Section 1
02 of the Code of
I. Procedural Due Process
Judicial Proceedings
 Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685
FACTS:
o Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and
one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with
homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to
death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma
Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
o Private complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III,
had filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Change of Venue,
purportedly to safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. Before petitioners could be arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations
in said cases. Prosecutor Villa- Ignacio filed four new informations against
herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms
which were subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of
Branch 10, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
o The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set of
informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the
first set of informations for homicide and frustrated homicide, or (b) the
subsequent informations for murder, frustrated murder, and illegal
possession of firearms.
ISSUE:
o Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations
was immediately final and executory.
RULING:
o It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the
accused is placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not
equivalent to an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense. It is not a final disposition of the case. Rather, it
partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and
leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the
commencement of the prosecution. The dismissal of Criminal Cases did
not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners.
o A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which is
actually an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be reconsidered.
Furthermore, an acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the
defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does not decide the case
on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
 State Prosecutors v. Muro 236 SCRA 505
FACTS:
o Respondent Judge Muro of the RTC of Manila, was charged by State
Prosecutors Mariano, Dee and Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.
Judicial Conduct.
o The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda
Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in
the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11
cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that
the President of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The
respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to
further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
o The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a
misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal
cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused,
and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is
not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but
is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
o Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of
discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the
President in the newspaper.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the
foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for
dismissing the case.
RULING:
o YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be
of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable
demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take
judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge,
and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB
Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the
improvident order of dismissal was issued.
o When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the
respondent judge admitted of not having seen the official text of CB
circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this
matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based
on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial
notice of. For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites
should be present:
o (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
o (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain;
o (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
o The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such
notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to
the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by
 the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the
knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are
accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration.
 Juan Carvajal v. CA (GR NO. 98328, October 9, 1997)
FACTS:
o Petitioner is the applicant in a land registration case involving a 96,470
square meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B, 6846-C and 6846-
D. Petitioner was ordered to refer to the Bureau of Lands for corrections
the discrepancy existing in the directional bearing and area of Lot 6846-D.
The technical descriptions as corrected by the Bureau of Lands were
submitted and the application was set for hearing. Solid Homes, Inc. filed
its opposition stating that a land registered in its name under the Torrens
System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is almost identical to the
property subject of the application. To avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was
directed to make the plotting of the relative position of the property
embraced in TCT No. 7873 and to submit its plotting to the court.
Meanwhile, as recommended by the Land Registration Authority, the
application for registration of petitioner was dismissed by respondent
court. Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent
judge required the parties and the engineers from the Land Registration
Commission and the DENR to appear before the Court. The engineer from
the Land Registration Commission was likewise directed to inform the
court whether the property applied for by petitioner is indeed inside the
titled property of private respondent. The Land Registration Authority
submitted a report showing that there was indeed an overlapping of the
four (4) parcels of land applied for by petitioner and the properties of Solid
Homes under TCT 7873. Hence, considering that the properties applied
for were [sic] within the titled property and could not be the subject of an
application for registration. the motion for reconsideration, was denied.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for
registration. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner claims that he was denied due
process because he was unable to take the witness stand.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the petitioner was given (the) chance and the opportunity
to be heard or allowed to fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding)
for Land Registration and to rest (his) case.
RULING:
o The petition has no merit. The reports prepared by the Land Registration
Authority and the DENR Survey Division clearly showed that there was
an overlapping between the two properties. The futility of petitioner's
application was apparent, thus, it is necessary to hear further evidence.
o The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial
of this opportunity that is repugnant to due process. In this case, petitioner
was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three.
However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even
when the trial court ordered the submission of the parties' memoranda
which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced
to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness
stand.
Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
o Such ailing finds no application to the present case, because neither
Respondent Mariano Raymundo (the applicant in the land registration
case) nor Petitioner Constantino Tirona (the oppositor in the cited case)
was a holder of any certificate of title over the land intended for
registration. Such being the case, the land registration court was ordered to
act in accordance with Section 37 of Act No. 496 either by dismissing the
application if none of the litigants succeeded in showing a proper title, or
by entering a decree awarding the land applied for to the person entitled
thereto.
 Perez v. Estrada AM. No. OI-4-O3-SC June 29, 2001 and Sept. 13, 2001
FACTS:
o On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas sent a
letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the trial of the
plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The letter was seconded by Mr. Cesar
N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice, and still later,
by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Richard Romulo. On 17 April
2001, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant
petition to allow live radio and television coverage of the court hearings
on the Plunder and Other Criminal Cases filed against former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. before the Sandiganbayan. The petition also
sought a re-examination of the 23 October 1991 resolution of the Court in
a libel case filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino which prohibits live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the
public.
RULING:
o In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that when the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press and of the right to
public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial, race against
one another, the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process
guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an
object of a public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
o The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be
installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting,
degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake,
and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the
people's right to information. The accused has the right to a public trial,
and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and
liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized
trial.

 Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635
FACTS:
o Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of
leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the
National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the
shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of
unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court
of Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme
Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang
Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
o The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are
documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these
documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.
ISSUE:
o Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements
prescribe special requirements of due process in administrative cases.
RULING:
o The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
o (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause
and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented;
o (3) The decision must have something to support itself;
o (4) The evidence must be substantial;
o (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing;
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
o (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
o (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
o The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction
that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
 OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
FACTS:
o Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the
Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan. the letter
was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an
investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent
may be conducted. Ordered to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the
then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team
leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI
Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for
Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a
fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to
the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent’s sala.
o In his affidavit executed before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he
was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of
Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary
investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only
physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the
case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that,
in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of
P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all
probability, would need money to serve his vice.
o In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought
to have been caught in flagrante delicto.
o The results of the investigation recommends that Judge Pascual be charged
and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual
were strong enough to convict him.
RULING:
o The evidence on record does not warrant conviction. The only bases for
the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad
G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the
bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent
was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can
confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.
o This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less.
 Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially
since the charge is penal in character. The above- quoted Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the
requirements of due process.
o The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes
committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with
anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been
expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such
vague accusations.
o While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the
Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a “discreet
investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an
instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-
writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an
accused before respondent’s court who could possibly be respondent
judge’s virtual victim.
 Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
FACTS:
o This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by herein petitioners
praying for the reversal of the Investigating Committee's report
recommending the dismissal or removal from office of Former Regional
Director, DAR-CAR Arsenio Lumiqued (deceased), without prejudice to
the filing of appropriate criminal charges against him. Records reveal that
three complaints were filed against Arsenio Lumiqued charging him of
malversation through falsification of official documents, violation of
Commission on Audit rules and regulations, and for oppression and
harassment. After the investigation, the Committee rendered a report
finding him liable for all the charges. Thereafter, acting on the report and
recommendation, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty and dismissing
him from the service with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
Lumiqued filed a petition for appeal in the Office of the President, but said
appeal was subsequently denied. A second motion for reconsideration was
filed, but the same was likewise denied. It was during the pendency of this
motion that Arsenio Lumiqued died. On appeal before the Court,
petitioners, as heirs of the late Arsenio Lumiqued, fault the investigating
committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during
the hearing. They maintained that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted
by counsel during an administrative inquiry.
RULING:
o The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners' arguments are untenable and
misplaced. The right to counsel is a right afforded to a suspect or accused
during custodial investigation. In the case at bar, Lumiqued was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation was
conducted for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable for the complaints filed against him. Also, such
right is not absolute and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. Moreover,
Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act) and
Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 explicitly provide that in an
administrative proceeding such as the one in case at bar, a respondent has
the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. Accordingly, the
instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is dismissed and the
challenged administrative order is affirmed.
 Fabella V. CA 282 SCRA 256
FACTS:
o On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a
return to work order to all public school teachers who had participated in
walkouts and strikes. Secretary Cariño filed administrative charges against
the striking teachers. The Secretary also placed the teachers under
preventive suspension. The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City charging the committee appointed by
Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit. However, the trial court did not
issue a restraining order. The teachers amended their complaint and made
it one for certiorari and mandamus. The DECS Secretary through the
Solicitor General, contended that in accordance with the doctrine of
primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative
proceedings. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the striking teachers guilty as charged and ordered their
dismissal. The trial court also dismissed the petition for certiorari and
mandamus for lack of merit. The teachers then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc
declaring void the trial court's order of dismissal and reinstating the action,
even as it ordered the teachers' reinstatement pending decision of their
case. The trial court rendered its decision declaring the dismissal of the
teachers null and void. The trial court held that Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers," is the
primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative
cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its
supplemental law. As a result, the committee tasked to investigate the
charges filed against the teachers was illegally constituted and all acts
done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. From this adverse
decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Cariño filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision holding in the main that private respondents were denied due
process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence,
this petition for review. aScIAC
ISSUE:
o Whether or not private respondents were denied due process.
RULING:
o The Supreme Court ruled that the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges did not include a representative of the local
or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization
as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, said committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction and all proceedings undertaken
 by them were necessarily void. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an
impartial tribunal and gives substance and meaning to the fundamental
right to be heard. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this
case are void, no amount of delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
private respondents. The Court ordered the DECS to reinstate the private
respondents and award all monetary benefits that may have accrued to
them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal.
 Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
FACTS:
o The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative
hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. The series of
twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the
incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, wherein Torcita, who was off-duty and was in civilian clothes,
riding in his private vehicle with members of his family, chased another
vehicle which overtook his car in a reckless manner and in violation of the
Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda Aimee, where he
allegedly entered the place without lawful warrant and while inside,
belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, pointed
his gun at somebody and urinated in full view of the persons therein. At
the pre- trial, the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the
twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major complaint" for
"conduct unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II,
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975. The Board did
not find sufficient evidence to establish any of the charges against him and
found that he was in the performance of his official duties when the
incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline
by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. Torcita
appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP,
Region VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition for certiorari
and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it
found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the
regional trial court, by petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same. The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
o Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of
internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
RULING:
o The Supreme Court ruled that while the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and
tried, cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process. It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the
titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, that
none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the
specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for
irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the
odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was
not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed and the petition was dismissed.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
FACTS:
o In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial
evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged
receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that respondent is
guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is
inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
o Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon
Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of Linamon Water
District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of 1997, designated
[respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a
General Manager shall have been appointed. In the morning of October
14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of the different
Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing
lunchtime, the group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon
meeting, attended by more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for
the lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice
No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for reimbursement
of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the
representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same
day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in
the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos
(P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of
Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty.
The complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she
submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the (P1,213.00)
when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the
original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process
o Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in
the decision rendered.
RULING:
o The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice
or hearing. In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be
heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this
Court indicate that she knew the bases for the ombudsman’s Decision. In
 fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would
merit our review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was
reached, respondent’s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal
leg to stand on.
o In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the
instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his
theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true
amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight
was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will
not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.
o The complainant’s evidence to prove falsification consisted of an
unauthenticated photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have
obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had
issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and authenticity.
Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy
of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an
accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.
o While the Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings
before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some proof of
authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original
duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative
value. Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against
respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence to
vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed
the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her
guilt was not proven by substantial evidence.
 GR No. 139465. January 18, 2000
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.
Facts:
o On June 18, 1999, Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to
Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax, Fraud by Wire, Radio, or
Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of
Another.
o On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating
and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the
case. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and
assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support
thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are
some other matters that needed to be addressed. Pending the the evaluation
process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner,
Secretary of Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from
the U.S. government, that he be given ample time to comment regarding
the extradition request against him after he shall have received copies of
the requested papers, and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.
o The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with
Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any
proceedings arising from an extradition request.
o The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon.
Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC Manila Branch 25) a mandamus, a
certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of DFA,
and NBI from performing any acts directed to the extradition of the
respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process of
notice and hearing.
Issue:
o Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights
of due process over the government’s duties under a treaty?
 Held:
o Yes. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to
keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with
nations."
o The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or
local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. However, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court.
o The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international law are
given an equal standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative
enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori” clarifies that a
treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the
Republic of the Philippines considers its Constitution as the highest law of
the land, therefore, both statutes and treaty may be invalidated if they are
conflict with the constitution.
 G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a.
MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
FACTS:
o This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. It seeks to void and set aside the Orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first
 assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
o In accordance to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
Government Note Verbale an extradition request of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Jimenez then sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) to prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition which was later on assailed by the SOJ. The Court initially
dismissed the petition, but later on reverse its decision when it filed its
Motion for Reconsideration and held that private respondent was bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
o On May 18, 2001, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with Respondent Jimenez then
filed an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, praying for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and
set a date for hearing. When the arrest warrant was issued, he was granted
bail for his temporary liberty in the amount of one million pesos in cash.
Issue:
o Whether or not there is a violation of due process of law.
Held:
o Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the
doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where
the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for
it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
o It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing
with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in
the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
 G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
Facts:
o On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
o Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
o On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch
19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. On
September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested
and detained him.
o Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr.
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” Thereafter, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then
raffled off to branch 8, presided by respondent judge. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Issue:
o Whether or not the admission to bail is valid.
Held:
o Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
o Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.
o While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The
time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish
a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also
by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
 should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
 G.R. No. 176830. February 11, 2014
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, et al.,
Respondents
Facts:
o A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco located in Leyte by the
43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to
be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party
of the Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front
(CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks
of suspected military informers. Members of the Scene of the Crime
Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis to identify the bodies by
way of DNA sample. The Special Report came up with ten names of
possible victims after comparing the testimonies of relatives and
witnesses. In this regard, the Chief of Police and the Staff Judge sent
undated request to Pros. Vivero for legal action on the twelve attached
complaint affidavits. These were from relatives of the alleged victims of
Operation VD who all swore that their relatives had been abducted or last
seen with members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
o Pros. Vivero, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15
counts of multiple murder against the 54 named members, including the
petitioners. He also caused some respondents to be used as state witnesses
for their testimony is vital to the prosecution. Said information was filed
before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided by Judge Abando. Prior
to receiving the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case
for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando found probable cause and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail.
o Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 and asked for the abovementioned
order and the prosecutor’s resolution to be annulled. He said that a case for
rebellion against him and 44 others was then already pending before RTC
Makati and so, the crime of murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line
with the political offense doctrine.
o The Court ordered the Solicitor General to comment on the issue and also
ordered the parties to submit their memoranda. From the oral arguments,
the Court found that the single Information charging them all of 15 counts
of murder was defective. The prosecution moved to admit amended and
new information, but Judge Abando suspended the proceedings during the
pendency of the case before the Court. Meanwhile, Echanis was arrested
and he, along with Baylosis, filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case
Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant,
but it was dismissed by Judge Abando. Around this time, Ladlad filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss with the RTC Manila.
o Echanis and Baylosis moved to reconsider but it was not acted because, as
per request of the DOJ Secretary to change the venue of the trial, the
records were transmitted to RTC Manila. Echanis and Baylosis continued
to seek relief from the Supreme Court in response to Judge Abando’s
orders. Echanis also prayed for his release. Both Ocampo and Echanis
were granted provisional release by the Supreme Court under cash bonds.
As to Ladlad’s Motion to Quash, it was denied by respondent judge and
the same happened to his Motion for Reconsideration. Ladlad sought to
annul the latter’s orders by way of special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65. As to their bail, Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail
whereas Baylosis filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail which
were granted, with no opposition from the OSG.
Issue:
o Whether or not the petitioners’ right to due process was violated.
HELD:
o No. Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest. A preliminary
investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the innocent
from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in
the administration of criminal justice.
o In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of
law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity
for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations
and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed,
and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint. "The essence of
due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own
side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.Moreover, Petitioner
Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to
participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to
participate.
o We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case." Having opted to remain passive during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now
claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-affidavit
was of their own doing. As to Ocampo’s claim that he was denied the right
to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the Resolution,
it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from
the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of
the resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
o Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15)
 days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed.
o Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor
Vivero on 12 March 2007, the former had until 27 March 2007 within
which to file either a motion for reconsideration before the latter or an
appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to
file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court on 16
March 2007.
 G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015.
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD,
Respondents.
Facts:
o On November 25 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy
of the complaint filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod for Plunder. On
December 3. 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada another
complaint for the crime of Plunder.
o Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their
counter-affidavits between December 9, 2013 and March 14, 2014. Sen.
Estrada filed his request to be furnished with copies of counter affidavits
of the other respondents, affidavits of new witnesses and other filings.
Sen. Estrada’s request was made "pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ based
on section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
o The Ombudsman issued an assailed order denying the motion of Estrada in
response to his request stating that under the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not entitled
to be furnished of the copy of all the filings of the respondents. The rights
of respondent Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
depend on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights he believes that he is entitled to or those that may be
derived from the phrase "due process of law."
o On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which
found probable cause to indict Estrada and his co-respondents with one
count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019. Sen. Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint
resolution dated 28 March 2014 and dated 7 April 2014. He prayed for the
issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him. Without
filing a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014
Order denying his request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March
2014 Order.
Issue:
o Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and violated his right to constitutional due process.
Ruling:
o No. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his request for the counter affidavits
of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process.
However, he fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation for
the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim.
o It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
only for the determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only
in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation
are limited to those granted by procedural law.
o It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation
has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine.
 G.R. No. L-68288. July 11, 1986.
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA,
petitioners,vs. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his
capacity as President of National University, respondents.
Facts:
o Petitioners, students of respondent National University, filed a petition
with the SC "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction" against the respondents due to the
latter’s "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll for the
first semester of the school year 1984-1985 ."
o They allege that, respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to
re-enroll them in their respective courses is "the latter's participation in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. That this
"attitude of the (University) disregards student's exercise of their basic
constitutional and human rights and violates petitioners’ right to due
process of law and that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme
penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without being
informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to
defend themselves.
o The respondents in their comment claimed that petitioners' failure to enroll
for the said semester is due to their own fault and not because of their
alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights;" such as the poor
academic performance and they lead and actively participated activities or
 mass action within the school premises without prior permit from school
authorities. By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have
forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in respondent
university.
Issue:
o Whether or not petitioners were deprived of their right to due process,
specifically in disciplinary actions against students.
Held:
o Yes. Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have
the right among others "to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations." Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined,
without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the
school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due
investigation shall have been conducted."
o The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-
examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof.
There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
 G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990.
ARIEL NON, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. SANCHO DANES II, et al., respondents
Facts:
o Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass
actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the
protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings. Petitioners filed a
petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to
the school, but the trial court dismissed the petitions. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but this was also denied based on a ruling in the
case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration which states that, Mabini College reserves the right to
deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are
unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct
discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or
interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are
required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and
discipline.
Issue:
o Whether or not the petioners were denied of a due process for not allowing
to re – enroll by the school.
Held:
o Yes. it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in
the manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment.
In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them
re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not
denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student
mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or
participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of
failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably
related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
 G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, et al., petitioners vs. HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, et al., respondents
Facts:
o As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in
the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites for students interested in
joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H.
Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital. He was not the lone victim, though,
for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion. In a notice, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee tasked to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the death and subsequently a
Disciplinary Board to ascertain if the respondent students violated Rule 3
of the Law School Catalogue entitled Discipline. After evaluation of the
circumstances, the written statements and answers and testimonies, the
Board found the respondent students guilty of violating the said Rule,
specifically guilty of hazing, either by active participation or by
acquiescence. However, Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her
prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of
the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.
Consequently, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo
de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
o In a resolution, however, Abas and Mendoza, respondent students, were
excluded from the coverage since neither had submitted their case to the
Board, and an investigation of the two will be set. In response, the
respondent students filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the
 second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations.
The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their
dismissal. On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary
restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent
students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the
hazing incident. A day after the lapsing of the TRO, petitioner Dean del
Castillo created Special Board tasked to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.Respondent students
reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the
Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition. The
respondent Judge granted their prayer. Respondent Judge ordered
petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court
ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final
examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and
enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel
Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the
instant case. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the
enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge
Issue:
o Whether or not the respondent were denied due process?
Held:
o No. Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their
argument that it is Ang Tibay case and not the Guzman case which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards
to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
o (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
o The abovementioned requirements are met. Respondent students were
notified and required to submit written statements, and such notices and
letters were addressed individually to them. Such notices and letters
clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against
them. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very
start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put
in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
 GR. No. 110280. October 12, 1993.
UP v. Ligot-Tan 227 SCRA 342 – from internet
Facts:
o In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the
University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the
Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly
known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with
the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva,
the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988, a Resolution
establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition
when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National
Budget for the implementation of the program.
o In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all
students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include a
reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships
which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour
by working for the University.
o Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among
others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from
which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the
basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further ensure the
integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data
indicated in a student's application form is undertaken.
o Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for the School Year 1989-
90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team
composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a
home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing,
Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report.
o Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies
between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella
M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services,
presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and
Financial Assistance.
o In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote
Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to
declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car
which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who
was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise
informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9
(from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs
to the contrary."
o Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees"
with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his
account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned
that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal
for further investigation of commercial rates." Failure to settle his account
would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned
 that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for
further investigation.
o Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother
migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had
not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular,
well-paying employment."
o U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that
he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately
withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living
abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the
SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University
and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if
he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected” by the
University thru outside legal action.
o The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive
Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P.
Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the
penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately,
plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal
interest.
o However, the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of
good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration
of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio
raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier,
he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de
Manila University (AdeMU).
o Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given
Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a
telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct
evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if
it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such
financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion.
o Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of
Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent
Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be
anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered
irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's
dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the
investigation and the reviews."
o In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the
effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979
to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according
to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal
"guilty."
o However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and
prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the
BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and
Olivia C. Caoili.
ISSUE:
o WON the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it
rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him"
during the March 29, 1993, meeting.
HELD:
o NO. With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent
considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process"
inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of
sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due
process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the
meeting.
o However, BOR ruled that in any event, it is a gross error to equate due
process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29,
1993, BOR meeting to the respondent.
o University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of
individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board.
This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been
appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did
respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the
regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation.
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not
given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon
which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March
28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he
received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio
himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge"
of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. It should be
stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of
Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio
was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words,
he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the
information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this
regard finds such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In
his July 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although
inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable,
regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the
education of his brothers with the help of another son. The court
constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information
on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court
also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals
who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
o In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady
character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his
profession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that
respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital
information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all
in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and
authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully
exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal’s right to
 due process.The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious
mandamus. to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
 Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756 - from internet o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a
SECTION 1 (PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS) criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
LAO GI V. CA administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person,
DOCTRINE the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied.
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, o Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. amended, it provided that the charge against an alien must specify the acts
Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what
FACTS ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a
o Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., proper judgment.
alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father o Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation
Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen. However the Minister of Justice must be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the
rendered another Opinion-Opinion No. 147, cancelling Opinion No. 191 respondent for deportation. The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests
and setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it without warrant and service of warrants should be in accordance likewise
was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A charge for deportation was with Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants
filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of
Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children. Criminal Procedure; and so the matter of bail, motion to quash, and trial,
o An amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that said respondents among others. Fealty to the prescribed rules of procedure in deportation
refused to register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to cases shall insure a speedy, fair and just dispensation of justice.
refuse to register as such. another amended charge was filed alleging that
Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.
ISSUE
o WON due process was accorded to the petitioners. (NO)
HELD
o Before any alien may be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged against the alien.
o In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered the
Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port
of entry.
o After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of
which he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and
it is only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered
deported. In such a hearing, Opinion No. 191 and Opinion No. 147 will
bear much weight in the determination by the CID of the citizenship of
said petitioners.
o The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that
they register as aliens as required by the Immigration Act. While it is not
disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner
to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on
a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this
case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should
be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the
petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.
o The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under
the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against