of the neo-scholastics was the pre-
servation of the influence of the Church and its teachings on social
behavior in the face of extant challenges.8 This pragmatic objective was
especially important with regard to the conduct of war, as a moral
quandary that was long subject to Church dictates. With challenges to
papal authority emanating from the Holy Roman Empire beginning in
the 11th century, and proliferating throughout much of medieval Europe
after the Reformation, the neo-scholastics feared that the era of theo-
logical jurisprudence was coming to a close, with weighty matters such
as the question of what makes a war ‘just’ no longer the sole province
of religious authorities. As a result the theory could no longer serve

merely as an outline of the conditions that made a war consonant with
the teachings of the Church; rather, its scope had to be broadened.
Medieval theorists therefore faced a conundrum: namely, how to adapt
the theory of the just war to the realities of a fragmented Christendom
and a Western civilization undergoing tenuous secularization, while
still retaining moral authority over war-decisions for the Church.
The ‘law of nations’ and the just war

The aforementioned balancing act of the medieval just war theorists
helped flesh out the specific criteria defining a morally permissible resort
to war. In the end, the additional refinement of the already specific
criteria advanced by Aquinas established just war theory as the lodestar
for moral deliberations on war in the Western world. Furthermore,
their deft attempts to render the theory widely applicable for political
authorities while still reserving ultimate say over the morality of war
for the Church had the additional effect of affirming the link between
just war theory and natural law (Christopher, 1994). As deliberations
over the legitimacy of offensive and defensive wars (among other appli-
cations of the theory) suggest, the medievalists relied heavily on the
idea of a universal moral standard applicable to and transcending any
and all social and political divisions, whether in supporting ‘defensive’
wars of self-defense or ‘offensive’ wars launched proactively to uphold
and impose order and peace (Suárez, 1944).
At the same time, the medievalist contribution to the just war tradi-
tion serves as a prime illustration of the subjectivity of just war pro-
scriptions in application, in the process reminding us that we are better
served by the metaphor of ‘conversation’ than scientific theory (Clark,
2005; Evans, 2005). While the efforts of the medievalists to extend the
scope of just war theory while preserving papal authority over the great
moral dilemma of war may have preserved the theory, they did not
(and in fact could not) arrest the rapid and radical changes afoot in
society. Indeed, the case can be made that the aforementioned ‘balan-
cing act’ of the medievalists, rather than aiding the Church’s attempt at
retaining its sway over the politics of post-Reformation/pre-Westphalian
Europe, actually helped pave the way for gradual secularization of the
just war tradition (Bull et al., 1990).
Like the medievalists who preceded them, the main architects of the
emergent body of public international law—most notably the Italian
jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), his Dutch compatriot Hugo Grotius
(1583–1645), and, later, the Swiss legal philosopher Emerich de Vattel
(1714–1767)—each confronted the challenge of the age relative to

justice and war; namely, how to adapt and advance effective standards
for the conduct of war within a radically changing social milieu. Yet
while the neo-scholastics adhered to the notion of a common morality
and a common locus of moral and legal authority in the Church, the
so-called Grotian school instead embraced that changing milieu in pro-
mulgating a set of rules to govern an emergent international society
dubbed the ‘law of nations’.
The fashioning of the ‘law of nations’ was primarily a reaction to the
expressed limitations of canon law (formalized in the 11th century by
Pope Gregory VII) for governing relations including the conduct of war
between nations in an emerging international system. The main lim-
itation identified by Grotius himself was not canon law’s association
with the natural law tradition per se, but rather the unshakeable con-
viction that the divination of the universal moral standard at the heart
of natural law was the sole province of religious authorities. In seeking
to address this problem (and the resulting abuse of authority over the
war-decision it engendered), Grotius articulated two primary alter-
natives: the ‘law of nature’ and the ‘law of nations’ (Bull et al., 1990;
Parker, 1994).
For Grotius, the ‘law of nature’ originates in and embodies certain
universals derived from the innate sociability and desire for self-
preservation that characterizes the broad swath of humanity. Though
decidedly non-religious in its overtones, the logic of the ‘law of nature’
echoes the contention of the jus gentium that universal moral and
ethical standards exist, can be divined, and should inform the pre-
vailing body of law. Complementary to and in some ways superceding
the ‘law of nature’ was the ‘law of nations’, Grotius’ embrace of Gentili’s
previous argument for a body of law defined by customary practices
and volitional agreements between states and sovereigns (Van Der Molen,
1968). Grotius contended that it was the ‘law of nations’ that should
take precedent in regulating the relations between nations and their
sovereigns (e.g., diplomacy and statecraft), in that doing so portends
greater potential jurisprudence between and among nations in the
likely instance that moral consensus does not entail.
Though the ‘law of nations’ is responsible for the emergence of inter-
national legal positivism, natural law did retain a place within Grotian
thought. This was mainly through the contention that certain behav-
iors and practices between and among nations might be universally
acceptable (or unacceptable) even within the bounds of a largely pos-
itivist framework. For his part, Gentili had already leaned heavily on
the universalism of natural law to argue against a carte blanche right

of sovereigns to resort to war, contending that while Machiavelli’s
‘prince’ may not be bound by positive law, he nevertheless remained
subject to the dictates of natural law and volitional international law
(Boyle, 1992). This dual aspect of the ‘law of nations’ should not be
overlooked, as it reflects the degree to which the Grotian installment of
the just war ‘conversation’ was shaped by many of the same tensions
confronting the neo-scholastic theologians of the day (Bellamy, 2006).
Yet unlike the medieval just war theorists, the changes embodied in
the ‘law of nations’ were consonant with the broader changes afoot in
Western society. Shifting the locus of authority and responsibility for
the rightful conduct of war from the papacy and church hierarchy to
the newly emerging nation-state, the ‘law of nations’ retooled existing
legal doctrine (including the theory of the just war) in a volitional and
positivist direction in order to regulate the conduct of the secular
sovereign entities that would come to dominate a Westphalian order
(Vattel, 1916).
The so-called ‘laws of war’ advanced through the codification of
the ‘law of nations’ were clearly informed by the just war tradition, as
is evinced in Gentili’s De Jure Belli (1589) and Grotius’ ‘The Law of War
and Peace’ (De Jure Belli ac Pacis), in 1625. The main contribution of
the Grotian school to the just war ‘conversation’ was this translation of
the moral and ethical concerns at the heart of classical and medieval
just war theory into a set of rational-legal conventions regulating inter-
actions between sovereigns concerning the use of force (Bull et al.,
1990). Particularly telling was the degree to which Europe’s disastrous
holy wars informed this transformation of war from a theological to
judicial concern, so as to reverse the trend toward unconstrained wars
waged at the whims of the sovereign (Edwards, 1981). In this, the attempts
of the Grotian school to advance the just war tradition can be inter-
preted as chiefly motivated by a desire to reclaim the theory from the
abuses that had come to define it (Grotius, 1925). Such attempts were
concentrated on using just war theory as a platform for developing
legal restraints on conduct on the battlefield, as well as in holding
sovereigns to account for their war-decisions. In the latter case, they
reaffirmed the importance of just cause, right intention, and pro-
portionality of ends independently as well as collectively. In seeking to
advance the contention that possessing competent authority alone is
not a sufficient basis to launch a war, the treatment of the war-decision
within the Grotian school reaffirmed the breadth and complexity of
the just war tradition.
While the efforts to introduce and develop a secularized ‘law of

nations’ had a major impact on the evolution of international legal
conventions on war, it also proved vital to the just war ‘conversation’,
decoupling the quest for establishing constraints on war from an explic-
itly religious basis and rooting them instead in appeals to human ratio-
nality. In the end, the Grotian legacy relative to the just war tradition
is Janus-faced. Its reclamation of the just war tradition served to advance
international public law, while at the same time codifying within that
body of law important features of the Augustinian and scholastic ele-
ments of the just war. Thus, while the introduction and profusion of
Grotian thought paved the way for the crafting of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions in the 19th and 20th centuries, it also helped infuse the
particularistic tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition into a body of inter-
national legal conventions intended to regulate the conduct of war among
secular states (Phillips, 1984). This complexity undoubtedly affirms the
embeddedness of the just war tradition within the Western historical
and cultural milieu, while also suggesting a basis for the continuing dis-
cord over, and non-compliance with, the ‘laws of war’ within contem-
porary international society.
Pardon the interruption: Demise of the just war
The intensive and extensive transformation of Western society which

prompted the development of the ‘law of nations’ (and the subsuming
of elements of the just war tradition within that law) by the Grotian
school continued in the years leading up to and following the Enlight-
enment, profoundly impacting the just war tradition in the process.
Whereas Gentili and Grotius sought to straddle the divide between the
universalist epistemology of the classical and medieval just war theo-
rists and the fragmented social realm they inhabited, by the 18th century
the ‘law of nations’ took a decidedly positivist turn, embodied in the
publication of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens (1758).
The rise of positivism

Relative to the war-decision, the heightened emphasis on popular
sovereignty produced by the age of Enlightenment proved a damaging
if not fatal blow to any remaining credibility associated with divine
authority concerning the matter of war. The concomitant rise of nations
that followed in the wake of the American and French Revolutions
effectively severed the connection between the war-decision and any
sense or source of universal moral standards associated with it; war,
like other transactions in the political sphere, should be conducted at

the behest of the people. In responding to the consolidation of the
early nation-state after the peace of Westphalia, Vattel’s vision of what
constituted the conditions for a ‘just war’ as reflected in Le Droit
des Gens (a definitive source of international jurisprudence for two
centuries after its publication) eliminated any residual traces of natural
law.
This second iteration of the ‘law of nations’ advanced a robustly pos-
itivist orientation that relied chiefly on a conception of legal sover-
eignty predicated on the assumption of functional equality (Vattel,
1916). Vattel’s transformation of the ‘law of nations’ relative to the
war-decision represents a pivotal turn in the just war narrative. Vattel
did not declare the subject of war to be amoral, nor did he dismiss the
idea of constraining war; indeed, he continued to adhere to the idea
that sovereigns had an incumbent duty to take into account classical
considerations of just cause and right intention. So it was that Vattel’s
version of the ‘law of nations’ could simultaneously feature an appeal
to sovereigns to continue to recognize the just war criteria alongside an
insistence that sovereigns had an inherent right to wage war whenever
they deemed it necessary.
Beyond Vattel, the philosophers Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and
Christian Wolff (1679–1754) were also key contributors in this pos-
itivist appropriation of just war theory as the basis for the laws gov-
erning war in an international system oriented around nation-states
(Nardin, 2003). The emphasis on the centrality of national sovereigns
and the volitional legal orientation necessitated by it purged from the
just war ‘conversation’ any vestiges of a universal standard under-
pinning these considerations. Rather, the primary moral concern
relative to the war-decision was the duty of the state to ensure the well-
being of the population to which it was beholden—a duty which legit-
imated war, in the event the sovereign determined it necessary for that
purpose.9
Raison d’état
With the state emerging as the central vehicle of political authority in
the Treaty of Westphalia (an arrangement repeatedly reaffirmed there-
after, including at the Congress of Vienna), deliberation over the justice
of the war-decision was effectively banished from legal and political dis-
course. What emerged was something close to a tautology sparked by the
fusion of popular and state sovereignty in liberal thought and practice.
States were both the most powerful and most legitimate form of political
authority; ipso facto, they should be able to act as they see fit, since
as powerful and legitimate representatives of the nation, their actions
would naturally be ‘just’ to the extent they reflected the popular will.
Within an international political environment where the construct of
‘the state’ possessed independent, unrivaled, and more or less unques-
tioned status, power, and responsibilities, the jus ad bellum convention
and the type of moral inquiry it represented possessed little relevance
(Forsyth, 1992).
The pre-eminent position afforded to the nation-state within the
second iteration of the ‘law of nations’ informed and affirmed the doc-
trine of raison d’état that dominated the war-decision and deliberation
about war throughout the 19th and early 20th century. It also reflected
the degree to which war, formerly a contest of honor and skill as well
as a display of power launched by vassals at the behest of monarchs
and waged through the proxy of knights and mercenaries, had come to
be harnessed under the yoke of the modern state. The emergence of
the state to a position as the primary unit of political organization
in the international system is closely intertwined with the evolution
of modern warfare; consider, for instance, such 19th century develop-
ments as the formation of professional standing armies to wage war,
the creation of public sector finance and the establishment of per-
manent systems of taxation to fund those armies and their military
campaigns, and especially the introduction of the convention of raison
d’état as a sufficient justification for war (Mann, 1993). It is yet further
affirmed by the degree to which the very authority of the state depended,
as Weber (1958) contended, on the possession of a monopoly on the
legitimate employment of organized violence.10 By virtue of possessing
this ‘monopoly’, the state was able to secure its interests and protect its
sovereignty while also advancing its position as the central actor on the
world stage—and by extension, the sole legitimate source of authority
over the war-decision.
Given the centrality of violence in the formation and evolution of
the modern state, it is not hard to envision how war came to be seen as
little more than another policy instrument in the toolkit of statesmen
(Clausewitz, 1984). The archetype of the Clausewitzian ‘old’ war held
that wars were the product of rational calculation. Political leaders
utilized the tools of the state over which they presided (professional
standing armies and national economies of scale) to deploy over-
whelming force against similarly organized opponents in a contest over
some discernable national interest(s). This dominant representation elim-
inated the need for deliberation about war (moral or otherwise) beyond
consideration of its strategic implications and its utility in advancing

the interests of the nation-state; e.g., ‘…if war is part of policy, than
policy will determine its character’ (Clausewitz, 1984: 605–606).
This stark departure from five centuries of challenges to the unchecked
authority of the sovereign over the war-decision within the just war tra-
dition notwithstanding, the larger point here is the incompatibility of
the concerns at the heart of the just war tradition and ‘conversation’ with
a ‘thick’ legal positivism in which national sovereigns serve as judge, jury,
and in the event that war occurs, executioner. In light of this irreconcil-
ability, the extent to which the evolutionary turn toward positive law in
the 17th and 18th century international system consigned the jus ad bellum
convention and its natural law foundation to irrelevance cannot be under-
stated. What followed logically from the attempt to sustain the just
war tradition in the midst of an international order oriented around
the unchallenged power of the Weberian state to declare and prosecute
Clausewitzian wars of strategic gain was its effective negation.
The modern resurgence: Just war revisited
The near total approximation of Hobbesian anarchy defining the inter-

national system beginning in the 18th century accounted for numerous
major conflicts and near-conflicts, sustained a climate of overt military
intervention, and culminated in two devastating world wars. The anar-
chical nature of the international system during this period left it to
enlightened and representative statesmen to navigate calculations on
when to use force solely in accordance with their assessment of the
national interest. The pursuit of self-determination and statebuilding
and the construction and deconstruction of empires that marked that
period were bloody endeavors, and military force was an instrument of
vital importance to sovereign authorities engaged in them. Since war
was particularly useful to such projects, statesmen saw no compelling
reason to seek its restraint. As such, the primary concern became not
whether a potential war was just, but rather whether it was likely to
succeed.
As Walzer notes, the assumption pervading ‘the age of Vattel to that
of Oppenheim is that states always have, like Hobbist individuals, the
right to fight’ (Walzer, 1977: 63). However, in contrast to some pre-
vailing characterizations (Bellamy, 2006), the just war ‘conversation’
did not completely disappear from Western discourse in the 18th century.
Indeed, the very transcendence of anarchy and the pervasive systemic
violence it permitted proved crucial to the resumption of the just war
‘conversation’. With the reallocation of political authority to the modern

state complete and total, the modern resurgence of just war theory was
prompted not by the original motive of the classical and medieval just
war theorists to discern and apply universal constraints on the war-
decision but rather out of a desire to advance a compelling rationale
for the use of force.
War in the liberal age

While the maturation of the modern state in the Westphalian order
seemingly relegated moral deliberation over the war-decision to the
dustbin of history, the internal contradictions of liberalism relative to
the conduct of statecraft and the use of force effectively reconstituted
it. Within a systemic environment defined by persistent instability and
violence, the utility of the use of force in the pursuit of the national
interest as well as the frequency with which it was employed were beyond
dispute. However, such realities proved problematic in the degree to
which they contradicted and undermined the Kantian premises of a pro-
gressive, cooperative order on which Western liberal thought and practice
depended. Thus, the modern resumption of the just war ‘conversation’
beginning in the 19th century was prompted by a logical conundrum that
had come to vex liberal statesmen: namely, how the gospel of ‘progress’
to which liberal societies were beholden could be preserved and even
expanded within an anarchical international system in which the use of
force was not only commonplace, but necessary and even desirable.
Foreshadowing the discussion of the ‘just war frame’, the ‘solution’
to that conundrum was found in a return to the just war tradition. The
resurgence of the language and concepts of just war theory in the late
19th century rested largely on two inter-related propositions: one, that
the inherent virtue and universal appeal of liberal values and insti-
tutions conferred greater legitimacy on the foreign policy interests and
actions of Western liberal states; and two, the need to promote and
project liberal norms and institutional arrangements externally to pro-
vide for and ensure a just, stable, and pacific international order (Lang,
1985). Animated by these two propositions, by the late 19th century the
reconstituted just war ‘conversation’ again permeated the social nar-
rative concerning the war-decision in the West, especially in Britain,
America and, to a lesser degree, France.11
As translated through the rhetoric of liberals such as William Gladstone,
the just war tradition became an animating vehicle for the forcible export of
the ‘social contract’, even in embryonic nations whose self-determination
had not yet been granted (Howard, 1978; Johnson, 1999).12 Leading the
charge were radical British liberals such as H.N. Brailsford, J.A. Hobson,
T.H. Green, and David Lloyd George, all of whom identified the chief
foreign policy concern of Britain and indeed all liberal societies as the
duty of defending and expanding liberal values, including national
self-determination. Contradicting the admonitions of Mill, Bentham,
and Richard Cobden on the dangers inherent in foreign intervention
(admonitions which Hobson rejected and Brailsford condemned as a
‘sterile and impracticable ideal’; Leventhal, 1974), British liberals were
particularly eager to employ force across the Continent in the face of per-
sistent challenges to liberal ideals by barbarous (Ottoman) and backward
(Russian) empires (Dangerfield, 1997).
In the American context, this radical liberal internationalism took
root in the jingoistic ‘New Whiggery’ that defined American foreign
policy in the latter half of the 19th century, linking imperial ambition
with liberal ideology (Hartz, 1955; Bukovansky, 2002). The sense of
natural duty ascribed to a dynamic liberal republic such as the United
States provided the ideological firmament necessary to transform the
US into a major world power after the Spanish-American War, while at
the same time exposing the peculiar contradiction of a liberal society
bent on expanding its ideals through force of arms. As in Gladstone’s
England, appeals to the just war tradition in constructing an argument
in favor of the use of force (rather than one seeking to limit it) helped
reconcile this contradiction. President McKinley, in promoting war
with Spain over Cuba in 1898, rooted the debate in moral universalism,
contending the necessity of the war stemmed from ‘obligations we can-
not disregard’ (McKinley, 1898; quoted in Hunt, 1987: 38). More explic-
itly, control of the spoils of this obligation (annexation and control of
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines) represented a ‘great trust’ carried
by the nation ‘under the providence of God and in the name of human
progress and civilization’ (ibid.). Similarly, turn-of-the-century Senator
Albert Beveridge (R-Indiana) argued in favor of a moral duty to undertake
the Spanish-American War to subdue and defeat the ‘infidels to the gospel
of liberty’ (Beveridge, 1908).13
In light of this radical liberal appropriation of the just war tradition,
‘just causes’ were readily advanced in conjunction with the war-decisions
of the late 19th and early 20th century, including (but not limited to)
the use of force to promote self-determination for the Serbs and Bul-
garians living under Ottoman rule, the liberation of Italy from Austrian
control, and the ‘civilization’ of Cuba and the Philippines. So it was that
liberal statesmen could condemn imperialism while participating in
the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War, champion international peace
conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 while engaging in arms

races and wars of colonial ambition, and seek a transnational ‘public
law’ for Europe while enmeshing themselves in entangling and ulti-
mately disastrous alliances. In so recasting the just war tradition, liberal
statesmen identified a convenient, effective, and culturally resonant
tool to balance interests and ideals, as well as to reconcile the seemingly
contradictory impulses of might and right. Purpose wedded to power
became a liberal cause célèbre, foreshadowing the rise of the ‘declaratory
tradition’ in 20th century international law (Jones, 1992).
Just wars and world wars

The early and mid-20th century was defined by profound dualism and
vacillation within the just war ‘conversation’. While the decision to
employ military force to support the export of liberal values (such as in
support of nations seeking self-determination) was rendered ‘just’ if
not obligatory by liberal statesmen, conventional wars between major
powers remained unconscionable. No doubt this was due to the greater
magnitude and implications attached to conventional inter-state war
relative to military intervention. Such differences restricted the degree
of agency or choice associated with the former in comparison to the
latter. Whereas military intervention might plausibly be interpreted by
decision-makers or sold to the public as an opportunity to forcibly
advance or defend the liberal sphere, inter-state wars clearly threatened
not only relations between nations but also the very premises on which
liberalism (interdependence) and modernity (progress) depended.14 While
the forcible export of democracy retained a decided appeal, the prospect
of major war remained an atavistic evil (Peceny, 1999b).
This prevailing view of the evils of conventional war was further under-
scored by the unprecedented devastation wrought by World War I. With
the legacy of ‘total’ war weighing heavily on the collective psyche of the
West in the aftermath of the Great War, liberal statesmen again turned to
the just war tradition—this time, as a means of defining a set of workable
constraints on the decision to go to war that could be embedded within a
collective security system. The League of Nations arrangement that emerged
from the ashes of total war directly reflected this impetus. As has been
well chronicled, the League’s raison d’être of collective security provision
and restraint of inter-state disputes was not complemented by effective
capacity to deal directly with the use of force by states. Yet just as damag-
ing from the standpoint of the League’s effectiveness was the extent to
which the alleged justice of liberal interventionism continued to inform
the views of the League’s architects, Wilson chief among them.
Established by early 20th century liberal internationalists, the League

proved to be an institutional embodiment of the very duality that per-
meated that ideology. Created to serve as a ‘general association of nations’
designed to prevent or limit war, the League was also envisioned as the
chief implement to promote Wilson’s admonition (contemporaneously
expressed in the Fourteen Points) that Western nations take up the vir-
tuous cause of any and all nations seeking political self-determination
through whatever means necessary (Calhoun, 1986; Fitzsimons, 1995).
This fundamental contradiction within liberal thought concerning the
war-decision proved debilitating to the League of Nations, but was hardly
unprecedented; indeed, a similar tension undermined the Hague confer-
ences of 1899 and 1907, and would later serve as the basis for the derisive
reception afforded to the Kellogg-Briand pact upon its introduction in
1928 (Cohen, 1989). Each of these attempts to constrain the war-decision
sought support from the classical (restraintist) orientation of the just war
tradition. Yet each was summarily undermined not only by the contra-
dictory actions of liberal states (who continued to employ force in con-
junction with the doctrine of raison d’état, such as in the joint Allied
military efforts against the Bolsheviks in Russia) but also by persistent
appeals to the just war tradition to rationalize those actions.
While renewed emphasis on war as a last resort during the inter-war
period represented something of a counter-point in the resumed just
war ‘conversation’, that counter-point proved a minority view incon-
sistent with the broader social narrative enveloping the war-decision.
Indeed, the very fact that efforts to limit war through renewed appeals
to the just war tradition after World War I occurred within the confines
of an anarchical international system and positivist international legal
framework, reinforcing both the place of military force and the perceived
‘right’ of statesmen to employ it had much to do with the shortcomings
of efforts to advance international legal and institutional restraints on
war and the war-decision during the inter-war period. The inchoate nature
of the just war ‘conversation’ during that period reflected the absence of
any shared agreement in Western liberal society concerning the morality
of the war-decision. This disconnect became particularly evident with the
collapse of the League and the coterminous ascent of fascism in the 1930s
(Johnson, 1975).
The provocations of fascism evident in Spain, Ethiopia, Manchuria, the
Sudetenland, and beyond provided the conditions in which the potential
for social consensus on the subject of war necessary to sustain the just
war ‘conversation’ in earnest returned. Again, as in the late 19th century,
the just war tradition became the basis for appeals favoring military
action rather than arguing for its limitation. Prompted largely by revul-
sion to the internal nature of fascist regimes as well to their increas-
ingly belligerent conduct in foreign relations, Western liberals returned
anew to the language and logic of jus ad bellum as a means to justify
the use of force. Even before the Nazi assault on Poland that sparked
World War II, such appeals demonstrated a broader resonance and greater
potential for majority support than did preceding efforts to recycle the
just war tradition into a framework to constrain war. This was due in
no small part to the growing perception that confronting fascism was
a moral duty in that it was the only hope for a lasting peace.15 Indeed, as
Howard (1978) contends, it was largely the pangs of liberal conscience
alongside a militant dedication to the correction of injustice through
whatever means necessary that closed the book on pacifism after Hitler’s
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
World War II represented a historical watershed in the just war ‘conver-
sation’. Throughout the first half of the century, the linkage between
moral deliberation and the use of force was used instrumentally by
Western liberal states as a means of justifying an activist, messianic liber-
alism committed to demonstrating the dangers of non-intervention. Even
the horrors of World War I only led to a temporary abatement in this
practice, with the aberration of the counter-point of the 1920s pass-
ing quickly away with the advent of the fascist threat in the 1930s.
Undoubtedly due to this gradual buildup of moral justifications for the
use of military force by Western liberal democracies throughout the first
four decades of the 20th century, World War II proved to be the most
prominent example of a modern war sustained by direct and frequent
appeals to the just war tradition (Walzer, 1977). The prominence of this
representation of the war is borne out both by the degree to which it
remains the ‘gold standard’ for a just war in the Western popular ima-
gination, as well as by the extent of historical revisionism and myth-
making which has obscured the evident fact that, in just war terms, the
war was one of the least justly prosecuted wars in history (ibid.).
In the view of Allied leaders and publics alike, the war itself was
justified by transgressions against the ‘law of nations’ by the Axis powers
(both in their internal and external conduct). Those transgressions, ubiq-
uitous and chilling on the part of the Axis powers, allowed for an exceed-
ingly convincing case to be made that the conditions precipitating the
war were ‘just’ in accordance with the ad bellum convention (though
perhaps the most ‘just’ of the war’s just causes, the systematic atrocities
carried out against Jews and others by the Nazi regime, hardly registered
in the calculations of the Allies to declare war). This claim was crucial
not only in rendering and sustaining a popular representation of the

war as ‘just’, but also in catalyzing a resurgence of natural law and the
conception of universal morality on which it depended.16
From the standpoint of the just war ‘conversation’, World War II
reflects two important and related truths for the modern era. The first is
that wars that are successfully attached in the broader social narrative and
popular imagination to just war conventions are likely to have wide-
spread if not universal appeal and support. The second is that a successful
and effective application of the just war tradition to the war-decision is
likely to limit and obscure widespread social consideration of conditions
related to the war’s actual conduct, once initiated. The continued rever-
berations within the consciousness of the nation of its righteousness in
going to war often leads to a de facto obviation of the moral compulsion
for combatants and those responsible for the conduct of the war to exer-
cise restraint once that war has begun (Walzer, 1977). In the prosecution
of World War II, Thorstein Veblen’s stark and radical admonitions on the
eve of American entry into World War I in 1917—that peace would and
could only come through the utter destruction of warlike nations like
Germany, as well as any voices of moderation at home—seem to have
found their translation in the conduct of the Allies (Veblen, 1945).
In this regard, World War II not only represents a historical watershed
in the just war ‘conversation’, but also a future blueprint for liberal states-
men relative to the framing of the war-decision. From World War II
onward, decision-makers in Western liberal states have disproportionately
appealed to jus ad bellum considerations to sell the war-decision, while
skirting jus in bello concerns relative to the conduct of the war after that
decision has been made. Like most of the wars that have followed it,
World War II was cast as a ‘just’ war by those responsible for waging
it chiefly (if not solely) due to its satisfaction of criteria such as just cause
and right intent; so cast, no further moral deliberation or reflection would
seem necessary.17
Continuing the conversation
The enduring resonance of the just war tradition proved indispensable

to the post-war effort to curtail the excesses of international anarchy
(unrestrained warfare chief among them). Indeed, the influence of the
jus ad bellum convention on the architects and architecture of the post-
war international order to the war-decision is evident, and represents the
first effective reference to the restrictive interpretation of that convention
since the rehabilitation of the just war tradition in the late 19th century.
Shaping the post-war order

If World War II demonstrates the potential for widely accepted just
causes to enable and sustain a close approximation of total war, then
the institutions introduced in the aftermath of World War II demon-
strate the degree to which liberal statesmen learned from previous
(failed) attempts at establishing the conditions deemed necessary to
sustain a long peace. Foremost among the failings of the League of
Nations was that institution’s inability to inhibit the unsanctioned use
of force by states—a shortcoming deemed paramount for any successor
organization to avoid. It was on that premise that the notion of collec-
tive security articulated in the United Nations Charter, and in parti-
cular the authority of the fledgling United Nations Organization relative
to the war-decision, was based. On that front, as Henkin (1991) notes,
the principal purpose of the UN Charter was to advance the norm of
self-defense as the sole lawful cause for a resort to war by sovereign
states.18 That claim is evident in the predisposition of the UN Charter
against the use of force as well as its emphasis on the principle of
last resort and the doctrine of non-intervention. As Article 2(4) of the
Charter stipulates:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.19
The influence of the just war tradition on the ‘law of armed conflict’
generated after World War II was also evident in the Charter’s explicit
articulation of the (limited) possibility for exceptions to the rule of
non-intervention. Such exceptions were only permissible in conjunc-
tion with authorization from the Security Council, as mandated under
Article VII. Extending the sole custodial obligation to attend to threats
to ‘international peace and security’ to the Security Council is parti-
cularly significant, since it reflects the intention of the UN’s architects
to embed within the Security Council the ‘competent’ or legitimate
authority of a sovereign—an authority crucial to the classical (natural
law-based) interpretation of just war theory, and one that had been long
missing from the just war ‘conversation’ (Claude, 1961; Nardin, 1992).20
Accordingly, and in line with classical translations of the ad bellum
convention, the use of force was held out as acceptable and legitimate
in two primary instances: in self-defense by the victim of an attack,
and in collective defense of the victim of that attack by other (or all)
states.
The reliance on the jus ad bellum convention even in articulating
possible exceptions to the principle of non-intervention further con-
veys the impact of the just war tradition in advancing and shaping the
‘law of armed conflict’ as well as prevailing norms concerning the use
of force in the post-World War II international system (Gray, 2008).
Reflecting the changed perception of the UN’s (primarily Western liberal)
architects toward the war-decision, the institution of the United Nations
and the international order it seeks to promote remain prime embodi-
ments of the return of the jus ad bellum convention in a restrictive sense
to international political discourse and to the ongoing effort to con-
strain the use of force by states. Rather than drawing from the just
war tradition instrumentally to provide moral ‘cover’ for the pursuit
of messianic liberalism and/or raison d’état, the explicit intention of
the UN’s architects in rehabilitating the restrictive version of the jus ad
bellum to international law and organization was to provide a (secular)
natural law basis for the definition and provision of collective security.
In doing so, they hoped to provide a moral and legal basis for the pre-
vailing view that, in the future, attempts to alter the status quo or
advance the interests of the state through the unsanctioned use of
force should be considered illegal and worthy of sanction (Cohen,
1989). As such, one can safely conclude that the just war tradition
helps underpin a legal and normative framework that has survived the
Cold War and which remains largely intact today, shortcomings and
challenges to it notwithstanding.
Prolonging the conversation

Aside from its contribution to the prevailing institutional and legal
conventions, the restraintist strain within the just war tradition has
enjoyed a further renaissance within the social narrative surrounding
the war-decision since the end of World War II. This renaissance began
in earnest in the United States in the Vietnam War era, kindled largely
by academics and theologians concerned with the insularity and immoral-
ity of the war-decision, as well as popular perception that applications
of military force in that conflict were made in a deliberative void (Osgood
and Tucker, 1967; Ramsey, 1968; Cohen et al., 1974; O’Brien, 1979a).
Emblematic of this narrative renaissance was Walzer’s seminal Just and
Unjust Wars, originally appearing in 1977. Dedicated largely to the task
of reclaiming the war-decision from those who would deny the impor-
tance of moral deliberation to it, Walzer attempted to reconcile nearly
three centuries of tension within the just war ‘conversation’ by advanc-

ing both a strong defense of the restraintist orientation of the jus ad
bellum convention and identifying and arguing for a set of exceptions
(e.g., ‘just causes’) to that set of restraints.
On the former score, Walzer sought to elucidate the utility of just war
theory by introducing the ‘theory of aggression’, which he contended
serves as the epistemological basis for thinking about war within the pre-
vailing Westphalian system. The roots of the theory of aggression in the
just war tradition are evident in its contention that aggressive war is a
crime—meaning that, by extension, wars fought in self-defense against
aggression, to enforce the law against aggression, and to punish the
aggressor are justifiable. Walzer’s chief contribution on the latter point
is the claim the theory of aggression and the law of armed conflict it pro-
duced has proven overly restrictive in contemporary application—emas-
culating just war theory by rendering it useless for all but the promotion
of a strict legalist paradigm governing the use of force.
In Walzer’s view, if the strict legalist paradigm of self-defense con-
tingent on state sovereignty remains the sole basis for determination
of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of war, we are bound to see the indis-
criminant use of force by states continue. In confining ourselves to the
legalist paradigm, we effectively give our blessing to unrestrained war-
fare, since it contains no restrictive conditions aside from the violation
of state sovereignty. Walzer contends that this paradox borne of the
legalist paradigm (e.g., that of an overly restrictive conception of when
force is acceptable in fact producing a context in which force can be
employed with few restraints and little deliberation) can be solved
by drawing from the just war tradition in order to identify exceptional
circumstances in which the use of force is justified. Walzer’s potential
exceptions to the strict legalist paradigm include the use of force in
‘anticipation’ (e.g., pre-emption), in support of secession or national
liberation, for the purpose of counter-intervention, or as a means of
humanitarian intervention. Still, in all such cases, the use of force,
while not automatically criminal, must be justified, with the burden of
proof on the user (1977: 86).
Such potential exceptions to the legalist paradigm allow for restor-
ation of the prudential element of just war theory and, more broadly,
the applicability of moral deliberation and contemplation to the war-
decision calculus. To that end, Walzer provides both theoretical and
empirical accounts of the potential admissibility of force in a first-strike
capacity (in the event territorial integrity and/or political independence is
threatened), to support ‘a community…whose members are committed
to independence and ready and able to determine the conditions of

their own existence’ (1977: 93), to protect the integrity a state that has
already been invaded by an outside power, or to stop or reverse acts
that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’, including the gross violation
of human rights (1977: 101). The just war tradition has long broached
the war-decision relative to many of these circumstances, Walzer’s con-
tribution to the contemporary just war ‘conversation’ is rehabilitative
rather than revolutionary (O’Brien, 1979b).21 Furthermore, he was clearly
preoccupied with the debate surrounding just causes—a preoccupation
he shared with many decision-makers at the time (and since), largely at
the expense of the remainder of the ad bellum criteria. Still, in identifying
and edifying a set of revisions to the theory of aggression, Walzer estab-
lished the relevance of the just war tradition for practical application to
the pressing problems of the modern age (Orend, 2000).
Arguments attesting to the applicability of the just war tradition to
the contemporary dilemmas produced by and associated with war were
subsequently extended by Doyle (1983a, 1983b), Cohen (1984), and
Elshtain (1991), among others. The intensification of the just war ‘con-
versation’ in the 1980s and 1990s was clearly a product of the renewed
and expanded concern over the means and ends of modern war after
the decline of détente in the 1970s and the massive buildup of American
and Soviet nuclear stockpiles that followed (Tucker, 1985; Finnis et al.,
1987). One widely resonant contribution to the just war ‘conversation’
elicited by that particular concern was the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops’ pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our
Response (NCCB, 1983). This letter, as well as similar subsequent mis-
sives from the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the question(s) of war sought
to elucidate the transcendent universality of the principles of the just war
tradition while reaffirming the currency of its application to modern
methods of war. Moreover, echoing the Augustinian tradition which
inspired it, the letter exhorts those concerned with curbing the savagery
of war to ‘look at the world as it is, not simply as we would want it to be’
(NCCB, 1983: 22).
The return of the just war tradition to the forefront of public conscious-
ness in the aftermath of Vietnam and in the face of potential nuclear cat-
astrophe reflected the reality that at the core of the just war theory lies
a blueprint for informed inquiry into the moral legitimacy of the war-
decision (Ramsey, 1968). To that end, the resurgence of the just war ‘con-
versation’ has continued into the post-Cold War era, remaining at the
forefront of the prevailing social narrative surrounding most if not all
of the major questions associated with the legality and legitimacy of
contemporary warfare and military intervention (Hudson, 2009; Falk,

2001). The just war tradition has been invoked relative to the debate over
pre-emptive wars, forced democratization, and regime change (Elshtain,
2003; Buchanan, 2006; Mellow, 2006), military responses to transnational
terrorism, failed states, and other ‘new’ security challenges (O’Driscoll,
2008; Patterson, 2007; Posner and Sykes, 2004; Crawford, 2003), the role
of non-state actors in authorizing or participating in war (Pattison, 2008;
Orend, 2006), humanitarian intervention (Nardin, 2003; Chesterman,
2003; Miller, 2000), and the connection between the war decision and
the obligations of jus post bellum (Orend, 2002; Walzer, 2004; Williams
and Caldwell, 2006). It has also been taken to task by critics contending it
is largely a gendered implement promoting a male heroism that systemat-
ically excludes issues of concern to women (Sjoberg, 2006) or, even more
fundamentally, a coherent mythology of illusion regarding the prospects
for moral conduct relative to war (Fiala, 2008).
In sum, as this discussion of the ever-evolving just war tradition
demonstrates, the notion of the ‘just war’ has been and remains embed-
ded within a subjective and highly changeable narrative enveloping
the war-decision. Throughout history, the social narrative concerning
the legitimate basis for war prevailing in Western civilization has been
defined and propelled by the just war tradition, which (like the narrative
it shapes) has swung pendulum-like from a restraining position to a facil-
itative one. With the pragmatic appreciation for its utility in advancing
and sustaining the case for war on the part of liberal statesmen ushering
in its modern resurgence beginning in the late 19th century, the pen-
dulum has clearly shifted in the latter (facilitative) direction. This is
evident both in the degree to which the language and concepts of just
war theory were affixed to military intervention in service of liberal inter-
nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century, as well as the part
it played in mobilizing popular support for the prosecution of ‘total’ war
(World War II) and for the various war-decisions subsumed within the
long ideological struggle of the Cold War that followed it.
The restrictive strain within the just war ‘conversation’ has had its
moments, namely in its influence on the architects of the United
Nations system, pursuant to disastrous military campaigns in Vietnam
and Iraq, and in relation to the specter of nuclear holocaust. Such
installments in the recent and contemporary just war ‘conversation’
uphold the pendulum metaphor, and the continuation of the long-
standing struggle between the restraintist inclinations of many just war
theorists and the utilitarian impulses of statesmen interested in appro-
priating the just war tradition to legitimate the use of military force
that metaphor seeks to describe. Still, in the end, the modern resur-
gence of the just war tradition undoubtedly has much to do with its
relevance and perceived utility for the politics of signification and the
reconciliation of the war-decision with the professed values of liberal
societies. As an instrument for that reconciliation, it is to the process
of framing, and specifically the mechanism of the ‘just war frame’, that
I now turn.
3
Framing, Foreign Policy, and
Just Wars
While extant changes in the views of liberal societies toward the prac-
tice of war suggest that the utility and by extension the practice of war
could or perhaps should be in jeopardy in the United States (and poten-
tially other liberal societies), this is clearly not the case. The origins of
the reason it is not, I contend, can be found in the continued prom-
inence of the just war tradition and the discursive forum it provides
for considerations of and arguments for war’s continued legitimacy.
Yet beyond that sustained and even resurgent ‘conversation’ concern-
ing the acceptable conditions for war in modern liberal societies, it is
the concerted effort of foreign policy decision-makers to tap into that
tradition in seeking to ‘frame’ decisions to go to war that provides the
crucial animus for war’s persistence and prominence.
As the analytical device at the heart of this research, framing occupies
a crucial space as a bridge between foreign policy decisions and society,
in the process telling us much about the reciprocal interplay between the
two. In seeking to systematically investigate the constellation of ideas,
values, beliefs, and symbols that decision-makers rely on in order to frame
(and legitimize) the decision to employ military force in response to for-
eign policy crises, the concept of framing provides a logical starting point.
What are frames? How are they made and used, and to what end? How
do they differ in their defining characteristics and effects—and how do
we evaluate them, particularly within a foreign policy context?
Defining frames
Framing across the disciplines

As befits what one of the foremost scholars of framing effects referred
to as its ‘scattered conceptualization’ (Entman, 1993), there is no single
46
Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars 47
definition of, or common approach to, framing. Indeed, the concept of

frames and the study of their application and utility spans the social
sciences, with important and relatively distinct translations in dis-
ciplines including sociology, psychology, and somewhat more recently
political science, as well as in fields such as communications and media
studies and linguistics. In the sociological literature, frames are most often
invoked (and studied) by social movement theorists, who view the uti-
lization of frames as a crucial determinant of the prospects for (and limits
to) political mobilization and collective action. Appropriating a working
definition of frames clearly discernable in the work of Erving Goffman
and Kenneth Boulding, among others, this robust body of research gen-
erally treats the frame as a dependent variable––meaning that the frame
itself serves as the object of study, with independent factors identified
and investigated in light of their impact on dimensions such as the process
of frame formation, framing objectives, and how frames work.
Frames have been associated with sociological inquiry and the study
of social movements in conjunction with what Mayer Zald (1996) dubbed
four ‘traditions’ in framing research.1 While these ‘traditions’ approach
social movements and the essence and importance of frames in accord-
ance with them in significantly different ways, each share at base Goff-
man’s view of frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ which provide a
necessary backdrop for understanding so as to enable individuals to
‘locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their lifespace and
the world at-large’ (Goffman, 1974: 21). While the emphasis of sociology
in general, and social movement theorizing in particular, on the frame
as a dependent variable worthy of direct consideration and analysis has
arguably advanced the concept of framing the furthest, one would be
remiss in not acknowledging the contributions of other social scientists
to the cumulation of knowledge about the dynamics and especially the
effects of frames. Two disciplinary traditions in particular—psychology
and political science—stand out in this regard, each motivated by different
concerns about frame effects while at the same time similarly considering
them from the standpoint of independent variables.
Within the psychological literature, frames have largely been intro-
duced and advanced as devices that significantly impinge upon and alter
individual perceptions and, by extension, the individual’s decision-making
calculus, thereby calling into question assumptions of rationality. Perhaps
the apex of psychological research in framing effects to date is the Nobel
Prize-winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) on fram-
ing, prospect theory, and individual choice, which found among other
things that different presentations of identical decision-making scenarios
significantly impact people’s choices and evaluations of the options

presented to them.
Though arriving to the scene a bit later, in recent years political
scientists have warmed to the importance of frames—largely in con-
junction with, and as a means for, increased scrutiny of the agenda-
setting function of the mass media and the interactive dynamics between
the media, public opinion, and policy-making. Like psychologists, polit-
ical scientists by and large have not been directly concerned with frames
themselves, but rather the notion that frames provide ‘alternative phras-
ing’ of policy dilemmas and their solutions. These may effect, or interact
with, media representation of those dilemmas and solutions, public
opinion and attitudes regarding them, and the mobilization and contri-
bution of interest groups to the discourse and debate surrounding them
(Chong and Druckman, 2007: 9). In parallel with the psychological inter-
est in individual choice, for most political scientists frames are of interest
for the effect they have on the primary concern––the policy process and
its outcomes—with relatively less interest paid to how frames emerge or
their content and structure.
This admittedly cursory treatment of framing across the disciplines
in which it has been most directly utilized reveals two distinct ‘truths’
about framing research. The first is that a more comprehensive treat-
ment of framing—one which knits together the sociological emphasis
on frame formation, process and content, and the focus of political
scientists and psychologists on framing effects—is crucial in order
to obtain a better and more complete picture of how framing actually
works and why it is important. Indeed, it was precisely this point that
resided at the heart of a ‘call to arms’ to political scientists in a recent
overview of framing research, structured around questions such as ‘what
makes a strong frame?’, ‘how are frames produced?’, and ‘how are frames
employed strategically?’ (Chong and Druckman, 2007).
Given the expansiveness of such an endeavor, it seems only possible to
carry it off within a narrowly defined purview—such as the problem at
the heart of this research. Thus, the limited focus of this inquiry on one
important but unique type of policy dilemma and decision (the decision
to use military force) allows for a fuller analysis of the intersection
between that decision and the frame producing and enveloping it. The
result is an analysis that can be broadened to encompass not just the
framing of affirmative war-decisions, but also to account for the forma-
tion, content, and objectives of the frame employed. As such, at least
indirectly, this book seeks to contribute to a marrying of disparate points
of emphasis within the literature on framing, as well as the more direct
concern with US foreign policy decision-making. The second evident

‘truth’ suggested by this rudimentary overview is the degree to which
framing is an emergent concept in the social sciences, but one which
has been defined and examined in very different ways. It is to the pro-
cess of sifting through those disparate treatments of framing and iden-
tifying a clearer picture of what defines a frame that I now turn.
Frames and related concepts

A public sphere oriented around the struggle to convey multiple and
highly contested ideas, concepts, and even ‘realities’ produces a politics
defined (if not consumed) by the attempt to render meaning. This can
lead to potential confusion as to what distinguishes frames from other,
related concepts such as ‘schema’ and framing from similar processes
such as ‘priming’, each in their own right introduced as heuristic devices
attempting to systematize and categorize the ‘politics of signification’
(Hall, 1997). These areas of possible confusion are not insignificant, in
that lacking such distinction one may draw the conclusion that framing
itself does not stand up as a viable concept; i.e., that there is no substance
to the very device around which this research is structured. Fortunately,
more rigorous observations and applications of framing have advanced
important qualifiers permitting one to distinguish framing from related
devices.
With respect to the difference between frames and ‘schema’, Klander-
mans (Johnston, 1995; Klandermans, 1997) has rightfully pointed to a
distinction in scale. While schema represent participant expectations about
people, objects, events, and settings in the world, frames are higher-order
alignments of schema negotiated in particular interactions. As Entman
(1993; emphasis added) phrased it, schema are ‘mentally stored clusters
of ideas that guide individual processing of information’. In other words,
frames are the product of concerted efforts to organize and arrange
schema, providing an independent interpretive footing borne of the
alignment of schemas across, and potentially within, individuals. While
frames are shaped by schema and, as we shall see below, must tap into
or reinforce existing schema in order to achieve broad resonance (Tannen
and Wallat, 1993), it is important to keep in mind the aggregating and
cumulating function of knowledge production associated with frames and
framing.
A second area of potential overlap and confusion lies at the process
level, in the seeming interchangeability of framing and other processes
such as priming and agenda-setting. Derived largely from the field of
communication and media studies, priming refers chiefly to ‘changes
in the standards that people use to make political evaluations’ (Iyengar

and Kinder, 1987: 63). As Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007: 11) note,
‘priming occurs when news content suggests to audiences that they
ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the perfor-
mance of leaders and governments’. Unlike priming, agenda-setting is
a less restrictive and more subtle and complex process, one which is
open to influence by interest groups, policy and norm entrepreneurs,
and political elites as well as the mass media. At the same time, agenda-
setting as generally understood shares with priming the defining charac-
teristics of what Scheufele and Tewksbury (ibid.) call ‘accessibility-based
models’—namely, models which are limited to a concern with the cor-
relation between attention directed at a particular issue, problem, or policy
and the importance attributed to that phenomenon by relevant audi-
ences. Both process models attempt to describe what people determine
to be ‘important’, and how the media (in the case of priming) or other
opinion-leaders (in the case of agenda-setting) contribute to that determ-
ination. Conversely, framing seeks to capture a broader picture of in-
formation processing and the construction of social knowledge in light
of life experiences and individual knowledge, folding in psychological
and social processes and factors that intervene in, and impinge upon,
that process.
Because the act of framing is deeply rooted in and fueled by a larger
social context, this defining feature of frames should not be over-
looked. Like the individual and social knowledge to which it is linked,
the process of framing and the particular frame or frames it produces,
advances, and modifies is dynamic and embedded within a larger struc-
tural and cultural context. This is borne out in the very terminology
surrounding the study of frames, and recurring efforts to distinguish
between the individual and social dimensions of the framing process.
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) refer to that difference as the ‘frame in
thought’ (dimensions of a frame that effect an individual’s evaluation)
versus the ‘frame in communication’ (dimensions of a frame that seek
to organize everyday reality at the societal level). Kinder and Sanders
(1990: 74) talk about the ways in which frames are simultaneously
embedded in political discourse and the ‘internal structures of the mind’,
and Scheufele (1999) describes the distinctive ways in which frames
effect and interact with both media representations and individual
perceptions. Important differences in these clarifications notwithstand-
ing, they all concur that frames occupy a crucial space astride two
distinct but closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing, knowledge
spaces.
Frames and their function(s)

Despite the overarching differences characterizing the ever-expanding
application of framing across the social science literature, it is possible
to identify recurring elements common to almost all explorations of
framing, whether concerned with the process of framing or framing
effects. At base, frames ‘help to render events or occurrences meaning-
ful’, in the process functioning so as to organize experience and guide
action (Benford and Snow, 2000). As Stuart Hall (1997) suggests, frames
act as a central mechanism in a ‘politics of signification’—a politics borne
of the dueling discourses and contestation that pervade the public arena,
particularly in post-industrial societies.
As a part of the politics of signification, it is important to remember
that frames are not extant phenomena, but instead are very much pro-
ducts of the efforts of agents concerned with, and actively engaged in,
the production of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders/
observers (Snow and Benford, 1988). This production of meaning is
defined as much by what frames exclude as what they include. Among its
many contributions, Kahneman and Tversky’s experimentation (1984)
shows that at the same time frames select and call attention to particular
aspects of reality, they also direct attention away from other aspects. In
their totality, frames are very much constructed entities, emanating from
source communicators, disseminated through ‘texts’ (written or verbal),
and received by one or more target audiences—all while being shaped
by, and shaping, the socio-cultural context within which transmission
occurs.
Perhaps the most in-depth treatment of the functions associated with
frames was advanced in the form of a schematic representation of the
‘core tasks’ of frames (Snow and Benford, 1988). They grouped framing
in accordance with three primary functions: diagnostic, prognostic, and
motivational. Diagnostic frames are chiefly concerned with identifying
problems and attributing their causes. Subsequent studies have advanced
our understanding of the diagnostic task of frames through the study of
‘injustice frames’ (Anheier et al., 1998; Cable and Shriver, 1995; Carroll
and Ratner, 1996; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996), designed largely
to infuse a normative and even moral dimension into the process of
problem identification by the identification of ‘victims’ (Benford and
Hunt, 1992; Hunt et al., 1994). Relatedly, another extension of diagnostic
framing comes in the form of attributional and adversarial/boundary
frames, which seek (respectively) to identify and attribute causality,
blame, and culpability for the injustice in question so as to cultivate a
consensus on the source of the problem and to delineate between ‘good’
and ‘evil’ (or, at a minimum, to identify protagonists and antagonists)

in the problem narrative (Gamson, 1995).
Following from the catalytic function of diagnosis, Snow and Benford
(1988) pointed to two additional ‘core tasks’ of frames: namely, prog-
nosis and motivation. Prognostic frames build upon the diagnosis of a
problem which logically precedes them, in the process articulating (or
seeking to articulate) a proposed solution or solutions to that problem(s).
As some of the leading studies of the prognostic function of frames
have pointed out, however, there is less leeway for framing agents on
these grounds than there is in diagnosis. To some extent, the range of
possible responses to be articulated in the prognostic frame is dictated
by the nature or content of the diagnostic frame (Nepstad, 1997). In a
similar vein, motivational frames—which attempt to provide a ratio-
nale for engaging in the proscribed action, including the generation of
an appropriate and effective vocabulary of motive—are, at least to an
extent, products of the diagnostic frame. At the same time, however,
one should not overlook the degree of discretion and range of action
which framing agents have at their disposal in articulating either prog-
nostic or motivational frames (Gamson, 1995). While the parameters
of the possible may be established by a diagnostic frame, prognostic
and/or motivational frames can be manipulated to great effect as well,
either with respect to framing the intended solution(s) or cajoling
audience members into action in pursuit of it (them). These mani-
pulations can in turn have interactive effects (intended or not) with
the diagnostic frame, sometimes even altering to a degree the ways in
which the problem was initially defined.2
Process models
As frames lie at the heart of a process by which ‘…people develop a
particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about
an issue’ (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 104), the manner in which frames
are constructed itself demands attention, if for no other reason than to
gain purchase as to how and why that conceptualization or reorientation
is advanced. Perhaps not surprisingly, views of frame construction vary in
accordance with the prevailing view of what is important about frames
from a functional standpoint. For instance, Scheufele (1999) offers a ratio-
nal and orderly conception of the framing process, with frames advanced
sequentially along the trajectory of frame building (introduction) and
setting (consolidation), proceeding through individual-level filtering and
processing, and finally circulating back from audiences to the media and
opinion leaders who originated the frame. Such a linear depiction is
undoubtedly a function of the more limited and narrow focus on the

intersection of framing and the mass media typifying his research agenda.
Conversely, other treatments of framing assume a broader and more
nuanced view of the process of frame construction, treating that pro-
cess as a complex set of linked or related processes. Those emphasizing
the discursive nature of frames point to the advancement of speech acts
and written communications to define a problem—or, more accurately to
establish the dominant discourse enveloping that problem. The emphasis
on the discursive function of frames highlights the twin processes of
articulation (connecting events and experiences in a compelling fashion
into a ‘package’ for audience consumption) and amplification (accent-
ing and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as more salient than
others), processes which Goffman (1974) fused under the heading of
‘keying’. Clearly these processes are linked and mutually reinforcing,
and are crucial not only to building a frame but also to sustaining its
resonance and importance over time (Hart, 1996).
Studies of framing emphasizing their strategic element such as those
associated with the study of social movements advance a portrayal of
the framing process as something that is above all deliberative and
goal directed, with frames developed to achieve a specific objective. Such
models focus less on the genesis of frames, instead emphasizing the pro-
cess by which already-articulated frames are ‘aligned’ and deployed for
political purposes (Snow et al., 1986). Encompassing a series of stages
(bridging, amplification, extension, transformation), frame alignment
models seek to capture the machinations of framing agents and, by
extension, the synchronicity (or lack thereof) between these machi-
nations and various ‘issue agendas’ associated with the media, govern-
mental sector, elected officials, and the general public (McCarthy et al.,
1996: 293). Among their other contributions, studies of framing as a
strategic process suggest that the effects of framing are greatest on so-
called ‘valence issues’, wherein they are deployed with a lack of specificity
to (re)affirm basic civic ideals, as well as on ‘easy’ issues in which only
a minimal amount of cognitive effort by the audience is necessary to
process the frame (McCarthy et al., 1996; Nelson, 1984).
Extending still further along the continuum of process models points
one in the direction of studies chiefly interested in the contested nature
of frames, and the aforementioned ‘signification’ function that charac-
terizes both frame construction and deployment. Building upon the insights
of strategic process models, these studies embed frames—from their devel-
opment and generation through their strategic deployment, alignment,
and realignment—within a robust conception of political and social
contestation in which frames are implements used by multiple agents

to advance multiple versions of reality, often concurrently. In this way,
frames can be advanced not only to render meaning, but to challenge
or compete with other potentially contradictory or threatening render-
ings (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004), whether by ‘counterframing’
(Benford, 1987) or ‘reframing’ (Benford and Hunt, 1992).
A more recent and promising addition to studies of the framing process
is the idea that frames and their effects are cascading (Entman, 2004).
Entman’s ‘cascade model’ differs from other depictions of the framing
process chiefly in the degree that it seeks to account for the effects of
time, reciprocity, and audience feedback which he asserts are central to
the spiraling dynamic of framing. Entman advances a depiction of the
framing process with respect to foreign policy (though a similar process
would conceivably apply to domestic issues as well) in which frames
originate from high-level decision-makers, in the process shaping and
orienting the frames used by other opinion leaders, the media, and the
general public.3 This reciprocal effect captured by the cascade model
postulates a less top-heavy view of the framing process, instead pre-
senting framing as a two-way street in which the meaning-rendering
efforts of policy elites are subjected to societal scrutiny and are influ-
enced, and perhaps even revised, as a function of that feedback. The pre-
vailing dynamic associated with the cascade model in turn determines
the amount of contestation surround the issue or policy concern; min-
imal, if a single frame dominates (e.g., if elite and public frames are in
relative harmony with one another) or extensive if there is parity or com-
petition between frames (e.g., at the elite level) or ‘dissensus’ between
elite and public frames (Larson, 1996).
Evaluating frame application
Having established the growing importance of framing to social scien-

tific inquiry and to foreign policy analysis specifically, the next logical
step is to consider the ways in which foreign policy frames can be eval-
uated. What factors explain why some frames are employed in certain
instances, and others not? Likewise, what makes some frames effective,
and others not? What explains the repeated application of a particular
frame relative to the same (or a similar) problem or decision over time?
Can the same frame be employed in different ways with respect to its
internal content, target audience, or in conjunction with changing con-
textual circumstances? Given the overriding objective of this research
with investigating the application of the ‘just war’ frame, it is impera-
tive to consider the criteria by which frame applications can be and are
evaluated.
The application of any frame (irrespective of content) is first dictated by
the perception of its authors and articulators that it will be well received
in the target audience(s) to which the frame is directed. In this vein,
Chong and Druckman (2007) advance three key conditions which frame
authors and articulators must (and do) take into account: the considera-
tion(s), concept(s), or idea(s) which lie at the heart of the frame and make
up its message must already be stored in individual memories; they must
have ‘activation potential’ (meaning, they must be readily accessible by
those individuals); and they must be relevant or applicable to the situ-
ation at hand (e.g., to the ‘real world’ empirical problem, solution, or
strategy around which the framing agent seeks to construct mean-
ing). Not surprisingly, in seeking to effectively satisfy these three con-
ditions, framing agents often resort to symbols, ideological appeals, or
other heuristic devices as a supplement to (or even in lieu of) the direct
delivery of substantive information. As Chong and Druckman conceive of
it, the application of a frame is decidedly contingent on the alignment of
these three conditions, in point of fact resembling art as much as science:
…people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored
in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment.
Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be
judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work
on all three levels, by making new beliefs available about an issue,
making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable
or ‘strong’ in people’s evaluations. (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 111)
At the same time, a more general evaluation of frame application is poss-

ible if one takes into account the three main criteria by which frames
can be evaluated, as well as ways in which these criteria have been opera-
tionalized and measured.
Credibility
As Downs (1957) notes, the credibility of leaders is an essential consid-
eration taken into account by the public when seeking reliable cues on
complex issues, serving as a shortcut that reduces information-gathering
costs. Frame credibility is in actuality a dual phenomenon, reflected both
in the degree to which the intended audience(s) finds the content or
message of the frame credible, as well as to by the level or extent of
the credibility of the architects of the frame among audience members.
Obviously, these two conditions are closely intertwined, and indeed the
credibility of frame architects might even be considered a necessary
(though not sufficient) and logically a priori requirement for assessing the
credibility of any frame in application. If we are to understand those who
construct and advance a frame as in some sense ‘moral entrepreneurs’
(Zald, 1996: 269), or even merely policy entrepreneurs involved in the
‘politics of signification’, then it would seem that the credibility of the
claim-maker in the view of the audience is essential to the credibility of
the claim being advanced.4
In seeking to operationalize credibility with respect to the importance
of frame architects, Lupia (2000) rightfully points to two critical consider-
ations: one, that the target audience(s) must believe that the frame archi-
tect(s) possess knowledge about what considerations are most relevant to
the issue(s) at hand; and two, that the target audience(s) believe that the
architect(s) can be trusted to reveal what he/she/they actually knows with
respect to that issue (or issues). Thus, the credibility of the frame architect
is derived from perceptions that she or he is an authority on the issue or
subject at hand––but at the same time, an authority that is perceived to
operate in a forthright manner, and one who is not entirely motivated by
self-interest.
In light of the substance of the frame itself, two factors must be taken
into account when evaluating frame credibility. The first is the internal
harmony of the claims, ideas, beliefs, or values advanced by a frame (e.g.,
frame consistency). Not surprisingly, a frame advancing incompatible or
even contradictory information is unlikely to make the grade, such that
the audience is likely to discredit it out of hand. The second relevant
factor with respect to the substantive credibility of a frame is the degree
to which those claims, ideas, beliefs, and values central to the frame (the
frame’s ‘message’) comport with and are verified by the actual events
in the ‘real world’ that they are designed to filter, interpret, and organize
in meaningful, and meaning-filled, ways (e.g., empirical credibility). In
evaluating the credibility of frames on these grounds, we are reminded of
the significant role for agency in the framing process, at both ends of that
spectrum. If frames reflect an effort to construct social knowledge, the
knowledge they project must be both logically coherent and empirically
grounded in the judgment of the intended audience(s) in order to serve
that function.
Salience
A second, and closely related, criterion for evaluating any frame is the
relative salience of the frame under examination. The first determinant
of whether or not a frame is salient is its centrality—e.g., the occur-

rence that the core beliefs, values, claims, and/or ideas associated with
a frame are consistent to the core beliefs, values, claims, and/or ideas
prevailing in the targeted audiences. A second and closely related con-
sideration is the experiential commensurability of the specific frame.
Is the framing congruent with the everyday experiences of audience
members, or are they too abstract or distant from the lives of the target
audience? The third condition of relevance is narrative fidelity, or the
extent to which the proffered framing is culturally resonant. In Entman’s
(2004) words, what is the magnitude of the frame; does the content or
substance of a frame repeatedly reinforce the ‘cultural myths’ (Campbell,
1988), ‘inherent ideology’ (Rudé, 1980), or ‘domain assumptions’ (Gouldner,
1970) that define a particular socio-cultural milieu—or do they challenge
or contradict the prevailing social and cultural narrative? Further, what
efforts have been made to publicly elaborate and repeatedly clarify that
similarity, or, conversely, to attempt to narrow it? As Entman (1993: 53)
points out, ‘…texts can make information more salient by placement,
repetition, or by association with culturally familiar symbols;’ absent
these explicit connections, they may lack salience.
Taken together, these factors strongly suggest that in the vast
majority of cases, the closer the central frame message is to the exist-
ence and experiences of the audience, their own core belief system,
and the prevailing cultural narrative of the society in question, the more
likely it is that message will ‘stick’ as a method of signification (Benford
and Snow, 2000). Indeed, highly salient frames which reflect requisite
levels of consistency, commensurability, and fidelity can in some cases
themselves be absorbed into the general ‘cultural stock’, subverting and
even transcending the distinction between frame and extant culture
(Zald, 1996). All of this is not to say that a counter-intuitive or counter-
cultural frame cannot prevail; of course, numerous examples to the
contrary exist. Rather, the larger point is that such a frame has to over-
come the significant obstacle of possessing a lesser degree of immediate
or ‘natural’ salience that a frame whose content is more consistent with
core beliefs, experiences, and cultural narratives might not.
Dynamism
The third major consideration in assessing the application of a frame is
the level of dynamism it does or does not exhibit. To a much greater
degree than the preceding criteria (credibility and salience), this con-
sideration attempts to capture the extent to which a frame’s content
can be (and is) manipulated by the frame architect, thereby reflecting
the idea that frames are not static but evolutionary. There are two
parallel axes on which frame dynamism can be evaluated: inclusivity/
exclusivity and flexibility/rigidity. As Benford and Snow (2000) point
out, frames that demonstrate greater inclusivity (that is, frames that fea-
ture a message with the potential for wide applicability across multiple
social strata, including race, class, gender, and age) and greater flexibility
(e.g., frames with a message that can be adapted to accommodate diver-
gent strains within the target audience, without losing features contribut-
ing to their credibility and salience) are more likely to attain (and retain)
the resonance necessary to achieve ‘master frame’ status (discussed in
greater detail below). Conversely, a frame constructed in such a fashion
that it is saddled with intrinsic limitations (whether in the potential appeal
of its particular signification, or in the potential for that signification to
be modified) is unlikely to attain that degree of resonance.
In this way, the extent to which a frame can be or is adapted to accom-
modate a broader audience without losing the essence of its signification
is a crucial measure of its utility. Further, as Swart (1995) suggests, frame
dynamism is intricately linked to credibility and especially salience; it
stands to reason that the more adaptive the frame is in application, the
more likely audience members will identify consistencies and continuities
between their own beliefs and experiences and those highlighted by the
frame. Suggesting the iterative and reciprocal aspects of effective framing,
the more dynamic the frame (that is, the more inclusive and flexible
it proves to be in application), the greater chance it has for achieving
fidelity with the relevant prevailing cultural narrative; its very adaptation
increases its prospects for survival, resonance, and by extension its chances
to reinforce (or revise) that narrative.
Limits to effectiveness
As Benford and Snow (2000: 618–619) point out, frames which attain and
retain high levels of salience are viewed as thoroughly credible, and per-
haps most importantly are open to the prospect of revision. Such frames
are dynamic and adaptable enough to be considered ‘master frames’. Those
frames that do attain ‘master frame’ status demonstrate a combined elas-
ticity and breadth such that they are thought to subsume other, more
limited and targeted frames and appeal to a far-reaching swath of society,
as a function of their resonance throughout the prevailing socio-historical
milieu in which they were introduced and in which they operate. Few
frames can be said to attain and sustain such a lofty and rarified position,
with even strongly resonant frames rarely achieving the unique and
tenuous balance of message and messenger credibility, overlap with the
beliefs and experiences of audience members, fidelity with master nar-

ratives, and breadth and flexibility of interpretive scope necessary to be
considered in this light.5
If frame resonance can be thought of as unfolding along a con-
tinuum, then the vast majority of frames must be located somewhere
further down that continuum from the rarified extreme of the ‘master
frame’ (see Figure 3.1). This may be, and often is, a result of the failure
of the frame to attain the degree of credibility or salience, or to display
the extent of dynamism, necessary for its particular signification (the
knowledge about an issue or problem it seeks to generate, disseminate,
and perpetuate) to prevail in light of alternative framings. Those frames
with a sufficient level of attainment on the three indicators of concern
here (and their components) tend to fall into the category of ‘inducing
frames’, such that they effectively convey frame content and induce at
least some proportion of the intended audience(s) to accept the frame
message, though not to a degree that they do not have to contend with
equally or nearly viable counter-framings. The least viable frames (‘dis-
cordant frames’) lack a necessary minimum standard of credibility, salience,
and dynamism so as to effectively transmit a frame message in a way that
is resilient and persuasive; rather, the framing proves discordant with the
audience, and withers away with little impact.
Of course, in some situations impediments to frame effectiveness exist,
irrespective of anything to do with the credibility of the frame/framer
or the salience and dynamism of the frame. Akin to what statisticians
Figure 3.1 The framing continuum

low resonance high
Discordant Inducing Master

Frames Frames Frames
• Frame lacks • Frame possesses • Frame exhibits high

requisite measure sufficient levels of degree of
of credibility, credibility, salience credibility, salience,
salience, and and dynamism to and dynamism
dynamism to influence intended necessary to strongly
influence audience(s) persuade intended
intended audience(s)
audience(s) • Frame message
subjected to • Frame message is
• Frame message is contestation by widely accepted and
not viable for other effective faces little to no
contestation frames contestation from
other frames
high competition low

refer to as random error or ‘noise’, factors such as the existence of unpre-

dictable and resilient predispositions regarding a problem or topic within
the audience may create intractable problems for a frame or its architects;
susceptibility to framing is greatly increased on issues about which a settled
interpretation is lacking. Random error notwithstanding, in most cases it
is precisely the factors outlined in this chapter (credibility, salience, and
dynamism) that providing the overarching structure by which frames in
application can be evaluated.
Framing and foreign policy analysis
High stakes, low salience

Framing is a vital, if often overlooked, aspect of the foreign policy pro-
cess. As is also true in other policy arenas, framing is a crucial aspect of
the formulation of foreign policy decisions and alternatives, in that the
‘decision frame’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) articulated by an indi-
vidual decision-maker or by principals in the core decision-making unit
is at once a reflection of the prevailing conception of the acts, outcomes,
and possible contingencies associated with a particular choice on the part
of that individual decision-maker or decision-making unit. As with any
frame, decision frames are constituted by equal parts personal/individual
(belief systems, habits and personality characteristics, prevailing norms
and values, life experiences, etc.) and social (effect of prevailing cultural
narrative, concordance with social norms, etc.) factors, each shaping
the formulation and interpretation of a problem and its causes, and the
identification of its possible and desirable solutions.
However, as a function of their prominence, power, and influence, as
well as by the potentially far-reaching scope and implications of their
decisions, the decision frames of high-ranking policy-makers differ by
orders of magnitude from those making decisions with lower stakes
and a far more constrained set of potentially affected parties. This is
especially true with respect to foreign policy decisions, in which the
national interest is presumably at stake—and undoubtedly so with
the decision to employ military force in international crisis, given the
obvious risks and costs associated with the former, and the high stakes
and grave threats corresponding by definition with the latter (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld, 2000). Further, foreign policy decisions typically are made
amidst a void of information and low public salience compared with
domestic policy issues. As public opinion data has reliably demonstrated,
public attitudes concerning foreign policy issues in most societies including
the US, while consistent, are less strongly held than on domestic issues
(Holsti, 1996). Further, foreign policy issues and problems in general

are much less likely to register among the most important policy issues
and problems than domestic problems, and when they do, tend to occupy
that place for relatively short durations (Soroka, 2003).
Considering the high stakes/low salience attributes of foreign policy
decisions (including and especially the decision to employ military force)
it would seem that framing is especially important. In a circumstance
where political decision-makers are contemplating the use of military
force, public support for that option is desired for a variety of reasons
(both political and operational), and public attitudes toward the issues at
stake and/or the potential theater for the operation are relatively weak,
framing is likely to take on added importance along with other domestic
political considerations (Risse-Kappen, 1991). In a relative void of durable
attitudes and accessible information, decisions of great magnitude and
consequence such as the decision to resort to military force are likely to
invoke framing efforts by decision-makers tasked with the responsibility
to act, especially in liberal societies where said decision-makers are also
responsible for presenting a public rationale for their action(s) to their
constituents.
This public rationale is particularly crucial in cases involving the poten-
tial for military intervention. As has been borne out empirically, the most
important determinant of public support for the use of force in the
American context is the ‘principal policy objective’ associated with
the use of military force as communicated by decision-makers (Jentleson,
1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998). For all of these reasons and more,
then, it seems exceedingly likely that decision-makers will be prone
to rely on the signifying function and power of frames in such circum-
stances, generating a shared collective understanding of the problem at
hand and leading the nation to what decision-makers perceive to be the
best course of action (Sobel, 2001). From the standpoint of foreign policy
analysis, all of this points to the necessity for a better understanding
of the contribution of frames to the construction of meaning and the
politics of signification.
The agency/structure debate

A more robust and rigorous consideration of framing, extending from
considerations of frame formulation and the framing process through
to frame effects, presents significant potential benefit from a theo-
retical standpoint. Applied to investigation of foreign policy decisions
and outcomes, frame analysis has the potential to synthesize and inte-
grate agency and structure considerations and concerns—in the process
bridging a divide that has long vexed international relations scholars

interested in exploring foreign policy behavior. As noted above, frames
are socially constituted entities, meaning they are most decidedly by-
products of a collision between the structural imperatives of the socio-
cultural context in which they are embedded and the cognitive processes
and choices of individuals engaged in an effort at ‘sense-making’.
On the former score, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any frame
is at least in part contingent on the design and functioning of political
institutions and the unfolding of informal processes central to any polit-
ical system. Gamson and Meyer (1996) go so far as to argue that these
institutional and process variables, reinforced by the prevailing political
culture, converge to a ‘political opportunity structure’ which explains,
at least in part, the production and effectiveness of frames in attaining
resonance and shaping public policy and/or political decisions. They
point to the emergence of such opportunity structures as a crucial deter-
minant in the life cycle and resonance of any frame—a conclusion which
highlights the importance of social structure to effective framing efforts,
apart from any consideration of frame content, the identity and credibil-
ity of framing agents, or the level of receptivity among audience members.
Apart from purely political institutions and processes, as is discussed
elsewhere in this chapter, extant cultural factors also greatly impinge
upon the framing process and the design, articulation, revision, and
reception of particular frames. Citing the work of Jasper and his col-
leagues (Jasper, 1997; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999) and Swidler (1986),
Benford and Snow (2000: 629) point out that ‘cultural material’ such as
the stock of meanings, beliefs, practices, values, myths, and narratives can
be ‘construed as part of a metaphorical toolkit…which constitute the cul-
tural resource base from which new cultural elements are fashioned, as
well as the lens through which framings are interpreted and evaluated’.
As they suggest, the pervasive if elusive effects of culture represent yet
another key structural parameter shaping the framing process (Berbrier,
1998; Kubal, 1998; Nepstad, 1997; Taylor, 1999). Among those cultural
considerations receiving the most attention is the impact of ideology on
frame construction and effectiveness (Oliver and Johnston, 2005; Zald,
1996). As a broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs that affect
one’s orientation to political phenomena (Geertz, 1973), ideology can
either provide a crucial source of sustenance to a frame, or effectively con-
strain it; in either case, frames are embedded within a broader and more
complex ideology, which itself is embedded within the larger culture.
As an inherently structural variable, ideology provides a cultural touch-
stone for frame articulation—with effective frames frequently providing
innovative amplifications or extensions of prevailing ideological pre-

cepts and tenets, and ineffective frames oftentimes out-of-sync with or
in contradiction to same (Oliver and Johnston, 2005).
On the agency side of the ledger, the active and iterative dimension
of framing is crucial. As Benford and Snow (2000) suggest, framing is a
‘processual phenomenon’ that at its very base assumes (and confers)
agency on the participants at both ends of the process. Agency, defined
simply in the context of this research as significant freedom of choice
accruing to the individual, is clearly discernable in the efforts of frame-
makers—whether social movement operatives, interest groups, media
elite, or representatives of the state (or all of the above). Indeed, as a
crucial tool of the ‘politics of signification’, as discussed above, framing
can be thought of at a basic level as an implement designed to make
political opportunities (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).
At the same time, agency abounds among audience members as well,
who are free to determine whether a frame message is credible, com-
mensurate with personal experiences and beliefs, and so forth—and to
accept or reject the message accordingly. On the audience side, while
agency may be obviously pervasive with respect to contested frames,
so too is it evident in conformity-inducing ‘master frames’. Whether
the choices of audience members converge or diverge, the larger point
is that framing is as much about the sense-making efforts of audience
members as it is the signification or knowledge-generation efforts of
framing agents; in the dynamic realm of framing, agents abound.
Introducing the just war frame
As Fiss and Hirsch (2005: 31) point out, through a fusion of the concern
with the cognitive processing and decision-making process of individuals
involved in ‘sense-making’ with an explicit recognition of the role of
structural factors in shaping that endeavor, frame analysis allows us to
explore the politics of signification with respect to the affirmative war-
decision in a novel but contextually sensitive way. The construction and
application of a frame for application to the affirmative war-decision, as
with any policy decision, may be undertaken for various purposes. Most
prominent among these are: forging a shared understanding of some
problem or situation; making attributions about the causes of or sources
of said problem or situation; articulating a response to that problem or
situation, and; urging members of the audience to which the frame is
being applied to act, typically in accordance with that articulated, favored
response (Benford and Snow, 2000).
In what is probably the best recent application of framing analysis to

foreign policy (though concerned primarily with the role of the media),
Entman (2004) offers a strikingly similar depiction of the major functions
of frames:
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to

select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating ‘text’, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993: 52).
Clearly these operational definitions underscore the utility of framing for

investigation of the ‘selling’ of affirmative war-decisions to the American
public by those responsible for making them. As Bartholomew and Mayer
(1992: 153) point out, framing analysis allows us to shift our attention
‘…away from what structures have done to actors to what actors do
within the space produced by the limits and possibilities thrown up by
structures’. And, from an analytical perspective, the emphasis placed
by framing analysis on the idea that frames serve both in the abstract and
in application as mechanisms for defining ‘problems’ and their proscribed
‘solutions’ for public consumption suggests that the concept of framing
itself is particularly applicable to the central concern of this research.
The ‘just war’ as social construct

As the discussion of the just war ‘conversation’ in the preceding chapter
demonstrated, the just war tradition has long been the central thread in
the narrative tapestry woven around the practice of war in the Western
socio-historical context. So too does that ‘conversation’ remain vitally
important to decision-makers and citizens in liberal societies as well as
the international legal and normative order that these societies have
erected and seek to uphold (Forsyth, 1992; Davis et al., 2001). Michael
Howard (1979) asserts as much through his contention that at least since
the Middle Ages, war in the Western mindset has failed to assume the
condition of generalized and random violence as alleged in the Hob-
besian state of nature, but rather has featured highly public debates and
considerations over proper restraint. Thus war has long taken on the
attributes of liberal societies, a foundational argument perhaps most often
associated with Rousseau (1970) and Montesquieu (1989), who each con-
cluded (though for differing reasons) that it was the state of society rather
than the state of nature that determines and encourages war. Given the
long-standing and persistent resonance not only of the core precepts of
just war theory but also the larger narrative tradition enveloping them
within liberal societies, the supposition that a signifying frame drawn
from and dependent on the centuries-old theory of a just war plays the
predominant role in the legitimization of the use of force within American
society appears wholly plausible and worthy of further consideration.
Yet as the preceding consideration of the just war ‘conversation’ also
illustrates, the notion of a ‘just’ war, like the practice of war in general,
is a social construct central to and largely produced and shaped by that
very conversation. In dispensing with the understanding of the just
war as an objective theoretical proposition (and the fixed and rigorous
standards ostensibly associated with such a proposition) and instead
embracing the evolutionary and inherently social (read: subjective)
nature of the ‘just war’, it follows that a ‘just’ war is any war waged in
accordance with the standards that the majority of the members of the
society in question perceive or accept as legitimate. As such, one must
acknowledge (as just war thinkers dating at least to Augustine have)
that the representation of what constitutes a legitimate and socially
permissible war within the just war tradition, while central and essen-
tial to that tradition, has never been sacrosanct in application (Wells, 1969).
If we accept the logical proposition of constructivist theory expressed in the
pithy slogan ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992), and infuse
that proposition with an equivalent appreciation for the empirical reality
that war is a frequent by-product of the permissive conditions entailed
by the anarchical structure of the international system, then it stands to
reason that the social practice of war (including, if not especially, the pre-
sentation of a rationale for the decision to go to war) is defined by an
inter-subjective understanding primarily directed by the state and its
leaders (Finnemore, 2003).6
While just war theory itself is arrayed around paramount concerns with
the circumstances in which the decision to go to war may be justified
(the ad bellum criteria), the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable
conduct during war (the in bello criteria), and the just termination and
settlement of war (the post bellum criteria), the just war tradition is better
understood as a bellweather reflecting the prevailing social norms envelop-
ing the practice of war at any given time period. In other words, if the
specific criteria associated with just war theory have remained essentially
constant over the centuries, the application of those standards (which is
the chief concern of this research) can be and has been renegotiated in
conjunction with changing social practices, conditions, and structures
(O’Driscoll, 2008). It is precisely this social (and, by definition, subjective
and mutable) dimension of the just war tradition that makes the just war
frame possible, and beyond that, makes it particularly suitable for a

study of the social (and subjective) ‘event’ that is the affirmative war-
decision.
Just wars and ‘the American experience’

The utility of the ‘just war frame’ as an analytical device designed to
shed light on how foreign policy decision-makers ‘sell’ the decision to
go to war is greatly enhanced given the targeted focus of this inquiry
on the United States. The decision to limit the focus of this study in
this way was based largely on the centrality of military force to, as
well as the highly ideological tenor and content of, contemporary US
foreign policy. Still, the preponderance of material power, the rhetorical
emphasis on liberal ideals, and especially the marriage of the two has
long defined and distinguished American foreign policy, lending further
support to the introduction and analysis of such a frame. By presenting
foreign policy elites with the evident need to reconcile their frequent
use of military power with professed commitments to the promotion of a
peaceful and just world order for domestic audiences, these factors—while
not necessarily unique to the American context—undoubtedly make the
US the most appropriate starting point for such an investigation. In the
absence of such reconciliation, either of the two most likely results—an
unrepentant realpolitik orientation negating the idealistic (if not mes-
sianic) script equating America’s interests with the world’s, or an unfet-
tered liberalism which could potentially limit or constrain the ability of
decision-makers to go to war—would be sub-optimal from the standpoint
of the effective conduct of statecraft.
The importance of wedding power to ideals in US foreign policy is
evident not only in the undesirable hypothetical scenarios that might
result from failing to do so, but also (and more convincingly) in the
reality that attempts at striking this balance have deep and long roots
in American history (Davis and Lynn-Jones, 1987). Appeals to national
greatness and indeed millennial destiny, introduced by political (John
Winthrop, Benjamin Franklin) and religious (Jonathan Mayhew,
Peter Muhlenberg) authorities alike, were ubiquitous prior to and
during the Revolution, providing moral justification for resistance against
a divinely sanctioned King George III. The paramount figure in mar-
shaling these sentiments into an ideological basis for American foreign
policy was the liberal theorist and revolutionary pamphleteer Thomas
Paine (Bloch, 1985). Relative to the war-decision, Paine was espe-
cially concerned with the exercise of power by the state and viewed
warfare as a singularly exploitative practice requiring restraint, which
free peoples should shun (Fitzsimons, 1995: 578). Yet in a peculiar

twist of logic, it was Paine’s very concern with the predations of war
as practiced in the Old World that would provide the basis for his
main contribution to the just war narrative in the New.7
Though Paine did not advocate military adventurism in the pro-
motion of liberal principles, his belief in the inherent virtue of the
American experiment provided the ideological firmament for outward
expansion as the nation, and its power and interests, matured (Hartz,
1955). Whether in references to manifest destiny or the aggressive
expansionism of Polk in the 1840s, Seward’s recycling of the Monroe
Doctrine in the 1850s, or the birthpangs of empire at the end of the
19th century and the dawn of the 20th, the vision of greatness espoused
by Paine was steadily and gradually transformed into a moral justi-
fication for nationalist expansion, often through military engagements.
Apart from any economic and strategic imperatives, the cause of liberty
and freedom around the world required extending the American enter-
prise progressively outward and justified America’s ‘peculiar aptitude
for expansion’ (Sen. Sidney Breese, D-IL, 14 Feb 1848; quoted in Hunt,
1987: 42).
What this cursory sketch reveals is the degree to which the historical
phenomenon of American exceptionalism has infused American thought
about the legitimacy of war (Payne, 1995; Lepgold and McKeown, 1995).
The enduring influence of American exceptionalism in turn reveals
a truly unique characteristic of war in the American context, beyond
the frequency or level of violence the US has employed: the quest to
harmonize applications of military power and the stated American (and
liberal) desire for a cooperative, peaceful, and just world order through
all means necessary, even the deception of ‘liberal lies’ described by
Mearsheimer (2011). This orientation has entailed among those with
the ultimate say over whether, where, and when to employ military force
without regard to contextual factors or ideological disposition, mani-
festing itself primarily in appeals for popular support and public rational-
izations for military adventures. Such appeals and rationales have
emanated with equal frequency and magnitude from Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, FDR and Eisenhower, JFK and Ronald Reagan,
buttressing 20th century military engagements in Cuba and the Philip-
pines, Korea and Vietnam, and Somalia and Kosovo. Given the degree
to which the just war tradition continues to dominate debate and dis-
cussion concerning war within American society, the application and
effectiveness of the just war frame relative to this evident need seems
particularly worthy of consideration (Rengger, 2002).
One frame among many?

The inherently social character of the practice of war and the just war
construct itself underscore the extent to which the war-decision has
long been a source of contestation in Western and American thought,
discourse, and practice. Beginning with the age of Enlightenment and
the modern, secular, bureaucratic, and pluralistic societies it begat,
multiple and varied ‘significations’ of the practice of and rationale for
war apart from those associated with the just war tradition began to
gain increasing traction within Western society. Whereas a priori delib-
eration over the legitimacy of war had once been common cause for
religious thinkers, legal theorists, and sovereign governing authorities,
by the 19th century changing social structures and sources of authority
rendered the just war ‘conversation’ anachronistic (Bull, 1979). In its
place, realism, liberalism, pacifism, Marxism, and other emergent epis-
temologies seeking to advance their own defining representation of
war (Cooper, 1991; Doyle, 1997; Balibar, 2010).
It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that while the just war tradition
has returned to a place of prominence as a source of meaning-making
relative to war, the rationale for going to war in Western liberal societies
(including the United States) remains open to alternative interpreta-
tions and, by extension, alternative framings. Within the contempo-
rary American social context, three distinctive alternative frames for the
affirmative war-decision are discernable: the structural realist, hegemonic
power, and ideological conflict frames (Hoffman, 1984). The structural
realist frame places an emphasis on the stabilizing function of military
force for securing existing polarity arrangements favorable to US interests
within an anarchical international system (Waltz, 1979; Linklater, 1995;
Huth, 1998). Tillema and Van Wingen concluded that the rationales
employed by states using armed intervention are ‘… primarily affected by
the opportunities and obstacles afforded by the recognized distribution of
power among states in the international system’ (1982: 221). Scott (1982)
cited the inclination of powerful actors toward ‘intra-bloc maintenance’
as a factor leading them to define the use of force as a powerful instru-
ment employed to reaffirm the ‘rules of the game’. Modelski (1970) offered
a similar characterization of the public representation of the decision to
use force by states within alliance structures.
A second alternative framing of affirmative war-decisions within the
context of US foreign policy draws upon the notion of hegemonic power.
Within the bounds of this frame, as Luard (1988) and Petersen (1976)
contend, US foreign policy decision-makers publicly define the decision
to use military force as a form of ‘policing’, framing it as a necessary prac-
tice to defend the hegemonic order and rules undergirding it, parti-
cularly when challenges to that order or rules occur in an overt sphere
of US interest (Windsor, 1984).8 Within the hegemonic power frame,
the affirmative war-decision represents a paramount service over which
the US enjoys a monopoly or near-monopoly, but from which other
states benefit. As Leurdijk notes, the use of military force by the US
throughout the 20th century tended to be advanced in conjunction
with established and publicly articulated doctrines helping to ‘…for-
mulate more or less explicitly the conditions of interference in the
internal affairs of other states…frequently their geographical sphere of
action can also be inferred from them’ (1986: 201).
Finally, a third alternative framing of the affirmative war-decision
within the American foreign policy context rests on notions of ideo-
logical conflict, with the decision to employ military force framed in
terms suggestive of a zealous desire to spread liberal, free-market demo-
cracy combined with the perceived need to convey resolve to real
or potential adversaries (Kegley, 1994; Katz, 1991; Huntington, 1987).
Even a hardened realist such as Morgenthau conceded that ideology
provided a unique and compelling frame for the decision to employ
military force, noting that ‘…interventions serving national power inter-
ests have sometimes been masked by the ideologies of communism
and anti-communism’ (1967: 428). The English school theorist Hedley
Bull advanced a similar point, arguing that wars ‘have and will always
be fought to promote ideological objectives…in the post-1945 period
[they] have been fought to advance communism and its inverse and to
liberate peoples from colonial rule…resort to war to spread an ideology
has typically taken the form of intervention’ (1977: 188–189). Within
the American context, typical applications of this frame are associated
with the embrace of the economic and military leadership of the Western
alliance after World War II, with the bold pronouncements of the Truman
and Reagan Doctrines concerning the legitimate use of American military
might representing convincing (if anecdotal) evidence to that effect.
The possibility that frames other than those derived from the just war
tradition might be employed within the context of contemporary American
society to affix meaning and legitimize the decision to use military force
highlights an important ‘wrinkle’ in this analysis. If framing can be under-
stood as a process used to ‘sell’ major foreign policy decisions (such as
the decision to go to war) to domestic audiences, this begs the question
as to what (if any) frame is most effective—and, by extension, what ideas,
values, beliefs, and symbols populate that frame. By investigating not
whether but rather how the just war frame is applied in conjunction with
the war-decision in contemporary US foreign policy, this analysis should

provide a basis for drawing some conclusions concerning the effective-
ness of the just war frame—thereby establishing a baseline of sorts
for further consideration and evaluation of that frame in conjunction
with the others with which it primarily contends within the ‘politics of
signification’ concerning the war-decision in American society.
4
Analyzing the Just War Frame
Defining the just war frame
At the simplest and most fundamental level, the importance I attribute

to the just war frame is due to the unconscious appeal of the just war
tradition within the Western liberal imagination. There is no compar-
able logic and set of ideas available to those in positions of authority in
Western liberal societies who wish to forge a shared understanding of
the conditions making a resort to war legitimate, the actors or con-
ditions making that resort to war necessary, why it is the best course
of action, and ultimately why all members of the society in question
should support the decision (Kennedy, 2006). Indeed, the extent to which
American decision-makers, opinion-leaders, and the public at-large auto-
matically and reflexively draw upon the language and logic of the just
war as a heuristic device when war enters the realm of the possible is
striking, and speaks to this point (Hudson, 2009).
Frame function
What explains the broad and enduring resonance and appeal of a
seemingly antiquated construct such as the ‘just war’ within contem-
porary American society, such that it can be translated into a palatable
frame affixed to such a controversial and high-stakes decision? The
answer to this question resides in the Aristotlean notion of praxis and
its importance to the concept of natural philosophy, an endeavor pur-
sued by Aristotle in seeking answers to timeless concerns including
(at least in a rudimentary sense) the defining conditions of a ‘just war’
(Hamburger, 1951). In a philosophical departure from his mentor
Plato, Aristotle contended that universal concepts such as justice could
be divined in the particular (e.g., within the defined parameters of
71
phenomenological ‘forms’ such as the social practice of war) rather

than remaining ethereal. As Aristotle himself notes in The Nicomachean
Ethics,
…the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged is

not, like the others, theoretical in its aim—because we are studying
not to know what goodness is, but how to become good men, since
otherwise it would be useless—we must apply our minds to the prob-
lem of how our actions should be performed, because, as we have just
said, it is these that actually determine our dispositions (Aristotle,
tr. by Ostwald, 1962: II, ii).
Undoubtedly, the timeless debate concerning the legitimate basis for

war that resides at the heart of the just war tradition has always been, and
remains, a practical question of (and for) applied ethics as much as or
more than an abstract question of metaphysical origin. If for no other
reason, the material costs and consequences of war force the questions
surrounding war and its legitimacy from the immaterial (metaphysical)
to the material (empirical) realm. Given the central focus of the just war
tradition on these material and empirical considerations, it would seem as
if the conversation at the heart of that tradition as well as the theoretical
construct of the ‘just war’ that it seeks to define is are, and have always
been, endeavors in applied rather than theoretical morality.
It is this very characteristic that facilitates the nexus between the just
war ‘conversation’ and war in American foreign policy discourse (Burke,
2004). In light of its basis in applied ethics and morality, the just war tra-
dition possesses and retains a currency relative to the social practice of
war that is quite unlike other philosophical positions concerning war and
the war-decision. Because it features a specific representation of the war-
decision that stems from and reflects an attempt to render that decision
virtuous, the construct of the just war has both utility and appeal within
that context. Indeed, what is unique about the representation of the war-
decision advanced and sustained by the just war tradition within the
narrative clamor surrounding war is the degree to which it is singularly
concerned with specifying the conditions that make the resort to war
permissible, legitimate, even virtuous.
Frame components
At its core, the just war tradition is concerned with the very same
dilemma as the decision-makers who draw upon it to frame the war-
decision—defining the conditions that make war legitimate and accept-
Analyzing the Just War Frame 73
able for the society considering or embarking upon war. Unlike other
prevailing representations of the war-decision, the just war tradition
meets a manifest need by providing a clear, appealing, and culturally
resonant mechanism for defining the use of force as an acceptable,
legitimate, and perhaps even obligatory exercise. As such, it provides
the intellectual, rhetorical, and moral firmament needed to ‘frame’ war
as an appropriate, legitimate, and even desirable ‘solution’ to some
extant problem or problems confronting society. What then does that
frame consist of?
Jus ad bellum convention

This research aims to define and empirically evaluate the use of the
‘just war frame’ in contemporary US foreign policy. In light of the unit
of analysis (the ‘affirmative war-decision’) and overarching concern of
this research (assessing the just war frame as an ex post facto means of
‘selling’ the use of force to the domestic audience), the most relevant
and applicable component of the just war tradition and theory is the
jus ad bellum convention. Deeply embedded in international legal
conventions concerning the use of force and referred to variously
as the basis of the ‘theory of aggression’ (Walzer, 1977) as well as the
‘war-decision law’ within the context of Western liberal societies
(O’Brien, 1979a), the jus ad bellum convention advances a set of criteria
which can be used to examine the legitimacy of an actor’s cause and
motives when considering the grave matter of the resort to war, as well
as whether one possesses the requisite moral authority to do so.
The concern at the heart of the jus ad bellum convention with the
legitimacy of the resort to war, as well as the specific criteria it advances
to articulate those conditions, make the jus ad bellum convention a
logical and natural source for the substantive content and form of the
‘just war frame’. Though hardly alone in this regard, the establishment
of the jus ad bellum in its entirety as well as the articulation of its com-
ponent criteria can be traced chiefly to the contributions of Augustine
and, later, Aquinas. Prompted by a mix of moral and instrumental
reasons, the primary concern of these two theologians and their pro-
ponents lie in establishing the righteousness of one’s cause (in essence
identifying a priori whose cause was deemed ‘just’ by God) rather than
regulating conduct within war.1
The main criteria around which the jus ad bellum was established
remain both central to that convention and largely unchanged over
the centuries. Within the context of the just war tradition, evidence of
these criteria enhance the ‘just’ nature of any war, thereby increasing
the moral permissibility and perceived legitimacy of the resort to war.

As rudimentarily established by Augustine and later more definitively
characterized by Aquinas, these criteria are: (1) Just cause: discernment
and possession of a ‘just cause’ for war; (2) Competent authority: the
sanctioning of war by a proper or what Aquinas would term a ‘legitimate
authority’, or an authority possessing a right to rule on such a question
on the basis of its sovereignty; (3) Right intention: the actor’s motivation
for war as stemming from a ‘right intention’, defined as a just motivation;
(4) Reasonable hope for success: a priori evidence of at least a reason-
able hope for a successful outcome to the war; and (5) Proportionality
(of ends desired): the relative proportionality of the end or ends desired
from the war relative to the means of war which would be employed to
attain them.
Basic v. prudential criteria For the purposes of this analysis, it is impor-

tant to distinguish between the ‘basic’ and ‘prudential’ criteria within
the jus ad bellum convention (Johnson, 1999). This distinction, which
sorts ‘just cause’, ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ into the
former category and ‘reasonable hope of success’ and ‘proportionality
of ends’ into the latter, is subtle yet critical for this analysis of the just
war frame. In the case of the ‘basic’ category, each of the criteria per-
tains to essential and generally demonstrable features of a war. Though
reasonable people may and often do differ over the constitutive aspects
of the basic criteria, it is possible to sift through the empirical evidence
pertaining to the war-decision and look for their presence (or note
their absence) within the framing affixed to a war-decision.2 While
debate may rage over what constitutes a truly ‘just’ cause for war, what
sources of political authority are ‘competent’ to authorize war, and
especially how it is possible to ascertain an actor’s real intentions (not
to mention their morality or immorality) when resorting to war, all
three considerations have at least some degree of discernable referent,
therefore lending themselves to empirical application.
The same cannot be said for the criteria included within the ‘pru-
dential’ category, which are largely concerned with the secondary cal-
culations of those actors contemplating the use of force (e.g., with the
likelihood of success, or the ratio of the objectives sought by war to the
decision to go to war in the first place) rather than primary (and tangible
and measurable) outcomes resulting from the decision (Reichberg, 2002).
The considerations pertinent in these two criteria are entirely contingent
on perception and advance calculation about the likelihood of a war’s
success, or about what tactics might be needed and whether they are on
par with the goals prompting the use of force. Lacking definitive empir-
ical referents, the prudential criteria resonate deeply in the internalized
logic of the decision-maker, and thus relate to the thought processes and
calculations of the actors contemplating the use of force rather than the
public representation of the conditions or characteristics legitimizing war
in the view of those actors (Johnson, 1999). While fully relevant from the
standpoint of an abstract morality, such concerns next to impossible to
analyze empirically.3
Because they speak directly to the concerns of this research and are
easier to operationalize and empirically analyze, the basic criteria of the
jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority, and right intention) pro-
vide the form and content for the just war frame. Causes of war are gener-
ally established publicly by the protagonist, while legitimate sanctioning
authority is (at least in the historical period of concern here), typically
a matter of public record; even the most potentially problematic of the
three (right intention) can be gauged at least to some degree by assessing
the statements of decision-makers prior to committing military force. As
such, these three criteria are at once both strongly representative of just
war thinking relative to the war-decision, and equally as useful from the
standpoint of systematic empirical research.
Just cause
Possessing just cause is the first and arguably most important jus
ad bellum requirement. In essence it serves as the catalyst for war, since
logically the just cause condition must be satisfied before the actor(s)
contemplating the use of force can proceed to other considerations—an
observation first drawn by Aquinas in Question 40 of the Summa theo-
logiae (1952). The most common translation of ‘just cause’ is that of
self-defense in the face of aggression, with the latter representing an
unacceptable act both in customary and treaty law (including, but not
limited to, the UN Charter). This is hardly surprising, given the near
uniform agreement among just war theorists that unprovoked acts of
aggression by one state or political entity against another is unjust and
inherently provides the transgressed party or parties with a just cause
for military retaliation.4
This contention has been embedded, with the help of liberal thought,
into the norms and laws of the contemporary international political
system via an extension of the social contract idea(l).5 However, wide-
spread agreement about the ‘just cause’ of self-defense breaks down with
respect to the standard for aggression necessitating self-defense, undoubt-
edly as a function of the larger debate over what constitutes aggression in
international law (Leonard, 2007).6 Similarly contentious is the inclusion

within the ‘just cause’ criterion the notion of anticipatory self-defense, or
defense against acts of violence that are perceived by the target state as
incipient. While this extended translation remains a subject of debate
amongst just war theorists, it has been relied on to legitimate pre-emptive
military strikes, most frequently and prominently by Israel in the Six Day
War and against Hezbollah in Lebanon (on several occasions) and by the
US in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Beyond self-defense, most just war theorists concur that initiation of
physical force in order to threaten or usurp another state or actor’s ter-
ritory, property, or persons is inadmissible and may justify the use of
force in response (Walzer, 1977). Indeed, in Johnson’s (1999) view, a ‘just
cause’ for war has classically reflected three possible realities: as a defense
against wrongful attack, to retake something wrongfully taken, or to
advance good and punish evil.7 These translations of just cause certainly
persist in contemporary practice. While ‘defense against wrongful attack’
can be equated with the fundamental notion of self-help, so might ‘retak-
ing something wrongfully taken’ overlap with the use of military force in
retribution following the usurpation of territory (e.g., ‘reclaiming’ Kuwait
from Iraqi invasion in 1991) or attempts to rescue hostages (e.g., the
Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976); furthermore the ‘punishment of evil’ con-
sorts at some level and in some cases with retaliatory strikes (e.g., by the
Front-Line States in response to frequent incursions by the apartheid
regime in South Africa, or the US-led military strike on al-Qaeda sanctuaries
in Afghanistan after 9/11).
Competent authority
Aquinas was the first to focus extensively on authorization for the war-
decision, articulating the criterion establishing the rightful standard-
bearers of the awful responsibility to recourse by the sword. This endeavor
has remained front-and-center within the just war tradition, reflecting the
degree to which the just war tradition has been and remains concerned
with determining the source of legitimate authorization for the resort to
war, as well as the extent to which considerations of the common good
have factored into that determination. Beginning with the attempts of
classical just war theorists to yoke the war-decision to a divine purpose,
considerations of competent authority have held fast to the notion that
the war-decision is a matter suitable for consideration only by the supreme
political authority. Because the sovereign possesses the primary respons-
ibility to provide for the security and welfare of its subjects/citizens, includ-
ing their protection through force of arms when necessary, competent
authority over the war-decision must necessarily and only reside with
the sovereign. Moreover, regardless of form, a true sovereign authority
has no superior, meaning that logically speaking no other authority is
qualified or even able to rule on the war-decision (Johnson, 1999).
In so demarcating legitimate agency over the war-decision, the crit-
erion of competent authority has proved instrumentally valuable to
existing and established sources of political authority, propelling the
social practice and societal perception of war toward centralization under
the guise of the state.8 With the ascent of liberalism and associated notions
of representative government and national self-determination, the com-
petency of the state to deal with the war-decision was only further rein-
forced. In the liberal view the right of the sovereign state to rule on
questions of war rests on the consent of the governed, consent typically
extended in conjunction with the state’s fulfillment of its own obliga-
tions via the social contract (Walzer, 1970). By virtue of the fact that it
governs in a transparent and accountable fashion, the most competent
authority for the war-decision in contemporary liberal thought is the
liberal republic. Conversely, the more removed a state is from this form
of governing arrangement, the less disposed it is to maintain its end of
the social contract—thereby undermining its claim to sovereignty and by
extension its competence to rule on matters of war, particularly if the
state in question is corrupt and rules arbitrarily (Weiss and Hubert, 2001).
The repository of competent authority over the war-decision has
clearly evolved over time from church to emperor to sovereign state to
liberal republic. What this suggests in light of the changing nature of
power and authority in the international system is the possibility of
emergent sources of competent authority apart from the state. Given
their composition as member-state organizations as well as their liberal
ideological bent, perhaps the strongest prospects in this vein are the
varied and expanding organs of regional, international, and supra-
national governance populating the contemporary international land-
scape. As embodied in the norms and institutions of the post-World
War II international system, the pre-eminence of the notion of col-
lective security makes it possible to advance a plausible claim that
political units residing ‘above’ the level of the state—most notably the
United Nations—possess some modicum of legitimate authority rela-
tive to the war-decision.9 Undoubtedly, the UN Security Council does
not possess sovereign authority as typically understood within the pur-
views of classical just war theory, nor is such authority embedded within
other international and regional governing organizations. Yet contem-
porary just war theorists have proven increasingly receptive to the idea
that in the event that they reflect a broad consensus among their member-
states on the legitimacy of a particular application of military force, such
organizations may provide a supplementary source of competent authority
(Kelsen, 1964; Regan, 1996).10
Right intention
Satisfaction of the right intention criterion requires a concern with secur-
ing just outcomes on the part of those authorizing the resort to war. As
such, the resort to war cannot be considered legitimate if narrow self-
interest is paramount in the decision-making calculus, and subsumes, dis-
places, or otherwise unduly impacts considerations of justice inherent in
the other jus ad bellum criteria. Since the just war tradition has stemmed
from and continues to adhere to the idea that the practice of war is
always undesirable (even if it can be justified as a permissible last resort
in some cases), the decision to go to war must be accompanied by a pre-
vailing concern on the part of decision-makers with securing and pro-
moting just, orderly, and peaceful outcomes in advance of their decision
to commit military force.
As in the more prominent translations of ‘just cause’ discussed above,
the right intention criterion has historically been elaborated in a two-
dimensional fashion. In the negative sense, ‘right intention’ refers to the
avoidance of ill intent or motivation when launching a war; as Augustine
described it, the need to avoid ‘the passion for inflicting harm, the cruel
thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit…’ (Johnson, 1999:
33). Acting in accordance with right intention requires decision-makers to
eschew the naked use of aggression solely or chiefly in pursuit of national
interest, aggrandizement, or the extension of a particular ideology (Phillips,
1984). In its positive connotation, the criterion refers to a more proactive
goal, namely serving the ends of justice in the temporal sphere through
the use of force. In revisiting Augustine, ‘…true religion looks upon as
peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement
or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil, and of
uplifting the good’ (Johnson, 1999: 33).
While both the negative and positive translations of right intention
were initially developed to govern the conduct of individual warriors,
since Aquinas’ time it has been applied to the dispatch of the war-
decision by sovereign political authorities. Evaluation of the criterion
has proven a thorny problem, however, given the difficulty of accu-
rately gauging the intentions of statesmen relative to the war-decision.
This difficulty in discerning right intention has increased alongside the
increased opacity of the modern state, in which the intentional effects
of justice and interest calculations (not to mention the relationship
between them) are exceedingly difficult to decipher. This is especially

problematic with regard to the war-decisions of liberal states, whose
leaders are prone to conflate the two considerations given their ideo-
logical commitment to, and receipt of material benefit from, liberal values
and the institutional arrangements on which they rest (Rawls, 1993).
In light of all this, empirical assessment of the right intention criterion
within the just war frame is tricky. Examining the ‘right intention’
criterion requires one to take into account indications of the intentionality
of decision-makers as well as the outcomes engendered by the use of
force.
Operationalization and evaluation
The preceding consideration of the jus ad bellum convention and the

three ‘basic’ criteria of just cause, competent authority, and right inten-
tion provide the defining parameters of the just war frame. Relative to
the ‘problem’ of the war-decision in the American context (e.g., the
need to legitimize commitments of military force for a domestic audi-
ence), the just war tradition as translated through the just war frame
provides an unparalleled instrument of, and for, ‘meaning-making’ on
the part of those seeking to imbue the decision to go to war with broad
social legitimacy. Yet the focal point of this analysis is not the dynamics
of war or even the war-decision but rather the dynamics of the applica-
tion of the just war frame to the war-decision. As such, I seek to assess
precisely how the just war frame has been employed by contemporary
US foreign policy decision-makers in an effort to generate and sustain
broad support for a policy action—the decision to go to war.
Operationalizing the frame

Evaluating the application of the just war frame in conjunction with
specific affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign policy requires
operationalization of that frame and the (basic) jus ad bellum criteria
that lend it substance (see Table 4.1). That operationalization rests on
a set of 15 indicators drawn from previous empirical research on the
relationship between the jus ad bellum criteria and US military engage-
ments (Butler, 2003, 2005) as well as from the just war literature in general
(Ramsey, 1968; Walzer, 1977; O’Brien, 1979a; Johnson, 1981; Regan, 1996;
Bellamy, 2006). While these indicators are hardly all-encompassing (e.g.,
other translations of just cause, competent authority, and right intention
are certainly possible), these indicators and the significations they are asso-
ciated with provide a basis for translating and analyzing the application
of the just war frame relative to specific war-decisions.
Table 4.1 Operationalizing the just war frame
Indicator Signification/Representation
Just cause
Self-defense (JC1) The vital security and national defense of the US is

at stake in the crisis.
Direct violent crisis trigger An act of direct and extreme violence precipitated
(JC 2) foreign policy crisis for the US.
Significant power The actor triggering a foreign policy crisis is
discrepancy between significantly more powerful than other involved
trigger and target (JC 3) parties (e.g., the classic ‘bullying’ scenario).
Territory seized (JC 4) Territory belonging to US was targeted and/or seized
by another actor in the crisis.
Property/persons seized Property and/or persons belonging to the US
(JC 5) was/were appropriated.
Authoritarian/military Authoritarian/military regime responsible for the
regime involvement (JC 6) crisis.
Response to/punishment Evil acts flouting basic ethical and moral
of evil (JC 7) conventions have been perpetuated against the US,
American citizens, and/or other innocents.
Competent authority
Global authority (CA 1) Authorization for US military action by the

international community and/or international
governmental authority present.
Regional authority (CA 2) Authorization for US military action by one or more
regional actors and/or relevant regional
governmental authority present.
Target authority (CA 3) Authorization for US military action by one or more
sovereign states or recognized authorities directly
affected by the crisis.
Right intention
Last resort (RI 1) US military engagement undertaken as a last resort.

Post-hoc satisfaction (RI 2) Other crisis actors satisfied with the US military
engagement.
Post-hoc tension reduction Tension among crisis actors reduced by US military
(RI 3) engagement.
Formality of outcome (RI 4) US military engagement intended to (or is) promote
(promoting) formal outcome acceptable to all
involved parties.
Pace of abatement (RI 5) US military engagement intended to (or is)
contribute (contributing) to crisis abatement.
Just cause
The notion of just cause is the catalyst for the jus ad bellum convention
in its conventional application as a war-decision law, representing a
necessary and sufficient condition for further deliberation and poten-
tial action. The most common translations of ‘just cause’ include the
defense of the innocent against wrongful attack, the reclamation of
persons, property, or other things of value which were wrongly taken,
and the punishment of fundamentally ‘evil’ acts against humanity (Walzer,
1977). The multiple forms that this catalytic criterion can assume sim-
ilarly require multiple translations when seeking to approximate the
place of ‘just causes’ relative to the framing of affirmative war-decisions.
The indicators introduced here as approximations of just cause there-
fore can be grouped in accordance with these three broad categories.
Defense of the innocent against wrongful attack

– self-defense
– direct violent crisis trigger
– significant power discrepancy (between trigger and target)
This aspect of the just cause criterion attests to the presence of a wrongful
attack against innocent parties, which in turn justifies the use of military
force in response. In light of this, a public representation of a ‘wrongful
attack’ on innocent parties is likely to hinge on assertions of a self-defense
imperative and/or the commission of a direct act of violence as the trigger
for a foreign policy crisis. Important as well to this representation of a just
cause are assertions of a significant discrepancy in power (including, but
not limited to, broad discrepancies in GDP, geographic size, military
expenditures, and so forth) between the actor(s) triggering a crisis and the
actor(s) targeted by that protagonist—such that those under attack are at
a demonstrable disadvantage, denoting them at least as disadvantaged
victims, if not ‘innocent’.
Reclaiming something wrongfully taken

– territory seized
– property/persons seized
As noted above, the principle of just cause for a resort to war is most
often characterized (and possibly most easily understood) when that
cause is a defense against wrongful attack. Apart from defending the
‘innocent’, another important translation of just cause is as a means to
reclaim something wrongfully (typically forcibly) taken from one actor

by another. The most obvious and desired target of such wrongful action,
particularly in conceiving of that wrongfulness within the bounds of the
contemporary international system, is territory. Another clear and recur-
ring articulation of a ‘just cause’ in accordance with just war theory is to
recover one’s own property or personnel when seized by another actor.
Punishment of evil
– authoritarian/military regime involvement
– response to/punishment of ‘evil’
The characterization of the ‘just cause’ criterion as solely concerned

with the application of military force in response to wrongful attack or
the recovery of material losses overlooks the fact that the notion of a
‘just cause’ also hinges at least in part on establishing a tenuous grasp
on immoral or ‘evil’ behavior relative to the conduct of international
relations, so as to define war as a legitimate means of retributive jus-
tice. To be sure, workable approximations of the presence of ‘evil’ in
international relations are difficult if not impossible to identify, and
highly problematic in application. Still, the extent to which this con-
cern is reflected in the jus ad bellum decision-law requires some such
approximation of irredeemable behavior in international relations in
order to assess whether this element of the just war frame is being used,
and to what end.
For the purposes of this study, any indicator seeking to approximate
the signification of ‘evil’ or immoral behavior within the framing of a
resort to war must reflect conceptions of ‘evil’ or immoral behavior
consonant with the Western socio-historical context. In light of the
privileged position of liberal democracy within that context, one loose
approximation of ‘evil’ (or at least, immoral) behavior in international
relations are the actions of authoritarian and military regimes. In con-
ducting statecraft in a void of representative governance (e.g., in the
absence of competitive elections, pluralist representation, competitive
parties, a free press and, in the case of military dictatorships, the overt
domination of political decision-making by the armed forces), author-
itarian and military regimes operate from a position of moral inferiority,
at least as seen through a liberal lens. Therefore, the involvement and
actions of an authoritarian or military regime (or regimes)—particu-
larly when they cause or worsen a foreign policy crisis—represents one
alternative for assessing this translation of just cause within the just
war frame. So too would violations of widely accepted international

norms or laws, including (but not limited to) acts constituting ‘crimes
against humanity’ or acts in direct contradiction to the standards
established in framework conventions such as the UN Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, and
so forth.11
Competent authority
– Global authority
– Regional authority
– Target authority
The ‘competent authority’ criterion of the jus ad bellum convention

requires that military action be clearly sanctioned by a duly authorized
representative of some sovereign political authority. In this sense,
the ‘competent authority’ criterion is consonant with the just war
tradition’s interest in imparting purpose to war. Through the artic-
ulation and application of this precept, only a sovereign authority
could authorize war because only a sovereign possessed a responsibility
to provide for the common good of his subjects and therefore protect
them through force of arms when required. Moreover, a true sovereign
had no superior, so no other authority would be logically qualified to
rule on the question (Johnson, 1999). The authority precept explicitly
defines resort to force without sanction of this sort as an immoral and
unjust act.
Based on the fusion of the just war tradition and international law,
three legitimate sources of authority for military intervention by one
state into a conflict can be discerned here: an international governing
organization or organ thereof (in this case, the United Nations);
a regional governing organization or organ thereof (in this case, the
Organization of American States, Organization for African Unity, etc.);
or a sovereign (target) state itself.12 While applying the concept of
sovereignty to global and regional organizations as done here may be
troubling for some, it need not be. The competent authority criterion,
like the other components of just war theory, has evolved in relation
to broader transformations in society. As such, leading intervention
and just war theorists have persuasively argued that it may be trans-
lated so as to include any politically legitimate actor or body, rejecting
the strict interpretation of the term in which authority can only be
extended by nation-states (Bull, 1984; Johnson, 1999).
Right intention
– last resort
– post-hoc satisfaction
– post-hoc tension
– formality of outcome
– pace of abatement
Whether one is interested in contending with the jus ad bellum as a

decision-law for war, or in this application as the source of a frame used to
‘sell’ affirmative war-decisions, the ‘right intention’ criterion is inarguably
the most difficult of the basic jus ad bellum criteria to approximate. This
problem stems in part from the reality that the ‘right intention’ criterion has
two dimensions. On the negative dimension, a ‘just’ resort to force is one
marked by the absence of aggressive or offensive intent, emblematized by
territorial acquisition, intimidation or coercion, or exhibitions of cruelty,
hate, or vengeance (Johnson, 1999). In its positive translation, ‘right inten-
tions’ are those in which the resort to force is employed to promote peace
and justice (ibid.).
The most pernicious aspect of this problem in translation comes in
attempting to discern the negative conception of ‘right intention’,
since this dimension of the criteria refers to what outcomes an actor is
seeking to avoid, rather than what outcomes the actor is seeking to
impart. Indeed, it is hard to define (and harder to empirically confirm)
the intention(s) an actor seeks to avoid in a given circumstance. Further-
more, while a consideration of the intentions that an actor seeks to avoid
may be relevant in attempting to assess right intention as a ‘decision-law’,
it seems largely irrelevant for an attempt at assessing the framing of an
action already taken. Therefore, to the extent that right intention can be
explored empirically as a component of the just war frame, the positive
dimension of that criterion seems to provide a better source for the
identification and application of useful translations.
Assessing the positive dimension of ‘right intention’ and its place
within the framing of affirmative war-decisions requires one to impute
intention from outcomes, at least to some degree. For one to conclude
that the resort to war was ‘sold’ by foreign policy decision-makers on
the basis of its reflection of right intention, presumably the articulators
and users of the frame would emphasize the degree to which the situ-
ation ‘on the ground’ in the aftermath of the use of force reflected a
condition in which most parties are perceptibly better off than they
were beforehand. The indicators introduced here as proxy measures of
the right intention criterion reflect this emphasis. Clearly, the framing
of the war-decision in line with ‘right intention’ would necessitate that
such an action be represented as a last resort. ‘Post-hoc satisfaction’ approx-

imates (alleged) satisfaction among crisis actors with the outcomes resulting
from the commitment of US military force within the ex post facto framing
of the war-decision. Similarly, ‘post-hoc tension’ reflects an attempt to cap-
ture the extent to which tensions between crisis actors are (again, alleged) to
be reduced or eliminated as a result of the use of US military force in res-
ponding to the crisis. The ‘formality of outcome’ indicator reflects the degree
to which the just war frame includes reference to/ emphasis of formal out-
comes to the crisis brought about in conjunction with the use of US military
force, and attempts to link the two as a means of ‘selling’ the decision to
resort to war. Finally, the ‘pace of abatement’ indicator is introduced as a
means of gauging whether the ‘framing’ of the decision is based in claims
that the US military engagement contributed (positively) to crisis abatement.
Analytical scope
Parameters of this inquiry

In conducting a systematic inquiry of the place of the just war frame
within contemporary US foreign policy decision-making, it is impor-
tant to begin by acknowledging what I am not seeking to do.13 To that
end, the analysis that follows this chapter is not strictly concerned
with US military interventions, or the foreign policy crises precipitat-
ing them. I am also decidedly not evaluating whether the three basic
criteria (just cause, competent authority, and right intention) and their
main signifiers (detailed above) are actually reflected in any meaning-
ful and demonstrable fashion in the scenarios in which the decision to
use military force is rendered. To that end, this is also not an investiga-
tion that seeks to prove or disprove the claim that the decision to go to
war itself is in any sense ‘explained by’ just war theory, if for no other
reason than the fact that I find the proposition that US foreign policy
decision-makers (or, indeed, their counterparts in any state possessing
significant military capabilities) would commit the nation to war solely
or even primarily out of a concern with exacting justice implausible.
Rather, the central concern here is with examining to how and to what
effect the just war frame is employed in an attempt to procure and sustain
broad societal support for the decision to go to war once that decision
has been made. This is a vital consideration since domestic support for
war in both the immediate context of a particular war as well as in the
larger sense (as a social practice) can hardly be assumed within contem-
porary liberal societies. What is at issue here is not establishing whether
the just war frame is evident on an anecdotal basis as ‘rhetorical chatter’
in the American social context, but instead establishing how it is employed,
and whether and to what extent it can be said that it is an effective means
for generating and sustaining broad societal support for war. Identifying
the extent of the application of the just war frame to affirmative war-
decisions, as well as variations in the degree to which different translations
of the frame are applied or not in particular cases, helps to go beyond
the anecdotal accounts that suggest (but by definition cannot ‘prove’) the
ubiquity of just war language and logic in contemporary American foreign
policy discourse.
Affirmative war-decisions
The central concern with how the just war frame is applied to the
decision to go to war necessitates difficult choices concerning what
to include and what to exclude from the present analysis. For starters,
it requires ruling out instances of major decision-events wherein the
prospect of war was considered but war did not actually occur. The
rationale for this decision is relatively straightforward; after all, it is war
and its social status, perceived legitimacy, and especially the effort to sell
it to domestic audiences by those launching it that are of chief concern
here. Therefore, examining the justification of the decision to go to war
through the application of the just war frame by default requires a narrow
purview in which only ‘affirmative’ war-decisions are relevant, and are
analyzed on an ex post facto basis for the degree to which they featured
the just war frame and its various components.
This makes sense not only from a logical standpoint, but also given the
object of concern to the just war frame and the ‘conversation’ from
which it is derived. The just war frame and conversation have little if any
relevance for actions short of war. Similarly, my interest in extending the
notion of framing to the war-decision stems from a logical assumption
that framing as a concept and process can shed new light on the manner
in which war is being ‘sold’ by decision-makers to domestic audiences.
Given that decision-makers can’t and don’t seek to frame or ‘sell’ actions
which they do not intend to undertake (they would seemingly have no
reason to), and since we can’t analyze the outcomes of events which did
not happen, the case for an ex post facto analysis of the just war frame
after the decision to go to war has been rendered seems clear.14
In focusing on only one branch of a dichotomous decision tree, the
approach undertaken here raises the possibility of selection bias relative
to the decision-events included (and excluded) from the analysis. That
potential selection bias is offset by the fact that this is not an analysis
of the causes or catalysts of the foreign policy decision from which that
decision tree springs (e.g., the resort to war), which is to be sure well-
trod ground (James and Hristoulas, 1994; DeRouen, 1995; Wang, 1996;
Fordham, 1998; Meernik, 2001; Mitchell and Moore, 2002; Brulé, 2008;
Koch and Sullivan, 2010). Rather, this study attempts to foray in a less
traveled direction by examining the attempt to manage the effects of
that decision once it is made by those who made it, through the con-
struction of an appealing rationale to engender support for it. In return-
ing to the metaphor one final time, this analysis does not set out to
explain why the war (as opposed to ‘not-war’) branch of the decision-tree
is actualized, but rather how those who make that decision contend with
the related problem of how best to justify it to the domestic audience.
Single frame focus

Another necessary if difficult decision concerning the exclusion of a
potentially important consideration from the purview of this study is
the isolation on the just war frame, apart from other potential alter-
native framings of the affirmative war decision. As discussed above, in
light of the contested nature of the war-decision, there are certainly
multiple alternative frames associated with war and the resort to war
that could potentially resonate within contemporary American society.
Still, no other conceivable war-decision frame has the potential to exhibit
the consistent and verifiable message, fidelity with existing beliefs and
narratives, and adaptive quality that the just war frame possesses.
This is not to say that other frames don’t in some sense ‘matter’;
indeed, they may in fact matter very much (and deserve careful analysis),
especially if the present investigation of the just war frame points toward
a conclusion that the just war frame is insufficiently, sporadically, or inef-
fectively applied. Still, the admittedly exploratory nature of this inquiry,
and its stated concern with analyzing framing within the context of con-
temporary US foreign policy and in particular the application of framing
to the decision to go to war, must necessarily identify and start with the
frame which has the greatest potential for effective signification. Given its
derivation from a centuries-old conversation about the legitimacy of war
itself steeped and forged in the Aristotlean tradition of praxis, the just war
frame seems the most appropriate starting point.
Contemporary US foreign policy

Extensive foreign policy commitments in concert with unparalleled
military capabilities explain the sustained frequency and magnitude of
US military engagements and, by extension, the paramount impor-
tance of military force and the war-decision in contemporary US foreign
policy (Regan, 1996; Yoon, 1997). At the same time, the enduring and
well-chronicled tendency of US foreign policy decision-makers to rely on

highly moralistic and ideological rhetoric to advance the case for war
makes the US a natural setting for an investigation of the mechanism
through which the decision to employ military force is presented to the
public (Russett and Starr, 1992; Meernik, 1996; Bukovansky, 2002). These
factors have converged, and consequently been magnified, during what
I refer to throughout this study as the ‘contemporary’ era of US foreign
policy, defined here as the post-Cold War period (1989–present).
During the Cold War, the US occupied a unique geopolitical position
as one of the two military superpowers in a bipolar international system,
as well as leader and guarantor of the Western security and economic
alliance and self-appointed champion of the ‘free world’. With the end of
the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the dawn of what some called
a ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) saw the US transition to the
role of hegemonic power. While the introduction of a precise temporal
parameter runs the risk of speciousness, it is widely accepted that the
post-Cold War period has been unique and defining for US foreign policy,
with profoundly ideological goals dovetailing to an unparalleled degree
with preponderant military capabilities. While the attempted marriage of
power and principle (Wittkopf et al., 2003; Jentleson, 2010) has deep roots
in the American experience (Kennan, 1951; Hartz, 1955; Tucker, 1971),
the qualitative sea-change in both material capabilities and ideational
objectives defining post-Cold War US foreign policy make that timeframe
uniquely suited for this inquiry.
It is not only or even chiefly the frequency with which the US has
resorted to force during this period that is of chief importance for this
study. Rather, what makes post-Cold War US foreign policy the best
laboratory for investigation of the application of the just war frame
is the propensity of US foreign policy decision-makers to seek to har-
monize pragmatic applications of military might and a stated belief in
peace and stability for public consumption. In returning to the leading
propositions of this study as outlined in the introductory chapter, the
classic contradiction of liberal statecraft is only heightened by the pre-
ponderant military power of the US during the post-Cold War era. Whereas
this degree of power which would seemingly confer the ability of the
US to resort to war with impunity, in light of that contradiction—as
well as the related need for a liberal hegemon to abide by their own
rules in order to sustain the hegemonic arrangement (Snidal, 1985; Lake,
2006)—such preponderant power makes the need for crafting a public
rationale and justification for war all the more significant. Rigorous assess-
ments of this phenomenon have demonstrated the tendency of US
decision leaders to draw upon the just war tradition to garner support for
post-Cold War military engagements, typically with great success (Russett
and Starr, 1992; The Gallup Organization, February 1991). Such efforts,
which have long buttressed the decision to use military force have only
persisted and intensified since the end of the Cold War.15
Foreign policy crisis

An additional and important decision narrowing the scope of this
research was limiting the empirical focus of this study to documented
cases of foreign policy crisis. As defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000:
3–5), foreign policy crises are situations concerning an individual state in
which three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change
in that state’s internal or external environment entail. These conditions
are perceptual, as received by the highest-level decision-makers of the
state in question. These conditions are: a threat to one or more basic
values; awareness of a finite time for response to said value threat; height-
ened probability of involvement in military hostilities (ibid.).16 The deter-
mination to narrow the focus to the decision-event of a foreign policy
crisis was dictated largely by the choice of the ‘war-decision’ as the central
unit of analysis in this research, and the related realization that such
decision-events provide the most suitable laboratory for exploring the
application of framing in general, and the just war frame in particular, to
affirmative war-decisions.
As is well-established in the foreign policy literature (Hermann, 1969;
Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Lebow, 1981; James and Rioux, 1998; Brecher
and Wilkenfeld, 2000), foreign policy crises by definition necessitate the
promulgation of decisions by an isolated group of key principals, under-
taken along a (relatively) compressed timeframe, with significant stakes
attached to them. Further, as the definition of foreign policy crisis above
indicates, these are events in which the perceptions of foreign policy prin-
cipals of the event and contextual changes spawned by or associated with it
are definitive. Such conditions, typical of crisis settings, have the important
effect relative to this research of maximizing the importance of decision-
maker agency and discretion amongst a narrow circle of key decision-
makers. This is especially true in relation to non-crisis decision-events,
wherein institutional and structural factors and considerations are likely
to play a greater role—thereby negating or at least greatly limiting the
importance of discretion and agency on the part of key individual decision-
makers.
Thus it would seem that foreign policy crises afford the best oppor-
tunity to intensively probe the efforts of a narrow slice of the highest-
ranking decision-makers to frame the decision to go to war for domes-

tic consumption, in that they are events in which such decision-
makers enjoy extensive influence (Hermann et al., 2001). In light of
this rationale and the resulting limitation of the focus of this study to
foreign policy crises, it is also important to note that the ex post facto
analysis of the affirmative war-decision must necessarily be bound by
the temporal parameters of the foreign policy crises subjected to ana-
lysis here. Whereas by definition the termination of a foreign policy
crisis is almost certain to occur prior to the actual termination of the
military operation and the withdrawal of US military forces, this con-
dition is an important one to impose. While the post-crisis phase of US
military engagements may have much to offer observers interested in
the intersection of framing and war, in order to satisfy the concern of
this inquiry with the framing of decisions to go to war (rather than
wars or enduring military occupations), some temporal limit allowing
for intensive focus on the immediate (or relatively immediate) imple-
mentation of the decision is needed. Establishing that limit as the date
on which the condition of crisis was terminated makes sense in that
regard, particularly given the unique laboratory for the study of foreign
policy decision-making that is afforded by the study of crisis situations.17
Case selection
The determination to narrow the focus of this inquiry in the manner
outlined above has important ramifications for the design and exec-
ution of the research. The decisions to limit this study to affirmative
war-decisions rendered by US foreign policy decision-makers in response
to foreign policy crises occurring since the end of the Cold War, and to
solely analyze the application of the just war frame to those decisions,
are decisions which have direct ramifications for case selection—thereby
necessitating the formulation and application of several criteria used in
that process.
Primary criteria
The preliminary criteria used in determining the population of affirmative
war-decisions relevant for potential inclusion are that such decisions
must be made by the United States, and made since 1989.18 Beyond
that, two main selection criteria were employed to identify foreign
policy crises most relevant for this analysis; these criteria were that the
crisis must feature a direct, overt use of military force by the US and
that the US was a direct crisis actor. The former criterion is clearly crucial
to the execution of the research, in that excluding from potential con-
sideration decision-events in which the outcome was solely or primar-
ily a non-military response (e.g., diplomatic condemnation, economic

sanctions, covert intervention) allowed for significant narrowing of the
population of potential cases for empirical analysis.19
In light of the definition of the ‘war-decision’ as a decision-event in
which an affirmative decision authorizes the overt use of military forces
in significant numbers and for a significant duration of time in the ser-
vice of some stated national interest or interests, this research necessarily
excludes events which do not result in the use of military force. By con-
trast, the second main criterion (that the US was a direct actor in the
crisis) is less obvious, but no less important. The rationale for this crite-
rion was driven by a desire to limit consideration only to those US mil-
itary engagements in which the war-decision was imperative; whereas the
US can (and did) deploy military force in numerous foreign policy crises
in which the conditions of crisis were not directly perceived or ‘felt’ by
the US itself, those which were of direct concern to the US undoubtedly
represent cases in which the stakes were higher—and by extension, the
need to effectively ‘frame’ the affirmative war-decision greater.
The decision to limit the empirical focus of this research to foreign
policy crises involving the US has the additional benefit of allowing for
the most recent iteration (version 10.0, released July 2010) of the
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (see http://www.cidcm.umd.
edu/icb/) to be used to systematically mine the population of possible
foreign policy crises relevant to this analysis, given the aforementioned
parameters. This dataset, which has long served as the primary repository
for empirical data concerning international and foreign policy crisis,
includes data on 452 cases of international crisis and 994 crisis actors
(e.g., actors experiencing foreign policy crises) ranging from the onset of
the Russian civil war in 1918 to a fourth crisis between Chad and Sudan
spawned by mutual recriminations in 2007. While the dataset serves
chiefly as a launching pad for quantitative study of crisis behavior, its com-
prehensive and systematic catalogue of objective conditions pertaining to
such a vast array of international and foreign policy crises alike afford it
great utility as employed here—as a mechanism for classifying and select-
ing empirical events for qualitative research.
In setting aside the data concerning international crises and concen-
trating solely on foreign policy crises during the period of concern here
(1989–2007), the US experienced 15 foreign policy crises (out of a total
population of 65 crises experienced by all actors in the system during this
period).20 As a subset of these 15 crises, 11 featured a direct overt use of
military force by the US. In taking into account the main selection criteria
employed in this study, in which the analysis was limited only to cases
in which the US was directly involved as a crisis actor and made the
Table 4.2 Population of eligible cases
Invasion of Panama 1989

Gulf War 1990
Haiti military regime 1994
Desert Strike 1996
US Embassy bombings 1998
UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox 1998
Kosovo 1999
Afghanistan–USA 2001
Iraq Regime Change 2002
decision to employ military force in response to the crisis, the aggre-

gate population of cases eligible for analysis here includes nine cases
(see Table 4.2).21
Secondary criteria
Having identified the general population of foreign policy crises per-
tinent to this analysis through application of the main selection criteria,
additional criteria were employed in order to winnow down this general
population to a more specific subset of cases that comport with the objec-
tives of this research. Where appropriate, these criteria feature a requisite
degree of variance in order to avoid selection bias. Whereas I see no prob-
lem in limiting a study of the just war frame only to cases of affirmative
war-decisions (in that the just war frame, like the tradition spawning it, is
solely concerned with war), other important factors associated with such
responses to foreign policy crises must necessarily be incorporated into
the research and allowed to vary.
One such factor is the geographic location/region in which the crisis
occurs. Analyzing cases of foreign policy crises occurring solely within
one geographic region (e.g., the Middle East) would equate with the
imposition of another limiting parameter on the study that might prove
counter-productive, in that any findings gleaned from the analysis
might be attributable to region-specific factors. Rather than seeking to
‘control’ for such potential variables, it seems more sensible to draw
upon cases which satisfy the two main selection criteria (US as direct
crisis actor; US employs overt direct military force) while also exhibiting
variance in terms of geographic dispersion.
Another secondary criteria in which intentional variance was crucial
was related to domestic politics; namely that of the Presidential adminis-
tration at the time of the affirmative war-decision, and in particular the

party affiliation of the Administration in power. Whereas a great deal of
attention has been devoted to the relationship between political parties,
party affiliation, and partisanship and the use of force (Koch and Sullivan,
2010; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Fordham, 2002), this research operates
from the premise that the party affiliation of a Presidential administration
is not of great significance relative to how the just war frame was used to
‘sell’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience. Indeed, for
reasons discussed above, if the just war frame is employed to great effect
in framing the war-decision, it is highly likely to transcend partisan pol-
itics in light of the contribution of the frame to the conduct of liberal
statecraft. In light of this, it seems important to establish a criterion for
case selection in which the foreign policy crises included in the study are
balanced relative to the party affiliation of the Presidential administration
in power at the inception of the crisis.
An additional defining feature of foreign policy crises useful in this
‘winnowing’ process is what Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) call the
‘gravity’ of the crisis for the crisis actor of concern (here, the US). Within
the ICB dataset, the ‘gravity’ variable identifies the object of gravest
threat at any time during the crisis as perceived by the principal decision-
makers of the crisis actor. In this study, this crisis variable is used as
a proxy indicator of prominent, ‘high profile’ crises. Unlike the other
secondary criteria, this consideration was explicitly held constant.
Whereas an analysis primarily concerned with crisis dynamics would
likely want to allow the gravity of the crisis to vary across the range of
possible values, the concern of this research with the just war frame is
best served by analyzing only ‘high profile’ crises.22 One means of dis-
cerning such cases, employed here, is by the perception of involved
decision-makers of the gravity of the threat posed by the crisis. Prom-
inent, ‘high profile’ cases are those crises in which the crisis featured at
a minimum a threat to territory, and beyond that (in order of increasing
magnitude) a threat to influence in the international system or regional
subsystem, a threat of grave damage, or even a threat to existence.23
An additional crisis variable featured in the ICB dataset and employed
in this winnowing process is that of triggering entity. This variable refers
to the entity triggering the crisis in question; e.g., the actor (or actors)
initiating the act(s) which was (were) perceived by the earliest crisis actor
as involving a threat to basic values, a heightened probability of military
hostilities, and a finite time for response. Triggering entities can be either
state or non-state actors. In light of the emphasis on framing affirmative
war-decisions, the determination was made to exclude from consideration
any cases of crisis in which the triggering entity of the crisis was the US.
Logically, the concern with analyzing the framing of an affirmative war-
decision as a response to foreign policy crisis does not hold up if in fact
the US provoked the crisis. While the employment of the just war frame
relative to such cases would undoubtedly be worthy of further invest-
igation, the interest here in analyzing the construction of a rationale
around war-decisions in which American foreign policy decision-makers
retained a significant degree of discretion over the ‘choice’ to employ
military force necessitates excluding such cases from the present analysis.
The sole instance of a crisis occurring during the post-Cold War era
excluded on that basis was the IRAQ REGIME crisis (2002).24
In subjecting all foreign policy crises occurring since 1989 to the two
main selection criteria outlined above (direct overt use of military force
by US; US direct crisis actor) as well as evaluating those crises in light
of the secondary criteria identified here (variable geographic location
of crisis; variable party in power; crisis triggered by ‘grave’ threat; crisis
not triggered by US), three distinct foreign policy crises featuring affirm-
ative war-decisions presented themselves as profoundly appropriate
subjects for further inquiry: GULF WAR (1990–91); KOSOVO (1999);
AFGHANISTAN–USA (2001). In an aggregate sense all three cases meet
or surpass both the main and secondary conditions outlined above. Geo-
graphic variability is evident, with one crisis occurring in the Middle East,
one in the Balkans, and one in South-central Asia; so too do the crises
vary temporally across the period of study.25 Two cases featured affirmative
war-decisions by Republican Administrations (George H.W. Bush and
George W. Bush) and one by a Democratic Administration (Bill Clinton).
All three crises posed ‘grave’ threats in that they represented at a min-
imum a threat to US influence in the relevant regional subsystem and/or
global system (GULF WAR; KOSOVO), if not a threat of direct material
damage to the US (AFGHANISTAN–USA); additionally, none of the crises
were directly triggered by US actions. And, while all three cases featured
varying degrees of multilateral authorization and involvement, none
can be characterized as a predominantly multilateral operation; to the
contrary, the US was the catalyst for and operated with great latitude and
discretion in all three instances.
Research design
Methodology
The concern of this research with analyzing the socially constructed
notion of the ‘just war’ as the basis for a frame used to ‘sell’ war by US
foreign policy decision-makers supports the use of a case study research

design in which content analysis is employed to empirically investigate
the application of the just war frame in a carefully selected subset of affirm-
ative war-decisions. The case study approach is most applicable when
the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and/or ‘why’ questions, when
the researcher cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the
study, and (as is especially important from a constructivist angle) when
contextual conditions are especially relevant to understanding the phe-
nomenon being studied, and the boundaries between that phenomenon
and the larger context in which it is embedded are unclear (King et al.,
1994; Baxter and Jack, 2008). Furthermore, the case study method is facil-
itated by (and particularly useful for) analyzing phenomena in which the
number of active participants are relatively few (ibid.). All of these con-
ditions are clearly satisfied by this research, which seeks to explain how
the just war frame is used to ‘sell’ affirmative war-decisions in the con-
temporary American context—a phenomenon which, if evident, would
certainly be both dependent on and inter-related with that social context
and, just as certainly, beyond the ability of the researcher to manipulate.
The satisfaction of these conditions, in addition to my related interest
in ‘structured, focused comparison’ (George and Bennett, 2005; George
and McKeown, 1985) of the public rationale for affirmative war-decisions,
provides the basis for development of three case studies profiling the
use of the just war frame in conjunction with three distinct foreign
policy crises (GULF WAR, 1990–91; KOSOVO, 1999; AFGHANISTAN–USA,
2001). As Yin (2009) notes, a multi-case study research design such as
that employed here facilitates the processes of pattern-seeking, inferential
explanation building, and cross-case comparison and synthesis (the latter
allowing for assessment of the application and resonance of the just war
frame across the cases as well as within them). In this particular analysis,
it should also be noted that the case study design (and these three case
studies in particular) serve what Stake (1995) refers to as an ‘instrumental’
function—meaning that the particular situations subjected to analysis
(e.g., the foreign policy crises) are secondary to the insight into the
framing of the affirmative war-decision that they provide.
Data collection and analysis

A hallmark of case study research is its reliance on multiple data sources,
so as to enhance the credibility of the data employed as well as to allow
for an integrated, synthetic, and contextually-sensitive portrayal of the
phenomenon of concern (Patton, 1990). Potential data sources of use
in developing case studies may include, but are not limited to: primary
source documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artifacts,

direct observations, and participant-observation (Yin, 2009). In develop-
ing case studies profiling the framing of a particular form of foreign policy
decision (the decision to go to war), the chief data sources employed here
are primary sources likely to reflect the crafting and application of the just
war frame; hence, an emphasis was placed on what linguists and others
refer to as ‘speech-acts’—that is, public statements expressly intended
to establish, advance, or otherwise contribute to a dominant discourse
or narrative concerning a particular subject (Frohmann, 1994; Campbell,
1998; Austin, 2005).
This investigation of the just war frame rests on the probing of the
documentary record of ‘speech-acts’ advanced relative to affirmative
war-decisions in foreign policy crises in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan. Data sources relied on especially heavily in the collection of
relevant data in light of this emphasis on ‘speech-acts’ which included
documented instances of public speeches and addresses (including tele-
vised and radio addresses); media interviews; press conferences, briefings
and releases; official administration papers including Executive Orders,
Proclamations, Signing Statements, and Statements of Administration
Policy; and archived transcripts of statements made at other public appear-
ances. Speech-acts considered relevant for inclusion in the analysis
were only those occurring or expressed (a) between the date in which the
decision to go to war was implemented (whether that decision is concur-
rent with or subsequent to the onset of the crisis) and the date in which
the crisis terminated, and (b) referring directly to the crisis itself.26
Additionally, this analysis focuses exclusively on speech-acts rendered
by the President of the United States.27 The justification for this decision
stems from a variety of factors relevant to this analysis. First and foremost
is the fact that, with respect to the conduct of US foreign policy since
World War II, the President has enjoyed an unparalleled ‘bully pulpit’ to
advance and shape policy decisions (Holsti, 2004; Haass, 2000; Sorensen,
1994). The pre-eminence associated with this ‘bully pulpit’ is highly
significant from the standpoint of framing analysis, in that as a function
of the sheer avenues and opportunities available to address targeted
audiences, the President has no rival with respect to the authorship and
transmission of foreign policy and war-decision frames (Feldmann, 2004).28
Furthermore, as Bennett’s concept and empirical evaluation of ‘indexing’
over two decades has shown (Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al., 2006), the
bulk of media coverage is implicitly ‘indexed’ to the range and dynamics
of governmental debate—further underscoring the need to focus on the
primary author and articulator of the ‘just war frame’.
such as audience type and the chronology and evolution of the crisis on
the various dimensions of the frame (see Figure 4.1). This approach allows
for the generation of descriptive and inferential statistical data useful
for grounding and contextualizing the analysis of frame application. The
evaluation of the application of the just war frame in these three instances
of US military intervention drawn from over 400 speech-acts will also
allow for conclusions concerning the utility of the just war frame, and
by extension the importance of the just war tradition, in and for contem-
porary American foreign policy and society.
5
The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert
Storm
Crisis summary
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was the first major
foreign policy crisis of the post-Cold War era for the United States
(see Table 5.1). Largely catching the White House unaware, the Iraqi
Table 5.1 Crisis profile: Gulf War
Pre-crisis/Crisis
Crisis trigger date 10/30/1990

Initiation of US military engagement 11/8/1990
Crisis termination date 4/12/1991
Elapsed time between perception of 165
trigger and termination (in days)
Duration of US military engagement 155
during crisis (in days)
Gravity of threat (to US) Threat to influence in international
system or regional subsystem
Triggering entity Iraq
Trigger to foreign policy crisis Violent act
Post-crisis
Content of crisis outcome Victory

Form of outcome Imposed (by US)
Escalating or reduction of tension Tension escalation
Extent of satisfaction about outcome Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries
dissatisfied
99
invasion was less of a surprise to regional experts or intelligence ana-

lysts within the Administration (Little, 2002; Freedman, 1993; Miller
and Mylorie, 1990). The attack came on the heels of months of verbal
provocations directed at Kuwait and the other Gulf states by Saddam
Hussein (most notably at the Arab League summit in May 1990),
including accusations of ‘economic warfare’ through the overproduction
of oil (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001). The tensions between
Iraq and Kuwait were particularly acute, and prompted by long-
standing discord between the two states concerning territorial claims,
allegations of ‘horizontal drilling’ in the Rumaila oil fields by Kuwait,
and the terms and conditions surrounding the repayment of loans extended
by Kuwait to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war (Diamond, 1996). The Iraqi
assault, launched the day after Kuwait’s rejection of Iraqi demands for
transfer of the Bubiyan and Warba islands, followed a mass mobiliza-
tion of forces on 23 July and culminated in the occupation of the emirate
within six hours (ibid.).
The invasion sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East, eliciting
concern from other states in the region (most notably Saudi Arabia)
while also prompting a flurry of diplomatic activity. That same day,
the Bush Administration reacted with condemnation of Iraq’s invasion
as well as a demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal and
the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. These conditions were echoed
in UNSC Resolution 660 (the first of 15 issued during the crisis) as well
as an Arab League condemnation, both issued on 2 August (Freedman
and Karsh, 1995). When Iraqi forces moved en masse to the Saudi border
the next day, the Council of Europe and the UN Security Council
responded with wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq (ibid.).
On 7 August 1990 the Bush Administration announced its intentions
to bolster the US military presence in the Gulf region—eliciting an Iraqi
announcement that same day of a ‘comprehensive, eternal, and insepar-
able merger’ of Iraq and its ‘19th province’.
Further complicating matters was the detention of thousands of largely
Western hostages by Iraqi forces, and Saddam’s continuing fulminations
concerning a looming ‘mother of all battles’, largely interpreted in the US
as an attack on Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 1991). After vigorous internal
debate (oriented around the competing positions of Defense Secretary
Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell),
these factors prompted President Bush to covertly approve the basic para-
meters of the military deployment that would become Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm on 30 October 1990 (Baker, 1995). The escalation of the
situation to crisis status for the US at this point became clear with the
The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 101
announced deployment of up to 200,000 additional US troops to the Gulf

region under the auspices of Operation Desert Shield by the President on
8 November 1990 (Diamond, 1996).
Apart from a retaliatory deployment of about a quarter-million addi-
tional Iraqi forces to Kuwait and southern Iraq, the onset of a major com-
mitment of US military force via Operation Desert Shield on 8 November
1990 ushered in a period of stalemate. This stasis was broken with the
adoption of UNSC Resolution 678 on 29 November, granting UN member-
states authority (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to use ‘all
necessary means’ to secure the mandated immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Iraq and total restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty by a dead-
line of 15 January 1991.1 With the Bush Administration spearheading
the process of building an unprecedented coalition (including major and
visible contributions from, among others, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria)
in preparation for military engagement, a series of diplomatic overtures
between the US and Iraq (and in particular Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz), culminating in a direct meeting between Aziz and US Secretary of
State James Baker on 9 January 1991 in Geneva, proved fruitless.
Coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm, commencing with
a massive aerial bombardment of Iraq, on 17 January 1991. Near-total
superiority in relative capabilities and strategy provided for saturation
bombing of Iraqi targets for 38 days, with the most effective Iraqi military
response being the launching of Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel
(Biddle, 1996). Plans for a direct ground offensive came to fruition with
a combined aerial, naval, and land assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and
southern Iraq beginning on 24 February 1991. Within 100 hours Iraqi
forces were expelled from Kuwait, withdrawing deep into Iraqi territory
while the US declared a ‘unilateral suspension of offensive combat opera-
tions’ on 27 February 1991 (Gordon and Trainor, 1995). Following the
decision to suspend hostilities (a major point of contention within the
Bush Administration), the terms for an interim cease-fire were codified in
UNSC Resolution 686 (passed 2 March 1991), followed by a subsequent
long-term cease-fire outlined in UNSC Resolution 687 (passed 3 April
1991).
In the midst of ‘victory’, Iraq descended into chaos as the Shiite
population in the south and the Kurds concentrated in the north initi-
ated mass uprisings against Saddam’s government. These uprisings
were summarily suppressed by the Iraqi regime through brutal applica-
tions of violence including mass detentions, executions, and the deploy-
ment of poison gas against civilians. Nonetheless, the draw-down of
US forces beginning on 8 April 1991, the authorization of UNIKOM
(UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission) through UNSC Resolution 689 on

9 April, and the implementation of the conditions of the long-term cease-
fire stipulated in UNSC Resolution 687 on 12 April 1991 marked the
termination of the immediate foreign policy crisis for the United States.
Presidential rhetoric: A snapshot
As noted above, evident signs of tension between Iraq and Kuwait were
either missed or ignored by the Bush Administration prior to the crisis,
likely as a result of prevailing assumptions in the Administration con-
cerning the prospects of continuing accommodation with Saddam (Hess,
2009). Indeed, 1990 began with the President’s hailing of the inclusion
of Iraq in the newly formed Arab Cooperation Council in a joint appear-
ance with President Ali Abdullah Salih of Yemen on 24 January. Even
Saddam’s oblique threat of a chemical weapons attack on Israel in April
inspired only a dismissal by the President and top aides (Smith, 1992). As
one would expect, the larger narrative surrounding events in the Gulf
changed significantly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. How did the Bush
Administration interpret those events, and more importantly project
their interpretations, through Presidential rhetoric?
Pre-crisis
The first official public reaction to the Iraqi invasion from the President
on the day of the attack was muted (Smith, 1992). Channeling the
pragmatism of realpolitik, Bush noted that the Administration ‘…view[ed]
the situation with the utmost gravity…and remain[s] committed to take
steps necessary to defend our longstanding, vital interests in the Gulf’,
while quickly shifting the focus to the recent release of an American
hostage in the Philippines (Bush, 1990a). Pressed by UPI’s Helen Thomas,
Bush seemed to dismiss the prospects of military action:
We’re not discussing intervention. I would not discuss any military

options even if we’d agreed upon them. But one of the things I
want to do at this meeting is hear from our Secretary of Defense, our
Chairman, and others. But I’m not contemplating such action (ibid.).
Later that same day, in a joint appearance with British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher at the Aspen Institute, Bush remained tempered in
response to a leading question from a reporter concerning Saddam Hussein:
Reporter. Mr. President, isn’t Saddam Hussein at the root of this

problem? Hasn’t he replaced Qadhafi as sort of the bad boy of the
region? Would you like to see him removed? And what can you do
about him? Mr. President, Saddam Hussein has been the source of
the most recent mischief in the region––nuclear triggers, missiles,
the big gun––as Prime Minister Thatcher knows about. Is he going
to be a constant source of problems there in that region?
The President. If he behaves this way, he’s going to be a constant

source. We find his behavior intolerable in this instance, and so
do the rest of the United Nations countries that met last night. And
reaction from around the world is unanimous in being condemnatory.
So, that speaks for itself (Bush, 1990b; emphasis added).
These and other remarks by the President, Press Secretary Marlin Fitz-
water, and other top aides during the first week after the Iraqi invasion
repeatedly referred to that invasion as a ‘naked’ and ‘unacceptable’
aggression constituting a ‘flagrant violation of international law’ while
continually restating the conditions of an immediate and complete with-
drawal. All the while, the Administration steadfastly avoided any inti-
mation of war (‘just’ or otherwise), instead focusing on procedural matters
such as implementing sanctions, notifying Congress of the ‘national
emergency’, and engaging in coalition diplomacy.2
The discursive environment changed dramatically with the 8 August
1990 announcement of an initial deployment of over 50,000 US forces in
a defensive posture to Saudi Arabia. Bush opened that nationally televised
address with a claim of profoundly (and to that point in the crisis
unprecedented) moral dimensions, explaining his decision to commit
military forces at that early stage as a simple matter of right and wrong:
In the life of a nation, we’re called upon to define who we are and
what we believe…today as President, I ask for your support in a
decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn what’s
wrong (Bush, 1990c; emphasis added).
The President then sought to drive this point home through invoking
historical analogy, likening the events in the Gulf to the concepts of
‘blitzkrieg’ and ‘appeasement’ on two occasions in that same address as
a means of justifying the commitment of American military force to
the defense of Saudi Arabia:
Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi
Armed Forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful
Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor,
Iraq’s tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few

short hours…
––
We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and

our allies remain stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will
require no less…But if history teaches us anything, it is that we
must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement
does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam
Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors (ibid.).
Analogous reasoning was employed repeatedly in Presidential state-

ments following the announced deployment to Saudi Arabia, particu-
larly in statements targeting what might be considered audiences of
‘friendly’ or sympathetic opinion-leaders.3 For example, in addressing
an audience of military officials and civilian employees at the Pentagon
on 15 August 1990, Bush linked the need to respond with resolve in
the Gulf not only to the specter of Nazi aggression in World War II but
to the defense of the freedom and prosperity of America and its allies:
…our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of
friendly countries around the world are at stake…no one should
doubt our staying power or determination…a half century ago, our
nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who
should, and could, have been stopped. We are not going to make
the same mistake again (Bush, 1990d).
Similar grandiose themes were sounded in remarks delivered at the

annual conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in Baltimore
five days later:
Throughout history, we have learned that we must stand up to evil.

It’s a truth which the past 18 days have reaffirmed, and its lessons
speak to America and to the world… Think back with me to World
War II, when together allies confronted a horror which embodied
hell on Earth, or Korea, where United Nations forces opposed totalitar-
ianism… We must not delude ourselves: Iraq’s invasion was more than
a military attack on tiny Kuwait; it was a ruthless assault on the very
essence of international order and civilized ideals (Bush, 1990e).
Having announced the commitment of US military force to the

Gulf on the basis of its inherent virtue as well as in order to avoid a
replay of Munich and its consequences, Presidential rhetoric concern-

ing the crisis quickly found its footing in the language of the ‘just war’
(Hallett, 1991; Russett and Starr, 1992).4 To wit, the President went to
great lengths not only to outline the moral basis for commitment of
military forces to the Gulf, but also to defining that action as a ‘last
resort’ (again to a ‘safe’ audience, at a GOP fundraiser in Rhode Island):
No sane person likes the specter of confrontations, and yet as we try to

chart the course of our existence, we must be guided by the imper-
atives of a strong moral compass… It was not with passionate haste
but really with a heavy heart that I had to commit our troops to
Saudi Arabia. I took this action not out of some national hunger for
conflict but out of the moral responsibility, shared by so many com-
mitted nations around the world, to protect our world from funda-
mental evil. We cannot remain silent, for peace is more than just the
absence of war. And its preservation really exacts on great countries
like ours a certain obligation (Bush, 1990f; emphasis added).
A broader and more specific elaboration of these themes was articu-

lated to a military audience at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii:
Well, today in the Persian Gulf, the world is once again faced with
the challenge of perfect clarity. Saddam Hussein has given us a
whole plateful of clarity, because today, in the Persian Gulf, what
we are looking at is good and evil, right and wrong. And day after
day, shocking new horrors reveal the true nature of the reign of
terror in Kuwait. In one hospital, dialysis patients were ripped from
their machines and the machines shipped from Kuwait to Baghdad.
Iraq soldiers pulled the plug on incubators supporting 22 premature
babies. All 22 died. The hospital employees were shot and the plun-
dered machines were shipped off to Baghdad. But you cannot pull
the plug on a nation. The invasion of Kuwait was without provoca-
tion. The invasion of Kuwait was without excuse. And the invasion
of Kuwait will not stand.
Iraq’s invasion marks an outrageous breach of the peace, a broad-

faced violation of the United Nations Charter. And by its actions,
the Iraqi regime has shown its contempt for the very principles
on which the United Nations was founded. Saddam Hussein will be
held accountable. Iraq has waged a war of aggression, plundered
a peaceful neighbor, held innocents hostage, and gassed its own
people. And all four of those crimes are punishable under the
principles adopted by the allies in 1945 and unanimously reaffirmed

by the United Nations in 1950. Two weeks ago I made mention of
the Nuremberg trials. Saddam Hussein must know the stakes are
high, the cause is just and, today more than ever, the determina-
tion is real (Bush, 1990g; emphasis added).5
Though hardly a systematic analysis, this cursory look at Presidential

rhetoric in the ‘pre-crisis’ stage (e.g., the interim between the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the onset of a foreign policy
crisis for the United States with the announced deployment of Oper-
ation Desert Shield on 8 November 1990) reflects palpable reliance on
the moralistic language as well as the definitive concepts of the ‘just
war’. Borne of explicit analogies to Munich and World War II, such
language was used selectively in conjunction with ‘friendly’ audiences
prior to the public announcement of a massive military deployment in
the Gulf—representing something of a ‘trial balloon’ for the use of the
just war frame as a legitimating device for war during the crisis.
Crisis
The first major departure from this ‘trial balloon’ approach came in the
release of a Presidential Proclamation (6221) calling for a ‘National Day
of Prayer’ concerning the situation in the Gulf on 2 November 1990.
Issued in the interim between the Administration’s final decision to
increase troop strength to nearly 250,000 (a figure that would ulti-
mately reach over 500,000) for an offensive operation on 31 October
and the actual public announcement of that decision on 8 November,
that Proclamation represents a transition point in which the siren call
of the ‘just war’ waged to defend the moral and legal standards of the
civilized world was sounded loudly for public consumption:
Today the United States and, indeed, all civilized countries are being
challenged by a dictator who would brazenly deny the sovereignty
of other nations… Iraqi forces continue to occupy neighboring
Kuwait, terrorizing that nation’s citizens in an affront to inter-
national law and fundamental standards of morality. Scores of
U.S. civilians and citizens of other nations continue to be held hostage
under inhuman conditions in both Kuwait and Iraq. Thousands have
been made refugees fleeing from aggression in Kuwait and brutality in
Iraq. To deter further aggression, thousands of American service men
and women have been deployed and remain on duty in the demand-
ing climate of the Persian Gulf region… Let us pray for peace in the
Persian Gulf, and let us ask the Lord to protect all those Americans and
citizens of other nations, who are working to uphold the universal

cause of freedom and justice half a world away from home (Bush,
1990h; emphasis added).
The actual announcement of the deployment on 8 November 1990,

followed by a lengthy Q&A with the press, offered further evidence to
this effect, with the President focusing in particular on just causes such
as ‘Iraq’s brutality, aggression, and violations of international law’ and
the ‘systematic brutality that is exercised against the citizens of Kuwait’
while emphasizing authorization for military action stemming from
‘the strong international solidarity and determination to ensure that
Iraq’s aggres-sion does not stand’ (Bush, 1990i). Throughout much of
November and December, numerous Presidential statements touched
in particular on various ‘just causes’ for military action. For example,
when a reporter posited in Bush’s joint press conference with Margaret
Thatcher at the CSCE summit in Paris on 19 November 1990 that the
stalemated end of the Iran–Iraq War would make it difficult for Saddam
to back down in Kuwait, Bush reiterated the transgressions associated
with Iraq’s invasion and the unshakeable rationale for redress they
provided6:
…But that doesn’t make the rationale, the moral underpinning,

any less compelling. That rationale is there. You do not brutalize a
neighbor. You do not kill and torture. You do not hold innocent
civilians. You do not beleaguer an embassy and try to starve its people
out in direct contravention of U.N. resolutions. And that’s exactly
what he’s doing (Bush, 1990j; emphasis added).
As exemplified in Presidential Proclamation 6221, an impending change

in the US response to the situation in the Gulf (in this case, commence-
ment of offensive military hostilities on 16 January 1991) prompted a
renewed and expanded use of just war language for an even wider
audience. In paving the way for a paradigm shift in the US military
engagement, a mass appeal drawing upon just war themes was advanced
through an open letter from the President to college students on 9 January
1991.7 The pervasiveness of both the language and logic of just war theory
(along with the end of moral reductionism to which it was employed) in
this missive was striking:
There is much in the modern world that is subject to doubts or

questions––washed in shades of gray. But not the brutal aggression
of Saddam Hussein against a peaceful, sovereign nation and its
people. It’s black and white. The facts are clear. The choice is
unambiguous––right vs. wrong.
The terror Saddam Hussein has imposed upon Kuwait violates every
principle of human decency. Listen to what Amnesty International
has documented. ‘Widespread abuses of human rights have been
perpetrated by Iraqi forces…arbitrary arrest and detention with-
out trial of thousands…widespread torture…imposition of the
death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of
unarmed civilians, including children.’ Including children––there’s
no horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good
vs. evil. The man who used chemical warfare on his own people––
once again including children––now oversees public hangings of
dissenters. And daily his troops commit atrocities against Kuwaiti
citizens.
This brutality has reverberated throughout the entire world. If we

do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up
for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and
democracy of the emerging new world order we now see: this long
dreamed-of vision we’ve all worked toward for so long (Bush, 1991a;
emphasis added).
As was noted in both academic analysis and opinion polls at the

time, the offensive phase of the military engagement afforded the
Administration a prime opportunity to describe the unfolding of
the Gulf War through just war rhetoric to the domestic audience
(Gallup, 1991; Russett and Starr, 1992). Repeated allusions to various
just causes for the war, the existence of competent (global/UN) author-
ity, and the necessity of acting as a last resort in the televised national
address announcing Operation Desert Storm on 16 January 1991 bear
this out:
This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded
a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait––a member of the Arab
League and a member of the United Nations––was crushed; its
people, brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this
cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined. Some
may ask: Why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The
world could wait no longer… While the world waited, Saddam
Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation,
no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeak-
able atrocities––maimed and murdered, innocent children (Bush,

1991b; emphasis added).
Similar references in yet another Presidential Proclamation (6243) calling

for a ‘National Day of Prayer’ for Operation Desert Storm and especially in a
public appearance by the President at Fort Stewart (Georgia) abounded:
Today the United States is engaged in a great struggle to uphold the

principles of national sovereignty and international order and to
defend the lives and liberty of innocent people. It is an armed strug-
gle we made every possible effort to avoid through extraordinary
diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter peacefully, yet––given no
choice by a ruthless dictator who would wield political and econ-
omic hegemony over other nations through force and terror––it is a
struggle we wage with conviction and resolve. Our cause is moral
and just (Bush, 1991c).
It began with Kuwait, but that wouldn’t have been the end. What
we’ve witnessed these last few weeks removed any last shred of
doubt about the adversary that we face: the terror bombing, without
military value––the terror bombing of innocent civilians with those
Scud missiles; the brutal treatment––that brutal, inhumane treat-
ment of our POW’s; the endless appetite for evil that would lead a
man to make war on the world’s environment. All of us know what
we’re up against. All of you know why we’re there. We are there
because we are Americans, part of something that’s larger than
ourselves. Our cause is right. Our cause is just. And because it
is just, that world’s cause will prevail (Bush, 1991d; emphasis
added).
And, finally, in announcing the suspension of offensive combat opera-

tions in a broadcast to the nation on 27 February, Bush ticked off in
various and sundry ways how the military campaign met and satisfied the
conditions of a ‘just war’:
Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives

are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of
their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our
compassion for their ordeal. Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies
above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American
flag flies above our Embassy….
Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We
declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And
tonight, America and the world have kept their word. This is not a time
of euphoria, certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride: pride
in our troops; pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis; pride
in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory
quick, decisive, and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to wel-
come back home to America our magnificent fighting forces. No one
country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for
Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for
the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what
is right. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort… (Bush,
1991e).
Though representative, the preceding examples of Presidential rhetoric

of course constitute neither a random sample nor a full population. At
the same time, what these few if telling illustrations of the language
and themes of the just war exhibited in Presidential rhetoric during the
Gulf War crisis do provide is a degree of context and insight into the
Presidential narrative before and during the crisis. This context, in turn,
is sufficient enough to merit the consideration, in a more systematic and
comprehensive way, of how the just war frame was employed by the
President in conjunction with the military intervention decision.
Frame application: Results
As shown above, the expressed reaction of the George H.W. Bush

Administration to the sudden and unexpected invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq in the summer of 1990 clearly betrays a heavy reliance on the
language of just war theory. Still, short of a more systematic analysis,
the question of whether these allusions to the defining notions of a
‘just war’ in the aftermath of Iraqi aggression in the Gulf were ‘rhetor-
ical chatter’ or the manifestation of the application of the just war
frame remains an open one. The remainder of this chapter seeks to
address this question by analyzing the 137 Presidential speech-acts
directly referencing the US military engagement in the Persian Gulf,
beginning with the announcement of a major deployment of air, land,
and naval forces to the Gulf on 8 November 1990 and the termination
of the crisis for the United States on 11 April 1991.8
As the following analysis demonstrates in detail, one of the most signi-
ficant aspects of the framing of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert
11
/8 # / day
11 /19
0
1
2
3
4
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
/1 90
2 4.5
11 /19
/1 90
6
11 /19
/2 90
11 0/19
/2 90
4
11 /19
/2 90
8/
12 199
/2 0
/
12 199
/6 0
12 /19
/1 90
0
12 /19
/1 90
4
November 8, 1990–April 11, 1991
12 /19
/1 90
8
12 /19
/2 90
12 2/19
/2 90
6
12 /19
/3 90
0/
1
1/ 990
3/
19
1/ 91
7/
1/ 199
11 1
/
1/ 199
15 1
/
1/ 199
19 1
Figure 5.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Iraq/Gulf War’—POTUS
/
1/ 199
23 1
date
1/ /199
27 1
/
1/ 199
31 1
/1
2/ 991
4/
1
2/ 991
8
2/ /199
12 1
/
2/ 199
16 1
/
2/ 199
20 1
/
2/ 199
24 1
2/ /199
28 1
/1
3/ 991
4/
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8/
3/ 199
12 1
/
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16 1
/
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20 1
/
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24 1
/
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28 1
/1
4/ 991
1/
1
4/ 991
5/
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4/ 991
9/
19
91
111
Storm by President George H.W. Bush was the unevenness with which the
just war frame was employed throughout the crisis. This is conveyed in a
basic way through Figure 5.1, which indicates a surprising fact about the
President’s discursive treatment of the crisis—namely, that throughout
the 155-day period between the commitment of US military forces to the
Persian Gulf and the termination of the crisis for the United States, only
85 days (54 per cent) featured speech-acts by the President concerning the
Gulf crisis.
Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that within the realm of Pres-
idential speech the crisis in the Gulf was of little consequence. Whereas
scarcely more than one-half of all days during the crisis featured one or
more Presidential speech-act(s) referencing events in the Gulf, the variance
and magnitude of such references when they did occur was notable.
Indeed, on the 85 days during the crisis that did feature at least one
Presidential speech-act referencing the Gulf situation, the number of rele-
vant speech-acts ranged from a minimum of one to a maximum of four per
day. While it is clear events in the Gulf featured prominently in Presidential
rhetoric throughout the crisis (as one would intuit), the pattern was exceed-
ingly variable. As Figure 5.1 also conveys, there were several prominent
peaks in Presidential speech-acts which largely corresponded with major
events, including those undertaken by the President (e.g., Thanksgiving
visit to the troops stationed in Saudi Arabia; State of the Union address in
late January 1991) as well as those outside the President’s direct control
(e.g., passage of UNSC Resolution 678 in late November 1990; Shia and
Kurdish uprisings in mid-April 1991).
Frame content
The topic of concern is not the occurrence of speech-acts per se, but the appli-
cation of the just war frame through them. As was discussed in Chapter 4,
the set of speech-acts identified for analysis were coded on a dichotomous
basis for the presence or absence of 15 just war indicators indicative of the
just war frame, with those indicators reflecting the three basic criteria of the
jus ad bellum component of just war theory.9 In establishing a referential
baseline, it is important to note that 26 per cent (529/ 2055) of all possible
values of the 15 just war frame variables across these 137 cases of ‘speech-
acts’ were positive (meaning they did feature a reference to the just war indi-
cator in question). In examining the just war frame relative to 137 individual
‘cases’ (e.g., speech-acts), 78 per cent (107/137) of the total Presidential
speech-acts pertaining to the crisis in the Gulf featured two or more positive
values, 34 per cent (46/137) featured positive values in over a third (five or
more) of all possible just war indicators, and 19 per cent (26/137) featured a
majority (seven or more) of positive values across all 15 indicators.10
As these basic descriptive statistics suggest, the vast majority of

speech-acts referencing events in the Gulf featured elements of the just
war frame, with over half of those speech-acts defined by extensive
reference to multiple just war signifiers (often drawn from different
criteria, as will be discussed below). Further compelling is the finding
that the average daily number of just war significations in Presidential
speech-acts throughout the 155-day crisis was 3.4, a figure that nearly
doubles if one includes only those days featuring speech-acts explicitly
referencing the crisis.11 The maximum number of just war signifiers
contained in any one speech-act was 13 (in the President’s 1 March
1991 news conference, the day following the announced ‘liberation’ of
Kuwait), with the minimum (no reference to any of the 15 frame signifiers)
occurring on 17 occasions.12
In looking more closely at these 15 indicators in conjunction with
the three major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent
authority, right intention) from which they are derived, it is evident
that the just cause criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced
here) far surpasses the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage of
all just war frame significations observed in the speech-acts analyzed;
51 per cent (270/529) of all just war significations corresponded
with ‘just cause’ considerations, compared to 25 per cent (133/529) for
‘competent authority’ and 24 per cent (126/529) for ‘right intention’.13
In considering the most frequently employed just war signifiers (of
the 15 considered here) in more detail, a somewhat mixed picture is
evident. Of the four just war indicators which exceeded the average
number of significations per signifier (35.3), two reflect just cause con-
siderations in framing the US military action as a legitimate response
to (a) the illegal seizure of territory in 49 per cent of the cases (67/137),
and (b) to evil acts perpetrated against innocents in 44.5 per cent of
the cases (61/137).14 However, it should be noted that far and away the
most common just war signification employed was reference to the
‘competent authority’ consideration of the existence of global author-
ization for just such an action, a signification reflected in 66.4 per cent
of the 137 speech-acts referring to the crisis in the Persian Gulf (91/137).
Last among the four most common just war signifiers was the ‘right
intention’ consideration of formality of outcome, in which case the use
of force by the US was characterized as intending to promote a formal
and acceptable outcome to the crisis in roughly 33 per cent of all crisis-
referencing speech-acts (45/137).
On the other side of the coin, the least frequently utilized just war
frame significations included two post-hoc ‘right intention’ consider-
ations, the first alluding to the US military action as reducing tension
among crisis actors and the second representing other crisis actors
as satisfied with the US military action. The former signification was
featured in only 8.7 per cent (12/137) of the speech-acts analyzed, the
latter 11 per cent (15/137). Together the relative infrequency of employ-
ment of these two signifiers speak to the largely indeterminate ending
to the crisis, which came in mid-April 1991 amidst the Shia and Kurdish
uprisings and Saddam’s bloody reprisals to them; such developments
likely mitigated against advancing claims of reduced tension and satis-
faction in the aftermath of the US military action. The other two least
frequent significations stemmed from ‘just cause’ considerations ren-
dering the military action as an act of self-defense and as a corrective
for a significant power discrepancy between original crisis actors. The
former was attempted in only 9.5 per cent (13/137) of relevant Presidential
speech-acts, the latter 11 per cent (15/137).
While it seems clear that in Presidential speech-acts concerned with
the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990–91 ‘just cause’ themes were the
most frequently employed component of the just war frame, the data
also suggests that the frame’s application exhibited ‘breadth’ (defined as
containing at least one just war signifier drawn from two different criteria
in any single speech-act) and to a lesser degree ‘totality’ (defined as con-
taining at least one just war signifier drawn from all three criteria in any
single speech-act). On the former score, 96 of 137 (70 per cent) of speech-
acts contained significations of the just war drawn from two of the three
ad bellum criteria, while 49 of 137 (36 per cent) reflected the ad bellum
criteria in totality (see Table 5.2). The fact that the large majority of
cases featured multiple translations of just war significations drawn
from different components of the ad bellum criteria suggests an inter-
active and mutually reinforcing relationship between and among signifiers
from the three different categories of jus ad bellum criteria—albeit with
‘just cause’ considerations providing a central point of orientation for
these interactions.
Table 5.2 Mono-applications and interactions (n = 137)*
Single criterion Interactions
Just cause 16 JC * CA 31
Competent authority 7 JC * RI 8
Right intention 1 CA * RI 8
JC * CA * RI 49
*17 cases featured no Just War indicators

Audience
Taking the full measure of the just war frame requires going beyond
merely looking at the frame in the abstract, requiring instead a consid-
eration of the interplay between the frame and the audience(s) to which
it was directed throughout the crisis. Before turning to consideration of
the interface between the just war frame and the various audiences
of concern (opinion-leaders, the media, the mass public), the highly
skewed distribution of Presidential speech-acts by primary audience
during the crisis must be emphasized.15 As depicted in Table 5.3, over
half (53 per cent, or 72/137) of all speech-acts concerning the crisis
were primarily directed at the press, a clear outlier. In concert with
the second most commonly targeted audience—opinion-leaders, the
primary audience in 23 per cent (32/137) of Presidential speech-acts
concerning the crisis—a picture emerges whereby the vast majority (over
three-fourths) of all Presidential speech-acts targeting a discernable
domestic audience were not directed at the mass public.
Having established a general sense of the target audience for Presidential
speech-acts concerning the affirmative war-decision in the Gulf War
crisis, it is worth turning to the interface between the just war frame
(as advanced through said speech-acts) and the domestic audience(s).
Doing so allows not only for a fuller appraisal of the application of the
just war frame during the crisis, but also for assessment of whether the
Administration’s favored strategy of targeting its message primarily at
the press holds up (and to what degree and in what way) when the
content of that message is the prevailing notion of the ‘just war’. In
looking at the broad groupings of frame indicators according to the
three basic criteria of jus ad bellum, in terms of the extensity (frequency
of employment across all audiences) of just war significations, ‘just
causes’ are far and away the most commonly employed, utilized more
Table 5.3 Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience (n = 137)
Primary audience Presidential speech-acts
Mass public 17
Press 72
Opinion-leaders 32
Foreign 9
Multiple 7
Mean = 27.4; Standard deviation = 26.8

Figure 5.2 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria)

120 Just cause
109 Comp authority
Right intention
100
84
79
80
# of significations
68
60
44
40
33
21
18 18 19
20
14
7 5 6
4
0
Mass public Press Opinion-leaders Foreign Multiple
primary audience
than twice as often as signifiers associated with the competent authority

or right intention criteria (see Figure 5.2).
From the standpoint of intensity (the proportional employment
of just war significations relative to audience type), the greatest pre-
valence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in conjunction with speech-
acts directed at the press, which is not surprising given the large volume
of Presidential speech-acts aimed at that audience. All told, 48 per cent
of all just war significations (regardless of categorical type) advanced
during the crisis were directed at the press (256/529), with 43 per cent
of those significations reflecting just cause considerations (109/256).
Further, just cause significations were less intensively employed in speech-
acts directed at the press than at those directed at the mass public (44
of 83, or 53 per cent, of all speech-acts primarily targeting the mass
public featured ‘just cause’ significations) or opinion-leaders (84 of 135,
or 62 per cent).
Conversely, while the extensive employment of the ‘right intention’
criterion was decidedly lower than that of ‘just cause’, right intention
signifiers were employed more intensively as a proportion of the total
number of just war significations directed at the press (accounting for
31 per cent of the 256 total just war significations in speech-acts target-
ing the press) than as a proportion of the total just war significations
directed at the public (22 per cent, or 18 of 83) and especially those
‘territory seized’ signifier, which accounted for roughly 25 per cent (67/270)
of the aggregate total of just cause significations—meaning that, of all
possible ‘just causes’ associated with the affirmative war-decision by the
Bush Administration through Presidential speech-acts, it was the seizure
of Kuwaiti territory by Iraq which proved the most commonly cited. A
close runner-up in this regard accounting for 22 per cent (61/270) of all
just cause significations was the denotation of the US military engage-
ment as a response to, or corrective for, fundamentally ‘evil’ acts—often
(though not exclusively) referring to the mistreatment of civilians and
prisoners by Iraqi forces under the alleged orders of Saddam Hussein.
In terms of extensity of employment, the two aforementioned consid-
erations outweigh in importance the seizure of (US/coalition) property
or persons (19 per cent, 51/270), and easily surpass considerations such as
the precipitation of the crisis by an act of direct violence (12 per cent,
33/270), the responsibility of an authoritarian regime for the crisis (11 per
cent, 30/270), and the power discrepancy (6 per cent, 15/270) and self-
defense (5 per cent, 13/270) conditions. The relative lack of emphasis in
some of these areas compared to the ‘just causes’ of the abrogation of
territorial sovereignty and the perpetration of ‘evil’ acts is somewhat sur-
prising, especially considering the extent to which the dynamics of the
crisis would seemingly support a frame emphasizing the unprovoked
initial violence by Iraq, the culpability of Saddam’s authoritarian regime
for the crisis, and the clear ‘bullying’ scenario involving Iraq and Kuwait.
In looking at the intensity of signification by audience type, the seven
just cause significations depart in interesting ways from their general rate
of use. The major discontinuities are concentrated in five of the seven
just cause significations: ‘self-defense’, ‘direct violent crisis trigger’, ‘(US/
coalition) property/persons seized’, ‘authoritarian/military regime involve-
ment’, and ‘response to/punishment of evil’. The infrequent reliance on
the ‘self-defense’ claim (explained above as a function of the somewhat
abstract link between national interest and defense and collective secur-
ity) in general is an important qualifier on the importance of any evident
difference.16 Still, it is interesting to note the intensity of the ‘self-defense’
significations directed at opinion-leaders, which accounted for almost
70 per cent of the (few) occasions in which ‘self-defense’ was invoked in
Presidential speech-acts throughout the crisis. And, in proportional terms,
‘self-defense’ was invoked at more than twice the expected rate in speech-
acts directed at opinion-leaders, accounting for 11 per cent of the 84 total
‘just cause’ significations directed at that audience, as compared to an
expected value for ‘self-defense’ as a proportion of all just cause signi-
fications across all audiences of 5 per cent.17 In allusions to the ‘direct
violent trigger’ to the crisis (e.g., the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990), an almost perfectly inverted outcome relative to the proportional
use of this signification in speech-acts directed at the press (where it was
used less frequently than expected, 8 per cent compared to 12 per cent)
and those directed at opinion-leaders (where it was used more often,
17 per cent compared to 12 per cent) exists. With respect to the two
audiences most commonly subjected to the just war frame through Presi-
dential speech-acts, there was clearly greater emphasis on ‘just causes’ of
a more traditional national security orientation in the framing efforts
directed at opinion-leaders than those targeting the press.
The emphasis on the discrepancy in power between Kuwait and
Iraq (curiously, one of the least often employed ‘just cause’ significations)
and the territorial dimensions of the crisis (the most often employed
‘just cause’) occurred in almost exact proportion by audience as they did
across audience. This was decidedly not the case for references to the
seizure of property/persons (evident in references to detained US embassy
personnel in Kuwait), the responsibility of Saddam’s authoritarian regime
for the crisis, and especially the ‘evil’ acts perpetrated by Iraqi forces
(including documented mistreatment of civilians and coalition prisoners
in occupied Kuwait). The issue of seized and detained US and coalition
property and persons (especially embassy staffers) was a frequent theme
in speech-acts directed at the press, a target audience for roughly half
of all such significations (occurring at a slightly higher than expected
proportional rate, 22 per cent v. 19 per cent), and was by contrast down-
played as a theme in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (appearing
in only 14 per cent of cases, again compared to the baseline rate of
19 per cent).18
A bit more curious is the lower-than-expected reliance on the ‘author-
itarian regime as responsible’ meme in speech-acts directed at the public
(occurring in only 7 per cent of 44 such speech-acts). This stands in
contrast to the greater reliance on this frame element in speech-acts
directed at opinion-leaders (15 per cent, compared to the average inci-
dence rate of 11 per cent). This difference can undoubtedly be explained
statistically by the comparatively lower aggregate total of speech-acts
directed at the mass public (n=44) than those directed at opinion-leaders
(n=84). Nonetheless, the finding that the clear ‘just cause’ represented by
the provocation of the crisis by an inarguably authoritarian and highly
repressive regime was rarely employed to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-
decision, and furthermore that this also did not serve as the basis for a
more extensive and frequent use of the just war frame for consumption
by the mass public, is striking. So too is the further confounding finding
that the closely related ‘response to/punishment for evil’ representation

was by contrast employed in greater than expected proportion (as a
function of its incidence across all audiences) in speech-acts directed
at the mass public (27 per cent, compared to the baseline incidence
of 22 per cent) and the press (29 per cent v. 22 per cent), and was
used sparingly in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (12 per cent
v. 22 per cent).
The distribution of just war significations by audience type according
to the ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are some-
what more difficult to interpret, in part because of the less frequent
reliance on these two components of the jus ad bellum in Presidential
speech-acts pertaining to the Gulf crisis. With respect to extensity, it
is important to note that the single most frequently employed of all
15 significations subsumed within the just war frame was the claim
of ‘competent authority’ emanating from the existence of global (UN)
authorization for the US military engagement. Typically these signi-
fications, which accounted for 17 per cent (91/529) of the aggregate
total of just war significations, were associated in Presidential speech-
acts with a series of UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing redress
by the international community for acts of Iraqi aggression consti-
tuting violations of international law and a breach of international
peace and security. Again relative to extensity, it is generally the case
that apart from ‘global authority’ the remaining two competent authority
significations and the five distinct translations of ‘right intention’ were
each for their part employed relatively infrequently. Of these seven signi-
fications, one (‘formality of outcome’) registered in aggregate terms
on the order of the values associated with several of the ‘just cause’
signifiers, with nearly 9 per cent (45/529) of all just war significations
advancing the claim of an acceptable formal outcome as the (rightful
or ‘just’) intention of the military engagement.
In looking first at the intensity of the competent authority signi-
fications, the signification of greatest aggregate importance across all
three jus ad bellum categories (global authority) not surprisingly pre-
dominates in application regardless of audience type. Furthermore, the
distribution of the three competent authority significations by audience
type is roughly equivalent to the general distribution, with a few small
but notable exceptions (see Figure 5.4). With respect to competent author-
ity significations directed at the press (the most commonly targeted audi-
ence for Presidential speech-acts during the crisis), there was a slight
diminution in emphasis on global authority, and an accompanying increase
in emphasis on the receipt of ‘target state authority’ for military action
Figure 5.4 Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion)

50
CA1
45
43 CA2
40 CA3
35
# significations
30
26
25
20
15 14 14
11
10
5 5
5 4 4
2 2 2
1 0 0
0
primary audience
(from Kuwait). While 63 per cent (43/68) of all competent authority

significations advanced through speech-acts targeting the press referred
to the existence of global (UN) authorization for US military action,
this was slightly below the expected ‘baseline’ across audience type of
68 per cent. Conversely, 16 per cent (11/68) of such representations
were derived from reference to target state authority, a proportion within
speech-acts directed at the press that was slightly higher than expected
based on the aggregate total (12 per cent of all competent authority
significations referenced target state authority). Even more telling in
that regard is that nearly 70 per cent (11/16) of all references to the
extension of ‘target state’ authority from Kuwait during the crisis came
in speech-acts directed at the press.
This slight shift within speech-acts directed at the press was
more than countered in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders. Nearly
80 per cent (26/33) of all competent authority significations solely empha-
sized the existence of UN authorization for US military action, with a cor-
responding lower-than-expected reliance on the ‘regional authority’ and
‘target state authority’ significations. Finally, within the realm of com-
petent authority, there was a slight increase in emphasis above the
expected baseline on the authorization for the affirmative war-decision
stemming from regional authorities such as the Arab League and the Gulf
Cooperation Council in speech-acts directed at the mass public (24 per

cent of which featured explicit reference to regional authorization for a
military response to Iraqi aggression, compared to 20 per cent on average
across all audiences).
Unlike the slight differences in intensity (by audience) exhibited with
translations of competent authority, the five significations associated
with the ‘right intention’ criteria (accounting for roughly one-fourth of
all just war significations) varied to a much greater extent when indexed
to target audience (see Figure 5.5). For instance, the claim that the US
military engagement in the Gulf constituted a ‘last resort’ was decidedly
over-represented (in comparison to the baseline proportion of 19 per cent
of all ‘right intention’ significations) in Presidential speech-acts geared at
the mass public (making up 33 per cent of all the ‘right intention’ signi-
fications aimed at that audience) and especially opinion-leaders (account-
ing for 61 per cent of all the ‘right intention’ significations aimed at that
audience). This signification concomitantly occurred on a less-than-
expected basis in statements targeting the press (comprising only 10 per
cent of the right intention significations directed at that audience).
From a statistical standpoint, this significance of this disparity is greater
with respect to de-emphasizing the ‘last resort’ claim to the press, given
the relatively large proportion of all right intention significations
Figure 5.5 Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion)

30
28
RI1
25 RI2
RI3
RI4
20 19 RI5
# significations
15
13
11 11
10
8
7
6 6
5
5
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
primary audience
(63 per cent, or 79/126) that were directed at the press.19 Still, the
finding that nearly seven in ten of all allusions to the affirmative war-
decision as a ‘last resort’ were directed at the mass public and opinion-
leaders, and that such allusions were accordingly far less frequent
in communications with the press, seems theoretically significant. The
other major disparity stemming from analysis of the intensity of
the right intention variables comes with regard to claims concerning
the (affirmative) contribution of the US military engagement to the
abatement of the crisis. The aforementioned (skewed) nature of the
distribution of the population of ‘right intention’ significations not-
withstanding, the claim that the use of force contributed positively to
crisis abatement was advanced on only one occasion to opinion-leaders,
accounting for only 6 per cent of all ‘right intention’ significations
directed at that audience. This is all the more striking when compared to
a baseline rate of 23 per cent, and to the 28 per cent of all right intention
significations directed at the mass public reflecting this claim.
Temporal dynamics
In seeking to evaluate whether there was a substantive evolution in the
attempt to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-decision as the crisis unfolded, the
last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account
the temporal dimension of the just war frame’s application. To the
extent that the 155 day period between the commitment of US mil-
itary force to the Persian Gulf and the termination of the crisis for the
US was a dynamic rather than static phenomenon, it seems worth con-
sidering whether (and if so, how) the application of the just war frame
to ‘sell’ the war-decision changed in conjunction with extant changes
in the crisis (and the US military engagement) itself. Two primary and
related factors were taken into account as a means of assessing this
relationship: first, whether and to what extent any ‘chronological clus-
ters’ (defined here as the occurrence of five or more just war signi-
fications per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) emerge
in the body of speech-acts issued over the duration of the crisis, and
second, whether these clusters (if they occur) can be explained by, or
at least understood in relation to, the evolution of the crisis and the
emergence of any major developments in it.20 In other words, this
component of the analysis seeks to determine whether the just war
frame was especially prominent at any temporally bound juncture(s) of
the crisis, as well as (potentially) why.21
The general assessment of the just war significations by time is broken
down in monthly increments, as depicted in Figure 5.6. In examining
the entire period of the US military engagement in the Gulf War crisis
(spanning from 8 November 1999 through 11 April 1991), roughly
21 per cent (112/529) of all just war significations rendered in Presidential
speech-acts occurred in November 1990, 9 per cent (48/529) in December
1990, 25 per cent (132/529) in January 1991, 20 per cent (106/529)
in February 1991, 17 per cent (88/529) in March 1991, and 8 per cent
(43/529) in April 1991. If one employs the daily average of 3.4 signi-
fications per day as a benchmark, the total number of just war signi-
fications consistently exceeded expectations in four months of the crisis,
with two notable exceptions in December 1990 and March 1991. Decem-
ber featured an especially low number of significations, accounting for
fewer than half (46 per cent) of the expected value for that month (based
on the average daily rate for the entire crisis).22
As Figure 5.6 also indicates, the conditions used to define a ‘chrono-
logical cluster’ outlined above (occurrence of five or more just war signi-
fications per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) were
fully satisfied on three occasions in the Gulf War crisis: 21–23 November
1990; 25 February–2 March 1991; and 5–7 April 1991. These 12 days
accounted for 24 per cent (128/529) of all the just war significations
advanced through Presidential speech-acts during the entire 155-day
period. In terms of total significations, the first cluster (21–23 November)
proved the largest, with 60 just war significations occurring in nine sep-
arate speech-acts over a period of just three days (accounting for 11 per
cent of the total number of significations advanced throughout the
crisis).
The large number of significations populating the 21–23 November
1990 ‘cluster’ were transmitted in a series of relatively open exchanges
with the press scattered throughout the President’s trip abroad to
cultivate allied support (which included a stop at the CSCE summit in
Paris, a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, and
with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad in Geneva) and especially in three
Thanksgiving Day (22 November) addresses to US military forces sta-
tioned in Saudi Arabia. The emergence of this ‘cluster’ of just war signi-
fications dovetails with the actual implementation of the announced
decision (approximately two weeks prior, on 8 November) of a massive
military deployment to the Gulf, as well as with the need to begin the
process of ‘summit diplomacy’ that proved pivotal to the operation.
This cluster suggests that the case for the legitimacy of a looming
military confrontation with Iraq was considered a crucial part of coal-
ition building from an early juncture of the US intervention in the
crisis.
Figure 5.6 Chronological effects, by month (# JW significations—all criteria)
125
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/2
/3
/3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
The second cluster, consisting of fewer overall significations (50) than

the first, nonetheless stands out for its duration with nine Presidential
speech-acts producing five or more just war significations on each of
six consecutive days (25 February–2 March 1991). The key events cor-
responding with this period are the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait begin-
ning on 26 February, the suspension of Allied offensive ground actions
(and announcement of this in a nationally televised address to the
public) the following day, and broader ruminations on the ‘victory’ and
its larger significance by the President in the ensuing days. Such rumi-
nations occurred in exchanges with the press following meetings with the
Kuwaiti and Saudi ambassadors on 28 February, and then in a strikingly
expansive news conference on 1 March. That news conference represents
the first (and most prominent) example of the President’s attempts to
underscore the legitimacy and justice of the rapidly concluding military
campaign in the Gulf by characterizing it (as a result of the high degree of
post-hoc actor satisfaction and reduced tensions that it was alleged to
have) as creating a window of opportunity in which ‘the conditions were
better than ever’ (as Bush stated in responding to a reporter’s query) for a
new and broader approach to peace in the Middle East.23
Beyond the three ‘chronological clusters’, the most significant feature
of the aggregate distribution of just war significations during the course of
the Gulf War crisis is the unevenness of that distribution, reflecting the
inconsistency and volatility inherent in the use of the just war frame
throughout the crisis. Fully half of the days within the period studied
here (78 days in total) did not feature just war significations expressed
through Presidential speech-acts (see Figure 5.6). The flipside of this, of
course, is that the 529 just war significations advanced during the crisis
were advanced in a highly compressed fashion, being transmitted in only
half (77) of the days between the commitment of US military force to the
Gulf and the end of the crisis for the US.
Quite apart from a concern with the temporal distribution of speech-
acts and the application of the just war frame within those chronolog-
ical clusters, it is also worth considering the application of the various
component parts of the just war frame (‘just cause’, ‘competent author-
ity’, ‘right intention’) and the significations associated with these jus ad
bellum categories over the evolution of the crisis (see Figures 5.7, 5.8,
5.9, 5.10, and 5.11). To that end, three distinct but overlapping ways
of assessing the dynamic aspects of frame application are considered
here, each corresponding to a different denominator. The first is on
a discrete basis, in which the total number of all just war significations
advanced in a given month of the crisis provides the basis for assessment.
12 11
/1 /8
12 /19 /
/2 9 11 199
12 /19 0 /9 0
/3 9 11 /19
12 /19 0 /1 90
Figure 5.8
Figure 5.7
/4 9 0
12 /19 0 11 /19
/1 90
/5 9 1
12 /19 0 11 /19
/ 9 /1 90
12 6/1 0 2
/7 99 11 /19
12 /19 0 /1 90
/8 9 3
12 /19 0 11 /19
/1 90
12 /9/1 90 4
/1 9 11 /19
12 0/1 90 /1 90
/1 9 5
12 1/1 90 11 /19
/1 9 /1 90
12 2/1 90 6
11 /19
/1 99 /1 90
12 3/1 0 7
/ 9 11 /19
12 14/ 90 /1 90
/1 19 8
12 5/1 90 11 /19
/1 9 /1 90
9
12 6/1 90 11 /19
/1 9 /2 90
12 7/1 90 0
/ 9 11 /19
12 18/ 90 /2 90
/1 19 1
12 9/1 90 11 /19
/2 9 /2 90
12 0/1 90 2
/2 9 11 /19
12 1/1 90 /2 90
3/
/2 99 11 199
12 2/1 0
/ 9 /2 0
4
12 23/ 90 11 /19
/2 19 /2 90
12 4/1 90 5
/2 99 11 /19
12 5/1 0 /2 90
Just war significations by precept—December 1990

6
Just war significations by precept—November 1990
/ 9 11 /19
12 26/ 90 /2 90
/2 19 7
12 7/1 90 11 /19
/2 9 /2 90
12 8/1 90 8
just cause
/2 9
just cause
11 /19
12 9/1 90 /2 90
9
right intention
right intention
/3 99
12 0/1 0 11 /19
/3 99 /3 90
1/ 0 competent authority 0/
competent authority
19 19
90 90
second is on a distributive basis, in which the total number of all just

war significations grouped within each jus ad bellum criterion (just
bellum criteria (just cause, competent authority, right intention). The

significations in each of the three months of the crisis by three jus ad
This approach permits consideration of the distribution of just war
Figure 5.9 Just war significations by precept—January 1991
right intention
competent authority
just cause
90
90
90
90
90
0
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
19
19
19
19
19
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
1/
3/
5/
7/
9/
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
1/
Figure 5.10 Just war significations by precept—February 1991
right intention
competent authority
just cause
91
91
91
91
91
91
1
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
19
19
19
19
19
9
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
1/
3/
5/
7/
9/
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
2/
cause, competent authority, right intention) provides the basis for

assessment. This approach permits consideration of the monthly distri-
bution of the total number of ‘just cause’, ‘competent authority’, and
‘right intention’ significations (respectively), and allows for greater pur-
Figure 5.11 Just war significations by precept—March 1991
right intention
competent authority
just cause
0
91
91
91
91
91
1
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
19
19
19
19
19
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
1/
3/
5/
7/
9/
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
3/
Figure 5.12 Just war significations by precept—April 1991
right intention
competent authority
just cause
0
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
1
99
99
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
/1
/1
1/
2/
3/
4/
5/
6/
7/
8/
9/
10
11
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
4/
chase on the proportional employment of each of the three criteria by

month, irrespective of their overall prevalence as signifiers. The third
is on an aggregate basis, in which the total number of all just war
significations (regardless of criteria) throughout the duration of the
crisis provides the basis for assessment. This approach combines the
concerns of the two previous forms of assessment, allowing for consid-

eration of the interactive effects between the temporal (by month) and
substantive (by criteria) dimensions of frame application over the dura-
tion of the crisis.
Given the higher occurrence of ‘just cause’ significations in general,
it is not surprising that the discrete assessment of frame application on
a monthly basis shows that the seven translations of ‘just cause’ ana-
lyzed here were the most consistently and frequently invoked of the
just war frame indicators in each of the six months of the crisis. Indeed,
speech-acts containing explicit references to ‘just causes’ accounted for
50 per cent or more of the total just war significations on a monthly
basis in each of the first four months of the crisis—ranging from 61 per
cent of all such significations in December 1990 to exactly 50 per cent
in January 1991 (as a reminder, the ‘baseline’ of just cause signi-
fications as a percent of all significations for the entire crisis was 51 per
cent). While still the largest proportion of just war significations in the
last two months of the crisis (March and April 1991), as a proportion of
all just war significations in those two months the ‘just cause’ considera-
tions became less frequent (to 40 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively).
Again in light of patterns in the overall data, the monthly distribution
of ‘competent authority’ significations is fairly consistent with the aggre-
gate baseline of 25 per cent, with slightly higher rates of occurrence
earlier in the crisis (December 1990, 29 per cent; January 1991, 30 per
cent) and below-expected occurrence later in the crisis (February 1991,
22 per cent; March 1991, 24 per cent; April 1991, 19 per cent)—figures
which suggest a slight and logical tilt in emphasis on the existence of
authorization for military action (especially, as we have seen above, from
the UN) toward the earlier stages of the crisis. Somewhat more telling
with respect to the temporal dimension of the frame application is the
notable increase in the prevalence of ‘right intention’ significations as the
crisis unfolded. Whereas ‘right intention’ indicators were invoked at a
rate below the baseline (24 per cent) in each of the first four months of
the crisis (bottoming out at 10 per cent in December 1990), they
accounted for more than a third of all just war significations advanced
in March and April 1991 (36 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively). This
far surpasses the rate at which competent authority significations were
utilized, and approaches the rate of just cause representations in each of
those two months. The bulk of these significations in the latter stage of
the crisis were, not surprisingly, assertions of the relationship between the
affirmative war-decision and the ‘right intentions’ of crisis abatement
and the securing of a formal outcome to the crisis.
Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics of the data sug-

gests other important temporal dimensions in the application of the
just war frame. In a general sense, as is to be expected, all three cat-
egories of significations (just cause, competent authority, right inten-
tion) vary in rough proportion to the number of just war significations
and speech-acts each month, declining at junctures in the crisis (e.g.,
December 1990, March 1991) where these were at low ebb and rising
in particularly ‘active’ months (e.g., November 1990, January 1991).
Such patterning is especially evident with respect to the monthly dis-
tribution of just cause significations and, to a lesser extent, right inten-
tion significations.24 And, as with the discrete assessment above, from a
distributive standpoint it is evident that the importance of competent
authority as a dimension of the frame application declined over time;
while 29 per cent of all competent authority significations occurred in
January 1991 (the highest percentage for any single month), such signi-
fications dropped significantly over the last three months of the crisis
(February 1991: 17 per cent; March 1991: 16 per cent; April 1991: 6 per
cent).
Finally, with respect to aggregate assessment, the monthly break-
down of just war significations (holding constant groupings by ad bellum
criteria) advanced throughout the entire crisis once again betrays little
variance from expectations based on the monthly trajectory of speech-
acts. The interactions of time and substantive emphasis evident within
the application of the frame provide further reaffirmation of these general
patterns (see Table 5.4). And, when taking criteria into account, it is clear
that the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision
in the Gulf War crisis featured a strong emphasis on the ‘just causes’ pre-
cipitating the use of force from the very outset of the crisis (an emphasis
which was sustained throughout the crisis). This is evident in the empha-
sis on (especially global and target state) authority for the military action
during the early coalition-building phase (November 1990) and especially
when the shift to an offensive posture occurred (January 1991), as well as
a perceptible increase in the emphasis placed on the ‘right intentions’
associated with the US military intervention as the military engagement
drew to a close while the crisis (within Iraq) intensified.
Frame application: Analysis
The preceding results shed significant light on how the just war frame
was employed in a concerted effort to ‘sell’ the Gulf War within a dom-
estic context. This was especially evident in the attempt to focus the
132
Table 5.4 Distribution of just war significations by month* and criteria
November 1990 December 1990 January 1991 February 1991 March 1991 April 1991
Just cause 11.5% 5.5% 12.5% 11.3% 6.6% 3.6%

Competent authority 5.4% 2.6% 7.4% 4.3% 4.0% 1.5%
Right intention 4.3% 0.9% 5.1% 4.3% 6.1% 3.1%
*November 1990 = 23 days; December 1990 = 31 days; January 1991 = 31 days; February 1991 = 28 days; March 1991 = 31 days; April 1991 = 11 days
attention of various audiences (particularly the press) on the fact

that the decision to go to war was ‘just’ in light of its authorization
by the United Nations (as emphasized in more than two-thirds of
all Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis). The overriding
emphasis on UN authority was supplemented by recurring references
to the existence of several ‘just causes’ for war, notably Iraq’s abroga-
tion of Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty as well as perpetration of ‘evil’
acts during the occupation of Kuwait (representations which appeared
in nearly half of all Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis).
The answer to the question of whether the just war language repre-
sented something more than mere ‘rhetorical chatter’ in the discursive
environment surrounding the dispatch of American military forces to
the Gulf is a resounding ‘yes’. Almost 80 per cent of the Presidential
speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis featured multiple (two or more)
references to essential notions of a ‘just war’, while over one-third (34 per
cent) of those same speech-acts could be understood as primarily ori-
ented around advancing the legitimacy of the affirmative war-decision,
featuring extensive (five or more) references to that end. The extensive
‘breadth’ and occasional ‘totality’ exhibited in the just war frame’s appli-
cation (70 per cent of Presidential speech-acts reflecting just war consider-
ations drew upon at least two of the three jus ad bellum criteria, while
36 per cent drew from all three criteria) indicate a clear element of intent
sufficient to distinguish a purposive effort to frame the decision to employ
military force in the Persian Gulf crisis in ways consistent with, and
reflective of, the ‘war-decision law’ provided by just war theory. The
following quote is tellingly representative:
Saddam tried to cast this conflict as a religious war, but it has nothing
to do with religion per se. It has, on the other hand, everything to do
with what religion embodies: good versus evil, right versus wrong,
human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression. The war
in the Gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Muslim war; it is a
just war (Bush, 1991g).
At the same time, the results of the just war frame’s application also
reveal that even the most central and recurrent significations embed-
ded within the just war frame (not to mention less salient elements
of the frame) were advanced in a highly variable, inconsistent, and
even inchoate fashion by the White House. As was noted above, only
slightly more than half of the entire 155-day period between the dis-
patch of US forces to the Gulf in November 1990 and the termination
of the crisis in April 1991 featured speech-acts referencing the crisis,

and the reliance on the just war frame reflected across those speech-
acts was exceedingly variable. It was not at all uncommon for either
‘chronological clusters’ or ‘peak days’ (single days with ten or more just
war significations) to be immediately preceded and/or followed by one
or more days with no significations or even crisis-related speech-acts. It
would seem that the just war frame was invoked on a sporadic and
inconsistent basis throughout the crisis—but at the same time, on days
in which it was invoked, it was utilized extensively (to the tune of
almost seven invocations per day).
Particular features of the just war frame’s use in the Gulf War crisis
reveal irregular and even problematic aspects in the frame’s applica-
tion. These can be grouped into three broad categories: one, emphasizing
aspects of the frame in ways which were either logically inconsistent
or mismatched with the primary audience(s) of concern; two, failing to
emphasize aspects of the frame in light of primary audience(s) of con-
cern; and three, applying significations within the just war frame at a
disjuncture with prominent developments occurring in the crisis at the
time. On the former score, there was a striking departure in the degree
of emphasis placed on two of the more prominently featured transla-
tions of just cause (‘authoritarian regime responsibility for crisis’ and
response to/punishment of ‘evil’) relative to audience type. While these
two significations would seem highly correlated within the context of
this particular crisis, in fact Presidential speech-acts tended to empha-
size the former to opinion-leaders and the latter to the public, while
de-emphasizing them to the other audience. The findings here present
a scenario wherein military, business, and religious leaders were likely
to be reminded (repeatedly) of Saddam’s authoritarian rule and cul-
pability for the crisis while the well-documented ethical and legal trans-
gressions of Iraqi forces in Kuwait were relatively downplayed – with those
two scripts reversed in the framing of the war-decision for consumption
by the general public.
The disaggregation of logically related (and mutually reinforcing)
significations evident in the actual application of the just war frame
almost certainly reflects a misapplication of the frame. An additional (if
more speculative) example in this vein might be the Administration’s
overriding emphasis on the existence of ‘global authority’ (translated
here as UN authorization) as the primary embodiment of the ‘just’
nature of the affirmative war-decision. While the extensive reliance on
this claim above all others and across all audiences certainly seems to
serve the effort to articulate a vision of a ‘new world order’ (see below),
whether or not it represented an effective method of framing the war-

decision in order to secure an enduring ‘buy-in’ from domestic audi-
ences remains less clear (Nye, 1992; Tucker and Hendrickson, 1992).
With respect to the other side of the same coin (e.g., the failure to seize
upon seemingly important, and therefore likely resonant, aspects of
the just war frame), examples abound. The aversion to any references to
‘self-defense’ in speech-acts directed at the mass public or press might be
understood as stemming from the nature of the crisis and the abstract
link between the national interest and collective security (Mearsheimer,
1994). This level of abstraction might have led such a claim to be per-
ceived by the Administration as both difficult to ‘sell’ to the mass public,
and likely to invite challenges from the (skeptical) press. However, the
failure to emphasize the ‘bullying scenario’ reflected in the power dis-
crepancy between Iraq and Kuwait, particularly in speech-acts directed
at the mass public is less comprehensible given the close resemblance of
the catalyst for the actual crisis (the invasion of Kuwait by the far more
powerful Iraq) to that scenario.
On a broader plane, the calibration of speech-acts in general and
the just war significations contained within them in particular by audi-
ence type was certainly noteworthy, perhaps even problematic. With the
majority of all crisis-related speech-acts (53 per cent) along with a near-
majority of all frame applications within those speech-acts (48 per cent)
directed at the press, in contrast to the small proportions of each relative
to the mass public (12 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively), it can be
safely concluded that the use of the just war frame in this case reflected
the ‘cascade model’ introduced by Entman (2004). This approach to
framing the Gulf War likely arose from the Administration’s stated desire
to ‘kick the Vietnam syndrome’ in light of the perceived importance of
a critical press in fueling that syndrome, but from the standpoint of
‘selling’ both the war-decision and the agent making such an approach
seems decidedly risky.
The third major irregularity revealed in the preceding analysis of the
frame’s application stems from discrepancies between the content of
the frame and contemporaneous developments in the crisis. This dis-
juncture is most prominent in (though not restricted to) the employ-
ment of translations of the ‘right intention’ criterion reflected in the
speech-acts analyzed. As was discussed above, the most often employed
‘right intention’ signification was that of ‘formal outcome’; indeed, as a
reference point in fully one-third of all Presidential speech-acts con-
cerning the crisis, this was one of the four most common significations
irrespective of associated criteria or audience type.
Still, it must be noted that the continued emphasis on the pre-

dication of the decision to go to war on securing a formal outcome
became increasingly untenable in the latter stages of the crisis. From
the standpoint of the objectives for the operation outlined in UNSC
Resolution 687 the US military engagement extensively contributed to
the ‘formal outcome(s)’ stipulated in that resolution (in particular the
reversal of Iraqi aggression and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty).
Yet from the standpoint of what constitutes a ‘just war’ predicated on a
formal outcome, ongoing developments after the cessation of major
hostilities between Iraqi and coalition forces pointed to an indeterm-
inate and ambiguous outcome. With the last month of the crisis (for the
US) defined by Saddam’s crackdown on the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings
and the massive and destabilizing refugee outflows and humanitarian
crisis that resulted (as well as the Bush Administration’s lukewarm res-
ponse to each), events ‘on the ground’ clearly did not correspond with
the persistent representations advanced through Presidential speech-acts
of the ‘formal outcome’ to which the war had been dedicated, and which
therefore purportedly made it legitimate. In concert with the sustained
emphasis on ‘formal outcome’ in spite of contradictory developments in
the crisis, the dearth of other post-hoc ‘right intention’ significations (e.g.,
‘post-hoc satisfaction of other involved actors’ and ‘post-hoc tension reduc-
tion’) during the last four weeks of the crisis provide further confirmation
of this discrepancy between frame application and empirical realities.
Two observations stemming from the just war frame’s application in
this case also deserve mention in light of the additional context for the
aforementioned findings they provide. First, and most notable, was the
recurring appearance of three distinct memes throughout the speech-
acts issued during the crisis throughout the collection of Presidential
speech-acts pertaining to the Gulf crisis. The appearance of these three
memes (‘reversing aggression’, ‘kicking the Vietnam syndrome’, and
‘establishing New World Order’) in Presidential rhetoric during the
Gulf War is well-documented (Entman, 2004).25 So too is the extent to
which each were steeped in historical analogy (through emphasis on
avoiding the ‘appeasement’ of Munich or on decisively restoring per-
ceptions of American credibility and military efficacy on the world
stage after the Vietnam debacle) and cultural tropes. Yet what is impor-
tant about these memes from the standpoint of this analysis is that
none of them were in fact directly related to or reflective of any of the
15 just war significations analyzed here.
Through their existence and recurrence in Presidential speech-acts
during the crisis these competing memes seem at least partially respons-
ible for the inconsistent and inchoate application of the just war frame.
Certainly the mixed efficacy of the just war frame’s application in the
Gulf War cannot be attributed solely to the recurrence of ideational and
rhetorical themes deviating from the just war frame and the ideational
and rhetorical themes at its core. Nor can it be said that there is no over-
lap between representations of the Gulf War as ‘just’ in light of just war
theory and these competing memes. At times the speech-acts reflected
attempts to fashion that link, such as in the case of the ‘new world order’:
So, part of this new world order has been moved forward by a United
Nations that functioned. We might have still been able to stand up
and come to the assistance of Kuwait––the United States. I might have
said, ‘To hell with them. It’s right and wrong. It’s good and evil. He’s
evil; our cause is right,’ and, without the United Nations, sent a con-
siderable force to help. But it was an enhanced––it is far better to have
this collective action where the world, not just the Security Council
but the whole General Assembly, stood up and condemned it. So,
part of it is these more viable international organizations. And that is
where we are now (Bush, 1991f).
At the same time, it stands to reason that the high degree of variability
characterizing Presidential speech-acts during the crisis, in concert with
the reliance on themes which distracted from the just war signi-
fications, would certainly have an inhibiting and limiting impact on
the effectiveness of attempts to ‘sell’ the military engagement in the
Gulf as a ‘just war’, rather than as a war to demonstrate resolve against
a dictator, to exorcise the demons of Vietnam, or to realize the foreign
policy destiny of American exceptionalism.
Another observation stemming from the preceding analysis relates to
the manner in which efforts to ‘frame’ the Gulf War as a just war tran-
spired in practical and procedural terms. In yet another manifestation
of the resonance of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, the Administration placed
a great emphasis (mostly through multiple Presidential letters) on for-
mally and routinely informing Congress of developments in the Gulf
as the US military engagement commenced and deepened throughout
November and December 1990. This effort can clearly be interpreted as
an attempt to head off any potential opposition from the legislative
branch (which proved problematic in the latter stages of the Vietnam
era) by framing the war for a particularly important group of opinion-
leaders using the just war frame (and in particular the signification of
the war-decision as a ‘last resort’) through a means which also signaled an
interest in recognizing the Constitutionally-stipulated role of Congress

concerning the use of force (Hess, 2009; Smith, 1992).
Conclusion
In the end, the analysis of the framing of the decision to go to war in

response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 affirms a central
tenet of frame analysis—the difference between purposive and effective
framing (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The
analysis above provides clear evidence in support of the former charac-
terization, as does the highly systematic nature of the frame applica-
tion reflected in the data. For instance, ‘just causes’ were emphasized
early but declined both in extensity and intensity of use as the crisis
wore on. ‘Competent authority’ grew in importance in conjunction
with the promulgation of UNSC Resolution 678 (29 November 1990)
and again when offensive action was undertaken in mid-January. Even
some translations of ‘right intention’ (such as formality of outcome,
and to a lesser extent crisis abatement) increased in application as direct
engagements with Iraqi forces drew to a close and the war was linked to
broader goals of Middle East peace talks and ‘new world order’.
The just war frame exhibited the hallmarks of salience (central to pre-
vailing ideas, commensurate with experiences, and faithful to the larger
cultural narratives) and, to a lesser degree dynamism in its application
in the Gulf War case. Yet, as the preceding analysis and discussion
reveals, the inconsistency in message and variability in application had
significant negative ramifications on the credibility both of the frame’s
message and its articulators (here, the President). This inconsistency is
borne out retrospectively in the comments of the CENTCOM Commander
Norman Schwarzkopf, who admitted the degree to which he and then-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell were at times surprised by
and uncomfortable with the disconnect between the President’s public
rhetoric and the military command’s own understanding of the opera-
tion and mission (PBS, 2011a). The most accurate characterization of
the application of the just war frame in the Gulf War crisis, then, is of a
frame that is undoubtedly employed with intent but incoherently. There
are two primary dimensions of this incoherence: inconsistency in actual
application, as well as substantive message.
On the former score, the volatility and ‘peaks and valleys’ evident in
the distribution of the data over the course of the crisis speak to an inat-
tentiveness to the framing of the crisis, with major gaps in transmitting
the ‘message’ at crucial junctures of the crisis when the initial flush of
support for the military engagement naturally waned (December 1990)

and when major hostilities ceased yet the situation in the region remained
uncertain and unstable (March 1991). By way of example, one can look
to a span of days in which a number of speech-acts thoroughly permeated
with multiple translations of the just war frame (such as the stretch of
28–31 January 1991 which included the President’s State of the Union
Address, a speech to the National Religious Broadcasters convention,
and an address at the National Prayer Breakfast) was immediately fol-
lowed by a series of underwhelming speeches to military families includ-
ing those at Cherry Point (North Carolina) Marine Corps Air Station,
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (Goldsboro, North Carolina) and Fort
Stewart (Georgia) in which the just war frame was underutilized. What
this acute example speaks to in a broader sense is, again, the inconsistent
application of the just war frame in the crisis—an inconsistency which is
surprising given the many aspects of the crisis which seemingly matched
up well with the translations of a ‘just war’ contained within the just war
frame.
On the latter front, the analysis here reveals that the inconsistency
entailing with respect to application also carried over into the substantive
domain. While the President was intent on ‘selling’ the merits of the
affirmative war-decision using the just war frame, he was also intent on
‘selling’ other significations of the war that were, at best, tangentially
related. Close scrutiny of some of the speech-acts analyzed here suggest
a compatibility in the President’s view between the ‘just’ nature of the
war and its contributions to objectives such as ‘kicking the Vietnam syn-
drome’, advancing New World Order, or jumpstarting a new round of
peace talks in the Middle East. Nonetheless, none of these considerations
can be seen as central to just war theory or the just war tradition, and
thus are neither subsumed within the ‘just war frame’ nor reflective of
its central concerns. As such, one is left to conclude that with respect
to the Gulf War as a just war, the Administration clearly strayed off
message—making it difficult to discern what, in the end, the President
was selling.
Although neither the data analyzed here nor the research question at
the heart of this analysis allow for or are concerned with any distinct
assertions along these lines, the inconsistency in the use of the just war
frame in the Gulf War may very well have had bigger ramifications for
the Bush Presidency, beyond this particular and discrete military engage-
ment itself. The precipitous decline in the President’s approval ratings,
which peaked at 89 per cent immediately after the cessation of offen-
sive hostilities on 28 February 1991 but fell below 50 per cent within
six months, are well-documented (Peters, 2011a). For the most part this
dramatic erosion of popular support for the President has been attributed
to domestic factors, including a persistent economic recession, perceptions
of the Administration’s insufficient policy responses to it, and the involve-
ment of a prominent self-funded third-party candidate (Alvarez and Nagler,
1995). The evidence here, in light of the prevailing view that foreign
policy issues of all types generally exhibit lower overall salience than dom-
estic issues (Holsti, 2004), hardly permits challenge to this prevailing
consensus concerning Bush’s electoral defeat in 1992. Yet what it does
indicate is that the efforts to frame the Gulf War for domestic consump-
tion using the just war frame were inconsistent both in terms of applica-
tion and substance, and were directed at the press rather than the public
at-large. These two factors taken together almost certainly explain to some
degree the fleeting afterglow of the war for the President, if not his elec-
toral fortunes 18 months later.
6
Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble
Anvil1
Crisis summary
One of the last and most dramatic acts in the saga of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration took place in Kosovo at the end of the 1990s. By that
time, the historical and cultural significance of Kosovo for Serbs (stem-
ming from the highly mythologized Battle of Kosovo in 1389) was
clearly at odds with the province’s ethnic composition; as of 1991, the
population was 90 per cent ethnic Albanian (Judah, 2000). In many ways
Kosovo was both a microcosm and exemplar of the tense dynamics per-
meating political life during the latter days of the Yugoslav federation.
Whereas the 1974 constitutional reform extending ‘autonomous pro-
vince’ status to Kosovo mollified the aspirations of some of the Albanian
majority, still others sought full republican status or even secession and
incorporation into a greater-Albanian federation (MccGwire, 2000). Such
tensions played out against the backdrop of economic collapse and
mounting ethno-nationalist sentiment across Yugoslavia’s major ethnic
groups, including the Serb population, in the 1980s (Ramet, 2002).
With the death of Tito in 1980, Kosovo was gripped in a seemingly
endless cycle of protests, riots, and martial law—with the Albanian
majority agitating for greater autonomy within or independence from
the Yugoslav federation, and the sizeable and vocal minority of 200,000
ethnic Serbs protesting subordinate status within Kosovo (ibid.). The
importance of Kosovo amidst a rising tide of Serbian nationalism in
the late 1980s provided a crucial window of opportunity for the con-
solidation of power by Slobodan Milosevic (Bowman, 2003; Judah, 2000).2
Milosevic’s skillful use of the ethno-nationalist ‘trump card’ beginning
notably with his infamous April 1987 Kosovo Polje speech facilitated
his rise from the ranks of middling Communist Party functionary to
141
President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (1989–1997) and President

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997–2000). It was from this
position of consolidated power that Milosevic and his nationalist sup-
porters were able to hammer through a constitutional amendment revok-
ing Kosovo’s autonomy in September 1990 (MccGwire, 2000). This act
was abruptly followed by a unilateral declaration of independence by
Kosovar Albanians and the construction of a ‘shadow state’ comprising
various institutions, elected officers (including Ibrahim Rugova, leader of
the Democratic League of Kosovo, as President), and even a militia (the
Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA).
A devotee of non-violence, Rugova prevailed over the unstable situa-
tion in Kosovo by insisting upon a strategy of passive resistance. This
strategy became less tenable upon completion of the Dayton Accords in
December 1995. By underwriting a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina
along ethnic lines and on a territorial basis established primarily through
violent campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the Dayton agreement (brokered
by the US) effectively rewarded the militarily stronger Bosnian Serb
and Croat elements. Not surprisingly, this outcome elicited a shift among
Kosovar Albanians toward support for a guerrilla war waged through the
KLA (Crawford, 2001). This shift in turn led to further intensification of
the ethnic and political polarization and spilled over into armed con-
flict throughout the province beginning in earnest in early 1998 in and
around Drenica (Zenko, 2001). In response, a UN Contact Group (com-
prising delegations from the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and
Russia) was formed to promote a negotiated settlement; responding to
the deteriorating situation, the Contact Group condemned the ‘unaccept-
able use of force’ by Serb security forces and the ‘terrorist actions by the
Kosovo Liberation Army’ (quoted in Bromley, 2007: 3). On 31 March
1998, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 imposing an arms
embargo on the FRY in a failed attempt to halt the violence (ibid.).
As of July 1998, the KLA held approximately 30 per cent of the province
in its control; with the situation unsettled, NATO began contingency plan-
ning in anticipation of a military response to Kosovo (Bowman, 2003).
Successes on the battlefield created the conditions for the KLA to introduce
an expansive new political agenda which included calls for unification with
Albania and the abrogation of civil liberties for Serbs and other minorities
(MccGwire, 2000). The result was a major Serbian counter-offensive in
the summer of 1998 led by troops dispatched by Milosevic. This counter-
offensive reversed many of the KLA’s gains and resulted in approximately
800 deaths and the displacement of over 200,000 Kosovars, as well as a
protracted siege of Drenica (Zenko, 2001).
Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 143
Prior to the so-called ‘Summer Offensive’, there was little consensus

within the US government and throughout NATO about the desirabil-
ity or utility of using military force. As early as March 1998, hardcore
liberal internationalists (including the so-called ‘Albright camp’, as well
as much of Tony Blair’s Foreign Office) favored the strategy of binding
political efforts to a credible threat or use of force (Daalder and O’Hanlon,
2000). Indeed, after the siege of Drenica, the State Department boldly
and unilaterally withdrew diplomatic concessions to Belgrade instituted
after Dayton (ibid.). Yet aside from Albright’s immediate cadre of insiders,
other top-ranking Administration officials (such as National Security
Advisor Berger and Secretary of Defense Cohen, as well as the Pentagon
and Joint Chiefs) were hesitant to plunge headlong into intervention.
Ambivalence over the proper course of action persisted even as NATO
deployed ground forces to the Balkans in anticipation of massive refugee
outflows, and engaged in a major over-flight exercise involving 80 aircraft
from 13 NATO nations, dubbed ‘Operation Determined Falcon’, in June
1998 (Bowman, 2003; Shattuck, 2003).
The decision to escalate the level of violence in Kosovo in July 1998
was Milosevic’s ‘most crucial mistake’, by virtue of galvanizing the
court of world opinion and making the case for a forceful response by
the US and NATO more appealing (IICK, 2000: 89). Also instrumental in
this regard was the fact-finding mission led by Julia Taft (US Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration) in the wake of
the Summer Offensive, which described Kosovo as an ‘eerie landscape’
teetering on the brink of genocide (Zenko, 2001: 3).3 The mission’s sub-
sequent report, featuring a 15 October 1998 deadline for the FRY to cease
and desist from all violence (while remaining largely silent on the KLA’s
role), served as a powerful catalyst for what was becoming the pre-
dominant strain of thinking within the Clinton Administration as to
the merits of the threat and/or employment of military force. Further to
that point, on 24 September 1998 NATO defense ministers issued an ‘acti-
vation warning’ for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in
Kosovo. This act sparked a cycle of escalation, including the 30 September
1998 massacre at Obrinje and, in response, the 12 October 1998 ‘acti-
vation order’ by defense ministers placing necessary forces for a major
operation under NATO command (Bowman, 2003).
The following day, US envoy Richard Holbrooke struck an agreement
with Milosevic in Belgrade postponing airstrikes in return for the satis-
faction of four conditions: the reduction of Serb forces in Kosovo to
‘pre-crisis’ levels; the granting of full entrée to NATO reconnaissance
flights over Kosovo; the acceptance of an international force of 2000
unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the cease-fire; and the com-

mencement of meaningful negotiations towards Kosovo’s autonomy
(ibid.). Despite the prospects associated with the so-called ‘October
agreement’, reports of episodic outbreaks of violence and atrocities
continued—most notably the death of over 40 Albanians on 15 January
∨
1999 at Racak in what was characterized by OSCE monitors at the time
∨
as a ‘massacre of civilians’ by Serb forces (Krieger, 2001). The Racak inci-
dent ultimately triggered the Contact Group to summon the parties to
the Chateau de Rambouillet near Paris with the charge to reach an agree-
ment in three weeks (BBC, 2000). This ultimatum was simultaneously
linked to an authorization from member-states to NATO Secretary-
General Javier Solana to launch airstrikes if that agreement did not
materialize by 20 February 1999.
While the deadline for an agreement was extended to accommodate
a new round of talks (held 15–18 March 1999) in Paris as well as a last
ditch overture by Holbrooke to Milosevic on 22 March, the conditions
serving as the basis of the talks remained fundamentally unchanged.
These conditions, including the restoration of the pre-1990 status quo ante
in Kosovo and the free movement of NATO forces within Yugoslavia were
untenable for the Serbs, leading some to view Rambouillet as little more
than a ruse on the path to war (MccGwire, 2000). It was against this back-
drop of intransigence and failed diplomacy that Yugoslav Army and Min-
istry of Interior paramilitary forces moved out of garrisons within Kosovo,
while about 20,000 additional Serb troops amassed at the northern Kosovo
border, both in blatant violation of the October agreement (Bowman,
2003). With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on
24 March 1999 NATO launched airstrikes against targets in Serbia and
Kosovo; Operation Allied Force had begun (see Table 6.1).
Pre-crisis
While direct clashes between the KLA and Serb forces were common-
place in the first half of 1998 and escalated dramatically throughout
the summer, the Clinton Administration remained disengaged from
public pronouncements concerning events in Kosovo throughout much
of the year. Kosovo was not mentioned in a public statement by the
White House until 4 March 1998. Throughout the remainder of the
spring, public statements by the President and top-level advisors desig-
nated Kosovo as an internal matter, offering little besides support for
direct negotiations between Milosevic and Rugova (Clinton, 1998a).
Table 6.1 Crisis profile: Kosovo
Pre-crisis/Crisis

Gravity of threat Threat to influence in international
system or regional subsystem
Triggering entity Yugoslavia (Serbia)
Trigger to foreign policy crisis Political act
Post-crisis

Form of outcome Formal agreement—voluntary
Escalating or reduction of tension Tension reduction
dissatisfied
Throughout much of 1998, Kosovo was referred to in numerous public

statements by the Administration, but only as one in a litany of chal-
lenges facing an international community in transition; while it was
deemed important, Kosovo was not seen as deserving of any concerted
attention or direct intervention (Clinton, 1998b, 1998c).
As the so-called ‘summer offensive’ by the Serb forces in and around
Drenica intensified, reversing most of the KLA’s territorial gains and sig-
naling the potential for a protracted conflict, the Administration under-
took significant policy actions against the rump Yugoslavia that belied
this seeming lack of rhetorical urgency. The imposition of economic sanc-
tions on 9 June 1998 was followed by an announced deployment of a
small contingent of US ground and air forces in support of the UN Pre-
ventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia on 19 June 1998.
These actions were among the clearest indicators that the situation of
Kosovo was becoming one of heightened concern to the Administration.
Still, statements about Kosovo from the White House were infrequent
prior to the President’s early September summit in Moscow with Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin. In a joint statement with Yeltsin, President
Clinton took the opportunity to highlight the massive displacement

of civilians and to single out Milosevic in attributing responsibility
for a looming ‘humanitarian catastrophe’—introducing for the first
time in a prominent way allusions to the ‘injustices’ inherent in the
conflict:
The escalation of tension in Kosovo inflicts heavy suffering on inno-

cent civilians. Over 200,000 people were forced to leave their homes as
the result of armed clashes. The situation is aggravated by large-scale
destruction of houses, food shortages, and the risk of epidemic disease.
The threat of humanitarian catastrophe is becoming ever more real.
Slobodan Milosevic, as President of the FRY, must order a halt to all
repressive actions against the civilian population in Kosovo… (Clinton,
1998d).
In many ways Clinton’s joint statement of 2 September 1998 repre-

sented a turning point in the Administration’s policy stance and in its
discursive treatment of the Kosovo matter. On both fronts, a height-
ened sense of urgency accompanied the shift from summer to autumn,
reflected in the release of $20 million from the US Emergency Refugee
and Migration Assistance Fund to assist Kosovar Albanians (Presidential
Determination No. 98-34; 9 September 1998) and in the Administra-
tion’s successful lobbying for a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC
Resolution 1199, passed 23 September 1998) invoking Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. In his statement on the passage of that Resolution,
which advanced a call for a complete and total cease-fire while character-
izing the situation in Kosovo as a ‘threat to regional peace and security’,
the President again made clear his perception of Milosevic’s culpability
for the situation in Kosovo:
Today’s U.N. Security Council resolution makes absolutely clear

that the international community is determined to see an end
to the violence and repression in Kosovo. The resolution places
responsibility squarely on President Milosevic to take the concrete
steps necessary to prevent a major humanitarian disaster and restore
peace in the region. I am particularly encouraged that the resolu-
tion, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, makes clear
that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat
to regional peace and security. The United States and its allies
are moving NATO activities from the planning stage to readi-
ness to act. With more than 250,000 Kosovars displaced from
their homes and cold weather coming, Milosevic must act imme-
diately to heed the will of the international community (Clinton,
1998e).
These inter-related points of emphasis (e.g., Kosovo as a human-

itarian disaster largely of Milosevic’s making) were repeatedly woven
through Clinton’s public statements throughout the fall of 1998. At a
12 October fundraiser for Senatorial Candidate Charles E. Schumer in
New York City, they served as springboards to the announcement of
the NATO ‘activation order’, an act on the path to war accompanied
by clear allusions to a host of ‘just causes’ necessitating it, legitimate
authority sustaining it, and ‘right intentions’ defining it:
Last month the United Nations Security Council, through Resolution

1199, demanded that President Milosevic implement a cease-fire,
withdraw the forces he has recently sent to Kosovo and garrison the
rest, allow refugees to return to their villages, give immediate access to
humanitarian relief agencies, and agree to a timetable for autonomy
negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians. President Milosevic has not
yet complied with the international community’s demands. Given
his intransigence, the 16 members of NATO have just voted to give
our military commanders the authority to carry out airstrikes against
Serbia. This is only the second time in NATO’s history that it has
authorized the use of force—and the first time in the case of a country
brutally repressing its own people…
…All along our objectives have been clear: to end the violence in
Kosovo which threatens to spill over into neighboring countries
and to spark instability in the heart of Europe; to reverse a human-
itarian catastrophe in the making as tens of thousands of homeless
refugees risk freezing or starving to death in the winter; and to
seek a negotiated peace.
But let me be very clear: Commitments are not compliance. Balkan

graveyards are filled with President Milosevic’s broken promises. In
the days ahead, we will focus not only on what President Milosevic
says but on what we see that he does… (Clinton, 1998f).
Such rhetoric continued apace into early 1999, with the President
drawing upon prominent installments of the deteriorating situation
∨
in Kosovo (such as the Racak incident) in enhancing the case for the
legitimacy of action against the Serbs and of the cause of the Kosovar
Albanians:
I condemn in the strongest possible terms the massacre of civilians

by Serb security forces that took place last night in the village of
∨
Racak in Kosovo. This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of
murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo. It is a
clear violation of the commitments Serbian authorities have made
to NATO. There can be no justification for it.
The perpetrators must be brought to justice. The Serb authorities

must act immediately to identify those responsible. They must coop-
erate with the Kosovo Verification Mission and the International War
Crimes Tribunal. They must withdraw security forces, carry out all the
commitments they have made to NATO, and cease their repression…It
is urgent that these murders not trigger a spiral of reprisals. Both sides
have a responsibility to work towards a peaceful resolution of this
crisis and for a settlement that allows the people of Kosovo the self-
government they so clearly deserve (Clinton, 1999a).
Crisis
The Rambouillet talks provided the last opportunity for any public
articulation by the Administration that military action in Kosovo could
be avoided. With the outcome of the negotiations linked to the threat
of NATO action through a de facto ultimatum to Milosevic, even at that
point the prospects seemed fleeting. The likelihood of military action
as well as assertions of Serbia’s sole responsibility for that outcome
were central to the President’s statement of 23 February 1999, issued
jointly with French President Jacques Chirac:
The Kosovo Albanians have shown courage in moving forward

the peace accord that we…have proposed. Serbia’s leaders now have
a choice to make: They can join an agreement that meets their
legitimate concerns and gives them a chance to show that an
autonomous Kosovo can thrive as part of their country, or they can
stonewall. But if they do that, they will be held accountable…If
there is an effective peace agreement NATO stands ready to help
implement it. We also stand united in our determination to
use force if Serbia fails to meet its previous commitment to
withdraw forces from Kosovo and if it fails to accept the peace
agreement. I have ordered our aircraft to be ready, to act as part of

a NATO operation… (Clinton, 1999b).
The failure of Serb representatives to agree to the conditions

presented by the Contact Group at Rambouillet in late February 1999
initiated a crisis for the US and its NATO allies. From the onset of the
crisis, the Clinton Administration repeatedly referred to the terms
of the Rambouillet proposal as the eminently fair by-product of a set of
negotiations genuinely aimed at non-violent resolution of the con-
flict—talks that featured sincere ‘buy-in’ from the ‘aggrieved victims’
(the Albanians) but intransigence from the alleged ‘aggressors’ (the
Serbs). As such, Rambouillet was characterized as a last-ditch effort by
the West to avoid the use of force, a characterization that in turn
paved the way for the use of force by NATO to be seen as a ‘last resort’
in defense of the ‘innocent’:
The peace talks in Rambouillet, France, are a significant step forward

in the search for a fair and lasting peace in Kosovo. In the last three
weeks, the negotiations have produced more progress than we have
seen in the decade since Kosovo’s autonomy was stripped away by
the Government in Belgrade. By agreeing in principle to a strong
plan that would provide substantial self-government for the people
of Kosovo, the negotiators on the Albanian side have shown
courage and leadership…The Serbs should be prepared to return to
the negotiations on March 15 with a commitment to sign the full
agreement—including the indispensable provisions on the with-
drawal of most Serb security forces from Kosovo and the deploy-
ment of a NATO-led peace implementation force…NATO Secretary
General Javier Solana retains the authority given to him by the
NATO Council to act if necessary (Clinton, 1999c).
This ‘last resort’ meme was only enhanced by the President’s reaction
after the collapse of the eleventh-hour talks in Paris on 18 March 1999:
…we have been involved in an intensive effort to end the conflict in

Kosovo for many weeks now…we proposed a peace agreement to stop
the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-determination and
government they need and to which they are entitled under the
constitution of their government. Yesterday the Kosovar Albanians
signed that agreement. Even though they have not obtained all they
seek, even as their people remain under attack, they’ve had the
vision to see that a just peace is better than an unwinnable war.

Now only President Milosevic stands in the way of peace. Today
the peace talks were adjourned because the Serbian negotiators
refused even to discuss key elements of the peace plan. NATO has
warned President Milosevic to end his intransigence and repression
or face military action (Clinton, 1999d).
In the month between end of the Rambouillet talks and the com-
mencement of NATO air sorties, the central theme of Presidential
speech-acts concerning the crisis remained that of Kosovo as a human-
itarian disaster of Serbia’s making (Clinton, 1999e).4 What did change
in the acceleration toward war was the additional emphasis placed on
the moral imperative for such action:
…we were facing a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo last summer

[1998]. We came in with the threat of force, and it worked, and we
averted it…Were there violations of the cease-fire? Yes, but they
were violations from both sides. And there were problems there. But
that’s why we started this new process with the new NATO action
order. It became clear we had to do more because of the terrible
killings in one village in Kosovo, that were precipitated by the
Serbs. Now, I do not believe that, at least at the present point,
Mr. Milosevic could be under any illusion, based on what happened
in Bosnia that—from the point of the view of the United States,
anyway, and what NATO has said—that we will keep our word…
(Clinton, 1999f).
In the days preceding the commencement of NATO air strikes on

24 March, such themes continued to permeate what became a more
frequent and more pointed array of Presidential speech-acts. One of the
most extensive elaborations of the case for war relying on various com-
ponents of the just war frame was the President’s 19 March 1999 news
conference after the breakdown of negotiations:
…we need to remember the lessons learned in the Balkans. We should

remember the horror of the war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire
aimed at children, the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the
despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done…We
should remember the thousands of people facing cold and hunger
in the hills of Kosovo last fall. Firmness ended that as well. We should
∨
remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January—
innocent men, women, and children taken from their homes to a

gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire, not because
of anything they had done but because of who they were.
Now, roughly 40,000 Serbian troops and police are massing in and
around Kosovo. Our firmness is the only thing standing between
∨
them and countless more villages like Racak, full of people without
protection, even though they have now chosen peace. Make no
mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will
be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hes-
itation is a license to kill…I will say again to Mr. Milosevic, as I did
in Bosnia: I do not want to put a single American pilot into the air.
I do not want anyone else to die in the Balkans. I do not want a
conflict. I would give anything to be here talking about something
else today. But a part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my
successors and to our country in the 21st century an environment
in Europe that is stable, humane, and secure (Clinton, 1999d).
The President continued to sound just war themes while also linking
them to narrower (realist) conceptions of the national interest as viol-
ence in Kosovo persisted (Clinton, 1999g). Perhaps the culmination of
Presidential speech-making in advancing the case for war through just
war language and concepts came in two separate public statements
announcing the launch of airstrikes on 24 March 1999:
We and our NATO Allies have taken this action only after exten-
sive and repeated efforts to obtain a peaceful solution to the crisis
in Kosovo. But President Milosevic, who over the past decade started
the terrible wars against Croatia and Bosnia, has again chosen
aggression over peace…He has rejected the balanced and fair peace
accords that our allies and partners proposed last month, a peace
agreement that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians courageously accepted.
Instead, his forces have intensified their attacks, burning down
Kosovar Albanian villages and murdering civilians…Kosovo’s crisis
now is full-blown, and if we do not act, it will get even worse. Only
firmness now can prevent greater catastrophe later…
At the end of the 20th century, after two World Wars and a cold
war, we and our allies have a chance to leave our children a Europe
that is free, peaceful, and stable. But we must act now to do that,
because if the Balkans once again become a place of brutal killing
and massive refugee flights, it will be impossible to achieve. With

our allies, we used diplomacy and force to end the war in Bosnia.
Now trouble next door in Kosovo puts the region’s people at risk
again. Our NATO Allies unanimously support this action. The United
States must stand with them and stand against ethnic violence
and atrocity (Clinton, 1999h).
––
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from

a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to
defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice
before in this century…By acting now, we are upholding our values,
protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace. As the
Kosovars were saying yes to peace, Serbia stationed 40,000 troops in
and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive—and in
clear violation of the commitments they had made. Now they’ve
started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torch-
ing their houses. We’ve seen innocent people taken from their homes,
forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men
dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and
shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an
attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose
leaders already have agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral
imperative…
Over the last few months we have done everything we possibly

could to solve this problem peacefully…Today we and our 18 NATO
Allies agreed to do what we said we would, what we must do to
restore the peace…if President Milosevic will not make peace, we
will limit his ability to make war (Clinton, 1999i).
The characterization of a victimized Kosovar Albanian population

looking to NATO for ‘help and hope’ in the face of an ‘organized cam-
paign of violence and destruction’ led by Milosevic and intended to
‘keep Kosovo’s land while ridding it of its people’ continued apace in
the weeks following NATO’s initial aerial bombardment (Clinton,
1999j). As the military campaign persisted with little operational
success (instead bringing about an escalation in attacks against civil-
ians within Kosovo), the singular focus on Milosevic as evil personified
as well as the dichotomy of Albanian victim/Serb aggressor grew more
intense.5 In an exchange with reporters in early April, Clinton under-

scored these themes:
We’re striking hard at Serbia’s machinery of repression, while making a

deliberate effort to minimize harm to innocent people. Serbian forces,
on the other hand, continue their deliberate, systematic attacks
against civilians, who are guilty of nothing more than being ethnic
Albanians. Mr. Milosevic has created a humanitarian disaster in
Kosovo. He can end it today by stopping the killing. He could end
the bombing. He could end the suffering of the refugees by with-
drawing from Kosovo his military police and paramilitary forces, by
accepting the deployment of an international security force, and
making it possible for all refugees to return…If Mr. Milosevic does
not do what is necessary, NATO will continue an air campaign. It
will be undiminished, unceasing, and unrelenting… We know we
are up against a dictator who has shown time and again that
he would rather rule over rubble than not rule at all, someone
who recognized no limits on his behavior except those imposed
by others. We have seen this kind of evil conduct before in this
century, but rarely has the world stood up to it as rapidly and with
such unity and resolve as we see today with NATO’s coalition…
(Clinton, 1999k).
A few weeks later, in an address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)

at Fort McNair (Maryland), President Clinton continued with these
characterizations of the crisis and of Milosevic’s role in it, attempting
to weave the dynamics of Serb aggression in Kosovo into a larger
historical narrative in the process:
Though his ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic exter-
mination of the Holocaust, the two are related, both vicious, pre-
meditated, systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic
hatred. This campaign to drive the Kosovars from their land and
to, indeed, erase their very identity is an affront to humanity and
an attack not only on a people but on the dignity of all people.
Nine of every ten Kosovar Albanians now has been driven from
their homes, thousands murdered, at least 100,000 missing, many
young men led away in front of their families; over 500 cities,
towns, and villages torched. All this has been carried out, you must
understand, according to a plan carefully designed months earlier in
Belgrade…
…There are those who say Europe and its North American allies
have no business intervening in the ethnic conflicts of the Balkans.
They are the inevitable result, these conflicts, according to some,
of centuries-old animosities…The truth is that for centuries these
people have lived together in the Balkans and southeastern Europe…
without anything approaching the intolerable conditions and con-
flicts that exist today. And we do no favors to ourselves or to the
rest of the world when we justify looking away from this kind of
slaughter…there is a huge difference between people who can’t
resolve their problems peacefully and fight about it and people who
resort to systematic ethnic cleansing and slaughter of people because
of their religious or ethnic background…And that is the differ-
ence that NATO—that our Allies have tried to recognize and act on.
Bringing the Kosovars home is a moral issue (Clinton, 1999l).
This attempt at historical contextualization was even more pronounced

in the President’s remarks at a Memorial Day ceremony at Arlington
National Cemetery on 31 May 1999. Evan as the prospects for Serb
capitulation were mounting, Clinton drew a direct parallel between the
violence in Kosovo to that in Bosnia, while characterizing the Balkan
conflicts of the 1990s as links in an unbroken chain extending back
to the two World Wars (Clinton, 1999m). In doing so, the President
pointed chiefly to the ‘fundamental interest in building a lasting
peace in an undivided and free Europe’ that ran through all three
conflicts—a peaceful and prosperous order against which Milosevic
represented the ‘last holdout’ in a scenario in which Serbia was likened
to Nazi Germany (ibid.). In response to domestic concerns about the
US involvement in Kosovo, Clinton was unequivocal:
…Our objectives in Kosovo are clear and consistent with the moral
imperative of reversing ethnic cleansing and killing…many
Americans believe that this is not our fight. But remember why
many of the people are laying in these graves out here— because of
what happened in Europe and because of what was allowed to go on
too long before people intervened. What we are doing today will
save lives, including American lives, in the future. And it will give
our children a better, safer world to live in (ibid.).
This slight but perceptible shift toward a focus on ‘right intention’

considerations and in particular the US and NATO plan for Serbia
after the cessation of hostilities was again evident in the President’s
Commencement Address to the US Air Force Academy on 2 June 1999.
In again seeking to connect the Kosovo campaign to a larger historical

narrative (that of America’s interest in ensuring an ‘undivided and free
Europe’) as the crisis drew towards its termination, the President decried
the notion that atrocities against Kosovars were linked to or increased
by the NATO bombing campaign (Clinton, 1999n). Instead, his address
pointed to the ICTY indictment and Milosevic’s culpability for war crimes
in Bosnia while articulating a moral rationale for Operation Allied Force:
Our reasons are both moral and strategic. There is a moral impera-
tive because what we’re facing in Kosovo is not just ethnic and
religious hatred, discrimination and conflict…America and NATO’s
military power cannot be deployed just because people don’t like
each other or even because they fight each other. What is going on
in Kosovo is something much worse and, thankfully, more rare:
an effort by a political leader to systematically destroy or displace
an entire people because of their ethnicity and their religious faith;
an effort to erase the culture and history and presence of a people
from their land. Where we have the ability to do so, we as a nation
and our democratic allies must take a stand against this. We do
have the ability to do so at NATO’s doorstep in Europe (ibid.).
Finally, in announcing the Military Technical Agreement which repre-

sented the formal end to the NATO operation and the suspension of
offensive military hostilities, the President reported that:
…we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic
values, and for a stronger America. Aggression against an innocent
people has been contained and is being turned back. When I ordered
our Armed Forces into combat, we had three clear goals: to enable
the Kosovar people, the victims of some of the most vicious atroc-
ities in Europe since the Second World War, to return to their
homes with safety and self-government; to require Serbian forces
responsible for those atrocities to leave Kosovo; and to deploy an
international security force, with NATO at its core, to protect all the
people of that troubled land, Serbs and Albanians, alike. Those goals
will be achieved. A necessary conflict has been brought to a just and
honorable conclusion (Clinton, 1999o).
Though representative of both the pre-crisis and crisis stages, the pre-
ceding examples of rhetoric constitute neither a random sample nor a
full population of Presidential speech-making concerning Kosovo.
What these few (if telling) illustrations of the language and themes of
the just war as exhibited in Presidential rhetoric do provide is a degree

of context and insight into the Presidential narrative before and during
the crisis. This context, in turn, is sufficient enough to merit the con-
sideration, in a more structured and comprehensive way, of whether
these statements serve as exemplars of a systematic, purposive, and
intentional application of the just war frame to the decision to inter-
vene with force in Kosovo.
As with the preceding examination of the Gulf War, a subset of public

statements is hardly sufficient to adequately address the question of
how, specifically, the Clinton Administration employed just war theory
to ‘sell’ a military action in Kosovo to the American public. As such, this
chapter will examine that question by analyzing 167 cases of Presi-
dential speech-acts directly referencing the military engagement in Kosovo,
beginning with the commencement of air strikes on 24 March 1999
and continuing through termination of the crisis for the United States
on 10 June 1999.6
One of the more immediate (if impressionistic) findings emerging
from this analysis relates to President Clinton’s discursive treatment
of the crisis, which was consistent—and with regard to the just war
frame, consistently muted. These qualities are conveyed in a basic way
through Figure 6.1; 68 of the 78 days (87 per cent) of the crisis featured
at least one speech-act concerning the crisis by the President, with the
Figure 6.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Kosovo’—POTUS

March 24, 1999–June 10, 1999
7
4
#/day
0
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
/1 99 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199
4 8 4/1 4/5 4/9 /13 /17 /21 /25 /29 5/3 5/7 /11 /15 /19 /23 /27 /31 6/4 6/9
3/2 3/2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
date
number of relevant speech-acts on those 68 days ranging from a min-

imum of one (multiple occasions) to a maximum of six (23 April) per
day. With respect to the just war frame more specifically, 59 of those
68 days (87 per cent) featured Presidential speech-acts containing at
least one just war signification. As Figure 6.1 also conveys, there were
several prominent peaks in Presidential speech-acts corresponding with
major events, including (but not limited to) an early proposal for a
cease-fire from Milosevic, a ‘preventative deployment’ of 2500 US
soldiers and aviators to Albania and Macedonia, the start of NATO’s
50th anniversary summit, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, and the ICTY indictment of Milosevic.
Frame content
The topic of concern here, of course, is not Presidential speech-making
per se, but the use of the just war frame through Presidential speech-
acts. To establish a referential baseline, it is important to note that only
7.5 per cent (190/2505) of all possible values of the 15 just war frame
variables distributed across 167 cases of Presidential speech-acts did in
fact feature a reference to the just war indicator in question. In exam-
ining the just war frame relative to these 167 Presidential speech-acts,
approximately 34 per cent (56/167) featured two or more just war signi-
fications, with no Presidential speech-act featuring positive values in even
as many as a third (five or more) of all possible just war indicators.
These general findings indicate the limited nature of the just war
frame’s application by the Clinton Administration in the Kosovo crisis.7
Further to this point is the finding that the average daily number
of just war significations in Presidential speech-acts throughout the
78-day crisis was 2.4, a figure that does not change much if one includes
only those days featuring speech-acts explicitly referencing the crisis.8
The maximum number of just war signifiers contained within any one
speech-act was four (which occurred on several occasions, though not
in conjunction with any especially noteworthy crisis event), with the
minimum (no reference to any of the 15 frame signifiers) occurring in
55 distinct speech-acts.9
In looking at the use of the just war frame only through the lens of
the three major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent
authority, right intention) from which they are derived, the just cause
criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced here) clearly out-
strips the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage of all observed
just war frame significations. All told, 62 per cent (118/190) of all
just war significations corresponded with ‘just cause’ considerations,
compared to 26 per cent (50/190) for ‘competent authority’ and approx-

imately 12 per cent (22/190) for ‘right intention’.10 However, a closer
examination of the 15 variables comprising the just war frame provides
a somewhat more mixed picture. Only four of the 15 just war indi-
cators exceed the average number of significations per variable (12.7).
Two of these four most common just war signifiers were ‘just causes’,
reflecting the attempt to frame the use of force as a legitimate response
to: (a) a violent crisis trigger in 10 per cent (17/167) of the cases and
(b) to evil acts perpetrated against innocents in 49 per cent (81/167);
the latter proved the single most common just war signification advanced
through Presidential speech-acts during the crisis.11 The second most
commonly employed signifier came through reference to the ‘com-
petent authority’ provided by regional authorization for military action,
via NATO and, secondarily, the European Council. This signification
was reflected in 29 per cent (48/167) of the Presidential speech-acts
referring to the crisis.12 Among the four most common just war signi-
fiers, the weakest in terms of frequency of use was the ‘right intention’
consideration of pace of abatement, in which the use of force was asso-
ciated with the intention to accelerate crisis abatement. This signification
appeared in 7 per cent of all crisis-referencing speech-acts (13/190).
The highly stratified nature of the findings precludes discussing the
least frequent just war indicators at length, as all but three (discussed
above) turned up in fewer than 10 per cent of the speech-acts. At a
minimum, it bears noting that four just war signifiers were never
invoked—the ‘just causes’ of self-defense, the seizure of territory, and
the seizure of (US) property and/or persons, as well as the competent
authority consideration of target state authority. None of these non-
findings should be particularly surprising, in that they all reflect the
objective conditions of the crisis (and, by extension, a more-or-less
faithful rendering of the just war frame through Presidential speech-
acts). As the case for war rested entirely on the responsibility to act as a
third party on behalf of the threatened Kosovar Albanians, there were
clearly no plausible grounds for self-defense from the American per-
spective, nor was there a direct threat to American property or persons
prior to the commitment of US military force. Similarly, territory was
not a relevant factor, in that territorial gain was incidental to ‘ethnic
cleansing’ and that the crisis played out entirely within the (then) rec-
ognized boundaries of the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
this latter fact also obviated any claims to target state authority.
While Presidential speech-acts concerned with the Kosovo crisis were
most likely to advance ‘just cause’ themes, the data also suggests that
the frame application exhibited a modicum of ‘breadth’ (defined as con-
JC * CA * RI 7
*55 speech-acts featured no Just War indicators
taining at least one just war signifier drawn from two different criteria
in any single speech-act), though clearly nothing remotely approaching
‘totality’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from
all three criteria in any single speech-act). On the former score, 43 of 167
(26 per cent) of speech-acts contained significations of the just war drawn
from two of the three ad bellum criteria, while only seven of 167 (4 per
cent) reflected the ad bellum criteria in totality (see Table 6.2). The rela-
tively slight degree of breadth and near-absence of totality are clearly
functions of a disproportionate focus on relatively few translations of the
just war frame, at the exclusion of the vast majority of the indicators con-
tained within that frame. While this does not necessarily indicate that the
frame was weakly or ineffectively employed, it is clear that application
was highly selective.
Audience
Before considering the interface between the just war frame and the main
audiences of concern to this research (opinion-leaders, the media, the
mass public), the distribution of Presidential speech-acts according
to primary audience is worth noting.13 As Table 6.3 shows, over two-
thirds of all Presidential speech-acts during the crisis were directed at the
press and opinion-leaders. These speech-acts were distributed in almost
Table 6.3 Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience (n = 167)
Primary audience Presidential speech-acts
Mass public 24
Press 59
Opinion-leaders 58
Foreign 4
Multiple 22
Mean = 33.4; Standard deviation = 24.2

identical proportion, with 36 per cent (59/167) targeting the press and
35 per cent (58/167) opinion-leaders. And, as was also the case in the pre-
ceding analysis of the Gulf War crisis, only a small minority of speech-
acts (14 per cent, or 24/167) were chiefly directed at the mass public.
In turning to the interface between the just war frame and the domes-
tic audience(s) through Presidential speech-acts, the extensity (frequency
of employment across all audiences) of just war significations shows
that ‘just causes’ were far and away the most commonly employed of
the three jus ad bellum categories. They were utilized more than twice as
often as signifiers associated with competent authority, and more than
five times as often as those associated with the right intention criteria
(see Figure 6.2). And, from the standpoint of intensity (the proportional
employment of just war significations relative to audience type), the
greatest prevalence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in conjunction
with speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders.
All told, 37 per cent of all just war significations (regardless of cate-
gorical type) advanced during the crisis were directed at opinion-leaders
(71/190), with 78 per cent of those significations reflecting ‘just causes’
(55/71). By contrast, just cause significations were less intensively employed
in speech-acts directed at the press (35 of 65, or 54 per cent, of all speech-
Figure 6.2 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria)

60
55
Just cause
50
Comp authority
Right intention
40
# of significations
35
30
21
20
17
13
11
10 9 8
4 5
3 3 2
3
1
0
primary audience
acts primarily targeting the press featured ‘just cause’ significations). The
significance of this finding is compounded when one considers that the
aggregate number of speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders and the press
were almost identical. This suggests a far more intensive emphasis on
framing using ‘just causes’ in those Presidential speech-acts directed at
opinion-leaders than in those aimed at the press.14
Conversely, appeals to ‘competent authority’ of any type were relied
on much more intensively in speech-acts directed at the press (32 per
cent, or 21/65) and mass public (34 per cent, or 11/32) and less so in
those aimed at opinion-leaders (18 per cent, or 13/71).15 In relational
terms, a roughly inverse relationship in emphasis by the ‘just cause’
and ‘competent authority’ criteria is apparent, with the former receiving
greater emphasis in communications with business, military, religious,
and professional elites and the latter greater emphasis in the media and
mass public. Finally, only 12 per cent (22/190) of all just war signi-
fications evident in Presidential speech-acts advanced during the crisis
stemmed from the five translations of ‘right intention’ advanced here.
The single most common audience to which these significations were
directed was the press, with right intention considerations accounting
for 14 per cent (9/65) of all just war significations targeting the press—
a total three times as high as those employed in speech-acts targeting
opinion-leaders.
Considerations of aggregate extensity and intensity beg the question
of which specific just war significations register most frequently within
the body of Presidential speech-acts concerning the commitment of US
military force to the NATO operation in Kosovo. Again, the concepts of
extensity and intensity allow for distinguishing these effects. With
respect to the extensity of the seven distinct translations of ‘just causes’
considered in this inquiry, Figure 6.3 conveys the degree to which the
emphasis on just causes was almost entirely propelled by significations
of the US military engagement as a ‘response to/punishment of evil’.
Fully 69 per cent (81/118) of the just cause significations identified in
the data were of this type. This means that of all ‘just causes’ associated
with the affirmative war-decision by the Clinton Administration through
Presidential speech-acts, the ‘evils’ associated with ethnic cleansing (typi-
cally linked to the alleged ‘Operation Horseshoe’ plan) were easily the
most commonly cited.
In light of this clear outlier, it is not surprising that the only other
‘just causes’ evident within the speech-acts analyzed appeared infre-
quently. To that end, 14 per cent (17/118) of the aggregate total of just
cause significations referenced the existence of a direct violent act as
nearly three-fourths (73 per cent, or 40/55) referenced the response

to/punishment of ‘evil’ (exceeding the expected or ‘baseline’ rate across
all audiences of 69 per cent). Yet while a response to or punishment of
‘evil’ is the most important translation of ‘just cause’ in relation to all
audiences, the intensity of the reliance on that signifier in speech-acts
directed at audiences other than opinion-leaders is not all that significant.
For example, of all just cause significations directed at the press, 63 per
cent (22/35) referenced the response to/punishment of ‘evil’ motive, with
53 per cent (9/17) of total just cause significations directed at the mass
public reflecting this consideration (again in comparison to the ‘baseline’
value of 69 per cent). Indeed, in terms of intensity of employment, other
variables rank higher in speech-acts directed at the press and mass public;
for example, the involvement/responsibility of an authoritarian regime
(accounting for 23 per cent of the just cause significations directed at the
press, compared to an expected value across all audiences of 10 per cent)
or the existence of a direct violent crisis trigger (accounting for 23 per
cent of the just cause significations directed at the mass public, compared
to an expected value of 14 per cent).17
Such findings suggest a clear pattern in the data, in which a greater
emphasis on just cause considerations in communications with opinion-
leaders is, in turn, linked to and accounted for by a disproportionate em-
phasis on framing the military engagement as a response to or punishment
of acts of ‘evil’. This point of emphasis persists in application of the frame
to other audiences, but to a lesser degree––with the difference largely
made up by slightly higher than expected use of other significations,
chiefly those related to the direct violent act triggering the crisis, the
power disparity between crisis actors (in speech-acts directed at the mass
public), and the responsibility of an authoritarian regime for the crisis
(in speech-acts directed at the press).
The distribution of just war significations by audience type according
to the ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are some-
what more difficult to interpret due to less frequent use. With respect to
extensity, the second most frequently employed of all 15 significations
subsumed within the just war frame was the claim of ‘competent author-
ity’ emanating from the existence of regional authority (extended from
NATO and various European institutions including the Council of Europe,
OSCE, and EU) for the military engagement. Accounting for 25 per cent
(48/190) of the aggregate total of just war significations, these signi-
fications were typically advanced in Presidential speech-acts stressing
the collective security dimensions of the operation (advanced under
NATO auspices) and their legal and institutional underpinning. As will be
discussed at length below, this finding is particularly instructive in

light of the absence of UN Security Council authorization for the oper-
ation. Again in terms of extensity, apart from this singular variable the
remaining two competent authority significations and the five distinct
translations of ‘right intention’ were employed infrequently and to
little effect.
In considering the intensity of the competent authority significations,
the signification of greatest aggregate importance across all three jus ad
bellum categories (regional authority) not surprisingly predominates in
application by audience type (see Figure 6.4). Overall, competent author-
ity significations directed at the press were more common than those
directed at opinion-leaders, as is reflected in a concomitant and propor-
tional increase in the value of regional authority significations. The only
slight deviation relative to competent authority significations in general
stems from President Clinton’s vague allusion to UN support for the oper-
ation in his televised address to the public of 10 June 1999 announcing
the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, an announcement marking
termination of the crisis for the United States. This single attempt at sig-
nifying global authorization resulted in a slightly lower than expected
rate of application of the regional authorization signification in speech-

25
21
20
CA1
CA2
# of significations
15
13 CA3
10
10
2 2
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
primary audience
acts directed at the mass public (91 per cent, compared to a baseline rate
of 96 per cent).
The most infrequently employed of the three jus ad bellum criteria in
framing the case for war in Kosovo was right intention, which accounted
for roughly 12 per cent of all just war significations (see Figure 6.5). To
the extent that any of the five significations associated with the ‘right
intention’ criteria registered in the framing of the war-decision through
Presidential speech-acts, the key outlier came in references to the inten-
tion of positively contributing to crisis abatement. In the aggregate, signi-
fications to this effect comprised nearly 60 per cent of all right intention
significations. From the standpoint of intensity of application, the majority
of these framing efforts were directed towards the press, in fact account-
ing for 78 per cent of all right intention significations targeting that audi-
ence (compared to a ‘baseline’ or expected value of 59 per cent).
Temporal dynamics
The last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account
the temporal dimension of the just war frame’s application. The dynamic
context of the 78-day period between the commitment of US military
force to Operation Noble Anvil and the termination of the crisis for the US
Figure 6.5 Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion)

8
7 RI1
7
RI2
6 RI3
RI4
5 RI5
# of significations
3
3
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
primary audience
requires assessment of whether the manner by which the just war

frame was used to ‘sell’ the war-decision changed in conjunction with
extant changes in the crisis (and the US military engagement) itself. As
in the preceding chapter, two primary and related factors were taken
into account: first, whether and to what extent any ‘chronological clus-
ters’ (defined as the occurrence of five or more just war significations
per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) emerge in the
body of speech-acts issued over the duration of the crisis, and second,
whether these clusters (if they occur) can be explained by, or at least
understood in relation to, the evolution of the crisis and the emer-
gence of any major developments in it.18 In other words, this com-
ponent of the analysis seeks to determine whether the just war frame
was especially prominent at any temporally bound juncture(s) of the
crisis, and if so, why.19
The temporal pattern of just war significations is depicted on a monthly
basis in Figure 6.6. In examining the entire period of the US military
engagement in the Kosovo crisis (spanning from 24 March through
10 June 1999), roughly 18 per cent (34/190) of all just war significations
advanced in Presidential speech-acts occurred in March 1999, 41 per cent
(78/190) in April 1999, 30 per cent (57/190) in May 1999, and 11 per cent
(21/190) in June 1999. If one employs the daily average of 2.4 signi-
fications per day as a benchmark, a sharp dichotomy emerges, in which
the first two months of the crisis (March and April 1999) featured just war
significations at a rate exceeding expectations, while the last two months
(May and June 1999) exhibited use of the just war frame at a rate slightly
below expectations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the use of the frame was
greatest proportionally in the initial (partial) month of March, in which
the incidence of just war significations was almost twice as high as expected
(with 34 significations, compared to the baseline value of 19.5 as derived
from the average daily rate for the entire crisis). This pattern continued
into April, in which actual significations exceeded the baseline rate, albeit
to a diminished degree (with 78 significations in total for the month,
compared to an expected value of 73.2). However, May 1999 marked
the beginning of a bifurcation in the data along temporal lines, with a
significant drop-off to the tune of 57 total significations accounting for
approximately three-fourths of the expected value of 75.6. This trend con-
tinued in the final (and partial) month of the crisis, June 1999, in which
total just war significations fell slightly below expected values (21 v. 24.4).
logical cluster’ (occurrence of five or more just war significations per
day for a period of three or more consecutive days) were fully satisfied
significations advanced in each month of the crisis. The monthly dis-

tribution of ‘competent authority’ significations as a percentage of all
just war significations varies inversely, with lower than expected occur-
rence relative to the aggregate baseline of 26 per cent at the outset of
the crisis (17.5 per cent in March 1999), average rates of application in
the middle two months of the crisis (26 per cent in April 1999; 24.5 per
cent in May 1999), and a significantly higher than expected rate of use
in June 1999 (47.6 per cent). Finally, as the low aggregate total evident
throughout the data indicates, ‘right intentions’ were minimally impor-
tant to the frame application—ranging from a high of 17.5 per cent of
all just war significations in March and 17 per cent in April (compared
to an aggregate baseline of 12 per cent), and declining to minimal per-
centages in May and June (3.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively).
In comparing these three components of the jus ad bellum solely on a
discrete basis, it is clear that while just causes were in aggregate terms
the most consistently important elements of the frame’s application
(and ‘right intentions’ fairly inconsequential), the relative importance
of the authority criterion increased later in the crisis, even as the overall
use of the frame declined.
Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics of the data reveals
other, and somewhat conflicting, temporal dimensions in the appli-
cation of the just war frame. All three categories of significations (just
cause, competent authority, right intention) vary in rough proportion
to the number of just war significations and speech-acts each month,
occurring less frequently in the ‘partial’ bookend months of March and
June, and more frequently in April and May. Moreover, as is borne out
in aggregate terms, the use of ‘just causes’ in applications of the frame
was consistent, and consistently robust, throughout all four months of
the crisis. However, the ‘full’ months of the crisis reveal some greater
than expected variability, especially May 1999. Whereas this month
featured the second largest number of just war significations as well as
crisis-related Presidential speech-acts, it also featured the lowest overall
ratio of significations to number of speech-acts for both the competent
authority and right intention criteria. Thus, while Presidential speech-
making (and, indeed, the crisis itself) was at its apex, attempts to frame
the war-decision in light of authority and intention were at their lowest
ebb.
From a distributive standpoint there is again evidence of a relative
increase in the importance of competent authority as a dimension of the
frame application (and in comparison to just cause) over time. Remem-
bering that as a percentage of monthly frame significations June 1999
proved to be the highpoint for references to competent authority (as

noted above, almost entirely derived from regional institutions such
as NATO), that month also accounted for 20 per cent of all competent
authority significations (compared to 12 per cent in March, 40 per cent in
April, and 28 per cent in May). This figure takes on added significance
when one recalls that the crisis terminated for the US only ten days into
the month of June. Again, as noted above, allusions to the authority for
the use of force from a legitimate or competent source grew in relative
importance late in the crisis, even as the number of Presidential speech-
acts concerning the crisis, and the overall reliance on the frame as a
function of those relatively few speech-acts, declined.
Finally, with respect to aggregate assessment (see Table 6.4), the monthly
breakdown of just war significations (irrespective of criteria) advanced
throughout the entire crisis betrays little variance from expectations
based on the monthly distribution of speech-acts. The interactions of
time and substantive emphasis evident within the application of the
frame provide further reaffirmation of the general patterns noted above.
The aggregate view conveys a consistent general emphasis on ‘just causes’
throughout the crisis (the three highest monthly percentages of frame
significations are ‘just causes’ in March, April, and May), a greater em-
phasis on ‘just causes’ relative to ‘competent authority’ significations earlier
in the crisis, and finally, an inversion of that relationship in the last (partial)
month of June 1999.
The preceding results provide sufficient evidence to conclude that

the just war frame was employed on a very limited and narrow basis in
conjunction with the US military engagement in Kosovo in 1999.
There is consistent evidence that various translations of the just war
frame were applied throughout the crisis, but the magnitude of that
March April May June

1999 1999 1999 1999
Just cause 11.6% 24% 21.6% 5%

Competent authority 3.2% 10.5% 7.3% 5%
Right intention 3.2% 6.8% 1.0% 0.5%
*March 1999 = 8 days; April 1999 = 30 days; May 1999 = 31 days; June 1999 = 10 days
application was extremely low. For instance, although slightly more than
one-third (34 per cent) percent of the Presidential speech-acts concerning
the crisis featured multiple (two or more) references to essential notions
of a ‘just war’, none exhibited a sufficient level of references to that end
(five or more) to be considered as primarily oriented around the just war
frame; a third of those speech-acts featured no reference to any of the
15 signifiers at all. Whether one considers the aggregate total of just war
significations advanced during the 78-day crisis, the average daily rate of
just war significations, or the lack (with one exception) of any chrono-
logical ‘clustering’, it is safe to conclude that the application of the
just war frame through Presidential speech-acts in the Kosovo case was
generally weak.21
The primary exception to this characterization was the concentrated
emphasis of the Clinton Administration on framing the affirmative war-
decision as legitimate through Presidential speech-acts coupling the
use of force with (a) the ‘just cause’ of responding to/punishing ‘evil’
and (b) the ‘competent’ authority derived from the operation’s asso-
ciation with NATO and support received from various regional (European)
institutions. Together, these two signifiers appeared in more than three-
fourths of all crisis-related speech-acts (49 per cent and 29 per cent,
respectively), and accounted for over two-thirds of all just war signi-
fications advanced in Presidential speech-acts throughout the duration
of the crisis (43 per cent for ‘response to/punishment of evil’; 25 per
cent for ‘regional authority’). At the same time, it bears noting that this
concentrated effort in terms of frame emphasis was not matched by
any similarly concentrated focus on target audience, with 36 per cent
of all speech-acts directed at the press, 35 per cent at opinion-leaders,
and the remaining 29 per cent split amongst the mass public, foreign
audiences, and mixed/multiple audiences. Finally, the relative lack of
attention paid at ‘framing’ the war-decision for the mass public, which
was the target of only 12 per cent of Presidential speech-acts concern-
ing the crisis, as in the Gulf War crisis seems in many ways to affirm
the ‘cascade model’ of framing introduced by Entman (2004)—in which
the presumption holds that the frame representation(s) can and do
effectively ‘trickle down’ from elite constituencies to the public at-large.
In appraising the application of the just war frame in the Kosovo
crisis in comparison to the preceding analysis of the Gulf War, impor-
tant dissimilarities appear. The first is the much lower overall volume
of just war frame significations featured in Presidential speech-acts.
This is made all the more noteworthy when taking into account that
the total number of Presidential speech-acts concerning the Kosovo
crisis exceeded those in the Gulf crisis. These findings together clearly
support the characterization of a diminished overall reliance on the
just war frame in the Kosovo crisis. There was also a near perfect inver-
sion of target audience, with the Clinton Administration in the Kosovo
crisis directing far more of its efforts at framing the war-decision
toward opinion-leaders (35 per cent, compared to 23 per cent) and rela-
tively less towards the press (36 per cent, compared to 53 per cent) than
was the case with its predecessor.
Also worth pointing out is the difference in proportional emphasis
by jus ad bellum criterion; whereas in the Gulf War ‘just causes’ accounted
for about half of all frame applications, with ‘competent authority’ and
‘right intention’ almost evenly splitting the other half, there is a decided
tilt toward ‘just causes’ (62 per cent) in the Kosovo crisis, almost entirely
at the expense of ‘right intention’ (12 per cent); ‘competent authority’
significations accounted for 26 per cent of all frame applications (roughly
the same proportion as in the Gulf War case). The diminished emphasis
on ‘right intention’ considerations in the framing of the war-decision
in the Kosovo crisis is curious to say the least, given the extent to which
(as discussed above) Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil was publicly framed
as a corrective to the ‘evil’ acts of ethnic cleansing perpetrated upon the
Kosovar Albanian population by the Milosevic regime.
Outside the narrower bounds of the just war frame, the efforts of the
Administration (and in particular Secretary of State Madeleiene Albright)
to draw upon historical parallels to the Holocaust as a means of legitimiz-
ing the operation further underscores the confounding and seemingly
counter-productive lack of attention paid to making the case that the US
and NATO action was intended to leave Kosovo, and by extension the
Balkans, a better place (Smith, 1998; Zenko, 2001). It seems hard to ima-
gine that this lack of emphasis on ‘right intentions’ in the Presidential
rhetoric translates into a true lack of concern among US and European
decision-makers with the fate of Kosovo after the operation, especially in
light of the continuing NATO and UN presence there. Yet from the stand-
point of frame application, it is apparent that the Clinton Administration
did not view communicating the merits of the intentions driving the act
of war as vital, or even necessary, in ‘selling’ the case for war to domestic
audiences.
One possible explanation for the differential points of emphasis evid-
ent in the use of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis compared to the
Gulf War is the close approximation of the ideal type of the ‘new war’
(Kaldor, 2007) that the former embodied. Whereas self-defense, the seiz-
ure of territory, and the seizure of (US) property and/or persons were rele-
vant to the crisis in the Persian Gulf and as such were frequently
employed features of the framing of Operation Desert Shield/ Storm, the
realities of Kosovo—an intra-state conflict catalyzed by identity and
involving irregular forces and third party intervention (by the US/
NATO)—were in fact much different. Accordingly, the appeal and utility
of the more traditional (i.e., statist) aspects and features of the just war
frame were obviated, explaining their irrelevance and, accordingly, absence
from efforts to frame the intervention in Kosovo as legitimate.
A final point of departure in appraising the use of the just war frame
in Kosovo as compared to the Gulf War concerns the temporal dimen-
sion of the crisis. Whereas the Gulf crisis featured an uneven rate of
just war significations by month and an evident disjuncture between
the use of the just war frame and developments in the crisis that seem-
ingly would (or would not) merit the frame’s use, the Kosovo crisis
embodied a more steady and even ‘normal’ (in population distribution
terminology) trajectory. As was shown above, the use of the frame on
a monthly basis gradually ramped up as the crisis unfolded, peaking at
the height of military hostilities (in April 1999), and declining steadily
after that, as the crisis began to stabilize and later drawn toward ter-
mination. Certainly this trajectory can be explained at least in part by
the lower overall rate of application of the just war frame in the Kosovo
crisis, and beyond that by the relative de-emphasis on ‘just causes’
(which, logically, are of greater concern and thus likely to have greater
traction earlier in the military engagement).
In seeking to draw a broad and general conclusion concerning the
application of the just war frame in this case on the basis of the results
generated here, the efforts of the Clinton Administration to ‘frame’ the
decision to employ military force in response to the crisis in Kosovo
through Presidential speech-acts revolved chiefly around a fusion of
the various ‘evils’ perpetrated by the Milosoevic regime and the author-
ity accruing to the United States via NATO and other region-specific
institutions to correct those ‘evils’. This fed into a concentrated and narrow
framing effort—with the former point of emphasis (just causes) dis-
proportionately directed at opinion-leaders, and the latter (competent
authority) to the press. Whereas these two aspects of the frame were
the clear outliers in terms of application, there was a clear tilt in emphasis
on the morally reprehensible aspects of the ethnic cleansing campaign
in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (accounting for 49 per cent
of all allusions to ‘evil’ advanced during the crisis), and conversely on
the authorization for a military response in those directed at the press
(accounting for 44 per cent of all such significations).
Conclusion
In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air cam-
paign; at the end of the campaign about 1100 aircraft were parti-
cipating, with the United States contributing about 725 (Bowman, 2003).
Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, with the US account-
ing for 323 of that total; the only NATO fatalities associated with
Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil were two US Apache heli-
copter pilots killed in a training accident in Albania (ibid.). The results
of the preceding analysis do nothing to challenge the conclusion that
the use of the just war frame by the Clinton Administration in relation
to that force deployment and the decision that produced it was weak
in the aggregate, and where it did occur, highly concentrated. How-
ever, they do lend needed context, underscoring an important if nuanced
element in the relationship between the weak and limited application
of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis on the one hand, and the
restrained and limited discursive handling of the crisis by the President
on the other. In light of that relationship—and in relation to the Gulf
War case in particular—it would seem that the muted and concen-
trated use of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis suggests a greater
sense of intentionality, prudence, and careful manipulation on the part
of the Clinton Administration in terms of frame emphasis and applica-
tion than was true of the George H.W. Bush Administration.
Whereas one of the take-away conclusions of the analysis of Presi-
dential rhetoric and the use of the just war frame in the Gulf War in the
preceding chapter was the volatile and incoherent nature of both the
frame application and Presidential speech-acts more generally, the same
cannot be said of the Clinton Administration’s treatment of the Kosovo
crisis. In terms of Presidential speech-acts, much more was being said
about the Kosovo crisis (2.1 speech-acts per day) on a more consistent
basis (only ten days lacked a speech-act) and in much less time (78 days)
than was true of the Gulf War (0.88 speech-acts per day; 70 days lacking
a speech-act in a 155-day crisis). Yet all of the measures of frame applica-
tion introduced here—whether related to content, audience, or timing—
indicate that the just war frame was employed consistently less often (as
evinced by the appearance of just one ‘chronological cluster’) and in a
much more limited and targeted way. Similarly, whereas the framing of
the war-decision in the Gulf War featured not only a volatility and inco-
herence in the use of the just war frame but also the emergence of tan-
gentially related but also competing memes (Munich; Vietnam syndrome;
‘New World Order’) within Presidential rhetoric, there was no such
deviating from message in the Kosovo crisis.
Taking the disparity in Presidential speech-making versus that of

frame application into account in the two cases, we can safely infer a
greater degree of intentionality and control was evident in the framing
of the war-decision relative to the crisis in Kosovo than was the case
in the Gulf War. This overriding characteristic of the framing of the
affirmative war-decision in the Kosovo crisis can in turn be explained
at least in part by the political and policy context prevailing at the
time—a context that made a controlled and intentional framing of
that decision particularly imperative. One example of such a factor at
the domestic level of analysis was the looming specter of the Lewinsky
scandal and the impeachment hearings involving President Clinton,
which immediately preceded the initiation of the crisis and overlapped
with internal Administration debates concerning the possibility of
military action in response to it.22
While much has been made of the so-called ‘wag the dog’ syndrome
associated with Operation Infinite Reach (the cruise missile strikes on
Afghanistan and Sudan following the 7 August 1998 attacks on the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania), some observers have pointed to
similar dynamics in conjunction with the Administration’s hard-line
response to Kosovo (Rozell and Wilcox, 2000). While such charges are
essentially impossible to prove, it is incontrovertible that President
Clinton’s approval rating and the overall stature of his Presidency were
under fire in early spring 1999 (Peters, 2011b). Many of Clinton’s
detractors at the time pointed to the President’s personal conduct and
his repeated and vehement denials of an inappropriate relationship
(which DNA evidence later forced him to recant) as evidence of his
lack of character and moral ‘fitness’ (Miller, 1999). Such accusations
were being lobbed at the President publicly at the very same time that
he confronted a decision always fraught with moral peril (e.g., the
use of military force) in response to an expanding crisis in Kosovo
in which moral and humanitarian considerations themselves (in con-
junction with charges of a Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign) were
especially prominent.
In light of all this, it is not hard to see how domestic political consider-
ations, always a factor shaping foreign policy decisions, intensified the
need for the President to effectively (and prudently) ‘sell’ the war-decision
to the domestic audience. That he and his Administration did so through
a set of speech-acts that chose to place an overriding emphasis on the
immorality and ‘evil’ of the Milosevic regime and its plan for ethnic cleans-
ing of Albanians through ‘Operation Horseshoe’ at a minimum reflects
a prevailing view that doing so would be the most appealing basis on
which to present the war-decision as legitimate and necessary. This point
of emphasis also suggests a possible ancillary benefit, in salvaging the

President’s own character and moral ‘fitness’ by juxtaposing him against
a ‘vicious, bloodthirsty tyrant’ (albeit one the US had recently concluded
negotiations with at Dayton) in the form of Milosevic.
Such a consideration would hardly be the only factor explaining the
prevalence of this point of emphasis in the frame application. Mount-
ing influence in the latter phase of the Administration exercised by
liberal internationalists such as Albright, Strobe Talbott, Ronald Asmus,
and Jamie Rubin (among others)—complemented by the similar foreign
policy orientation of the Blair government in the UK—played a cat-
alytic role in staking out a hard line in the crisis as a means of reviv-
ing the ‘assertive multilateralism’ of the early 1990s (Boyer and Butler,
2005; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000). Pressure from the Administration
to avoid repeating the mistake of an active campaign for non-intervention
as in the Rwandan genocide only compounded this changed orientation
(Peroni, 2009; Weiss and Hubert, 2001). These factors were influential
not only in terms of the excessive reliance on framing the war-decision
as stemming from a ‘just cause’ or responding to/punishing evil, but
also with respect to the second most common point of emphasis—that
being associating the decision with a ‘competent authority’ stemming
from NATO and other relevant regional institutions. Indeed, within
the contemporaneous efforts of the Blair government to promote an
explicitly ‘moral’ foreign policy in the late 1990s—efforts which
proved greatly influential on the Clinton Administration—a multilateral
campaign to stop and punish acts of evil were considered the lodestar
(Blair, 1999).
The final and most direct feature of the prevailing political and policy
context which made an intentional, precise, and ultimately effective
framing of the decision to employ military force in response to the
crisis in Kosovo a critical imperative was the reality that the Clinton
Administration wished to avoid a ground war at all costs (Ignatieff,
2001; Zenko, 2001). If the Lewinsky scandal and the return of assertive
multilateralism help to explain, at least in part, the two elements of the
just war frame that were far and away the most frequently applied, it
is the Clinton Administration’s desire to avoid introducing ground
troops in an offensive posture in the former Yugoslavia in response
to the Kosovo crisis (over the objections of the Blair government) that
best explains the muted and generally weak use of the frame in its totality
(Bowman, 2003).
Whereas selected elements of the just war frame were deemed effec-
tive and necessary to ‘sell’ the war and its legitimacy to the domestic
audience in order to ensure some measure of operational success

in bringing an end to ethnic cleansing (and potentially to restore the
President’s own political legitimacy at home), that war was from the
outset intended to be restricted to an air war of limited scope and dura-
tion (Lambeth, 2001; Byman and Waxman, 2000). Thus one could
intuit from the restricted application of the just war frame revealed in
the analysis above a prudent and strategic use of the frame intended to
general support for a limited war, without ‘fanning the flames’ for war
to the point that the Administration found itself obligated to expand
the scope of the operation.
Framing is best understood as a vital tool to organize collective expe-
riences and guide or even motivate collective action (Gamson, 1995;
Benford and Snow, 2000). As such, evidence of an overriding con-
sistency in frame application such as in the Kosovo crisis is a key com-
ponent for an effective exercise in framing, irrespective of the breadth
of that application. Though, as the preceding analysis of Presidential
speech-acts conveys, the content of the just war frame that was employed
in advancing a case for the ‘legitimate’ use of force in Kosovo was clearly
limited, it was likewise clear that there were particular aspects of the
frame (response to/punishment of ‘evil’; competent authority) which
framing agents intentionally sought to emphasize repeatedly and con-
sistency to maximum effect.
The narrow basis on which the Clinton Administration ‘sold’ the
use of force in Kosovo as ‘legitimate’ for domestic consumption was
decidedly and purposefully advanced, and was designed to foster sup-
port for a limited air war. In light of this, the distinction between pur-
posive and effective framing as discussed in the framing literature is once
again instructive (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Gamson and Meyer,
1996). In the end, the analysis of Presidential framing of the war-decision
in the Kosovo crisis reveals an important, if on its face seemingly para-
doxical, truth. With respect to the effectiveness of framing, while more
applications (defined in terms of frequency and breadth of significations
employed) certainly reflect a more extensive use of the frame at hand, it
does not always or necessarily reflect a more effective one.
7
Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom
and Infinite Justice
Crisis summary
To say that the 9/11 attacks dramatically reshaped US foreign policy

would be to patently state the obvious. Indeed, in the view of many,
9/11 remains a transformational event that has significantly reconfigured
American society, US foreign policy, and the international system
(Kellner, 2003). From the standpoint of this research, the chief impor-
tance of 9/11 stems not from the allegedly transformative effects of the
9/11 attacks on American foreign policy and society, but rather in its
function as a catalyst for a major foreign policy crisis for the United States
and for the overarching policy legacy of the George W. Bush Adminis-
tration, a ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (Dolan, 2005).
The primary response to the foreign policy crisis inspired by 9/11 by
the US was Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (see Table 7.1).
In a televised address to the nation on the night of 11 September 2001,
President Bush pledged to take action against all states harboring or sup-
porting terrorist activities, putting the country on a war footing by noting
that ‘America and our friends and allies join with all those who want
peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war
against terrorism’ (Bush, 2001a). While leading figures in the Taliban
regime (including Mullah Muhammad Omar) denied support for the
al-Qaeda network, in the ensuing days after 9/11 all major foreign policy
principals in the Bush Administration (most notably the President him-
self, in an Address to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001)
trained the sights for a potential military response on Afghanistan, which
had provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda leadership since 1996.
After an extensive military deployment, US (and UK) forces commenced
military operations in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, consisting initially
180
Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 181
Table 7.1 Crisis profile: Afghanistan–USA
Pre-crisis/Crisis

Gravity of threat (to US) Threat of grave damage
Triggering entity Non-state actor
Trigger to foreign policy crisis Violent act
Post-crisis

Form of outcome Imposed (by US)
Escalating or reduction of tension Tension reduction
dissatisfied
of cruise missile attacks and bombing sorties and later supplemented

by Apache helicopter gunships. Throughout the crisis, the primary appli-
cation of force by the US came through aerial bombardment, though
major strategic and tactical gains were made through the deployment
of special forces drawn from the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD),
the US Army Special Forces from the 5th Special Forces Group, and
other contingents drawn from the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM). These units all worked in collaboration with Northern
Alliance forces as well as small British and Australian contingents
(Woodward, 2002). The skillful and effective coordination of this two-
pronged operational effort prompted early observers to dub the cam-
paign a ‘masterpiece of military creativity and finesse’ representing,
potentially, ‘one of the most notable US military successes since World
War II’ (O’Hanlon, 2002) while sounding the alarm that it would leave
the US ‘dizzy with success’ (Cox, 2002). Such an alarm was hardly
unfounded given the brimming optimism engendered by the swift
capture of Mazar-i-Sharif on 9 November and Kabul on 13 November.
On the political side of the equation, similarly rapid inroads were
made, notably due to the skillful mediation efforts of UN Special Envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi. With explicit US support, Brahimi employed shuttle

diplomacy throughout the fall of 2001 to convince the relevant
ethnic and tribal factions in Afghanistan as well as interested external
parties (including Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Russia) to support the
formation of an interim government. Fashioned at the UN-brokered
International Conference on Afghanistan (27 November–5 December
2001) and chartered in the Bonn Agreement, that provisional govern-
ment was established under the leadership of US backed Pashtun leader
Hamid Karzai (who was subsequently granted a two year extension as
head of the transitional government by a traditional Afghan loya jurga
council in June 2002, and was elected President of Afghanistan in 2004).
The case of Afghanistan illustrates a basic truth: namely, that the
response(s) to a crisis, and the outcomes they engender, always outlast
(and oftentimes dwarf in importance) the actual crisis itself. This state-
ment is borne out by the reality that in relation to the prevailing con-
ditions defining a foreign policy crisis (a threat to one or more basic
values; awareness of a finite time for response; heightened probability
of military hostilities) the crisis for the US triggered by the events
of 11 September 2001 drew to a close with the collapse of the final
Taliban stronghold in Kandahar on 7 December 2001 (CICDM, 2010).1
In light of the evident links between the Taliban regime and the
al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the 9/11 attacks (and by
extension the crisis), the overthrow of the Taliban regime and dis-
ruption and displacement of the al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan
through a joint military and intelligence effort, in conjunction with
the formation of an interim government, terminated the conditions
of crisis for the US—if not the larger importance of Afghanistan for
US foreign policy and national security.
The decision to employ military force in Afghanistan was the first major
volley in the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWOT) by the Bush Adminis-
tration. The nature of the Afghanistan crisis, which lacked any perceptible
buildup and was triggered suddenly and without provocation by the 9/11
attacks (continuing from that date through the perceived expulsion of
the Taliban from Afghanistan in mid-December 2001) makes it imposs-
ible to consider Presidential rhetoric in ‘pre-crisis’ and ‘crisis’ components
(as in the two preceding case studies). Instead, the primary intent here lies
in providing and appraising samples of Presidential rhetoric concerning
the GWOT leading up to the military engagement in Afghanistan in
order to take into account the larger narrative context in which the US
military intervention in Afghanistan was embedded.
In his televised address to the public on the evening of September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush quoted Psalm 23 in his first concrete
reaction to the attacks. In doing so, he gave early voice to the theme of
‘good versus evil’ that would become the centerpiece of the GWOT in the
months (and years) to come:
…America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon
for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep
that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst
of human nature (Bush, 2001a; emphasis added).
Bush followed this address with an admonition to the American public

on 16 September 2001 to return to their daily routines, while also
vowing to ‘rid the world of evil-doers’ and warning Americans that
‘this crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take awhile’ (CNN.com,
2001a). The conversion to the war metaphor even at this earliest stage
was far from incidental. While Bush initially characterized the 9/11
attacks as ‘despicable acts of terror’, the term ‘acts of war’ was intro-
duced as early as 14 September 2001 in order to engender broad
popular support for a military response to the 9/11 attacks through
comparison to, and conflation with, previous ‘good wars’ such as
World War II (Jackson, 2005). A Lexis-Nexis search of transcripts asso-
ciated with public statements by President Bush during the period
between 11 September and 7 October 2001 (the date of commence-
ment of air strikes in Afghanistan) returned over 50 occasions where
‘war’ and ‘terrorism’ were used together.2
The employment of a relatively simplistic dichotomous prism of
‘good versus evil’ facilitates the crucial claim that the essential nature
of the terrorists precedes their actions. This in turn furthers the notion
that the attacks of 9/11 were the natural acts of the inhuman and irre-
deemably evil, not the instrumental acts of radically disaffected yet
rational individuals (Murphy, 2003). In presenting the American public
with a depiction of the US as locked in a Manichean struggle between
good and evil, the necessity for retaliation and the exercise of retribu-
tive justice was clearly evident in a series of subsequent speech acts by
the President:
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend

freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution.
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our

enemies, justice will be done (Bush, 2001d; emphasis added).
I see things this way: The people who did this act on America are
evil people. As a nation of good folk, we’re going to hunt them
down…and we will bring them to justice (Bush, 2003; emphasis
added).
At the same time, a fully compelling rendering of the GWOT required

not only the designation of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks as
‘evil’, but also reaffirmation that Americans and America were inher-
ently good—the polar opposite of the inherent evil that required (nee,
demanded) redress through the use of military force. Such reaffirmation
received its first prominent public expression at the Prayer and Remem-
brance Day service on 14 September 2001, at which Bush remarked:
In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that
our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave.
We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion;
in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have
asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our
national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice. […] In these acts,
and in many others, Americans showed a deep commitment to one
another, and an abiding love for our country. Today, we feel what
Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity. This
is a unity of every faith, and every background (Bush, 2001b).3
Statements such as these can be very easily understood as the natural

reactions of a wounded nation; further, they reflect the expected reac-
tion of a nation’s political leadership when attempting to pay homage
to the victims of egregious violence. However, from the standpoint of a
critical inquiry into the launching of the GWOT, as Jackson (2005) reminds
us, the public representation of Americans and America as inherently
good, virtuous, peace loving, and heroic is essential to making the case
for war.
The essential juxtaposition between the virtue embedded within Amer-
ican society and the evil inhumanity typifying the terrorist ‘other’ reflects
the process of ‘moral disengagement’ critical to the effective prosecution
of war (Bandura, 1999). In this sense it is telling that Bush’s first extended
remarks on the morning of 9/11, from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louis-
iana, featured the missive that ‘Freedom itself was attacked this morning
by a faceless coward…’ (CNN.com, 2001b). Within days, Bush had des-

cribed terrorism as a ‘curse…upon the face of the earth’ (Bush, 2001c),
while later referring to terrorists as ‘parasites who threaten their coun-
tries and our own’ (Bush, 2002).4 Accordingly, the expression of ethical
objections or opposition to war, or even the resort to ethical delib-
eration concerning the GWOT or the grounds on which it was being
advanced, proved extremely difficult (Williams, 2006). The coup de
grace was the repeated depiction of the GWOT as the latest chapter in a
broad and long-running existential struggle between ‘civilization’ and
‘barbarism’ or between lawful peoples and those ‘beyond the pale of
the law’ and undeserving of legal or moral consideration (Salter, 2002;
Hurrell, 2002):
This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake

is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civil
ization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and
pluralism, tolerance and freedom (Bush, 2001d; emphasis added).
Appeals to caution or expressions of dissent proved untenable when

those representations were overlain with public characterizations of
the 9/11 attacks as drawing a line between the ‘the civil and the savage’
(Ashcroft, 2001b). Moreover, as those who ‘live on the hunted margins
of mankind’ (Bush, 2001f) and reject the ‘values that separate us from
animals; compassion, tolerance, mercy’ (Baker, 2001), terrorists and
their supporters were easily cast as ‘the new barbarians’, serving as
the epitome of savagery (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 156). To that
end, their defeat by means of war (beginning in Afghanistan with the
aptly-named Operation Enduring Freedom) was a transcendent imper-
ative, limited neither by national borders nor national interests by virtue
of the fact that it reflected a common threat to all humanity. Presenting
the grounds for a ‘global war on terrorism’ in such a fashion obviated
any true debate about its legitimacy or authorization. Since all residing
under the umbrella of ‘civility’ were targets, typically relevant distinctions
between the US, other sovereign states, and the central source of author-
ity for the use of collective force (i.e., the UN) were rendered irrelevant;
authority to act was conveyed by virtue of an actor’s proximity to the
norms, values, and practices associated with ‘civility’.5
From a legalist standpoint, the ‘civilization v. barbarism’ overlay had
the additional utility of permitting the Bush Administration to paint
the GWOT as at its base an act of collective as well as individual self-
defense—the primary accepted justification for the use of military force
in the contemporary international system. Whereas international

law designates wars of aggression as illegal (see Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter), Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly provides for the legit-
imate use of force for individual or collective self-defense, a proposi-
tion with deep roots in both customary and treaty law (Arend and
Beck, 1993).6 The grounds for a ‘global war on terrorism’ were thus
underscored by virtue of it representing an act of self-defense.7 Sim-
ilarly, this ‘war on terrorism’ associated with the defense of civilization
itself was presented not as a last resort, but in actuality as the only
resort, given the stakes associated with a war waged in defense of civil-
ization and its basic core values (Jackson, 2005). This is borne out in
several statements by Bush in fall 2001:
the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life

is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows (Bush,
2001d).
…In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is
to pursue those who threaten it (Bush, 2001e).
Those who hate all civilization and culture and progress, those who
embrace death to cause the death of the innocent, cannot be ignored,
cannot be appeased. They must be fought (Bush, 2001f).
In light of these characterizations of the ‘global war on terrorism’,

as well as the obvious connections between the GWOT and the US
military intervention in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that similar
themes were expounded within Presidential rhetoric concerning the
decision to employ military force in Afghanistan. In announcing the
commencement of airstrikes on 7 October 2001, the President returned
to the stark moral dichotomy employed after 9/11:
Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every

nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral
ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of inno-
cents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves (Bush,
2001g).
At an event sponsored by the March of Dimes, the President expounded

further on the ubiquitous ‘evil’ that not only prompted the 9/11
attacks but which also defined Taliban rule in Afghanistan, accordingly
making the then five-days old US-led military action a moral

imperative:
Ours is a war against terrorism and evil, not against Islam…Those

who hijacked four airliners on September the 11th are also trying to
hijack Islam. But the mass killing of innocent people clearly violates
Islam, and countries and clerics throughout the Islamic world have
rejected these acts.
Nor is our war against global terrorism a war against the people
of Afghanistan. The Afghan people are victims of oppression and
misrule of the Taliban regime. There are few places on Earth that
face greater misery. One out of every four children dies before the
age of 5 in Afghanistan. It is estimated that one in every three chil-
dren in Afghanistan is an orphan. Almost half suffer from chronic
malnutrition; millions face the threat of starvation. The situation is
so bad, so bad, that we read about 3-year-old children in Afghan-
istan who weigh less than the average newborn in America. We’re
trying to get food to starving Afghans. In contrast, the Taliban regime,
those who house the evildoers, has harnessed international aid—
harassed international aid workers and chased them out of their
country.
The people of Afghanistan have suffered too long under Taliban

rule. That suffering provides us with a task (Bush, 2001h).
This continuing theme was taken up in explicit just war terms empha-
sizing both the ‘just cause’ of responding to evil and the ‘last resort’
nature of that response in mid-October addresses to business leaders
in Sacramento, CA and workers at the Dixie Printing and Packaging
Corporation in Glen Burnie, MD:
We are fighting for the security of our people, for the success of
our ideals, and for stability in large parts of the world. We fight evil
people who are distorting and betraying a great religion to justify
their murder. Our cause is just. We will not tire. We will not falter,
and my fellow Americans, we will not fail (Bush, 2001i; emphasis
added).
I gave the Afghan Government, the Taliban Government, plenty of

time to respond to the demands of the United States. I said, ‘You
must hand over the Al Qaeda leadership which hides in your country.’
I said, ‘You must free those who you illegally detain in your country.’
And I said, ‘You must destroy the camps that have been used to train
the terrorists.’ And they had time to respond, and they didn’t respond
positively, and therefore, they’re paying a price….Our military is
conducting a campaign to bring the terrorists to justice, not to harm
the Afghan people. While we are holding the Taliban Government
accountable, we’re also feeding Afghan people. You need to be proud
of the United States military. It’s doing its job. It is slowly but surely
encircling the terrorists so that we’ll bring them to justice…justice will
be done (Bush, 2001j; emphasis added).
As a signifier deeply embedded in American political rhetoric and

religious life, the language of good and evil proved an effective means
for distilling the perpetrators of 9/11 and their supporters and sym-
pathizers as irredeemable ‘evildoers’ (Butler, 2007). From the stand-
point of an analysis of the framing of the decision to go to war in
Afghanistan, the importance of the dominant discourse surrounding
the GWOT in its earliest incarnation stems largely from the fact that
it was purposefully advanced as a classic ‘good war’ reflective of basic
elements of just war theory rather than merely a counter-terrorist
policy or strategy (Dexter, 2008; Jackson, 2005; Lawler, 2002). As such,
the demonizing of terrorists (and their supporters and sympathizers)
was crucial to the discursive context of the nascent GWOT and the
impending military engagement in Afghanistan.
The importance of the discursive environment surrounding US foreign

policy in the aftermath of 9/11 notwithstanding, short of more focused
empirical scrutiny the question of concern here (how, specifically, was
the just war frame used to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war in Afghan-
istan?) remains unanswered. Once again, one means of addressing this
question can be found in a systematic analysis of Presidential speech-
acts during the crisis—in this case, of the 87 Presidential speech-acts
directly referencing the US military engagement in Afghanistan between
the initiation of military hostilities on 7 October 2001 and the ter-
mination of the crisis on 7 December 2001.8
As Figure 7.1 indicates, there was great variability in the promul-
gation of such speech-acts during the 62-day duration of the crisis.
During that 62-day period, 48 days featured at least one Presidential
Figure 7.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Afghanistan’—POTUS

October 7, 2001–December 7, 2001
6
3
#/day
0
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
/ 7/20 0/20 3/20 6/20 9/20 2/20 5/20 8/20 1/20 /3/20 /6/20 /9/20 2/20 5/2018/20 1/20 4/20 7/2030/20 /3/20 /6/20
10 10/1 10/1 10/1 10/1 10/2 10/2 10/2 10/3 11 11 11 11/1 11/1 11/ 11/2 11/2 11/2 11/ 12 12
date
speech-act referencing Afghanistan, with the number of speech-acts per

day ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of five. The inten-
sity of Presidential speech-acts referencing Afghanistan also vacillated
greatly over the period of concern (even on a day-to-day basis). While
it is clear that Afghanistan featured prominently in Presidential
rhetoric throughout the crisis (as one would intuit), there was no dis-
cernable pattern. As Figure 7.1 also conveys, there was one dispro-
portionately prominent peak in Presidential speech-acts concerning
Afghanistan, centered around the President’s 10 November 2001 address
to the UN General Assembly. With the exception of that run-up to and
aftermath of that address, there is sufficient evidence of a consistent
and stable distribution of Presidential speech-acts regarding Afghanistan
during the crisis—an important finding in that it also suggests the
validity of any potential patterns that may emerge from that analysis.
Frame content
As in the preceding two case studies, the topic of concern here is not
the speech-acts themselves but rather how the just war frame was
employed through them. The set of speech-acts identified for analysis
here were coded on a dichotomous basis for the presence or absence of
15 just war indicators indicative of the just war frame, with those indi-
cators reflecting the three basic criteria of the jus ad bellum component
of just war theory.9 In establishing a referential baseline, it is important
to note that 22 per cent (290/1305) of all possible values of the 15 just
war frame variables across these 87 cases of ‘speech-acts’ were positive
(meaning they did feature reference to the indicator in question).
In examining the just war frame relative to individual ‘cases’ (e.g.,
each speech-act), 83 per cent (72/87) of the speech-acts related to
Afghanistan issued by the President during the duration of the US mil-
itary engagement featured two or more positive values, 24 per cent
(21/87) featured positive values in over a third (5 or more) of all just
war indicators, and 4.5 per cent (4/87) featured a majority (7 or more)
of positive values across all 15 indicators.10 Further compelling is the
finding that the average daily number of just war significations in
Presidential speech-acts throughout the 62-day crisis was 4.7.11 The
maximum number of just war signifiers contained within one speech-
act was 11 (the President’s 10 November 2001 address to the UN General
Assembly in New York), with the minimum (no reference to any of the
15 frame signifiers) occurring in eight cases.12
In scrutinizing these 15 indicators in conjunction with the three
major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority,
right intention) from which they are derived, it is evident that the just
cause criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced here)
significantly outstrips the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage
of all just war frame significations observed in the speech-acts analyzed
here. Fully 60 per cent (173/290) of all just war significations cor-
responded with ‘just cause’ considerations, compared to 12 per cent
(36/290) for ‘competent authority’ and 28 per cent (81/290) for ‘right
intention’.13 To that end, three of the four most frequently employed
frame signifiers (of the 15 considered) reflected just cause considerations
in framing the US military action respectively as: a response to the
involvement of an authoritarian regime in the crisis in 55 per cent of
the cases (48/87); a response to or punishment of ‘evil’ in 45 per cent
of the cases (39/87); and a response dictated by the fact that the crisis
was triggered by an act of violence (the 9/11 attacks) in 39 per cent of
the cases (34/87). The only exception among the most frequent frame
signifiers were allusions to the US military engagement as reflecting a
‘right intention’ by contributing positively to the ‘pace of abatement’
of the crisis, which occurred in 41 per cent of the speech-acts analyzed
(36/87). Similarly, the signification of the use of force as reflecting a
‘right intention’ by positively contributing to a formal outcome with
which all parties were satisfied was also relatively frequent, appear-
ing in 33 per cent of all speech-acts (29/87).14 With respect to the
competent authority criterion, allusions to global authority for the US
military action appeared in approximately 27 per cent of the speech-

acts collected (24/87), with regional and target-state authority barely
registering appearances in the application of the frame across these
speech-acts.15
Clearly, in Presidential speech-acts concerned with the crisis in Afghan-
istan the just cause criterion was by far the most frequently employed
component of the just war frame. At the same time, the data also points
to ‘breadth’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn
from two different criteria in any single speech-act) and ‘totality’ (defined
as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from all three criteria in
any single speech-act) in the frame’s application. On the former score,
57 of 87 (66 per cent) of speech-acts contained significations of the just
war drawn from two of the three ad bellum criteria, while 21 of 87 (24 per
cent) reflected the ad bellum criteria in totality. And, as Table 7.2 reflects,
nearly two-thirds (64 per cent, 56/87) of the speech-acts included in the
analysis featured some combination of just cause, competent authority,
and right intention significations (with just cause considerations, either
in concert with one or both of the other criterion categories, reflected in
all but one of these cases). The fact that this sizeable majority of cases fea-
tured multiple translations of just war significations drawn from different
components of the ad bellum criteria suggests a degree of symbiotic rein-
forcement between and among the three categories of signifiers—albeit
with ‘just cause’ considerations the clear catalyst and lynchpin for these
interactions.
JC * CA * RI 21
*8 cases featured no Just War indicators
Audience
Apart from analyzing the content of the just war frame in application,
it is important to again take into account the audience(s) to which that
frame application was directed. Before turning to the interface between
the just war frame and the various audiences of concern in this research
shows, ‘just causes’ are the most frequently employed regardless of audi-
ence—with the sole exception being speech-acts directed at multiple
audiences. The greatest prevalence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in
conjunction with speech-acts directed at the press (which is to be expected,
by virtue of the press being the most common target audience). How-
ever, it is also worth noting that in terms of concentrated intensity ‘just
causes’ make up a significantly greater proportion of all just war signi-
fications advanced in speech-acts directed at the mass public and opinion-
leaders.
Whereas allusions to ‘just causes’ in some form occurred in 57 per cent
(65/114) of all Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan and directed
at the press during the crisis, similar allusions occurred in 73 per cent
(43/59) of all Presidential speech-acts directed at the mass public, and
77 per cent (27/35) of all speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders. It would
appear that while the press was the primary target for Presidential speech-
acts, and appeals to ‘just causes’ were commonplace within those speech-
acts, the relative degree of emphasis on the ‘just’ cause(s) for the affirmative
war-decision in Afghanistan was much greater in speech-acts directed
at the public and opinion-leaders. Conversely, whereas overall signi-
fications linked to the ‘right intention’ criterion were relatively fewer
than those associated with ‘just cause’, they appeared most frequently
(30 per cent, or 34/114) in speech-acts directed at the press, and less
so in those directed at the public (22 per cent, or 13/59) and opinion-
leaders (17 per cent, or 6/35). Finally, appeals to ‘competent authority’
were exceedingly rare irrespective of target audience, occurring in 13 per
cent (15/114) of the speech-acts targeting the press, and far fewer in
the other two instances.17
Such considerations raise the question of which specific just war signi-
fications were employed most often within Presidential speech-acts con-
cerning the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan. Figure 7.3 depicts a
number of important findings with respect to the various translations of
‘just causes’ considered here. The first finding of note is that the classic
condition of a ‘significant power discrepancy’ between the target and
trigger of a crisis is invalidated here; it is never invoked during the crisis,
no doubt as a result of the fact that the crisis was triggered by an act of asym-
metric warfare (the 9/11 attacks) in which relative power runs counter
to the classic ‘bullying scenario’, thereby rendering such a signification
irrelevant and illogical. Power discrepancy aside, there is a great degree of
variability in the deployment of the ‘just cause’ significations by audience
type, both in terms of extensity (frequency of use across all audiences)
and intensity (proportionality of use by audience).
Allusions to the ‘direct violent crisis trigger’ (the 9/11 attacks) proved to
be slightly more frequent in speech-acts directed at the press than other
audiences (25 per cent, as compared to an average of 20 per cent). Con-
versely, efforts to link the affirmative war-decision to acts of ‘evil’ were less
common in speech-acts directed at the press (15 per cent, as compared to
23 per cent on average). In speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders, other
discontinuities appear; references to the affirmative war-decision as an act
of ‘self-defense’ and as a response to the ‘direct violent crisis trigger’ of
9/11 fell below the average (occurring only in 7 per cent of all speech-acts
in which at least one ‘just cause’ was invoked), whereas reference to the
appropriation of US property and persons was greatest (in 22 per cent of
speech-acts, versus the average across all audiences of 14 per cent).19
Just war significations by audience type according to the ‘competent
authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are more difficult to interpret. This
is especially true with respect to the three ‘competent authority’ signi-
fications, which as noted previously were individually and collectively
the least frequently observed in the data by a wide margin (accounting
for only 12 per cent of all just war significations). That caveat notwithstand-
ing, it is clear that competent authority significations clustered on two
audiences (press and foreign), with the claim to global authority for the
affirmative war-decision by far the most common and almost exclusively
directed at those two audiences (see Figure 7.4).

10
9
9
8
8 CA1
CA2
7 CA3
6
# significations
4
4
3 3
3
2 2 2
2
1 1 1
1
0 0 0 0
0
Mass public Press Opinion leaders Foreign Multiple
primary audience
cent). Whereas the frequency of ‘formality of outcome’ significations held

true to form, speech-acts directed at the press also featured somewhat
greater emphasis on the other-directed significations of ‘post-hoc satis-
faction’ (9 per cent, v. 4 per cent) and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’ (15 per
cent, v. 7.5 per cent). In other words, the case that the affirmative war-
decision was ‘just’ because other actors were satisfied with the US action
and because tension among other crisis actors was reduced by the US
action (respectively) occurred twice as often in speech-acts directed at the
press as one would expect based on the overall employment of these
significations across audiences (indeed, all ‘post-hoc satisfaction’ signi-
fications were targeted at the press, as was true of all but one of the ‘post-
hoc tension reduction’ significations). The patterns which emerge in terms
of extensity and intensity are particularly significant when one takes into
account that the press was the single most commonly targeted audience
(44 per cent or 38/87) for Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan
during the crisis.
Temporal dynamics
The last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account
the temporal dimension of framing, in seeking to evaluate whether there
was a substantive evolution in the effort to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-
decision as the crisis unfolded. As in the preceding chapters, two features
of the frame’s application were taken into account: first, whether and to
what extent any ‘chronological clusters’ (the occurrence of five or more
just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive
days) can be discerned over the duration of the crisis, and second, whether
these clusters (if they occur) relate in any way to the temporal evolution
of the crisis and the occurrence of any major developments through-
out it.21 Once again, this component of the analysis seeks to determine
whether the just war frame was especially prominent at any particular
time(s) of the crisis—and if so, why.22
The general assessment of the just war significations in their totality
by time is depicted on a monthly basis in Figure 7.6. In the aggregate,
during the entire period of the crisis roughly 43 per cent (124/290) of all
just war significations rendered in Presidential speech-acts were arti-
culated in October, 50 per cent (144/290) in November, and 7 per cent
(22/290) in December. In large part these figures reflect the distributional
pattern of the 62 days of the crisis, which began a full week into October
and terminated in the first week of December. Still, if one uses the 4.7 daily
average of just war significations as a benchmark, the total number of
just war significations occurring in October and November exceeded
expectations for each month (117 and 141, respectively) while the total
number of just war significations occurring in December fell well short
of the projected total (33).
logical cluster’ as outlined above (occurrence of five or more just war
significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days)
were fully satisfied on three occasions, each occurring within the first
30 days of the crisis—from 7–12 October, 19–21 October, and finally from
30 October–1 November. These 12 days accounted for 30 per cent (88/290)
of all the just war significations advanced through Presidential speech-
acts during the entire 62-day crisis, with 17 per cent of all just war signi-
fications advanced during the crisis (48/290) occurred during the initial
‘cluster’ of 7–12 October. That ‘cluster’ was typified by a range of speech-
acts issued directly by the President including (but not limited to) prime-
time news conferences, public appearances with foreign leaders such as
Chancellor Schröeder and Lord Robertson, and a memorial service at the
Pentagon. This ‘cluster’ of just war significations advanced in conjunction
with the initial commitment of the US to war is clearly suggestive of the
launching of a multi-pronged rhetorical offensive through application of
the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision.23
Other notable peaks that fell just short of the conditions established
for a ‘chronological cluster’ include the profound spike in just war signi-
fications (40 in total, accounting for 14 per cent of all such significations
during the crisis) on 9–10 November centered around the President’s
address to the UN General Assembly, and a peak (14 significations, spread
across 3 speech-acts) on 19 November 2001 corresponding with the begin-
ning of Ramadan. Other near-clusters occurred from 26–29 November
2001 attributable in part to a large number of speech-acts concerning the
rescue of American aid workers in Afghanistan as well as the first reported
battlefield casualty) and from 4–6 December 2001, as the US-led military
engagement approached the apparent completion of its appointed task of
defeating the Taliban.
In returning to the categorical schema of the jus ad bellum by which the
significations of the ‘just war frame’ are organized, other interesting pat-
terns emerge with respect to the application of the frame over the dura-
tion of the crisis (see Figures 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9). Aside from a concern with
the chronological clustering of speech-acts and the apportionment of the
just war frame within those clusters, it is also worth considering the evo-
lution of the frame’s application in broad relief. This is again captured in
three distinct but overlapping ways: on a discrete basis, in which the total
number of all just war significations advanced in a given month of the
crisis), 12 per cent of all significations in November, and a scant 4.5 per
cent of all significations advanced in December. Somewhat more telling
with respect to the temporal dimension of the frame application is the
significant and persistent increase in the prevalence of ‘right intention’
significations as the crisis unfolded. Whereas the ‘right intention’ indi-
cators were invoked sparingly (and on par with the ‘competent author-
ity’ indicators) in October, accounting for 19 per cent of all just war
significations in the first three-plus weeks of the crisis, they were nearly
twice as common as the crisis persisted into November (34 per cent)
and December (36 per cent).
Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics evident within the
data underscores these apparent patterns in the temporal dynamics of the
frame’s application, while also suggesting others. The termination of the
crisis for the US on 7 December 2001 makes characterizations of that
month difficult. Still, the general pattern suggested above—in which just
cause significations are consistent (and consistently prevalent) through-
out the crisis and right intention significations increased in importance as
the crisis wore on—both hold true. With respect to the total number
of ‘just cause’ significations advanced throughout the entire crisis, 47 per
cent occurred in October, 45 per cent in November, and 8 per cent in
December; the equivalent percentages by month for ‘right intention’
significations are 30 per cent in October, 60 per cent in November, and
10 per cent in December. The main point of departure from the discrete
assessment above, however, comes with respect to the ‘competent author-
ity’ criteria. The much less frequent invocation of ‘competent authority’
significations (viz. just cause or right intention) notwithstanding, it is
important to note that there is almost no distinguishable pattern in the
total number of those significations, which are split almost evenly by
month (50 per cent in October, 47 per cent in November, 3 per cent in
December). If anything, there is a slight frontward tilt towards the early
phase of the crisis, in that half of all ‘competent authority’ significations
during the crisis occurred in the (25 days) of October.
The interactions of time and substantive emphasis evident within the
application of the frame provide further reaffirmation of these general
patterns (see Table 7.4). Taking both time and criteria into account, it is
clear that the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-
decision in the Afghanistan crisis in the fall of 2001 featured a strong
emphasis on the ‘just causes’ precipitating the use of force from the very
outset of the crisis (an emphasis which was sustained throughout the
crisis), little concern with significations of competent authority for the
military action, and a gradual but perceptible increase in the emphasis
October November December

2001 2001 2001
Just cause 28% 27% 4.5%

Competent authority 6.3% 6% 0.3%
Right intention 8% 17% 2.9%
*October = 25 days; November = 30 days; December = 7 days
placed on the ‘right intentions’ typifying the US military intervention as

the crisis unfolded and the military engagement persisted and intensified.
The empirical results presented above provide compelling evidence that

the just war frame was applied to the affirmative war-decision through
Presidential rhetoric in a consistent and compelling way. As such, it is
clear that the ‘discursive environment’ in which the GWOT was launched,
steeped in just war language, provided the conditions by which 9/11 and
a military engagement in Afghanistan could be fused together in the
public consciousness—thereby providing an entrée for the decision to go
to war in Afghanistan. Over 80 per cent of the Presidential speech-acts
concerning Afghanistan during the crisis featured multiple (two or more)
references to the signifiers of just war theory featured in this analysis,
while over 25 per cent of Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan
could be understood as primarily vehicles for the delivery of just war
significations, in that they featured extensive (five or more) references to
those signifiers. In light of the extensive ‘breadth’ in the just war frame’s
application in these speech-acts (90 per cent of which included signi-
fications reflecting translations of at least two of the three jus ad bellum
criteria), these findings indicate the requisite degree of intent and com-
prehensiveness which distinguishes a purposive effort to frame the affirm-
ative war-decision.
However, the empirical analysis of the 15 just war signifiers which
together make up the ‘just war frame’ reveal a nuanced and in some
cases surprising depiction of how just war language can be (and was)
assembled and deployed in this concerted effort to ‘sell’ the war-
decision. Of the three jus ad bellum criteria, it is clear that Presidential
rhetoric was most prominently concerned with advancing the notion
that the US military intervention in Afghanistan was predicated on
a panoply of ‘just causes’. As the results presented above indicate, this

is a finding that holds up even when taking into account other factors
crucial in assessing frame application such as the target audience or the
relationship between the frame and the evolution of the decision-event
to which the frame application is tied; overall, just causes were the most
common frame signifiers across all audiences and throughout the entire
62 duration of the crisis.
This finding is in some ways expected given the degree to which estab-
lishing a plausibly legitimate casus belli is often times conflated with the
broader legitimacy of the decision to go to war (Walzer, 1977). However,
the empirical confirmation of this presumption with respect to the fram-
ing of the affirmative war-decision that marked the opening salvo in
the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ shows that this long-standing bias in the
inclinations of US foreign policy decision-makers remains evident even
amidst discussions of a post-9/11 ‘new security environment’ for the US
populated by ‘Protean enemies’ and oriented around pre-emptive strikes
and asymmetric warfare (O’Driscoll, 2008).
Another evident pattern in the data which also held up even when
considerations of time and target audience were introduced was the em-
phasis on right intention in the application of the frame. This was most
notable with respect to allusions that the use of force contributed positively
to the abatement of the crisis in Afghanistan, allusions that grew more fre-
quent as the military engagement persisted. Finally, and tellingly in light of
prevailing characterizations of the unilateralist bent of the Bush Adminis-
tration foreign policy, ‘competent authority’ significations were easily the
least common and important in the application of the just war frame to
the affirmative war-decision. Numerous expressions of support for the
US military engagement from the international community (including crit-
ical regional actors) had little bearing on the framing of the war. Likewise,
references to obtaining or securing authorization for the military action
were few and far between, apart from occasional vague allusions to an
unspecified authority derived from a self-appointed role as guardian of
abstract principles rather than any formal institutional or legal sources.
As the results reported above also make abundantly plain, this com-
prehensive and intentional effort at ‘selling’ the affirmative war-decision
through use of the just war frame by the Bush Administration was at its
most comprehensive and intentional relative to the press, which was the
primary target audience of Presidential speech-acts during the crisis. This
finding is consistent with many of the more prominent and recent ana-
lyses of framing in US foreign policy, which have determined a decided
trend in this direction (e.g., media as primary target audience) driven at
least in part by the proliferation of media sources and the emergence of

a 24-hour news cycle (Nacos, 2007; Carruthers, 2000; Mermin, 1999). It
is also broadly consistent with the savvy (if somewhat heavy-handed)
efforts of the Bush Administration to cultivate media support for the
war in Afghanistan (and, later, Iraq) embodied in the strategic employ-
ment of ‘embedded reporting’ and intentional ‘leaks’ to sympathetic
reporters and outlets (Klopfenstein, 2006; Hess and Kalb, 2003).
It is also clear from the empirical results presented above that the
application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision in
Afghanistan was ‘front-loaded’, with nearly a third of all allusions to just
war considerations in Presidential speech-acts during the crisis coming in
three ‘chronological clusters’, each occurring within the first 25 days of the
crisis. This suggests not only an intensity of application but also provides
further evidence of the purposive and intentional efforts of the Adminis-
tration, through Presidential speech-acts, to get out in front of the issues
so as to ensure procurement of the requisite level of domestic support
for an effective military campaign in a complex theater of operations in
which the potential for a protracted war was great.
Assessing the temporal dimension more broadly provides further con-
firmation of this purposive intent. While speech-acts concerning Afghan-
istan were issued consistently throughout the crisis, there was clear evidence
of undulating ‘peaks’ and ‘valleys’ in the application of the just war frame
within those speech-acts. Looking at the overall trajectory of the frame
application in conjunction with the unfolding of the crisis provides a
sense of a clear ‘beginning’ (in the first three weeks of the crisis), ‘middle’
(surrounding the President’s address to the UN General Assembly), and
‘end’ (the battle of Tora Bora) in terms of the prevalence of just war
significations suggestive of a concerted and mechanistic effort to frame
the affirmative war-decision as legitimate and ‘just’.
The preceding characterizations provide an overarching depiction
of the substantive emphasis, target audience, and temporal evolution
of the just war frame in application to the affirmative war-decision in
Afghanistan. Of course, looking in greater detail at each of these three
dimensions and their inter-relationships provides a more evocative and
telling portrayal of the manner in which the just war frame was employed,
as well as what that employment tells us about the Bush Administration’s
view on the decision to go to war itself. Whatever else may have changed
with respect to the use of force in the American context, the predisposition
of decision-makers to disproportionately emphasize ‘just causes’ when
attempting to ‘sell’ the decision to employ said use of force to domestic
audiences endures. Curiously, however, while ‘just causes’ were the most
commonly employed type of just war significations regardless of audi-

ence, they were employed in significantly greater proportions in the
relatively fewer Presidential speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders and
the mass public than in the more frequent speech-acts directed at the
media. In part that persistence might be explained by a perception on
the part of the Administration that the more visceral element of ‘just
causes’ (in contrast to comparatively more abstract notions of ‘right
intention’ or the more legalist consideration of ‘competent authority’)
provide for a more compelling ‘politics of signification’ relative to the
American public and/or key opinion-leaders, and are comparatively less
likely to resonate (or be accepted as sufficient) by the media.
Though the scope of this analysis mitigates against sweeping con-
clusions, the fact that the Bush Administration clearly targeted the press
more than other domestic audiences in its speech-acts provides com-
pelling evidence for the interpretation that varying degrees of emphasis
within, and across, the just war significations assessed here were not
coincidental nor accidental. As such, the reality that ‘just causes’ were
de-emphasized in speech-acts directed at the press (compared to other
audiences), and conversely ‘right intention’ significations received
greater emphasis in speech-acts directed at that audience (again, in
comparison to other audiences) further illuminates the view of the
Administration in terms of which aspects of the just war frame were
seen as more likely to persuade the media of the legitimacy of the
affirmative war-decision.
The same sophisticated calibration in frame application is evident in
the fact that while in an aggregate sense the involvement of an author-
itarian regime (the Taliban) in the crisis and the characterization of the
US military engagement in Afghanistan as a response to ‘evil’ were the
most commonly employed significations of ‘just cause’ (and, by exten-
sion, of just war considerations in general), these two translations of
‘just cause’ were less often used in speech-acts directed at the press. The
markedly greater emphasis on these two ‘just causes’ in an aggregate
sense is attributable to their disproportionate appearance in speech-acts
directed at the public; conversely, the existence of a violent crisis trig-
ger in the form of the 9/11 attacks was the most frequently employed
translation of ‘just cause’ considerations in speech-acts directed at the
press. Again, an inference can be drawn here that the Bush Adminis-
tration perceived appeals to democracy expansion and public moral-
izing would be less well-received in the press than would connecting
the affirmative war-decision to the 9/11 attacks. These findings speak
not only to the inclinations of the Bush Administration in terms of
efforts to ‘sell’ the war in Afghanistan, but also to the profound and
variable effects of audience type on the application of frames and the
politics of signification.
Conclusion
In declaring that the US invasion of Afghanistan was an unequivocally just

war, Jean Bethke Elshtain based her argument on the non-controversial
claim that governments have a singular responsibility to maintain civic
peace (2003: 46–54). It was this tranquillitas ordinis that was shattered
by the fear, violence, and destruction wrought by the 9/11 attacks. How-
ever, in assessing the empirical analysis of the just war frame’s application
to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan, it would seem that such
a concern was of minimal importance to the Bush Administration, at
least if one takes the rhetoric employed by the President in framing the
decision to invade Afghanistan at face value. As the preceding analysis of
the use of the just war frame in this case illustrates, the 9/11 attacks and
the violent destruction of property and persons they caused were not the
primary basis on which the decision to go to war in Afghanistan was sold
to the domestic audience. Nor was the long-standing just war tenet of
self-defense—a notion vital enough to trigger collective response by
NATO under the aegis of Article V of the Washington Treaty, but hardly
featured in the Bush Administration’s efforts to ‘sell’ the invasion at home.
In point of fact, the two translations of ‘just cause’ which were the
centerpieces of the just war frame’s application by the Bush Admin-
istration had little to do with Elshtain’s starting point for what made
the war ‘just’. In terms of frequency of use, the most important com-
ponents of the Bush Administration’s attempts to sell the war in Afghan-
istan were the involvement of an authoritarian/military regime (e.g., the
Taliban) in the crisis and the notion that the use of force was a response
to/punishment of a fundamentally ‘evil’ act. These two highly subjec-
tive and value-laden significations outstripped even the incontrovertible
‘just cause’ of the gross and violent injustice triggering the crisis. While
it may very well have been a ‘dereliction of duty’ (Elshtain, 2003: 59) for
the Bush Administration not to have responded to the 9/11 attacks by
invading Afghanistan, it does not seem that this ‘ethic of responsibility’
to restore the tranquility of order was seen as a compelling basis for war
by the Administration itself.
The fact that representations of the decision to go to war in Afghan-
istan as a response to/punishment of ‘evil’ actions wrought by the Taliban
varied greatly by audience provides further empirical confirmation, while
also underscoring the instrumental nature of the frequent allusions to

it. Either the Administration viewed ‘evil’ as a mutable concept, or rather
(as seems more likely) as a concept that ‘plays in Peoria’ but not in New
York or Washington. Such an outcome can be explained through refer-
ence to Mearsheimer’s (2011) recent work on lying in international pol-
itics. Here, the impulse to reconcile the application of military force
and liberal norms, values, and institutions (which he dubbed ‘liberal lies’)
took a backseat to the interests of the Bush Administration in ‘fear-
mongering’—a wholly different strategy of deception designed to inflate
threats in order to launch or shore up support for wars of choice (or what
Walzer refers to as ‘anticipations’) fought against distant and unfamiliar
enemies.
These main points of emphasis within the Bush Administration’s appli-
cation of the just war frame to the decision to invade Afghanistan tell us
much about the foreign policy inclinations and worldview of the Admin-
istration itself. Presidential speech-acts during the crisis placed relatively
greater emphasis on the regime type of the primary crisis protagonist
and on characterizations of the military engagement in Afghanistan as a
critical chapter in a larger ‘cosmic war’ (Aslan, 2009; Jeurgensmeyer, 2003).
Objective and material realities—such as the fact that the crisis was pro-
voked by the deadliest attack on American soil in history and resulted in an
extensive loss of life and property, and was therefore consistent with the
long-standing ‘just cause’ of self-defense—received relatively less emphasis
than did the effort to cast the Taliban and al-Qaeda as posing an existential
threat to the United States.
The results of the frame analysis here also illustrate that the credibility
of the frame (with respect to the consistency of message) as employed in
this case was somewhat uneven. While the overriding memes evident in
the discursive environment enveloping the GWOT (a struggle of ‘good
versus evil’, and ‘civilization versus barbarism’) were certainly borne out
in the more prominently emphasized significations depicting the war in
Afghanistan as ‘just’ (especially ‘response to/punishment of evil’), charac-
terizations of the GWOT as a tool of self-defense and a last resort were
largely excluded from the framing of the decision to go to war. A similar
disjuncture comes in assessing the dynamism of the frame application.
While the varying emphasis placed on different aspects of the frame
according to target audience reflects a flexible application, this variability
(in conjunction with the variability of the application of the frame in
general over time) also points toward negative consequences in terms of
inclusivity. There were, in actuality, multiple ‘sub-framings’ and associ-
ated narratives embedded within the application of the just war frame to
the war-decision in Afghanistan, varying by audience and constituency.

Such incongruities in the application of the just war frame to the decision
to go to war in Afghanistan were dwarfed in importance by the looming
specter of the 9/11 attacks and the GWOT. Under those circumstances,
a somewhat clumsy and inconsistent frame application proved less prob-
lematic in terms of affirmation and implementation of the war-decision
than it might have been in other contexts.
In the end, the empirical record of the framing of the affirmative war-
decision in Afghanistan provides support to characterizations of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy as ‘hyper-moralistic’. It also reveals a
disjuncture between that policy’s neo-conservative underpinnings and
the assumptions at the heart of what had previously constituted ‘main-
stream’ US foreign policy. Front-and-center here is the extent to which
democracy promotion, already a centerpiece of post-Cold War US foreign
policy, came to be the very raison d’être for the invasion of Afghanistan
and the GWOT (Steele, 2007). The reality that the existence of an author-
itarian regime in Afghanistan (one lacking in military capacity, external
support, and even full sovereignty over its own territory and population)
proved to be the single most emphasized ‘just’ cause for war by the Bush
Administration, as well as the evident fact that any form of ‘competent
authority’ for war scarcely registered in the empirical record, seems a
significant departure not only from Kant or Mill’s admonitions against
spreading democracy at the point of the bayonet but even from the
Bush Administration’s immediate predecessors (Smith, 2007; Peceny,
1999a).
Perhaps even more telling in terms of the aforementioned disjuncture
evident in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy (especially during the
Administration’s first term) comes in relation to realism. This is of course
a well-chronicled phenomenon, highlighted not only in the pages of
scholarly journals but in the ‘Weberian activism’ of the ad-hoc ‘Coalition
for a Realist Foreign Policy’ and, later, the ‘Security Scholars for a Sensible
Foreign Policy’ group (Jackson and Kaufman, 2007). This empirical assess-
ment of Presidential speech-acts highlights the extent of the divergence
of the Bush foreign policy from realist logic. That material threats to US
national interests and security represented by transnational terrorism
and the 9/11 attacks, not to mention the associated loss of property and
persons (all satisfying long-standing and widely accepted translations
of ‘just cause’), received significantly less emphasis in the efforts of the
Administration to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan than
did the notion that the use of force by the United States was primarily
justifiable as a response to ‘evil’ both reveals and contextualizes the Bush
Administration’s tendency to fold foreign policy threats neatly, and

erroneously, into an overarching Manichean worldview.
The fact that the Bush Administration elected to place greater emphasis
on such subjective and ideational signifiers in making the case for a war
which had such obvious and incontrovertible ‘just causes’ (including
the singular event of the 9/11 attacks) at a minimum suggests either
a new point of departure for the just war frame, or its breaking point. In
either case, we are left to wonder whether ‘meaning-making’ with respect
to war has undertaken something of a post-modernist turn, in which
foreign policy-makers in liberal societies no longer privilege material con-
ditions, but instead view ideational casus belli as more appealing signifiers
for domestic consumption—and therefore better tools for coping with the
latent ambivalence to the use of war as a policy tool.
Conclusion: Selling a Just War
The preceding analysis provides an exploratory assessment intended

to push beyond the anecdotal impression that just war theory matters
in US foreign policy, in order to address the more compelling question
of how it does. While it is possible for even a casual observer to find
copious evidence of the saturation of the prevailing American war-
discourse in the rhetoric of just war theory, the manner in which the
concepts embedded within that centuries old ‘decision-law’ concerning
war are actually related to the decision to employ military force within
the context of contemporary US foreign policy is less clear. The central
question advanced here (e.g., how just war theory is employed to sell
the decision to go to war as legitimate to domestic audiences by those
responsible for that decision) is a direct by-product of that concern.
By systematically analyzing the application of the just war frame (derived
from the jus ad bellum criteria of just cause, competent authority, and
right intention) in three prominent cases of US military intervention
in crisis since the end of the Cold War, a more definitive picture of how
the case for the legitimacy of the decision to go to war is made by the
Commander-in-Chief emerges. This picture is brought into even greater
relief in considering not only what distinct components of a ‘just war’
were utilized (or not utilized) in ‘selling’ affirmative war-decisions in these
three cases, but also the manner by which the frame (and its com-
ponents) were employed in relation to different audiences (the mass public,
the media, and opinion-leaders) and in relation to changing developments
in the crisis itself. It is to some concluding observations and insights stem-
ming from this application of the just war frame that I now turn.
Assessing the just war frame
The preceding analysis of the just war frame’s application in the Persian
Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led invasion of
211
Afghanistan reveals both commonalities and discrepancies in the manner

in which the just war frame has been employed. The temporal and sub-
stantive span of the three case studies as well as my interest in addressing
the question of how the just war frame is employed by decision-makers to
ensure the continued appeal of military force in American foreign policy
and society requires a comparative and synthetic assessment of the pre-
ceding empirical investigations. Whereas the case studies themselves
permit in-depth consideration of the use and utility of the just war frame
in each discrete application, here I will attempt to tease out broader and
more general insights about the frame’s overall significance within the
larger context of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. These ‘lessons
learned’ speak to points of substantive emphasis (or de-emphasis) within
the just war frame as well as to characteristics of the frame’s transmission
and delivery.
In drawing together the most significant empirical and theoretical find-
ings gleaned from the individual case studies, this concluding chapter pro-
vides an opportunity to evaluate the just war frame in totality. Doing
so allows for reflection on the overarching questions and propositions
concerning the utility and appeal of military force in contemporary US
foreign policy that were the catalysts for this investigation. Of particular
importance in this regard, as was discussed at length in Chapter 3, is the
need to take into account the frame’s credibility, salience, and dynamism
as reflected in its application across the three cases examined here. Taking
such an account in turn requires consideration of the following themes
and questions:
• Credibility: Were the elements of the message emphasized by the

framers logically consistent and empirically verifiable, and were the
framers themselves credible?
• Salience: Was the message articulated within the frame central to,
commensurate with, and faithful to the experience of members of the
intended audience or audiences?
• Dynamism: Did the frame articulation evolve over time and/or in
conjunction with a changing context to incorporate new elements?
These three components, depicted schematically in Figure C.1, provide

the guiding parameters for meta-analysis of the just war frame.
If nothing else, this inquiry of the just war frame reminds us that the
act of making war and the art of selling it to the public are two sides of
the same coin. In light of the previously discussed ‘liberal contradiction’
concerning war, if the use of force cannot be utilized effectively for any
This brief return to the notion of frame credibility provides an entrée

for reflection on the substantive consistency evident (or not evident) in
the just war frame’s application to the three war-decisions examined here.
If at base frames ‘help to render events or occurrences meaningful’ amidst
a politics born of dueling discourses and public contestation (Benford and
Snow, 2000; Hall, 1997), effective application of a frame is at least in part
contingent on the ability of the framer(s) to stay ‘on message’; e.g., to rely
wholly and consistently on the frame in question amidst the process of
meaning-making, and to avoid incorporating divergent (and potentially
competing) frames. Adopting this tack is crucial to the consistency of
frame application which, in turn, enhances the credibility of the message
(and the messenger).
This is a ‘lesson’ most clearly evident in the recurring encroachment
of sometimes related and sometimes competing memes by President
George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf War (see Chapter 5). The recur-
rence of these memes (‘reversing aggression’, ‘kicking the Vietnam syn-
drome’, and ‘establishing New World Order’) in Presidential rhetoric
during the Gulf War clearly contributed to the inconsistent and inchoate
application of the just war frame, undermining the credibility of the
‘message’ that the Gulf War was a ‘just war’ in line with the reasons
specified. This inconsistent application of the just war frame also had
evidently and profoundly damaging consequences beyond the attempt to
‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in the Gulf, by undermining
the perceived credibility of the messenger as well. These consequences were
chiefly manifested in the prevailing confusion within American society
concerning the war’s causes and especially objectives as the crisis wore
on, as well as in the fleeting support for the war and the President who
waged it in the aftermath.
This problem of frame inconsistency was decidedly not evident in the
analysis of the just war frame’s application to affirmative war-decisions
in Kosovo and Afghanistan (see Chapters 6 and 7). Certainly there is no
hard evidence to suggest that Presidents Clinton and (George W.) Bush
(or their advisors) drew from the mis-steps of their predecessor’s attempt
at ‘selling’ a similar decision in the Gulf War, and probably no feasible
way to systematically investigate that claim. Yet the evidence presented
here suffices to support the assertion that in each of those cases Presiden-
tial speech-acts remained steadfastly ‘on message’ in seeking to frame the
US military engagements in Kosovo and Afghanistan as necessary, legit-
imate, and ‘just’ through reliance on the just war frame. While the specific
applications of the frame to those two war-decisions certainly differed—
particularly when considerations of audience and time were introduced
into the analysis—what held constant in both cases was the lack of any
semblance of other potentially competing frames. As such, the credibility
of the frame itself as well as that of its chief articulators was enhanced in
the process.
Salience: Evil, ‘boogeymen’, and frontier justice

The closer the central frame message is to the existence and experi-
ences of the audience, their own core belief system, and the prevailing
cultural narrative of the society in question, the more likely it is that
the message will ‘stick’ (Benford and Snow, 2000). Those frames that
are most salient are those that reflect high levels of consistency, com-
mensurability, and fidelity with the individual and collective experi-
ences and beliefs of an audience or audiences—and with the dominant
narratives at work within those audiences. Indeed, high levels of con-
sistency, commensurability, and fidelity can even lead to the frame’s
absorption into the general ‘cultural stock’—thereby subverting and
even transcending the distinction between the frame and the culture
in which it is employed (Zald, 1996).1
In turning to the substantive aspect of the just war frame’s applica-
tion in the three cases examined (the Persian Gulf War, the NATO
intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan), there
is a consistently prominent emphasis on the ‘just cause’ component of
the jus ad bellum decision-law. In many ways the fact that the presence
of legitimating causes for war (rather than the securing of competent
authority, or the articulation of the intentions of the war prior to engag-
ing in it) resonates most powerfully in the efforts of US Presidents to
frame their decisions to go to war as necessary, just, and therefore legit-
imate is to be expected. What might be more telling is which ‘just causes’
are utilized most frequently and to greatest effect in the application of the
just war frame to affirmative war-decisions. In that vein, two signifiers
of ‘just causes’ were the most frequently and consistently employed: the
need for a response to or punishment of acts of ‘evil’, and the involve-
ment in and responsibility for the crisis by an authoritarian regime.
The preceding empirical analysis of the framing of affirmative war-
decisions reveals a set of clear and consistent translations of acts of
‘evil’ which are strongly correlated with efforts to ‘sell’ the decision to
employ military force in crisis situations. These primarily include, but are
not limited to: the targeting of non-combatants, hostage taking, willful
destruction of the natural environment, and most prominently system-
atic campaigns of human rights abuses and the perpetration of crimes
against humanity. The inherent subjectivity of the notion of ‘evil’ in
foreign policy terms notwithstanding, this analysis conveys the degree

to which such acts occupy a position of central importance in the
efforts of recent Presidents to make the case for military intervention
to the domestic audience—especially when perpetrated by authoritarian
leaders and regimes in crises they inspired or provoked.
Above and beyond other potential translations of justice that might be
associated with a legitimate use of America’s military might in responding
to crisis situations, this analysis shows us that military force is most likely
to be advanced for public consumption as a legitimate corrective for ‘evil’
actions carried out by ‘bad’ leaders; e.g., as an implement of retributive
justice (Lu, 2002). Such a finding is telling, suggesting a common repre-
sentation (if not understanding) not only of what constitutes ‘evil’ but
also what is considered to be the chief source of evil in the international
arena—one that has held constant across three successive Presidential
Administrations. It also indicates a clear commitment by those three
Administrations to publicly link the use of military might with the need
to punish or correct such ‘evil’ acts and their perpetrators, in a rough
approximation of ‘frontier justice’ within an anarchical international
system in which the US assumes the role of sheriff, reluctant or otherwise
(Tirman, 2010; Haass, 1998). Furthermore, the recurrent reliance on this
signifier across all three cases analyzed suggests a significant and con-
tinuing degree of utility and effectiveness. Indeed, one might reasonably
conclude from the repeated and consistent efforts of three consecutive
Presidents to ‘sell’ the legitimacy of war on the basis of these ‘just causes’
that domestic audience(s) are at some level ‘buying’ it.
The continuing tendency of US decision-makers to advance American
military might as a useful corrective for punishing the evil actions of
‘boogeymen’ such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, or Mullah
Muhammad Omar and his Taliban brethren points to a sobering con-
clusion concerning the future of US military intervention. Sophisticated
and pragmatic estimates of America’s declining military capabilities and
changing interests aside (Nye and Armitage, 2007), if Presidents continue
to rest their case for military intervention on the utility of military force
as a tool to punish acts of evil and their perpetrators, it seems extremely
likely that US military intervention will remain a frequent and costly
endeavor. This is due in no small part to the tendency of such represent-
ations to take on a life of their own, such that those advancing them
come to supplant the pursuit of the national interest with the quest
to live up to their own rhetoric (Kennan, 1951). Of course, all of this is
not to say that a recurring scenario of US interventionism driven by
retributive impulses is inevitable. But on the basis of this frequently
employed signification, one would expect military intervention to remain

a centerpiece of US foreign policy unless one or more of the following
(in declining order of likelihood) were to entail: a significant segment
of the domestic audience begins to reject the connection between the
use of force and retributive justice; future Presidents rely less on this
signification; international normative and legal standards change signi-
ficantly, such that crimes against humanity are no longer seen as ‘action-
able offenses’; or (impossibly) evil is eliminated from our world.
Dynamism: Fitting ‘new wars’ in an old bottle

The extent to which a frame proves adaptable to a changing contextual
environment without losing the essence of what its articulators wish
to signify about the event, decision, or problem of concern is a crucial
measure of frame utility. As Swart (1995) suggests, such dynamism is
intricately linked to the credibility and especially salience of a frame. It
stands to reason that the more adaptive the frame is in application, the
greater the likelihood that more members of a target audience (or audi-
ences) will identify consistencies and continuities between their own
beliefs and experiences and those highlighted by the frame. The sus-
tained commensurability with beliefs and experiences even in the face
of an evolving context that typifies a dynamic frame is likely to broaden
the frame’s appeal, with the result a frame that is perceived as credible
to a larger and more diverse range of individuals and an increased overall
resonance.
The preceding analysis of the just war frame highlights not only the
specifics of how the frame was used in three prominent cases of US mili-
tary intervention since the end of the Cold War, but also the degree to
which the frame continued to be employed through Presidential speech-
acts in all three cases in spite of the significant differences between and
among those cases. While these three cases of foreign policy crisis were
similar enough to satisfy the primary and secondary criteria employed
in the case selection process, it is indisputable that the particularities of
the Persian Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan (whether in terms of happenings ‘on the ground’
or the domestic response to them) varied greatly. So too did the larger
geopolitical context in which these crises were embedded, spanning the
decade-plus period extending from the very dawn of the post-Cold War
era to the inception of the ‘global war on terrorism’.
One of the most significant contextual shifts concerns the very nature
of warfare itself. While the Persian Gulf War is often characterized as
marking the dawn of the post-Cold War era, from the standpoint of
armed conflict it can be viewed as something of an anachronism. The

archetype of the Clausewitzian ‘old’ war held that wars were the product
of rational and strategic calculation. Political leaders utilized the tools of
the state over which they presided (professional standing armies and
national economies of scale) to deploy overwhelming force against sim-
ilarly organized opponents in a contest over some discernable national
interest (Butler, 2009). Typified by a clear breach of international law
exemplified in the violent abrogation of the territorial sovereignty of
one nation-state (Kuwait) by another (Iraq) using an organized standing
military force commanded directly by a head-of-state (Saddam Hussein),
the inception of the Gulf War as well as the international community’s
response to it in many ways embodied that Clausewitzian ideal.
The same cannot be said of the other two cases examined here. Indeed,
each bears more than passing resemblance to the ‘new wars’ described
by scholars such as Azar (1990), Shaw (1999), Kaldor (1999), and Münkler
(2004). In this view, contemporary armed conflict is largely intra-state
in nature, fuelled by clashing identities and economic and political dis-
location, waged by a range of official and irregular combatants, and sus-
tained by remittances, organized crime, and transnational networks moving
money, arms, and people. With the unraveling of the key distinctions
around which the ‘modern’ state is organized, armed conflict is prose-
cuted without much regard for separation between internal and external
political and social realms, public and private goods and activities, civil-
ian and military authority, or even between states of ‘war’ and ‘peace’.
The NATO operation in Kosovo was primarily advanced to thwart a
campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as well as a humanitarian crisis stem-
ming from intra-state conflict. The US-led assault on Afghanistan proved
the initial military salvo in a broader counter-terrorism offensive against
a non-state transnational terrorist group (al-Qaeda) and the largely unrec-
ognized political authority granting that group safe haven (the Afghan
Taliban). Differences between the two notwithstanding, each of these
cases featured a US military intervention prompted by a void of statehood
and violently clashing identity groups—with each representing drastic
departures from the Gulf War in terms of the ‘ideal type’ of warfare they
best reflect.
From the standpoint of the primary concern of this research (e.g., how
the just war frame was used to sell the decision to go to war), what is
most telling is the degree to which the just war frame proved adaptable to
the aforementioned changes in the nature of the armed conflicts precipi-
tating US intervention. In the Gulf War, points of emphasis within the
framing of the affirmative war-decision included self-defense, the seizure
of territory, and the seizure of (US) property and/or persons as legitimat-

ing ‘just causes’ for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. With such traditional
themes common to inter-state warfare rendered largely irrelevant to the
‘new wars’ unfolding in Kosovo and Afghanistan, these elements of the
frame dropped out. In their place, the framing effort relied chiefly on ‘just
causes’ such as response to/punishment of ‘evil’ and the involvement/
responsibility of authoritarian leaders for the crisis, as well as allusions to
authorization by the international community. This heightened empha-
sis on just causes at the expense of authority and especially intention
considerations is clearly indicative of the process of threat inflation neces-
sary to justify the ‘wars of choice’ that typify the post-Cold War era. This
is not a process without negative consequences, including the blowback
which is often linked to ‘fearmongering’ (Mearsheimer, 2011); in this we
are reminded of Robespierre’s famous dictum that ‘no one loves armed
missionaries’.
What these points of departure in the just war frame’s application
within and across the three cases analyzed here reflect in the aggre-
gate is the adaptability and commensurability of the just war frame to
profoundly changing circumstances concerning the dynamics of con-
temporary armed conflict, including those involving non-state actors
(Heinze and Steele, 2009). Indeed, the fact that the frame was used by
the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations in a more targeted,
intensive, consistent, and purposeful way in situations more closely
approximating the ‘new war’ dynamic suggests that the utility of the
just war frame, or at least select elements of it, might not only be retained
but even enhanced when seeking to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military
force in response to these ‘wars of a third kind’ (Rice, 1988).
Frame transmission
Reaffirming the ‘cascade’

Meta-analytical reflection on the ‘lessons learned’ from this inquiry
can extend beyond the substantive emphasis of the just war frame to
include the manner in which the frame was applied. In other words, in
looking across the three case studies, it is possible to observe clear and
consistent attributes of the just war frame’s transmission. The first and
arguably most important concerns Entman’s (2004) ‘cascade model’
(previously discussed in Chapter 3). In this model, while the signal mes-
sage of a frame may be activated by the frame’s architects, its overall
salience, effectiveness, and ultimately impact is determined by the degree
to which that message reverberates and is (re)transmitted through other
key elites including, but not limited to, the media (ibid.). The cascade
effect refers to the process by which the frame’s content is received,
filtered, and reproduced for mass consumption by elite audiences—as
well as the reverberation of the frame back to the ‘top’ in a series of
feedback loops.
At the heart of the cascade model is the insight that effective frames
are, and must be, culturally sustained and reinforced. This is a con-
dition that requires adjustment of the frame when needed, and beyond
that necessitates the constitutive involvement of opinion-leaders other
than the frame’s primary architects. The use of the just war frame to
‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan for the most part confirms the ‘cascade model’ of
framing, though to a diminished degree over the span of the three
cases. In terms of transmission, perhaps the overriding and most com-
pelling feature of the just war frame’s application in the Persian Gulf
War and in Kosovo was the degree to which the mass public was by-
passed in favor of the media and, to a lesser extent, other opinion-leaders
(business leaders, religious authorities, military officers). In both cases, a
sizable majority of speech-acts concerning the crisis as well as speech-acts
employing the just war frame targeted these audiences, with the public
at-large much less likely to be the primary target for Presidential speech-
acts concerning the crisis, or for efforts at ‘selling’ the affirmative war-
decision via the just war frame.
From the standpoint of frame transmission, such findings can clearly
be interpreted as supporting Entman’s cascade model. However, this
pattern was not replicated in the Afghanistan case, in which the ratio of
both Presidential speech-acts and just war frame significations by audi-
ence type tilted to a greater degree in the direction of the mass public.
In making the case for a US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the George
W. Bush Administration (unlike its predecessors) relied much more heavily
on direct appeals to the public at-large, while placing relatively less emphasis
on speech-making and frame transmission aimed at the media and other
opinion-leaders. While the exploratory nature of this analysis does not
allow for any compelling conclusion or interpretation of this finding rela-
tive to Entman’s cascade model, it is clear that within the bounds of this
study, the Afghanistan case stands as an outlier in terms of frame transmis-
sion and target audience. Whether that outlier status is a simple outgrowth
of the mass public trauma gripping American society in the aftermath of
9/11, or rather is indicative of a broader shift away from the cascade effect
in framing within the context of US foreign policy would seem a question
worthy of further and more finely calibrated analysis.
Intention and intensity

As stated earlier, this empirical investigation of the application of the
just war frame to the legitimization of US military intervention decisions
indicates that the importance of just war theory to contemporary US
foreign policy goes far beyond that of providing the odd rhetorical flour-
ish. Rather, it seems safe to say that the language and concepts of just war
theory, and in particular the jus ad bellum, together constitute an impor-
tant tool used purposefully by US Presidents amidst the tumultuous and
contested process that is the ‘politics of signification’. While it is imposs-
ible within the confines of this particular study to speak to whether or not
other frames might also serve this function with respect to the task of
‘selling’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience, it seems fairly
certain that the just war frame spawned by the just war ‘conversation’
does.
The evidence in support of this assertion of purposive intent is fairly
compelling, particularly in the calibration of the frame to empirical
events and ‘facts’ evident within the cases themselves. To be sure, dif-
ferent components of the just war frame were employed to greater or
lesser extent (and effect) in the three cases. Yet it is also instructive to
take note of the components of the frame that were not employed, and
the circumstances associated with those ‘non-significations’. To that end,
there is very little evidence of wholly baseless framings; plausibility reigns
across all three cases. By way of example, there is but only one instance of
an attempt at a ‘global authority’ signification in the Kosovo case—a clear
reflection of the Clinton Administration’s acknowledgement that the
well-documented absence of UN authorization for military action would
make such a signification implausible (potentially undermining the effort
to frame the war as legitimate in the process). Similarly, self-defense is
minimally invoked in the Persian Gulf War (and only through a highly
circuitous logical connection to the notion of collective security), and
drops out altogether in the Kosovo and Afghanistan cases.
Such ‘non-significations’ underscore the extent to which the three
case studies reveal systematic transmission and application of the just
war frame. Beyond these and other examples of Presidents refraining
from attaching one or more just war significations to events and ‘facts’
that would strain credulity, the degree of purposive intent employed in
the use of the frame can also be seen in the temporal dimension of the
analysis. One compelling example of this phenomenon, again drawn
from the Persian Gulf War case, is the notable absence of references
to ‘right intentions’ such as crisis abatement until after termination of
the 100 hours of ‘official hostilities’. This is a dimension of the frame’s
application (or, more accurately, non-application) which again speaks

to an awareness of, and concern with, the need to apply the frame in
as plausible a fashion as possible. Such fine calibration in the transmis-
sion of the just war ‘message’ can also be seen in the impact of domestic
politics. As was highlighted in the case studies themselves, there were
clearly unique and differential points of emphasis in the frame’s applica-
tion in the three cases which correspond to domestic political considera-
tions such as Bush (41) seeking to overcome the ‘wimp factor’, Clinton
seeking to reaffirm his character and ‘fitness’ for the job of President, or
Bush (43) seeking to exact revenge amidst a period of national mourning
and outrage.
Corresponding with and reaffirming the clear degree of intent and
care evident in the use of the just war frame in these three cases is the
degree of intensity in the transmission of that frame’s central message.
While the points of emphasis in the three applications of the frame
vary in major and important ways, another thing that runs constant
across the effort to ‘sell’ the legitimacy of the affirmative war-decision
in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan is the degree to which
the just war significations that were emphasized were strongly empha-
sized, while those that were not employed were highly marginalized.
Whether or not Presidents and top-ranking foreign policy decision-
makers view justice in ‘black and white’ terms, it seems clear that they
have a strong sense of what they think will resonate with the public
when making the case for war—and what won’t—and advance their
efforts to frame the war-decision accordingly.
Postscript, Libya: Plus ça change?
As this book was completed in the summer of 2011, the US was involved
in yet another military intervention in response to a crisis, as part of a
NATO operation (‘Operation Unified Protector’) contributing to the end
of Moammar Gaddafi’s four decades of autocratic rule in Libya. And yet
again a sitting US President has turned to the language of moral obliga-
tion and the concepts of just war theory as a means of framing the deci-
sion to use military force. Announcing the beginning of Allied air sorties
over Libya on 18 March 2011, the President outlined the rationale driving
the decision:
Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qadhafi chose the
path of brutal suppression. Innocent civilians were beaten, impris-
oned, and in some cases killed. Peaceful protests were forcefully put
down. Hospitals were attacked and patients disappeared. A campaign

of intimidation and repression began…In the face of this injustice, the
United States and the international community moved swiftly…
…For decades, he’s demonstrated a willingness to use brute force

through his sponsorship of terrorism against the American people
as well as others and through the killings that he has carried out
within his own borders… Left unchecked, we have every reason to
believe that Qadhafi would commit atrocities against his people.
Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue…And
that’s why the United States has worked with our allies and partners to
shape a strong international response at the United Nations…
Now, the United States did not seek this outcome. Our decisions
have been driven by Qadhafi’s refusal to respect the rights of his
people and the potential for mass murder of innocent civilians…So
I’ve taken this decision with the confidence that action is necessary
and that we will not be acting alone. Our goal is focused, our cause
is just, and our coalition is strong (Obama, 2011a).
As the operation intensified and expanded including a greater role for

the US and other NATO allies aside from the UK, France, and Italy in
conjunction with a strong supporting resolution (1973) from the UN
Security Council, the President articulated the logic of his decision to
intervene with military force to the American public in a nationally
televised address:
It’s true that America cannot use our military wherever repression
occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always
measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot
be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this
particular country, Libya, at this particular moment, we were faced
with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique
ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action,
a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab coun-
tries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We
also had the ability to stop Qadhafi’s forces…without putting American
troops on the ground.
To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader, and more pro-

foundly, our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such
circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some

nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other coun-
tries. The United States of America is different. And as President,
I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before
taking action (Obama, 2011b).
And, as the operation continued into the spring without profoundly

altering the dynamics of the situation on the ground and domestic
opposition in the US grew, the President responded by drawing a direct
parallel between the necessity to act in Libya, and the failure to do
so 17 years earlier in Rwanda:
Today we also reflect on Rwanda’s progress…Rwanda reminds us

of our obligations to each other as fellow human beings and our
shared responsibility to prevent attacks on innocent civilians, as
the international community is doing in Libya (Obama, 2011c).
The evolving situation in Libya represents the latest installment in the

unfolding trajectory of US military intervention since the Cold War.
Indeed, it exhibits many of the characteristics and quandaries evident
in other prominent cases of US military intervention, including (but not
limited to) those studied here: the central involvement of an authoritar-
ian regime; allegations and/or proof of unrestrained violence and atroci-
ties against civilians; repeated assertions of the unified support of the
international community for the use of force as well as that use of force
as a ‘last resort’; and explicit connections between the use of force and a
more prosperous, humane, and just aftermath in the target state, society,
and/or region.
The relevance of the intervention in Libya to this study is evident not
only in these similarities or in the reliance of the Obama Administration
(like its immediate predecessors) on just war language to ‘sell’ the affirm-
ative war-decision, but also in the repeated charges by critics of that
decision that the current Administration (again like its immediate pre-
decessors) lacked a discernable framework or set of criteria by which it
advances, explains, and justifies such decisions. One prominent expres-
sion of this viewpoint was articulated by former US Senator Gary Hart
(D-Colorado) in an interview with PBS’ Jim Lehrer after Operation Unified
Protector began:
What strikes me about this operation is how much it is part of a

pattern over the past 20 years, since the end of the Cold War. If you
look over the past four administrations, what has been remarkable, in
addition to the two wars, long wars, that we’re involved in, are how
many of these brushfire operations we have either gotten into or not
gotten into. We did not in Rwanda. President Clinton said that was a
mistake. We have in Libya. What is lacking here is any kind of frame-
work for deciding when American military force will be used. We have
gone through four administrations—we’re in the middle of the fourth
administration—since the end of the Cold War. And what I think is
needed right now is what I would call an Obama doctrine, which lays
out a framework for intervention or nonintervention. And that would
help the American people, certainly people like myself, understand
why we get involved, when we get involved and how much we will
get involved. And that kind of context has been lacking for the better
part of 20 years (PBS, 2011b).
Hart’s comment reflects not merely dissatisfaction with the Obama

Administration’s handling of the Libyan situation, but rather a broader
view that US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been
and remains inchoate with respect to military intervention, and lacks
a consistent and publicly articulated guiding framework. This is a
perspective that is hardly original or unique to the former senator; in
recent years countless voices within the mainstream US foreign policy
community have raised similar concerns (Kissinger and Baker, 2011;
Robinson, 2011; Gates, 2010; Kagan, 2008; Krauthammer, 2002; Kristof,
2002; Glennon, 1999; Haass, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Crocker, 1996; The
Aspen Institute, 1996; Luttwak, 1995). Yet it is my contention that
the preceding study of framing, and in particular the manner in which
the just war frame has been applied to US military intervention decisions
since the end of the Cold War, poses a direct challenge to this charac-
terization—at least with respect to how that decision is presented to
domestic audiences.
In viewing the connection between just war theory and the use of force
in US foreign policy through the prism of the just war frame, this analysis
indicates that in at least these three recent and prominent examples of
US military intervention policy-makers have employed a definite and
clear framework when presenting the decision to use military force in res-
ponse to foreign policy crises to the public, the press, and various opinion-
leaders. To be sure, as this analysis also indicates, the application of the
just war frame has varied by situation and circumstance. Different ele-
ments have been emphasized and de-emphasized, and the frame in its
totality has been used to varying extent and with varying degrees of
success. Still, I would contend that the preceding empirical analysis,

advanced primarily to address the question of how just war theory is used
to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war by US foreign policy decision-makers,
sheds ample light on the ways in which the just war frame has encom-
passed and propelled that decision in three critical instances of post-Cold
War intervention spanning over a decade. While again it may not be the
only framework advanced in conjunction with the decision to intervene
with force, or even the best, this analysis shows us not only that the just
war frame is very much in evidence as a means of ‘selling’ the affirmative
war-decision, but how. In the process, this inquiry seemingly puts the lie
to the claim that US military intervention decisions are random events
advanced without regard to any consistent, overarching framework.
This is not to say that US military intervention decisions are in any real
sense ‘just’, nor that they are rendered in an effort to satisfy the particular
translations of justice associated with the age-old conditions of just war
theory and in particular the jus ad bellum criteria. Though impossible to
‘prove’ in any scientific sense of the term, it seems highly unlikely that
the US (or any other nation-state, for that matter) uses its military primar-
ily, or even secondarily, as an instrument to promote justice and virtue.
Instead, what this research does allow us to say with some conviction
is that such decisions are systematically presented to the domestic audi-
ence(s) in that light. So while the claim that contemporary US foreign
policy lacks any decision-making framework with regard to the use of
force may be true, we should be careful to conclude that the same is true
of how those decisions are presented for public consumption—or that
in a socially constituted endeavor such as war, the latter has no bearing
on the former.
The Libya case will undoubtedly prove instructive for years to come,
particularly as the record of the Obama Administration’s decision-
making becomes public and illuminates the latest of America’s many
post-Cold War military adventures. It will also likely prove instructive in
allowing us to once again see definitive evidence of the overlap and syn-
thesis of Presidential rhetoric surrounding an affirmative war-decision
and the actual decision itself. This overlap and synthesis is clearly evident
in the three cases of US military intervention decisions analyzed here—a
finding that, in turn, points to an important conclusion underscored
(though hardly unearthed) by this research. Both historical and con-
temporary scholars of war agree that the act of war and the decision to
undertake that act are fundamentally and profoundly social in nature,
concerning not just the political leaders that make the determination or
advance the orders, but indeed subsuming the entire society in question.
Yet in the same way that we can and should think of the decision to go
to war as one that impacts all of society, in the process rejecting the
splendid isolation of decisions rendered for raison d’état by monarchs
and liberals alike, so too does this study of the framing of that decision
suggest that we would also reject the notion that the decision to go to
war and the ‘selling’ of that decision are wholly distinct entities.
Of course the effort to frame a decision to go to war by America’s polit-
ical leadership as ‘just’ hardly makes it so. But the collision between
a deeply embedded social behavior such as war and a fundamentally
socially constructed concept such as legitimacy does provide decision-
makers with the opportunity to frame it as such—an appealing prospect
to those responsible for such a high stakes decision. Indeed, if the effort
to frame the decision to go to war is effective enough, that decision (and
the war that ensues) is likely to be perceived and received as legitimate by
a substantial segment of the society in question—including, quite poss-
ibly, those making it. This construction of legitimacy makes successful
conduct of the war infinitely more likely by enhancing both the appeal
of the decision and those responsible for it. This was undoubtedly the
‘endgame’ sought by the three Presidential Administrations (George H.W.
Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush) in their employment of the just
war frame to advance the three major military intervention decisions
analyzed here. And, irrespective of the effectiveness of their efforts, the
extensive and intensive employment of the just war frame to ‘sell’ the
legitimacy of decisions to employ military force in responding to foreign
policy crisis suggests that the framing of that decision and the decision
itself are inextricably linked in ways that are likely to remain important
for many years to come.
Notes
Chapter 1 Introduction
1 Armed conflict of all types increased by a factor of three during the period
1960–1992 (Human Security Centre, 2010).
2 See, among others, Pearson (1973), Small and Singer (1982), Levy (1983),
Tillema (1991), Pearson and Baumann (1993–1994), Bercovitch and Jackson
(1997), Huth (1998), Regan (2002), Hegre (2004), Lacina (2004), and SIPRI
(2010) for a sampling of such empirical research.
3 Not inconsequential here is the article of faith at the heart of liberal thought
that human rationality can be directed toward the mutually reinforcing ends
of personal and social progress, a belief that resonates to varying degree
within all liberal societies. On the question of war, this faith in rationality is
especially crucial, in that it underpins the allegedly transformative effects of
Kant’s ‘asocial sociability’ upon the domestic and eventually international
arena—as well as the associated supposition that the rule of law and the devel-
opment of non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution can supplant the
‘war of all against all’ that typifies an anarchical international system (Doyle,
1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett and Oneal, 2001).
4 Indeed, since the end of World War II the United States has inarguably occu-
pied a unique geopolitical position as the sole enduring military superpower as
well as the leader and guarantor of liberalism and self-appointed champion of
the ‘free world’, in essence rendering US foreign policy during this period an
effort to consummate what Wittkopf et al. (2003), Jentleson (2010), and others
have famously referred to as a marriage of ‘power and principle’.
5 From this perspective, resorting to war is understood to constitute a breakdown
in the implicit code of conduct presumed to govern relations between nations,
and as such an undesirable outcome that violates common and shared stan-
dards of humanity. One can discern strains of this view and the universalism
that underpins it in such disparate sources as Hammurabi’s Code, Kant’s three
Definitive Articles, or Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’.
6 Narrowly, the resort to war may obviate or liquidate the war’s objectives before
they can be secured. From a wider vantage point, the resort to war may create
additional enemies, weaken material capacity and capabilities, or undermine
the ideals and values of the society in question (or some combination of the
three). On the merits of constraining war on account of the material benefits
associated with doing so, the contribution of classical utilitarians like Bentham
(1798) and Mill (1859) are especially noteworthy.
Chapter 2 Entering the Just War Conversation

1 Just war theory and the ‘tradition’ it has spawned each have much to offer
relative to consideration of the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable
conduct during war (the jus in bello criteria) as well as the conditions denot-
228
Notes 229
ing a just order after the war’s conclusion (the jus post bellum precept). How-
ever, as neither speaks directly to the war-decision and the ex ante rational-
ization of that decision, these components of the theory and tradition largely
fall outside the bounds of this research and are not systematically examined or
discussed.
2 Roman proscriptions on war, advanced in accordance with fetial law (jus
fetiale), were important early sources of just war thinking. In this respect, the
efforts of Cicero to harness war solely to the purpose of defense of empire
should not be overlooked. Cicero was especially instrumental in sustaining the
earliest antecedents of the just war tradition, particularly as concerns the feas-
ibility and merits of a universal standard of conduct in war (see Bellamy, 2006).
At the same time, relative to social practice, Roman contributions to the just
war ‘conversation’ had significantly less impact on the war-decision than did
those of Hebrew and Greek civilizations. Furthermore, the contributions of
imperial Roman society to this ‘conversation’ have not translated to modern
liberal societies to a similar degree (no doubt due to liberal sensibilities con-
cerning overt imperial dominion and conquest); hence, the diminished empha-
sis here.
3 Other pretexts, such as to take vengeance, to gain advantages for the polis,
or to maintain authority over those unfit to rule themselves, stemmed from
the Platonic conception of a natural social order and the duties of the
philosopher-king to preserve or restore them (see Hamburger, 1951).
4 Even such a critical empiricist and utilitarian as Hume—while certainly at
odds with, say, Locke with regard to the presumed primacy of natural law
and associated notions of justice over human relations—asserted that the
central importance of justice to society is so unquestioned that undertaking
to prove it would be an utterly superfluous activity (Aiken, 1970).
5 This is reflected thematically in the intellectual labors of the neo-scholastics
(especially Vitoria) to define and extend standards concerning the treat-
ment of the indigenous peoples in the conquest of the ‘New World’, as well
as those within the African diaspora swept up in the brutal and inhumane
practice of slavery, and to hold sovereigns as well as conquistadors to
account for their conduct relative to those standards (Ballis, 1937; Vitoria,
1991).
6 It is important here to acknowledge the role of the Crusades relative to the just
war tradition and ‘conversation’. Clearly the Christian holy wars launched in
order to reunify the Western and Eastern Christians and ‘liberate’ Jerusalem
(and, earlier, Moorish Spain) reflect the fundamental just war precept of ‘legit-
imate authority’ to the extent that they were defined (and perceived by their
protagonists) as directly commanded by God, through the papacy. At the
same time, other ad bellum precepts (such as just cause) received relatively less
emphasis, while the brutal atrocities committed exposed the lack of any con-
cern with just conduct in relations with non-Christians, bearing little resem-
blance to any form of in bello restraint associated with the just war theory or
the larger just war tradition surrounding it. Whereas Walters (1973) is correct
in identifying that, by virtue of reflecting the potential for the abuse of just
war precepts, the holy war doctrine underpinning the Crusades was part of
(rather than antithetical to) the just war tradition, it is also clear that the era
of the Crusades themselves contributed little to the ‘conversation’ of what
230 Notes
constitutes a ‘just’ war, beyond papal authority. As such, while the nexus of
just war theory and the Crusades is a hugely significant and important one,
it falls largely outside the particular bounds of this research.
7 As Johnson (1975) suggests, these attempts at clarification were certainly influ-
enced by the unsatisfactory results of the Crusades and by prompting of the
neo-scholastics’ religious benefactors who wished to consolidate the authority
of Church after those disastrous campaigns.
8 In light of this objective, the medieval theorists confronted a difficult chal-
lenge; namely, that of seeking to harmonize religious authority with the rise of
a class of professional statesmen with little interest in adhering to the will
of the church or doing its bidding. As direct appeals to divine sanction or for-
mative theological teaching were no longer effective, medieval just war theo-
rists instead appealed to a common moral standard rooted in the essence of
humanity (Boyle, 1992). For example, Vitoria repeatedly and explicitly exhorted
political authorities to abide by a jus gentium, while Suárez took a similar tack,
insisting that ‘…a ruler’s right to make war must have at least some relation to
natural law’ (Vitoria, 1991; Suárez, quoted in Taylor, 1979: 248).
9 With the decision to wage war left to the devices of statesmen, to the extent
that the just war tradition retained any credence within the ‘second’ law of
nations, it was due to its incorporation of the jus in bello criteria in the effort to
regulate war’s conduct. The amenability of particular interpretations of the
in bello precepts of proportionality (of means) and discrimination to the pro-
motion of a state-based system in the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the pos-
itive law doctrine which supported that system, is evident in the codification
of in bello principles into formal laws of war such as the 1868 Declaration of
St. Petersburg (Reichberg, 2002).
10 Internally, such a monopoly underwrote the very authority of the state, as
violence could be (and was) used to thwart potential internal challenges
to ruling elites, while simultaneously allowing for any such challenges to be
framed by agents of the state as inherently illegitimate—allowing for the con-
solidation of state power. At the same time, the ‘Weberian monopoly’ also
allowed, and indeed encouraged, ‘the state’ to employ violence to defend
national interests and advance national objectives relative to other states, or
even to divert attention from domestic problems by initiating armed conflict
with ‘enemies’.
11 The durability of the ancien regime in French political life, continuing national-
ist and revolutionary sentiment in France, rapid industrial transformation, and
the specter of eclipse by a unified Germany after defeat in the France-Prussian
War all combined to make social cohesion the Third Republic’s primary con-
cern (Shirer, 1969). It was in this context that Adolphe Thiers, the first presi-
dent of the Third Republic, called republicanism the form of government that
divides France the least. France had, of course, played a pivotal role as pro-
genitor of the idea of popular revolution, an idea culminating in the Revo-
lutions of 1848 that had engulfed the Continent. Yet France also had been
the object of revolutionary scorn after backsliding into the Second Empire
(1851–1870). France differed from Britain or the United States in that liberal-
ism faced more entrenched internal challenges and did not enjoy the relative
unbroken upward trajectory it did in British or American society (Bernard and
Dubief, 1985). This made advocating the export of liberal ideals through
Notes 231
force—which the Jacobins had argued for a century earlier—a far less natural
proposition for the Third Republic, a regime attempting to govern a moribund
society that largely desired a return to monarchy (ibid.). Whereas France too
boasted an expansionist agenda during the late 19th and early 20th century
in places such as Indochina and North Africa, for these reasons and others the
war-decision was chiefly legitimated through appeals to national glory and
mission civilisatrice rather than liberal ideology (Logue, 1983).
12 This radical liberal internationalism, which was frequently translated into
wars of ‘national liberation’ encouraged from without rather than organically
generated from within, speaks of a return to an earlier proactive strain in the
just war tradition which envisioned the articulation of the prudential criteria
as little more than a means to advance a foreordained social order through
military force.
13 Beveridge’s ‘March of the Flag’ speech singularly captures the degree to which
moral legitimization was applied to the burgeoning project of American empire,
and the war-decision in general: ‘Shall the American people continue their
resistless march toward the commercial supremacy of the world? Shall free
institutions broaden their blessed reign as the children of liberty wax in
strength until the empire of our principles is established over the hearts of all
mankind? Have we no mission to perform—no duty to discharge to our fellow
man? Has the Almighty Father endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts, and
marked us as the people of His peculiar favor, merely to rot in our own selfish-
ness, as men and nations must who take cowardice for their companion and
self for their deity…shall we be as the man who had one talent and hid it,
or as he who had ten talents and used them until they grew to riches. And
shall we reap the reward that waits on the discharge of our high duty as the
sovereign power of earth?’ (ibid.)
14 Indeed, perhaps the ultimate incongruity of post-Enlightenment modernity is
the reality that it is an age at once defined by the rational pursuit of ‘progress’
as well as by wars of striking frequency and increasing destructiveness, draw-
ing upon the full resource endowments of the nation and the state and prompted
and sustained by competing ideologies that countenance war in all-or-nothing
terms (Kaldor, 1999).
15 The Popular Front in France, led by Leon Blum, was instrumental in this regard,
arguing against non-interventionism despite significant internal challenges from
the Right and external opposition by the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments
in Britain.
16 At the same time, this exceedingly convincing case does not change the fact
that the conduct of the war by the Allies as well as the Axis powers was
morally repugnant. The explicit policy of the Royal Air Force to target civilian
population centers in Germany (adopted in 1942 and persisting for the
remainder of the war), the fire-bombing of Dresden, and the twin detonations
of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki come to mind as ready exam-
ples confirming the unjust nature of the prosecution of the war (relative to the
just war criteria) from the Allied side.
17 Because this research is focused on the war-decision relative to the just war
tradition, it is possible to limit consideration here to the jus ad bellum consid-
erations alone. However, I openly acknowledge that in the same way that such
a narrowed focus impedes the ability of decision-makers and the public
232 Notes
at-large to appraise the ‘justice’ of any war, so too does it limit the ability to
draw broader conclusions about the behavior of states relative to the just
war theory or the standards of ‘legitimacy’ relative to the prosecution of war
that it seeks to advance.
18 The allowance for self-defense is codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter,
which stipulates the ‘…inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs…until the Security Council has taken measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security’. The privileged moral
position extended to self-defense within the just war tradition dates at least as
far back as Augustine, at least in the case of response to armed attack. Attempts
at more expansive articulations of the self-defense exception (i.e., where armed
attack does not occur, but appeals to ‘self-defense’ are made—see the British
and French justification of the use of force during the Suez crisis, various Israeli
military forays into neighboring Arab states, or the US attack of Iraq in 2003)
have been met with mixed reviews by just war theorists.
19 The full text of the Charter can be found at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/
charter/.
20 While the explicit attempt by the UN’s framers to confer competent authority
on the Security Council diverges from the traditionally statist orientation of
just war theory, the logic is the same. Since the international agreement estab-
lishing the United Nations Organization had recognized legal status, and since
the principles espoused by the UN Charter concerning the use of force, while
imperfect, were not manifestly unjust, than in just war terms that body pos-
sessed (and possesses) the right to serve as a legitimately recognized authority
able to sanction acceptable uses of force and prohibit unacceptable ones as it
saw fit.
21 Though in other respects, such as his contention the traditional basis of
just war theory in the universality of natural law should be replaced by a
robust emphasis on advancing and defining individual rights, Walzer’s take
is decidedly less orthodox.
Chapter 3 Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars

1 These four traditions are loosely oriented around culture (Geertz, 1973;
Skocpol, 1985; McAdam, 1994); cognition (Goffman, 1974; Snow and
Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1995); dramatistic and rhetorical analysis (Edelman,
1988; Burke, 1989; Gusfield, 1989); and repertoires of contention and action
(Tilly, 1993, 1995; Tarrow, 1993).
2 See, for example, Benford (1992) on the complex interactions between the
vocabularies of motive associated with the nuclear freeze movement of the
1980s and the original diagnostic frame that movement leaders generated.
3 The harmony or disharmony of these frames at the elite level, and the inter-
face of ‘official’ (governmental) and public frames, each represent junctures
for the generation of feedback to be circulated back to the relevant decision-
makers (as well as other opinion-leaders). See Entman (2004: 4–17).
4 As Druckman (2001: 1045) notes: ‘Instead of viewing framing effects as
evidence of unilateral elite manipulation, I suggest that framing effects may
occur because citizens delegate to ostensibly credible elites to help them sort
Notes 233
through many possible frames. In this portrayal, people turn to elites for
guidance and they are thus selective about which frames they believe—they
only believe frames that come from sources they perceive to be credible.’
5 Among some notable examples of frames interpreted as sufficiently represen-
tative of this ‘master frame’ status in the view of those who most closely
study framing are the rights frame (Williams and Williams, 1995; Valocchi,
1996), the injustice frame (Gamson et al., 1982; Carroll and Ratner, 1996), and
the hegemonic frame (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993).
6 The advancement of such a decidedly constructivist interpretation of what con-
stitutes a ‘just war’ should not be interpreted as a rebuke of the concrete and
measurable concepts and propositions at the heart of just war theory or the
tradition subsuming it. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. With
respect to the central focus of this research (the war-decision) as well as the
conduct and termination of war, the just war tradition has clearly promulgated
and sustained a set of enduring moral and ethical standards. From the neces-
sary (but not sufficient) catalytic criterion of ‘just cause’ through concerns with
proportionality and discrimination on the battlefield and the proper dispatch
of the vanquished after the war’s cessation, those standards have remained con-
sistent and coherent even amidst centuries of efforts to apply them in a social
context; there is, in fact, a ‘there’ there. Yet it is the applied dimension of the
entire just war enterprise, and the mutability that defines that application,
which makes just war theory and the narrative tradition enveloping it particu-
larly useful for this analysis.
7 Setting the tone for centuries of American foreign policy to come, Paine argued
that the otherwise vile institution of war provided a legitimate means to advance
the cause of national liberation—including, of course, the revolution against
imperial Britain to which he was committed. Paine contended that the lib-
eration of society from the domination of oppressive and illegitimate state
power was a moral duty. Drawing upon an expanded notion of self-defense and
making an explicit appeal to natural law (both prominent features of the just
war narrative before and since), he argued that it was in the common interest
of humanity, and in the particular interests of liberal society, to aid threatened
nations in repelling invasion and throwing off the yoke of colonial rule (Keane,
1995).
8 Modelski defines the sphere of influence as ‘an area in which one great power
assumes exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of peace…it denotes a
situation in which one power has acquired a monopoly or near-monopoly for
its services to that area’ (1972: 156).
Chapter 4 Analyzing the Just War Frame

1 Though both the Augustinian and scholastic traditions did in fact contribute
to the development of the jus in bello convention, the concern with conduct
in war remained a matter of secondary importance in both the classical and
medieval chapters of the just war tradition since, if the criteria at the heart
of the jus ad bellum convention were followed, only divinely sanctioned
wars (which on the basis of their sanction required little constraint) would be
prosecuted in the first place.
234 Notes
2 Reichberg (2002) contends, with appeals to Kant, that Johnson’s ‘basic’ criteria
are what really differentiate the just war tradition from cosmopolitanism. I would
extend this characterization of the basic category further, in contending that
they also distinguish the just war tradition from the idealism of the ‘just peace’
view as well.
3 Doing so would require unfettered access to a small handful of powerful indi-
viduals who are not only nearly impossible to interview, but who are highly
likely (for a variety of reasons) to have difficulty accurately recalling their
thought processes relative to such considerations, and (again, for a variety
of reasons) may even in some cases intentionally obfuscate their logic and
reasoning should they be able to recall it accurately. Distortion and/or deception
concerning the decision and the event precipitating it is always possible; in
few (if any cases) is one individual the only actor with significant impact on
major decisions such as overseas military deployments; such events are rare
and beyond the reach of most researchers, and even when they occur within
the ‘fog of war’ usually leave one with as many questions as answers. Added to
these logistical obstacles is the more fundamental problem that even if the
interested researcher were to gain access in order to attempt to evaluate the
presence, absence, and relative weight of such criteria, because these criteria
turn on assessing the resonance of moral considerations within the perception
and cognition of individual decision-makers contemplating war, any findings
they produce are necessarily idiosyncratic to the individual concerned and the
cognitive and psychological processes by which they operate. As such, any
broader generalizations (such as I seek here) would be difficult if not impossible
to draw.
4 Walzer, for example, contends that the ‘self-help’ principle has historically
been considered the paramount example of a legitimate use of force; even
Mill’s entrenched opposition to external interference in the affairs of a sover-
eign nation explicitly leaves a place for self-defense and self-determination
(Walzer, 1977: 87–88; Mill, 1859).
5 As Walzer (1977: 53–55) notes, the right of states to territorial integrity and
political sovereignty are derived from the rights of individuals to build a
common life and depend on the consent of their members. To the extent that
a state seeks to and/or succeeds at protecting the lives and interests of its
individual constituents, it should remain beyond (aggressive) challenge by any
other state or states.
6 For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be
responses to a physical assault (e.g., a violation of territory), but could plaus-
ibly be extended to include aggressive verbal overtures (e.g., the impugning of
national honor or threats to national sovereignty), trade embargoes and sanc-
tions (acts of aggression against economic activity), and other less direct
provocations (Regan, 1996).
7 Far less consensus exists with respect to those revisions to the strict legalist
translation of ‘just cause’ introducing the prospects of a just use of military force
in anticipation of probable acts of aggression, as a mechanism of counter-
intervention, and as a means of assistance in the cause of national liberation.
While Walzer’s attempt to chronicle such revisions proved vital to the post-
Vietnam War effort at revising just war criteria to fit contemporary dilemmas,
the extent of disagreement within the just war tradition over the specification
Notes 235
of ‘just causes’ necessitates their exclusion from the operationalization of

the just war frame introduced here.
8 The authority criterion by definition renders the sovereign the sole legitimate
conduit for the use of organized violence, thereby reifying the prevailing struc-
ture and source of political authority and depriving potential rivals to that
authority of any moral basis for forcibly challenging the status quo. As such,
the competent authority criterion has proven an invaluable impetus for the
consolidation of a Weberian monopoly on coercion critical to the emergence
and centrality of the modern state in the prevailing Westphalian arrangement
(Johnson, 1981; Phillips, 1984).
9 The degree to which legal instruments such as the UN Charter (see Chapter I,
Article 2 and Chapter VII, Articles 39, 42, and 51)—as well as the NATO
Charter (Article 2)—betray the influence of the just war tradition is striking.
These two instruments articulate a vision of collective security which, like
the just war tradition, seeks to maintain the self-help focus consonant with
the predominant legalist paradigm, while also affirming the possibility for
extenuating circumstances in which the resort to war is permissible beyond
immediate self-defense. Accordingly, both charter documents take great
care to address the conditions under which such a use of force may be legit-
imate, thereby not only affirming but essentially claiming competent
authority by presenting a hortatory declaration relative to the use of force
directed at their constituent member-states (Arend and Beck, 1993).
10 Common examples raised by contemporary just war theorists include the
use of military force in response to humanitarian suffering (Walzer, 1977) or
as part of a major collective security operation such as the Persian Gulf War
(Johnson, 1999).
11 This is not to say that the demonstrated commission of such acts—e.g., the
extensive targeting of civilians in wartime, systematic violent discrimination
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, age, or other demographic character-
istics, forced imprisonment and torture, etc.—are ‘evil’ in an epistemological
sense (which is a philosophical concern outside the bounds of this research),
but rather that they are likely to be understood and more importantly repre-
sented as such by the decision-makers of concern in this analysis.
12 This translation of competent authority refers to authority imparted by a sov-
ereign state that is itself a target of ‘wrongful attack’. For the purposes of this
analysis, target state authorization is sufficiently represented either in the form
of a direct invitation or request for military response from the US, or through
an indirect invitation or request extended through a legitimate intermediary
(an IGO, RGO, or another sovereign state).
13 As Miles and Huberman (1994: 25) note, qualitative case study analysis by
definition attempts to explain a ‘phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded
context’ (emphasis added). Thus it is crucial to establish that phenomenon by
denoting what falls outside that ‘bounded context’.
14 For a related rationale in a similar analytical domain, see Western (2005).
15 One can point to recent operational designations such as Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (Iraq), Operation Restore Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Just Cause (Panama)
and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) or to allegorical flourishes proclaiming the
existence of an ‘axis of evil’ in the world for telling (if anecdotal) evidence to
that effect.
236 Notes
16 This definition, which builds upon preceding analyses of international and

foreign policy crises by Hermann (1969), Snyder and Diesing (1977), Lebow
(1981), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), and others provides the best and most
parsimonious elaboration of the phenomenon.
17 As such it is clear that resulting analysis must be singly concerned with the
framing of the affirmative war-decision for the duration of the crisis, in order
to ensure both the internal and external validity as well as reliability of this
inquiry and its findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Mintz et al., 2006; Hudson
and Butler, 2010).
18 Though these basic limitations do not limit the possibility that the findings
of this study may prove applicable to other liberal societies, and/or to other
historical time periods.
19 However, application of this criterion does not itself narrow the scope of the
population too greatly, in that the use of military force in response to foreign
policy crisis is a rather frequent practice by the US (Huth, 1998; Meernik,
1996; Regan, 1996). Indeed, in consulting the latest (v.10.0) iteration of the
ICB dataset, over 20 per cent of all crises occurring since 1945 have featured
some direct application of military force by the US (CICDM, 2010).
20 The start date of 9 November1989 was utilized as a proximate date for the start
of the post-Cold War era; that date representing the date of record with respect
to the breaching, en masse, of the Berlin Wall. It is also important to mention
here that the satisfaction of the three necessary and sufficient conditions for a
foreign policy crisis for the US does not exclude other states from experiencing
a foreign policy crisis in relation to the same crisis event, either simultaneously
or at some other juncture still within the defined temporal bounds affixed
to the crisis (e.g., the first foreign policy crisis experienced by the US after
9 November 1989, over Panama, was also a crisis for Panama).
21 Since 1989, there were two cases in which the US employed an overt direct use
of military force, but was not itself a direct crisis actor (hence requiring exclu-
sion of these cases from the population of concern here): YUGOSLAVIA II:
BOSNIA (1992), and IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE (1992).
22 Employing crisis variables such as this one as sorting devices has the addi-
tional benefit of allowing for some consideration of the relationship between
the just war frame and manifest features of the crises (such as the object of the
gravest threat within the crisis) featured within the crises selected for analysis.
23 While to some degree this selection criterion seemingly overlaps with the
main selection criteria (US direct crisis actor and US overt direct military force),
applying this condition does help further delimit prominent cases of crisis
while also distinguishing (at least to a degree) between crises in which the US
was bound and determined to render an affirmative war-decision from the
outset regardless of the gravity or severity of the crisis and those in which the
affirmative war-decision was somewhat more of a response to crisis events.
To that effect, two cases satisfy these two main selection criteria, but do not
feature a sufficiently ‘grave’ threat as the trigger to the crisis, and are thus
excluded from the analysis: US EMBASSY BOMBINGS (1998), and UNSCOM II-
OPERATION DESERT FOX (1998).
24 This crisis would seem, at least anecdotally, suitable for examination in light
of the just war frame, given the extensive and elaborate (and sometimes inter-
nally contradictory) rationale advanced by the Bush Administration in justify-
Notes 237
ing a resort to war (Butler, 2007). However, the extent to which the resort
to war was a fait accompli—as reflected in the reality that the crisis itself was
precipitated by the US—renders the case too idiosyncratic for inclusion in a
comparative, multi-case study research design.
25 There is a clear and not insignificant ‘gap’ between the Gulf War (1990–1991)
and the Kosovo (1999) cases. I attribute this inter-regnum to two factors: one,
the disproportionate effect of the Somalia debacle and the subsequent issuance
of Presidential Decision Directive 25 in 1994, which expressly limited US mil-
itary intervention during the middle years of the Clinton presidency; and two,
the limitations associated with the self-imposed requirement of variance in
party in power, which require selection of a case occurring during the Clinton
years which also satisfies the other primary and secondary selection criteria.
26 ‘Speech-acts’ were readily available from a variety of sources, including (but
not limited to) official government websites associated with the Office of the
White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA), and so forth, including both current and
archived sites (maintained both by the agencies themselves, as in the case of
the Department of State, or through use of the Internet Archive search tool).
Particularly valuable were the extensive web-based collections maintained by
NARA (archives.gov), DOD (DefenseLINK), and the Department of State (Office
of the Historian, as well as the Foreign Relations of the United States, or FRUS,
archive housed by the University of Wisconsin) and the FOIA Electronic
Reading Room maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Several acad-
emic and other non-governmental collections were invaluable as well, again
including (but not limited to): the database maintained by the American
Presidency Project at the University of California-Santa Barbara, and in partic-
ular the ‘Papers of the Presidents’ archive; the holdings of the Miller Center of
Public Affairs at the University of Virginia; the National Security Archive,
maintained at George Washington University; the Cold War International
History Project (CWIHP) based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars; and the various national security-related documents and state-
ments available at the Federation of American Scientists website. For less readily
available ‘speech-acts’, archival research was utilized requiring multiple in-
person visits to the National Archives I and II (Washington, D.C. and College
Park, MD, respectively), the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.) and the
Pentagon Library (Arlington, VA).
27 Speech-acts attributed to the White House Press Secretary, as a constituent of
the Executive Office of the President and a direct public outlet of the President,
were also considered relevant for inclusion.
28 Secondary concerns include the need for parsimony as well as consistency in
the analysis. On the former score, the already extensive array of indicators within
the just war frame lend a significant degree of breadth and potential variability
to the analysis; seeking to conduct that analysis for multiple foreign policy
principals (such as the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
National Security Adviser) would be unwieldy, at least within the bounds of
a single inquiry. On the latter, the significant variability in the cases selected
with respect to the decision-making authority and more importantly (for this
analysis) public profile of these foreign policy principals has the potential to
undermine the analysis; for instance, the role of Vice President Cheney in
238 Notes
framing the US military engagement in Afghanistan was extensive, whereas

Vice President Quayle issued no public statements of importance concern-
ing the Persian Gulf crisis. This is a degree of variability which of course does
not entail with respect to the President, lending needed consistency to the
empirical analysis.
29 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at
the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indi-
cators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder
reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded
a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).
Chapter 5 The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

1 Similar support was extended to these goals and the multinational coalition
assembled in pursuit of it through a resolution by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) following its summit of 22 December 1990.
2 This is reflected in a statement issued by Secretary of State James A. Baker III
jointly with his Soviet counterpart (Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze),
‘…today, we take the unusual step of jointly calling upon the rest of the
international community to join us in an international cutoff of all arms
supplies to Iraq…as for military intervention…the United States has no such
plans at this time’ (Los Angeles Times, 1990).
3 Throughout this period, the President made repeated mention of the fact
that he was engrossed in Martin Gilbert’s popular history of World War II,
The Second World War, as well as what he considered to be ‘uncanny parallels’
between Gilbert’s chronicling of the run-up to WWII and events in the Gulf.
4 The embeddedness of Presidential rhetoric in the language of the ‘just
war’—as exemplified in the statements noted here, and more systematically
in the analysis that follows—is significant not only for its own sake, but in
light of the President’s well-chronicled (and self-acknowledged) struggles with
the ‘vision thing’. As Smith (1992) contends, the crisis was perceived by many
of the President’s top advisors and to some degree by the President himself as
affording an opportunity to address that problem, thereby making the use of
just war language and, potentially, the ‘just war frame’ doubly significant.
5 The Munich analogy remained central as well, as is evident later in the same
address: ‘…You know, if you look into history, America never went looking for
a war. But in World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor
who could have been stopped. Appeasement leads only to further aggression,
and ultimately to war. And we are not going to make the mistake of appease-
ment again’ (ibid.).
6 This statement was representative of several advanced during Bush’s diplo-
matic foray through Europe and in particular his Thanksgiving holiday visits
to troops stationed in the Gulf, all marked by extensive allusions to various
aspects of just war theory, including examples both of just causes and com-
petent authority.
7 The somewhat unusual decision to single out students is comprehensible in
light of the looming specter of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, and the desire by the
White House to attempt to cultivate support (or at least blunt criticism) from
Notes 239
populations such as college students and the press that had proven crucial
sources of opposition to the war effort a generation hence.
8 For a description of how relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the
United States were collected for this case, see Chapter 4, note 26.
9 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving
at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these
indicators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-
coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or
exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).
10 In total, 88 per cent (120/137) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one
just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the
analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of
minimal significance for the frame.
11 Indeed, if one eliminates the 70 days in which no Presidential speech-acts
concerning Iraq and the Gulf occurred, the average number of just war signi-
fications per day exceeds six (6.22).
12 The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 3.86, with a standard
deviation of 3.04.
13 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause
criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the competent
authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five respectively).
14 The magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signifiers
(23.32) can largely be accounted for by the prominent outlier of the ‘global
authority’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers (independent
variables) is not significant.
15 These 137 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audi-
ence’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the
venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references
or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery
mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised
appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple cor-
relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met
or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).
The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders,
the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refer to
instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audience;
the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences
were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary and
secondary audience(s).
16 Additional speech-acts directed at foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences
were also accounted for in the data, though for the most part they reside
outside the bounds of this research and provide only minimal contextual
information. In this case (Gulf War) in particular they are relatively inconse-
quential, accounting (combined) for approximately 10 per cent of all 270
just war significations in Presidential speech-acts. Apart from their infre-
quency, it is also worth noting that the seven ‘just cause’ considerations were
in rough proportion to the average across all audiences both for speech-acts
directed at a foreign audience and those in which the primary audience was
indeterminate.
240 Notes
17 It is also worth noting the finding that claims of ‘self defense’ occurred in a far
lower than expected proportion in speech-acts directed at the press—the most
commonly targeted domestic audience—thereby providing further evidence
of the claim that its abstract quality rendered it of seemingly little use to the
Administration, particularly relative to its most frequently targeted audience.
18 Interestingly, the degree of reduced emphasis relative to the general baseline
in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders was, in proportional terms, even
greater than the enhanced emphasis evident in those directed at the press; the
marginal difference was made up by a slightly greater than expected resonance
in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign audience—a difference perhaps
explained by the Administration’s perception of the likely sensitivity of for-
eign audiences to a perceived violation of diplomatic custom and norms of
diplomatic immunity.
19 The relatively small number directed at the other two audiences (14 per cent,
or 18/126, in each instance) requires conditioning any strong conclusions about
an enhanced emphasis in either case.
20 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should be
pointed out that the average daily number of just war significations contained
in Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis was 3.4; hence, the
notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war
significations above the daily average for the crisis.
21 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible
effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This
required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than
one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to
the 15 translations of the just war frame.
22 While the actual number of just war significations advanced in March 1991
fell short of the expected value of 105, the total number actually advanced
that month (88) equates to about 84 per cent of the expected figure—making
the shortfall in December 1990 all the more striking.
23 The third cluster, occurring from 5–7 April 1991, minimally exceeds the thresh-
old both in terms of duration and significations per day. Featuring 18 total signi-
fications distributed over five total speech-acts, the essence of this ‘cluster’ was a
public effort by the White House to disavow any responsibility for encouraging
the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings which engendered brutal reprisals by Saddam’s
regime—as reflected in the emphasis on ‘response to/punishment of evil’ and
various right intention significations within this cluster.
24 In proportional terms (by month), the distribution of right intention signi-
fications hews closely to the larger fluctuations in speech-acts and total signi-
fications, with one major exception—March 1991. That month, which featured
a relatively low number of speech-acts and just war significations, at the same
time accounted for the single largest percentage of right intention signi-
fications (25 per cent of all right intention significations advanced during the
crisis were advanced in March 1991). This outcome was undoubtedly a func-
tion of the impending termination of the crisis and in particular the successful
expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, events which triggered repeated signi-
fications in Presidential speech-acts affirming the association between the
decision to use military force and the pursuit of ‘right intentions’ such as a
formal outcome and crisis abatement.
Notes 241
25 This point was stated explicitly by others in the Administration as well; see,
for example, NSA Brent Scowcroft’s September 1990 assertion that ‘This [the
crisis] represents the first test of our ability to maintain global or regional
stability in the post-Cold War era’ (Drew, 1990).
Chapter 6 Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil

1 These two operational monikers refer to the NATO action and the US
contingent attached to it (respectively).
2 This was a site to which he returned to celebrate the 500-year anniversary
of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989.
3 The State Department’s dispatch of Taft, given her title and position, hardly
seems incidental, especially given the credence that a report issued by a
high-ranking official specifically concerned with refugees and displacement
would lend to Albright’s public assertions that the situation was devolving
toward genocide and therefore justified military intervention. The high-profile
mission led by self-described ‘human rights hawk’ (and then Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) John Shattuck to south-
ern Serbia, following closely on the heels of Taft’s mission, can be thought of in
a similar vein (Shattuck, 2003).
4 ‘…Does the United States have an immediate, selfish interest in what happens
on some lonely road in Kosovo to some poor farm family driving a wagon,
with horses that are underfed because they haven’t been able to get food?
No. We have…I would argue we have a humanitarian interest’ (Clinton,
1999e).
5 These characterizations were greatly facilitated by the ICTY indictment for
war crimes and crimes against humanity issued against Milosevic on 27 May
1999.
6 For explication of data collection methods employed in identifying relevant
‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States employed in this analysis
see Chapter 4, note 26.
7 In total, 67 per cent (112/167) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one
just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the
analysis the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of frame
application.
8 Even in eliminating the ten days in which no Presidential speech-acts con-
cerning Kosovo occurred, the average number of just war significations per
day of the crisis increases only slightly, to 2.8/day.
deviation of 1.05.
10 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just
cause criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the com-
petent authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five
respectively).
11 Indeed, the magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signi-
fiers (22.6) can largely be accounted for by the outlier status of the ‘response
to/punishment of evil’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers
(independent variables) is not significant.
242 Notes
12 See ‘Statement by the European Council concerning Kosovo’, Berlin European

Council, 24–25 March 1999; available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html.
relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or
exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The
audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the
legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to
instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audi-
ence; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple
audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a
primary audience.
14 Though a much smaller population of speech-acts, the appearance of ‘just
causes’ in speech-acts targeting the mass public (53 per cent, or 17 of 32) was
nearly identical in proportional terms to that evident in speech-acts directed at
the press, thereby further underscoring the intensive emphasis on these
significations relative to speech-acts targeting opinion-leaders.
15 It bears noting here that the relationship of the crisis actors to one
another—and in particular the reality of Kosovo as a province within the
sovereign borders of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—makes ‘target
state authority’ impossible to attain except by the FRY, which of course
defies logic in this instance; as such, all allusions to ‘competent authority’
in the speech-acts collected and coded were either global or regional in
nature.
16 This increased emphasis bears up in spite of the fact that all else being equal,
as was discussed above, ‘just causes’ are more likely to be invoked in speech-
acts directed at opinion-leaders.
17 Though not audiences of particular concern here—and representing less than
10 per cent of the entire population of Presidential speech-acts advanced
during the Kosovo crisis—it is interesting to note that the overriding if not
monolithic emphasis on the response to/punishment of evil signification,
while not evident in other domestic audiences, is also reflected in speech-acts
directed primarily at foreign (non-US) audiences as well as those in which a
single target audience was not discernable.
18 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should
again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations con-
tained in Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis was 2.4; hence, the notion
of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations
above the daily average for the crisis.
19 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible
effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This
required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than
one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to
the 15 translations of the just war frame.
Notes 243
20 Also relevant here are the relatively high number of speech-acts (eight) featuring
one or more frame significations during this three day period.
21 One key qualifier here is the muted overall response to the crisis by the
President, irrespective of the frame. It is worth recalling here that the total
number of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis (167) translates to
an average of slightly more than 2 speech-acts per day; further, ten of the
78 days during the crisis featured no Presidential speech-act concerning the
crisis at all.
22 Impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives concluded 19 December
1998, while those in the Senate drew to a close on 12 February 1999.
Chapter 7 Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite

Justice
1 It should be noted that the ICB dataset also considers the AFGHANISTAN–USA
crisis to satisfy the conditions for a foreign policy crisis for the UK (which
immediately pledged support in finding the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks),
Afghanistan (where the ruling Taliban regime, playing host to al-Qaeda leader-
ship, was immediately identified as a facilitator of the attacks) and Pakistan
(for whom the stakes of any direct action in Afghanistan had direct rami-
fications, given the country’s geographic and political proximity to Afghanistan
and the Taliban, respectively).
2 Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism remains the most complete treatment
of the dominant discourse advancing the GWOT. Thus the author’s con-
tention that ‘in examination of over 300 pages of speeches by dozens of
different speakers, from the president to ambassadors, and covering more
than two years, I found virtually no instances of deviation from the primary
narratives…’ (2005: 154) is especially telling in this regard.
3 The use of such moralistic appeals to define 9/11 as a pivotal event in a larger
struggle of good versus evil (e.g., the first volley in a ‘just’ if metaphorical war)
was hardly limited to the President. In addressing those assembled at a memo-
rial service to the Pentagon victims a month after the 9/11 attacks, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld underscored not only the heroic nature of the victims, but
by extension the virtuous nature of the American character and spirit more
broadly: ‘We remember them as heroes. And we are right to do so. […] “He
was a hero long before the eleventh of September,” said a friend of one
of those we have lost—“a hero every single day, a hero to his family, to his
friends and to his professional peers.” […] About him and those who served
with him, his wife said: “It’s not just when a plane hits their building. They
are heroes every day.” Heroes every day…we are here to affirm that’ (Rumsfeld,
11 October, 2001b).
4 In a similar vein, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to terrorism as a
‘scourge’ (Powell, 2001), while Secretary Rumsfeld characterized terrorism as ‘a
cancer on the human condition’ (Rumsfeld, 2001a). In emphasizing this ‘oth-
erness’, Attorney General John Ashcroft characterized terrorists and their sup-
porters as ‘alien’ ‘…Today I’m announcing several steps that we’re taking to
enhance our ability to protect the United States from the threat of terrorist
aliens…The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force…will ensure that federal
244 Notes
agencies coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States all aliens who
meet any of the following criteria: aliens who are representatives, members or
supporters of terrorist organizations; aliens who are suspected of engaging in
terrorist activity; or aliens who provide material support to terrorist activity
(Ashcroft, 2001a).
5 In a wide-ranging interview with Tim Russert of NBC News, Vice President
Dick Cheney unequivocally situated the 9/11 attacks relative to this struggle
between civilization and barbarism: ‘I think the world increasingly will under-
stand what we have here are a group of barbarians, that they threaten all of
us, that the US is the target at the moment, but one of the things to remember
is if you look at the roster of countries who lost people in the bombing in New
York, over 40 countries have had someone killed or have significant num-
bers missing…so it’s an attack not just upon the United States but upon, you
know, civilized society’ (Cheney, 2001).
6 The fact that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (a.k.a., the NATO Charter)
was invoked in support of the first out-of-area offensive deployment in NATO’s
history in Afghanistan further underscores both the wide appeal of self-defense
as a legitimate grounds for war as well as the degree to which 9/11 and the
GWOT were understood in that light.
7 A representative sampling of this rationale was provided by Undersecretary of
State Marc Grossman, ‘I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was
passed on the 12th of September, offers all of the legal basis and requirement
that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which is
the right of self-defense. And we believe the United States was attacked on the
11th of September and that we have a right of self-defense in this regard’
(Grossman, 2001).
8 See Chapter 4, note 26 for an accounting of data collection procedures
employed in identifying and obtaining relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President
of the United States employed in this analysis.
9 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at
the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indi-
cators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder
reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded
a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).
10 An even more robust 91 per cent (79/87) of Presidential speech-acts featured
at least one just war signification, though in the interests of conservatism in
analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of
minimal significance for the frame.
11 Furthermore, if one rules out the 14 days in which no Presidential speech-
acts concerning Afghanistan occurred, then the average number of just war
significations in days in which Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan
were rendered was just over 6 (6.04).
deviation of 2.0.
13 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause
criterion had more potential observations than the competent authority and
right intention criteria.
14 The mean value for all 15 indicators of the just war frame was 19.3, with a stan-
dard deviation of 15.2. There was one prominent outlier in the data that
Notes 245
accounts for the magnitude of the standard deviation estimate; namely, the
just cause signifier ‘Significant power discrepancy between trigger and target’.
This long-standing translation of just cause within just war theory intended to
reflect the classic ‘bullying scenario’ in which a resort to war would be jus-
tifiable to defend a weaker party from a stronger belligerent was never invoked.
Its total lack of appearance within the application of the just war frame to the
affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan is seemingly a by-product of two factors,
one logical and the other political. On the former score, the clear asymmetry
in power in favor of the US in the crisis makes painting a scenario in which the
‘victim’ was weaker implausible. On the latter score, the Bush Administration’s
perception of the gains to be had in portraying the Taliban regime as illegit-
imate and lacking a base of support within Afghan society (and al-Qaeda as
uninvited and unwelcome intruders in Afghanistan) mitigated against such a
portrayal.
15 ‘Target state authority’ was completely absent from the data in the early stages
of the crisis; as the military campaign progressed (and cooperation between US
special forces and Northern Alliance forces increased), the Northern Alliance
received occasional acknowledgements in Presidential speech-acts as the right-
ful and legitimate political authority within Afghanistan.
relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or
exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The
audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the
legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to
instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audi-
ence; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple
audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a
primary and secondary audience(s).
17 However, it should be noted that appeals to ‘competent authority’ were
somewhat more frequent in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign
audience, appearing in 21 per cent (11/53) of all such speech-acts—though
at the same time remaining the least cited of the three jus ad bellum criteria
even in speech-acts intended for consumption by non-US audiences.
18 The employment of the ‘property/persons seized’ signification can be explained
largely by allusions to the loss of life and property associated with the 9/11
attacks, as well as to a high profile episode involving the detainment of
two young American relief workers by the Taliban during the crisis. Apart
from the ‘power discrepancy’ translation of ‘just cause’ which (as men-
tioned above) was never employed, the ‘territory seized’ translation was also
very sparingly used, on only three occasions—all early in the crisis, in
conjunction with Presidential speech-acts portraying the 9/11 attacks as
attacks on the territorial integrity of the United States. Clearly this signi-
fication was rendered irrelevant as the military engagement in Afghanistan
proceeded.
246 Notes
19 It is important to note that these figures also include speech-acts directed at

foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences; whereas the various just cause signi-
fications directed at foreign audiences were in rough proportion with the aver-
age across all audiences, sizable divergences from the average (towards ‘response
to/punishment of evil’, and away from ‘direct violent crisis trigger’) emerged
in speech-acts directed at multiple audiences—with the important caveat that
this was by far the audience category with the lowest number of observations.
20 In relation to speech-acts directed at the public, some of the ‘slack’ from
the diminished use of the ‘formality of outcome’ signification, as well as the
complete absence of the two significations related to the perception of the
effects of the affirmative war-decision by other actors (namely, ‘post-hoc sat-
isfaction’ and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’), was taken up by the fundamen-
tal competent authority claim of ‘last resort’, which was employed almost
twice as often (15 per cent, v. 8.6 per cent) in speech-acts directed at the mass
public as was true on average across all audiences.
21 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should
again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations con-
tained in Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan was 4.7; hence,
the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war
significations above the daily average for the crisis.
22 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its poss-
ible effects on the just war frame, the unit of analysis was days. This required
a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one
Presidential speech-act were aggregated, as were the data pertaining to the
15 translations of the just war frame coded here.
23 The second ‘cluster’, consisting of 21 total just war significations advanced
during the period 19–21 October, also could be readily explained by empirical
events—in this case, the use of the just war frame came largely (though not
exclusively) in speech-acts directed at a foreign (non-US) audience, in con-
junction with efforts to attract diplomatic support from foreign leaders at APEC’s
‘Shanghai summit’.
Conclusion
1 Of course, this ‘subversion’ can prove dangerous if it leads to the fetishization
of the frame itself. As Chong and Druckman (2007) point out, strong and cul-
turally embedded frames may draw their effectiveness from the heuristic func-
tion they provide rather than direct information about a problem, event, or
decision. In such cases, the rationale for a policy comes to be associated with
and advanced through a particular frame only because that frame is known to
resonate with one or more audiences of concern, not because the frame conveys
useful or relevant knowledge.
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Index
ad bellum conventions see jus ad al-Qaeda, 180, 182, 208

bellum conventions American exceptionalism, 67
adversarial/boundary frames, 50–1 see also US foreign policy
affirmative war decisions, 85–7, 211, Amos, 20
236n17 analysis of the just war frame,
see also the war-decision 211–22, 225–7
Afghanistan affirmative war-decisions in, 86–7,
as al-Qaeda sanctuary, 180 211, 236n17
crisis profile of, 181t, 243n1 cascade models in, 54, 135, 173,
Karzai’s government in, 182 219–20, 232n3
NATO’s deployment in, 244n6 case selection criteria in, 90–4,
as new war, 218–19 236–7nn19–25
Northern Alliance of, 181, 245n15 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15, 232n4
public opinion on, 7 data analysis in, 94–8,
summary of, 180–2 237–8nn26–9
Taliban government of, 180–2, dynamism in, 57–8, 212, 213t,
187–8, 206, 208, 245n18 217–19
Afghanistan’s just war frame ex-post facto conditions in, 90
analysis of, 203–7 foreign policy crisis settings in,
chronological clusters in, 197, 199, 89–90, 236n16
205, 246n21, 246n23 geographic considerations in, 92
consistency in use of, 203, 206–8, gravity of crisis in, 93, 236n23
214–15 jus ad bellum conventions in, 73–9,
democracy promotion in, 209 80t, 234–5nn2–10
focus on ‘evil’ in, 209–10, multicase design of, 94–5
243–4nn3–5 operational signifiers of, 16, 79–85
just war frame signifiers in, 188–91, parameters of, 85–90
244–5nn10–15 political party contexts in, 92–3
multiple sub-framing of, 208–11 practical considerations (praxis) in,
Presidential rhetoric in, 182–8 71–2, 87
selection for study of, 92t, 94 Presidential speech acts in, 96–8,
speech acts in, 188–9, 199 237nn26–8
target audiences in, 191–7, 204–6, salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17
208–9, 220, 245–6nn16–20 single-frame focus of, 87
temporal dynamics of, 197–203, triggering entity in, 93–4
205, 246nn21–2 US contexts of, 87–9, 236n19
agency, 63 ancient criteria for just war, 19–22
agenda-setting, 50 anticipatory self-defense, 76, 234n7
Albania, 157, 168 Aquinas see Thomas Aquinas
see also Kosovo Arab League, 100, 121
Albright, Madeleine Aristotle
Holocaust parallels for Kosovo of, on justice and just war, 21, 71–2
174, 241n3 on social practice (praxis) of war,
liberal internationalism of, 143, 178 71–2, 87
271
272 Index
Ashcroft, John, 243n4 Boxer Rebellion, 35

Asmus, Ronald, 178 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 182
al-Assad, Hafiz, 124 Brailsford, H.N., 35
asymmetry in power see power Brecher, Michael, 89, 93, 236n16
discrepancy Britain, 34, 231nn15–16
atomic weapons, 231n16 Bulgaria, 35
attributional frames, 50–1 Bull, Hedley, 69
audience Bush, George H.W., administration
for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, credibility problems of, 214
204–6, 208–9, 220, electoral defeat of 1992 of, 139–40
245–6nn16–20 foreign policy crises of, 92t
for Gulf War speech acts, 115–23, Gulf War rhetoric of, 102–10,
134, 135, 239–40nn15–19 134–8, 238nn2–7
for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, New World Order paradigm of, 107,
173–4, 242nn13–17 134, 136–7, 139, 214, 238n7,
Augustine of Hippo, 19 241n25
just war criteria of, 22–3, 26, 73–4 political considerations of, 222
on right intent, 78–9 pragmatic policies of, 102
‘Two Cities’ notion of, 23 speech acts of, 110–12, 214
authoritarian regimes, 80t, 82–3, see also Gulf War
215–16 Bush, George W., administration
in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, democracy promotion of, 209
194, 207, 209, 219 focus on ‘evil’ by, 209–10
in Gulf War speech acts, 119–20, foreign policy crises of, 92t
134 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
in Kosovo speech acts, 162, 219 of, 180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9,
in Libya speech acts, 224 243–4nn2–6
authority see competent authority Iraq regime crisis of, 8, 44, 76, 92t,
signifiers 94, 236n24
Azar, Edward, 218 political considerations of, 222
Aziz, Tariq, 101 Presidential rhetoric of, 13, 182–8
September 11, 2001, attacks, 180,
Baker, James, 101, 238n2 182, 207, 243n3
Bartholomew, Amy, 64 speech acts of, 188–9, 199, 214–15,
Battle of Kosovo, 141, 241n2 219, 220
Benford, Robert D. world view of, 208–20
on agency in framing, 63 see also Afghanistan
on frame functions, 52, 232n2
on master frames, 58 canon law, 28
Bennett, W. Lance, 96 cascade model of frames, 54, 135,
Bentham, Jeremy, 35, 228n6 173, 219–20, 232n3
Beveridge, Albert, 35, 231n13 the case for war see the just war frame
Blair, Tony, 143, 178 case studies, 16–17, 90–6
Blum, Leon, 231n15 the categorical imperative
Boer War, 35 in early Christian tradition, 22
Bosnia-Herzegovina in Kantian thought, 10, 228n5
Dayton Accords on, 142 centrality of frames, 57
ethnic cleansing in, 153–5 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise
Boulding, Kenneth, 47 and Our Response (NCCB), 43
Index 273
Cheney, Richard, 100, 244n5 Walzer’s theory of aggression in,

Chirac, Jacques, 148–9 42–3, 232n21
Chong, Dennis, 55, 246n1 see also post-Cold War era
Christian tradition competent authority signifiers, 74,
Aquinas’s exploration of intent and 76–8, 80t, 83, 235nn8–10,
consequences in, 23–5, 26 235n12
Augustine’s criteria for war in, in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1,
22–3, 26 193, 195, 201–2, 204, 245n17,
Crusades in, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 246n20
neo-scholastic pragmatism in, 25–7, in Gulf War speech acts, 113,
229n5, 230n8 116–18, 120–2, 130–3, 138
in secularized law of nations, 27–30 in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8, 161,
chronological clusters 163–4, 170–2, 173, 175, 178
in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, consequences, 24
199, 205, 246n21, 246n23 contemporary era see post-Cold
in Gulf War speech acts, 123, War era
240n20 contested nature of frames, 53–4
in Kosovo speech acts, 166–8, Council of Europe
242n18 on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 100
Cicero, 229n2 Kosovo policies of, 158, 163
Clausewitz, Carl von credibility
on public opinion, 9, 12–13 in frame evaluation, 55–6, 232n4
on warfare, 3–4, 32–3, 218 of the just war frame, 212–15
Clinton, Bill, administration, 237n25 crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5
foreign policy crises of, 92t in Gulf War speech acts, 221–2
impeachment of, 177, 243n22 in Kosovo speech acts, 165
Kosovo rhetoric of, 144–56, 175, Crusades, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7
241n4
liberal internationalism under, 143, Dayton Accords, 142
178 decision-making see frames/framing
political considerations of, 222 Declaration of St. Petersburg, 230n9
Rwandan policies of, 178, 225 defensive war, 25–7
speech acts of, 156–9, 214–15, 219, see also self-defense
221 De Indis et De Jure Belli (Vitoria), 25–6
US embassy bombings crisis, 92t, De Jure Belli (Gentili), 29
177, 236n23 destruction of property see
see also Kosovo persons/property seized
Coalition for a Realist Foreign Policy, Deuteronomy, 20
209–10 diagnostic frames, 50–1
Cobden, Richard, 35 Diesing, Paul, 236n16
Cohen, Marshall, 43 direct violent trigger, 80t, 81
Cohen, William, 143 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190,
Cold War era, 40–4 195, 246n20
collective security in, 77–8, 235n9 in Gulf War speech acts, 118–19
proliferation of armed conflict in Kosovo speech acts, 161–2
following, 2 in Libya speech acts, 224
restraint orientation of just war discordant frames, 59
tradition in, 40–1, 44–5 discrepancies in power see power
UN Charter in, 41, 232nn18–20 discrepancy
274 Index
Downs, Anthony, 55 for Gulf War speech acts, 115t,

Doyle, Michael, 11, 43 239n16, 240n18
Druckman, James N., 55, 232n4, for Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t,
246n1 173, 242n13, 242n17
dynamism foreign policy crisis settings, 89–90,
in frame evaluation, 57–8 236n16
of the just war frame, 212, 213t, foreign policy decisions, 60–3
217–19 high stakes and low salience in,
60–1
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 67 political opportunity structure in,
Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 43, 207 62
empirical credibility, 56, 213 public rationale of, 61
see also credibility see also US foreign policy
Entman, Robert M., 49 formal outcomes, 80t, 84–5
cascade model of frames of, 54, in Afghanistan speech acts, 190,
135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 196–7, 246n20
on cultural resonance of frames, 57 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 120,
on foreign policy framing, 64 135–6
evil action, 80t, 82–3, 215–17, 235n11 frames/framing, 16
in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, analytical uses of, 48–9
194, 207–8, 219, 246n20 broad social context of, 50
in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 118, cascade model of, 54, 135, 173,
119–20, 134 219–20, 232n3
in Kosovo speech acts, 161–3, consistency in, 56
173–5, 177–8, 219, contestation and signification in,
242nn16–17 53–4
subjectivity of ‘evil’ in, 215–16 core functions of, 51–2
exclusivity of frames, 58 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15,
experiential commensurability of 232n4
frames, 57 criteria for evaluation of, 54–60
extensity of just war significations cross-disciplinary use of, 46–9,
in Afghanistan speech acts, 193–4, 232n1
197 cultural factors in, 62–3
in Gulf War speech acts, 115–20, dynamism of, 57–8, 212, 213t,
138 217–19
in Kosovo speech acts, 161–4 failures of, 59–60
in foreign policy decisions, 60–3
fascism of the 1930s, 37–8 impact of ideology on, 62–3
fearmongering, 208, 219 individual agency in, 63
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia see master frame status of, 58–9, 233n5
Yugoslav wars potential subversiveness of, 215,
‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ 246n1
(Mill), 4 process of, 52–4
Fiss, Peer C., 63 production of meaning in, 51
Fitzwater, Marlin, 103 purposive vs. effective use of, 138,
flexibility of frames, 58 221–2
foreign audiences salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17
for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, terminology used in, 50
245nn16–17, 246n19 valence issues in, 53
Index 275
vs. agenda-setting, 50 inconsistency and incoherence of,

vs. priming, 49–50 138–40, 176, 214
vs. schema, 49 just war frame signifiers in, 112–14
see also the just war frame Presidential rhetoric in, 102–10,
France, 230n11, 231nn15–16 134–8, 238nn2–7
Franco-Prussian War, 230n11 selection for study of, 92t, 94
function(s) of frames, 50 speech acts in, 110–12, 221,
239nn8–14
Gaddafi, Moammar, 2, 222–7 target audiences in, 115–23, 134,
Gamson, William A., 50, 62 239–40nn15–19
Geneva Convention, 30 temporal dynamics of, 123–31,
Gentili, Alberico, 27–30 134–5, 240nn20–4
George, David Lloyd, 35
Gilbert, Martin, 238n3 Hague Convention, 30
Gladstone, William, 34–5 Haiti invasion, 92t
global authority, 80t, 83 Hammurabi’s Code, 228n5
in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, Hart, Gary, 224–5
195, 219 Hebraic traditions of just war, 19–22
in Gulf War speech acts, 113, hegemonic power frame, 34–6,
120–1, 134–5 233n5, 233n8
in Kosovo speech acts, 221 Henkin, Louis, 40
‘Global Views’ survey, 7–8 Herman, Charles F., 236n16
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Hezbollah, 76
180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9, Hirsch, Paul M., 63
243–4nn2–6 history of just war theory, 15–16
Goffman, Erving, 47, 53 in the Cold War era in, 41–5,
gravity of crises, 93, 236n23 232nn18–21
Greek traditions of just war, 19–22, in early Christian tradition, 22–5
73–8, 229n3, 233n1 in Hebrew and Greek traditions,
Green, T.H., 35 19–22, 73–8, 229n3, 233n1
Gregory VII, Pope, 28 law of nations and nature in,
Grossman, Marc, 244n7 27–31
Grotius, Hugo, 27–30 the liberal contradiction in, 34–6,
Gulf Cooperation Council, 102, 230–1nn11–14
121–2 in medieval neo-scholasticism,
Gulf War, 237n25 25–7, 229n5, 230n8
as anachronistic, 217–18 in the modern era, 33–9, 231n13
crisis profile of, 99t positivist legal framework of, 30–3,
Iraqi transgressions in Kuwait 37, 230n9
during, 134 in the post-Cold War era, 43–5, 68,
multinational coalition in, 101, 71–2
238n1 raison d’état doctrine in, 31–3, 37,
Saddam’s post-war reprisals in, 114, 41, 227, 230nn8–10
136, 240n23 in Roman tradition, 21, 229n2
summary of, 99–102 as social narrative, 18, 228–9n1
Gulf War’s just war frame in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71,
analysis of, 131–8 221–2, 233n7
chronological clusters in, 123, in the world war era, 36–9, 44,
240n20 231nn15–16
276 Index
Hobbes, Thomas, 33 Isaiah, 20

Hobson, J.A., 35 Israel, 76
Holbrooke, Richard, 143–4
Holy Roman Empire, 26–7 Jackson, Richard, 184, 243n2
Hosea, 20 Jasper, James M., 62
Howard, Michael, 38, 64 Jentleson, Bruce W., 228n4
Huberman, A. Michael, 235n13 Johnson, James Turner, 229n6
Hume, David, 229n4 on just cause for war, 76, 234n2
Hurd, Ian, 6 on just war tradition, 15–16
Hussein, Saddam, 100–1, 102, 114, jus ad bellum conventions, 19, 39, 65,
136, 216, 240n23 73–5
see also Gulf War basic criteria of, 234n2
competent authority in, 74, 76–8,
the ideological conflict frame, 68, 69 80t, 83, 235nn8–10, 235n12
ideology, 62–3 historical articulation of, 73–4,
implementation of war, 9 233n1
in bello concerns see jus in bello hope for success in, 74–5
conventions just cause in, 74, 75–6, 80t, 81–3,
inclusivity of frames, 58 234nn4–7
inducing frames, 59 in just war frames see the just war
the injustice frame, 233n5 frame
injustice frames, 50 liberal thought on, 38–44
intensity of just war significations, neo-scholastics on, 25
221–2 in positivist raison d’état thought,
in Afghanistan speech acts, 194–7, 32–3
205 proportionality of ends desired in,
in Gulf War speech acts, 116–23, 74–5
138 prudential criteria in, 234n3
in Kosovo speech acts, 161–5 right intention in, 74, 78–9, 80t
intent see right intention signifiers jus in bello conventions, 19, 20,
internal harmony of claims, 56, 213 39–41, 65, 230n9, 233n1
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer), 41–3
dataset, 91 just cause signifiers, 74, 75–6, 80t,
on Afghanistan crisis, 243n1 81–3, 215–17, 234nn4–7
on gravity of crises, 93 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–7,
on US uses of military force, 201, 202, 204–6, 219, 245n18,
236n19 246n20
international public law, 27–31 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 114,
intra-state wars, 218–19 116–18, 130–4, 138, 218–19,
Iran-Iraq war, 100, 107 239n16
Iraq in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8,
Kuwait invasion by, 99–102 161–5, 170–5, 219, 242n14
no-fly zone crisis in (1992), 236n21 the just war frame, x, 11–15, 63–70,
regime crisis in (2002), 8, 44, 76, 211–22, 225–7
92t, 94, 236n24 in Afghanistan see Afghanistan’s
Saddam’s post-Gulf-War reprisals just war frame
in, 114, 136, 240n23 analysis of see analysis of the just
war with Iran of, 100, 107 war frame
see also Gulf War case studies using, 16–17, 90–4
Index 277
contradictions in see the liberal Kahneman, Daniel, 47–8

contradiction Kaldor, Mary, 218
defining parameters of, 72–9 Kant, Immanuel
fearmongering in, 208, 219 on asocial sociability, 228n3
function of, 71–2 the categorical imperative of, 10,
in the Gulf War see Gulf War’s 228n5
just war frame on war and peace, 3–4, 34,
hegemonic power alternative 234n2
in, 68–9, 233n8 Karzai, Hamid, 182
ideological conflict alternative Kellogg-Briand pact, 37
in, 68, 69 Kennedy, John F., 67
importance of, 71 kidnapping see persons/property
intent and consequences in, 24, seized
221–2 Kinder, Donald R., 50
in Kosovo see Kosovo’s just war Klandermans, Bert, 49
frame Kosovo, 237n25
legitimacy considerations in see crisis profile of, 145t
legitimacy ethnic cleansing in, 144, 147–8,
moral language in, 13–14 177–9
non-signification in, 221–2 ethnic makeup of, 141
operational signifiers of, 16, Military Technical Agreement on,
79–85 155, 164
in politics of signification, 18 as new/intrastate war, 174–5,
role of tradition in, 15–16, 18 218–19
in selling of war, x–xi, 85–6 parallels with Holocaust of,
as a social construct, 14–18, 64–6, 174–5
68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 Rambouillet talks on, 144, 148–9
structural realist alternative in, 68 summary of, 141–4
underlying assumptions in, 12–13 Kosovo’s just war frame
use of frames/framing in see analysis of, 172–5
frames/framing chronological clusters in, 166–8,
US use of, 13–14, 66–71, 79, 242n18
211–22 just war frame signifiers in,
just war theory 157–9
ad bellum criteria in, 19, 65 limited, prudent, and effective
in bello criteria in, 19, 65 use of, 176–9, 214–15,
historical overview of see history of 243n21
just war theory muted and limited application
importance in the US of, x, 13–16, of, 173–6
71 Presidential rhetoric in, 144–56,
jus ad bellum criteria in, 73–9 241n4
language and rhetoric of, 13–14 selection for study of, 92t, 94
post bellum criteria in, 44, 65 speech acts in, 156–7, 173–4, 221,
in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71, 241nn7–11, 243n21
221–2, 233n7 target audiences in, 159–65, 173–4,
war-decision law in, 5–6, 15–16, 242nn13–17
133, 211 temporal dynamics of, 165–72, 175,
just war tradition see history of just 242–3nn18–20
war theory; the just war frame Kuwait see Gulf War
278 Index
language of just war theory, 13–14 utilitarianism in, 10, 228n6

last resort, 80t, 83–4 in Western nation-states see
in Afghanistan speech acts, 246n20 nation-states
in Gulf War speech acts, 122–3, Libya’s just war frame, 2, 222–7
240n19 Locke, John, 229n4
in Kosovo speech acts, 149–50 Luard, Evan, 68–9
in Libya speech acts, 224 Lupia, Arthur, 56
law of nations, 27–30 lying/deception, 12, 208
positivist framework of, 30–3, 37
rise of nation-states in, 30–1, Macedonia, 145, 157, 168
230nn9–10 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 29
‘The Law of War and Peace’ (Grotius), mass public audiences
29 of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7,
laws of war, 40–1, 230n9 206, 220, 246n20
League of Nations, 36–7, 40 of Gulf War speech, 115–23, 135,
Lebow, Richard Ned, 236n16 240n19
Le Droit des Gens (Vattel), 30–1 of Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 173,
legitimacy, 5–6, 211 242n14
impact on military outcomes of, 9 master frames, 58–9, 63, 233n5
in just war tradition, 15–16, 34–6, Mayer, Margit, 64
215, 230–1nn11–12 McKinley, William, 35
of organized violence of nation- Mearsheimer, John J., 67, 208
states, 32–3, 230n10 media see press audiences
role of public opinion in, 6–9, Meyer, David S., 62
212–13 Miles, Matthew B., 235n13
as social construct, 9–11, 227, military regimes, 80t, 82–3
228nn5–6 Mill, John Stuart, 4, 35, 228n6, 234n4
see also the just war frame Milosevic, Slobodan, 216
Lehrer, Jim, 224–5 celebration of the Battle of Kosovo
Leurdijk, J. Henk, 69 by, 141–2, 241n2
Lewinsky, Monida, 177, 178 indictment for war crimes of, 155,
the liberal contradiction, x–xi, 3–4, 241n5
34–6, 228n4 see also Kosovo
in France’s Third Republic, 230n11 Modelski, George, 68, 233n8
frequency of war under, 231n14 modern era
just war frames in, 11–15 collective security systems of, 36–7,
popular support due in, 6–9, 40, 77–8, 235n9
212–13 liberal contradictions in, 34–6,
in radical liberal internationalism, 230n11
35–6, 44, 231nn12–13 liberal internationalism in, 35–6,
in US war decisions, 5–6, 10, 88–9, 44, 231nn12–13
231n13 liberal interventionism under,
the liberal tradition 36–7, 38
justification of war in, 11–15 self-determination and anarchy of,
Kant’s categorical imperative in, 10, 33–7
228n5 world wars of, 36–69, 231nn15–16
peace as normative in, 3–4, 6, see also Cold War era
228n3 Modigliani, Andre, 50
US reliance on, 66 Monroe Doctrine, 67
Index 279
Montesquieu, 64 primacy of justice in, 229n4

Morgenthau, Hans J., 4, 15, 69 of UN Charter’s non-intervention
motivational frames, 52 doctrine, 41, 232n18
Mubarak, Hosni, 124 Nazism, 38–9
Mueller, John E., 6 neo-scholastic parameters of just war,
multiple audiences 25–7, 229n5, 230n8
of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, New Whiggery, 35–6
245n16 New World Order, 107, 134, 136–7,
of Gulf War speech acts, 115t, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25
239n16 The Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 72
of Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t, Niebuhr, Reinhold, 4
173, 242n13 non-intervention doctrine, 3, 40–1,
Münkler, Herfried, 218 232n18
narrative fidelity of frames, 57 Obama, Barack, administration

National Conference of Catholic Libya operation of, 2, 222–7
Bishops, 43 obsolescence of war notions, 1–2,
national interest see social practice of 228n1
war offensive wars, 25–7
national liberation wars, 231n12 Omar, Mullah Muhammad, 180, 216
nation-states operationalizing of the just war
affirmation of sovereign power in, frame, 16, 79–85
31, 33, 37, 77 Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil, 141,
inter-state wars among, 36–9, 151–5, 174, 241n1
218 see also Kosovo
laws of war among, 40–1, 230n9 Operation Desert Fox, 92t, 236n23
legitimate organized violence of, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
32–3, 230n10 100–1
the liberal contradiction of just see also Gulf War
war in, 34–6, 230–1nn11–14 Operation Desert Strike, 92t
natural law of, 27–31 Operation Determined Falcon, 143–4
raison d’état doctrine of, 31–3, 37, Operation Enduring Freedom/Infinite
41, 227, 230nn8–10 Justice, 180
self-determination and anarchy of, see also Afghanistan
33–4, 37 Operation Infinite Reach, 177
the social contract in, 34–5, 77 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 235n15
Treaty of Westphalia of, 31–2, Operation Just Cause, 235n15
34 Operation Noble Anvil, 165
NATO Operation Restore Freedom, 235n15
collective security focus of, 163–4, Operation Restore Hope, 235n15
244n6 Operation Unified Protector, 2, 222–7
Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil opinion-leader audiences
of, 143–4, 151–5, 158, 163, for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7,
174, 176 206, 245n16
Operation Unified Protector of, 2, for Gulf War speech, 115–23,
222–7 240nn18–19
natural law for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65,
nation-states under, 27–31, 230n9 161, 173–4, 175, 242n13,
Paine’s evocation of, 233n7 242n16
280 Index
opposition to war decisions see public post-hoc satisfaction, 80t, 83–5

opinion in Afghanistan speech acts, 197,
outcomes see formal outcomes 246n20
in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14,
pace of crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5 126
in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, in Kosovo speech acts, 174
196–7 Powell, Colin, 100, 138, 243n4
in Kosovo speech acts, 158 power discrepancy, 80t, 81
Paine, Thomas, 66–7, 233n7 in Afghanistan speech acts, 193,
Panama invasion, 92t 244n14, 245n18
peace in Gulf War speech acts, 114,
as normative in the liberal 118–19, 135
tradition, 3–4, 6, 228n3 praxis, 21, 71–2, 87
in notions on the obsolescence of pre-emptive wars
war, 1–2, 228n1 as anticipatory self-defense, 76
Peace of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 Crusades as, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7
Persian Gulf War see Gulf War’s just presidential power, 6
war frame Presidential speech acts, 96–8,
persons/property seized, 80t, 81–2 237nn26–8
in Afghanistan speech acts, 207, of Barack Obama, 222–4
245n18 of Bill Clinton, 156–9, 214–15, 219,
in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 119, 221
218–19 of George H.W. Bush, 110–12,
in Kosovo speech acts, 158 214
Petersen, J.H., 68–9 of George W. Bush, 188–9, 199,
Plato, 21–2, 71–2, 229n3 214–15, 219, 220
political opportunity structure, 62 press audiences, 135
political parties, 92–3, 237n25 for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7,
political science scholarship see 204–6
frames/framing for Gulf War speech acts directed
Polk, James K., 67 towards, 115–23, 135, 240n17,
positivism, 30–3 240n19
affirmation of sovereign power for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65,
under, 31, 33, 37, 77 173–4, 175
raison d’état doctrine under, 31–3, priming, 49–50
37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 process models, 49–50, 52–4
post bellum criteria, 44, 65 prognostic frames, 52
post-Cold War era property seizure see persons/property
armed conflict of, 2 seized
the just war conversation in, 43–5, prospect theory, 47–8
68, 71–2, 212–22 Psalms, 20
the liberal contradiction in, 5–10, psychology scholarship, 47–8
88–9, 212–13, 231n13 public opinion
liberal internationalism in, 143, opposition to war-making in, 6–9
178 role in military success of, 9–11,
new war dynamics of, 174–5, 12–13, 212–13
218–19 role of frames in, 61
US use of force in, 87–9 selling of war in see selling of war
see also the just war frame see also legitimacy
Index 281
Pufendorf, Samuel, 31 salience

punishment for evil see evil action in foreign policy decisions, 60–1
in frame evaluation, 56–7
raison d’état doctrine, 31–3, 37, 41, of the just war frame, 212, 213t,
227, 230nn8–10 215–17
Rawls, John, 228n5 Salih, Ali Abdullah, 102
Reagan, Ronald, 67 Sanders, Lynn M., 50
Reagan Doctrine, 69 schema, 49
reduction of tension see tension Scheufele, Dietram A., 50, 52
reduction Schröeder, Gerhard, 199
refugees from post-Cold War wars, Schwartzkopf, Norman, 138
2 Scott, Andrew M., 68
regional authority, 80t, 83 Scowcroft, Brent, 241n25
in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, The Second World War (Gilbert),
219 238n3
in Gulf War speech acts, 121–2 Security Council of the UN see United
in Kosovo speech acts, 163–4, 173, Nations Security Council
175, 219 Security Scholars for a Sensible
in Libya speech acts, 224 Foreign Policy group, 209–10
Reichberg, Gregory, 234n2 seizure of territory, 80t, 81–2
The Republic (Plato), 22 in Afghanistan speech acts, 245n18
research methodology see analysis in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 113,
of the just war frame 118, 218–19
response to evil see evil action in Kosovo speech acts, 158
rhetoric of just war theory, 13–14 self-defense, 25–7
right intention signifiers, 74, 78–9, in Afghanistan speech acts, 195,
80t, 83–5 207
in Afghanistan speech acts, anticipatory forms of, 76, 208,
190–1, 193, 196–7, 202–3, 234n7
204, 206 Cicero’s views on, 229n2
Aquinas’s introduction of, 24 in Gulf War speech acts, 118, 135,
in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14, 218, 221, 240n17
116–18, 120, 122–3, 130–1, in the just war frame, 75–6, 80t,
132t, 135–6, 138, 221–2, 81, 234nn4–5
240n24 in Kosovo speech acts, 158
in Kosovo speech acts, 158–9, 163, Paine’s evocation of, 233n7
165, 171, 174 standard for aggression in, 75,
the rights frame, 233n5 234n6
rigidity of frames, 58 UN Charter on, 40–1, 186, 232n18,
Robertson, George, 199 244n7
Robespierre, 219 in Walzer’s theory of aggression,
Roman church, 19 42–3, 232n21
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 67 self-determination, 34–7, 231n12
Roosevelt, Theodore, 67 self-help principle, 234n4
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 64 selling of war, x–xi, 9–16, 85–6,
Rubin, Jamie, 178 211
Rugova, Ibrahim, 141–2, 144 lying and deception in, 12, 208
Rumsfeld, Donald, 243n3 moral and utilitarian frameworks
Rwandan genocide, 178, 225 for, 10, 228nn5–6
282 Index
selling of war – continued in the Gulf War’s just war frame,

political cost considerations in, 110–15, 239nn8–14
12–13 in Kosovo’s just war frame, 156–9,
Presidential speech acts in, 6, 96–8, 241–2nn7–12
237nn26–8 spheres of influence, 233n8
as social practice/appeals to Stake, Robert E., 95
national interest in, 9–11, the structural realist frame, 68
226–7 Suarez, Francisco, 25–7
see also frames/framing Summa Theologica (Aquinas), 23–5
September 11, 2001, attacks, 180, Swart, William James, 58, 217
182, 207, 243n3
Serbia Taft, Julia, 143, 241n3
Dayton Accords, 142 Talbott, Strobe, 178
independence from Ottomans Taliban, 180–2, 187–8, 206, 208,
of, 35 216, 245n18
NATO bombing of Belgrade, 157 see also Afghanistan
war in Kosovo of, 141–4, 242n15 the Talmud, 19–22
Seward, William, 67 target-state authority, 80t, 83,
Shattuck, John, 241n3 235n12
Shaw, Martin, 218 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1,
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 238n2 245n15
significant power discrepancy see in Kosovo speech acts, 158,
power discrepancy 242n14
Six Day War, 76 in Libya speech acts, 224
Smith, Jean Edward, 238n3 temporal dynamics
Snow, David A., 52, 58, 63 of Afghanistan speech acts,
Snyder, Glenn H., 236n16 197–203, 205, 246nn21–2
the social contract, 34–5 of Gulf War speech acts, 123–31,
social practice of war, 226–7 134–5, 240nn20–4
the just war frame in, 14–18, 64–6, of Kosovo speech acts, 165–72, 175,
68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 242–3nn18–20
legitimacy considerations in, 9–11, tension reduction, 80t, 84–5
27, 228nn5–6 in Afghanistan speech acts, 197,
sociology scholarship, 47 246n20
Solana, Javier, 144 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14
Solomon, Norman, 21 territory seizure see seizure of
sovereign power, 28–31, 74 territory
as competent authority in Tewksbury, David, 50
war-decisions, 76–8, 80t, Thatcher, Margaret, 102, 107
235nn8–10, 235n12 theory of aggression, 42–3, 232n21
positivist affirmation of, 30–1, 33, Thiers, Adolphe, 230n11
37 Thomas, Helen, 102
of the UN Security Council, 40–1, Thomas Aquinas
77–8, 232n20, 235n10 on authorization for war, 76
Spanish-American War, 35 on consequences, 24–6
speech acts, 96–8, 237nn26–8 criteria for just war of, 22–5, 73–4,
in Afghanistan’s just war frame, 75, 78
188–9, 199 Tillema, Herbert K., 68
coding of, 239n9, 239n15, 244n9 Tito, Josip Broz, 141
Index 283
Tjalve, Vibeke Schou, 4 role of political parties in, 92–3

tradition see history of just war uses of military force in, 2–3, 46,
theory 91–2, 235n15, 236nn18–19
Treaty of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 wars of choice in, 12
triggering entities, 93–4 see also Afghanistan; Gulf War;
Truman Doctrine, 69 the just war frame; Kosovo
Tversky, Amos, 47–8 utilitarian reasons for military force,
10, 228n6, 229n4
UNIKOM (UN Iraq–Kuwait
Observation Mission), 101–2 Van Wingen, John R., 68
United Nations Vattel, Emerich de, 27–8, 30–1
collective security under, 40, 77–8, Veblen, Thorstein, 39
235n9 Vietnam syndrome, 135, 136–8,
Contact Group on Kosovo of, 142, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25
144 Vietnam War, 41–2, 43, 44
United Nations Charter Vitoria, Francisco de, 25–7, 229n5,
just war tradition influence in, 230n8
235n9
on non-intervention, 40–1 ‘wag the dog’ syndrome, 177
on self-defense, 40, 186, 232n18, Walters, LeRoy, 229n6
244n7 Walzer, Michael, 33, 41–3
United Nations Security Council on anticipatory self-defense,
resolutions on Iraq’s invasion of 208
Kuwait of, 100, 101–2, 120, on self-defense, 234n7, 234nn4–5
121, 136, 238n1 theory of aggression of, 42–3,
resolutions on Kosovo of, 142, 232n21
146–7, 164–5 the war-decision
sovereign authority of, 40–1, 77–8, affirmative war decisions, 85–7,
232n20, 235n10 211, 236n17
UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox crisis of legitimacy in, 4–5
(1998), 92t, 236n23 presidential power in, 6
US embassy bombings (1998), 92t, public opposition in, 6–9,
177, 236n23 212–13
US foreign policy, 87–9 as social practice, 9–11, 226–7
American exceptionalism in, 67 The War on Terrorism (Jackson),
attribution of ‘evil’ in, 215–17 243n2
case studies of, 16–17, 90–6 war-related deaths, 2
crisis of legitimacy of the war- warrior’s code, 19
decision in, 5–6 wars of choice, 12
expansionist focus of, 67 Weber, Max, 32, 230n10, 235n8
fundamental liberal contradiction Wilkensfield, Jonathan, 89, 93,
in, 3–4, 228n4 236n16
the just war frame in, 13–14, Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 36–7, 67
66–71, 79, 211–22, 233n7 Wittkopf, Eugene R. et al., 228n4
the liberal contradiction in, Wolff, Christian, 31
212–13 world wars of the twentieth
liberal internationalism in, 35–6, century, 36–9, 231nn15–16
44, 143, 178, 231n13 World War I, 36, 38, 39
in Libya, 2, 222–7 World War II, 38–9, 44, 231n16
284 Index
Yeltsin, Boris, 145–6 in Kosovo, 141–4, 145t, 242n15

Yin, Robert K., 95 see also Kosovo
Yugoslav wars
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 142, Zald, Mayer, 47
236n21 zones of peace, 3

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Selling a ‘Just’ War

Also by Michael Butler

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Preface and Acknowledgments x

List of Acronyms xiii

2 Entering the Just War Conversation 18

3 Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars 46

4 Analyzing the Just War Frame 71

5 The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 99

6 Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 141

7 Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 180

Conclusion: Selling a Just War 211

1.1 Support for US troop use—2010 7

7.3 Speech-acts—primary audience (JW criterion) 194

4.1 Operationalizing the just war frame 80

objective realities of America’s wars and the justifications associated with

been possible without generous support from the Francis A. Harrington

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

The persistent problem of war

War and the liberal contradiction

Such persistent realities concerning the utility of military force as an

not in and of themselves noteworthy, unless one considers them in

by liberal norms and republican institutions will evolve to adopt non-

Problematizing the war-decision

(Desch, 2008). The decision to go to war, and the factors underlying

The ‘crisis of legitimacy’

Hurd, 2007). That such a problem might be described in crisis terms

The implementation problem

the conditions for a latent and generalized diminution in societal

Percentage supporting/opposing the use of US troops in each of the following

If China invaded Taiwan

If North Korea invaded South Korea

Part of international peacekeeping force to enforce

for unclear or debatable causes or undertaken with questionable authority or

War as social practice

Given the importance of securing broad societal support to the effective

The importance of effectively ‘selling’ the war-decision within the context

This hypothesis rests on several simple if key underlying assumptions.

military campaigns in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq among others have

foreign policy decision-makers to the end of crafting inter-subjective

Interrogating the just war

This book stands as a testimony to the conviction that greater heed

the just war tradition. This conversation concerning the legitimacy of

case studies of affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign

The core function of any frame is to advance a collective perception of

The prevailing normative and legal perspective within liberal societies

theory; for instance, Deuteronomy (Deut. 10: 16–20) explicitly stated

While relative to the nexus of justice and war Deuteronomy is much

hova (obligatory war); milhemet reshut (optional war); and pre-emptive

Augustine and Aquinas

some form of (moral) ‘collateral damage’ is always an attendant poss-

of religious authorities. As a result the theory could no longer serve

The ‘law of nations’ and the just war

(1714–1767)—each confronted the challenge of the age relative to

the universalism of natural law to argue against a carte blanche right

While the efforts to introduce and develop a secularized ‘law of

Pardon the interruption: Demise of the just war

The intensive and extensive transformation of Western society which

The rise of positivism

like other transactions in the political sphere, should be conducted at

consideration of its strategic implications and its utility in advancing

The modern resurgence: Just war revisited

The near total approximation of Hobbesian anarchy defining the inter-