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A JOURNAL OF

Femipr Pbioopby
 Hypatia A JOURNAL OF

Femirit P'ilo5op1y

Fall 1986
Volume1, Number2

S+4eOhtiL(k- 4 454ej

MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY

edited by Ann Ferguson
Amherst
Universityof Massachusetts,
 Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha) was an Egyptian woman
philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer who lived in
Alexandria from her birth in about 370 A.D. until her
death in 415. She was the leader of the Neoplatonic School
in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring
teacher. The journal Hypatia is named in honor of this
foresister. Her name reminds us that although many of us
are the first women philosophers in our schools, we are not,
after all, the first in history.

Hypatia has its roots in the Society for Women in

Philosophy, many of whose members have for years envis-
ioned a regular publication devoted to feminist philosophy.
Hypatia is the realization of that vision; it is intended to
encourage and communicate many different kinds of
feminist philosophizing.

Hypatia (ISSN 0887-5367) is published by Hypatia, Inc. which assumes no responsibility

for statements expressed by authors. Hypatia will publish two issues in 1986, and three
issues in each successive year. Subscription rates for 1986-87 are: Institutions, $40/year;
Individuals, $20/year. Foreign orders add postage: $5/year to Canada, Mexico and
overseas surface; $10/year to overseas airmail. Single copies will be sold for $20 (institu-
tions) and $10 (individuals). A 40% discount is available on bulk orders for classroom use
or bookstore sales.

Address all editorial and business correspondence to the Editor, Hypatia, Southern
Illinois University at Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1437. Notice of nonreceipt of
an issue must be sent within four weeks after receipt of subsequent issue. Please notify us
of any change of address; the Post Office does not forward third class mail.

Copyright © 1986 by Hypatia, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hypatia was first published in 1983 as a Special Issue of Women's Studies International
Forum, by Pergamon Press. The first three issues of Hypatia appeared respectively as vol.
6, no. 6; vol. 7, no. 5; and vol. 8, no. 3 of Women's Studies International Forum. They
are available as back issues from Pergamon Press, Maxwell House, Fairview
Park, Elmsford, NY 10523.
 Margaret A. Simons, University

Assistant Editors
TameraBryant
KateTaylor

Editorial Assistant
ThorayaHalhoul
Book Review Editor
JeffnerAllen, EasternMontanaCollege
The Forum Editor
MariaLugones, CarletonCollege
Associate Editors
Azizah al-Hibri(Editor 1982-84),New York
SandraBartky, Universityof Illinois, Chicago
Ann Garry,CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles
SandraHarding, Universityof Delaware
Helen Longino, Mills College
Donna Serniak-Catudal,Randolph-MaconCollege
Joyce Trebilcot, WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis

Advisory Board
ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity
Simonede Beauvoir(France,1908-1986)
GertrudeEzorsky,BrooklynCollegeof City Universityof New York
ElizabethFlower, Universityof Pennsylvania
VirginiaHeld, GraduateCenterof City Universityof New York
GraciellaHierro(Mexico)
JudithJarvisThompson,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
MaryMothersill,BarnardCollege
MerrileeSalmon, Universityof Pittsburgh
Anita Silvers,San FranciscoState University

Editorial Board
KathrynPyne Addelson, Smith College
JacquelineAnderson, OliveHarveyCollege, Chicago
Asoka Bandarage,BrandeisUniversity
SharonBishop, CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles
LorraineCode, TrentUniversity
BlancheCurry,Shaw College
ElizabethEames, SouthernIllinois Universityat Carbondale
SusanFeathers,Universityof Pennsylvania
Ann Ferguson,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst
Jane Flax, Howard University
Nancy Fraser,NorthwesternUniversity
Carol Gould, Steven'sInstituteof Technology
Susan Griffin, Berkeley,California
Donna Haraway,Universityof California,Santa Cruz
Nancy Hartsock,Johns Hopkins University
SarahLucia Hoagland,NortheasternIllinois University
Alison Jaggar, Universityof Cincinnati
ElizabethJaneway,New York
EvelynFox Keller,NortheasternUniversity
Rhoda Kotzin,MichiganState University
LyndaLange, Universityof Alberta
Linda Lopez McAllister,Universityof South Floridaat Ft. Meyers
PatriciaMann, City Collegeof New York
Ann Matter, Universityof Pennysylvania
KathrynMorgan, Universityof Toronto
JaniceMoulton, Smith College
AndreeNichola-McLaughlin,MedgarEvars College
Linda Nicholson, State Universityof New York,Albany
Susan Ray Peterson,New York
Connie CrankPrice, TuskegeeInstitute
Sara Ruddick,New School of Social Research
Betty Safford, CaliforniaState University,Fullerton
Naomi Scheman, Universityof Minnesota
Ruth Schwarz,Universityof Pennsylvania
Joan Shapiro, Universityof Pennsylvania
ElizabethV. Spelman,Smith College
JacquelineM. Thomason,Los Angeles
Nancy Tuana, Universityof Texasat Dallas
CarolineWhitbeck,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
Iris Young, WorcesterPolytechnicInstitute
JacquelineZita, Universityof Minnesota
Fall 1986
Volume 1, Number 2 contents

Preface
1
Ann Ferguson Motherhood and Sexuality:
Some Feminist Questions
3
Jana Sawicki Foucault and Feminism:
Toward a Politics of Difference 23

Janice Raymond Female Friendship:

Contra Chodorow and
Dinnerstein 37

Cynthia A. Freeland Woman: Revealed or Revelled? 49

Cheryl H. Cohen The Feminist Sexuality Debate:

Ethics and Politics 71

Reyes Lazaro Feminism and Motherhood:

O'Brien vs Beauvoir 87

Janet Farrell-Smith Possessive Power 103

Anne Donchin The Future of Mothering:

Reproductive Technology and
Feminist Theory 121

Marjorie Weinzweig Should a Feminist Choose

A Marriage-Like Relationship? 139

References 161

Notes on Contributors 173

Announcements 175

Submission Guidelines 179

 This issue of Hypatia, a specialissue on Motherhoodand Sexual-
ity editedby Ann Ferguson,completesour first yearof publicationas
an autonomousjournal. It has been a year of many changes, begin-
ning this springwith the deathof an honoredmemberof our Advisory
Board, and friend, Simonede Beauvoir.Beauvoirgenerouslylent her
supportto Hypatiaas she did to so many feministprojectsbecauseof
her commitmentto the liberationof women. She believedwith a zeal
that seemed to some naive and out-of-step with the style-conscious,
post-modern1980'sthat the rootednessof literaturein historyshould
not be an excusefor obfuscationand superficialitybut a challengefor
philosophical clarity and action. Her contribution to feminist
philosophy was enormous, although she never saw herself as a
philosopher.
The Frenchfeministphilosopher,MicheleLeDoeuff, once observed
that Beauvoir'ssense of not being a "real" philosopherlike her close
associate Jean-PaulSartregoes back to her experienceat the Ecole
NormaleSuperior.Unlike Sartreshe was denied formaladmissionto
do graduatework in philosophybecauseof her sex. Althoughshe at-
tendedlecturesthereher senseof exclusionfromthe disciplineremain-
ed. When I asked Simonede Beauvoirabout her graduatework, she
vigorously denied having been a "Normalien" since she merely
"followed courses"thereas manyothershad. I askedif otherwomen
had ever been admitted. "No," she replied," but women who came
after me like Simone Weil were allowed to enroll." Simone de
Beauvoiropened many doors for the women who followed her. She
will be sorely missed.
This year has also broughtexcitingnew developmentsfor feminist
philosophers.Dr. Mary Ellen Waithe reportsthat two of Hypatia's
three known works have survived.Her Commentaryon Diophantus'
Arithmeticorumhas been translatedand Waithe has describedher
Commentaryon Ptolemy's Syntaxis Mathematicain a chapter on
Hypatia in A History of WomenPhilosophers, Volume I, Ancient
Women Philosophers: 600 B.C. - 500 A.D.. This volume is part of a
four-volume history of women philosophers Waithe is editing for
MartinMijhoff. In celebrationof this importantwork, we are issuing
a call for papers for a special issue on the History of Women
Philosophers.
The Hypatia circulationcontinuesto grow; we hope to have 1000
subscribersby the end of the year. We have also begun bookstore
distribution,so let us know about your favorite bookstores. In the
coming year, we plan to expand our publication schedule to three

1
 hypati

issues and to begin a Book Review section under the editorshipof

Jeffner Allen (See SubmissionGuidelinesfor more details on special
issues and the Book Review section). We have also begun plans to
reissue the first three annual issues of Hypatia and make them
availableto currentsubscribers.
Our success this year would not have been possible without the
generoussupportof manypersons.We are especiallyindebtedto Ann
Lazersonfor her efforts on behalf of Hypatia. I would also like to
thank: Kim Blankenship,Tamera Bryant, J.J. DeRousse, Thoraya
Halhoul, Kitty Henderson,MaureenKinsella,MariaPinckney, Den-
nis Pluta, Jan Scott, CathySurack,and Kate Taylor from SIUE and
the surroundingcommunities;Candida Lacey and Dale Spenderof
Women's Studies InternationalForum; Phyllis Hall of Pergamon
Press; from the Society for Women in Philosophy, the regional
Treasurers:SandraBartky, Ruth Doell, Bett Farber,Wanda Teays,
and Carol Van Kirk;the SWIPNewsletterEditor, MarilynFriedman;
Ti-GraceAtkinson for carryinga wreathfrom Hypatiato Beauvoir's
funeral;the memberof the Core Boardwhosevital role in shapingthe
course of Hypatia is finally acknowledgedwith the title of Associate
Editor; Libby Potter and the other individualSWIP memberswhose
personal encouragementand philosophicalexplorationshave made
Hypatia a reality.
Financial support in the form of loans, grants, and sustaining
subscriptionshas been vital in enablingHypatiato begin autonomous
publication.I wouldlike to gratefullyacknowledgethe generousgrant
from HamiltonCollege;the loans and grantsfrom the variousSWIP
divisions;and donations from individualsincluding:SandraBartky,
KathrynBlair, ClaudiaCard, ElizabethEames, SarahFowler, Nancy
Fraser,MarilynFriedman,MarilynFrye, MerrillHintikka, Lorraine
Ironplow, Carolyn Korsmeyer,Rhoda Kotzin, Eleanor Kuykendall,
Sharon Montgomery,MarilynNissim-Sabat,Andrea Nye, Elizabeth
Potter, Sara Ruddick, Nancy Skeen, MaryellenSymons, and Terry
Winant.

2
 ann ferguson

Motherhood and Sexuality:

Some Feminist Questions

This is a review essay that also serves as an introduction to the other

essays in the issue. It discusses feminist theory's relation to Freud,
feminist ethical questions on motherhood and sexuality, the historical
question of how systems of socially constructed sexual desire connect to
male dominance, the question of the role of the body in feminst theory,
and disputes within feminism on self, gender, agency and power.

I. Introduction

hereis a sense in whichmy motherwill alwaysbe

a centralpartof me. After all, in my young days when I
developedas a self, she was my all. Good and bad were
defined by her. So, at one level, even when I disagree
with her, she is my touchstoneof value. In the sameway
my daughterwill alwaysbe a partof that partof me that
is definedthroughmotherhood-and-childhood. In spite
of my ambivalence about mothering and being
mothered, childraisingand being childraisedhas been
an intrinsicvalue. Havinga child (and stepchildrentoo)
has given me an emotional security that no relations
with lovers (male or female) or husbandshave done.
After all, motherhoodis foreverif one wantsit to be: no
other commitment in our society can provide such
assurance!No marxistor liberaleconomic theory that
tries to graspthe relationbetweenmy childrenand I or
my mother(or grandmother)as simplya relationshipof
exchange (and thus of dominanceor oppression)will
have got it all. (From my diary, 11/26/85)
Readingthis entrytoday, I hear my contraryvoice disagreeing.After
all, thereis anotherway to see my self; or should I say anotheraspect
of my self? This alter aspect is not defined in terms of either my
mother or my children. Neither the same or in opposition is this
aspect, just different: as a leftist, a lesbian, a feminist and an

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Ann Ferguson.

3
 hypatia

academic, I am unlike both my mother and my daughter.How then

can I understandhow such a dividedself gains or loses power?This is
the way that my own personalquest for mentalhealthconnectsto one
of the importantquestions for feminist theory, i.e. the role of male
dominancein relationto motherhood,genderand sexuality.
One importantdirectionto look for the answer is toward an ap-
propriationof some aspectsof Freudiantheory.Thereseemto be four
popularpositionshere. Feministsby and largeagreethat Freud'sideas
cannot be saved as is, for they incorporatea biologisticand patriar-
chal theoryof "penis envy" to explaingenderidentity.Those who are
very concernedto emphasizecultural, racial and class differencesin
the social constructionof parenting,genderand sexualityrejectFreud
outrightas too Western-orientedand too universalisticin his theories.
Feministswho are influencedby the work of post-structuralistssuch
as Foucault are in this camp and Jana Sawicki'spaper in this issue
reflects this tendency.
The secondtendencyis representedby Nancy Chodorow(1978)and
DorothyDinnerstein(1976). These theoristsacceptthe idea that there
is a universalcross-culturalbase for male dominancerooted in the
social constructionof genderand sexualityin asymmetricalparenting
arrangements.Patriarchythus has an unconsciouspsychologicalbasis
independentof economic,politicaland social structureswhichcan on-
ly be eliminatedby a radicalreorganizationof the sexual division of
labor in the family and kin networks.
The thirdtendency,radicalfeminism,acceptsthe idea of a univer-
sal cross-culturalbase for patriarchyand also certain aspects of
Freud's thought (Firestone 1971). However, since most radical
feminists are also lesbian-feminists,they are much more sharply
criticalof Chodorowand Dinnerstein'sstress on co-parentingas the
solutionto male dominance.Instead,they take compulsoryheterosex-
ualiltyto be the key mechanismof male dominance,by which means
the original woman-identifiederotic tie between mother and infant
daughteris broken and patriarchyis installed. AdrienneRich (Rich
1976, 1980) was the groundbreakingradical feminist thinker on the
connection between motherhood and compulsory heterosexualilty.
Jan Raymond (1979) emphasizesin her new book, A Passion for
Friends: A Philosophy of Female Affection (1986) and in her article
here, "FemaleFriendship:ContraChodorowand Dinnerstein,"that
Chodorow's emphasis on women's mothering and sexual relations
with men ignoresthe more importantbase of patriarchy,whichis the
coercive nature of hetero-relations,whetherof kinship, sexualityor
friendship.Since male bondingis the key mechanismfor reproducing
male dominance, Raymondargues that women's friendshipsare the

4
 ann ferguson

the key to female resistanceto patriarchy.

The fourthcontemporaryfeministuse of Freudianthoughis a revi-
sion whichcombinessome of his cross-culturalinsightswith concepts
which allow us to historicizedifferent types of male dominanceand
female resistance. We can divide these theorists further into three
groups: Lacanians (Juliet Mitchell 1974, Gallop 1982), French
feministsKristeva(1979, 1980), Irigaray(1974, 1977, 1979), and Cix-
ous (1976), and Gayle Rubin's sex/gender systems theory (Rubin
1975).
Mitchell and Lacan (in Mitchell and Rose 1982) give a quasi-
historical rendition of Freud by combining his theory with that of
Levi-Strausson the cross-culturalmale exchangeof women in mar-
riage which defines kinshipties. Accordingto these thinkers,women
then become defined as objects rather than subjects of language.
Children,when developinggender identity and forming their sexual
desire come to define the masculine position as the object of the
mother'sdesire,hence desirableand powerful,and the feminineposi-
tion as a lack of power, hence undesirable.Though the exchangeof
womenin kin ties is no longerthe centralorganizingprincipleof soci-
ety, patriarchycontinuesto be reproducedby the unconsciousstruc-
ture of masculineand feminineDesire.
Lacan's interpretationof Freud has been appropriatedby some
French feminists to suggest a way of challengingpatriarchy.Lacan
suggeststhat the woman who passivelyallows herself to be loved, to
be the object ratherthan the subject of Desire, may attain a type of
jouissance, mysticalsexual pleasure, not availableto women or men
who seek activelyto satisfy sexualDesire. The truly femininewoman,
being outside the assumptionsof patriarchallanguage, has another
way of being, enjoying and knowing not bound by these limitations.
Kristeva, Irigarayand Cixous, while challengingmany of Lacan's
assumptions,all accept the idea that woman's unique relationto our
bodies as subjects outside the assumptionsof phallic language, our
uniquerelationto our mothersand our sexuality,createdthe possibil-
ity for a radicallynew feminine writing and sensibility outside the
patriarchy.
Cynthia Freelandchallengesthis view in her article in this issue,
"Woman:Revealedor Reveiled?"She takes on the obscureLacanian
theories of Desire, Self and Gender by using them to interpretthe
feminine roles juxtaposed in Nathanial Hawthorne's The Blithedale
Romance. Lacan's views both romanticizeand devalue women, she
argues, since he presentswomen as universalvictims of patriarchy
who unconsciouslyalwaysdesiretheir own oppression.The only way
out of the circleof phallicdesire, he suggests,is for women to eschew

5
 hypatia

active sexuality(alwaysphallic)and to revel passivelyin their bodily

Othernessto men, for in not actively seekingsexual pleasureit may
happen to them unexpectedly!Freelandpoints out how this indirect
approach to feminine liberation mars the strategies of Lacan's
erstwhilefollower, Luce Irigaray,who seems to suggest that women
should not seek to describe, generalizeor articulatetheir desire for
fear of falling into phallocentriclogic.
While I acceptFreeland'scriticismsof Lacanand of one "natural"
readingof Irigaray'swork, I think there is another way of reading
Irigaraywhichsaves her enterprisefrom fatalistconclusionsFreeland
sees in it. I read Irigarayas seeking to revalorizewomen's bodies by
reconstructingtheir meaning, while acknowledgingthe hold that
phallic signifiershave had in coding the Unconscious.
Irigaraywants to open a descriptivespace for women which is
ironic:that is, a discoursewhichseemsto providea universaldescrip-
tion of the multipleand diffuse natureof women'sbodily sexualityas
opposed to men's, but in actualityinvites women to consult our own
individual, diverse and multiple bodily experiences in order to
reconceptualizethe individual"body and its pleasures"(as Foucault
mightsay). Thus thereis a nonessentialistreadingof Irigarayin which
her work, unlike Lacan's, points us in the important direction of
reconceptualizingthe role of our bodies in genderand sexualityin in-
dividual and relativeterms. Irigaray'sworkis importantas a partof a
more generalfeministprojectof re-assessingthe role that bodily dif-
ferencesbetweenmen and women play in reproducingpatriarchyand
also, potentially,in underminingit.
WhileMitchelland the FrenchFeministstry to reconstructFreudin
a way that can allow us to take historicaldifferencesand changesinto
account, ultimatelyit seems to me that they fail in this task. Gayle
Rubin's appropriationof Lacan is more promising as an overall
theoreticalparadigmthan either Mitchellor Irigaraybecause of her
innovative concept of "sex/gender systems." Rubin defines a
"sex/gender system" in a manneranalogousto a "mode of produc-
tion," that is as a historicallybased set of categories of kinship,
genderand sexualitywherebya sociallyproducedsexualityand gender
is createdout of biologicalsexuality.However,herown workdoes not
applyherconceptof sex/gendersystemsto allow us to understandand
periodize historical types of male dominances. Isaac Balbus (1982)
comes closer to a historicalapplicationbut his paradigmis too neo-
Hegelian,in my opinion, in his concentrationof the dialecticbetween
autonomy and merging that different types of parenting practices
create.
In my own work I try to carry Rubin's analyticalinsights further

6
 ann ferguson

(Ferguson 1981a, 1981b, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986 forthcoming). I

coin the idea of "sex/affective production systems," i.e. historical
systemsof parenting,sexualityand nurturance(friendships,kin rela-
tions, work bonding). I agreewith Folbre(1983, 1984)that the ques-
tion of biological reproduction(fertility rates) is a key factor of
economic productionthat mainstreamand Marxisteconomistshave
ignored. The historicallyvariableneed for children'slabor, and the
work necessary for childrearing,are part of the material base for
socially constructedpatriarchalmodes of sex/affective production.
These systemsorganizethe social practicesof marriage,prostitution,
kin networksand stigmatizationof homosexualpracticesthat allow
men's control of women's bodies. In the process men dominate
women's sexuality,nurturance,an unequalexchangeof genderlabor
and control of the key product, children.
I argue that there are tri-systems of social domination (class,
race/ethnicand gender)operatingin Americansocietytoday, each of
which is semi-autonomous and which have separate dynamics.
Although I have criticizedChodorowin the past, as of this momentI
think it may be possible to historicizesome of both Chodorow and
Mitchell's reconstructionof the Freudiantheory of gender develop-
ment so as to understandthe cross-culturalbase for male dominance
along her lines while at the same time not erasing important dif-
ferencesin how race, ethnic, class and sexual identity position may
differentlyconstructgenderdynamics(Ferguson1985, mss.)

II. Feminist Ethics of Motherhood and Sexuality

Shouldtherebe a feministethicsof sexualityand motherhood?This
questionis morecentralthan it mightotherwiseseemto the American
women'smovementtoday. It is to be expectedthat a social movement
demandingliberation of women from patriarchalvalues would be
called upon to develop its own values, not only to confront conser-
vativeswith a coherentvision of an alternativeset of ethicalstandards
for personallife, but to provideguidelinesfor a feministoppositional
cultureto show forth its values by attemptingto exemplifythem.
Problemshave immediatelyarisen,however,with the demandfor a
set of feministalternativevaluesand the insistencethat the personalis
the political. It is much easier to reject male breadwinner-female
housewifemarriageas the ideal way to organizeparentingand sexual-
ity than it is to decidewhichalternativelife stylesare feminist!Should
we be monogamousor non-monogamous?Livealone, in couplesor in
communalhouseholds?Be lesbianor straight?And whateverhappen-
ed to bisexualityin the shuffle to claim a vanguardfeminist sexual

7
 hypatia

identity?Or celibacy?Or prioritizingfriendshipsover one's love life?

Is prostitutiona life-style that any self-respectingfeminist should re-
ject? Sincemotherhoodas an institutionhas beenso infusedwith male
dominance, should feminists reject motherhood altogether? Or at
least avoid committing themselvesto bringing up boys? (After all,
motherhood involves self-sacrificeenough, and if, as some radical
feministssuggest, men are incorrigible,why should one sacrificetime
to bring up boys which might better be spent helping women (in-
cluding oneself)?
The decision to mother unavoidably requires one to define a
feministethicby whichto guideone's parentingchoices. For example,
should beinga motherbe a commitmentthat one makesindependent-
ly of a commitmentto a lover or mate? How should childrenbest be
broughtup to have feminist values? Should we commit ourselvesto
co-parentingwith a father (when he is available)on the groundsthat
this is most desirablefor the childreneven when it may limit our own
options, as when the mother has a new lover-mate-partnerbut has
previouslyengagedin co-parentingwith the father?(Thisis often par-
ticularlydifficult when the new lover is a woman.) What about the
situation of the child who has a numberof co-parents,each subse-
quent lovers of (one of her) mothers?(My former "house" daughter
has one biologicalmother, one biologicalfatherand threesubsequent
co-parentingmothers!)What do we teach them (and think ourselves)
about the issues of sex education, incest, adult/child sexuality,
child/child sexuality, erotica, pornography,fantasies of rape, S/M
sex? Can one be feministand engagein and/or recommendsuch prac-
tices to others?
With respect to a feminist sexual morality, the recent debate has
been dominated by radical feminists on one pole and those I call
"libertarian" feminists on the other (Ferguson 1984b). While the
formercan be criticizedfor overemphasizingthe power of patriarchy
to constructmen with sadisticand womenwith masochisticdesires(cf.
rDworkin1974, 1982;MacKinnon1979, 1982, 1983),the latterend up
validatingany consensualpracticeat all, thus slidinginto a "do your
own thing" mentality(Califia 1981;Rubin 1982, 1984;Rubin,English
and Hollibaugh 1981). While this stance has a certainplausibilityfor
consentingadults,it is unworkableas a guide for dealingwithchildren
about sex. Part of the commitmentof motherhoodafter all is to form
one's children'svalues in a way one considershealthyuntil the point
wherethey are consideredmatureenough to make theirown choices.
While the vagueness of what counts as achieving this "maturity"
createsthe possibilityof muchmisuseof parentalpower, the dilemma
is a real one which is not dissolved by those who argue that mutual

8
 ann ferguson

consent, not age, is the sole criterionon whichsexualpracticesshould

be approved. For the question simply pops up again in trying to
establish under what conditions it is plausibleto assume consent is
really present.
Cheryl Cohen, in "The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and
Politics," challengesthe libertarianposition, arguingthat feminists
cannot eschewthe politicaltask of attemptingto constructa feminist
sexual morality. She argues that the current sex debate in the
Women's Movementneeds to take account of Gilligan's distinction
betweena masculine"rights" ethic and a feminine"responsibilities"
morality. Using the latter approachwe must insist on reconstructing
the distinctionbetween public and privatethat early feminist theory
broke down with its insistencethat the personalis the political. While
feminists should support public policy which guaranteesindividuals
the right to many forms of sexual expressionin their private life it
does not necessarilyfollow that what is privatelymorallyacceptable
(that is, should be protectedfrom being restrictedby state policy) is
politically liberatoryfrom a feminist ethical point of view.
While I agree with Cohen that we must reject the relativist "do
your own thing" implications of the libertariansexual liberation
strategy, she herself seems to underemphasize this strategy's
historical importance to counteract a certain smug puritanismof
radical lesbian-feministthought. Even if we agree to make the
distinction she urges between feminist state policy on sexualityand
our prescriptions for an oppositional liberatory feminist sexual
ethics, we must find a way to permit people to challengestatus quo
norms in their personal sexual interactions.Libertariansare on the
righttrackwhen they insist on the value of sexualpleasurefor its own
sake. But this does not imply that there are not other values (emo-
tional intimacy, autonomy, equality, self-respect, etc.), which are
also ends in themselves.We must examine sexual practicescontext-
ually and not abstractlyto seek which of them can betterachievenot
merely pleasure but these other ends as well. The search for a
feministsexualliberatoryethics must find a middlegroundbetweena
"nothing goes but lesbianvanilla sex" moralismand an "everything
goes" sexualexperimentalism.We seek not merelya transitionalsex-
ual morality, one which allows us autonomy from the sexual repres-
sion characteristicof 20th century capitalist patriarchy,but also a
theory of self-development,tactics and strategyto change ourselves
and a vision of where we are going.
Otherpapersin this issue attemptto developtheoriesof autonomy,
reproductionand self-developmentto providethe groundworkfor an
ethics of motherhoodand sexuality. MarjorieWeinzweigdevelopsa

9
 hypatia

Heideggeriannotion of "autonomous-being-with-others" as the ideal

mode of combiningthe feministvaluesof equality,freedomand self-
development.She combinesthis with a threestage theory of develop-
ment which then yields answersto when and how to engage in mar-
riage, couple relationshipsand parenthood. Anne Donchin in "The
Future of Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Feminist
Theory"defendswhat she calls a "moderateinterventionist"position
on the question of what feminists' stance should be on the develop-
ment of reproductive technology. In "Possessive Power" Janet
Farrell-Smitharguesthat feministsshould demandrights against the
state whichallow for parenthoodunderconditionsof autonomy.And
Jan Raymondargues, at least by implication, that heterosexualco-
parenting should never take precedenceover women's friendships,
and thus that the ethical injunction to co-parent, regularlydrawn
from Chodorow and Dinnerstein'swork, should be rejected. For
furtherdiscussionof these claims I referthe readerto sectionsbelow.

III. Sexuality and Desire

Ironically,Americanradical feminist thepriesof motherhoodand
eroticismof Rich(1976, 1980)and Daly (1978, 1984)manifestsome of
the same over-simplificationsof the relation as does Freud's work.
Eroticismin motheringis assumedto be a naturalgiven, an otherwise
unproblematicjoyous connectionbetweenmothersandchildrenwhich
patriarchyand compulsory heterosexualityrepresses. Like Irigaray
and Flaxmy alternativereadingof sexualityassumesthatthereis a pro-
blematicinherentto mother/childeroticrelationswhichhas littleto do
with the power of the father or adult lover (male or female) or the
mother. This is that the inevitablepowerdifferentialbetweenmother
and child createsan autonomy/eroticismconflict for childrenof both
sexes which will tend to lead them to attemptto find other erotic ob-
jects in orderto establisha sense of independencefrom the mother.
My view of sexualitydiffersfromFreudin that I theorizean inherent
predilectionfor social relationswithothersbuiltinto humaneroticism.
I agree with the emphasis of Objects Relations theory that human
understandingsof self are constructionfromrelationswithothers.But
unlike the Chodorowianversion, I would hold that masculine and
femininegender personalitieshave no cross-cultural,cross-classand
cross-racialcontent. Rather,they dependimportantlyon the natureof
the familystructure(extended,nuclear,maleor femaleheaded,etc.) in
whichchildrenare raised.In nuclearfamilieswherethe oppositionbe-
tween an erotic relationto the motherand a distancedrelationto the
father is present, childrenof either sex who identify with the father

10
 ann ferguson

may assumesuch identificationcarriesthe consequencethat no erotic

relationis possible with a personof the male sex. In nuclearfamilies
where the mother herself has a suppressedor ambivalenteroticism
towardthe childrenand the fathera more erotic one, the conseqences
may be the converse.Extendedfamilieswherethereis more than one
significant female kin doing motheringmay providechildrenwith a
choice of erotic objects and self-identifications.
Another way that Freud's theory of gender and sexual identity
developmentis mistakenis the deterministicemphasisit puts on fam-
ily relations and childhood developmentas opposed to childhood,
adolescentand adult peer and communityinteractions.Like the sym-
bolic interactionists(Simonand Gagnon 1973;Plummer1975)I hold
that genderand sexualidentityis a processsubjectto constantchange
by one's relationswith one's peerreferencegroupsas one's earlyfam-
ily experiences.Freud'semphasison the latterignoresthe key impor-
tance of whetherone is defined as "normal" or "deviant" by one's
peers.
In my view, what follows from the emphasison genderand sexual
identityas an ongoing process is that oppositionalculturalnetworks
for heterosexualand lesbian-feministswhichredefinethe meaningand
value of "femininity," femininesexualpleasure,and lesbianidentity
thus become extremelyimportantmodes of resistanceto dominant
identificationswhichtie womento patriarchaland heterosexistvalues.
What explains the apparentuniversalityof male dominance and
compulsoryheterosexualitycross-culturally?Ratherthan locatingthe
persistenceof these featuresin a repressedor tabooed mother/child
sexuality, my readingof sexualityrejects the idea of a sexual drive
whose major aim is bodily satisfaction, and a secondary, or
sublimated,interestin emotionalor affectionaterelationswith others.
Rather, human sexual energy is always both emotional and affec-
tionate energy, what I would call "sex/affective energy." Sex/affec-
tive energy has a double-sided aim: the desire to be incor-
porated/unitedwith other social subjectsand in doing so to achieve
bodily pleasure(e.g. not merelyorgasm:simple touching, as in hug-
ging, satisfies this desire). Although tension reduction is achieved
when orgasm is achieved, tension reductionper se is not, as Freud
thought,the ultimateaim of humansexualitybut a healthyside effect.
Althoughemotionalincorporationwith othersis a key aim of sex/af-
fectiveenergy,partialsatisfactionof this desirecan be attainedby sex-
ual practicesthat substitutean imaginaryrelationwith othersor with
oneself, e.g. as in masturbation.
It is my view that historicallydifferentforms of the family, embed-
ded in different modes of sex/affective production, mesh together

11
 hypatia

with differenteconomic modes of productionto yield differentsocial

practiceswith respectto motherhood,friendshipand sexuality.These
in turn have differentgeneralimplicationsfor the strengthof patriar-
chy in that period, as well as for opportunitiesfor oppositionalprac-
tices of feminist resistance(Ferguson 1984a). For example, in New
Englandcolonial familiesmotherhoodand sexualitywereassumedto
go togetherby Calvinistideology. Since this was evil, fatherswereex-
pectedto intervenein the mother/childrelationshipin orderto break
the will of the child, since it was assumedthat the motherby herself
would encourage the child to be lustful. Female resistancein this
period no doubt consisted in persisting in eroticism with young
children in spite of paternal interdictionsand, more generally, by
prioritizingthe needs of the body (through "witchcraft," taught by
elders to youngsters)over the presumedneeds of the soul.
Other examples of a changed ideological relation between
motherhood, friendshipand sexuality, and hence different forms of
feministresistance,can be drawnfrom what I term 19thcentury"hus-
band patriarchy"and 20th century "public patriarchy"(Ferguson
1984a). In the 19th century bourgeois family, "true" women in
naturalmotherhoodwerepresumedto be asexual. Women'ssole goal
in life was to the high vocations of wife and motherhood.Feminine
resistancein this period included sexual abstinencewhich led to a
reduction in fertility rates for women (called by some "domestic
feminism," (cf. Scott-Smith 1974), prostitution (for working class
women)and female spiritualand presumablyasexualfriendshipsthat
allowed for women's peerbondingoutsideof patriarchallycontrolled
families (Faderman1981;Smith-Rosenberg1975).
Conditionsfor public patriarchyin the 20th centuryhave included
the expansion of wage labor to include fulltime work for married
women, publicwelfareprovisionsfor poor singlemothersand the ex-
pansionof statecontrolof childhoodsocializationby publicschooling
and social serviceagencies. Psychoanalysiscreatedthe categoryof a
homosexualidentityas well as the new ideal of the heterosexualsex-
ually passionate companionate marriage (Jackson 1983). These
changeshave weakenedthe patriarchalcontrolof individualmen over
women and childrenin familieswhile strengtheningthe powerof men
to control women and childrenthroughwage labor, the state and sex-
ual liasons. One resulthas been the expansionof the feminizationof
poverty through the increase of single mother-headed families.
Womenhave escapedoppressivemarriagesonly to fall into increased
exploitationas the sole parentassumingboth domesticand breadwin-
ner responsibilityfor childrearing.
There are many forms of feminist resistanceto this contemporary

12
 ann ferguson

form of patriarchy. Many women have delayed or bypassed

motherhoodas a primarylife goal. In the sexual sphere some have
consciouslyexpressedfeministresistanceby choosinga lesbianidenti-
ty and lifestyle. For others feminist independence has involved
separatingheterosexualsexualityand motherhoodby contraceptive
use. The permanentmonagamousfamily has been challengedby in-
creasing divorces, extramaritalsex, single motherhood and singles
lifestylesin general.
The point of these historicalexamplesis to suggestthat since com-
pulsoryheterosexualityand sexual repressiontake different forms in
different modes of sex/affective production,we must develop a new
paradigmof sexualityand sexual liberationthat itself is more social
than the Libido that Freudassumes. Sexual Desire is determinedby
specific, not general conditions of patriarchy:that is, by specific
forms of the family, schooling,and the sexualdivisionof wage labor.
The Unconsciousis continuallybeing createdand modified, not only
in childhood but by the implicit "sex/affective" assumptionsof our
ongoing friendship,romanticand sexual relationswith each other.
Such a paradigmof Sexualitywill allow us to highlightthe current
importanceof a lesbian-feministidentityas a type of feministsexual
liberation without supposing that this is the universal vanguard
resistanceto patriarchyas Rich (1980) seems to suggest. It will also
allow us to focus on the specific historical drawbacksand oppor-
tunities that single motherhoodin the 20th centuryraises both with
advanced reproductivetechnologies (cf. the Donchin article in this
issue) and the changednatureof male exploitationof women in the
asymmetrical relations of parenting and childcare (Brown 1981,
Ferguson 1984a).

IV. Conceptualizing the Body in Motherhood and Sexuality

Feministtheoristsneed to developa distinctivesocio-biologyof our
own, one which allows us, as Adrienne Rich and the French Feminists
suggest, to "think the body." Yet this cannot be in the way that con-
servative, mainstream sociobiology proceeds. We have to come to
terms with the perhaps irreversible gendered social differences that are
predicated on our sex-biological differences, to seek if this will
necessarily involve a different view on the social world, a different at-
titude toward parenting, etc. This whole area of reproductive dif-
ferences between the sexes has been mostly ignored by marxists, who
prefer to confuse the issue by insisting that social reproduction is the
relevant category, rather than biological reproduction. The whole
study of demography is thus given short shrift. For them, the question

13
 hypatia
of whether women's bodies, as a (re)productiveforce of economic
production, set up material conditions which create, influence or
cause male dominance to control these (re)productiveforces, is a
study left as an interestingsidelightto economics and anthropology
but not really theorized to be part of the marxist theory of the
"economic" processper se (Folbre 1982, 1984).
Feministtheoristscan be arrangedin a continuumin theirattitudes
on the sociobiologicalimplicationsof bodily differencesbetweenmen
and women,. One pole originateswith Beauvoir(1952)and is takenup
by Firestone(1971). O'Brien(1981), Rich, Ruddick(1980, 1984)and
Hartsock(1983)can be loosely juxtaposedon the other. The first pole
treatswomen's reproductivedifferencesfrom men as a liability;while
the second treats it, ultimately, as an asset. Rossi (1977), a liberal
feminist, is hard to place in this spectrumsince she seems more con-
cerned to defend the necessity of the status quo gender division of
childrearingthan the relevanceof her sociobiologicaltheoryof paren-
tal and sexual differencesbetween men and women for the perpet-
uation of male dominance.
What is distinctiveabout O'Brien is that she tries to give a non-
static, dialecticalaccount of how it is that women's metaphysicalad-
vantage over men, women's species continuity via their special rela-
tion to children,causesmen to counterby creatingpatriarchalstates.
These patriarchal states create a public/private split, and a
nature/cultureideological division in which women are relegatedto
the privatesphereas propertyof men in orderto allow men paternal
control over children.Patriarchyhas been able to surviveas long as it
has due to the ideology that women, as naturalreproducers,belong in
the home as possessions of men. This ideology however cannot be
maintainedin the face of a revolutionin the reproductiveforces of
society; viz. the mass productionof contraceptivetechnology. Power
for women and feminist theory grounded in our distinctivefemale
reproductiveconsciousnessare now joint possibilities.
Reyes Lazaro, in "Feminismand Motherhood"in this issue takes
on O'Brien's argument.O'Brien claims to give us a dialecticaland
materialisticaccountof women'soppressionbut it ends up being con-
tradictoryon a numberof points. A key claim is the implausibleand
ahistoricalone that humansneed "species continuity." O'Brienuses
this idea as a way to valorize motherhoodand provide men with a
motive to dominatewoman. Howeverthe idea boomerangsbecause,
as Lazaropoints out, O'Brien'stheory ignores the specific historical
features of societies which strengthenor weaken male dominance,
such as the economic need for children'slabor, which exists in some
modes of production(and in some classes) but not others. She thus

14
 ann ferguson

cannot explain why the patriarchalnuclear family is giving way, in

contemporaryAmericansociety, to a vast increasein single mother-
headedhouseholds.Furthermore,her technologicaland metaphysical
emphasesignorethe key symbolicimplicationsof contraception,that
sex as pleasurecan be moreeasily distinguishedfrom sex as reproduc-
tion. What follows, however, is not the automatic elimination of
men's control over women's bodies in sexualityas O'Brienseems to
suggest but a potentialshift in the way men use sexualityto control
women: no longer so much to guaranteethe productionof children
but ratherto control the productionof sexualpleasurefor themselves
(Jackson 1983;Jeffreys 1986)!
Janet Farrell-Smithdiscusses Beauvoir'scontributionto feminist
theoryin herpaperin this issue. She discussesthe root meaningof "to
alienate," make other, which contains both the positive value of
creating and producing, and the negative estrangementsense of
separationor loss of self. Beauvoirthinksthat creatinganotherself by
biological motherhoodcan involve only the negativedynamic, since
one cannotcreatethe valueof anotherhuman'slife (that mustbe self-
createdby each person).
Farrell-Smithdisagreeswith Beauvoiron this point. She arguesthat
the necessaryexistenceof a self-other tension in mother/child rela-
tionshipsdoes not have to yield the bad aspectof possessivepower, a
dominationof the other. These are not due to naturalalienationin
childbearingbut to social and patriarchalpower relations.The solu-
tion is not, as some suggest, to reject motherhoodaltogether(Allen
1984),but to reconstitutethe possessivepower of motherhoodby ex-
pandingthe legal and moral rightsof women to control reproductive
decisions and claim for ourselvesand others a sense of belongingin
families or communities,without imposing upon others our (or my)
reason for existence.
PresumablyFarrell-Smithis here advocatingthe need for a strong
feministcounterculturewhich may includemen as fathersand lovers
but whichreservesa distinctive"mother-right"to women againstthe
patriarchalstate. Her perspectivehere is an importantcorrectiveto
the Chodorow/Dinnersteinideal of co-parenting,whichpresentsitself
as if in an androgynousvacuum, and as if the fact that women not
men bear babies were not in principlean importantdifference that
must be taken into account in all plausiblereorganizationsof paren-
ting relations. If women, because we bear the babies, always have
more prima facie right to keep them in the case of divorce, in what
sensecan therebe "equal" co-parenting?Is the suggestionfinallythat
men have equal obligations to childbearingbut not equal rights to
make reproductiveor child custody decisions?

15
 hypatia
Anne Donchinpursuesthe implicationsof reproductivedifferences
between the sexes for feminist perspectives on motherhood and
reproductive technology. She distinguishes between non-
interventionists,moderateinterventionistsand radicalinterventionists
on the questionof the extentto whichsociety ought to aim to develop
reproductivetechnologiesthat minimizereproductivedifferencesbe-
tween men and women. Although there are religious conservatives
who are non-interventionistsbecause they assume the natural func-
tions of sexualityand reproductionshould not be tamperedwith by
humans,the feministdebateis betweenmoderateand radicalinterven-
tionists. ThusRich(1976)and Raymond(1984)are moderateinterven-
tionists, who value biological motherhood, fear male-dominated
technologicaldevelopmentbut want to guaranteethat existing birth
control technologywill continue to be availableto women.
Rich and Raymond's view is at odds with radicalinterventionists
Firestoneand Piercy (1976) who favor artificialreproductivetechni-
ques which will eventullyremove the necessityof childbearingfrom
women. Donchin attempts to mediate betweenthe two positions by
arguingthat the woman's movementshould avoid a symbolicsplit on
these policy issues which ultimately stem from totally devaluing
biologicalmotherhoodand the risks that need to be taken to protect
or replaceit.
In my opinion, Donchin is correct that both tendencies are
overblownbecausethey ignorethe existenceof contradictoryfeatures
of the mother/child relationshipand its implications for feminist
goals (Sayers1984). Since therewill be many women who will choose
biological motherhoodin spite of its drawbacks,some who will seek
other avenuesto motherhood,and some who will avoid it altogether,
we should seek pragmaticways to influencereproductiveinnovations
that reflect the diversityof women's needs in this area, at the same
time as we challengemale control of this new technology.

V. Self, Gender and Agency

The relevantmetaphysicalquestions for feminist theory all center
aroundthe questionof Agency, such as, what is the natureof the Self
(Subject)? Is the subject essentiallyor accidentallyrelated to other
people? Are the subject's actions determinedby social structuresor
voluntarilychosen (structuralismvs. voluntarism)?The mind/body
question is raised by the question of the role of the biological
reproductivedifferences between men's and women's bodies and
whethertheseset the stage for a diferenttype of consciousness,or way
of knowingthe world, that is distinctivelymasculineor feminine.

16
 ann ferguson

The question of Agency as it connects to different types of con-

sciousnesscan be answeredby a phenomenologicalapproach.For ex-
ample, Majorie Weinzweigtakes agency to be an "authentic" or
"automatic"or "autonomous"consciousnessas opposed to an "in-
authentic" or "merged" consciousness. From this point of view,
agencyis not a given but a state to be strivenfor, in a dialecticalpro-
cess with others. For there is a Hegelian "strugglefor recognition"
betweenany consciousnessand any other: people need autonomyin
the senseof the abilityto makeindependentchoices, whileat the same
time their need to merge with, get affirmationand nurturancefrom
othersimpliesthat they can only get the sense of self-worththey need
whenotherssupportthemto do so. Assumingsucha dialecticbetween
the need for autonomyas independencefrom othersand the need for
recognitionby, and identificationwith others, whatare the best social
practices(parenting,sexual/love liasons, household choice) to pro-
mote a balanceof each?
Weinzweig argues that there is an ideal state for humans,
autonomous-being-with-others through which the autonomy/recog-
nition dynamiccan be overcome.This is only possible,however,if in-
dividuals go through certain stages of development.Thus for most
people, living separatelyfrom a lover is an importantstrategy for
establishingneededautonomy.A potentialcontradictionin needsmay
arise for single motherswhose lover dynamicwould be better served
by living separatelyfrom theirloversbut whose childrenmay be given
a betterchance for autonomyby the kind of diversityin adult signifi-
cant others offered by a communalhousehold. I have experienceda
solution to this conflict: a parent cooperative learning community
(ours was an alternativeschool) in which parents live in separate
householdsyet create a kin-likecommunityof adult role models for
the childrenand counterculturalpeer supportsfor both childrenand
adults (Ferguson1981b).
The phenomenologicalquestions of how to understandcertain
states of consciousnessin termsof their politicaland ethical implica-
tions shades into the questionsabout the natureof the self from the
psychologicaland sociologicalpoint of view. For example,thereis an
analogy (if not an identity)betweenphenomenologicaltalk about a
dialecticbetweenan autonomousand an embeddedconsciousnessand
the psychoanalytictalk of "object relations"theoristsChodorowand
Flax, who talk about a conflict betweennurturanceand autonomyin
stages of infant ego development.
Weinzweig'snotion of a dialecticbetweenthe autonomousand the
mergedconsciousnesssharesa problemwith Chodorow'sdichotomy
between permeable/rigid ego boundaries (the latter's way to

17
 hypatia

distinguishfemininefrom masculinegenderpersonalities).This is that

(1) they are static not historicalcategoriesand (2) they assumea one
dimensional theory of the Self that is problematic. Criticisms of
Chodorow have centeredaround the misleadinguniversalizationof
male dominancesuggested.The suggestionthat thereis some common
"core" to men's and women's personalitiescross-culturallyis a slip-
pery one indeed. If the idea of rigid/permeableego boundariesis to
work at all it may need to be made relativeto differentaspectsof the
personality.
Let us consideras an examplehow a relativizationto aspectsof self
expressedin differentsocial practicesmighthandleracialdiferencesin
femininegenderidentityin America.Some Black feministsarguethat
racismin Americaforces blackwomento developa strongSelf/Other
dichotomy when it comes to race (Josephs 1981). But it does not
follow that this Self/Other dichotomy is as strong in a male/female
sexuallove bond withinthe blackcommunityas it is in black/whitein-
teractionsin politics or at the workplace.
Chodorow's early more sociological work (Chodorow 1974) sug-
gests that in contexts where women's economic and social networks
make them socially independentof men, they may develop a per-
sonality characterizedby "mature dependence" while if they are
isolated as economicallydependenthousewivesthey may have per-
sonalitiescharacterizedby immaturedependence.This move suggests
we should conceptualize different variables to explain these dif-
ferences.
My theory conceptualizes the Self as consisting of aspects, one of
which is an incorporativeand the other a self-interestedor opposi-
tional aspect. The incorporativeaspect involves identification and
merging with others while the bargaining,self-interestedaspect in-
volves the separationof one's interestsfrom those of relevantothers.
Theseaspectscan operateas indivividualpotentialswhichare more or
less developedin particularindividualsdependingon the complex of
social practicesin which they are involved.
This theoryof the Self explainsdifferencesof gender,raceand class
in the core identitiesof people by supposingthat a womancan have a
permeableego boundary in those gender practices(e.g. sexual and
family practices)where strong masculineand feminine complemen-
taryyet incorporativerelationsare assumedyet have a rigidego boun-
daryin social practiceswhererace and class oppositionalinterestsare
predominantfeatures (e.g. the workplace,schools, political interac-
tions betweenblack and white communitiesetc.).
There are social practicesin which many aspects of self (gender,
race, class) may be involved simultaneously.Some of these practices

18
 ann ferguson

involve contradictoryself/other dynamicsfrom the point of view of

the individualinvolved.Thus, for example,singlemothersin extended
kin networksmay engage both their oppositional, bargainingaspect
and their incorporativeaspectsin relationto their love.

VI. Power
Feministtheory must have a philosophicaltheory of power and its
sources to complete a theory of human agency. Possessive in-
dividualisttheoriessee poweras possessionsof individuals,viz. their
abilitiesto get others to do what they want, which should only be in-
terferedwith by social institutionssuch as the state in extremecir-
cumstances.Marxisttheoriesof poweron the other handtend toward
structuralism,i.e the view that it is social roles and institutionalized
rulesof the game that createpowerratherthan invididualabilitiesand
wills.
The problem with both marxist and classical liberal notions of
power is that they are too "centrist" in their approach to social
power. Althoughthey differ in whetherthey see poweras a possession
that some groupscan use againstothersor as a social processin which
prescribedrules of the game give one set of playersgreatercontrol
over goods and resourcesthan others, they both agree that thereis a
central "social site," viz. the state or the economy, in which some
people are enabledto be more effective in the ongoing politicaldeci-
sions of the society than others.
WhereFoucaultwoulddiffer is (1) his de-centeredunderstandingof
power: power comes from social practicesin all and any social site,
anarchistically.It comes throughthe quasi-accidentaldevelopmentof
discoursesthat come to be used manipulativelyby agents for short
term goals in ways that (2) are not merely repressive(power on the
juridico-coercivemodel)but also "productive,"i.e. they allow people
to "reconstitute"themselvesand their interests.
Is Foucault a philosopherof power whose approachis of use for
feminists or not? Radical feminists may disagree with Foucault
because he refuses to universalizeany one centralized system of
power, e.g. patriarchy,whichwe can say operatesin a totalist fashion
cross-culturally and trans-historically. Rather than attempt to
discoveran innercontinuityor logic to history, he sees social domina-
tion as discontinuous, as a matter of localized and contextualized
"power-knowledge."Particulartechniques,developedto controlone
population, e.g. prison techniques, are used on another, e.g. in
schools and the army.Thisassumesthat it is an essentialistabstraction
toclaim that men, as a sex/class, are alwaysself-consciousagentsout

19
 hypatia

to control women. Rather, some men, e.g. the sexologists, create a

discourse to help them control their hysterical women patients
(psycho-analysis),and this discoursebecomesgeneralizedas a techni-
que used to control those defined as "perverse"(women, homosex-
uals, neuroticsand psychotics,young children).The social powerthat
emanatesfrom thesepracticesnot only producesthe kindof sexuality,
self-identities, neuroses and psychoses so categorized, but it also
generatesresistances;viz. feminists,lesbianand gay activists,who re-
ject the characterizationof "perverse"or "deviant" implied in the
discourseand set out to subvertor invertthis discourse.
If we carry the implicationsof the Foucauldianapproachto their
logical extreme,it would seemto follow that any theoreticaldiscourse
that centers around one form of social identity as being central to
humannature,social poweretc., e.g. class, race/ethnic,gender,etc.,
comes itself to be an exercisein the social constitutionof identitiesand
interestswhich is used by some group to attemptto control and con-
solidatepowerover anothergroup, whichresistsand then attemptsto
redefine the existing discourse, or to constitute another discourse
more to their interest. An example of this, accordingto some Black
feminists, is the way that not only radical feminist but also marxist
and socialist-feministtheoryhave proceededto privilegeeithergender
or gender and class dominaton over racial domination in terms of
which is "more primary"(Josephs 1981).
From this point of view, Foucault'snotion of power, in relativizing
and contextualizingit, is able to promote,as Sawickisuggests,a more
egalitarian "politics of difference," a politics consonant with the
Aspect theory of the Self I sketchedabove.
While Sawickiis correctto stressthe deconstructionof universalist
discoursesin orderto respectdifferencesbetweenwomen, she ignores
the fact that feministtheory also needs to explainthe continuitiesof
male dominancein history as well as the discontinuities.All human
discourse we know of is "genderized," in some way: gender dif-
ferenceswhethercreatedsocially or biologicallystill supportsystems
of male dominance.The sexual division of labor and assymmetrical
parentingstill provide power continuitiesand male control of more
extensivepolitical networksand economic resourcesthan women in
most known societies. It is implausibleto assumewith Foucaultthat
thesecross-culturalcontinuitiesin malepoweraredue merelyto an ac-
cidental conjunctureof discourseswhich create patriarchalconcepts
whichin turncreatethe genderclass men as self-consciousdominators
of women. Rather we need a more materialistexplanationof why
males organizedin groups via the sexual, racialand class division of
labor seek to gain power at the expenseof women.

20
 ann ferguson

It is my view that we do not need to choose betweena feministuse

of Foucault and a feminist universalset of analyticalconcepts for
understandingmale dominance: we can use both. Foucault's own
genealogicalapproachto understandingthe power/knowledgescon-
structedin the modernperiod to control the body and sexualityis a
useful tool for understandingspecifichistorical"power/knowledges"
that both generatedifferencesand resistancesto them. But his own
history presupposesa more general marxist functionalismin which
classes in certainhistoricalperiods are set generalhistorical"tasks"
by economic developments(Foucault 1978, 122-127).
Similarly, radical and socialist-feministtheory must continue to
develop its own general analytic categories for understandingthe
cross-culturalpersistenceof male dominancewhile at the same time
seeking to contextualizethe applicationsof these concepts in a way
which respects historical differences between women in terms of
race/ethnic background,class and sexual identity. Those of us who
are serious about developinga politics of differenceneed not eschew
general theory. Rather, we need analytic categories that can be
historicized.
One examplefrom my book in progress,Blood at the Root (forth
coming) is my characterizationof minoritywomen in Americatoday
(e.g. Black, Hispanic, native Americanand other non-whitewomen)
and deviantwomen such as prostitutesand lesbianwomen as located
in contradictorymodes of sex/affective production. Each subgroup
may havetheirmotherhoodand sexualitydefineddifferentlyin subor-
dinate modes of sex/affective production(e.g. differenttypes of kin-
ship relationsin the family, differentcodes of masculineand feminine
sexual behavior,differenthousehold, communityand economiccon-
texts). Nonethelessall the groups are bound together under certain
features of the dominant mode of sex/affective production:white
supremacist,capitalist public patriarchy.Thus, we must not ignore
the hegemonicrole of publicschools, mediaand the state in enforcing
common standardsof "satisfactory"motherhoodand femininesex-
uality.
What follows from this is that theoreticallywe must delve into the
understandingof contextualdifferencesbetweenourselvesas women
if we are to challenge the American white middle class bias under
which much radicaland socialistfeministtheorylabors. On the other
hand, however, the InternationalWomen's Conference in Nairobi
shows that on the practical level, there are certain commonalities
across modes of economicand sex/affective productionthat provide
opportunities for coalition-building between women: issues of
comparableworthin wagelabor, healthcare, child care, reproductive

21
 hypatia

rights, sexual freedom and freedom from male violence and sexual
abuse, basic survivalneeds (hungerand housing)and education. Jan
Raymond as well as Maria Lugones and Vicky Spelman argue
(Spelmanand Lugones 1983)that our theoryand our politicscan only
advance when we prioritizefriendshipswith other women as a key
aspect of a feministpolitics of difference.Then, and perhapsonly by
this meanscan a lastingfeministcoalitioncreatea commonalitywhich
can overcomeour differences.

22
 jana sawicki
Foucault and Feminism:
Toward a Politics of Difference

This paper begins with the assumption that the differences among
women pose a threat to building a unified feminist theory and prac-
tice. Utilizing the work and methods of Michel Foucault, I explore
theoretical and practical implications of taking difference seriously. I
claim that a politics of difference puts into question the concept of a
revolutionary subject and the idea of a social totality. In the final sec-
tion a brief Foucauldian analysis of the feminist sexuality debates is
given.

The beginningof wisdomis in the discoverythat there

exist contradictionsof permanenttension with whichit
is necessaryto live and that it is above all not necessary
to seek to resolve. (Gorz 1980, in Hirsh 1981, 2)
It is not differencewhich immobilizesus, but silence.
And there are so many silences to be broken. (Lorde
1984, 44)
The questionof differenceis at the forefrontof discussionsamong
feministstoday. (cf. Moragaand Anzaldua,eds. 1981;Dill 1983and
Anthias and Yuval-Davis1983.)Of course, theoriesof differenceare
certainlynot new to the women's movement. There has been much
discussionconcerningthe nature and status of women's differences
from men (e.g., biological, psychological,cultural).Theoriesof sex-
ual difference have emphasizedthe shared experiencesof women
across the divisionsof race, class, age or culture.In such theoriesthe
diversityof women's experiencesis often lumped into the category
"women'sexperience,"or women's caste, presumablyin an effort to
providethe basis for a collectivefeministsubject.
More recently,however,as a resultof experiencingconflicts at the
level of practice,it is the differencesamong women (e.g. differences
of race, class, sexual practice) that are becoming the focus of
theoreticaldiscussion.To be sure, Marxistfeministshave consistently
recognizedthe significanceof class differencesbetweenwomen, but
other important differences cry out for recognition. The question
arises: Do the differencesand potential separationsbetweenwomen

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

23
 hypatia

pose a seriousthreatto effective politicalaction and to the possibility

of theory?
Perhapsthe most influentialand provocativeideas on the issue of
differencein feminismare to be found in the writingsof black, lesbian
feministpoet and essayistAudre Lorde. In her work, Lordedescribes
the ways in whichthe differencesamongwomen have been "misnam-
ed and misused in the service of separationand confusion" (Lorde
1984). As a lesbian mother and partnerin an inter-racialcouple, she
has a unique insight into the conflicts and divided allegianceswhich
put into questionthe possibilityof a unifiedwomen'smovement.She
has experiencedthe way in whichpowerutilizesdifferenceto fragment
opposition. Indeed this fragmentationcan occur not only within
groupsbut also withinthe individual.Hence, Lorderemarks:"I find I
am constantly being encouragedto pluck out some one aspect of
myself and presentthis as the meaningfulwhole, eclipsingor denying
the other parts of self" (Lorde 1984, 120).
Lordeclaims that it is not the differencesamong women which are
the sourceof separationbut ratherour "refusalto recognizethose dif-
ferences, and to examine the distortions which result from our
misnamingthem and theireffects upon humanbehaviorand expecta-
tion" (Lorde 1984, 115). Thus, she appears to be saying that dif-
ference is not necessarilycounter-revolutionary.She suggests that
feministsdeviseways of discoveringand utilizingtheirdifferencesas a
sourcefor creativechange. Learningto live and strugglewith manyof
our differencesmay be one of the keys to disarmingthe powerof the
white, male, middleclass normwhichwe have all internalizedto vary-
ing degrees.
In what follows I shall elaborate on the notion of difference as
resourceand offer a sketchof some of the implicationsthat what I call
a "politics of difference" might have for "revolutionary"feminist
theory.' In order to elucidate these implicationsI shall turn to the
writingsof the social philosopherand historianMichelFoucault. It is
my contentionthat despite the androcentrismin his own writingshe
too has recognized the ambiguous power of difference in modern
society, that is, he recognizes that difference can be the source of
fragmentationand disunity as well as a creativesource of resistance
and change.
My aim in this paperis two-fold: (1) to turnto Foucault'swork and
methodin orderto lay out the basic featuresof a politicsof difference
and (2) to show how such a politics might be appliedin the feminist
debateconcerningsexuality.In orderto accomplishthese aims I shall
begin by contrastingFoucault'spolitics with two existingversionsof
Revolutionaryfeminism,namely,Marxistandradicalfeminism.I have
24
 jana sawicki
selected these two feminist frameworks becuse they contain the
elements of traditional revolutionary theory which Foucault is rejec-
ting.2 Other Foucauldian feminisms are developed by Morris (1979)
and Martin (1982).

I. Foucault's Critiqueof RevolutionaryTheory

It will be helpful to contrast Foucault's approach with Marxism,
on the one hand, and radical feminism, on the other. Both Marxism
and radical feminism conceive of historical process as a dialectical
struggle for human liberation. Both have turned to history to locate
the origins of oppression, and to identify a revolutionary subject. Yet
radical feminists have criticized Marxism for its inability to give an
adequate account of the persistence of male domination. They iden-
tify patriarchy as the origin of all forms of oppression. Hence, they
view the struggles of women as a sex/class as the key to human
liberation.
The recent intensification of feminist attention to the differences
among women might be understood as a reaction to the emergence of
a body of feminist theory which attempts to represent women as a
whole on the basis of little information about the diversity of
women's experiences, to develop universal categories for analyzing
women's oppression, and, on the basis of such analysis, to identify
the most important struggles. When Audre Lorde and others speak of
the importance of preserving and redefining difference, of discover-
ing more inclusive strategies for building theory, and of the need for
a broad based, diverse struggle, they are calling for an alternative to a
traditional revolutionary theory in which forms of oppression are
either overlooked or ranked and the divisions separating women ex-
acerbated. The question is: are there radical alternatives to traditional
revolutionary theory? As I have indicated, it is in the writings of
Foucault that we find an attempt to articulate an alternative ap-
proach to understanding radical social transformation.
Foucault's is a radical philosophy without a theory of history. He
does not utilize history as a means of locating a single revolutionary
subject, nor does he locate power in a single material base. Never-
theless, historical research is the central component of his politics and
struggle a key concept for understanding change. Accordingly, in
order to evaluate the usefulness of Foucault's methods for feminism
we must first understand the historical basis for his critique of tradi-
tional revolutionary theory.
Foucault's rejection of traditional revolutionary theory is rooted in
his critique of the "juridico-discursive" model of power on which it is

25
 hypatia

based. Accordingto Foucault, this model of power underpinsboth

Liberaltheoriesof Sovereignty(i.e. legitimateauthorityoften codified
in law and accompaniedby a theory of rights) and Marxisttheories
which locate power in the economy and the State as an arm of the
bourgeoisie. The juridico-discursivemodel of power involves three
basic assumptions:(1) power is possessed (e.g. by individualsin the
state of nature,by a class, by the people), (2) powerflows from a cen-
tralizedsourcefrom top to bottom (e.g. law, the economy, the State),
and (3) power is primarilyrepressivein its exercise (a prohibition
backedby sanctions).
Foucault proposes that we think of power outside the confines of
State, law or class. This enableshim to locate forms of power which
are obscuredin traditionaltheories.Thus, Foucaultfrees powerfrom
the political domain in much the same way as radical feministsdid.
Rather than engage in theoretical debate with political theorists,
Foucaultgives historicaldescriptionsof the differentforms of power
operatingin the Modern West. He does not deny that the juridico-
discursivemodel of power describesone form of power. He merely
thinksthat it does not capturethose forms of powerwhichmakecen-
tralized, repressiveforms of power possible, namely, the myriad of
power relationsat the micro-levelof society.
Foucault'sown model of power differs from the traditionalmodel
in three basic ways: (1) power is exercisedratherthan possessed, (2)
power is not primarilyrepressive,but productive, and (3) power is
analyzedas coming from the bottom up. In what follows I will give
Foucault's reasons for substitutinghis own view of power for the
traditionalone.
(1) Foucaultclaimsthat thinkingof poweras a possessionhas led to
a preoccupationwith questions of legitimacy, consent and rights.
(Who should possess power?Whenhas poweroversteppedits limits?)
Marxists have problematizedconsent by introducing a theory of
ideology, but Foucault thinks this theory must ultimatelyrest on a
humanisticnotion of authenticconsciousnessas the legitimatebasis of
consent. Furthermore,the Marxistemphasison poweras a possession
has resultedin an effort to locate those subjectsin the historicalfield
whose standpoint is potentially authentic, namely, the proletariat.
Foucaultwantsto suspendany referenceto humanisticassumptionsin
his own accountof powerbecausehe believesthat humanismhas serv-
ed more as an ideology of dominationthan liberation.
For the notion that power is a possession Foucault substitutesa
relationalmodel of poweras exercised.By focusingon the powerrela-
tions themselves, rather than on the subjects related (Sovereign-
subject, bourgeois-proletarian),he can give an account of how
26
 ana sawiki

subjectsare constitutedby power relations.

(2) This bringsus to the productivenatureof power. Foucaultre-
jects the repressivemodel of power for two reasons. First, he thinks
that if power were merelyrepressive,then it would be difficult to ex-
plain how it has gotten such a grip on us. Why would we continueto
obey a purely repressive and coercive form of power? Indeed,
repressivepower representspower in its most frustratedand extreme
form. The needto resortto a show of forceis moreoften evidenceof a
lack of power. Second, as I have indicated,Foucaultthinks that the
most effective mechanismsof power are productive.So, ratherthan
develop a theory of history and power based upon the humanistic
assumptionof a pre-socialindividualendowedwith inalienablerights
(the Liberal's state of nature) or based on the identificationof an
authentichuman interest (Marx's species being), Foucault gives ac-
counts of the waysin whichcertaininstitutionaland culturalpractices
have producedindividuals.These are the practicesof a disciplinary
power which he associateswith the rise of the human sciencesin the
nineteenthcentury.
Disciplinarypoweris exercisedon the body and soul of individuals.
It increasesthe power of individualsat the same time as it renders
them moredocile (e.g. basictrainingin the military).In modernsocie-
ty disciplinarypower has spread through the productionof certain
forms of knowledge(the positivisticand hermeneutichumansciences)
and throughthe emergenceof disciplinarytechniqueswhich facilitate
the process of obtainingknowledgeabout individuals(techniquesof
surveillance,examination, discipline). Thus, ways of knowing are
equatedwith ways of exercisingpowerover individuals.Foucaultalso
isolates techniquesof individualizationsuch as the dividingpractices
found in medicine, psychiatry,criminologyand their corresponding
institutions, i.e. the hospital, asylum and prison. Disciplinaryprac-
tices createthe divisionshealthy/ill, sane/mad, and legal/delinquent,
which, by virtueof their authoritativestatus, can be used as effective
means of normalizationand social control. They may involve the
literal dividingoff of segmentsof the populationthroughincarcera-
tion or institutionalization.Usually the divisions are experiencedin
the societyat largein more subtleways, i.e. in the practiceof labeling
one anotheror ourselvesas different or abnormal.
For example, in The History of Sexuality Foucault gives an
historicalaccountof the processthroughwhichthe modernindividual
has come to see herself as a sexual subject. Some discourses(e.g.
psychoanalysis)view sexuality as the key to self-understandingand
lead us to believe that in orderto liberateourselvesfrom personality
"disorders,"we must uncoverthe truth of our sexuality. In this way

27
 hypatia

dimensions of personal life are psychologized, i.e. rendered pro-

blematic, and thus become a target for the interventionof experts.
Again, Foucaultattemptsto show how these discourses,and the prac-
tices based upon them, have played more of a role in the normaliza-
tion of the modern individualthan they have in any liberatorypro-
cesses. He calls for a liberation from this "government of in-
dividualization," for the discovery of new ways of understanding
ourselves,new forms of subjectivity.
(3) Finally, Foucaultthinks that focusingon poweras a possession
has led to the location of powerin a centralizedsource. For example,
the Marxistlocation of power in a class has obscuredan entire net-
workof powerrelations"that investsthe body, sexuality,family, kin-
ship, knowledge, technology. . ." (Foucault 1980a, 122). Foucault's
alternativemodel is designedto facilitatethe descriptionof the many
formsof powerfound outsidethesecentralizedloci. He does not deny
the phenomenon of class (or State) power, he simply denies that
understandingit is moreimportantfor resistance.As I haveindicated,
Foucault expands the domain of the political to include a
heterogeneousensemble of power relations operating at the micro-
level of society. The practical implication of his model is that
resistancemust be carried out in local struggles against the many
forms of power exercisedat the everydaylevel of social relations.
Foucault's "bottom-up" analysis of power is an attemptto show
how powerrelationsat the micro-levelof societymakepossiblecertain
global effects of domination(e.g., classpower,patriarchy).He avoids
using universalsas explanatoryconcepts at the start of historicalin-
quiry in order to preventtheoreticaloverreach.He states:
One must ratherconductan ascendinganalysisof power
starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms,
whicheach have theirown history,theirown trajectory,
theirown tactics, and then see how thesemechanismsof
power have been-and continue to be-invested, col-
onized, utilized, involuted, transformed,displaced,ex-
tended, etc., by even more generalmechanismsand by
forms of global domination. It is not that this global
dominationextendsitself rightto the base in a plurality
of repercussions. . . . (Foucault 1980a, 99)
In otherwords, by utilizingan ascendinganalysisFoucaultshows how
mechanismsof power at the micro-levelof society have become part
of dominantnetworksof powerrelations.Disciplinarypowerwas not
invented by the dominant class and then extended down into the
micro-level of society. It originated outside this class and was

28
 jana sawicki

appropriated by it once it revealed its utility. Foucault is suggesting

that the connection between power and the economy must be deter-
mined on the basis of specific historical analyses, i.e. it cannot be
deduced from a general theory. He rejects both reductionism and
functionalism insofar as the latter involves locating forms of power
within a structure or institution which is self-regulating. He does not
offer causal or functional explanations but rather historical descrip-
tions of the conditions which make certain forms of domination possi-
ble, i.e. the necessary but not sufficient conditions for domination.
In short, Foucault's histories put into question the idea of a univer-
sal binary division of struggle. To be sure, such divisions do exist, but
as particular and not universal historical phenomena. Of course, the
corollary of his rejection of the binary model is that the notion of a
subject of history, a single locus of resistance, is put into question.
Resistance. Despite Foucault's neglect of resistance in Discipline and
Punish, in The History of Sexuality he defines power as dependent on
resistance.3 Moreover, emphasis on resistance is particularly evident in
his more recent discussions of power and sexuality.4
In recent writings Foucault speaks of power and resistance in the
following terms:
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or
rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position
of exteriority in relation to power. (Foucault 1978, 95)
I'm not positing a substance of resistance facing a
substance of power. I'm simply saying: as soon as
there's a relation of power there's a possibility of
resistance. We're never trapped by power; it's always
possible to modify its hold, in determined conditions
and following a precise strategy. (Foucault 1980b, 13)
There are two claims in the above remarks. The first is the weaker
claim that power relations are only implemented in cases where there
is resistance. In other words, power relations only arise in cases where
there is conflict, where one individual or group wants to affect the ac-
tion of another individual or group. In addition, sometimes power
enlists the resistant forces into its own service. One of the ways it does
this is by labeling them, by establishing norms and defining dif-
ferences.
The second claim implied in Foucault's description of power is the
stronger claim that wherever there is a relation of power it is possible
to modify its hold. He states: "Power is exercised only over free sub-
jects and only insofar as they are free" (Foucault 1983, 221). Free sub-
jects are subjects who face a field of possibilities. Their action is struc-

29
 hypatia

tured but not forced. Thus, Foucault does not define power as the
overcoming of resistance. According to Foucault, when resistant
forces are overcome, power relations collape into force relations. The
limits of power have been reached.
So, while Foucault has been accused of describing a totalitarian
power from which there is no escape, he denies that "there is a
primary and fundamental principle of power which dominates society
down to the smallest detail (Foucault 1983, 224). At the same time he
claims that power is everywhere. He describes the social field as a
myriad of unstable and heterogeneous relations of power. It is an
open system which contains possibilities of domination as well as
resistance.
For Foucault, the social and historical field is a battle field, a field
of struggle. Power circulates in this field and is exercised on and by in-
dividuals over others as well as themselves. When speaking of strug-
gle, Foucault refuses to identify the subjects of struggle. When asked
the question: "Who is struggling against whom?," he responds:
This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it's all against
all. There aren't immediately given subjects of the strug-
gle, one the proletariat, the other the bourgeoisie. Who
fights against whom? We all fight against each other.
And there is always within each of us something that
fights something else." (Foucault 1980a, 208)
Depending upon where one is and in what role (e.g. mother, lover,
teacher, anti-racist, anti-sexist) one's allegiances and interests will
shift. There are no privileged or fundamental coalitions in history, but
rather a series of unstable and shifting ones.
In his theory of resistant subjectivity Foucault opens up the
possibility of something more than a history of constructions or of
victimization. That is, he opens the way for a historical knowledge of
struggles. His genealogical method is designed to facilitate an "insur-
rection of subjugated knowledges" (Foucault 1980a, 82). These are
forms of knowledge or experience which "have been disqualified as
inadequate to their task, or insufficiently elaborated: naive
knowledges, located low down in the hierarchy, beneath the required
level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault 1980a, 82). They include
the low ranking knowledge ("popular knowledge") of the psychiatric
patient, the hysteric, the imprisoned criminal, the housewife, the in-
digent. Popular knowledge is not shared by all people, "but it is, on
the contrary, a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential
knowledge incapable of unanimity" (Foucault 1980a, 82, emphasis
added).

30
 jana sawicki

According to Foucault, the question whether some forms of

resistanceare more effective than others is a matterfor historicalin-
vestigationand not for theoreticalpronouncement.He would endorse
feministefforts to resistthe elision of differencein the name of some
abstract principle of unity-with those who resist the attempt to
define a priori measuresof effective resistance.(For a similarargu-
ment against a-historicalcriteriaof effective resistancesee Addelson
1982.)
Genealogyas a Form of Resistance
"Freedomdoes not basicallylie in discoveringor being
able to determinewho we are, but in rebellingagainst
those ways in whichwe are alreadydefined, categorized
and classified." (Rajchman1984, 15)
The view that knowledgeis power, i.e. that the purposeof a theory
of history is to enable us to control history is part of the Enlighten-
ment legacy from which Foucault is attemptingto "free" us. For
him, there is no theory of global transformationto formulate, no
revolutionarysubject whose interest the intellectualor theoretician
can represent.He recommendsan alternativeto the traditionalrole
for the intellectualin modern political struggles. He speaks of the
"specific intellectual"in contrastto the "universalintellectual,"i.e.
the "bearerof universalvalues" who is the enlightenedconsciousness
of a revolutionarysubject.
The specificintellectualoperateswith a differentconceptionof the
relationbetweentheory and practice:
Intellectualshave gotten used to working, not in the
modality of the 'universal,'the 'exemplary,'the 'just-
and-true-for all,' but within specific sectors, at the
precisepoints wheretheirown conditionsof life or work
situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the
laboratory,the university,family and social relations).
(Foucault 1980a, 126)
Focusingattentionon specificsituationsmay lead to moreconcrete
analysesof particularstrugglesand thus to a betterunderstandingof
social change. For example,Foucaultwas involvedin certainconflicts
withinmedicine,psychiatryand the penal system. He facilitatedways
for prisonersto participatein discussionsof prisonreformand wrote
a history of punishmentin order to alter our perspectiveson the
assumptionswhich inform penal practices.
In part, Foucault's refusal to make any universal political, or
moral, judgementsis based upon the historical evidence that what

31
 hypatia
looks like a changefor the bettermay have undesirableconsequences.
Since struggleis continual and the idea of a power-freesociety is an
abstraction,those who struggle must never grow complacent. Vic-
tories are often overturned;changesmay take on differentfaces over
time. Discoursesand institutionsare ambiguousand may be utilized
for differentends.
So Foucaultis in fact pessimisticabout the possibilityof controlling
history. But this pessimismneed not lead to despair. Only a disap-
pointed traditional revolutionarywould lapse into fatalism at the
thought that much of history is out of our control. Foucault's em-
phasis on resistanceis evidence that he is not fatalistic himself, but
merelyskepticalabout the possibilitiesof global transformation.He
has no particularutopian vision. Yet, one need not have an idea of
utopia in orderto take seriouslythe injusticesin the present.Further-
more, the past has provided enough examples of theoreticalinade-
quacy to make Foucault'semphasison provisionaltheoreticalreflec-
tion reasonable.
In short, genealogyas resistanceinvolvesusing historyto give voice
to the marginal and submergedvoices which lie "a little beneath
history," i. e. the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal, the disem-
powered.It locates many discontinuousand regionalstrugglesagainst
power both in the past and present. These voices are the sources of
resistance,the creativesubjectsof history.5

II. Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference

What are the implications of Foucault's critique of traditional
revolutionarytheory, his use of historyand his analysisof power for
feminism? I have called Foucault's politics a politics of difference
because it does not search for a unity in difference, i.e. does not
assumethat all differencescan be bridged.Neitherdoes it assumethat
difference must be an obstacle to effective resistance. Indeed, in a
politicsof difference,differencecan be a resourceinsofaras it enables
us to multiplythe sourcesof resistanceto particularforms of domina-
tion and to discoverdistortionsin our understandingsof each other
and the world. In a politics of difference, as Audre Lorde suggests,
redefiningour differences, learningfrom them, becomes the central
task.
Of course, it may be that Lorde does envision the possibility of
some underlyingcommonality,some universalhumanity,which will
provide the foundation for an ultimate reconciliationof our dif-
ferences. Her own use of the concept of the "erotic" might be
understoodas an implicitappealto humanism(Lorde 1984,53-59).As

32
 jana sawicki

we have seen, Foucault'smethod requiresa suspensionof humanistic

assumptions.Indeed, feministshave recognizedthe dangersof what
Adrienne Rich (1979, 134) refers to as "the urge to leap across
feminismto 'humanliberation.'" What Foucaultoffers to feminism
is not a humanist theory, but rather a critical method which is
thoroughly historical and a set of recommendationsabout how to
look at our theories.The motivationfor a politics of differenceis the
desireto avoid dogmatismin our categoriesand politicsas well as the
elision of differenceto which such dogmatismcan lead.
In conclusion, I want to illustrate the value and limitations of
Foucault's politics of difference by bringing it to bear on a recent
discussion of difference within feminism, namely, the sexuality
debate. This debate has polarized American feminists into two
groups, radical and libertarianfeminists (Ferguson 1984, 106-112).
The differencesbeing discussedthreatento destroy communications
betweenthem. Hence, an understandingof theirdifferencesis crucial
at this conjuncturein Americanfeminism.
Radical feminists condemn any sexual practices involving the
"male" ideology of sexual objectification which, in their view,
underlies both male sexual violence and the institutionalizationof
masculineand feminineroles in the patriarchalfamily. They call for
an eliminationof all patriarchalinstitutionsin which sexual objec-
tification occurs, e.g. pornography, prostitution, compulsory
heterosexuality, sadomasochism, cruising, adult/child and butch
/femme relations.They substitutean emphasison intimacyand affec-
tion for the "male" preoccupationwith sexual pleasure.
In contrast, libertarianfeminists attack radicals for having suc-
cumbed to sexual repression. Since radicals believe that sex as we
know it is male, they are suspicious of any sexual relations what-
soever. Libertariansstress the dangersof censoringany sexual prac-
tices betweenconsentingpartnersand recommendthe transgressionof
socially acceptablesexual norms as a strategyof liberation.
What is remarkableabout these debates from the perspectiveof a
politicsof differenceis the extentto whichthe two campssharesimilar
views of power and freedom. In both camps, power is representedas
centralizedin key institutionswhich dictate the acceptableterms of
sexual expression,namely, male-dominatedheterosexualinstitutions
whoseelementsare crystallizedin the phenomenonof pornographyon
the one hand, and all discoursesand institutions which distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate sexual practice (including radical
feminism)therebycreatinga hierarchyof sexual expression,on the
other. Moreover,both seem to regardsexualityas a key arenain the
struggle for human liberation. Thus, for both, understandingthe

33
 hypatia
truth about sexualityis central for liberation.
In addition, both operatewith repressivemodels of power. Radical
feministsare in fact suspiciousof all sexual practicesinsofar as they
view sexualdesireas a male construct.They think male sexualityhas
completelyrepressedfemale sexualityand that we must eliminatethe
source of this repression,namely, all heterosexualmale institutions,
before we can begin to construct our own. Libertarians explicitly
operatewith a repressivemodel of powerborrowedfrom the Freudo-
Marxist discourses of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. They
recognize that women's sexual expression has been particularly
repressedin our society and advocate women's right to experiment
with their sexuality. They resist drawingany lines between safe and
dangerous, politically correct and politically incorrect, sex. Radical
feminists accuse libertariansof being male identified because they
have not problematizedsexual desire;libertariansaccuse radicalsof
being traditionalfemale sex-prudes.
There are other similaritiesbetween the two camps. In the first
place, as Ann Ferguson (1984, 110) has pointed out, both involve
universalisttheoriesof sexuality,that is, they both reify "male" and
"female" sexualityand thus fail to appreciatethe way in which sex-
uality is an historically culturally specific construct. This is prob-
lematic insofar as it assumes that there is some essentialconnection
between gender and sexual practice. An historicalunderstandingof
sexuality would attempt to disarticulategender and sexuality and
therebyrevealthe diversityof sexualexperiencesacrossgenderas well
as other divisions.For example,RennieSimpson(1983, 229-235)sug-
gests, Afro-Americanwomen's sexuality has been constructeddif-
ferently from white women's. They have a strong tradition of self-
reliance and sexual self-determination.Thus, for American black
women, the significanceof the sexualitydebatesmay be different. In-
deed, the relationshipbetweenviolenceand sexualitytakes on another
dimensionwhen viewedin the light of past uses of lynchingto control
black male sexuality.And considerthe significanceof blackwomen's
emphasison issues such as forced sterilizationor dumpingDepo Pro-
vera on third world countriesover that of white Americanfeminists
on abortionon demand(Amos and Parmar1984, 1-19). Yet, radical
feministsstill tend to focus on dominantcultureand the victimization
of women. Ann Snitow and Carol Vance (1984, 132) clearlyidentify
the problemwith this approachwhen they remark:
To ignore the potential for variations(in women's sex-
ual expression) is inadvertentlyto place women out-
side the culture except as passive recipientsof official

34
 jana sawicki

systems of symbols. It continues to deny what

mainstream culture has always tried to make in-
visible-the complex struggles of disenfranchised
groups to grapple with oppression using symbolic as
well as economic and political resistance.

Rather than generalizeon the basis of the stereotypesprovidedby

"dominantculture," feministsmust begin to explorethe meaningof
the diversityof sexualpracticesto those who practicethem, to resur-
rectthe "subjugatedknowledge"of sexualityelidedby the dominance
disclosure.
Secondly,both radicalsand libertarianstend to isolate sexualityas
the key causeof women'soppression.Therefore,they locate powerin
a centralsourceand identifya universalstrategyfor seizingcontrolof
sexuality(e.g. eliminatepornography,transgresssexualtaboos by giv-
ing expressionto sexual desire). Both of these analysesare simplistic
and reductionist.While it is important,sexualityis simplyone of the
many areas of everydaylife in which power operates.
In sum, the critique of the sexualitydebates developed out of a
politics of differenceamountsto (1) a call for more detailedresearch
into the diverserangeof women'ssexualexperiences,and (2) avoiding
analyses which invoke universalexplanatorycategoriesor a binary
model of oppressionand thereby overlook the many differencesin
women's experienceof sexuality. Although a politics of difference
does not offer feministsa moralityderivedfrom a universaltheoryof
oppression, it need not lapse into a form of pluralism in which
anythinggoes. On the basis of specific theoreticalanalyses of par-
ticular struggles,one can make generalizations,identify patternsin
relationsof powerand therebyidentifythe relativeeffectivenessor in-
effectiveness,safety or dangerof particularpractices.For example,a
series of links have been established between the radical feminist
strategyof anti-pornographylegislationand the New Right's efforts
to censorany sexualpracticeswhichpose a threatto the family.Thisis
not to suggestthat the anti-pornographymovementis essentiallyreac-
tionary, but ratherthat at this time it may be dangerous.Similarly,
one ought not to assume that there is any necessaryconnectionbet-
ween transgressionof sexual taboos and human liberation.Denying
that censorshipis the answeris not tantamountto endorsingany par-
ticularform of transgressionas liberatory.
In a feminist politics of difference, theory and moral judgments
would be geared to specific contexts. This need not preclude
systematic analysis of the present, but would require that our
categoriesbe provisional.As Snitowand Vance(1984, 133)point out:

35
 hypatia

"We need to live with the uncertaintiesthat arise along with the
change we desire." What is certain is that our differencesare am-
biguous;they may be used eitherto divideus or to enrichour politics.
And if we are not the ones to give voice to them, then historysuggests
that they will continueto be eithermisnamedand distorted,or simply
reducedto silence.

Notes
1. "Revolutionary" feminisms are those which appeal to the notion of a "subject
of history" and to the category of a "social totality" in their analyses of the theory and
practice of social transformation.
2. Socialist feminism is an obvious alternative to the ones that I have chosen. It
represents a theoretical development in feminism which is closest to embodying the
basic insights of a politics of difference. See the work of Linda Nicholson (1986) for ex-
ample.
3. One feminist critic, Jacqueline Zita (1982, 173) charges that Foucault's institu-
tionalist theory of sexuality results in a picture of the "one-dimensional" containment
of sexuality by objective forces beyond our control. She claims that it obscures the
"continuous struggles of women against. ..patriarchy .. ." Yet Zita's criticism begs
the question since it assumes that an emancipatory theory must rest on the notion of a
continuous revolutionary subject. Foucault, after all, is attempting to displace the pro-
blem of the subject altogether.
4. See Foucault's reproduction of the memoirs of a hermaphrodite for an example
of his effort to resurrect a knowledge of resistance (Foucault 1980c). This memoir is an
account of the despair experienced by Herculine (formerly Alexina) once a male sexual
identity is imposed upon her in her "happy limbo of non-identity." This occurs at a
time when the legal and medical profession has become interested in the question of sex-
ual identity and has decided that every individual must be either male or female.
5. Linda Nicholson (1986) describes an explicitly historical feminism in which the
search for origins (genealogy) involves an attempt to deconstruct (give an account of the
process of construction of) our present categories (e.g. "personal," "public") and
thereby free us from a rigid adherence to them. Foucault's genealogies serve the same
function.

36
 janice raymond
Female Friendship:
Contra Chodorow and Dinnerstein

The author critiques two widely-used works in Women's Studies for

their hetero-relational content and the ways in which they minimize
the necessity for affinities between women. Dinnerstein and
Chodorow give us in theory what movies such as Kramer vs. Kramer
depict in the film. It is not co-parenting and the inclusion of the male
in an equal parenting role that will remedy present "sexual ar-
rangements," without first giving attention to women's relations with
each other.

Feminist thoughtis at a pointin its historywhereit needsa theoryof

femalefriendship-what I also call Gyn/affection.In discussingfemale
friendship,however,it is also necessaryto discussits opposite-hetero-
relations.In developinga theoryof hetero-relations,I seekto represent
the strucureof the world as men have fabricatedit for women. In
developinga theoryof femalefriendship,I seekto representthe worldas
women imagine it could be, and as many women have created it.
Feministtheorymust take into accountthe forcesmaintainingthe sur-
vival of women as well as those that maintainthe subordinationof
women.A theoryof femalefriendshipis meantto giveform,expression,
and realityto the ways in whichwomen have beenfor our Selvesand
each other.
In this work, Gyn/affectionis definedas woman-towoman attrac-
tion, influence, and movement. In many ways, it is a synonym for
femalefriendship.The word,however,has a meaningcontextof its own
which politicizesthe personalmeaningof female friendship.Female
friendshipis muchmorethanthe privatefaceof feministpolitics.Onthe
one hand, Gyn/affectionconnotesthe passionwomenfeel for women,
thatis, theexperienceof profoundattractionfor one'svital"womanist"
Self, and the movementtowardother vital women. There is another
meaningto affection, however,whichconveysmore than the personal
movement of one woman towards another. Affection in this sense
meansthe stateof influencing,actingupon,movingandimpressing;and
of being influenced, acted upon, moved, and impressedby other
women. VirginiaWoolf expressedthis widermeaningof Gyn/affection

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Janice Raymond.

37
 hypatia
in saying, "Only women stir me to action and power."
Women who affect women stimulate response and action; bring
abouta changein living;stirand arouseemotions,ideas, and activities
that defy dichotomiesbetweenthe personaland politicalaspectsof af-
fection. Thus Gyn/affection, as female friendship,means personal
and political movement of women toward each other. One task of
feminismhas been to show that "the personalis political." Female
friendshipgives integrityto that claim. Female friendshipis entered
into not only by two or morediscreteindividualwomen, but by two or
more political beings who claim social and political status for
themselvesand other women.
Hetero-realityhas conferred social and political status only on
hetero-relations(woman-to-manrelationships).In this work, hetero-
relationsis a term used to expressthe wide rangeof affective, social,
political, and economic relationsthat are ordainedbetweenmen and
women by men. The literature,history, philosophy, and science of
patriarchyhave reinforcedthe supposedlymythicand primordialrela-
tionship of womanfor man.
Hetero-realityinstitutionalizeshetero-relations.Thus, it was ex-
pectedin the past, and still in the present,that everywomanshouldbe
married,and that every woman's most meaningfuland most satisfy-
ing relationsare with men. The traditionalmodel for hetero-relations
is marriage, but many revolutions in history-sexual and
political-have claimed to overthrowthe hegemony of the marital
bonds. What none of them have revolutionized,however, is hetero-
reality-the societal "given" that male-femalerelationshipsare the
"reallyreal" ones for women. In any society, revolutionaryor tradi-
tionalist, hetero-relationsare the only bonds that receive social,
political, and economicsanctionfor women. In hetero-reality,female
friendship is regarded as second-rate, insignificant, and/or as a
preludeto hetero-maturity.Hetero-realityis an overridingculturalap-
paratuswhich, althoughit has taken variedforms throughouthistory
and in differentcultures,has vast social and politicalconsequencesfor
women's relationshipswith each other.
In searchingfor the historyof femalefriendship,we find important
challengesto hetero-realityby groupsof womenwhose politicalbonds
of friendshiphave broken the strangleholdof hetero-relations.The
marriageresisters,in 19th and early 20th centuryChina, are one ex-
ampleof such women (Raymond1986, ChapterII). And surprisingly,
the academic fields of hetero-relationalknowledge, although they
have "disciplined"the memoryand reality of Gyn/affection out of
manywomen'slives, also revealimportantand unwittinginformation
about the history of female friendship.It is important,therefore,to

38
 janice raymond

examinethese "disciplines,"not only to specifywhat they omit about

women and our relationshipswith each other, but to investigatethe
unintendedclues that they give about female friendship.
I have selectedone area-psychology-to analyzeat this point; and
two thinkers-Chodorow and Dinnerstein.Theirwork has been used
by various feminist theoristsand writers(uncriticallyI would main-
tain) who fail to emphasizethe hetero-relationalbias of each. At the
same time, in spite of its overwhelminghetero-relationalcharacter,
each work containsfragmentsimportantto the historyof Gyn/affec-
tion that are revealed especially against the backdrop of its over-
whelminghetero-relationalscenario.

Clues from the Disciplines of Hetero-Relations:

Psychologisms
The firsttenetof Freud'stheoryof femalesexualityis that femalenessis
flawed. Early in her life, the young girl realizesthis ultimatefemale
adversity-thatshe lacksa penis-and thishas ramificationsfor all areas
of femaleexistencein the world.It is a supposedtragedythatwill haunt
the younggirl all her life.
Theynoticethe penisof a brotheror playmate,strikingly
visibleand of largeproportions,at oncerecognizeit as the
superiorcounterpart of theirown smallandinconspicuous
organ,andfromthattimeforwardfalla victimto envyfor
the penis. (Freud1925, 190)
In this scheme,one can say that the femalenot only developsinferiority
and self-contempt,but also contemptfor otherwomen.For the girl in-
itiallyblamesher mother"who sent her into the worldso insufficiently
equipped"and who is "almostalwaysheldresponsiblefor herlack of a
penis" (Freud1925, 193).
Accordingto Freud,the maturingfemaledirectsherselfto men after
she rejectsher own sex in the initialpersonof the mother.This is the
beginningof the oedipalstage in girls. Assumingthat her motherhas
castratedher, she turnsherattentionto her fatherand, throughhim, to
othermen. For Freud,the majoroedipaltaskis adjustmentof the young
maturinggirl to heterosexualrelationships.Freudmakesclearthat girls
must be primedfor these. In fact, we infer from his workthat a whole
scaffoldingmust be constructedfor matureheterosexualorientationto
takeplace.Whatis alsoimportantto understand in thiscontextis thatthe
productionof women'sheterosexuality is partof a largerproject-that of
the constructionof hetero-relations in general.

39
 hypatia
The major supportsfor this scaffoldingconsist of three tiers. Not
only must the girl surmounther penis envy to achievenormal female
heterosexuality.She must replace her first love-mother/woman--
with another, i.e. father/man. Simultaneously,she must transferher
sexualityfrom clitoris(active)to vagina(passive).Freuddefinesan af-
finity for clitoralstimulationas "pathologicalregression"and as that
whichcripples"the sexualfunctionof manywomen. .." (Freud1908,
67). Yet Freudalso states that "the leadingerotogeniczone in female
childrenis located in the clitoris" (Freud 1905, 613). In order for the
girl to becomea woman, she has to "repress"clitorissexualityduring
puberty.
Dorothy Dinnersteinin her book, TheMermaidand the Minotaur,
a work that has been used widelyin Women'sStudiesand in feminist
circles, adheres to Freud's theory of love transference from
mother/woman to father/man, but highlights this shift quite dif-
ferentlythan Freud. "The girl's originallove. .. was, like the boy's, a
woman. Upon this prototypiceroticimage, the imageof man must be
superimposed" (Dinnerstein 1976, 44). Unlike Freud, Dinnerstein
developsthe idea that the girl's originallove was a womanand that the
love of a man is secondary.Evenmorepointedly,Dinnersteinremarks
"To realizethat one is a female, destinedto competewith femalesfor
the erotic resourcesof males, is to discoverthat one is doomed to re-
nounce one's first love" (Dinnerstein1976, 146).
Thereis, then in Dinnerstein'swork, a sense of the actual tragedy
that confronts the young girl: that she must renounceher primordial
feelingsof Gyn/affection in orderto becomea "normal"female;that
she relinquishes to someone else (a man), love that rightly and
originallybelongedto a woman: and that "The result is that she has
cut herselfoff from a continuitywith her own earlyfeeling, for which
she now mourns" (Dinnerstein1976, 65). What Dinnersteinfails to
note is that the young girl is also cut off from her own history and
cultureof Gyn/affection and the possibilitiesfor strengtheningits pre-
sent realityin her life.
One can interpretfrom Dinnerstein'sanalysisof the oedipaltheory,
clues that are important for a genealogy of female friendship:that
love of woman is primordialfor women; that women remain angry
and ambivalentat havingto suppressthat originalGyn/affection; and
that women may spend lifetimes tryingto regainthat love, although
often in contortedand convolutedways. However, for all of Dinner-
stein's enlightening variations on the oedipal theme, what she
ultimatelyhighlightsis the absenceof women'slove for otherwomen,
not the presenceof it. Her book is finally directed toward the im-
provementof prevailing"sexualarrangements,"i.e. "the male-female

40
 janice raymond

collaboration to keep history mad" (Dinnerstein1976, 225, italics

mine).
Other Freudian commentators take a different tack. Helene
Deutsch, who did even more than Freudto promulgatethe theoryof
female masochism, nevertheless diverged from Freud's oedipal
theory.
It is erroneousto say that the little girl gives up her
first mother relation in favor of the father. She only
graduallydrawshim into the alliance,developsfrom the
mother-child exclusiveness toward the triangular
parent-childrelationand continuesthe latter,just as she
does the former, althoughin a weakerand less elemen-
tal form, all her life. (Deutsch 1944, 205)
Nancy Chodorow in her work, The Reproductionof Mothering,
anotherwidely used text in Women's Studies, follows Deutschin ac-
centingwhat I call the lingeringGyn/affection of women. "For girls,
then, there is no absolutechangeof object, nor exclusiveattachment
to their fathers" (Chodorow1978, 193). Girlsnevermake "final and
absolute commitmentsto heterosexuallove, as emotional commit-
ment, whetheror not they make final commitmentsof genitalobject-
choice" (Chodorow 1978, 140).
Traditional psychology has focused on women's ambivalence
towardwomen:i.e. the fact that women distrustor envy their female
peers. What Chodorow emphasizesis that many women feel pro-
foundly ambivalent about loving women, because an original and
powerfulattractionto womenis constantlyat warwithinwomencom-
peting with a superimposedattractionto men.
Girls cannot and do not 'reject' their mother and
womenin favor of theirfatherand men, but remainin a
bisexualtrianglethroughoutchildhoodand into puber-
ty. They make a sexual resolutionin favor of men and
their father, but retain an intense emotional triangle.
(Chodorow 1978, 140)
Of course, Chodorow omits the fact that many women do not "re-
main in a bisexualtriangle," and that this concept does not describe
the realityof those womenwho do not participatein such a triangular
arrangement.Further, many other women who do remain in this
trianglehave not made a "resolution"in favor of heterosexualitybut
have been coerced into that "resolution" or perhaps resigned
themselvesto it.
Chodorow theorizes that a girl's transference of love from

41
 hypatia

mother/woman to father/man is not completely accomplished

becauseof severalthings. Comparativelyspeaking,the fatheris not as
physically or emotionally available. Like Dinnerstein, Chodorow
notes that through erotic identification with a man, a woman
"refuses" herself with a woman. Freudtoo recognizedthis when he
said that women, in heterosexual relationships, look to men for
"gratifications they want from a woman."' However, because a
motherdoes not confer upon the girl the same kind of love that a boy
gets, the daughterlooks elsewhere(to the father)for "the sameconfir-
mation of her specialnessthat her brotherreceivesfrom her mother"
(Chodorow 1978, 195). At the same time, a daughterseeks to escape
from the mother,to developa senseof separatenessand individuality,
which is also found in turningto men. "She is more able to do this
becauseher distancemeans that she does not know him."2
Refutingthe societal stereotypethat women are the romanticsand
men the rationalistsin love, Chodorow makes clear that "Women
haveacquireda realcapacityfor rationalityand distancein heterosex-
ual relationships,qualitiesbuilt into theirearliestrelationshipswith a
man" (Chodorow 1978, 198). She cites clinical and sociological
evidenceto support this claim. "Most of these studies argue. . .that
women's apparent romanticism is an emotional and ideological
response to their very real economic dependence(Chodorow 1978,
198). In addition to economic rationalism, Chodorow might have
cited other social and psychologicalpowers that men exercise over
women's lives which make women more "rationalistic"in giving an
apparentprimacyto hetero-relations.As AndreaDworkinhas listed,
men, besides having the power of money, have the power of self,
parasiticthough it may be; the power of physicalstrength,used over
and against women; the power to terrorizeand inculcate fear; the
power of naming, initiallyanalyzedin Mary Daly's work; the power
of owningwomenand all that issues from them;and the powerof sex,
i.e. fucking-taking, forcing, conquering(Dworkin 1981, 151).
To women'sdistancefrom men, Chodorowjuxtaposesthe affinities
women have for each other. Womenspendmore time in the company
of other women then men do in the companyof men. Citing Booth's
findings, and writingsfrom men's liberationgroups, she states that
women's friendships with each other "are affectively richer than
men's" (Chodorow1978, 200). In many cultures,femalerelativesare
each other's friends. "However, deep affective relationships to
women are hard to come by on a routine, daily, ongoing, basis for
many women. Lesbian relationships do tend to recreate
mother-daughteremotions and connections, but most women are
heterosexual"(Chodorow 1978, 200). AlthoughChodorowmentions

42
 janice raymond

heterosexual preference, "taboos against homosexuality," and

economicdependenceon men as the reasonsthat makeprimarysexual
bonds with other women unlikely, the phrase, "most women are
heterosexual,"is a vast over-simplification.AdrienneRich has stated
the complexitymost clearly:
The assumption that 'most women are innately
heterosexual' stands as a theoretical and political
stumblingblock for many women. It remainsa tenable
assumption, partly because lesbian existence has been
writtenout of historyor cataloguedunderdisease;part-
ly becauseit has been treatedas exceptionalratherthan
as intrinsic; partly because to acknowledge that for
women heterosexualitymay not be a 'preference'at all
but something that has had to be imposed, managed,
organized,propagandized,and maintainedby force, is
an immensestep to take if you consideryouself freely
and 'innately'heterosexual.Yet the failure to examine
heterosexualityas an institutionis like failing to admit
that the economic system called capitalismor the caste
systemof racismis maintainedby a varietyof forces, in-
cludingboth physicalviolence and false consciousness.
(Rich 1980, 648)
On the level of personal relations, Chodorow does acknowledge
that "Women's desiresfor intense primaryrelationshipstend not to
be with otherwomen, both becauseof internaland externaltaboos on
homosexuality,and becauseof women's isolation from theirprimary
female kin (especiallymothers)and other women" (Chodorow 1978,
203-204). Further,the lack of affective responsethat women get in
hetero-relations,what Chodorowcalls "contradictionsin heterosex-
uality," help promote these same hetero-relationsas normative. In
orderto have deep affection, women seek emotionalsustenancewith
children and are thus oriented toward family and mothering, says
Chodorow. "Thus, men's lack of emotionalavailabilityand women's
less exclusiveheterosexualcommitmenthelp ensurewomen'smother-
ing" (Chodorow 1978, 208).
Were not Chodorow'sanalysisof personalfactors so emphatically
psychoanalytic,and her analysis of social factors so emphatically
economic, she might have namedas "internaland externaltaboos on
homosexuality"all of theobstaclesthataremarshalledagainstthewhole
continuumof Gyn/affection in a hetero-relationalculture. And she
mighthavenamedwomen'ssupposed"isolation"fromotherwomenas
the enforced segregation and sundering of women from each other.

43
 hypatia
Chodorowand Dinnersteinprovidecluesto the originsand primacy
of Gyn/affection, it seems, withoutintendingto do so. Theirultimate
goal, as is apparentfrom the conclusionsto both of theirbooks, is to
bolsterand maintainflagginghetero-relationsand failed fathers.They
wish to reorganizethe institutionof parentingso that men take more
responsibility.Both arguethat the male absencefrom child rearingis
responsiblefor a host of individualand social disorders.If this ine-
quitable situation were remedied,they say, and men took an equal
part in parenting, all sorts of saving graces would follow. For
Chodorow:
. ..this dependenceon her [mother/woman],and this
primaryidentificationwould not be createdin the first
place if men took primaryparentingresponsibilities.
Childrencould be dependentfrom the outset on peo-
ple of both gendersand establishan individuatedsense
of self in relationto both. (Chodorow 1978, 218)
For Dinnerstein:
Whenthe child, once born, is as muchthe responsibility
of man as of woman, the early vicissitudes of the
flesh-our handlingof whichlays the basis for our later
handlingof mortality-will bear no special relationto
gender. (Dinnerstein1976, 148-49)
What both Dinnersteinand Chodorowtell us is that once more men
will be the saviors. When men become equal parents,the grievances
and ambivalencesof childhood developmentthat are now foisted on
the mother, the blame she incurs from being primarycaretaker,and
the gamut of "heterosexualknots" and "sexual arrangements"will
not occur.
Whatthis finallymeansis that, once more, hetero-relationsmust be
the focus of women's lives, and that womenshould devote themselves
to re-constructingnew forms of hetero-relations.Thereis no percep-
tion, and certainlyno prescription,that women need to develop new
forms of relationswith women. Having developedsome remarkable
insightsinto the originalattractionof women for women, and having
given us some clues as to why women re-orientthat attractionto men,
both authors fail to emphasizethe importanceof women's affection
for each other as primaryand paradigmatic.
Insteadwhatwe get in Dinnersteinand Chodorowis an implicitand
invisibleexhortationfor women, once more, to mothermen. But this
time, womenmust mothermen to be mothers,for if womendo not do
so, who will? This is the unacknowledged,and perhapsunforeseen,

44
 janice raymond

agendain both books.3

Dinnersteinand Chodorowgive us in theory what movies such as
Kramervs. Krameroffer us in film. All three presentthe full-blown,
"humanized,"and caringfather. None of them tells us wherehe will
come from.
The major problemis not that mainly women parent. Rather,the
major problem is that mainly women become the visible and im-
mediate conduits of hetero-realitywhile deriving the least benefits
from such a system.4As long as women acquiescein the formationof
what Dinnersteinand Chodorow would call the oedipal conflict in
girls, and what I would namehetero-reality-the channelingof female
love, power, and energyinto men-nothing will changeradically.Un-
til women "mother" women to love and care for other women, the
system of hetero-realitywill not be transformed.
If the originalwoman, who experiencesprimarylove for hermother
(women) were not confronted with the mother (women) as hetero-
relational and patternedinto these relations herself by the mother
(women), but were instead confronted with the mother (women) as
female friend who put women first in her life, then Gyn/affection
would become a prevailingreality. The young girl would draw quite
differentconclusionsabout her feelingsfor her Self and otherwomen.
It is not co-parenting,and the inclusionof the male in equal paren-
ting responsibilities,that will restore (among other imbalances)the
lack of female friendship,because then presumablywomen will be
free not to hate or be ambivalentabout other women. Rather, co-
parentingunderpresentconditions,enhancesmalesupremacybecause
it gives men more power than they now have; this time, emotional
presenceand powerwithinthe family. To continueto ignorewomen's
lack of power in all other social institutionsand to prescribemale
parentingas the solutionto our oppressive"sexualarrangements"is a
lop-sidedvision indeed.
Furthermore,wherethe male is portrayedas a sensitiveand caring
co-parent, the mother is often displaced. What emerges is a more
"humane" and "touching" version of male bonding. At least this is
the cinematicmessagein such films as OrdinaryPeople and Kramer
vs. Kramer,two popularfilms of the early 80's that depictedthe sen-
sitive father. In the latterfilm, the motheris physicallyabsentbecause
she has left husbandand son to "find her self" and her way in the
world, exitingfrom a troubledmarriage.In the former,the motheris
emotionallyabsent from the son, while remainingphysicallypresent
as wife and mother. In both films, there are touchingand teary-eyed
scenes of father-sonlove wherefatherbecomesnot the co-parentbut
eventuallythe only parentwho is reallypresent.The mythicthemeof

45
 hypatia
male motheringis indeed made flesh.
What Dinnersteinand Chodorowsend women searchingfor is the
"new man." But the new man is, in manyways, the old man. First,he
is a man, not a woman, and women have been traditionallyenjoined
to seek men, albeitnew and sensitizedmen. Second, he bondswith his
own kind, even underthe influenceof sensitization.We see this bon-
ding at work in the new "sensitivemale" films, and we can expect a
rejuvenatedform of male bonding from the fulfillmentof Dinners-
tein's and Chodorow'svisions of the male as co-parent.Women are
oriented to new forms of hetero-relationshere. And what is not
discussedis that men will be encouragedto createnew forms of male
bonding, becauseleeway for increasedintimacybetweenmen will be
establishedunderthe influenceof sensitization.Male intimacy,added
to the present male solidarity based on male money, power, and
physical prowess, will result in the further institutionalizationof
homo-relations.Women's relationshipswith each other will remain
ever secondary to the imperativeto create new forms of hetero-
relations. Any such bonds which occur among women within this
"new" hetero-relationalcontext will, as in this old hetero-relational
context, be second-born.They too will not be lived as primary.
For both women and men, love for womenwill continueto be kept
in its properplace and not allowed to interferewith the vital ties be-
tween men. Men, havingbeen "freed up" to expressemotion, will be
able to manifest their love for men in different ways than before.
Women, having been re-orientedto new forms of hetero-relations,
will also be directedto men again, and will be much more confined
and constrainedin manifestingGyn/affection.
In the final analysis, Dinnerstein'sand Chodorow'stheoriesmain-
tain the presentsystmof hetero-reality.They even give it a new boost.
There is no conscious intent, and certainlyno articulatedprescrip-
tions, to do this. However,male bondingwill persistand thrivein the
wake of new forms of hetero-relations,since homo-relationscan only
be strengthenedin the absence of any focus on the primaryimpor-
tance of women's relationswith each other.
There is nothing in Chodorow and Dinnersteinthat sets primary
storeon women'srelationswith women. Thereis no ultimateand con-
cludingprescriptionin theirworksfor the enhancementof Gyn/affec-
tion that compareswith their final idealizingof hetero-relations.The
girl or woman is offered nothingto encourageher originalattraction
to woman. Again, but this time more subtly, she is encouragedto be
for men.
Much contemporary feminist theory has focused on hetero-

46
 janice raymond

relations, i.e. woman-to-manrelationships.The social sciences, in

particular,have not studied,or have given little theoreticalweight, to
female friendship.Thereare, for example,no coursesthat I know of
on the sociology of friendship, as there are on the sociology (and
psychology)of the family. Even in Women's Studies Programsand
Departments,there are few whole courses devoted to the subject of
women's relations with each other. Thus our curriculareflect our
society in diminishing the importance of female friendship. Both
minimizethe meaningof femalefriendship,the formerby expellingit
from serious theoreticalconsiderationand the latter, by neglecting
and erasingit from reality.
Hetero-relationshave definedtoo muchof the theoreticalagendain
feministtheory. It is time to think, in a moreexpansiveGyn/affective
way, about the importance of female friendship. The works of
Chodorow and Dinnersteinidealize hetero-relationsin their "salva-
tion history" theories of co-parentingas the answer to "prevailing
sexual arrangements."Both obscurethe far greaterliberatingpoten-
tial of Gyn/affection wherewomen turn to our Selvesand each other
for empowerment,ratherthan once more seekinghelp from men.

Notes
--. This article is adapted from my recent book, A Passion for Friends: A
Philosophy of Female Affection (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986).
1. Chodorow interprets Freud on this subject. Citing his essay on "Female Sexu-
ality" (1931), she says: "Freud speaks to the way that women seek to recapture their
relationship with their mother in heterosexual relationships. He suggests that as women
'change object' from mother to father, the mother remains their primary internal ob-
ject, so that they often impose on their relation to their father, and later to men, the
issues which preoccupy them in their internal relation to their mother. They look in rela-
tions to men for gratifications that they want from a woman" (Chodorow 1978,
194-95).
2. (Chodorow 1978, 194-95). Carrying this point further, one might cite
Beauvoir's remarks about the insincerity of what I call hetero-relations.
Man and woman-even husband and wife-are in some degree play-
ing a part before one another, and in particular woman, upon whom
the male always imposes some requirement; virtue beyond suspicion,
charm, coquettishness, childlishness, or austerity. Never in the
presence of husband or lover can she feel wholly herself... .(Beauvoir
1949, 394)
3. Given the fact that many men have no idea of, or training for, consistent and
responsible parenting, women, having been enjoined to relinquish the primary mother-
ing of children, may now find that they will have to "mother" men into male mother-
ing.
4. I use the words "visible" and "immediate" purposefully. Mothers, while being
the visible and immediate conduits of hetero-relations, are not the primary conduits.

47
 hypatia

Chodorownotes:
. . . from both psychoanalytic clinical reports and from social
psychological research . . .fathers generally sex-type their children
moreconsciouslythanmothersalongtraditionalgender-rolelinesand
. . . they encourage feminine heterosexual behavior in young
daughters.(Chodorow1978, 118)
However,fathers'encouragement of hetero-relationsis often lessvisiblethanmothers',
becausethe formerare most often the distantand invisibleparent.

48
 cynthia a. freeland
Woman: Revealed Or Reveiled?

My aim is to examine Lacan's views on women's sexuality and

desire in general. I use Hawthorne's novel The Blithedale Romance to
supply a concrete narrative context in which to understand Lacan's
two modes of femininity: the "veiled lady" and the "phallic mas-
querader."I criticize Lacan for holding (like Hawthorne) an essential-
ly Romantic picture of the Ideal Woman who achieves happiness or
peace outside the male/phallic sphere of activity and
strife.

Recent publications in English, and particularlythat of the

volumeFeminineSexuality(Mitchelland Rose, eds. 1982)'havemade
JacquesLacan'sviewson women'ssexualitythe focus of increasedat-
tention here, though not necessarily of increased understanding.
Despite the help of two introductoryessays by this volume's editors,
Juliet Mitchell and JacquelineRose, readersmay yet find Lacan's
positiondifficultto assess.This is so not only becauseof the notorious
obscurityof Lacan'sprosebut even more, I think, becauseof the level
of abstractnessof the psychoanalyticstudiescontainedin the volume.
We know of Freud'sviewson womennot only throughhis (admirably
lucid)lecturesand theoreticalessays, but also throughthe remarkable
medium of the case study, with its intricateinterweavingof theory,
observation,and narrativein a nearlynovelisticcontext. In this paper
I proposeto supplya similarsort of concretenarrativecontextto aid
in our reading and evaluation of Lacan's views-in particular,his
views on feminine sexuality. I will suggest a Lacanianreading-or
rather,exegesisin parallel-of a novel by NathanielHawthorne,The
BlithedaleRomance(1983;henceforwardreferredto by page numbers
alone). My juxtapositionis not as arbitraryas it might first appear,
for Hawthorne's novel concerns the relations between men and
womenmembersof a utopianfarmcommunitydesignedto overthrow
class and sex distinctions.Hawthorne'snarrator,MilesCoverdale,ex-
plores reasons for the utopian experiment'sfailure, which he at-
tributes to certain "facts" about the nature of men, women, and
erotic attraction.
ThoughI find in Lacan'stheorya set of conceptswhichhelpto shed

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

49
 hypia

light on Hawthorne'sbleak story, I want to emphasizethat my con-

cern is not to do a critical analysis of Hawthorne'stext. This self-
consciouslyliterarynovel takes the form of a narrativeby a "poet-
romancer,"and Coverdaletreatshis romancingwith heavy, even bit-
ter, irony. A complete study would need to consider Hawthorne's
idiosyncratic use of symbolism and his peculiar attitude toward
language:
I have felt, a thousandtimes, that wordsmay be a thick
and darksomeveil of mysterybetweenthe soul and the
truth which it seeks (Hawthorne 1840, in Bell 1980,
193)2

My aim is to examineLacan'saccountof women, theirsexuality,and

desire in general. I hope to uncoverthe strikingsimilarityin the vi-
sions presented by the twentieth-centuryFrenchman and the
nineteenth-century American;they sharean essentiallyRomanticpic-
ture of an Ideal Woman who achieves "peace" outside the
male/phallicsphereof activityand strife.

I
TheBlithedaleRomanceis at one and the same time the tragedyof
the gorgeouslyexotic Zenobia, the love story of her pale half-sister
Priscillaand the stern, egomaniacalHollingsworth,and the tale of its
poet-creatorMiles Coverdale,the perpetualobserverseekingto inter-
pret the mysteriousrelationsamongthe others. He spies and attempts
to provokereactions,like a child longing for admissionto the sexual
orderingof adults, but the othersrefuseto acknowledgehim as a par-
ticipant;"Miles Coverdaleis not in earnest," declaresHollingsworth
dismissively.
Among the "knot of characters"occupyingCoverdale's"mental
stage" (156)the two olderpartnersfunctionin parentalroles. Zenobia
has arrivedfirst at Blithedaleand welcomesthe others to its hearth.
Awed, Coverdale finds her the "very type" of womanhood, and
likens her to the Biblicalmother:
One felt an influence breathingout of her such as we
might suppose to come from Eve, when she was just
made, and her Creatorbrought her to Adam, saying,
"Behold! Here is a woman!" (17)
Though simplyattired, this lush, exotic woman retainsone luxurious
adornment,a rare hothouse flower. She owns an elegant city house
with an unusuallyfertilegarden(acrosswhichCoverdalewill laterspy

50
 cynthia a. free/and

on her). She chooses to be known by her pen name, "Zenobia," "a

sort of mask," denoting the ancient, imperious-and doom-
ed-Oriental queen of Palmyra.
To complement this Arcadian Eve, Coverdale presents a crudely
primeval man, almost a jungle creature, the rough-hewn Holl-
ingsworth. He has a "rude massiveness," "shaggy brows" and "a
great stalwart frame;" he is likened to a "bear," a "polar bear," even
a "tiger." Hollingsworth enters Blithedale in the paternal role of pro-
tector to young Priscilla, entrusted to him by her father, Old Moodie.
Like Priscilla, Coverdale has been made weak and shivering by his
own journey to Blithedale, and he too seeks Hollingsworth's care. He
starts his stay not with labor at dawn but by lapsing into an "ef-
feminate" illness; and while he lies feverishly expecting to die, he
becomes "piteously" dependent upon Hollingsworth's ministrations
(which he prefers to Zenobia's watery gruel):
Hollingsworth's more than brotherly attendance gave
me inexpressible comfort. (41)
But Coverdale's fantasized image of the warmly paternal Holl-
ingsworth, and of his "womanish heart", is curtly rebuffed by the
older man:
I would rather say that the most marked trait in my
character is an inflexible severity of purpose. Mortal
man has no right to be so inflexible as it is my nature
and necessity to be. (43)
Hollingsworth plainly revels in his hard severity later on, when he
breaks with Coverdale after the younger man refuses to become his
proselyte and work toward his prison reform scheme.
As Coverdale begins his recovery he embroiders a romance between
his two parental figures, whom he observes strolling about the farm
together, presumably plotting the site of their future home. He cannot
help but link these two; in a dream he is "impotent to regulate," they
exchange a kiss of passion across his bed (153). Coverdale struggles to
grant Zenobia some immunity to Hollingsworth's masterful personali-
ty. He seems to seek a way to deny the "father" privileged access to
Zenobia's bounty, by supposing she is already possessed. He
speculates on whether she is married, sure she must have the "secret of
a woman's destiny." His own desire for her remains unacknowledged,
even in an exchange they have, laden with innuendo. She complains:
Did you ever see a happy woman in your life? . . . How
can she be happy, after discovering that fate has assign-
ed her but one single event, which she must contrive to

51
 hypatia

make the substanceof her whole life? A man has his

choice of innumerableevents. (60)
Coverdalerepliesobliquely:
A woman, I suppose ... by constant repetition of her
one event, may compensatefor the lack of variety.
UltimatelyCoverdaleconcludes, though never with any certainty,
that Zenobiahas been married,to the villainousProfessorWestervelt.
This beautiful man Coverdale detests with surprisingpassion, and
even suspects(on the sole apparentgroundsof his false whiteteeth)of
being a wizened dwarf who has magicallyconjured up his smooth
handsomedemeanor.Despitehis disgust, Coverdaleadmitsto feeling
some kinshipwith Westervelt.They occupy parallelpositions in rela-
tion to Zenobia,as bitterrivalsof Hollingsworthwho neverthelesswill
not intervenein her self-destructivepath.
Zenobia'stragedystems from Hollingsworth'srejectionof her and
his unexpectedpreferencefor Priscilla.When she learnsthat she has
lost to the pale half-sistershe comes to know so late in life, Zenobia
drownsherself.PriscillareturnsHollingsworth'slove andbecomeshis
support when his prison scheme fails and he is rackedby guilt over
Zenobia'ssuicide. Like her half-sister,Priscillatoo had been entangl-
ed earlierwith the wicked Westervelt.And to completethis knot of
emotions and destinies,we are told at the book's end that Coverdale
himself is in love with Priscilla.

II
Outwardly, Zenobia and Priscilla could not be more unlike.
Zenobia is dark, brilliant,graceful, full-bodied, at the height of her
glorious womanhood. Priscilla is pale, gawky, coltish, an
undeveloped girl. Zenobia has wealth, fame, and intellectual ac-
complishments;Priscillais a poor, retiringseamstress.Yet they are
both daughters-although childrenof differentphases in his life-of
the same father, Old Moodie. Theirroutesaway from him have taken
the same path; they are enmeshedfirst with Westervelt,then fall in
love with Hollingsworth.
Zenobia is the child of Old Moodie's flourishingperiod when, as
"Fauntleroy,"a wealthyadventurer,he speculates,is ruinedin scan-
dal and must eventually hide away in disgrace from the world.
Because of her mother's early death, Zenobia "lacked a mother's
care;" and her survivingparentonly loved her "becauseshe shone"
(182). Indeed, "Fauntleroy" had not even cared for his wife but
rather "wore her beauty for the most brilliant ornament of his

52
 cynthia a freeland

outward state" (182). Following "Fauntleroy's"disappearanceand

presumeddeath, Zenobia,as her uncle's heir, has an irregulareduca-
tion, so her brillianceremainsuncultivated.Still, she becomesa well-
known writer, under her pen name, an accomplishedspeaker, an
elegant gracefulwoman with the naturalpresenceof a great actress.
Though she does not choose the stage, she has a passion for mas-
querade.At Blithedaleshe organizesspringrevels and a fall masked
carnival.She adornsherselfand Pricillain costumessuitedto various
occasions, and she stagesstunningtableauxvivants.Once she charms
a hushed audiencewith her allegoricalstory of the Veiled Lady.
As Coverdalesees it, Zenobia's first love was for Westervelt,the
self-styled"Professor" of unidentifiedexpertise.Though plainlyshe
now detests him, she admits that she has had a "life hopelesslyen-
tangled with a villain's" (225). Apparently referringto him, she
remarksthat
Beauty, in a man, has been of little account with me
since my earliestgirlhood, when, for once it turnedmy
head. (227)
In other words, Zenobia has substitutedfor her lost father-that
"optical delusion"- a lover, perhaps husband, who also has no
substance. (Coverdalejudges, after Westervelt'svist to Blithedale,
that he is a man "miserably incomplete, on the emotional side"
(103).) Westerveltindeed has no more love for Zenobiathan did her
father; he stands over her grave with no sympathy for her "full
heart," bemoaninginstead the waste of her death: "Had she lived,
and hearkenedto my counsels,we mighthave servedeach otherwell"
(241).
The sinister Westerveltis succeededin Zenobia's affections by a
man no better,but one in whom Zenobiathinksshe has found a "true
strong heart." She joins Hollingsworth'sprison reform program,
even offering to finance it, despite her professeddislike for "philan-
thropists." But what binds Zenobia to Hollingsworthis, it emerges,
his dominance,his antifeminism.He declaimsagainstthe freedomof
woman:
Her placeis at man'sside. Her office, that of a like sym-
pathizer; the unreserved,unquestioningbeliever; the
recognition,withheldin every other manner,but given
in pity, throughwoman'sheart, lest man should utterly
lose faith in himself;the echo of God's own voice, pro-
nouncing, "It is well done." (122)
Astonishingly,Zenobia,who beganher stay by predictinga time when

53
 hypatia

the "sisters" of Blithedalewill join their "brethren"in hardlabor in

the fields, now respondswith abject admiration:
Let man be but manly and god-like and woman is only
too ready to become to him what you say! (124)
Even Coverdalecannot contain his surprise,wondering:
Women almost invariably behave thus . . . What does
this fact mean? Is it their nature?Or is it, at last, the
result of ages of compelled degradation? And . . . in
eithercase, will it be possibleeverto redeemthem?(124)
It is an amusingprospectto fancy the compulsivelyinert Coverdale
envisaging himself as knight-errantpreparedto "redeem" women
from their victimizationby men such as Hollingsworth.His motives
will merit furtherscrutinybelow.
When Zenobiaat last graspsHollingsworth'spreferences,and sees
he has only been using her in anticipationof getting her money, she
denounceshim in a speech of icy clarity:
It is all self! . . . Nothing else, nothing but self, self, self!
... You have embodied yourself in a project. You are a
better masquerader than the witches and gypsies
yonder;for your disguiseis a self-deception.(218)
She bewails the "great and rich heart ... ruined in (his) breast" (219)
but, on tryingto convey to Coverdalesome messagefor him, realizes
"I have no message," and concludes by passing along her jewelled
hair ornament(a variationof her customaryflower) for Priscillato
wear. Laterthat night she drowns herself.
Priscilla will never wear that jewel. Her femininity is not
representedby display and hothouse flowers, but ratherby the veil.
That is, Priscillaturnsout to be the famedVeiledLady, whose perfor-
mance Coverdaleis musingover at the story's start. Her identityis a
mystery(and becomesthe basis for Zenobia'stale one evening).Peo-
ple speculatethat she is someone rich and beautiful, and so we half-
expectto learnthat Zenobiahas been playingat this game. But in fact
her real identity is immediatelyclear from descriptionsof Priscilla.
She enters Blithedaleas a figure "envelopedin a cloak-evidently a
woman" (26). She is "unsubstantial,""secret" and "shadow-like,"
prompting Coverdale's "fantasy" that she is some kind of snow-
wraith. She turns out to be a ratherordinary,sickly seamstress,who
possessesone extraordinaryskill, at craftingintricatesilk purses:
Theirpeculiarexcellence,besidesthe delicacyand beau-
ty of their manufacture,lay in the almost impossibility

54
 cynthia a. free/and

that any uninitiated person should discover the aper-

ture; although to a practised touch, they would open as
wide as charity or prodigality might wish. (35)
Coverdale seems to resist admitting the sexual allusions so close to
the surface here, and even hesitates in his own taste for becoming "in-
itiated" into Priscilla's secrets:
... If any mortal really cares for her, it is myself; and
not even I, for her realities, . . . but for the fancy-work
with which I have idly decked her out! (100)
Priscilla was the child of Old Moodie's ("Fauntleroy's") period of
poverty and disgrace, "the daughter of my long calamity" (193); he
claims to love her best, but "with shame." Priscilla too grows up
motherless, but she has, unlike Zenobia, a powerful female figure in
her life. Moodie tells her fairy-tales about her beautiful, princess-like
sister-Zenobia herself. Priscilla worships her unknown half-sister:
. . . Out of the loneliness of her sad little existence,
Priscilla's love grew, and tended upward ... .It was
almost like worship . . . nor was it the less
humble,-though the more earnest-because Priscilla
could claim human kindred with the being whom she so
devoutly loved. (186)
This selfless, undemanding love becomes the pattern for Priscilla's
later devotion to Hollingsworth. In both cases, she asks nothing from
her beloved. Once when Coverdale inquires about her desires, she
replies, "I am blown about like a leaf .... I never have any free-will"
(171).
Like Zenobia, Priscilla is victimized by the demonic Westervelt. He
hears of the young girl's reputation for "strangeness," absences, a
kind of clairvoyance, and decides to capitalize upon it by staging a
mesmerism show with her, entranced, under a gauzy veil. Coverdale's
own reaction testifies to Westervelt's brilliant spectacle. By trapping
Priscilla under this veil Westervelt prolongs her adolescence; he has
preserved her purity and remoteness by concealing her identity. Even
after Old Moodie has helped her to escape Westervelt for the pastoral
scene of Blithedale, Priscilla seems not quite free; she still pauses,
frightened and abstracted, listening to voices, somehow mysterious
and remote. She is really only freed from Westervelt when, after
Zenobia sends her back to the stage, Hollingsworth finds her, steps up
and tells her to remove her veil. At the story's conclusion when Cover-
dale sees her at Hollingsworth's side, supporting him, she remains
quiet and shadow-like, wearing "a look of veiled happiness" on her

55
 hypatia
face. As Zenobia once observes, pityingly, "Poor child! She is the
type of womanhoodsuch as man has spentcenturiesin making it....
He is never content, unless he can degrade himself by stooping
towards what he loves." Coverdale concurs, seeing her at Holl-
ingsworth'sbeck and call:
She seemedto take the sentimentfrom his lips into her
heart, and brood over it in perfect content. The very
woman whom he pictured-the gentle parasite,the soft
reflectionof a more powerfulexistence-sat thereat his
feet. (123)
The romanticentanglementsof Blithedalepresenta nest of puzzles.
Why does Hollingsworth fail to respond to the rich beauty and
challenge so evident in Zenobia? Why does Coverdaletoo love the
"gentle parasite," Priscilla?Why does Zenobia, ardent defenderof
women's rights, immolate herself in a successionof destructiverela-
tionships,culminatingin her passionfor the self-centeredchauvinistic
Hollingsworth?What is the significanceof the two sisters' parallel
paths away from their father and their homes?We may ponderthese
questionsfurtheras we turn next to examineLacan'sviews of desire
and femininesexuality.
III
Lacan charts the development of a subject from infancy into
Oedipalcomplicationsand the abstractcomplexitiesof language.He
takes it as Freud'spre-eminentachievement(thoughone which could
not be suitablyappreciateduntil the adventof linguistics,by whichhe
means Saussure) to see that these two entries or initiations are
simultaneous.Freud'slittle grandson,in the tale Lacanloves retelling,
invented a simple word game to symbolize, yet master, his despair
over the motherwho could not alwaysbe presentfor him. Becausethe
initiationinto social structuresof languageand sexualityis the entry
into subjectivity,Lacanremarksthat the (psychoanalytic)subject,like
a Cartesian ego, appears simultaneouslywith doubt. In both ad-
vances, the infant encounters some uncertainty,absence, or lack.
Concretely,the child realizesthat he* (*I speak of the infant as "he"
for reasonswhich will, I hope, become apparent;this is important)is
not the mother'sentireworld, that the motheris often absent;and he
also comesto understandthat languageoperatesby substitutingwords
for their absent referents,objects no longer present.
More abstractly,the infant confronts two highly organizedstruc-
tures: language and the societal institutions governing sexual rela-
tions. Both are Other;they come from without(from others),they are

56
 cynthia a. freeland

outside of him. The child must adopt these pre-existenttools to ar-

ticulate and realize his own wants (4 Concepts, 188). By the Other
Lacan also refers to the unconscious,the level or mode of reality at
which the subject experiencesfeelingsand desiresand "knows" this
even though their expression is inhibited or repressed from con-
sciousness.This Otherin the subjecthas knowledgecoded in another
language,the code of the unconscious,with the quirkylogic, blithe
endorsementof contradictions,and peculiarpictographicsymbolsun-
covered by Freud. Hence Lacan sees the task of the therapistas in-
troducingthe patient to the languagehe is alreadyspeaking(ltcrits,
81).
Again following Freud, Lacan emphasizesthe archetypalpaternal
role in institutingstructuresof languageand sexuality(i.e. the Oedipal
taboo). This leads to his examination of the significance of the
phallus,that is the symbolicphallus,not to be identifiedwith any par-
ticularbodily organ. Lacansees in this symbolthe clearestrepresenta-
tion of desire, the embodimentof a humandesiredirectedtowardno
particularobject. It is somewhateasierto understandhis account of
the role of this symbolic representationin the child's entry into sex-
uality than to see its role in language, so let us examine the sexual
orderingfirst.
For the child, the real paternalphallusis the first hint or parallelto
the conceptual,symbolicphallus;this is why Lacancan write almost
crudelyat times of the child's appreciationof this organ the mother
wants and which he lacks-as, for example, in his essay on Hamlet:
... In the tragedyof Hamlet, unlike that of Oedipus,
after the murderof the father, the phallusis still there.
It's thereindeed,and it is preciselyClaudiuswho is call-
ed upon to embody it. Claudius'real phallusis always
somewherein the picture. What does Hamlet have to
reproach his mother for, after all, if not for filling
herself with it? (Lacan 1982, 50)
The child sees in this phallusthe reason for his mother'sabsence, for
her failureto respondto his unconditionaldemandfor love. Though
the mother may satisfy the infant's basic biological needs, Lacan
posits that there is an overwhelming,unsatisfiabledemand for her
love, her presence-a demand which would presumablynecessitate,
for its fulfillment,returnto the womb (Ecrits,310-11). Demandcan-
not be expressed;Lacanspeaksof the subjectas being "barred"in the
face of demand. "To be Barred," he explains, "means to have no
'possibilityof saying which demand" (FS, 132). What the child does
articulate are its desires, but these expressions cannot succeed at

57
 hypatia

capturingwhat is really wanted. Desire, unlike demand, can be for-

mulated, but it is evanescent: ". . . What we call desire crawls, slips,
escapeslike the ferret" (4 Concepts, 214).
Fromthe startthe infant's problemin satisfyingneedsand express-
ing desiresis a relationalone, a questionof how to addressthe Other
(in this case, the Mother). Lacan sees here a locus of frustration:
But the child does not alwaysfall asleepin the bosom
of being, especiallyif the Other,whichhas its own ideas
about his needs, interferes, and in the place of that
whichit does not have, stuffs him with the chokingpap
of what it has, that is to say, confuseshis needswith the
gift of its love. (lcrits, 263)
The infant and mother are placed in a complex dual relation of
seekingexpressionof desireand love:
For both partnersin the relation, both the subject and
the Other,it is not enoughto be subjectsof need, or ob-
jects of love, but that they must stand for the cause of
desire. (lcrits, 263)
Manifestationsof love thus do not succeedbecausethe mother,who
is equallybarredin the face of demand,cannot make clear her desire
any morethan can the child/subject.A cruelgameensues:"He is say-
ing this to me, but what does he want?" (4 Concepts,214). It should
now be more obvious just in what respect the phallus putatively
possessedby the fatheris symbolic,the theorized,inferredimpossible
"ratio of the other's desire" (lcrits, 288).
Just as the infant is realizinghis inabliity to be the cause of the
mother'sdesire, he inheritsa languagewhichis inadequateto express
his own. Lacan describesit with this sour metaphor:
For the unripe grape of speech by which the child
receivestoo early from a father the authentificationof
the nothingnessof existence, and the bunch of wrath
that replies to the words of false hope with which the
mother has baited him in feeding him with the milk of
her true despair,set his teeth on edge more than having
been weanedon an imaginaryjouissance [NB: a termto
be furtherclarifiedbelowl or even havingbeen deprived
of such real attentions.(Ecrits, 143)
The phallusis not just the best representationof desire, according
to Lacan, but it is the representationof representation,the first gen-
uinely symbolic notion the child experiences as such. ". . . It is the

58
 cynthia a. freeland

signifierintendedto designateas a whole the effects of the signified,in

that the signifierconditionsthem by its presenceas a signifier"(Lcrits
285). The system of signifiers, or language, forms experienceas a
whole, and it is not accidentalthat the phallusitself signifiesthe pre-
existent, patriarchallyinstitutedmodes of conceptionin the language
we use. "The signifier enters into the signified," notes Lacan (cf.
lcrits, 150-54).
Nowherewill pre-conceivedschemesmodify experiencesas muchas
in the subjectiveexperienceof sexuality, i.e. in the constitutionof a
female subject:
It is the representation(Vorstellungin the sensein which
Freuduses the term to signal somethingrepressed),the
representationof femininesexuality,whetherrepressed
or not, which conditions how it comes into play. (FS,
90)
Like Freud, Lacanseems to have becomemore and more occupied
with questionsabout femininesexuality, with problemsthe terms of
whichcan best be understoodby recalling,Freud's thesis, whichLacan
reflectsupon, that "Thereis no libido otherthan the masculine"(FS,
151). Clearly both agree in taking masculine and feminine to be
psychicallyrepresentedby an opposition between the active and the
passive;and both meanto deny that the psychologicalis anatomically
or biologically determined. Thus Lacan speaks about "situating"
oneself "on the side of" the phallic, a choice open to (biological)
women, and a position which can be renouncedby (biological)men
(FS, 147). Nevertheless,and althoughhe insistentlydeniesthat thereis
any such thing as "The" woman (hence writing "The Woman")
Lacanrefersto and triesto elaboratefemininesexualityas profoundly
Other. Other, presumably,than the phallus.
Insofar as it is the phallus which pre-eminentlysymbolizesdesire,
the woman-that is, women, little girls generally-must deal with the
alreadydifficult problemof knowingand articulatingdesirein terms
made even more difficult by the fundamental alien-ness of this
signifierof desire. So Lacan writes:
As is true for all women, and for reasonswhich are at
the verybasisof the most elementaryforms of social ex-
change .. ., the problemof her conditionis fundamen-
tally that of acceptingherself as an object of desire for
the man. (FS, 68)
This is how Lacan sets the problem;to it, he proposes, or discerns,
two alternativesolutions.

59
 hypatia
On the one hand, or takingone possibleroute, the woman/girlmay
activelystriveto become what is desired;she seeks to define and res-
pond to the Other'sdesire. But, of course, this is the usual route, for
all subjects; as such, it exists within the realm of the phallic. Put
anotherway, this is the path for a womanwho attemptsto realizepre-
existingsex roles and so, in effect, legitimatesthem;she plays at being
a woman in the artificialityof what Lacan calls the "masquerade."
Lacan comments:
Paradoxicalas this formulationmay seem, I am saying
that it is in order to be the phallus, that is to say, the
signifierof the desireof the Other,that a womanwill re-
ject an essential part of her femininity, namely all her
attributesin the masquerade.It is for that which she is
not that she wishes to be desiredas well as loved. But
she finds the signifierof her own desire in the body of
him to whom she addressesher demand for love. (FS,
290)
We must note, but reservecommenton, Lacan'sclaim that this ac-
tive womansets aside her "essentialfemininity."What she cannotac-
cept, he tells us here, is her existence as castrated;this will prove
equally what makes it problematicfor men to love women (in doing
so, they acceptcastration).But it should alreadybe clearthat we have
sketchedhereexactlythe patternof femininityadoptedby Zenobiain
Hawthorne'snovel. Zenobiadenotes herself as femininethroughthe
flower emblem. She rejoices in masquerade.Even in daily life her
clothing is a sort of costume, whetherit be the exaggeratedlysimple
attire she adopts at Blithedale or the "costly robes" she wears,
parading before her own reflection in her richly furnished home
(163-4). Her very nameis a mask. In relationto men, Zenobiadefines
her own value as a sort of ornamentor reflection, encouragedfrom
the start by her father (". .. it is Fauntleroy that still shines through
her!", 192 ), and again by her superficiallover Westervelt. Holl-
ingsworthcan only see herin relationto himself, as the financierof his
program;but she borrowsfrom this her own self-concept,even to the
point of articulatingjust whyhe ought to want her, just what she can
signify to him:
What can Priscillado for him? Put passionatewarmth
in his heart,whenit shallbe chilledwith frozenhopes...
No! but only tend towardshim with a blind, instinctive
love . . . She cannot even give him such sympathy as is
worth the name. For will he never, in many an hour of
darkness,need that proud intellectualsympathywhich

60
 cynthia a. freeland

he might have had from me? (224-5)

It is intriguingthat in her delayed moment of- clarity about Holl-
ingsworthshe finds in him a "masquerader,"a "self-deceiver"who
has "embodied himself in a project" (218). Zenobia's despair and
suicidemay then be promptedby herrealizationof how both men and
women become trapped and frozen in the ritualized masquerade
governingthe exchangeof sexual desire.
Zenobia had, more than most daughters,to "learn from scratch
from the Other what to do as . . . woman" in that she was raised
without a mother, in fact altogether without parental care. Lacan
muses over Freud'squestionabout what the little girl wants from the
mother. In one response,which he deliversin the course of a discus-
sion of Freud'spatient Dora, Lacan exploresjust what the younger
woman seeks from her beloved older woman friend-here, Frau K,
the mistressof Dora's father and wife of her own lover, Herr K; she
must learn from Frau K "to accept herself as an object of desire;"
"This is for Dora the mysterywhich motivatesher idolatryfor Frau
K" (FS 68). This too accountsfor herbitterreactionwhenHerrK pro-
tests "My wife is nothing to me;" hence her renunciation,her angry
slap in his face. Priscilla,like Dora, is presentedwith an olderwoman,
her rival in many senses: the beautifuldaughterher fatherworships,
the apparentbelovedof Hollingsworth;and, like Dora again, Priscilla
is moved toward a form of idolatrous love. Presumablythen, we
ought to say that she learnsfrom Zenobiato accept herselfas an ob-
ject of desirefor the man. She is given simple, straightforwarddirec-
tions for doing this, because Moodie retells his pathetic tales night
after night. Priscilla, in other words, has been given the fantasized,
theorized, hypothetical,symbolic object of her father's desire, what
he had lost and can no longerpossessor even know-Zenobia herself.
Priscillahas been expresslycreatedto listento the expressionof man's
desire, without voicing her own, without demanding anything in
return.
Zenobia'sactive.searchfor a way to acceptthe man's desiresleads
ultimatelyto suicide;Priscilla'sroute, quite strikinglyin an otherwise
somber novel, produces happiness. Even in Zenobia's final action
Lacan would see an affirmation of "the immediateparticularityof
desire," a desire which in suicide reconquers:
... .its ineffable form, rediscovers in negation a final
triumph. . . not a perversion of the instinct, but rather
that desperateaffirmationof life that is the purestform
in which we recognizethe death instinct. (Pcrits, 104-5)
At Blithedale,Priscillacontinuesto be a passiveadorer;Zenobiain

61
 hypatia

realityfurtherconspiresin makingPriscillaattractiveby supplyingthe

propergarb:a garlandof flowers, a dressof purewhite. Priscillacon-
tinues too to be a listenerreceivingmysterioussignals:
... All at once, midway to Hollingsworth, she paused,
looked roundabout her, towardsthe river,the road, the
woods, and back towardsus, appearingto listen, as if
she heard someone calling her name, and knew not
preciselyin what direction.(60)
Coverdalejokingly supposesthat, like the young maidensin Milton,
she is listeningto men's tonguesvoiced in the air (60). He laterteases
her to exercisethe "sybilline"gift she denieshaving-despite his own
experienceof it, in the audience at her performanceas the Veiled
Lady.
One other facet of Priscilla'sbehaviordeservesmention:her unex-
pected wildness in playing as she enjoys her first taste of outdoor
freedom at Blithedale.Coverdaleobservesappreciatively:
Girls are incomparablywilder and more effervescent
than boys, more untameable,and regardlessof rules of
limit, . . . their steps, their voices, appear free as the
wind, but keep consonancewith a strain of music, in-
audibleto us. Youngmen and boys, on the other hand,
play according to recognized law, old, traditionary
games, permittingno capriolesof fancy, but with scope
enough for the outbreak of savage instincts . . . (73)
In Priscilla,in short, it should now be apparent,we see a womanwho
occupies the place of that other form of femininity described by
Lacan, a woman who remainsOtherand is outsidethe phallicdomain
of ritualized play and masquerade. She is, presumably, more
"natural,"more genuinelyOther, this woman who has embracedher
"essentialfemininity."As such, he appearsto regardher as morecon-
nectedto the unconscious;her status as a knowingsubjectis to know
"from Beyond" (or he says, the Unconsciousknows in her)-in the
way we suspect Priscillasomehow hears men's voices in the air (as it
were). The hint of mysticismhere is welcomed, even toyed with, by
Lacan, who speaks of how the unconsciousis in the place of "good
old God;" the analystsare "laicizing"or "exorcising"God (FS, 140).
Again, he explicitly links the woman's ineffable knowledge(of the
Other, of her own desires)to the mystic's knowledgeof God, writing
with apparent relish of the "coming" or jouissance of St. Theresa (as
imaged by Bernini) as somehow "extra," unrequested, unex-
pected-and, we suppose, for all that the better. He writes:

62
 cynthia a. freeland

It is insofar as herjouissance is radicallyOtherthat the

woman has a relationto God greaterthan all that has
been stated in ancient speculationaccordingto a path
which has manifestlybeen articulatedonly as the good
of mankind.(FS, 153)
And again:
Thereis womanonly as excludedby the natureof things
whichis the natureof words, and it has to be said that if
thereis one thingthey themselvesarecomplainingabout
enough at the moment, it is well and truly that-only
they don't know what they are saying, which is all the
differencebetweenthem and me.
It nonetheless remains that if she is excluded by the
natureof things, it is preciselythat in being not all, she
has, in relationto what the phallic function designates
of jouissance, a supplementaryjouissance.
Thereis a jouissance properto her, to this 'her' which
does not exist and which signifies nothing. There is a
jouissance proper to her and of which she herself may
know nothing, except that she experiences it-that
much she does know. She knows it of course when it
happens. It does not happen to all of them. (FS, 144,
145passim)
It seems to be the crowning indication of women's inability to
describe,give directions,or locate their sourceof this supplementary
jouissance that, no matter how often men ask them about it,
they-even the womenanalysts!-can say nothingabout it. (FS, 146).
What makes a woman like Priscillaone who can be desired(whose
castrationis acceptable)?To understandthis we may simplynote that
Lacan maintainsthat the phallus can play its role only when veiled,
"as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiableis struck,
when it is raisedto the function of a signifier"(FS, 82). The veil em-
phasizesthe mysteryof the phallus, its existenceas a symbol, or as a
"ratio" of desire. Lacan adduces the example of young Alcibiades'
confession of love in Plato's Symposium:
It is becausehe has not seen Socrates'prick, if I may be
permittedto follow Plato, who does not spare us the
details, that Alcibiades the seducer exalts in him the
agalma, the marvelthat he would like Socratesto cede
to him in avowinghis desire:the divisionof the subject
that he bears within himself being admittedwith great

63
 hypatia

clarityon this occasion.

And moreover,Lacancontinuesin this key passage:
Such is the woman concealedbehind her veil: it is the
absenceof the penisthatturnsherinto the phallus,the ob-
ject of desire.( crits, 322, emphasismine)
This, then, is Priscilla,belovedand "happy"behindthe veil.

IV
In reflectingon Lacan,we shouldnoticeparticularlyhow Coverdale's
account of the "style" of femininityembodiedin Priscillaparallels
Lacan's notion of the psychoanalyst. Lacan typically, even self-
consciously,disparageslove whichhe treats,as did Freud,as a form of
narcissism:"To love is, essentially,to wish to be loved" (4 Concepts,
253); "The subjecttries to induce the Otherinto a miragerelationin
whichhe convinceshim of beingworthyof love . .."(4 Concepts,267).
In love as typicallyconceivedthe subjectfails to be relatedto a genuine
Other;he is like the little child who takes the objectsof its desires(the
breast,etc.) to be partsof itself, who seesonly himselfin his libidinalac-
tivities.In the essay "FromLove to the Libido"(4 Concepts,187-200),
Lacanidentifiesthe essentialintermediarystep betweenthe child'snar-
cissismandbonafiderelationsto theOther,namely,thelibido'soutward
path towarda separateand distinctobject, the objet petit a ("other"
(autre)witha small"o" ("a")). Thedriveis saidto reachout towardthis
object,returning,perhapsproducingsatisfaction,alongwithrecognition
of the object'sindependence,or separateexistence-'that objectaround
whichthe drivemoves,... thatrisesin a bump,likethe woodendarning
egg in the materialwhich, in analysis,you are darning"(4 Concepts,
257). The movementof the driveopens up a hole or "split" in the sub-
ject's completeness,promptinga realizationof "lack;"only now is the
subjectin a positionto beginto recognizethe realexistenceof the Other,
launchinghis entryinto the relationalphenomenonof desire.
Of courseeven havingattaineda measureof realinteractionthe sub-
jectmaylapseinto narcissisminsofaras he keepstryingto forceuponthe
Othersome understanding of the Other'sdesire.Thisoccursnot merely
fromsadismor pigheadedness butratherin a desperatesearchto be what
the Otherdesiresthe subjectto be. As notedabove,Lacantakesthispro-
cessof communicationto be subjectto inevitableimpediments.Butsuch
a viewmustsurelyhaveimplicationsfor hisconceptionof thetherapeutic
enterprise,for "mentalhealth"generally.He remarks:

64
 cynthia a. freeland

In any case, man cannot aim at being whole (the "total

personalilty" is another of the deviant premises of
modernpsychotherapy),whileeverthe play of displace-
ment and condensationto whichhe is doomedin the ex-
erciseof his functionsmarkshis relationas a subjectto
the signifier. (Lcrits,287)
For the analyst then the task is not "healing" but establishing
"good faith" with the frustrated,"divided" subject:
He will simply find his desire ever more divided,
pulverized,in the circumscribablemetonymyof speech.
. That is why he must get out, get himself out, and in
the getting-himself-out,in the end, he will knowthat the
real Other has, just as much as himself, to get himself
out, to pull himselffree. It is herethat the need for good
faith becomesimperative,a good faith basedon the cer-
tainty that the same implicationof difficultyin relation
to the ways of desireis also in the Other. (4 Concepts,
188)
The strandof pessimismin Lacan'soutlook stems from his attitude
toward sexuality, which he takes to be coordinate with, even to
"mean" death. We experiencesexual reproduction,and are hence
unlikethe amoeba,a beingwhichattainsa form of eternitythroughits
infinite divisions. This is the point of Lacan's sad tale of the lost
"lamella", the homunculus(littleman, or I'hommelette)slicedoff the
tops of our heads (as one slices a boiled egg) in a "cut" whichlost us
our amoeba-like status and launched our existence as sexed in-
dividuals(muchas, in Aristophanes'fable, the happysphericalbeings
werehalved, sufferingever after the desirefor theirlost partners).3(4
Concepts, 196ff.)
The relationto the Otheris preciselythat which, for us
bringsout whatis representedby the lamella-not sexed
polarity, the relation between masculine and
feminine-but the relation between the living subject
and that which he loses by having to pass, for his
reproduction,throughthe sexual cycle.
In this way I explainthe essentialaffinity of everydrive
with the zone of death, and reconcilethe two sides of
the drive-which, at one and the same time, makespre-
sent sexualityin the unconsciousand represents,in its
essence, death. (4 Concepts, 199passim)

65
 hypatia

Lacan'sposition on the equationof sexualitywith deathis what lies

behind some of his fairly extravaganttalk of lofty human ideals (he
speaksof "the courageand patienceof the soul in bearingthe world,"
(FS, 155). It also accounts for his almost peculiar requirementof
detachmentfrom the analyst;he explains:
The analyst'sdesireis not a puredesire. It is a desireto
obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes
when, confrontedwith the primarysignifier,the subject
is, for the first time, in a position to subjecthimself to
it. There only may the significationof a limitless love
emerge,becauseit is outsidethe limits of the law, where
alone it may live. (4 Concepts, 276)
... A man can adumbrate his situation in a field made
up of rediscoveredknowledgeonly if he has previously
experiencedthe limit within which, like desire, he is
bound. Love, which, it seems to some, I have down-
graded, can be posited only in that beyond where, at
first, it renouncesits object. (4 Concepts, 276, passim)
Lacan sees a distinct resemblancebetweenthe "ethic of analysis"
and certainstringentphilosophicalconceptionsof moral value. "Is it
not strange,that echo we found ... betweenthe ethic of analysisand
the Stoic ethic?" (4 Concepts,254). Both systemsrequirea "recogni-
tion of the absolute authority of the desire of the Other . . ." (4 Con-
cepts, 254). Again, Lacancites Kantas a predecessor;the emphasison
universal law at the cost of rejecting the personal and subjective
(Lacan speaks of "the sacrifice and murder of the pathological
object") resultsin an achievementof
. . . desire in its pure state, that very desire that
culminates in the sacrifice strictly speaking, of
everythingthat is the object of love in one's human
tenderness.(4 Concepts, 276)
Lacan struggleshere to describea desire which does not meet the
conditionsof desire he himself has laid out-a desire purgedof par-
ticularity. But in its "otherness" this desire recalls that of "The
Woman" who occupies the strange positon of experiencinggreat
satisfactionwithoutexperiencingany particulardesire. The condition
of the Lacanian analyst, then, is precisely that of Priscilla-the
womanwho loves withoutmakingany demands,who acceptsand em-
bodies her statusas a genuineOther,who suppliesan opportunityfor
the man to "rest" his desire upon/in her preciselybecauseshe rests

66
 cynthia a. freeland

contentwith what she is, the castratedbeing, the VeiledLady. We can

detect grounds for some disgruntlementon Lacan's part in assessing
"The Woman," for she is naturallywhat an analystmuststriveto be.
The analystmust desirenot to desire(i.e. not to dictateto the Other);
recallthat the "analyst'sdesireis not a puredesire." The analystmust
striveto "sacrifice... the objectof love." But "The Woman"places
herselfin relationto the man as an Otherwho does not force him into
a mold, refusingto projectsome conceptionof her value onto him by
way of interpretinghis desire to him. In this way the woman can be
there supportingthe phallus (even when it goes limp; Priscilla sup-
ports Hollingsworthin Coverdale'slast glimpse).She can be the Laca-
nian "friend" helpingthe man to "bear"the world. And what'smore
(luckily for her) in this role she experiencesher own jouissance.
Does all of this mean that Lacanenvies "The Woman?" Is Lacan-
the-analystreallyLacan-as-Woman?(Is the therapistin drag?)I think
not, and it is importantto see why not. Lacan'ssternand severeethic
is meant for "men" who may self-consciouslystriveto meet his stan-
dards. It requiresa choice and a self-sacrifice,presupposinga clear
self-conception. Given Lacan's bleak pictureof the frustratingcycle
of defeated desires, and his pessimistic equation of sexuality with
death, then he has laid out for the analystthe best, the "purest"desire
availableto "men." But the conditionof desireso achievedis not the
same as the conditionof "other" desireoccupiedby "The Woman."
She seems naturally to exist in this realm; she has not arrivedat it
throughself-definition.WhenPricillaexperiencesjouissanceor "hap-
piness" (to use Coverdale'sphrase),it is somethingwhichbefalls her,
not somethingshe choosesor conceivesof as a good. But Lacanvalues
this conditiononly when it is the resultof a difficult self-overcoming.
That is, he valorizesit, sees it as an achievement-the resultof a par-
ticularlyclever kind of phallic striving.
UltimatelyLacan presentsboth men and women with an unsavory
pair of options. On the one hand, we may "escape" the sphere of
phallic struggleby achievingan attenuatedkind of desire, the "pure
desire" of the analyst. Such a desirehas its sublimeaspects, enabling
"souls" to sharethe burdenof the world. But it seems not to concern
real human beings in concrete situations of pain and distress. The
messagecommunicatedbetween sublime souls of analyst and analy-
sand is itself attenuated.On the other hand, there are the Priscillas
who experiencejouissance. They receivean ineffable fullnessof being
withouthavingeverhad any self-conception.It is hardto imaginehow
these people could understand others' real, material, day-to-day
needs. Nor is it easy to see how a person unable to conceptualize
herselfand her own needs might be withthe othersin whose presence

67
 hypatia
she (supposedly)experiencesher happiness.Perhaps,after all, Cover-
dale's ironywas at work againin his sunnydepictionof Priscilla'slot;
he allows a shadow to pass briefly over her:
Her one possible misfortune was Hollingsworth's
unkindness; and that was destined never to befall
her-never yet, at least-for Priscillahas not died. (242)

V
As I have tried to suggest, Lacan'sviews about desire, "men" and
the supremephallic achievementof the therapistare not without dif-
ficulties. In the final section, however,I will concentrateon his views
of women and femininesexuality,to try to revealhis most basic, and
problematic,assumptions.
First, there is some respect in which Lacan remains a
biological/anatomicaldeterminist,in spite of his repeateddenials, as
for example in his interpretationof the phallus as more than, and
hence not, the bodily organ. It is nonethelesstrue that he takes this
emblemof actual, real male desireas the representationof desire,and
one which makes all articulationof desiresradicallyalien to women.
That is, very concretely,even the individuallittle girl growingup to-
day must learnto experienceher own desire/valuefrom conceptualiz-
ing this erect male penis. Though Lacan also repeatedlydenies that
there is any such thing as "the" women, in his theory woman are
treatedas a kind of naturalclass: theirsexualityis a problem;they are
representedin all of language,as in his remarks,as Other;they have
an "essentialfemininity;"they have peculiarproperties,such as inex-
plicableorgasmsand knowledgethey cannot express. We can hardly
be surprisedafter this theoreticalplacementof women to find Lacan,
in the Seminarof 21 January 1975, telling about a man for whom
women exist after the fashion of fictional, fairy-tale creatureslike
sylphs and water-sprites.(In this essay he also writesthat "A woman
is a symptom," FS 168).
This playingwith ambiguityalso characterizesLacan'streatmentof
the woman/mother's desirefor the phallus. That is, we ought not
understandthis as a literal desire of a particularwoman for "her"
phallus. But if we banish this (perhapsplausible) account of what
some women infact desirefrom men, Lacan'sclaim can be seen to be
more and moreimplausibleand moreand morereactionary.The sym-
bolic phalluswhich the mother is supposedto desire is, after all, the
entireapparatusof patriarchy,everythingrangingfrom religiousrites
to conventionalizedsex-rolesto the conceptualframeworksembedded
in our language. This is what the mother wants?-even the mother

68
 cynthia a. freeland
who also as a lesbian, a politicalactivist,a feminist,a poor womanor
a memberof an oppressedracialor religiousminorityseeks or strug-
gles for change and redefinition?In other words Lacan is telling us
that all women, even feminist women, desire the conditions of their
oppression;he is exactly like Coverdalemusingover Zenobia'sturn-
about docility towardsHollingsworth-only he does not go so far as
to fancy redeemingwomen, as Coverdaleat least did, choosingrather
to mystify their condition, to find in it the source of theirmysterious
jouissance. If this is not Lacan'sintentionin declaringthat the mother
desiresthe phallus,then we seem forcedto take the cruderline and say
that women are after all lecherous, like Queen Gertrude,who can't
wait decentlyto get "full" of herphallus(evenafter the murderof her
King).
Finally, in a claim which seems to have had the greatestimpacton
his associates, Lacan posits that women have some alternativemode
of knowingand articulatingdesiresfrom that of men. He emphasizes
the dangerof male misconstrualsof female knowledgeand desire, as
in his essay on Freud's "Dora" case, "Intervention on
Transference."Here he remarkson aspectsof Freud'smisreadingsof
Dora's utterances.This apparentsensitivityon Lacan's part to the
suppression of women's speech has made his writings a natural
resourcefor women critics and analysts;some of the ensuing work,
such as Helene Cixous' (1983) play based on "Dora," has been rich
and imaginative.One almost beginsto hope for an end to suppression
of the sort promptingZenobia'spassionateplea in Blithedale:
Thus far, no woman in the world has ever once spoken
out her whole heart and her whole mind. The mistrust
and disapprovalof the vast bulk of society throttlesus,
as with two gigantichandsat our throats!We mumblea
few weak words, and leave a thousandbetter ones un-
said. You let us write a little, it is true, on a limited
range of subjects. But the pen is not for women. Her
poweris too naturaland immediate.It is with the living
voice alone that she can compel the world to recognize
the light of herintellectand the depthof her heart!(120)
But in point of fact Lacan leads the way not to women who voice
theirheartbut to womenwho embracetheirinabilityto do so, rejoic-
ing in their own mysteriousness.Lacan'sview here culminatesin his
(one-time)associateLuceIrigaray'sremarkable,obliqueessay, "That
Sex Whichis Not One":
It is thereforeuselessto trapwomeninto givingan exact
definition of what they mean, to make them repeat

69
 hypatia
(themselves) so the meaning will be clear. They are
already elsewhere than in this discursive machinery
where you claim to take them by surprise.They have
turned back within themselves. . . . They do not ex-
periencethe same interioritythat you do and whichyou
perhaps mistakenly presume they share. "Within
themselves"means in the privacy of this silent, multi-
ple, diffuse tact. If you ask them insistentlywhat they
are thinking about, they can only reply: nothing.
Everything.(Irigaray 1980, in Marks and Courtivron
1980, 103)
Thereis a temptationhere for woman:not to describe(for descrip-
tions falsify), not to articulatedesire (for happinesslies in renuncia-
tion), not to study sexual techniques(for the best orgasm happens
unexpectedly),not to conceptualizeher own sexuality(for she is "dif-
fusely" in touch with herselfalready),not to act (for activityis phallic
and ultimatelypointless). It is easy for women to be this Lacanian
kind of feminists,becauseto do so requiresdoing absolutelynothing,
exceptsimplyto be and ergo be Other,and know withoutasking. But
this position is again reactionary;we women who adopt this position
are seekingto make our daughtersinto Priscillas.

Notes
---. I am grateful to Ann Ferguson, Tamsin Lorraine, Linda Podheiser, Andreas
Teuber, Dan Warren and Tom Wartenberg for their comments; I must also thank an
anonymous referee. In addition, I have learned much from the discussion of related
materials in Stanley Cavell's seminar at Harvard on psychoanalysis and literary theory.
This essay is dedicated to Pierre Pellegrin, who has helped me to improve my
understanding of French psychoanalytic thought on these topics.
1. Henceforward references to this volume will cite it as "FS", with the page
number. Other works influenced by Lacan include the French feminists represented in
Marks and Courtivron, eds. 1980, and the literary critics in Felman, ed. 1982. For
convenience I refer to other of Lacan's translated writings according to the following
method of coded abbreviations: "Ecrits" designates Ecrits, A Selection, Sheridan, tr.,
1977; and "4 Concepts" designates TheFour Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Miller, ed., 1978.
2. Coverdale's ironical manner makes it especially hard to discern the author's at-
titude to the feminist issues he discusses in this novel.
3. See Aristophanes' story in Plato's Symposium, 189c-193e, especially 190d-e.

70
 cheryl h. cohen
The Feminist Sexuality Debate:
Ethics and Politics

The purpose of this paper is to offer a critical evaluation of

representative positions in the feminst sexuality debate and to suggest
that ethical considerations are essential to the complex task of political
transformation which is the goal of both sides in the debate. This
paper explores both a "rights view" of ethics and a "responsibilities
view" and shows, through specific examples, how an appeal to
ethics might take feminist sexual politics beyond the current debate.

The feminist sexuality debate seems to focus on issues of por-

nography,sadomasochism,and the condemnationor defense of sex-
ual minorities.The pointed argumentsof the debate raise a general
question:what counts as politicallyvalid sexualityfor feminists?
In this paperI will summarizerepresentativepositionsin the debate
and attempta criticalevaluationof those positions. I will also argue
that the debatelacks a feministethics that might serveas a consistent
frameworkfor criticizingthe structuresand practicesof patriarchy,
for formulatinga feministpolitics of sexuality,and for imaginingthe
future towardwhich we struggle.

A) The Critics of Pornographyand Sadomasochism:

Radical Feminists'
Radicalfeministsclaim that pornographyis sexist propaganda;it is
both a reflectionof patriarchalcultureand a means of perpetuating
the patriarchalmodel of sexualityas male dominanceand femalesub-
mission. But writerslike Robin Morgan and Susan Griffin in Take
Back the Night are most critical of violence in pornographyand its
connectionto violence against women. Morgansays,
... the act of rape is merelythe expressionof the stan-
dard, "healthy" even encouraged male fantasy in
patriarchalculture-that of aggressivesex. And the ar-
ticulationof that fantasyinto a billion-dollarindustryis
pornography.(Morgan 1980, 128)
She claimsthat pornographyis not only associatedwith rape but also

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

71
 hypatia
with pressureto "performsexualllyin ever more objectifiedand ob-
jectifying fashion" (Morgan 1980, 130).
Susan Griffin attacksthe standardliberaldefense of pornography,
the catharsis theory: that men are by nature violent and that por-
nographicimages and fantasiesprovidea harmlessreleaseof violent
impulses. The catharsis theory implies that pornographyserves a
useful social function by diffusing male violence towardswomen. In
opposition to this theory, Griffin claims that pornographycauses
violence against women; she claims that putting sexual images in a
violent context creates an association: ". . . to put violence and
women's bodies together, to associate sexuality and violence
fabricates a need" (Griffin 1980, 137). If pornographywere truly
cathartic,thereshouldbe an end to the need for sexualviolencerather
than a continualconsumptionof violent pornography.She concludes
with the suggestion that violence is not natural or innate but
pathological.She says,
Whatif we imaginedour true natures,male and female,
as undeniablytender?
Such behavior as war and rapaciousneshas not been
seen as proceedingfrom illness. Such behaviorhas been
termed normal, if not "animal," wild, untrammeled,
uncivilizedperhaps,but not pathological.(Griffin 1980,
136, 138)
Linked to the issue of violence and pornographyis the issue of
sadomasochism.Against Sadomasochismis a collectionof essaysthat
offers a generalcritique of culturalsadism and specific critiquesof
lesbian-feministsadomasochism.KathleenBarrytracesthe historyof
culturalsadism from the Marquisde Sade in the eighteenthcentury,
throughFreud, to contemporarytheoriesof sociobiologythat justify
an innate and biological basis for violence and hostility. The result,
accordingto Barry,is a deterministicmodel of human behavior:
Both sadistic and masochisticbehavior are defined in
termsof unconsciousinstinctualneeds. The concept of
unconscious instinct precludes morality and divorces
psychologyfrom the conceptof victimor assailant.The
social situationor milieu,the conditionsthat give riseto
sexualviolencehave been reducedto a discussion of in-
ternalpsychologicalmechanisms.(Barry1982, 59)
In the same collection, Sally Roesch Wagner questions the
emergence of a lesbian-feministsadomasochisticliberation move-
ment. She accuseslesbian sadomasochistsof following the uncritical

72
 cheryl h. cohen

acting out of the sexual revolution:they are simplyreactingto a rigid

patriarchalmoralityby declaringthat "everythingimmoralor taboo
must be healthy, fun, and worth trying" (Roesch Wagner 1982, 30).
She says,
Womenare certainlygoing to have sexualfantasiesthat
involve dominanceand submissionbecause this is how
we have learnedto experienceour sexuality.The ques-
tion for feminists is, what do we choose to do about
these fantasies?(Roesch Wagner 1982, 39)
She suggeststhat feministsneed to questionpatternsof power in sex-
ual relationsand developa vision of sexualliberationthat is not mere-
ly a revolt against patriarchalmodels of sexuality: "True sexual
freedomwill be possible only when we breakthe connectionbetween
sex and power, when there is no power componentin sexual interac-
tions" (Roesch Wagner 1982, 30).
Finally, Marissa Jonel contributes a personal attack on lesbian
sadomasochismfrom her experienceas a "bottom" (masochist)in a
sadomasochisticlesbian relationship. She explores her own sexual
pleasuresin sm relationshipsand the fear and abuse she suffered in
one of these relationships.She concludes,
The continuedsupportof "feminists" is giving license
to manylesbiansto practiceabusewithoutconscience..
. . Sadomasochismand the attitudes put forth by the
new league of sm "feminists" are dangerousto all les-
bians because they make violence and abuse, in
whatever form, acceptable .... violence has no place in
a love relationship. . . . (Jonel 1982, 21-22)

B) The Defenders Of Lesbian Sadomasochism,

Pornography, And Sexual minorities:
Libertarian Feminists
Pat Califia represents the position of sadomasochist lesbian
feminists who view patriarchalcontrol over sexual ideology and
behavior as "erotic tyranny" and who demand that feminists
"dismantlethe institutionsthat foster the exploitationand abuse of
women": primarily,the family, conventionalsexuality, and gender
(Califia 1981, 30). Califia defends the sm lesbian subcultureas one
way to challengeconventionalsexualityand gender. She says,
Sadomasochismis not a form of sexual assault. It is a
consensual activity that involves polarized roles and

73
 hypata

intense sensations. ... A sadomasochist is well aware

that a role adopted during a scene is not appropriate
duringother interactionsand that a fantasy role is not
the sum total of her being. . . . (Califia 1981, 31)

According to Califia, the realization of fantasy enhances sexual

pleasurefor sm lesbiansand thus servesas a liberatingexperience.She
accusesfeministswho emphasizethe "gentleand loving kind of sex,"
of remainingwithin the confines of repressedsexuality.
Amber Hollibaugh and CherrieMoraga are more concernedwith
fantasy, role-playing,and powerin sexuality.They claimthat the fear
of heterosexualcontrol of fantasy has led feministsto say almost no
fantasy is safe and to reject butch/femme lesbian sexuality as a
reproductionof heterosexualgenderroles and oppression.Hollibaugh
and Moragaclaim that it is betterto acknowledgeand play out sexual
fantasiesratherthan forcingthem to remainunconsciousmotives for
behavior:"If the desire for power is so hiddenand unacknowledged,
it will inevitablysurface throughmanipulationor what-have-you.If
you couldn't play capturer, you'd be it" (Hollibaugh and Moraga
1983, 397). Secondly, they claim that giving up power can feel "pro-
foundlypowerfuland veryunpassive"(Hollibaughand Moraga1983,
399). They use seductionin butch/femmesexualityas an exampleof a
very active and powerful role. Finally, they argue that fantasy and
role-playing provide access to different forms of desire and are
therefore liberatingpractices. They suggest that feminists returnto
consciousness-raisinggroups that can explore sexual issues, feelings,
experiences,and fantasies with sexual values suspendedin order to
createa theoryof sexualitythat recognizesthe politicalimplicationsof
sexual differences.
Gayle Rubin, DeirdreEnglish,and AmberHollibaughcontinuethis
sort of dialogue on sexuality in their article, "Talking Sex." They
criticize certain feminists for holding a rigid view that fantasy and
desire are socially constructedand thereforeany power, lust, or pas-
sion in sex is automaticallysuspect.They claimthat the feministaffir-
mationof the femalerightto be a sexualpersonis beinglost in the cur-
rent tendenciestoward "vanilla sex." They argue that it is a mistake
to define female sexuality exclusivelyin terms of feminist political
practices.2
The authors charge the anti-pornographymovement with con-
tributingto the repressionof sexualityby conflating a repulsionto
violence with a repulsion to sex. In defense of pornography,they
claim that sex is a humanneed that can be filled in some ways by por-
nographicmaterials.
74
 cheryl h. cohen

Having access to sexually explicit materialhas by and

large been a male privilege.Yet ratherthan wantingto
get rid of it, since women haven't been able to get it, I
want women to be able to get it. (Rubin, English,
Hollibaugh 1981, 55)
Pornography,they argue, is a reflectionof sexismin the cultureand
not the cause. The anti-pornographymovement forbids sexual ex-
perimentationand prevents making risky sexual fantasies explicit,
practicesthat might be liberatoryfor femalesexuality.They conclude
that we need women eroticiststo supplynon-sexistsexualimagesand
that we need to separatesex and pleasure from sexism in order to
make a non-sexistsexual liberation.
In "Sexual Politics, the New Right and the SexualFringe," Gayle
Rubin voices her concern over the feminist repudiationof sexual
minorities. She cites right-wing persecution as a reason for the
women's and gay movementsto defend sexual minorities from in-
justice. She advocatesa position of tolerancewhile feministsgain in-
sight and understandingthrougha"consideredexamination"of the
variety of sexual practiceskept alive, in some sense, in the sexual
fringe (Rubin 1981, 108-115).

C) Philosophical Assumptions: Agreements And

Disagreements
Underlyingthis debateover politicallyappropriatefeministsexuali-
ty are certain assumptions about the self, sexuality, power, and
freedom.Thoughthe two sides differ on most of these assumptions,I
will argue that there are some basic agreements that might help
mediatethe differences.

(1) RadicalFeminists
The radical feminists argue that sexuality is socially constructed,
that patriarchyis the socio-politicalstructurein this culture at this
time, and therefore all sexuality is constructedaround patriarchal
models. This view impliesseveralthings:unreflectivehumanagencyis
suspect, unexamineddesireis suspect, and sexual fantasiesand prac-
tices involving power, violence, or polarizedroles are suspect. Ideal
sexuality on this view emphasizes tenderness, intimacy, and an
egalitarian loving relationship. Heterosexuality is automatically
suspectbecauseit traditionallyinvolvespolarizedroles and sexualob-
jectification and perpetuatesmale domination in the context of the
patriarchalnuclear family. The result is a privileging of lesbian

75
 hypatia

"vanilla sex." The radical feminists assume that power is equated

with dominanceand violence, is always unequal, and thereforedoes
not belong in sexual relations.
Freedom, in the sense of sexual liberation, requires avoidance of
patriarchalforms of sexuality.

(2) LibertarianFeminists
Libertarianfeministsagreethat sexualityhas been underthe control
and repressionof patriarchy;at least in that sense they also agreethat
the self and sexualityare sociallyconstructed,but they claim that the
sexualfringeis a repositoryfor repressedsexuality,that pornography,
woman-constructederotica, and fantasy can help women regaincon-
tact with represseddesires. They assume that human sexuality is a
need that is best filled by a maximum of sexual pleasure;whatever
contributesto pleasureis thereforepermittedunderthe minimalcon-
straintof mutualconsent. This view requiresthe assumptionthat the
self can be a consentingautonomousagent and demands"the rightto
genuinelyfeel, in my body, what I want" (Rubin,English,Hollibaugh
1981, 44). Libertarianfeminists assume that power is inherent in
human relations and is part of sexual pleasure. Power is not a
dominance/submissionor a have/lack relation;ratherthere is an ap-
peal to the Hegelian master/slave dialectic in which the slave has
powerbecauseof the master'sdependenceon the slave;the act of sub-
mission is thereforeviewedas powerful. Freedom,in termsof sexual
liberation, is the freedom from oppression and injustice, freedom
from patriarchalvalues and heterosexualreproductivenorms of sex-
uality, and freedom from sexual repression. It is also therefore a
freedom to experiment with fantasy and desire in the pursuit of
pleasure.

(3) A Major Point Of Agreement

Becauseof the polarizednatureof this debate,both sidestend to lose
sight of a fundamentalagreement:they agree that patriarchyis op-
pressive,that patriarchalvaluesare personally,socially, and political-
ly unacceptable,and that male-definedsexualityis inappropriateto
women. Both sides agree that patriarchymust be dismantled;both
sides advocatepoliticalpracticesfor the women'smovementto attack
patriarchalinstitutionsand bring about a new vision of personaland
political relationsand sexual liberation.But the two groups focus on
differentaspectsof sexualityunderpatriarchyand thereforeadvocate
radicallyopposed methods of change.3
The radical feminists pick violence and the objectification of

76
 cheryl h. cohen

women as centralto the continuingpatriarchaloppressionof women

in the realm of sexuality.They thereforereject pornography,violent
sexual relations,dominationas a form of power in sexuality,and the
traditional masculine emphasis on pleasure; they offer instead the
traditional feminine emphasis on intimacy and bonding. The liber-
tarianfeministspick sexualrepressionand particularlythe oppression
of sexual minoritiesas the place to attack patriarchaldefinitions of
sexuality. They therefore defend pornographyand sexual practices
that are oppressedunderpatriarchy,and they advocatethe use of sex-
ual diversity to break compulsory heterosexualityand reclaim the
richnessof repressedsexuality. They want to detach sexual pleasure
from the emotionalbondingthat they claim has limitedfemale sexual
experience;and they asserttheir freedomto seek sexual pleasure.
In addition, both the radicaland libertarianfeministsmake univer-
sal judgementsand appealto abstractprinciplesin theirarguments:in
Comingto Power (SAMOIS1982)lesbiansadomasochistsprovidean
informationaland personal sharing of their sexuality, but they also
defend their sexuality with a generalizedargumentbased on rights,
contracts, and consent; and they justify their sexual practice as a
legitimatepoliticalstanceagainstpatriarchy.It is this abstractdefense
and political justification of lesbian sm that invites the equally
abstractand universalcondemnationfrom the radicalfeminists.And
becausethe two groupsare looking for a politics of sexuality,they fail
to appreciatethat, although at the social level, universaljudgements
are important,sexualityis also personaland privateand not simplya
matter for political legislation.
But can we developa politics of sexualitythat can accomodateper-
sonal variations in sexuality and sexual experimentation? Can
feminists respect the individual'spersonal reflectivechoices and yet
avoid a dangerouspublicpoliticalstance?I will argue,in the final sec-
tion of this paper, that a feministethics could providethe answerto
this question and therebysupply an essential ground for a feminist
sexual politics that goes beyond the currentdebate.

D) Feminist Ethics
By feministethics, I do not mean that some set of abstractrulesor
universal principles could definitively settle this debate over ap-
propriatefeministsexuality;instead,the questionof sexualityrequires
carefulthinkingguidedby valuesthat shouldgrow out of the feminist
struggle to overcome male domination, the struggle to insert the
characteristicshistoricallyand contingentlyidentifiedas feminineinto
the dominantculture.4

77
 hypatia

Thus Carol Gilligan's work in moral developmenttheory serves a

heuristicfunctionin the developmentof an ethicsthat includesthe ex-
perienceof women. Gilligan'sresearch,In a Different Voice,suggests
that the socializationof femalescauseswomento define themselvesin
a context of humanrelationships,as part of a networkof caringrela-
tions, whereasthe socializationof males leads men to focus on in-
dividuation and personal autonomy (Gilligan 1982, 17). Gilligan
claimsthat thesegender-baseddifferencesin socializationand identity
lead to differentconceptionsof morality:the moralityof responsibili-
ty and the traditionalmale-definedmoralityof rights:
In this conception [the morality of responsibility],the
moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities
ratherthan from competingrights and requiresfor its
resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and
narrativeratherthan formal and abstract.This concep-
tion of moralityas concernedwith the activity of care
centersmoraldevelopmentaroundthe understandingof
responsibility and relationships . . . the morality of
rights differs from the moralityof responsibilityin its
emphasis on separationrather than connection, in its
considerationof the individualratherthan the relation-
ship as primary.(Gilligan 1982, 19)
Accordingto Gilligan,women'smoraljudgementsaremoreimmersed
in the detailsof relationships;women tend to considerthe standpoint
of the "particular other" rather than to reason abstractly about
universalneedsor rights;and womenappearto developthe sensitivity
and empathyfor others that this kind of moral reasoningrequires.
In "A Different Reality:FeministOntology," CarolineWhitbeck
develops a feminist ontology and ethics that relies on an understan-
ding of the practiceof "mutual realization"of people. She says,
I take this practiceto have a varietyof particularforms,
most, if not all, of whichare regardedas women'swork
and are therefore largely ignored by the dominant
culture. Among these are the rearingof children, the
education of childrenand adolescents, care of the dy-
ing, nursing of the sick and injured, and a variety of
spiritualpracticesrelatedto daily life. (Whitbeck1984,
65)
Whitbeck is critical of "masculist ontology" and the ethics of in-
dividualismwhich views the self-other relation as one of opposition
and conflict. Her feministontology is based on an understandingof

78
 cheryl h. cohen

the self-otherrelationas a relationbetween "analogousbeings":

Sincean otheris not takento be oppositeto the self, the
character of the self does not uniquely define the
characterof the otherby oppositionto it: othersmay be
similaror dissimilarin an unlimitedvarietyof ways....
The relation is not fundamentallydyadic at all, and is
better expressedas a self-othersrelation, becauserela-
tionships, past and present, realized and sought, are
constitutiveof the self, and so the actions of a person
reflectthe more-or-lesssuccessfulattemptto respondto
the whole configuration of relationships . . . the self-
others relation generates a multifactorial interactive
model of most, if not all, aspects of reality. (Whitbeck
1984, 75-76)
Whitbeck goes on to defend the adequacy of this relational and
historical model of the person and then outlines a "responsibilities
view" of ethics that is compatible with the self-others ontological
viewpoint. She contraststhis view of ethics with "the rightsview" of
ethics:
Accordingto the rightsview of ethics, the conceptof
a moral right is the fundamentalmoral notion, or at
least the one of preeminentsignificance. People are
viewed as social and moral atoms, armed with rights,
reason, and actuallyor potentiallyin competitionand
conflict with one another. ... If any attention is given
to relationshipson the rightsview, it is assumedthey ex-
ist on a contractualor quasi-contractualbasis and that
the moralrequirementsarisingfrom them are limitedto
rights and obligations.
In contrastto obligationsthat generallyspecify what
acts or conductare morallyrequired,permitted,or for-
bidden, responsibilities(in the prospective sense of
"responsibilityfor") specify the ends to be achieved
ratherthan the conductrequired.Thus, responsibilities
require an exercise of discretion on the part of their
bearers. . . . What I call "the responsibilities view" of
ethics takes the moral responsibilitiesarising out of a
relationship as the fundamental moral notion. ... In
general, relationships between people place moral
responsibilities on both parties, and these respon-
sibilities change over time with changes in the parties
and their relationship. . . . Each party in a relationship

79
 hypati
is responsiblefor ensuringsome aspect of the other's
welfare or, at least, for achievingsome ends that con-
tribute to the other's welfare or achievements.
(Whitbeck1984, 79-80)
The denialof egoism and individualismimplicitin the responsibilities
view of ethics does not imply the acceptanceof a morality of self-
sacrifice;ratherit implies the choice to be unselfish, to give careful
considerationto one's own needs and take the interestand needs of
othersinto account. Whitbeckclaimsthat "the rightsview of ethics"
fails to account for the special responsibilitiesthat are part of affec-
tional and occupationalrelationshipsand is thereforean inadequate
view of the moral status of persons.
Nevertheless,she does not discard human rights: "Human rights
are claims upon society and upon other people that are necessaryif a
person is to be able to meet the responsibilitiesof her or his relation-
ships" (Whitbeck 1984, 80). Furthermore,although she claims that
the descriptionof a relationshipand its attendantresponsibilitiesmust
beginwith the experienceof the personsinvolved,sucha descriptionis
still criticizableby others. Unfortunately,Whitbeckonly offers an ex-
ample to support this claim; she says: ". . . for example, there may be
groundsfor sayingthat a child is being abusedeven if initiallyneither
the child nor parentsees the relationshipthat way" (Whitbeck1984,
80). But I think her descriptionof the self-othersrelationas a relation
betweenanalogousbeings actuallysuppliessome generalgroundsfor
criticalevaluationof the relationshipsof others:sharedattributesand
needs determinehumanwelfarein general,and the descriptionof the
individuals and the context of their relationshipdeterminehuman
welfare in particularcases.
Thus the responsibilitiesview of ethics is preferableto the rights
view of ethics becauseit includesfemaleexperiencewithoutexcluding
male experience:all human beings experiencecaring relationships,
such as family relations, friendship,occupationalrelations(and sex-
ual relations),in whicha sense of moralresponsibilityis derivedfrom
caringand concernfor the welfareof particularpersonsand not from
an abstractobligationto respectrightsor abide by implicitcontracts.
Furthermore,empathy is a human capacity that grows out of our
abilityto expressourselvesthrougha commonlanguage,our abilityto
create, choose, feel, and act purposefully,and our abilityto be other
than self-interested.If we can share in the feelings of others, we can
also sharein the motivationto act in the interestsof others. If we are
all fundamentallyconnectedthrough our life together, if a sense of
self develops through identificationand relation with others rather
than through alienation from others, then we all have good reasons
for respectingothers, for attendingto the needs of others, and for

80
 cheryl h. cohen

expectingthat our needs will receiveattention.

In order to determinethe role of ethics in the feminist sexuality
debate, a distinctionmust be madebetweenthreeareasof concern:(1)
the problem of State control over sexuality (including legislation
against fringe sexual practices,possible censorshipof pornography,
and problemsof rape and adult-childsexuality;(2) feministcriticism
and condemnationof specificsexualpractices,and (3) countercultural
transformation of sexuality through experimentationwith sexual
practices.The rightsview of ethics, becuaseit is basedon atomisticin-
dividualism, relies on abstract conceptions of social contracts and
derivativeduties and obligations. At the level of public policy and
state legislation,an appealto abstractrightsand criteriasuch as equal
consensualrelationsbased on implicitcontractsis essentialto protect
individuals from the violation of rights on the part of other in-
dividualsor the state. Thus for example,feministsmightuse the rights
view of ethics to defend the legal rightof adultsto participatein con-
sensual fringe sexual practices,but they would also retaina justifica-
tion for laws against rape and sexual abuse of children.
On the other hand, the responsibilitiesview of ethics generates
generalcriteriafor evaluatingrelationshipsand yet involvesa detailed
and contextualjudging.We can applythis view of ethicsin the current
sexualitydebate to distinguishbetweendangerousand dehumanizing
sexual practicesand those that are experimentaland liberatory.Any
sexualpractice(and any social practiceor politicalpractice)that does
not recognizethe connectionsbetweenpersonsand the responsibilities
entailed by those connections would be unacceptable. Thus the
responsibilitiesview of ethics could be used as a basis for feminist
criticismand condemnationof specificsexualpracticesand as a guide
for experimentationand transformationof sexuality.
In the case of pornography,there is the problemof distinguishing
pornography from erotica. Eva Kittay suggests the following
characterizations:
Pornographydeals in the representationof violence,
degradation,or humiliationof some persons(most fre-
quentlyfemale)for the sexualgratificationof otherper-
sons (almostexclusivelymale).... To call a workerotic
is to focus, specifically, on the following condition:
That we regardit as being apt to evoke what we thinkto
be the appropriateresponseof sexual interestwhich is
more sensuous and voluptuous than lewd or prurient.
(Kittay 1984, 148-149)
But if pornographyis merely a representationof fantasy, imagined

81
 hypatia

and actedout, can it be harmfulin any way?Pornographyuses images

of people, and most of the imagesimplythat some kindof relatingac-
companiesthe image:someone,even if an unseensomeone, had to put
the subject in the uncomfortableposition, or tie the ropes, or fasten
the chains, or use the whip. And because pornographyis only a
representationof a relation,it may not mean to the consumerwhat it
means to the participantsin such sexual practices;pornographycan-
not portray the caring and concern that could prevent apparently
violent or degrading sexual practices from being humiliating and
harmful. If this caring and concern is somehow included in the
representation(in a writtentext for example), then the work would
not necessarilybe pornographic.
Pornographicimages often misrepresentthe desiresof the subjects
portrayed,yet they contributeto the fantasiesof the consumerand in-
fluencethe consumer'sexpectationsand desires.The consumptionof
pornographyis not a relationship,but it does affect one's self-image
and imagesof sexualpartners,and thereforeit affects relationshipsto
others. To use anotherhumanbeing (even the image of a humanbe-
ing) for sexualsatisfactionis to concentrateon self-interestand to ex-
clude any considerationof concern or responsibilityfor the other.
One might arguethat this view also prohibitsthe use of erotica for
sexual pleasureand satisfaction.But becausethe responsibilitiesview
of ethics demandscareful considerationof context and details, and
beginswith the experienceof the individualsengagedin a practice,its
political use (its use for purposesof proposinglegislationor even for
public condemnation) should be limited to clear cases of harm,
humiliation,and neglectof responsibilityfor the welfareof others.5It
remainsthe task of individualswho choose to use eroticato evaluate
the effect on their personalpractices,desires, and fantasies.
Similarly, lesbian sadomasochismis first of all a personal, and
therefore private, sexual practice. The publication of Coming to
Power, for example,is an attemptto shareinformationabout lesbian
sm relationships,and many of the contributorsto that book offer
their personalexperiences,fantasies, and feelings. But when lesbian
sm is advocatedas a politicalpractice,as a way to escape patriarchal
constructionsof sexuality, as a public protest against sexual repres-
sion, thereis a dangerousloss of the care, concern,and responsibility
that may be presentin personalsm relationships.Of course, it is not
sufficient to criticizelesbian sadomasochismfor its apparentuse of
patriarchalmodels of violence and power; the sm lesbians simply
arguethat the retreatto nonviolent"vanillasex" is a compliancewith
patriarchalconstructionsof sexuality.The mistakeis to describesex-
ual relationsas though they werea matterof personaltaste (i.e. yours

82
 cheryl h. cohen
is vanilla, mine is wild cherry,and you have no rightto tell me which
flavor to choose), and then to argue that sexual practicesare also
political tools. What becomespublic and political loses its groundin
the personal:viewed from outside the personalcontext of caringand
responsibility, lesbian sm creates an explicit association of sexual
pleasurewith powerlessness,pain, humiliation,and violence.
The sm defendersargue that sadomasochismis a ritualizedenact-
ment of fantasy,that these fantasyrolesdo not extendbeyondthe sex-
ual interaction, and that experimentingwith fantasy is one way to
breaksexual repression.But if sexualityis part of identity,if all rela-
tions to othersare part of identity,then even these ritualfantasyrela-
tions are part of identity. The sm defenders argue that lesbian
sadomasochismis safe in the sm subculture;but just as lesbiansand
gay men createa safe subculturefor themselvesand therebyidentify
themselveswith their subculture,so too, the sm subcultureis a form
of social identity, and the ritual roles are no longer confined to per-
sonal relationsbut extend to social interactions.
The public displayof whips, chains, and swastikas,for example,is
dangerousbecausethese are all symbolsof dehumanization.Similar-
ly, the public self-identificationof mistressand slave and the acting
out of these roles suggestsinequalityand abuse that may not be pre-
sent in the personalrelationship.Of course, sm defendersare quickto
point out that objectificationand abuseareall an illusionand that sm,
as it is experienced, is safe and pleasurableand even potentially
therapeutic,that it involvesa high level of trustand requiresthe kind
of caringfor one's partnerthat I have arguedshouldbe presentin sex-
ual relations. A responsibilitiesview of ethics that condemnssm sex-
uality as an unacceptablepoliticalchallengeto patriarchycould clear-
ly be used to validatesm sexualpracticeswhen these are criticallyex-
aminedas personaland privatesexualpractices.Just as in the case of
erotica, the persons engaged in lesbian sm could use the respon-
sibilitiesview of ethics to legitimatetheir fantasies, desires,and prac-
tices; but they could not advocate sadomasochismas a feminist
political stance.
Finally, to return to Rubin's plea for justice, tolerance, and
understandingof the sexualminoritiesand herclaimthat muchof this
"fringe" sexuality is worth reclaiming-I think an appeal to ethics
could answer what Rubin does not answer: which practicesshould
stay in limbo and which shouldbe reclaimed.She admitsthat thereis
danger, violence, and even psychopathyin the sexual fringe, yet she
offers no means of critically examining these sexual practices. In
another article, "The Leather Menace: Comments on Politics and
S/M," (Rubin 1982) Rubin suggests that any evaluation of sexual

83
 hypatia

behaviormustreston the actualexperienceof the individualsinvolved

in it. She appealsto constraintsof consentand pleasurein fringesex-
uality, claiming that the issue of consent is not as troublesomefor
fringe sexual practicesas it is for conventionalsexual practices.6
But if we take our social connectednessseriously, then we need
more than the notion of a consentingautonomousagent to evaluate
sexual practices.And if our desiresare socially constructed,then we
must at least be willing to undertakea criticalself-evaluationof our
fantasies and desires. I think that the responsibilitiesview of ethics
provides fundamentalgrounds for limits to desire, the grounds that
connect us to others and make us responsible for the "object of
desire" as a personwith needsand not simplyas a free agent who can
consent to almost anything.Whethersexual relationsare undertaken
for pleasureor parentingor emotionalbonding,the qualityof the per-
sonal interactionscan and should be evaluated. A feminist respon-
sibilitiesview of ethics would allow us to evaluate the relationsbet-
ween sexual partnersin all forms of sexualityand in the context of
personalexperience;it would allow us to distinguishbetweenabusive
or dehumanizingsexualityand liberatorysexuality, between what is
publiclyand politicallydangerousand whatis privatelyand personally
valid. We may appealto rightsand talk of consentin orderto defend
sexualminoritiesfrom injustice,but theseare not adequategroundsto
advocate a political use of fringe sexual practices.Consent does not
make a relationshipgood; and a history of oppression is neither
necessarynor sufficient to make a sexual practiceliberatory.

E) Conclusion: The Ethics of Political Transformation

Whenfeministsare primarilyconcernedwith the threatof statecon-
trol over sexualityand with questions of privacyand freedom from
censorship,then an appeal to the universalrights of consentingand
autonomousagents is valid. The defense of sexual minoritiesagainst
injusticeand advocacyof the rightsof adults to experimentwith sex-
ual practicesis necessaryto createthe spacein whichcounter-cultural
feminist transformationsof sexualitycan begin. But when feminists
focus on politicallyappropriatesexuality,and particularlywhen they
advocate specific sexual practices as liberatory and as political
challenges to patriarchalsexuality, then I think the responsibilities
view of ethicsmust enterinto the debate. I thinka politicalmovement
that uses any means to its end is doomed to achieve an undesirable
end. A feminist political praxis that uses any means to tear down
patriarchymay find that the practicesit advocates ultimately con-
structthe personalitiesof the next generations.If feministsadvocate

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 cheryl h. cohen

sexual practiceswhich, when removed from a context of caring, can

becomeobjectifyingand dehumanizing,they may therebybe responsi-
ble for an experimentalismwith desirethat sets no limits and gives no
guidelines for constructiveand healthy relations between persons.
They may succeed in dismantlingpatriarchy,they may succeed in
escaping from patriarchalconstructionsof sexuality, but they may
also therebydestroythe humancaringand responsibilitythat give us
hope for a better world. I think ethics is essentialto all politics but
particularlyin the traumatictransitionto an unknownfuture.
The complexity of human sexuality, psychology, and sociality
demands a complex evaluationand complex guidelinesfor political
practice; and the responsibilitiesview of ethics could supply the
framework for this critical thought and constructive action. A
feminist ethics must make a distinctionbetweenwhat is publiclyac-
ceptable and what is privately acceptable, a distinction between
political action and personalchoice. Generalpolitical guidelinesfor
liberatorysexualpracticesmust be primarilynegativeguidelines-any
sexual practicethat can be judged within a particularcontext to be
harmful to the persons involved could never be a valid political
challengeto patriarchy.Furthermore,positive generalizationsabout
what is liberatoryare ruled out because the responsibilitiesview of
ethicscan only judge a practiceby its implicationsin a context. When
sexualpracticesbecome political, they tend to lose theirpersonaland
particularcontext; they become generalizedand distorted(as in the
case with fringe sexual practicesand with both lesbian sm sexuality
and lesbian "vanilla sex"). Thus a feminist ethics might affirm the
right of individualsto consensualexperimentationwith sexual prac-
tices, but it could not advocate any particularpracticeas political.
Rather, feministswould have the responsibilityto examinethe social
and political implicationsof sexual practicesin concretecontexts in
order to distinguishthe dangerousfrom the liberatory.
A feminist ethics also provides guidelines for personal choice,
demandinga criticalself-examinationof fantasiesand desiresand an
ongoing evaluationof sexual practicesby the particularpersonswho
choose to engagein them. The fact that a particularpracticehas been
oppressedunderpatriarchyor judgedto be a deviantform of sexuality
could never be a sufficient criteriafor liberation. In a personaland
privatecontextwhatis liberatorymustpromotea depthof caring,sen-
sual satisfaction, mutual personaldevelopment,and human connec-
tion. Again, individualshavethe rightto experimentwith sexualprac-
tices, but they also have a fundamentalresponsibilityfor their sexual
partnerand for others affected by their personalchoices.
The kind of public/privateapplicationof ethics permittedby the

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 hypatia

responsibilitiesview, impliesthat there can be room for variationsin

sexual preferenceand sexual practicewithout advocatingthe use of
oppressedsexualityas a political challengeto patriarchyand thereby
convertinga personalchoiceinto a politicalobligation.'Thepoliticsof
sexualitywould thereforeinvolve critical,reflectiveevaluationof per-
sonal relationsand their social manifestationsand consequences.It is
the complex task of political transformation that requires the
guidanceof ethicalconsiderations.Thusfeministshavethe rightto ex-
perimentwith sexuality, to explore female sexual pleasure, and to
escape from sexual repression.But we have the simultaneousrespon-
sibility to respectour relatednessto others, and to create a new sex-
uality, sociality,politics, and economicsthat reflectsour fundamental
human connectionsand responsibilities.

Notes
1. I rely on Ann Ferguson's discussion of the sexuality debates for the labels
"Radical feminist" and "Libertarian feminist." See Ferguson 1984b.
2. For example, that the radical feminist notion of the "Woman-identified-
Woman" which made lesbianism a political practice for feminists lost sight of the
liberation of female desire; lesbianism was no longer primarily an expression of re-
pressed female desire but became a rebellious sexuality, defined in terms of its relation
to patriarchy.
3. For a brief historical summary of feminist sexual politics and the current
political split, see Freedman and Thorne 1984.
4. Carol Gould reminds us that some men display more of these historically
"feminine" traits than some women, and more importantly, that the whole range of
character traits are human traits which may be appropriated for one's own self-
development (Gould 1984).
5. Here again, the distinction between the three areas of concern in the sexuality
debate is important. A rights ethic would prevent state censorship of pornogaphy and
erotica, but it might also justify some form of legislation against certain kinds of por-
nographic images used in public places (especially violent pornography). A respon-
sibilities view of ethics could then extend feminist criticisms to all forms of por-
nography, and also provide guidelines for the creation and use of erotica as a means of
transforming and liberating human sexuality.
6. Rubin says, "One may more reasonably ask if anyone truly 'consents' to be
straight in any way. Coercion does occur among perverts, as it does in all sexual con-
texts. One still needs to distinguish rape and abuse from consensual situations. But the
overwhelming coercion with regard to S/M is the way in which people are prevented
from doing it. We are fighting for the freedom to consent to our sexuality without in-
terference, and without penalty" (Rubin 1982, 223).

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 reyes kizaro
Feminism and Motherhood:
O'Brien vs Beauvoir

I argue that both Mary O'Brien's celebratory analysis of

motherhood and Simone de Beauvoir's critical one fail, due to
biologism and a lack of historical sense. Both approaches, I claim, are
complementary: motherhood need be analysed both as
alienating-Beauvoir-and as a potential ground for
feminism-O'Brien. I conclude by suggesting that feminism can only
reappropriate the female reproductive experience in a critical way.

Patriarchal thought has limited female biology to its

own narrow specifications. The feminist vision has
recoiled from female biology for these reasons; it will, I
believe, come to view our physicality as a resource,
rather than a destiny. In order to live a full human life we
require not only control of our bodies (though control is
a prerequisite); we must touch the unity and resonance
of our physicality, our bond with the natural order, the
corporeal ground of our intelligence. (Adrienne Rich
1976, 39)
In this article I analyze Mary O'Brien's attempt to recover "the cor-
poreal ground of our intelligence." She argues against feminist views
which following Simone de Beauvoir present a negative picture of
motherhood. On the contrary, she holds that the reproductive process
is the basis of a female reproductive consciousness which necessarily
underlies feminist theory. I will attempt to show that O'Brien's attempt
to recover motherhood for feminism-with which I absolutely sym-
pathise-is flawed by biologism and ahistoricism, notwithstanding her
claims to the contrary. Futhermore, I believe that Beauvoir's most im-
portant insight concerning motherhood, namely, that it can be
alienating for women, cannot be dismissed as O'Brien does, even
though Beauvoir's analysis presents serious problems.'
In her pioneering book The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir claims
that female reproductive capacities are-partially, at least-the cause
of patriarchal oppression. She says:
The fundamental part that from the beginning of

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc..

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 hypatia

historydoomedwomanto domesticworkand prevented

her taking part in the shaping of the world was her
enslavement to the generative function. (Beauvoir
1953,117)
In The Politics of ReproductionMary O'Brienargues, on the one
hand, against Beauvoir'sviews, that male, not female, reproductive
capacitiesare the sourceof the patriarchaldominationof women. On
the other hand, she claims that female reproductiveprocessprovides
the materialbase for feministtheory. She says, "Wheredoes feminist
theory start? I answer:within the process of human reproduction"
(O'Brien 1981, 8). Accordingto her, a feministtheory based on the
reproductiveprocess would allow, on the one hand, a criticism of
traditionalpatriarchaltheory-which in her scheme becomes an at-
tempt on the part of males to compensatefor the lack of continuity
with the species which they experiencein reproduction-and, on the
other, the recoveryfor feminismof the denigratedfunction of giving
birth. O'Brien,furthermore,arguesthat the appearanceof a feminist
theory based on reproductionis now possible, for the first time,
thanks to the developmentof contraceptivetechnology.
I believe that O'Brien's position presents a deeper challenge for
feminismthan Beauvoir's.In a way whichis inconsistentwith her own
intimation that the denigrationof female reproductivecapacitiesis
culturally created, Beauvoir repeatedly states that females are
biologicallydoomed; she, in other words, assumes the very cultural
values which are contemptuousof motherhood,as O'Briencorrectly
points out. However, O'Brien presentsan analysis which is, against
her own claims to the contrary2,heavily biologistic and ahistorical
and, as a result,it is also internallycontradictory.In section(I) I show
the two main inconsistenciesin O'Brien'swork. First, her claim that
feminist theory must have its materialbasis in the reproductivepro-
cess contradictsher views on contraception.Secondly, her theory in-
consistentlyfavors historyover nature. In section (II) I arguethat the
contradictionsin her analysis are due to the fact that it is ahistorical
and biologistic. In (III) I criticize O'Brien's view that female
reproductiveconsciousness is not alienated. I claim that she must
broadenher notion of alienationto analyzean aspectof motherhood
which Beauvoirpoints out, namely, motherhoodas alienating.Final-
ly, I offer my own conclusions.
I
O'Brien's view that feminist theory must be based on the female
reproductiveexperienceis incompatiblewith her claim that only after
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 reyes klzaro

contraceptivetechnologycan a feministconsciousnessarise. In a nut-

shell, the contradictionis the following: she holds that feministcon-
sciousness is based on female reproductiveconsciousness,which is,
accordingto her, unitary;on the otherhandshe claimsthat contracep-
tion breaksthe unity of reproductiveconsciousnessand, furthermore,
that only after "the age of contraception" can a feminist con-
sciousness arise, thus contradictingher first point: she asserts both
that feministconsciousnessis, and yet cannot be, based on a unitary
reproductiveconsciousness.
As opposed to Beauvoir's negative analysis of motherhood for
women, Mary O'Brien claims that reproductiondoes not alienate
women but, rather, men. O'Brien argues that males' alienation in
reproductionacounts for patriarchaldomination. Accordingto her,
the reproductiveprocess produces two gender-differentiatedcon-
sciousnesses,one male, one female. She says:
Both processes, production and reproduction . . . con-
tribute to the dialectical structure of human con-
sciousness. There is a reproductive genderic aspect of
consciousness,just as thereis a productive,class aspect
of consciousness.(O'Brien 1981,8)
Male and female reproductiveconsciousnessesdiffer, accordingto
O'Brien, in that the male is-and feels-naturally alienatedfrom his
seed, whereasthe femaleis not; she experiencesreproductionas a con-
tinuousprocess.This is due to the fact that malesexperiencesexuality
as disconnectedfrom reproduction,whereas,in the case of women,
the gap is mediatedthroughgestation3.In O'Brien'swords:
. . .this negation [male negation]rests squarelyon the
alienation of the male seed in the copulative act. The
unity of seeds is experientiallypresentin an immediate
way only to female reproductive consciousness.
(O'Brien 1981, 9)
As a result, the alienatedmale reproductiveconsciousness,according
to O'Brien, lacks a sense of continuity with the human species.
However, O'Brien adds, allegedly following Hegel, human con-
sciousnessresistsalienation. She says: "When Hegel claims that . . .
humanconsciousnessresistsalienationand negationof the self, he is
makinga claim about the structureof consciousnesswhich is vital to
the theory of reproductiveconsciousnessdeveloped here" (O'Brien
1981, 20). Males, accordingto her, turn to the theoretical,economic
and political realms, in order to create artificial continuity principles
and thus overcome their natural alienation. Examples of those

89
 hypatia

principlesare the notion of paternity,hereditarymonarchyand con-

stitutionallaw. Moreover,accordingto O'Brien, males have created
the necessaryjuridicalcorpusto protectthe institutionswhichembody
these principles, as well as a public/private split, all of which
perpetuatesmale domination. She says:
What I hope to show is that suchtheories[artificialcon-
tinuity principles]are not merelyanaloguesof genera-
tional continuityand procreationbut take social forms
which meet in quite practicalways the problemsof the
integrity of male reproductive consciousness . . . pro-
blems which are posed by the actual process of
reproduction.(O'Brien 1981, 11, emphasisadded)
O'Brien does not explain what she means by "female reproductive
consciousness."She presumablymeansthat, becauseof the continui-
ty with the natural process which mothers experience,accordingto
her, they have a perceptionof the world which differs from males.
She, moreover, believes that female consciousnessallows women to
have a perceptionof the worldwhichis closerto the truththan males.
She states, for instancethat "historyis indubitablya continuouspro-
cess;" thus, she indicates that the female continuous perceptionof
time is more true than the male discontinuous one. This superior
female reproductiveconsciousness, O'Brien claims, is the basis for
feministtheory.
On the otherhand, O'Brienclaimsthat the technologicalchangesin
contraceptionallow, for the first time in history, for a change in the
reproductiveprocesswhichwill resultin a feministchallengeto gender
inequality.She says:
The institutionsof patriarchyare vulnerablebecausethe
Age of Contraception has changed the process of
reproductionand the social relations of reproduction
must thereforeundergotransformation.(O'Brien1981,
32)
This statement,however,conflicts with her view that reproductionis
the basis for a feminist consciousness.
O'Brien hardly develops her views on the specific impact of con-
traceptivetechnologyon women. As a matterof fact, she devotesjust
a couple of pages to explain the way in which contraceptive
technologymakes possible the appearanceof a feminist theory. She
holds that contraceptionhas changed the reproductiveprocess. It
follows from her own analysis that it must also have changed both
female and male reproductiveconsciousnesses. For, as she says,

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process and consciousnessof process are inseparable(O'Brien 1981,

21). It would thus follow that there is a difference between female
reproductiveconsciousnessbefore and after the appearanceof con-
traceptivetechnology.For the purposesof this paper,I call the former
female reproductiveconsciousnessand the latterfeminist reproductive
consciousness.As it turns out, in one of the rare occasions in which
O'Brien suggests the specific changes in female reproductivecon-
sciousnesswhich technology bringsabout, she states that contracep-
tion separatessexualityfrom reproduction.As she puts it:
Unlike men, women have had no objectivebasis for a
separationof gendericcontinuityfrom human history.
Now, we do have such a challenge to meet, for the
separation of sexuality and reproduction which nature
decreed for men, technology has now decreed for
women. (O'Brien 1981, 160, emphasisadded)
O'Brien clearlyindicates that feminist theory is based on a feminist
reproductiveconsciousness. ThroughoutPOR she claims, however,
thatfemale reproductiveconsciousnessis constitutedby the unitysex-
uality/parturitionwhich women experiencein reproduction.But this
unity is eliminatedby contraception.Thus the first contradictionin
POR: O'Brienholds at the sametime that feministtheoryis and is not
based on female reproductiveconsciousness.
A second importantinconsistencywithin O'Brien'sanalysisis that
it favors the natural over the historical, a concession to traditional
patriarchalthought which she criticizesin Beauvoir.O'Brienargues
that male reproductiveconsciousnessis alienated,and, furthermore,
that this is due to the fact that males perceivesexualityas separated
from reproduction.She also claims that contraceptionproduces a
discontinuousfemale reproductiveconsciousness,as well. It follows
that contraceptionmust also alienatewomen. She acknowledgesthis
fact. However, she points out that female and male forms of aliena-
tion differ from each other. She says:
For women, the historical,technologicalseparationof
sexuality from parturitionis an objective equalization
with men, but not an identity with men. . . . (O'Brien
1981, 191, emphasisadded)
The gender disanalogy which O'Brien's argument creates,
withoutofferinganyjustificationsfor it, is enoughto alreadymakeus
feel uneasy4.Her argument,however,shows a still deeperflaw: when
pressedto specifywhatthis differencebetweenmalesand femalescon-
sists in, O'Brien surprisinglyinvokes the nature/historydichotomy,

91
 hypatia
and states that female reproductivealienation is historical, whereas
male alienationis merelynatural. In her own words,
The access to a destiny, with its concomitantcompul-
sion to createa second naturewhichcan cope with it, is
now presentedto women by historicalaction, the crea-
tion of a technology ... and women must mediate this
separationhistorically.For men, mediationis historical,
but the alienation is natural. (O'Brien 1981, 191, 192,
emphasisadded)
Even thoughO'Brienis not veryexplicitat this point, it is clearthat
she believes that reproductivealienation is positive for females and
negativefor males, sinceit, on the one hand, forces malesto createar-
tificial continuity principlesand, on the other, turns women into a
progressivesocial force. (cf. O'Brien1981,63.) It seemsthat, sincethe
only differences between both kinds of alienation are that one is
natural and the other is historical, female reproductivealienation
must be superiorprecisely by virtue of the fact that it is historical.
Moreover,female reproductiveconsciousness-i.e., beforecontracep-
tion-also is natural, in the same sense that male reproductivecon-
sciousness is-since both are directly based on biological reproduc-
tion-, whereasfeminist reproductiveconsciousness-i.e., after con-
traception-is, accordingto O'Brien,historical.It follows, then, from
O'Brien'sanalysis that, in order for a feminist consciousnessto ap-
pear, nature must be overcome. But this is precisely the approach
which she criticizesin thinkerslike Simone de Beauvoir.
O'Brien,for one, criticizesBeauvoirfor identifyingthe naturalwith
the valueless and the irrational, on the one hand, and history with
anti-physis,rationalityand values, on the other. She says:
As dualismis perceivedas natural,the mediationwhich
men must performto overcomethis conditiontakes the
form of resistanceto nature, and De Beauvoirargues
that the significant movement in masculine history is
anti-physis..... Life by itself, withouthumanlycreated
values, can have no meaning. (O'Brien 1981, 68, em-
phasis added)
O'Brien claims that the consequence of Beauvoir's view is that
women, who are traditionallyassociated with the natural and with
biology, are relegatedto the category of the irrational.As O'Brien
puts it, "They [women]remainimmuredin naturalprocess,by defini-
tion irrational"(O'Brien 1981, 68).
It is paradoxicalthat O'Brien,who, as pointedout above, basesthe

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superiorityof female reproductiveconsciousnesson women's special

rapportwith the naturalprocess,ends up groundingthe superiorityof
feminist consciousness precisely on its being historical. Why does
O'Brien, who so opposes the dichotomy natural/historicaland the
relegationof women to the formercategory,end up advocatingit? I
suggest that this is precisely due to the fact that O'Brien, like
Beauvoir, presents an analysis which is heavily biologistic. O'Brien
allegedlyattempts to presentbiology in a historicalkey, in order to
mediate the natural/historicaldistinction. However, she is unsuc-
cessful, since the undesirabledichotomyreappearstime and again in
her work.
II
O'Brienclaims that her analysisis not based on " crudebiology."
She states:
Our feministperspectiveis a materialperspectivein that
it attempts to root this long oppression in material,
biologicalprocess, ratherthan in mute, brute biology.
(O'Brien 1981, 44, emphasisadded)
She furthermorearguesthat her analysisis historical.As she puts it:
The generalthesis which is to be proferredhere is that
the reproductiveprocessis not only the materialbase of
the historicalforms of the social relationsof reproduc-
tion, but that it is also a dialectical process, which
changes historically. (O'Brien 1981, 21, emphasis add-
ed)
She specifies that by "historical" she means "not merely
biological," or not biological "in a crude sense." In her words:
The processchangeshistorically.This contentiouspro-
position rests upon the neglected consideration that
human reproductionis inseparablefrom human con-
sciousness ... the strong historical tendency ... to see
reproductionas 'pure'biologicalprocesscarriesthe im-
plication that reproductionis all body without mind.
O'Brien, thus, claims that her analysis is biological but not biologistic,
i.e., not biological-determinist,and, moreover,that this is due to the
fact that it is historical.Theseare herclaims:the realityof heranalysis
contradictsthem. O'Brien fails to bridge the nature/historygap be-
cause she fails to make the natural(biological)reproductiveprocess

93
 hypaia
historical.Her theory on contraceptionis a result of this flaw in her
analysis. Thus, in order to introduce history into reproduction,
O'Brien extemporaneously introduces the technological element
which, as has been shown above, conflict with the rest of her analysis.
O'Brien's mishandlingof the question of biology leads her into the
view of reproductionwhich she criticizes,namely, one which opposes
nature to history and which suggests, against her own views, that
womenmustovercometheirnaturalconditionas childbearersin order
to become feminists.
I have said that both O'Brienand Beauvoirfail to give a historical
accountof biology. ThoughBeauvoirclaimsexplicitlythat biology by
itself is not a sufficient factor to explain the domination of women
underpatriarchy,otherpassagesbelie this assertion.Thus, thoughshe
says:
Biology is not enough to give an answerto the question
that is before us: why is woman the other? (Beauvoir
1953, 37)
and,
Thus we must view the fact of biology in the light of an
ontological, economic and psychological context.
(Beauvoir1953, 36)
She also makesopenlydeterministicstatements,such as that "woman
is doomed to the continuationof the species" (Beauvoir1953, 429).
O'Brien'sattemptto reinterpretthe date of biology from a feminist
perspective,does not take her much further. Some feminist authors
(Hardingand Byaya 1982, 361-363) claim that she is successful. In
what follows I take the opposite view.
O'Brien states that reproduction is a historical phenomenon.
However, of the ten different moments of the reproductiveprocess
whichshe presents,seven are heavilybiological.O'Brienmakesno at-
tempt whatsoever to explain how they can be historical. She,
moreover,does not attributechildrearingany import in the develop-
ment of reproductiveconsciousness5.The reproductivemoments,ac-
cordingto O'Brien, are the following: menstruation,ovulation, con-
ception, gestation, labor and birth, copulation, nurtureor childrear-
ing and, finally, alienationand appropriation.The first six are purely
female moments;the seventhis shared;nurtureis, by and large, only
female; the last two are, in this view, male reproductivemoments.
O'Brien does not offer us a historicalreadingof these moments;
yet, such readingis necessary. Clearly, menstruationis viewed very
differentlyin 20th centuryUSA than it was viewedin the colonial era.

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 reyes lzaro

Speakingof menstruationin generalas an abstractunchangeablemo-

ment within the reproductiveprocess intimatesthat it has a value in
itself, which somehow applies cross-culturallyand transhistorically.
Similarlygestation, for example, can, under certain conditions, be
empoweringfor women. It can confer on them, for instance,political
power or prestige or moral status within a specific community.
However, underdifferentconditions-such as those which prevailin
most currentsocieties-gestation can be a liability.O'Brienfails to ex-
plain that. Thus in her analysis, as in Beauvoir's,reproductionends
up being biological "in a crude sense."
Moreover,her disregardfor childrearingshows that her analysisis
more groundedon "crude biology" than she herselfis willing to ad-
mit. Even though she includesit among the moments, she practically
ignoresit in her analysis. However,nurtureis the one momentwhich
is less groundedon biology. It is also one which, as opposed to the
first six, can also be experiencedby males. Most feminist theorists
who have analyzedmotherhoodattributeto it extremeimportance,
preciselybecauseof its historicity,which allows them to go beyonda
crude biologicalapproach.
Besidesbeing biologistic,O'Brien,like Beauvoir,bases her analysis
on the ahistoricalpremisethat women'sdominationis due to a univer-
salprinciple of consciousness. Beauvoir claims that woman has always
been definedin oppositionto man; she is "the other." As she puts it,
"He is the subject, he is the Absolute-she is the Other" (Beauvoir
1953, xvi). She furtherstates that this is due to the universalprinciple
that says: "The category of the Other is as primordial as con-
sciousness itself" (Beauvoir 1953, xvi). She adds, as pointed out
above, that women have become 'the other' due to theircapacitiesas
reproducers.O'Brieninvokesanotheruniversaland ahistoricalprinci-
ple of human consciousness,that it resistsalienation.
Both O'Brienand Beauvoirconceiveof consciousnessahistorically.
The consequencesof their views are quite discouraging,in political
terms. If males are compelledto searchfor an other, as Beauvoirhas
it, and if, on the otherhand, womenare the best candidatesbecauseof
their reproductiverole, then women will always be seen as inferior,
unless they renouncechildbearingaltogether.Similarly,if males are,
on the one hand, both biologically doomed to alienation and
metaphysicallycompelledto overcomeit and if, on the other, the op-
pressionof women is the only meansby whichmalescan overcomeit,
then the conclusion is equally obvious and disturbing: men are
metaphysicallycompelled to oppress women. These universalprin-
ciples close the door to a solution other than withdrawal from
reproduction.If, on the contrary, male compulsion to control the

95
 hypatia

productof humanreproductionis based on reasonswhich are social,

not metaphysical,then we can provide a much more all-embracing
analysis. Such analysiswould allow for a more wide-rangingscope of
political action.
A historizationof O'Brien's views requiresa concrete analysis of
the relations between the process of production and the process of
reproduction6.It is absolutelynecessaryto show that the principlethat
male consciousnessyearnsfor artificialcontinuityis not metaphysical
but grounded on real, material needs. It is a fact that males have
claimed their right to their offspring throughout much of history.
However,this needto appropriatechildrenmustbe explainedin terms
of the needs which it satisfies within a specific mode of prodution,
ratherthan in metaphysicalterms. It can be arguedthat in societiesin
whichkinshipis the way to ensurea social networkwhichsatisfiescer-
tain materialneeds-such as economic and sexual needs, a need for
social bonding, etc.-men need to control women's reproductive
capacities.In certainsocieties, for instance,the desireto acknowledge
paternitymay come from the fact that childrenare necessaryas labor
force; they might also be necessaryin order to take care of their
parentsin their old age, and so on. The advantageof the approach
suggestedhere over O'Brien'sis that the formerallows us to account
for changes in male attitudes with respect to paternity. Such an
analysis can explain, for example, the current voluntary
disengagementsby males in twentieth century USA from the ap-
propriationof children. It can be arguedthat in societies where the
state has taken over the role of the offspring in taking care of their
parentsand where, besides, childrenare not useful as a labor force,
men tend to disengagethemselvesfrom paternity.The progressivein-
creasein single-motherhouseholdsin the US supportsthis hypothesis.
O'Brien'smetaphysicaluniversalprinciplecannotprovidean explana-
tion for cases such as these since, accordingto her, the need which
malesexperienceto mediatetheiralienationthroughpaternityapplies
universally.
A feministanalysiswhich wants to escape biologism must account
for the fact that the data of biology are differentlyvaluedin different
societies. Beauvoir'sclaim that biology is not a sufficient reason for
the dominationof women should be given much more attentionthan
she herself gives. There is nothing inherentlygood or bad in the
capacityto bear children;rather,society assignsa value to it and dif-
ferentsocietiesassigndifferentvalues. A shovel in the handsof an in-
dependentfarmer, for example, is a tool which advancesher/his ef-
forts towardsindependentproduction;however,the sametool used to
producefood for the feudal lord is part of an oppressiveproduction

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 reyes lazaro

process which limits the possibilitiesfor independentproductionof

the peasant.In a parallelfashion, havinga body whichbearschildren
has differentimplicationsfor a femaleslavethan it has for herlady. A
woman who is free to choose or reject motherhoodhas a different
relationshipto her body than one who is forced-the degreeof force
can varylargely,from social pressureto sheerviolence-to reproduce.
It follows from this that if, as O'Brien contends, process and con-
sciousnessof processare inseparable,we cannot any longer speak of
one reproductiveconsciousness,as she does; we must speak, instead,
of reproductiveconsciousnessescorrespondingto differenthistorical
and cultural conditions. The reproductiveconsciousnessesthat are
formed under patriarchy, I want to argue, are-at least par-
tially-alienated.
This leadsus into the thirdsection. We havedismissedas biologistic
O'Brien's claim that women are not alienated in reproduction.In
what follows I hold that O'Brien'snotion of alienationin reproduc-
tion-which, according to her, applies only to males-must be ex-
panded. In particularI argue that she needs to incorporateto her
theory Beauvoir'snotion of alienationas lack of control, both over
reproductionand over society. At the same time, her own views on
male alienationas separationfrom continuitywiththe species mustbe
retained,althoughreformulatedand expanded. I want to argue that
both males and females can be alienatedin reproduction.Males are
naturally deprived from a sense of continuity with the species;
females, on the other hand, lack control both over their bodies and
over public affairs.

III
Beauvoirpoints out two differentaspectsof women's alienationin
reproduction.In the first sense, women are alienateddue to a lack of
control over theirbodies; in the second sense, they are alienatedfrom
social control. Womenare alienatedfrom theirbodiesboth biological-
ly and socially. Biologically, there is a certain sense in which a
woman's body is beyond her control, unless she uses contraceptive
technology.Beauvoirpoints out this first senseof femalereproductive
alienationas follows,
. . .instead of integratingthe powerful drives of the
speciesinto her individuallife, the femaleis the prey of
the species. (Beauvoir1953, 375)
This biological condition, however, does not explain the fact that
women lack social control over their bodies; for most women, the

97
 hypatia
decisionto becomemothersis more a matterof social pressurethan a
free decision. Nor does it explainthe fact that women are deniedpar-
ticipationin the public spherebecause of their role in reproduction.
Becauseof theirreproductivecapacities,patriarchyassociateswomen
with nature and then nature with the irrational,and uses this iden-
tification to justify the denial of entrance in the public sphere to
females and their domination by 'rational'males. Biological aliena-
tion does not doom women; moreover, contraception allows
heterosexualwomen to control their bodies. It is the patriarchal
historicalinstitutionof motherhoodthat dooms women, in the second
and third senses, since all women are culturally associated with
motherhood,which is underestimatedin most cultures.
Beauvoir, thus, distinguishestwo aspects of reproductivealiena-
tion, one biological,one social. The problemwith herargumentis that
she equatesboth and concludesthat both kindsof alienationaredeter-
mined by biology. As a result, as pointed out above, her emphasisis
contradictory:statingon the one hand, that biology is not a sufficient
reason to explainthe dominationof women, and, on the other, that
"the fundamentalreason" for women's oppressionis "her enslave-
ment to the reproductivefunction" (Beauvoir1953, 117). While she
initiallycondemnsthe patriarchaldenigrationof female reproductive
capacities,ironicallyshe falls into a biologicaldeterminismwhichim-
plies such a denigration.
A political, strategicreason compels O'Briento criticizeBeauvoir
and offer an alternativeexplanation.O'Brienattemptsto recoverthe
richness of female reproductiveconsciousness,which male thought
has relegatedto the realm of irrationality.She criticizesBeauvoirfor
eliminatingmotherhood from her project for female liberation. In
O'Brien'swords:
De Beauvoir falls into the trap of subjective deter-
minism,just as she succumbsto the more seriousfailure
to relate female authenticityto reproduction.(O'Brien
1981, 74)
In this sense, she is right: Beauvoir'sdeprecationof motherhoodis a
clearcase of 'bad faith'7.In her attemptto avoid Beauvoir'smistakes,
however, O'Brien throws away the baby with the bath water. She
denies the double sense in which motherhoodcan trap women. She
says, "What does it mean to be trapped in a natural function?"
(O'Brien 1981, 20).
O'Brien correctly argues that Beauvoir simply reformulatesthe
traditionalview that women are doomed by biology. She says that
Beauvoir accepts this premise but alters the traditionalconclusion;

98
 reyes I,~zaro
reyes lazaro

thus, whereas traditional thought infers that women cannot par-

ticipate in social life, Beauvoir concludes that they must repudiate
motherhood.
O'Brienfurtherarguesthat it is thepremisethat womenare natural-
ly trappedin childbearingthat is wrong, not the conclusion. She is
correct in that the premise that women are naturally alienated
misrepresents the problem; however, O'Brien's conclusion that
women are not at all alienatedin reproductionis wrong: women are
socially alienated. O'Brien's and Beauvoir's notions of alienation
complementeach other. O'Brien'sdefinitionof alienationis both ex-
tremelybroadand narrow.She defines it as "separationand the con-
sciousness of negativity" (O'Brien 1981, 52). This definition is too
vague. Withrespectto the reproductiveprocess,however,O'Brienap-
plies it in a veryrestrictiveway. Alienationwithinreproductionmeans
for O'Brienexclusivelythe separationbetweensexualityand parturi-
tion which only males experience.This peculiarinterpretationallows
O'Briento deny the fact that women are alienatedin reproduction.
Reproductionis not simply an option for most women. Biological-
ly, it is a compulsionfor women who are heterosexuallyactive, unless
she has the 'unnatural'means to avoid it. Furthermorethe goal of
motherhoodis culturallyimposed on women:8A woman is brought
up, first by her mother and then by teachersand society in general,
knowing that motherhoodis expectedfrom her. Thus, most women
lack control over their reproductivecapacities. This estrangement
from the controlof one's own body, is not a naturalalienation,but it
is a type of alienationnonetheless.
It is hard to understandthe fact that O'Brien brushes away the
alienation factor in reproduction.This major hole in her analysis
becomesmanifestwhenshe feels compelledto acknowledgethat, with
respectto reproduction,men are 'in some sense' more free. In herown
words:
Men are free both in the sensesof freedomwhichliberal
thought has developed:there are positive and negative
aspects of paternal freedom, freedom from and
freedomto. Men are awareof parenthoodbut free from
reproductivelabor. Theyare also free to choose paterni-
ty. (O'Brien 1981, 52)
How is it, then, that she considerssuch a lack of freedomon the part
of women non-alienating?O'Brien provides a very unsatisfactory
answer:she rendersmale freedomproblematic.She claims that men
are, on the one hand, free to choose paternityand, on the other,
metaphysically compelled to acknowledge it. Thus, they are,

99
 hypatia
accordingto O'Brien, "forced to be free." In her words, "This is a
furthercontradictionfor, of course,to be forcedto be free is to render
that freedomproblematic(O'Brien1981,52). This explanation,which
is consistent with her account, does not explain away the fact that
women are neither free from nor free to reproduce.From the claim
that males are not free in reproductionit does not follow that women
are.
As mentionedbefore, Beauvoirbelievesthat females are alienated
in reproductionin a double sense: first, they are pressuredto become
mothers-thus lackingcontrol over reproduction-and, second, they
are relegatedto the privatesphere.O'Brien'sdefinitionof alienation
does not apply to either of these situations.
On the one hand, O'Brienacknowledgesthe fact that patriarchyex-
ploits women's reproductivecapacitiesand that it relegateswomento
the privatesphere;but, on the other hand, she believesthat patriar-
chal oppressionand the prevalentsocial views about reproductiondo
not affect femalereproductiveconsciousness.This is inconsistentwith
her claim that process and consciousnessof process are inseparable.
Our consciousness does not arise in a vacuum; it is socially con-
structed.Similarly,women's reproductiveconsciousnessis formedin
the midst of specific social valuations of motherhood, which create
theirperceptionof motherhood.In this respect,Beauvoir'sanalysisis
much more sensitive: she acknowledges the fact that the female
reproductiveconsciousnesscan be alienated, because many women
come to see themselvesin the way in whichthey are viewedby society.9
There is a sense in which males are alienatedin reproduction:the
fact that they cannotbearchildrencuts them from a part of reproduc-
tive experience which can be immensely enriching. In this sense,
womenhavebeen biologicallygiven an option whichmen lack. On the
other hand, the fact that men, by and large, do not participatein
childrearing,is an equally important source of male alienation. A
broader notion of alienation is necessary, which combines both
O'Brien's and Beauvoir's. This new inclusive notion of alienation
opens politicalperspectivesthat did not exist in eitherone of the two
previousnotions. In fact, the only politicalmeasurewhichcomes out
of Beauvoir's analysis is that women must renounce childbearing.
O'Brien,on the other hand, excludesmen from the reproductivepro-
cess and minimizesthe social implicationsthat motherhoodhas for
women. My alternative unified perspective maintains that
motherhood,i.e. childrearing,concernsmalesas well as females,since
both sexes can be alienatedin the reproductiveprocess.
Thereare no simplesolutionsto the problemof reproductivealiena-
tion, as shouldbe clearby now. Technologyprovidesa partialsolution

100
 reyes lzaro

to female natural alienation: contraceptionallows women to over-

come biology and achieve a natural control over the body.
Technology,althoughit is not a universalpanacea,opens unsuspected
doors which are potentially-although in fact not
necessarily-liberating.'° On the other hand, participationas equal
childrearersin the reproductiveprocesscould allow malesto achievea
feeling of "continuitywith the species," assumingthat we redefine
this value as a social ratherthan a metaphysicalneed.
On this view, males are alienated in reproduction not merely
becausethey do not gestate, but also because,they do not participate
in childrearingby and large. A participationin that process would
allow men to make up, at least partially, for their separationfrom
speciescontinuity.Co-parentingcould help destroythe devaluationof
women which results from their being associated with motherhood.
Finally, if we acceptthat women's reproductiveconsciousnesscan be
alienated, then feminism must perform a criticism of such a con-
sciousness: only after a feminist critique can reproductive con-
sciousnessbecome incorporatedinto feministtheory.
Many patriarchalmechanismsare internalizedby women in the
mothering process. Feminist psychoanalysis points out some of
them." Feminist theory faces the task of dismantlingthe works of
patriarchywithin reproductiveconsciousnesswhile, at the same time,
pointingout the feministpotentialwithinit-for example,the poten-
tial for a non-patriarchalkind of thought (Hartsock 1983;Whitbeck
1984; Ruddick 1984). Female reproductiveconsciousness, I have
arguedhere, is not feminist per se.
A final point. The narrowlink which O'Brienestablishesbetween
feminism and motherhood is prima facie disturbingfor those who,
like Beauvoir,are awareof the perversewaysin whichpatriarchycon-
trols women's reproduction.On the one hand, I firmly agree with
O'Brien's attempt to reclaim for women the capacityto reconstruct
biology-which is always socially constructed 2--in a feminist key.
However,I also believethat her focus on motherhoodis too restrictive
and too acritical.With respectto the first point, O'Briendisregards
entireaspects of women's lives-such as sexuality,women's position
in the sexual division of labor-which are absolutelyrelevantfor the
developmentof a feminist theory; as to the second point, I have at-
temptedto show here that her notion of a superioruniversalfemale
reproductiveconsciousness is too biologistic and romanticized;it
underestimatesthe fact that, underpatriarchy,such consciousnessis
partiallyalienatedand that it mustbe subjectto a feministanalysis,in
order to actualizeits feminist potential.

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 reyes Azaro

Notes
1. Most feminist writers on motherhood can be classified along the
O'Brien/Beauvoir lines: Nancy Hartsock, Sara Ruddick and Catoline Whitebeck rep-
resent the positive approach (for Ruddick and Whitbeck, see Trebilcot ed. 1984; for
Hartosock, see Harding and Hintikka ed. 1983). Shulamith Firestone (1971) offers a
radical version of Beauvoir's approach.
2. Both O'Brien and Beauvoir claim to be doing something very different from
what they actually do in their respective analyses. Both criticize biological determinism;
however, their analyses are deterministic. This complicates an exposition of their
arguments greatly.
3. In a personal communication, Christine DiStefano suggested to me a different
reading of O'Brien's notion of male alienation. In her interpretation, O'Brien is not
saying that men experience sexuality as disconnectedfrom reproduction, but that male
experience of reproduction itself is disconnected. If correct, this new reading would in-
validate some of the criticisms to O'Brien's argument presented in this paper. I believe,
however, that my interpretation is supported by textual evidence.
4. O'Brien pushes the disanalogy so far as to claim that males, not females, are
doomed by biology. She says, "Men are necessarily rooted in biology, and their
physiology is their fate" (O'Brien 1981, 192).
5. Most feminist thinkers who hold that there is a specifically female view-
point/thought/consciousness give childrearing a primordial role in its development. See
Ruddick and Hartsock.
6. Zillah Eisenstein (1979) provides an analysis of this sort. Martha E. Gimenez
(1979) and Ann Ferguson (1984a) offer a similar approach.
7. O'Brien paraphrases Beauvoir's existentialist concept of 'bad taith' as tollows:
".. accepting the measuring of an individual existent's experience in the light of
another's values" (O'Brien 1981, 76).
8. Sociologist Martha Gimenez argues, against the Reproductive Rights move-
ment, that speaking of reproduction as if it were a right for women obscures the fact
that most women do not have freedom of choice as to whether they want to become
mothers or not. Gimenez quotes sociologist Judith Blake: "People make their 'volun-
tary' reproductive choices in an institutional context that severely constrains them not
to choose non marriage, not to choose childlessness, not to choose only one child and
even not to limit themselves solely to two children" (Gimenez 1984, 288).
9. Mary Lowenthal Felstiner points out that The Second Sex starts with an exposi-
tion of the patriarchal myths-biological, historical, literary, psychological-which sur-
round motherhood in order to indicate that such myths precede and conform the image
that women have of themselves. Felstiner (1980, 248) poses the question: "Why did she
[Beauvoir] choose this sequence which emphasizes man-made myths and history before
it focuses on women's experience?"; she answers that, according to Beauvoir, it is
because "women imagine themselves in response to being imagined."
10. Linda Gordon's (1979) analysis shows that contraception under patriarchy is
not necessarily liberating for women.
11. It follows from Chodorow's (1978) analysis, for example, that it is much
harder for females to develop an autonomous sense of self (see also Flax 1978). Dinner-
stein (1976), on the other hand, suggests that children of both sexes inevitably project
hostility onto the mother because she cannot meet their insatiable demands.
12. As biologist Ruth Bleier puts it: ". .. the historical and ethnographic reality is
that the significance of woman's biology, of her reproductive capacity, is itself cultural-
ly constructed" (Bleier 1984).

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 janet farrellsmith
Possessive Power

The concept of possessive power as it manifests in reproduction is the

focus of criticism in this paper. The analysis utilizes both positive in-
sights and illustrative mistakes from Beauvoir's account of maternity.
An alternative notion of power is proposed to replace possessive
power as proprietary control.

Introduction
Possessive power, the power to claim what is "mine or "ours,"
goes deepinto the rootsof humanpersonalityandculture.Claimedover
persons, it is the-often-corrupted-expression of the normalhuman
need to belong, to be relatedintimatelyto someoneor somethingwho
carriesoneself outside the self and into the future. But the sense of
"mine" whichexpressesbelongingand connectionoften gets boundup
with the sensewhichexpressesproprietarycqntroland possession.This
proprietarycontrol, whichinvolvesdominatingpower, is the focus of
my criticismhere.
To say that somethingis "mine"is also to say in most casesthat it is
alienable.Whethersuchalienabilityalso involvesalienationis a question
raisedby Simonede Beauvoir.For reasonsthat have much to do with
possessivepower,Beauvoirconsiderswomen'sreproductivebiologyand
motherhoodbasicallyalienating.I arguethat, whileBeauvoir'sthesisis
historicallydescriptiveof woman'sstatusas "the other," this does not
mean that woman'sbiologicalnatureis inherentlyalienating.
In constructingan alternativeviewof powerin procreativesituations,
I take up some of Beauvoir'spositiveinsightsabout possessivepower,
namelythat it is impossibletrulyto possessanotherperson.Childbear-
ingitselfcannotbe a creativeact, in at leastone sense,becausewe cannot
reallycreateanotherhumanbeing. Each person must be allowed the
freedomto createthemselves.
Despitecontradictionsin possessivepowerin oursociety,certainbasic
elementsin possession,namelypreservationandprotection,yielda basis
for modifyingthe notion. Sucha modifiednotionmay be usefulon the
politicaland legal level to protectreproductiverightsand familialin-
tegrity,subjectof courseto constraintson parents'arbitrarypowerover
offspring.

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Janet Farrell Smith

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 hypatia
I
Basic Concepts
Possessive power can be provisionallycharacterizedas fpllows: it is
the powerto call a thing or person "mine" (or "ours") and (a) to re-
tain it or themwithinmy (our)domainof decision-making,interestor
control;and (b) to have a connectionwith it or themby social conven-
tion or biologicalreproductionsupportedby social conventionwhich
other personsdo not have in the sameway, and wherethis connection
is one of "belongingto me (us)" or beingtied to me in some exclusive
or uniqueway. Condition(b) holds by virtueof some sociallyground-
ed practice.In other words, the mereclaim that somethingis "mine"
is not adequateto groundpossessivepower, which is not to be taken
as a "state of nature"but is alwayssocially formed(cf. Laslett 1963,
13). Collectivities(families, clans, communities)may hold possessive
power, but for the sake of simplicitythis paper considersmainly in-
dividualpossessivepower.
WhenVirginiaWoolf claimed"a room of one's own" as a precon-
dition for creativework she drewon notions associatedwith sense(a).
Whenpersonsapplythe terminologyof "my" or "mine" to othersin
their care they draw on sense (b), and sometimesalso expressa sense
of responsibilityas well as belonging. The power to call something
'mine' is not deservingof globalcondemnation,as thesetwo examples
show. Possessive power, on the other hand, does call for a negative
valuationwhen either (i) I use my possessivepower over a person to
justify my own existenceand directtheirs, as Beauvoirarguesin her
commentson inauthenticmotherhood(SectionsII and V, below), or
(ii) possessivepowerleadsto dominatingpowerover personsin a way
which oppressestheir humanity, constrainstheir abilities or under-
mines their development(SectionsIV and VI, below).
The notion of possessivepoweris connectedto the social institution
of property.' Propertyin contemporarywestern democraciesis not
simplya materialthing, but a complexset of phenomenaconsistingof
relations, interests and rights (cf. CB MacPherson 1973, 136ff).
Possessivepoweris a kind of dominatingpower in the sense that it is
power over things or persons, in contrast to power in the sense of
energy,competence,development,or cooperative,activatingrelations
among persons(Hartsock1974, 1983, ch. 9, 10). Whilethe above no-
tion of power is provisionallydescribed as a characteristicof in-
dividuals or collectivities, it must be noted that power itself is not
simplya characteristicpredicatedof someone,but "a complexfield of
shiftingrelations"withina givensociety(Foucault1972, 1982;Fraser,
1981).In orderto comprehendthe workingof powerwe mustscrutinize

104
 janet farrell smith

not just the individualwhich exerts it or is subject to it, but the net-
work of relationswhich manifeststhe whole phenomenon.
The many levels in the notion of possession-ontological, social,
political, psychologicaland legal-are intertwinedin a given culture.
Possession will show markedvariation among culturesespeciallyin
symbolicand expressivemeanings.Here, my focus is on the concept
as it occursin the westerntraditionsincethe 17thcentury.In addition,
an examinationof forms of powermust take into accountdifferences
in social structurein various historicalperiods as well as genderdif-
ferences within these periods. For example, during the time John
Locke was writingin Englandin the 1600's,the fatherheld possessive
power in the family by his control over his progeny's occupation,
monies, etc.2 The father's possessive power was then a kind of pro-
prietarycontrol by rightwhereasthat of the mother,who lackedpro-
pertyrights,was one of responsibilityfor herchildren'semotionaland
characterdevelopment,as well as their physicalcare. Withinparent-
ing these genderdifferencesin possessivepower are crucial
Alienabilityhas typicallybeen takenas one characteristicof proper-
ty. It is importantto define its neutralphilosophicalsense in contrast
to alienation which immediately conveys a negative evaluation.3
Alienabilityis the capacityto "make other" or to "make separate"
that whichwas once a partof oneself, or belongedto oneself (e.g., one
can give away, sell or lease propertywhichbelongsto oneself). This is
the capacityfor alienabilityof property.Alienationimpliesa making
other, where the other stands in a negative or hostile relation to
oneself or wheresome negative,estrangingcondition occursin social
relationsor in oneself.4
Merealienabilityneednot implythis negative,estrangingcondition,
as for example, when farmersin tribal societies make alienablethe
fruits of their labor by exchangingtheir grains for salt or meat. In a
more fundamentalsense, humangenerativitymanifestsalienabilityin
its root meaningof 'makingother'. The creationof sculpture,musical
compositionsor mathematicaltheoriescan be seen as 'makingother'
what was once a part of oneself, as in externalizinga creativeidea or
impulse.Humanreproductioncan also be takenas alienabilityof pro-
creativecapacityin this root sense. It is the makingof separatehuman
beings what was once a part of the self through the processes of
childbearingand childrearing.But this is not to say tht human pro-
creation is inherently alienating in the sense of producing
estrangements.Biosocialmodesof procreationin differenterascan be
more or less alienating(i.e. estranging)dependingon the underlying
cultural and material conditions which allow for lesser or greater
human and humanecontrol of these processes.

105
 hypatia
II
Beauvoir's Philosophical Viewpoint
"The very concept of personal possession," says Beauvoir, "can be
understood only with reference to the original condition of the exis-
tent," namely the "whole person" (Beauvoir 1953, 62).5 She appeals
to two significant elements of this "original condition." First is the in-
clination of the subject to think of himself or herself as "basically in-
dividual, to assert the autonomy and separateness of his existence."
Possession, on Beauvoir's analysis, is a means to carry forth this sub-
jective feeling into the objective, practical world. In creative work,
made visible in property, the individual finds "courage to see himself
as an autonomous, active force, to achieve self-fulfillment as an in-
dividual" [62].
But even this urge to individualize oneself is not enough to explain
property and its attendant concept of interest. Beauvoir claims that a
second condition, namely alienation, is necessary: "The existent suc-
ceeds in finding himself only in estrangement, in alienation; he seeks
through the world to find himself in some shape, other than himself,
which he makes his own." Only by recognizing this estranging relation
can man's interest in his property become an "intelligible relation"
[63].
To see the full significance of Beauvoir locating alienation both in
possessor and possessed, we must understand how her philosophical
perspective informs her analysis. Her central view is that activities
which are freely chosen "projects" lift the human subject above the
mundanity of life. Following Sartre, she calls engagement in these
projects "transcendence." Without this striving toward liberty, which
is achieved only through a "continual reaching out for other
liberties," human life "falls back into immanence, stagnation," and
"degradation of existence into the 'En-soi,'-the brutish life of sub-
jection to given conditions-and of liberty into constraint and con-
tingence" [xxxiii].
Such was the nature of life for woman bound to her reproductive
functions under the domination of patriarchy, especially in ancient
times when she was reduced almost to the status of an animal, accord-
ing to Beauvoir. Because engagement in projects requires authentic
choice in freedom, and reproduction under patriarchy allowed woman
no choice, woman "in maternity . . . remained closely bound to her
body, like an animal," whereas for man, "the support of life became
... an activity and a project through the invention of the tool" [73].
Activities imply projects which are chosen as an assertion of liberty.
Facticity, in contrast, implies failure to go beyond the given

106
 janet farrell smith

circumstancesof one's life, and an inabilityto asserthumanvaluesfor

one's life above these circumstances,i.e. what Beauvoir calls 'im-
manence' [73].6
Authenticityand choice are preconditionsfor freely chosen pro-
jects. These elements are notably missing from woman's traditional
reproductiverole. It is not incidentalthat after emphasizingauthentic
choice in her Introduction, Beauvoir begins her chapter on
Motherhoodwith a discussionof the importanceof woman's ability
to choose birth control and abortion [540-55].Authenticexistencein
Beauvoir'sterms is not to be found in any fixed essence or nature,
"but with self-creation through choice." Since most of women's
traditionalpracticeshave been chosen for her ratherthan freely by
her, this philosophicalemphasis "helps to explain why women's ac-
tivity has been (rightly,in her opinion) (Gardiner1983, 7) devalued."
The theme of 'the other' is central to Beauvoir'sanalysis in The
Second Sex. She follows Hegel in finding "in consciousnessitself a
fundamentalhostility toward every other consciousness;the subject
can be posedonly in beingopposed-he setshimselfup as the essential,
as opposed to the other, the inessential,the object" [xx]. Although
Beauvoirappearsnot to rejectthis fundamentalviewpointthroughout
The Second Sex, we can say that she regardsit as capable of being
mitigatedif not overcome in the authenticachievementof Mitsein.
Mitsein('being-with')is true reciprocitybetweenhumanbeings.
In Beauvoir'sterminologyin TheSecondSex the makingof woman
into "the other" impliesnot only alienabilitybut alienation,whichis
the sourceof women'sculturaland social estrangement.Beauvoirex-
plicitly connects "dominatingactivity" with the "subordinationof
natureand woman," in particularthe controloverwoman'sreproduc-
tive and maternalactivity.Chief amongthese formsof dominatingac-
tivity is man's sense of transcendencesecuredthroughthe networkof
propertyrelationswhichprojectshis senseof himselfbeyondthe limits
of his finite life [92].
The materialon which this dreamof transcendenceis realized,ac-
cordingto Beauvoiris woman's body and her reproductivecapacity.
Beauvoir accepts Engels' thesis that the passage from community
ownershipto privatepropertyinvolved the enslavmentof woman to
the service of the patriarchalfamily, though she is critical of how,
precisely, this transition occurred. Engels also "assumes without
discussion the bond of interest which ties man to property," an
assumption Beauvoir thinks is inexplicablewithin the confines of
economic explanation[62].

107
 hypatia

III
Beauvoir on Woman's Biology and Maternity
Beauvoir'sdiscussionin TheSecondSex revealsspecificwaysin which
possessivepoweraffects women'sexperience.Part of her revelationis
deliberate and critical. Part is unwitting. For the first part, her
awarenessof historicaland culturaleffects of propertyrelationssup-
ports her thesis on how woman-as wife and mother-has been cast
into the role of "the other." For the second part, her discussion of
the so-called "naturalfunctions" of reproductivebiology and mater-
nity, presents her view that they are a form of alienation. She ap-
parentlyconsidersthis alienationinherentor essential,even claiming
at one point that "maternityas a natural phenomenonconfers no
power." In her discussion of woman's reproductiverole this view
seems definitive, despite her denial that the biological facts about
women "establishfor her a fixed and inevitabledestiny" [29].
Beauvoir'soscillationbetweenthese two viewpointscan be seen in
The Second Sex. The theme of alienationof oneself from one's body
and one's reproductivecapacities emerges very strongly from the
following passages in which Beauvoir gives her own picture of
women's experienceof the menses, pregnancyand birth:
"Woman, like man, is her body; but her body is
somethingotherthan herself." "It is duringher periods
that she feels her body most painfully as an obscure,
alien thing" [33]. "Woman experiencesa more pro-
found alienationwhen fertilizationhas occurredand the
dividing egg passes down into the uterus." "True
enough, pregnancyis a normalprocess,whichif it takes
place under normalconditionsof health and nutrition,
is not harmful to the mother ... however, gestation is a
fatiguing task of no individualbenefitto the womanbut
on the contrarydemandingheavysacrifices[33], "Nurs-
ing is also a tiring service" [34].
"The conflict between species and individual, which
sometimesassumesdramaticforce at childbirth,endows
the femininebody with a disturbingfrailty. It has well
beensaid that women"have infirmityin the abdomen";
and it is true that they have within them a hostile
element-it is the species gnawingat their vitals" [34].
"Here we find the most striking conclusion of this
survey: namely that woman is of all mammalian
creatures(female) at once the one who is most pro-
foundly alienated" [36]. (Emphasis added through
above quotes.)

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 janet farrell smith

It is truly remarkablethat one of the major feministtheoristsof the

mid-twentiethcenturycould paintsucha negativeportraitof woman's
experienceof her body, her reproductivecapacitiesand capacity to
give birth. Whataccountsfor it? Beauvoirhas said that motherhoodis
a classically enslaving role for women, even today. Society gives
women the bulk of the responsibility,but little support.7
One could also take the view that Beauvoir is describing
motherhood still under patriarchal dominaton. However, as
MarguriteDuras remarks, "even if men (or social conditions) are
responsiblefor this enslavingform of motherhood,is this enough to
condemn maternityitself?" (Cahill 1982, 10). While we can under-
stand Beauvoir'spoints on the oppressiveand alienatingaspects of
motherhood,it is also importantto look at the deeperreasonsfor her
portrayal. These, which I discuss in the next section, concern her
underlyingphilosophicalviews on human biology and gender.

IV
Critique of Beauvoir on Maternity
As Beauvoirhas remarkedin recentyears, she would have taken a
more historicaland materialistapproachto her theses in The Second
Sex. Indeed,we can isolate two basic mistakesin her originalposition
based on its insufficiently historical perspective. The first is a
philosophicalmistake. The second is a social or historicalmistake,
due to herunderestimatingthe powerwhichwomenhavederivedfrom
motheringeven if this is sometimesdistortedby oppressiveconditions.
The 19th centuryview of motherhoodin the U.S. took it as "the
highest office a woman could attain." This view did indeed restrict
women and made access to public leadershipvery difficult. Never-
theless it carried with it a recognition of moral superiority and
demandedsocial attention. Even if, today, we regard this ascribed
moral superiorityas a dubious distinctionborn out of social restric-
tion, it did at least give women an edge they could exploit to theirad-
vantage (Cott 1977, Showalter 1971). It was also a source of self-
esteem.
On the philosophicalaspectsof Beauvoir'stheses, considerherview
that alienationis inherentin women's biological nature. Her reasons
for takingthis position are, first, that she attributespossessivepower
over women's reproductive capacities to a generalized
"species-drive."This mistake lies in taking what is a social notion,
namely alienation, and locating it within nature, in this case the
generalizednatureof the specieswhichhas possessivepower over the
inner natureof woman.

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 hypatia
But naturealone does not "possess." Humanbeingsinterpretit as
possessing. Beauvoir's view results from the failure to realize that
possession,like liberty,is a humannotion built up out of sociallycon-
structed values and belief sysems. Her notion of alienation is thus
flawed by its inadequatesocial components.
In addition, Beauvoirimplicitlydrawsa master-slavedialecticinto
the female body and its reproductivecapacitywherethe speciesdrive
is the masterelementand the woman's inner, biological natureis the
slave or servant element. The trouble with this assumptionis once
again that it imputes a social structureto the basic characteristicsof
natureor biology (Hubbard1982).This aspectof her argumentcan be
seen in her discussionof pregnancy
In pregnancy,on Beauvoir'sportrayal,the universalagencyof the
species-drivebecomesfocusedin the form of the fetus: "Pregnancyis
above all a drama that is acted out within the woman herself .... The
fetus is part of her body and it is a parasite that feeds on it; she
possesses it, and she is possessed by it" [553, emphasis added].
Althoughpregnancyappearsas a kind of creation,the bringingforth
of a "new life which is going to manifest itself and justify its own
separateexistence," Beauvoirremarksthat it is a "strange kind of
creationwhich is accomplishedin a contingentand passivemanner"
[553]. The woman becomes subject to the process, as an object. She
appearsto fit Hegel's definition of the servantstatus [73].
The positive side of the "ambiguoussignificance"of pregnancyis
the potentialof the flesh for transcendence,as Beauvoirputs it, name-
ly a "stirringtowardthe future"in the form of newlycreatedlife. The
mother-to-benow experiencesherself, not as object, but as a "human
being in herself, a value." She has undertakena project, the creation
of a child. But this impressionthat one has undertakena project, as
Beauvoiremphasizes,is an illusion.
There are two basic reasonswhy woman's impressionthat she has
undertakena creativeproject in childbearingis an illusion according
to Beauvoir.One, dealingwith humanlibertywill be discussedin the
next section. The other has much to do with possessivepower: The
pregnantwomanhas come to the equivocalrealizationthat "herbody
is at last her own, since it exists for the child who belongs to her.
Society recognizesher right of possession and invests it, moreover,
with a sacredcharacter"[554, emphasisadded]. But this realizationis
equivocal, because as Beauvoirobserves, "she does not really make
the baby, it makes itself within her" [554]. Beauvoircould also have
reasonedthat the illusorinessof projectingoneself onto a childcarries
the remnantsof the propertyrelationwhich she has alreadyasserted
alienates the existence of the possessor "onto his property . . . it can

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be his [sic] beyond death only if it belongs to individualsin whom he

sees himself projected,who are his" [92].
Now I would agreewith Beauvoirthat reproductivesocial relations
are permeatedthrough and through in our culture with possessive
power and various other evidenceof propertyrelations. But she has
misconstruedthe originand the characterof thesepossessiverelations
by failing to emphasizetheir social source which she then projects
upon an asocial 'nature.' This projectionis, I think, partiallydue to
Hegel, whose metaphysicsappearsto influenceBeauvoir'sontology.8
In ThePhenomenologyof Mind Hegel positeda differential"nature"
for the female and male genders (cf. Landes 1982). Whereas the
masculineprinciplein the form of the husbandassertsits individuality
in the civic realm, the femininefeels a generalized,not an individual,
allegiance"to a husband,to childrenin general,not to feeling, but to
the universal"(Hegel 1931, 476). Hegel is explicit about the lack of
autonomy and particularityin woman's traditonalrole (Hegel 1931,
477).
Similar assumptions about gender can be found in Beauvoir's
philosophyof biology, especiallyin her descriptionof women'sstrug-
gle for individualitypittedagainstthe generalizeddriveof the species.9
Just as Hegel held that the traditionalwoman, bound into her biology
and familyties, does not riseto an individualizedconsciousnessof the
ethicallife, so, for Beauvoirsuch a womandoes not riseto the level of
authenticaction in projectsundertakenin liberty.
Beauvoirstressesthe obstaclesto realizingauthenticlibertywithin
woman's biological condition, thereby accepting an implicit
nature/cultureduality. Woman's reproductiveactivityis confined to
the former. This view of course drops out the enormityof women's
work involved in childrearing,domestic, agriculturaland nurturant-
affective areas. These factors, in which women's activity is crucial,
renderreproductionin the humanspeciesirreduciblysocial (Ferguson
1984a).
Beauvoir's discussion of woman's psychology exhibits hints of a
similarly conservativestance. She frequentlycites Helene Deutsch
whose views on women'spassivitywerestronglyinfluencedby Freud,
and whose account might have quoted Hegel on woman's "inherent
implicit inwardnature" (1961, 476). However, Deutsch's views con-
tradict Beauvoir's own view that woman's nature is a created
phenomenon,not a constant. Similarly,psychoanalystsMalkahNot-
man and Carol Nadelson point out that "femininity itself (and
masculinity as well) is a shifting and variable concept, intimately
related to woman's awarenessof the capacity to bear and nurture
children, but not invariably dependent on this capacity for self-

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 hypatia
realization" (Notman and Nadelson 1984, 40).
Contemporary feminists have criticized Beauvoir's views as
masculinist, rationalist, and based on competitive individualism
(Hartsock 1983; Culpepper 1985; Ehrenreich 1978).'° The deeper
reason for their dissatisfaction lies in the following philosophical
premise: Beauvoir's primary criterion for liberty is located in the self-
chosen and self-determined projects. But, by both her Hegelian view
of gender and woman's biology and her background psychological
theory, it follows on Beauvoir's view that woman's peculiarly female
activity, namely that connected with her reproductive capacity and
biology, cannot achieve such liberty and is condemned to facticity.
Hence, Beauvoir's only consistent line of reasoning is to affirm the
liberation of woman by projects which have traditionally been iden-
tified with male activity. For examples, see Simons (1984).
The solution to this bind is not necessarily to drop the theory of
liberty and woman's overcoming the status of the 'other,' but to revise
the background theories and the practices associated with them. This
is not a simple project. It involves re-structuring a notion of autonomy
as well as one of power. In the next section I make some brief observa-
tions on how contemporary psychological theory has begun such a
reconstruction.
In sum, Beauvoir can be criticized for failing to take the positive
potential of women's experience as the centerpiece of her theory, and
for acceding to an implicit theory of power as dominance within her
analysis of reproduction. She does recognize another kind of power,
but this does not figure strongly in her analysis of woman's biology.
In some ways one could say that she takes the most distorted and op-
pressed aspects of women's reproductive experience, aspects which are
real historical experiences, and mistakes these for an inherent condi-
tion of human (woman's) nature. Adrienne Rich (1976) has clarified
the matter by distinguishing between the institution of motherhood,
which is (or can be) oppressive, and the experience of motherhood,
which itself has the potential for beauty and joy. We must therefore
recognize clearly that the sources of oppressive conditions are cultural
and historical, rather than inherent conditions of nature.

V
Beauvoir's Argument on Inauthentic Motherhood
Beauvoir denies that childbearing is a truly creative act in her sense
of authentically created values. She argues that the mother cannot give
the created object-in this case, the child-an essential value by her
(the mother's) act of childbearing, even if she undertakes it freely.

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This is because what the mother brings forth is another human being.
And each human being must give themselves, by themselves, for
themselves, the authentic reason for their own existence. To attempt to
do otherwise is to attempt to impose possessive power upon another
human being. And a human being cannot be possessed without the
very result of alienation which Beauvoir has so vividly described in
woman's subjugation to patriarchal systems. The child, in other
words, cannot justify the mother's creative project, because the child is
the sort of creature which must justify its own existence:"
A mother can have her reasons for wanting a child, but
she cannot give to this independent person, who is to
exist tomorrow, his own reasons, his justification, for
existence. [554]
Beauvoir has stated here what I think is a positive insight about
mothering, parenting and nurturing children. Her point could apply
not just to the birth mother but to any parent who cares for a child. It is
also worth stating that Beauvoir is not denying that bearing or rearing a
child could be creative in any way. She would of course affirm this
point. What she is denying is that authentic creative activity can result
from making another human being my "project."
Beauvoir has said that one cannot create one's own value in a child
because this is to wrest from the child the opportunity to create his or
her own values. The catch, of course, is that a child is not an "indepen-
dent person," but a dependent creature, especially in infancy, who re-
quires years of physical care and emotional nurturing to become a fully
human person. So how is it, one could ask, that true reciprocity bet-
ween subjects, as Beauvoir characterizes Mitsein, could occur between
mother and child? Or between any nurturing adult and child? How is it
possible to overcome elements of the master-servant struggle for
dominance, a tendency which surely threatens to invade all relation-
ships in societies patterned on dominating power?
Beauvoir says: "It is possible to rise above this conflict if each in-
dividual being freely recognizes the other, each regarding himself and
the other simultaneously as object and as subject in a reciprocal man-
ner [158]. If this condition, which Beauvoir calls Mitsein, or being-with
others, cannot be immediately and fully realized with a very young
child, it is at least possible to lay its foundations in an environment of
care which recognizes the integrity of the child's needs and its growth
towards independence.12 A clinging "love" manifesting on the
psychological level a claim to possessive power leads to an inconsistent
pattern of attention on the parent's part and undermines such growth
to independence.

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 hypatia

These observationson possessivepowerapplyto other love, friend-

ship and familial relations as well. In fact, Beauvoir stresses that
"possession can never be positivelyrealized" [213]. "In truth," she
says, "one neverhas any thingor person;one triesto establishowner-
ship in a negativefashion. The surestway of assertingthat something
is mine is to prevent others from using it" [174]. Jealousy, which
could be characterizedas the attemptto keep others away from the
loved one, is, accordingto Beauvoir,insatiable.It is so because"Even
if all others are forbidden to dip therein, one never possesses the
springin which one's thirstis quenched:he who is jealous knows this
full well" [213].
Theseinsightsimplya contradictionin the verynotion of possession
in human relations. To insulatea loved one from othersis to under-
minetheircapacityto relatein a reciprocalmannerto oneself and thus
to frustratethe very aim of possession. In order to possess, I must
makewhat I possess 'other,' or else the relationof possession(i.e. this
belongs to me) could not occur. On the other hand, the impulse to
possess is an impulseto appropriate,to make somethingor someone
my own.13 The impulse to possess simultaneously distances or
separateswhat is 'other,' i.e. 'not-me,' in orderto effect the relation
of possession to me, and then appropriatesthat 'not-me' or other,
back into what is 'mine,' i.e. myself and its extension. In this dialect-
ical contradictionlies another reason why possession is ultimately
frustrated.
Issues of autonomymay be crucialfactors in precipitatingexercise
of possessivepower over others, particularlyover offspring. Gender
differencesoften occur here. A man in the traditionalmasculinerole
may exertpossessivepowerbecause,assuminghis autonomy, he feels
he has the prerogative. On the other hand, a woman who exerts
possessivepowermay be compensatingfor her felt lack of autonomy.
Similarly,lack of a sense of autonomy may be a factor in persons'
allowing themselvesto be subjectto possessivepower.
In such situations,what would be a neutralalienabilityin reproduc-
tive situations often becomes alienation. Without the psychological,
or as Beauvoirmight (rightly, I think) say, ontologicalgroundingof
an establishedself, woman'screationof a new life becomesa process
precariouslyvulnerableto another's control. At least the woman's
sense of this processwithinher experiencemay more likely be a sense
of being possessedby forces outside herself.'4She is not participating
in a processin which she is the centralhuman factor.
Beauvoirmakesautonomy, understoodas independence,a precon-
dition for her sense of exercising liberty or engaging in projects.
However, she criticizesthe isolating sense of autonomyas that which

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propels individuals to extend their interest into property. In a cor-

responding sense, we may distinguish (a) autonomy as independence
of the self, an independence which still allows the self to establish in-
timate and reciprocal relations with others; (b) autonomy as the boun-
daries of an isolated and separate self which impedes the self in
establishing intimate and reciprocal relations with others. Autonomy
in sense (b) has been associated with male development, whereas sense
(a) has been identified by psychologists as more closely paralleling
woman's development. Gilligan's third perspective in women's moral
development, the self-in-relation-with-others, more closely describes
Beauvoir's sense of the independent woman engaging in reciprocal
relations with others, than does the usual philosophical sense of
autonomy as self-legislation (Gilligan 1982, Ch. 3).
These senses of autonomy, however must be understood in connec-
tion with the power structure in the larger society. Jane Flax, for ex-
ample, describes female conflicts regarding autonomy and nur-
turance. What often emerges as a mother's possessive power, e.g. a
controlling activity over a son, or a clinging, symbiotic closeness to a
daughter, results, perhaps as compensation, from factors which in-
clude women's lack of power in the culture. As Flax puts it, the child
perceives that men are valued and women are devalued, that the
mother is held in lower social esteem than the father (Flax 1976,
173,177).
These observations signify that possessive power in its distorted or
alienated form is itself a symptom of a more deeply rooted malaise.
The problem comprises among other things, a gender-differentiated
power struture in the society. This power structure takes the form of a
hierarchy in which women are subordinate. Its effects are felt in the
concept of self and in self esteem. In a female-devaluing culture,
female sexuality is often denied or ignored, and hence the female self-
concept, including woman's sense of efficacy, energy, and esteem for
her body and reproductive capacity, suffers. This in turn affects the
quality and drive behind women's contribution to society, as well as
woman's experience of herself and its consequences in mothering.
Two dangers thus threaten the autonomy [in sense (a) of autonomy]
of both the mother and the growing child. One is the possibility of
what Beauvoir has called immanence, the lack of authentic self-
creation. The other is the possibility of domination in the form of
possessive power intruding into the encounter between two free
human beings. Liberty is impossible on the former, while Mitsein or
true reciprocity is undermined on the latter. If Beauvoir had put more
stress on the social roots of alienation in the parenting relationship,
particularly the effect of possessive power on women, she would have

115
 hypatia
been better able to articulate an alternative concept of maternal
power, i.e. one which has its historical and ontological basis within
women's culture. Such an alternative concept would also incorporate
her notion of reciprocity.

VI
Alternate Concepts of Power and Maternity
Dominating power operates over persons, whereas cooperative or
energizing power operates among, rather than over, persons. There is
an enormous power in motherhood, but it is not accurately
characterized by a notion of dominating power. Under a notion of
power as creative energy (Gilligan 1982), "effective action" (Hartsock
1983), or "a capacity to implement" (Miller 1976), however, women's
power emerges more clearly.'5
The power in woman's procreative capacity is of a different sort
from dominating power. It is the power to create and nurture life, a
power which is necessary to the reproduction of life. The mother has
enormous power to give or to withold nourishment and therefore sur-
vival, which sustains the reproductive processes of society itself (Rich
1976, 44-52). Such power is not merely biological. It is also social. The
relation between mother and child is the first relation between human
beings. It is not only the first psychological and physical relationship,
but the first social relation between two human beings, or, if you
prefer, between two beings, one of whom is in the process of being
socialized.
Creative or energizing power includes "the strengths of inter-
dependence, building up resources and giving, . . . which characterize
the mature feminine style," as these are portrayed in the myths of
Persephone and Demeter in the ancient Greek Mysteries (Gilligan
1982, 22). These qualities, characteristic of groups of persons rather
than separate individuals, are rarely recognized in discursive
philosophical analyses of power, but they are preserved in the culture
through the symbolic expression in myth and literature. They are a
neglected, but central part of the meaning of power.'6
Both the mystery which lies at the core of creation of life and the
tremendous power woman has by participating in this process are
recognized by Beauvoir in her chapter on Motherhood. Here she is
more inclined to recognize the positive potential of maternity.
Beauvoir appeals to mythic symbolism when she recognizes the
"mystery of the incarnation" which "repeats itself in each mother."
Beauvoir points out that "The mother lends herself to this mystery but
she does not control it, it is beyond her power to influence what . ..

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will be the true nature of this being," herebyexcludingdominating

power and proprietarycontrol from authenticmaternalpower [555].
Beauvoirhas, therefore,despiteher negativeview of women'sbiology
and reproductivecapacity, provided crucial insights into possessive
power and human relations.
On the social-historicallevel Beauvoir has accurately described
many distortionswhicharise from possessivepower, even though she
has misidentifiedtheir source in some cases as inherentlybiological.
Thesedistortionsincludethe woman'slack of freedomand autonomy
and the subsequentdegenerationof humanrelationsinto dominating
power over others.
On the ontologicallevel, Beauvoirhas argued,correctlyas I see it,
that no humanbeing, even a helplessinfant, can becomeanotherper-
son's project.A projectcreatesthe reasonfor one's own existence.No
one can do that for anotherhumanbeing. A personcan derivea sense
of identityfrom devotingtheir lives to educationor nurtureof others
in a compassionatemanner.But that does not make the humanbeing
one nurturesthe project.
These two levels, the ontologicaland social, are closely connected.
When authenticself creationis denied in social life the temptationis
strongto seek a substitutefor it, to cling to or dominatethose around
one in a possessivemanner,or to allow oneself, like Ibsen'sNora, to
be directed,howeverbenevolently,by another.
One way to lessen the dilemmas of possessive power, if not
eliminatethem completely,is to reclaimpossessivepower in its root
notion of preservationand survival.'7At the same time, we would
keepin mindthat the affectiveties whichbond peopletogethershould
not fall prey to possessiveand dominatinginfluences.
Then, on the politicallevel, to claimpossessivepowerin the senseof
retaining something in my domain of decision-making,interest or
control, [sense(a) above in SectionI]might be to retainreproductive
rightswithinindividualdecision-making.Examplesmightbe the man-
ner in which women give birth. Or the custody of childrenwhen it is
threatenedunjustlyby othersor by the state. Theseclaimsdrawon the
originalsense of possessionas a claim or right to exclude, expecially
where unjustified intrusion would underminethe cooperative and
joint survivalof woman and child or of families.
Ratherthan relyingon an individualisticnotion of interestand an
atomisticsocial philosophy(Taylor 1979), however,the notion of in-
terestwould be revisedto includethe interdependenceof social beings
whose sense of themselvesdepends on their relationswith others. A
notion of joint and interdependentinterestrejectsthe narrowview of
self-interestand emphasis on freedom from dependenceon others.

117
 hypatia
Each of these views is presupposed in the western tradition of
possessiveindividualism(MacPherson1962, 263).
We can now returnto sense [b] of possessivepowerstatedin Section
I; The power to have a connectionwith personsby social convention
or biologicalreproduction,wherethis connectionis one of "belonging
to me" or beingtied to me in some uniqueway. On the view suggested
here, a new kindof powerwouldbe to claimfor ourselvesand othersa
sense of belonging, in relationships, families and communities,
withoutimposingupon othersour reasonfor theirexistence.In other
words, the attempt to avoid the estrangingconditions of making
'other,' or imposing one's own project upon the life of a child (or
lover, spouse, familymember)is the attemptto avoid the dehumaniz-
ing effects of possessivepower. Beauvoirhas vividlydesribedthe pit-
falls of such attemptsin her argumenton inauthenticmotherhood.Of
course, she does not condemnall motherhoodto inauthenticity,nor
all forms of intimateattachments,but only the kindswhichattemptto
find the reason for my existencein your existence.
On our modifiedapproach,the uniquetie betweenparentand child
for example,could remain.Such a tie facilitatesthe developmentand
growth of children.But it would not allow the arbitraryexclusionof
others(i.e. the possessiveexclusion)from the social worldof the loved
one. It would preclude the arbitraryexercise of dominatingpower
wherethis underminesthe developmentof persons.
To redefinesuch a notion of possessivepower is to bring it within
the social interestsof preservation,growthand survival.Preservation
and growth, as Sara Ruddick points out, have historically been
characteristicof maternal practice.'8For the interest of profit we
could substitutethe interestof preservationand survival.For the in-
terst of appropriationwe could substitutethe humanecontinuationof
the life cycle. We might then find a model for humansocial relations
in maternalpractice free from the influences of possessive power,
namely cooperativesocial relationshipssupportingthe development
of self and others.'9

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 janet farrellsmith

Notes
I. For a discussion of how a property model, that is, a cluster of rights and in-
terests,affectsthe family,see my "Parentingand Property(FarrellSmith1984).In that
article I argue that a property model is ethically deficient when applied to fathering or
mothering.
2. Locke argued that such "paternal power" should cease with adulthood.
3. One difficulty in distinguishing alienability from alienation lies in their
frequently overlapping terminology in the English language, e.g. the verb "to alienate"
is used for both notions. Nevertheless they are distinct philosophical concepts and
should not be conflated.
4. For example, consider Marx's characterization of the worker: "The life he has
given to the object confronts him as hostile and alien" (Marx 1967, 290). The notion of
alienation here owes much to Hegel, as does, I believe, Beauvoir's notion of alienation
and the other in The Second Sex. Alienation of persons from themselves and from other
persons is the third aspect of alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts.
5. Hereinafter, page references to this work follow in brackets within the text. In
the above quote, I have taken the liberty of changing Beauvoir's "whole man" to
"whole person", because I wish to stress the consequences of women as well as men
standing in relations of possession.
6. The contrasting concepts of transcendence and immanence imply a duality on
the social level which some, including myself, have trouble understanding. Here I em-
phasize Beauvoir's notion of freely chosen projects and creativity rather than
transcendence.
7. Beauvoir speaks of her own personal esape from "many of the things that en-
slave a woman, such as motherhood and the duties of a housewife." She advises women
to be on their "guard against the trap of motherhood and marriage. Even if she would
dearly like to have children, she ought to think seriously about the conditions under
which she would have to bring them up, because being a mother these days is real
slavery. Fathers and society leave sole responsibility for the children to the mothers"
(Schwarzer 1984, 36,73).
8. Beauvoir could be interpreted as following a typically Hegelian dialectic in her
analysis of women in her reproductive role subject to patriarchal systems. First, there is
the stage of women being "sunk in nature," to use Hegel's phrase. For Hegel this is a
"happy consciousness" in simple unity. For Beauvoir, woman in this stage appears as a
bound and miserable consciousness, stuck in repetitive maternity, devoid of choice and
authentic activity. The second stage is woman as 'the other,' with all the cultural over-
tones of estrangement from patriarchal culture which she describes. In the third stage, if
we take her vision of liberation seriously, this alienation of woman as 'other' can be
overcome in true reciprocity with other human beings. This third stage can be realized
only if woman ceases any complicity with what perpetuates her devalued status and
realizes her liberty by seizing the opportunity to create her own independent projects.
See Hegel 1931, Ch. 6.
9. See Margaret Simons (1984, 352) for an analysis supporting this view. She
interprets Beauvoir as leaving her work describing women's experience "without ade-
quate philosophical foundation," and as devaluing female experience, e.g. Beauvoir's
comment that the male activity of warfare is superior to giving birth. My interpretation
on the other hand sees Beauvoir as implicitly drawing upon Hegelian assumptions about
women's experience. Beauvoir attributes an inherent lack of individual to peculiarly
female activities, i.e. those which involve female reproductive function, such as
childbearing.

119
 hypatia
10. These views need to be supplemented by a greater awareness of Beauvoir's
ontological viewpoint, e.g. she stresses individuality, but explicitly criticizes the institu-
tion of private property and its attendant individualism.
11. On the notion of establishing one's own existence, we might compare Heideg-
ger's notion of Jemeinigkeit ("I, myself") in Being and Time: "Dasein is an entity
which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine." But this first-person ex-
istence is found also in being-with-others; "In the end an isolated 'I' with Others is just
as far from being proximally given" (Heidegger 1962, 150, 152).
12. For example, one element of successful mothering or parenting with very
young infants is the ability to recognize and respond to the infant's needs (feeding,
sleep). Although this may not constitute reciprocity in the sense of two equal adult be-
ings it does provide a basis for reciprocity in the sense of respect for the other's needs, a
basic condition which can be met either with an infant or with an adult.
13. Jacques Derrida speaks of property and possession as appropriation. In
French, he uses "Propre" to emphasize the appropriation to oneself. See his
hermeneutical discussion of Nietzsche in Derrida 1978, 109ff.
14. Fumiko Enchi's novel Masks (1983) explores women "possessed" by spirits
outside their control. My thanks to Carol Gilligan for this reference.
15. These notions bear a resemblance to MacPherson's notion of developmental
power of persons "as the ability to exercise and develop their human capacities," as
distinguished from "the power to control others" (1973, 50). See also the critical
analysis in Gould 1980.
16. In societies like the Iroquois, woman's political importance was marked by re-
spect for women's agriculture. "The earth was thought to belong to women which gave
them religious title to the land and its fruits" (Sanday 1981, 25). This sense of 'belong-
ing' clearly differs from the western European notion of private property, a concept the
Iroquois did not have.
17. Locke originally defined 'property' as the right which all human beings have to
things necessary for their subsistence. This right is distinguised from the individualized
property which a person comes to have from the common gift (Locke 1963, Ch. 5). One
need not appeal to natural law to return to those notions. The point is to broaden the
notion of property from the narrowing to material possession which it received after the
17th century.
18. See Ruddick 1984. In place of her third maternal interest, acceptability, I
would emphasize instead survival, which under certain conditions might include accept-
ability. It is also distinct from preservation, e.g. one might preserve the life of a child,
who nevertheless does not develop the psychosocial and physical skills to survive then or
later.
19. My thanks to the editor and referees of this issue of Hypatia, as well as to E.
Kuykendall and C. Watson for helpful suggestions.

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 anne donchin

The Futureof Mothering:

Reproductive Technology and Feminist Theory

An exploration of (I) alternative perspectives toward recent innova-

tions in reproductive technology: support for new techniques for the
sake of the kind of feminist future they facilitate; unqualified opposi-
tion despite therapeutic benefit to individual women; or qualified op-
position depending upon specific threats to women's interests and (II)
relationships between these positions and values bound up with
mothering practices.

The nurse said I would have to show you, but you

reachedright for my breast. You suckledright away. I
rememberhowyougrabbedwithyoursmallpursedmouth
at mybreastandstarteddrawingmilkfromme, howsweet
it felt. How could anyone know what being a mother
meanswho has nevercarrieda child nine monthsheavy
underherheart,who has neverbornea babyin bloodand
pain, who has never suckled a child . . . What do they
knowof motherhood?
ConnieRamos,a motherof our time.
It was part of women'slong revolution.When we were
breakingall the old hierarchies.Finallytherewasthatone
thingwe hadto giveup too, theonlypowerwe everhad,in
returnfor no more powerfor anyone. The originalpro-
duction:the powerto give birth.Causeas long as we were
neverbiologicallyenchained,we'd neverbe equal. And
malesneverwouldbe humanizedto be lovingand tender.
So we all becomemothers.Everychildhasthree.To break
the nuclearbonding.
Luciente,a 'mother'from a possiblefuture.
Connie'sdialoguewith Lucientetakesplacewithinthe imaginativeter-
ritory explored by Marge Piercy in Woman on the Edge of Time (1976,
105-106).Hers is a culturallyandrogynoussociety based on feminist
values and organized about a commitment to the extinction
of all systematicsex-roledistinctionsand the eliminationof biological

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Anne Donchin.

121
 hypaia

reproduction by females. Instead genetic material taken from human

males and females is stored in 'brooders' where it is fertilized and the
embryos are grown until ready for birth. The bond between genes and
culture is deliberately broken. Knowledge of genetic origin is
obliterated. Still the citizens of Luciente's world remain divided over
the desirability of genetic intervention. They watch for birth defects,
for genes linked wth disease susceptibility, but they do not yet breed
for selected traits. The 'shapers' among them push for selective
breeding; the 'mixers' "don't think people can know objectively how
people should become." They see the 'shapers' proposal as a 'power
surge' (Piercy 1976, 226).
The breeding practices adopted in Piercy's utopian society bear a
remarkable resemblance to the reproductive arrangements instituted
in Aldous Huxley's dystopian Brave New World (1932), though in this
imaginative future, not only eugenics, but dysgenics, as well, is prac-
ticed systematically. In their laboratories they gestate both biological-
ly 'superior' embryos and, in far larger numbers, biologially 'inferior'
embryos which are subjected to the Bokanosky Process (ninety-six
identical twins from a single ovum) and treated prenatally with toxins.
When decanted they are barely recognizably human, but are useful in
performing unskilled work and, with appropriate conditioning, can be
relied upon to docilely follow the commands of superiors. Reproduc-
tion has been brought wholly within control of the state.
Since Huxley's dystopian fantasy appeared, the feasibility of such a
world has drawn increasingly nearer to us. Researchers have made
substantial strides in both genetic research and reproductive
technologies. Artificial insemination has become a commonplace oc-
currence. In vitro fertilization and ovum transfer, though only
marginally successful, are widely practiced. Economically disadvan-
taged women are readily available to serve as surrogate mothers for a
modest fee. When mastery of the processes of extra-uterine gestation
is achieved, they will be dispensible too. Already extra-corporeal
membrane oxygenation (an adaptation of the heart-lung machine) is
being applied successfully to infants weighing even less than one
kilogram (Bartlett 1984). Once the functions of the placenta have been
successfully mimicked, perpetuation in vitro to viability (ectogenesis)
will render the biological process of pregnancy technically obsolete.
Though the mere fact of technological feasibility might suggest possi-
ble development within either a Piercean or a Huxleyan social
framework, subsequent achievement of effective political control over
larger, more diffuse populations than even Huxley envisaged only
sharpens the vision of the more portentous future. And were extra-
uterine gestation to become available, the potential for such a concen-

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 anne donchin

tration of political power would be immeasurablyenhanced. Those

who control the instrumentalitiesof power would command the
means to bring either futureinto being.
If women's long-terminterestsare to be representedin determining
the future directionof reproductivetechnology, women will need to
participatecollectivelyin shaping public policy. Unfortunatly,there
has been too little discussion among women about either the fun-
damentalvalues at stake or the social goals that would best promote
women's well-being. Though many feminist writers have expressed
concern retrospectively about the increased dominance of medically
controlledchildbirthtechnologiesand some have pointedto the direc-
tion in whichprevailinginterestsare pushingreproductivetechnology,
this discussion has taken place in virtual isolation from both the
general context of feminist theorizingand the backgroundof social
theory with which feministtheory is intertwined.'Thereis need now
to integrategrass-rootfeminist concernsabout medicallycontrolled
reproductionwith feministtheorists'attemptsto reconstructthe social
frameworkof women's collective past and draw out connectionsto
possible feministfutures.We need to think collectivelyabout the sort
of social policy that would best servewomen's most fundamentalin-
terests:whetherthe capacityto give birthis of such paramountvalue
that no social aim achievablein any technologicalfuture could sup-
plant it; whetherall technologicalinnovationsin reproductiveprac-
tices should be opposed despite their therapeuticbenefit to some
women individually;or if specific technologicaladvances might be
supportedstep by step until their deleterioussocial effects become
clearlymanifest.
In the following pages I should like to sketch out a framework
within which such a feminist dialogue might proceed. First, I shall
briefly discuss the utilizationof reproductivetechnologieswithin the
present social context, then describethe principalethical and social
positions regardingemergingreproductivetechnologies, considering
the social values and policy alternativesimplicitin each position, at-
temptingto ferretout the implicationsof these developmentsfor the
interestsof women. Next I will raise some conceptualand theoretical
questionsabout the veryidea of a utopianfeministfuture,considering
first, the argumentsof feministtheoristswho have taken exceptionto
the sort of utopiananalysisShulamithFirestoneoffers and then those
feministcommentatorswho share Huxley's dystopianprognosisof a
future where the bond betweenpregnancyand procreationhas been
severed: Finally, I will contrast their positions with the utopian
feministsin order to better understandthe basis of presentfeminist
reactionto reproductiveinnovation,whetherit stemsprincipallyfrom

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 hypatia

reservationabout the nature of technologicalinterventionitself or

from fears about the more probable consequencesof such a tech-
nological future. I will end with some observationsabout the presup-
positions underlyingtheoreticaldifferencesamong feministsand sug-
gest an interimcourse of action to meet the presentsituation.

The Present Social Context

Although Great Britain and Australia have establishednational
commissionsto investigatethe ethical and social implicationsof the
new reproductivetechnologies and recommend appropriatesocial
policy, in the United States the development and utilization of
reproductiveinnovations is left to the discretionof individualsand
physicians.Though there has been some considerationat the federal
level of ethical issues involving in vitro fertilization and embryo
transfer, the Ethics Advisory Board which undertookthis work was
disbandedafter submittingits initialreportin 1979.Though federally
supportedresearchinto these processescannot proceed without the
approval of the disbandedcommittee, both private researchefforts
and commercialmarketingof new reproductivetechniquescontinue
to go forward with virually no ethical constraintsother than those
researchersthemselves choose to impose.2 Individuals seeking to
benefit from the fruits of reproductiveresearch are left free to
negotiatewith individualphysicianssubjectonly to the constraintsof
privateconscienceand economic resources.In instancesof artificial
insemination, a low-tech 'cottage' industry, medical and economic
constraint virtually fall out and individual choice becomes the ex-
clusivedeterminant.Recipientchoiceis limited,however,by available
information which lies principally within the control of 'donors'
(more accurately'sperm vendors,' since in most instances they are
paid for their product). Because of possible legal liability their
anonymityis usuallyprotected.Though most recipientswould prefer
to receivespermfrom geneticallyscreeneddonors, access to such in-
formationis frequentlydenied them. Wherewomen attemptto pro-
cure spermthroughnon-medicalchannelsfrom known donors, they
risk the possibilitythat the donor may later claim paternity.
Hence some controls are desirableboth from the perspectiveof
those seeking to suppress the dissemination of reproductive
technologiesaltogetherand in the interestsof unmarriedand infertile
womenwho hope to benefit from reproductiveinnovations.The prin-
cipal issues, then, centeraroundthe natureof these controls and the
goals towardwhich they are to be directed.Would women's interests
be better servedby continuingalong the presentfreewheelingcourse

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 anne dJ,,hin

that maximizes'reproductivefreedom,'limitedonly by the capacityto

find a cooperativephysicianand by the patient's ability to bear the
cost of the service?Or should the availableoptions be limitedby cir-
cumscribingchoices, either at the level of service deliveryor in the
process of furtherresearchdevelopment?
Both of these positions are defendedby their supportersas options
which maintaincontinuitieswith social and political traditions.One
emphasizes individual freedom; the other gives centralityto tradi-
tional patterns of reproductionand parenting. However, emphasis
upon individualistic values tends to push in the direction of
technologicalinnovation.Attentionto the focal role of the biological
family in social organization,in effect, subordinatesindividualin-
terestsand would suppressunfetteredtechnologicaldevelopment.
Social reactionsto innovativereproductivepracticesdivideroughly
into threecamps:the noninterventionists,who questionthe advisabili-
ty of any practicewhich tamperswith either nature's way of doing
things or traditionalsocial institutions;the moderateinterventionists,
who give primacyto reproductivefreedomwhile acknowledgingthat
some weightshouldbe attachedto othervaluesas well;and the radical
interventionistswho divide into two distinctivefactions: those who
support advances in knowledge of reproductiveprocesses for their
own sake without regardto possible technologicalapplicationsand
those who favor reproductive research for the sake of the
technological future such researchwill facilitate. Advocates of the
first versionof the radicalposition are to be found principallyamong
researchersand some philosopherswho arguethat we shouldpush the
frontiers of knowledge forward now and concern ourselves about
undesirableapplicationsonly as the need becomes manifest.3Most
conspicuousamongsupportersof the secondversionare MargePiercy
and her model, ShulamithFirestonewhose 1970work: TheDialectic
of Sex: TheCasefor FeministRevolution,first focusedfeministatten-
tion on the political significance of reproductivebiology. Ursula
LeGuin's fantasy: The Left Hand of Darkness (1976) and Joanna
RussTheFemale Male (1975) also borrow their centralthemes from
Firestone'sproposal. All look with favor upon reproductiveinnova-
tions which free women from their traditionalbiological role.

The Noninterventionists
Among the most eloquentand articulateof the noninterventionists
is Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, who participated in the
deliberationsof the now defunctEthicsAdvisoryBoard.He objectsto
all forms of reproductiveinnovation other than medical or surgical

125
 hypatia
treatmentof infertility(Ramsey1972).In supportof his positionhe of-
fers three arguments.(1) It is a violation of the receivedcanons of
medicalethics to expose a possible human being to any unnecessary
risk. Since a merelypossiblehumancannot grantconsent, thereis no
grounduponwhichit is morallypermissibleto jeopardizeits futurewell
being. (2) The properrole of medicineis the correctionof 'medicalcon-
ditions,' such as infertility.However,if there are no remediesfor the
physicalconditionitself, then it is not appropriateto intervenefurther.
(3) Procreationand parenthoodare 'coursesof action' appropriateto
humansas naturalobjectstowardwhoman attitudeof 'naturalpiety'is
appropriate.They cannot without violation be disassembledand put
together again. Instead we should work accordingto the functions
operatingin the whole of the naturalorderof whichwe are a part. In-
creasingmasteryover naturebringsincreasedpowerover humansand
even greaterrisk of abuse.
Each of Ramsey'sargumentsincorporatescontroversialpresupposi-
tions: (1) that the canons of medicalethics are extendableto merely
possiblehumans,and (2) that medicine'sproperfunctionis the reversal
of a physicalcondition.Manyphysicaldeficitscannotbe reversed,but
wherethe functionis highlyvalued, ways are found to circumventthe
incapacity,e.g. prostheticlimbs, or eyeglasses,etc.
Manywomenexperiencesterilityas suchan incapacity.Havinglearn-
ed from infancy to associatefemininitywith fertilitythey look upon
their barrennessas a mutilation. The apparenteagernessof many
women to endure considerablepain and suffering at the hands of
technologicalexperts in an often futile attempt to bring about a
pregnancycannot be understoodapartfrom this largersocial context.
Othersfully intendto bearchildrenbut arevictimsof 'familyplanning'
technologiesor environmentalpollutantsinjuriousto theirreproductive
capacities.The social obligationto such women cannot be dismissed
merelyon the ground that patient desire is not the properobject of
medicalintervention.That argumentfails to speakto the morallyrele-
vant featuresof the situation.4
Ramsey's final argumentis complex, incorporatingpresumptions
about both the placeof humansin natureand the tendenciesof human
nature.Thereare seriousambiguitiesherewhichmeritcarefulexamina-
tion. It is not clearwhy the bare fact that somethingis naturalshould
give it any moral weight. Why moral force shouldbe attributedselec-
tivelyto normalprocreationwhilehumanintervention,say, in the useof
respiratorsfor prematureinfantsis unquestioninglysupportedcalls for
furtherexplanation.Forsuchan appealto natureto standit wouldhave
to reston some otherground,possiblythe fearthat humanpowerover
reproduction,in particular,would invite seriousabuse.5

126
 anne donchin

Despite the fragmentarycharacterof Ramsey'sargumentsthey do

point to severalwidely sharedconcernsabout the directionin which
reproductiveinnovationis leadingtechnologicallyadvancedsocieties.
His allusion to a relationshipbetweenpower over natureand power
over humans, in particular, captures a concern widely shared by
feminist critics of technologicalinnovation, a theme which I shall
return to later and examine in detail within the context of feminist
criticism.
Leon Kass, a physician and influential writer on medical ethical
issues, also frameshis principalobjectionto reproductiveinnovations
on traditionalistgrounds, but unlike Ramseywho sees the principal
threatin the violationof 'nature,'Kassemphasizesvaluesattachedto
humanrespect.However,his notion of 'respect'bearsthe markof an
origin closely linked to Ramsey'sconceptionof 'nature.' Though he
claimsthat what is at stakeis the idea of the humannessof humanlife
and the meaningof humanembodiment,these conceptionsappearto
borrowtheirmeaningfromtheiraffinity with social practicesassumed
to be naturallygiven ratherthan socially derived.
On the basis of these assumptionsKass favors legislativeinterven-
tion to regulate the dangers of in vitro fertilization and embryo
transferwhich, he argues,"erode fundamentalbeliefs, values,institu-
tions and practices"(Kass 1979). He proposesthat the use of embryo
transferbe restrictedto the marriedcouple from whom the embryo
derivesin orderto sustaintraditionalbondsamongsexuality,love and
procreation.
Like Ramsey, Kass proposes that furtherresearchbe restrictedto
the treatmentof infertilityor othermeasuresthat supportthe desireto
have a child of 'one's own' (by implicationpresupposinga distinction
betweenlegitimateand inappropriatedesires).He opposes use of em-
bryos in investigativeresearch,donationto other couplesor commer-
cial transactions(such as surrogatemotheringarrangements),claim-
ing that such practicesviolate the traditionalhumansense of our sex-
ual nature and the experienceof relatednessto our ancestors and
descendants. He, too, fears the concentration of power such
technological developments would place within the control of
researchersand special interests, but his fear, unlike Ramsey's, is
couched within an appealto culturalpracticesratherthan to nature.
However,sincehis culturalarrangementsseeminglyowe theirauthori-
ty to what is 'natural'the differencesbetweenthem are not so greatas
would first appear. ThoughKass is undoubtedlycorrectin observing
that certain innovative practices, were they to become widespread,
would threatenpresentconceptionsof historicalconnectedness,it is
not self-evidenteitherthat such innovationswould be widelyadopted

127
 hypatia
or that prevailingnorms are more desirablethan any that might sup-
plant them. Moreover, there are other well established traditions
whichtend to give primacyto individualautonomousdecision-making
over collectivesocialinterests,traditionsfrequentlyappealedto by ad-
vocates of innovativereproductivepractices.

Moderate Interventionists
The right to procreateis firmly imbedded in the Westernliberal
tradition. However, the desire to have a child of 'one's own' is not
harboredexclusivelyby couples as pairs, as Kass' view suggests, but
may extendto individualsone by one. Noel Keane(1981),6an attorney
involvedin facilitatingsurrogatemotheringarrangements,relatesthe
story of a 59 year old lawyerwho came to his office. He and his 61
year old wife had no children.She had been infertilethroughouttheir
marriage.He had plannedto leave his estateto his niecesand nephews
but then becameintriguedby the renewedpossibilitythat he mightstill
be able to will his propertyto a child of his own. He asked Keaneto
find a couple willing to assist him. The wife would be artificiallyin-
seminated with his semen and bear his child. He would guarantee
financial arrangementsfor the child and provide for its education.
Keane pursuedhis requestand made suitable arrangements.He has
also established a surrogatemothering agency and is lobbying for
legislativereformthat would facilitatelegal enforcementof surrogate
contracts.7Decisions either to support such individualisticpractices
within the law or discourageoptions of this kind will have an impor-
tant bearing on future social policy determinations,marking the
boundarybetweenthe permissibleexerciseof personaldesireand the
sphereof collectivesocial interests.Thoughthe desireto pass on one's
genetic endowment seems a predominantly male preoccupation,
women's interestsin bearingand rearingchildrenoutside the institu-
tion of marriagemight also be servedby a social policy that allows in-
dividuals free space to construct alternative childrearing ar-
rangements. However, the legal advantages presently available to
marriedcouples, such as Keanerepresents,are not so readilyextended
to the unmarriedwho seek to fulfill comparabledesires.
Recentjudicialdecisionshave repeatedlyaffirmedthe 'right'of in-
dividuals,at least within marriage,to control their own reproductive
activity.This freedomis takento be derivedfrom the rightto privacy,
to a domainwithin whichindividualsmay pursuetheirown life plans
with a minimum of societal interference.Supportersof innovative
reproductivetechnologies are by implicationadvocatingapplication
of these individualisticnorms to an increasinglybroader range of

128
 anne donchin

circumstances.Extension of the scope of reproductivefreedom to

gratificationof a desire to parent (either biologicallyor socially) by
technologicalinterventionis highlyproblematic.Legalrulingssuppor-
ting reproductive freedom have leaned principally on rights of
noninterference,on the liberty not to procreate. However, at issue
here, is legal support for service demandedfrom other parties. In
such instances,the use of innnovativetechnologiesis likelyto impinge
on otherpersons'rightsof noninterferenceand on othersocial values,
some that are preconditions for the very exercise of personal
autonomyand othersthat would commandcomparableweightin any
just social ordering.
George Annas, in testimonyto the U.S. House of Representatives
Committeeon Scienceand Technology(U.S. 1985), recentlypointed
out that if childrenresultingfrom such techniquesas surrogateem-
bryo transfer(to a woman other than the egg donor) and the use of
frozen embryosare to be adequatelyprotected,governmentwill have
to interveneinto the arenaof humanreproduction.Failureto regulate
privatecontractualagreements,he argues,jeopardizesthe integrityof
the family and threatensthe interestsof children.The claimsof some
infertile couples, he contends, are outweighedby the interestof the
potentialchild. For the sake of protectingthese interestshe advocates
legal action: (1) defining maternityand paternityat the moment of
birth, preservingthe current legal presumptionthat the gestation
motheris the legal motherso that it will be conclusiveand cannot be
overriddenby private contractualarrangements,and (2) protecting
the human embryo from commercialexploitation by restrictingthe
freedomto use frozen embryosto the purposespecifiedby the donors
(Annas 1984). The WarnockCommissionReport incorporatescom-
parablerecommendations.
However, some object to the modesty of such regulatoryrecom-
mendations, particularly those noninterventionists who accept
Ramsey's and Kass' arguments in defense of early embryos and
traditonalconceptionsof the family. Some feministsreach the same
conclusions,too, though for other reasons.They fear furthererosion
of women's decisionmakingpowers if reproductivetechnologiesare
allowed to proliferateso freely.
Radical Interventionists
Incorporationof Marge Piercy's thought-experimentinto considera-
tion of policy options for the more immediatefutureshould promote
us to consider more carefully the grounds for hesitancyto support
reproductiveinnovations, where what is principallyat issue is the
natureof the activity itself or fears about the likely consequencesto

129
 hypatia
follow. Luciente,Piercy'sprotagonistfrom Mattapoisett,her utopian
feministworld, readilyacknowledgesthat the institutionof their new
reproductivearrangementsrequiredwomento relinquishthe powerto
give birth. However, they judge the benefit well worth the sacrifice
since all power relationshave been abolishedas well. Within such a
social context the choice seems obviously sensible.
There is reason to wonder, though, whether such a social
frameworkis plausible, or even intelligible?Apart from the obvious
difficulty in understandinga set of social circumstancesunderwhich
the socially and politically advantaged would agree to relinquish
power, it is far from clearthat we can even comprehendthe meanings
of the radicallynew roles envisagedfor such a society. The astonish-
ment of MargePiercy'scharacter,Connie Ramos, is sharedby all her
readerswho wonder what the word 'mother' could mean divorced
from both the facts of biological motheringand the set of social ex-
pectations imbedded in traditional mothering practices. Within a
social traditionthat ungrudginglygrantswomen little status and few
gratificationsapart from the motheringrole, thereis no solid ground
upon which so radically novel a conception can get a foothold.
Presentedwith such a set of facts about alternativesocial structures
Connie is at a loss to understandwhat value to place upon them. Her
plight dramatizes the reaction of many feminists to Shulamith
Firestone's case for feminist revolution: The Dialectic of Sex.
Firestone's proposals for the "abolition of all cultural categories"
(1970, 182) and the transformationof procreationso that "genital
distinctions between the sexes would no longer matter culturally"
(1970: 11) boggle the imagination;for without the mediationof a set
of culturalroles and expectationswe cannot know whatvalue to place
upon our experiences.
ThoughFirestone'sadvocacyof technologicalreproductionaims to
serve feministsinterests,it rests on conceptualfoundationsthat have
much in common with the presuppositions of researchers and
policymakerswho would pursuegoals antagonisticto her own, who
would supporttechnologicalinterventionfor the sake of the monopo-
ly of power it would make possible. Both sorts of interests view
technologyas "a victoryover nature." They favor not only reproduc-
tive technology but the technologicaltransformationof production
and the eliminationof labor as well. Both see human biology as a
limitationto be overcome-for Firestone,becauseshe takes the rela-
tions of procreation to be the base of society and the source of
women's oppression; for those who would support "a brave new
world," because the diffusion of power among women and families
threatenstheir own power hegemony.

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 anne donchin

Feminist Reaction
In this section I will try to isolate the issues of deepest concernto
feministthinkerswho see advancesin reproductivetechnologyas fur-
therencroachmentson the social statusof women. Some of thesecon-
cernsrelateto the theoreticalunderpinningsof Firestone'stheoryand,
by implication,to similaranalysesof the causesof and correctivesfor
women's cultural subordination.Others focus instead on the more
probable consequences of technological transformationswithin a
social context still dominated by male power structures. In most
feminist commentaries both kinds of concerns are intertwined.
However, here I will attemptto disentanglethem so that detachable
claims can then be examinedone by one on their own merits. I will
focus first on one issue that entersimportantlyinto the expressionof
these concerns: the presumptiveneutralityof technology to gender
specific social practices.Then I will briefly alludeto a second signifi-
cant issue: the possibilityof makingmeaningfuldistinctionsbetween
the biologicallygiven and the culturallyacquired.FinallyI will offer a
tentativeinterpretationof the importanceof the motheringdebatefor
feminist theory, ending with some remarksabout conditions for the
participationof feministtheoristsin shapingreproductivepolicy.
Firestone'sinfluence on subsequentfeministsis a matter of some
controversy, particularlywith regard to her principal claims: that
motheringis more a barrierto women's self-fulfillmentthan a vehicle
for it and that biologicalmotherhoodlies at the heartof women'sop-
pression. Hester Eisenstein,in her most recent work, Contemporary
Feminist Thought (1983), credits Firestone with considerable in-
fluence over subsequentfeminist theorists, particularlyin the early
1970's when feminism and motherhood were widely held to be in
diametrical opposition. She attributes opposition to Alice Rossi's
(1977) advocacy of women's nurturingrole (the position that the
capacityto nurtureis shapedby biologicalas well as social factors)to
sympathy for Firestone's position. However, Alison Jaggar in her
Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) points to a lack of en-
thusiasmfor Firestoneamong grass-rootsfeminists,probablyspring-
ing, she speculates, from a widespread suspicion of advanced
technology, from the observationthat technology has so often been
used to reinforcemale dominance. Hence these feministsdo not see
how womencould take control of technologyand use it for theirown
ends. This latter position is given futher supportby Azizah al-Hibri,
who arguesthat:
Technological reproductive does not equalize the
natural reproductivepower structure-it inverts it. It

131
 hypatia

appropriatesthe reproductivepower from women and

places it in the hands of men who now control both the
spermand the reproductivetechnologythat could make
it indispensable . . . it 'liberates' them from their
'humiliatingdependency'on women in order to pro-
pagate.(1984,266)
Further,she argues, were cloning techniquesto be perfectedas well,
men would finally be freed from their need to share their genes with
women.
Her argument challenges both the claim that it is women's
biological function that lies at the root of their oppressionand the
derivative implication that technological reform can eliminate op-
pressive social practices. It rests on a very different analysis of the
basis of male domination, the presumptionthat envy of women's
reproductivecapacitiesand fear of their powerscreatea male need to
control women, limiting the free exercise of those powers. Several
featuresof the presentsituationsupportsuch an alternativeanalysis.
If the root of women's oppression were their biological role, then
enormous male resistance to the technologization of procreation
might be expected;for each step toward its perfectionwould further
threaten male power. However, the contrary is the case: male
dominated social institutionsprovide the principalbasis of support
for technologicaltransformationof reproductivepractices.Moreover,
al-Hibri's analysis is compatible with conclusions reached by num-
erous other feminist theorists. Though some, like Mary O'Brien
(1981), sharea similarstartingpoint, otherssuch as Nancy Chodorow
(1978)and Dorothy Dinnerstein(1976), reachthe same conclusionby
verydifferentroutes, derivingsupportfrom disciplinesas disparateas
psychoanalysisand anthropology.
Recent criticismof Firestone'sposition has not focused solely on
her analysis of the sources of women's social subordinationbut ex-
tends to her remedyas well. Of course, exposureof weaknessesin the
argumentfor the biologicalbasis of social stratificationwould, itself,
underminesupport for Firestone's solution. But the remedy is also
suspecton independentgrounds.CarolMcMillan(1982),for instance,
has noted that Firestone'stheory of social institutionspresupposes
that relations between individualsand society are exclusivelyfunc-
tional. Firestonesees all barriersto the achievementof desiredgoals as
technical problems, presuming that the ends sought can be fully
knownin advanceand we needonly figureout the most technicallyef-
ficient way to get there. This presuppositionstems, McMillanthinks,
from the presumption that reproduction is analogous to the

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 anne donchin

production and manufactureof goods, where the means to bring

about a desired end have no significanceof themselvesapart from
theirinstrumentalvalue(McMillan1982,77). Oncethe expertiseto ac-
complishthe aim more efficientlyis at hand, earliermore 'primitive'
methods can be abandonedwith no loss of value.
Close readingof Firestonesupportsthis interpretation.She com-
pares development of artificial reproduction to the future of
cyberneticsand speculatesthat the same reticenceunderlyingreserva-
tions about the benefitsof artificialreproductionpervadesour think-
ing about a work world wheremachinethinkingand problemsolving
have displaced human efforts. She attributes this reticence to the
presentlyprevailingdistributionof power;to envisageeitherpossibili-
ty "in the hands of present powers is to envisage a nightmare"
(Firestone 1970, 90). But within 'post-revolutionary'systems both
reproductivetechnologyand cyberneticswould be left free to play a
wholly differentrole in social life. Hence, within Firestone'sconcep-
tual frameworktechnologyplays an instrumentalrole twice over, first
by transformingthe means to achieve socially desiredgoals without
itself affectingthe characterof the goal, and second, by neutrallyserv-
ing the interestsof whicheverparty happensto control the means of
productionor reproduction.
McMillan shares company with the vast predominanceof both
feminist and nonfeministwomen who presentlyhold a markedlydif-
ferent assessmentof values bound up with childbearingand rearing
practices as human activities. Unlike Firestone and the utopian
feministswho presumethat the values attachedto motheringcan be
detached,lifted off and reappliedto a radicallydifferentset of social
practices,they see the values identifiedwith motheringas integralto
procreationand nurturing.RobynRowland,for instance,has remark-
ed that:
a groundswell of women within the movement has
begunto reassesthe value of biologicalmaternity.Reac-
ting against the feeling that the women's movement
coercedthemto give up havingchildren,many feminists
are striving to create the experienceof maternityand
family in a non-exploitiveway. (Rowland 1984, 358)
She points to Adrienne Rich's contention that the problem is not
motherhood itself but the patriarchal institutionalization of
motherhood(Rich 1976, 369) and arguesthat the sourcesof women's
oppression lie in the nature of the social structureswithin which
motherhoodis experiencedratherthan in motherhooditself-which
embodies within it a network of affirmative values which women

133
 hypatia

ought not to abandon. She and the many women writersshe cites all
see technologicalcontrol of these practicesas usurpationof a body of
values central to the fundamental interests of women. She ap-
propriatesLeon Kass' (1979) argumentsto her own cause, citing his
admonitionthat "some men may be destinedto play God, to recreate
other men in their own image," in supportof her own fear that the
new reproductivetechnologieswill ultimatelybe used for the benefit
of men and to the detrimentof women (Rowland 1984, 356).
Writingin the samevolume JaniceRaymond(1984)not only decries
the technologicalfuture that new modes of reproductionwill impose
on women, but the presentsocial context "in whichwomensupposed-
ly 'choose' such debilitatingprocedures"as in vitro fertilizationand
embryotransfer. Such technologies,she believes, only give scientific
and therapeutic support to female adaptation to the patriarchal
ideology that reproductionis women's prime commodity, thereby
reinforcing women's oppression. She, too, echoes the fears first
voiced by noninterventionists,such as Paul Ramseyand Leon Kass,
that submissioneven to presentlyestablishedmodes of technological
interventiondehumanizeswomen, imposingupon them 'choices' not
of their own making and forcing them to submit to a technology
whose developersseek ultimatelyto rendertheir motheringrole ob-
solete. The argumentsof Rowlandand Raymonddrawtogetherboth
issues: that women's historical and social capabilitiesincorporated
within childbearingand childrearingpractices possess independent
value wholly apart from their patriarchal context and that
technologicalinterventioninto reproductionwould only removefrom
women occasion to developthese capabilitiesunderthe guise of serv-
ing their interests. Recognizingthis, women need to voice their own
interestsin accordwith the moral and social values that supporttheir
sense of the good life. Unlike noninterventionistsfrom Ramsey's
backgroundor criticsof feminismsuchas CarolMcMillan,their 'con-
servatism' attempts to avoid appeal to women's natural function.
Theirobjectionsto alternativeforms of reproductionare not couched
in allusionsto theirsupposed'unnaturalness'but focus on a profound
sense of dis-ease, stemmingfrom the threatof furtherconsolidation
of power structures which purport to speak for women while
simultaneouslyunderminingwomen's control of their own reproduc-
tive activities.Nonetheless,despitetheirdeliberateeffort to base their
case on a directappealto women's own expressionof their interests,
their argumentsappear to rely on a theoreticaldistinctionvery like
AdrienneRich employs in her analysisof motherhood.She wrote:
I try to distinguishbetween two meanings of mother-

134
 anne donchin

hood, one superimposedon the other:the potentialrela-

tionship of any woman to her powersof reproduction
andto children;andthe institutionwhichaimsat ensuring
that that potential-and all women-shall remainunder
male control. (Rich 1976, 13)
If the institutionof motherhood-the "symbolic architecture"that
derives from male control-could be lifted off, the experienceof
motherhood would be revealed in its true nature, grounded, Rich
believes,in women'sbiology.
In arguingthat we have by no means yet exploredor
understoodour biological grounding,the miracle and
paradoxof the femalebody and its spiritualand political
meanings, I am really asking whether women cannot
begin, at last, to think throughtheir body, to connect
what has been so cruellydisorganized-our greatmental
capacities,hardlyused;ourhighlydevelopedtactilesense;
our genius for close observation;our complicated,pain-
enduringmulti-pleasured physicality.(Rich 1976,24)
Rich's argument,like Firestone's,presupposesthat we can thinkin-
telligiblyaboutmotheringexperiencesdetachedfromtheirsocialcontext
andthattheycanbe liftedoff andopenedto viewapartfromanyinstitu-
tional structures.She assumes,too, that we can imaginethemtranspos-
ed into a radicallydifferentcontext,withinwhichthe affirmativevalues
imbeddedin motheringwould be freed from the negativeassociations
bound up with presentmotheringarrangements.
The foundationfor thesepresumptionsneedscloserscrutiny.Despite
her penetratingcriticismof "malecreateddualisms"her own workap-
pears to reintroduceanalogous dualisms, relying, as it does, on the
distinguishability of the sourcesof women'sexperiences,on the assump-
tion that we can tracethe derivationof certainexperiencesto women's
biology and that others owe their origin to patriarchalinstitutions.
Thoughsuchscrutinyof the logicof herworkmightseemto overlookits
most obvious intent: to preparea space within which to celebrate
motherhoodas a source of women's most cherishedexperiences,I
wonderwhetherthis aim can be givensecuresupporton sucha founda-
tion. I wouldlike to suggestnow that a commonthreadlinks Rowland,
Raymondand Rich'spositionstogetherand, whetheror not thatthread
connectsthem all to a nature/culturedualism, they do share certain
commonpsychologicalassumptionsthat hold all of them togetherand
apartfrom Firestoneand her company.
Like many other contemporaryfeminists they see the relation
betweenthe infant and motheras essentiallya positiveone and look to

135
 hypatia
this relationshipfor images of what relations between woman and
woman might be once women have-been freed to give expressionto
their own values and shape social institutionsthat foster their unfet-
teredexpression.Theirvision standsin markedcontrastto the percep-
tions of Firestone and her generation of feminists who looked to
sourcesoutside of the mother-childrelationshipfor models on which
to build sense of the unity and solidarityof women.
In a recentpapercriticalof Rich'sposition, JanetSayers(1984)has
argued that any attempt to ground relationshipsbetween women in
imagesof the infant-motherbond rests upon a fantasy, that in reality
this relationshipis marked by contradiction,by both positive and
negativeelements. She writes:
The meritsof MelanieKlein'sworkas far as feminismis
concernedis that it drawsattentionto the way we often
deny contradictionsin personal relationshipsthrough
the defensivemechanismof splitting, and drawsatten-
tion to the hatredas well as love that inheresin the early
infant-motherrelationship-an ambivalencethat is not
only overlookedin feminist writingthat celebratesthis
relationas the basis of women's solidarityas a sex, but
that is also overlookedin that writingwhichby contrast
sees in this relationthe very sourceof women's oppres-
sion and alienation. (Sayers 1984, 240)
By way of exampleshe cites Luce Irigarayas illustrativeof the latter
view, though she could as easily have cited many other feminists,in-
cluding Firestone. Though her reliance on the Kleinianperspective
might be called into queston, her cautionarywarningought not to go
unheeded.Both attitudestowardthe mother-infantrelationare amply
representedwithinfeministwriting.Neithercan be claimedto capture
the true expressionof feminism.Her appealto Kleinis an attemptto
drawtogetherboth positionswithina more inclusiveframework.The
developmentof such a frameworkleaves muchtheoreticalwork to be
done but the need for feministaction cannotbe delayeduntil we have
workedout an adequatetheory of intergenerationalrelationships.
For the present, lacking any feminist theory capable of providing
unambiguousdirection in guiding the developmentof reproductive
technology, these options lay before us: (1) we might commit
ourselves unequivocallyto a Richian position, accept Rowland and
Raymond'sanalysis of the consequencesof reproductiveinnovation
and oppose all use of reproductivetechnology despite its short-term
benefits to some women individually;8(2) we could join forces with
the heirs of ShulamithFirestone,though it is by no meansclear what

136
 anne donchin

implicationsthis might have for present social policy consideringthe

extent to which powerfulinstitutionaland commercialinterestscur-
rentlycontrolthese technologies;or (3) we could workto integratethe
plurality of feminist positions into an interim policy, commit
ourselvesto intensifieddialogueand attemptto influencethe present
direction of reproductiveinnovation in much the same pragmatic
ways feminists are now participatingin framing economic policies.
Thoughpursuitof the thirdoption is likely to put the cohesivenessof
the feministcommunityto its most severetest, adoption of eitherof
the remainingoptions would alreadypresupposea cleavagefar more
irreconcilable.Overthis issue eitherthe current'wave'of the feminist
movementwill lose its momentumand disintegrateor feminismwill
emerge a far stronger,more unitary force for social transformation
than ever in its prior history.

Notes
1. A notable exception is a recent collection edited by Joan Rothchild (1983).
2. In the summer of 1984 the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversights heard testimony on the new reproductive technologies
with the intent of eventually introducing appropriate regulative legislation (U.S. 1985).
3. See, for instance, two recent philosophical works: Glover (1984) and Singer
and Wells (1984).
4. Comments of Simone Novaes have been most helpful to me in efforts to under-
stand the complex motivations of women seeking these technologies. I am grateful, too,
for the valued insights of two unnamed reviewers.
5. This argument was first suggested to me in a discussion of Ramsey's position by
Samuel Gorovitz (1982).
6. I do not discuss other individual 'moderate interventionists' at length here only
because their arguments are not directly pertinent to the issues I emphasize. However,
the regulatory bodies that I do refer to-the British Warnock Committee and the
Australian and Canadian commissions-all adopt versions of a moderate interven-
tionist position. Also, most legal commentators and scientific researchers fall into this
category. Some have no principled objections to the new technologies at all; others sup-
port innovations only selectively. All of them seek regulation principally to maintain
continuity with prevailing liberal values.
7. Several states have already considered legislation that would bind both parties
to surrogate contracts. Both Kentucky and Michigan have ruled against it.
8. Gena Corea (1985) offers much empirical evidence in support of this position.

137
 hypatia

138
 marjorieweinzweig
Should a Feminist Choose
A Marriage-LikeRelationship?

Is "living together" in a marriage-like relationship compatible with

the feminist ideal of individual self-development? Paradoxically,
while the structure and social-historical context of marriage-like rela-
tionships seems in fundamental conflict with the goal of autonomous
self-development, the development of individuality also seems to be
better fostered by living with a significant other in a committed rela-
tionship than by living alone. This paradox is resolved through the
suggestion of a three-stage account of self-development: inauthentici-
ty, autonomous being oneself, and autonomous being with others. At
the third stage, living together in a marriage-like relationship is one
social format in which autonomous relating to others is possible.
Unless the partners have attained the second stage, however, such a
relationship will be destructive rather than conducive to individuality.

I. The Issue
In traditionalmale dominatedwesternsociety, women'ssexuality
has been channelledexclusivelyinto monogamousmarriage,because
of the perceivedneed to raisechildrenin "families" based on this in-
stitution. With the women's and sexual liberationmovementsof the
past twenty years, feminists frequentlyreject marriageas the ap-
propriateinstitutionfor satisfyingtheirneeds for sexuality,friendship
and "family," but insteadchoose to "live together"with a singlesex-
ual partnerin a relationshipof long term commitmentand duration.
In such relationships,whichmay be eitherlesbianor heterosexual,the
partnerssharea householdand the detailsof their daily lives in much
the same manneras do the partnersin a marriage(whenthe latterare
dedicatedto the eliminationof the traditionalgender-basedroles in
their marriage).They may raise childrenin such households.Among
heterosexualcouples dedicatedto women's liberation, the debate is
betweenmarriageand "livingtogether";lesbiansfrequentlychoose to
"couple" in marriage-likehouseholds. Such individualsmay fail to
consider the question of whether a marriage-likearrangementand
relationshipis appropriateand conduciveto their realizationof the
feministideals to which they are committed.
This paperdeals with the issue of the relationshipof marriageor a

Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

139
 hypatia

marriage-likearrangementto feminist ideals. Three ideals will be

adoptedas centralto the goals of feminism:equality,freedom,and in-
dividual self development.'Two questionswill be asked about mar-
riage in relationshipto these goals:
(1) Is there any form of marriagewhich is compatible with the
achievementof these values?(2) If so, are thereany reasonsto choose
sucha relationshipover suchalternativesas livingalone or livingcom-
munally?
Thereis an importantrespectin whichthe notion of individualself
developmentor autonomyis the most fundamentalvalueof the three.
For without this attribute women will be unable to achieve and
preservefreedom and equality, or to benefit from them if the latter
should happen to be bestowed on them without their efforts.
Thereforethe discussionwill focus primarilyon self-development.
I define autonomy or individualityas a charactertrait which com-
bines the two central features of independenceor responsibilityfor
self and self-actualizationor developmentof potentialities.2
An autonomous individualis one who is able and willing to take
care of herself, and who has adopted or affirmed her values of her
own free choice for reasonswhichshe would acknowledgeas her own.
She is thus able to stand up for herself and her values in the face of
adversityand externalpressure.The abilityto standup for oneself and
what one believesin is essentialif an individualor group is to achieve
equalityand freedomin the economic, politicaland social spheres.It
is also essentialif an individualis to attainequalityand avoid domina-
tion and exploitationin close inter-personalrelationships(Mill 1962;
Bishop 1979).
"Living together" will be defined as a sexual relationshipbetween
two personswhich is accompaniedby the following features:(a) the
assumption by the partners of joint responsibility for a shared
household; (b) a commitmentby the partnersto generallyshare the
other details of their lives, (c) the mutual understandingby the part-
ners that these commitmentswill be of indefinite duration. "Living
together"contrastswith "living alone." In the lattersituation, one is
not committedto sharingthe detailsof her daily life for the indefinite
future with a single sexual partner.Thus an adult who "lives alone"
might share a household with roommates, friends or relatives, but
such a situationwould not involvea sexualrelationshipor features(b)
and (c) of a "livingtogether"relationship."Livingtogether"thus en-
compasses both a certain type of "life style": sharinga household
consistingof just the two sexual partnersand a certaintype of com-
mitmentby the partners:to share the details of their lives for the in-
definite future. While this commitment does not imply sexual

140
 marjorie weinzweig

exclusivity,the combinationof features(a) and (b) does implythat the

relationshipbetweenthe partnerswill be the primaryrelationshipfor
each in terms of the amount of time and energy invested, and pro-
bably thereforealso in terms of overall emotionalimportance.
Marriageis a special form of "livingtogether"in whichheterosex-
ual partnersmay publiclyand formallyundertakea speciallegal com-
mitmentwhich incorporatesthe externalsociety's rules for the struc-
turing of the relationship(Ketchum 1977; O'Driscoll 1977, 260-1).
While this additional feature may change the relationshipin ways
which are importantfor the issues to be discussedin this paper, the
differencesbetweenliving togetherand living alone are far more fun-
damentalfor presentpurposesthan those betweenmarriageand other
forms of living together. The marriedand unmarriedforms of living
together will therefore be treated together. "Living together" rela-
tionshipsmay be either heterosexualor homosexual.
The questionof the compatibilityof marriageor "living together"
with feminist ideals is asked from the view point of a contemporary
feminist: an individualwhose beliefs, values and goals are those of
feminism,but who is strivingto achievethesevaluesas social and per-
sonal goals not yet realized. Feminism arises in the context of a
prevailingsystemof patriarchalvaluesabout the role of womenwhich
it rejects, and feministsare individualswho have been profoundlyin-
fluenced in their own upbringingby those traditional patriarchal
values. Just as our presentsociety is at best in a transitionalstate be-
tween its past oppressionof women and the realizationof feminist
ideals, so do most feministsthemselveslive as individualsin a transi-
tional state between their past upbringingand the goals they would
like to achieve.

II. Feminism vs Marriage and "Living Together"

There is no doubt that traditionalmarriage,as it existed in this
country before the developmentof the women's movement, was in-
compatiblewith the achievementof freedom,equalityand individuali-
ty for women.
First, because marriagehas been the sole life style available to
women, women have been denied the freedom to exerciseother op-
tions. In this respect they have also been treatedunequallyto men,
who have always been free not to marry without adverse social,
economic and sexual consequences.
Second, in traditional marriage, the woman was treated as the
man's sexual and economic property. Thus as late as the nineteenth
centurysuch diversethinkersas John StuartMill and FriedrichEngels

141
 hypatia
describemarriageas a state of slaverybecauseof the completelack of
economic and political rights for women, both in fact and underthe
law, and becauseof the acceptanceof the "double standard"of sex-
ual morality.Underthese conditionsa womanis not treatedas a per-
son equalin her humanityto otherpersons.She does not possessbasic
human rights such as the right to equal treatmentunderthe law and
the legal and moral right to self-determination,but is a mere object
for male satisfaction,in sex and the bearingand rearingof children.3
Thus the relationshipbetweenthe partnersis that of dominationand
exploitationratherthan one based on respectfor personsand equali-
ty.
Finally, the rigid distributionof roles in traditionalmarriageand
the personalitycharacteristicswhich women have had to develop in
order to fulfill these roles have made it very difficult for women to
develop themselves as individualswith interests and ideas separate
from those of the membersof their families. In theirtraditionalroles
as exclusive homemakersand child rearers,4women have been ex-
pected to sacrificetheir personalinterestsfor those of their families,
deriving their satisfaction from the knowledge that they are con-
tributingto the latters'interests.In orderto performthese roles, they
were expectedto acquirethe "feminine" characteristicsof altruism,
patience, self sacrifice, compliance, passivity, and dependence on
others for direction and control. They were to give in rather than
assertthemselves,and to look to theirhusbandsto makethe decisions
ratherthan participatingin them as equal partners.While a woman
who failed to develop these personality traits was chastized as
"unfeminine," one who does develop these characteristicsmay have
little sense of self.5 She may thus find it difficult to exerciseindepen-
dent choice even if giventhe opportunityor if requiredto do so: if, for
example,she becomeswidowedor divorcedand must supportherself
and make her own life. Becauseshe has learnedto look to others for
directionratherthan allowingher own intereststo be expressedin free
choice, she may have become incapableof even recognizingher own
interests, let alone promotingthem. On the other hand, nineteenth
centuryfeministliteratureshows that suicideand madnessweremany
times the only options available to women whose desire to assert
themselvesindependentlymade them incapableof or unwillingto fit
these traditionalroles (Chopin 1972; Gilman 1973).
Today some couples are attemptingto restructurethe division of
labor and roles in their relationshipsso as to eliminateor mitigatethe
obstaclesposed by the traditionalroles to woman's freedom,equality
and self-development.Such couples do not base their relationshipon
the assumptionthat the wife will deriveher sole identityfrom her role

142
 marjorie weinzweig

as wife and mother. She is ratherregardedas a separateindividual

with interests and needs-professional and otherwise-of her own,
which deserve equal consideration to those of the other family
members.The partnersattemptto sharechild-rearing,householdand
economic responsibilitiesand decision making, and to interactin a
manner involving communication and co-operation rather than
dominanceand submission(Bernard1972, Ch. 10, 11). In addition,
some of the externaleconomic, social and legal obstaclesto equality
and freedomhave been alleviatedif not eliminated.
However, there is a fundamental conflict between the goal of
autonomous self-developmentand even a "liberated" form of mar-
riageor livingtogetheras describedin the precedingparagraph.There
are severalaspectsto this conflict:
(a) Suchan intimate,committedrelationshipcombinedwith the liv-
ing together arrangementprovides a greater opportunity than is
availableif one lives alone to slip into sexuallystereotypedroles. Thus
one partnermay easily assumethe role of the "stronger"member,or
the "leader," who makesthe decisionsand assumesprimaryrespon-
sibility for the couple's economicwelfare,,while the other may take a
less remunerativeor significantjob than she would if she were living
alone, or may stay home and dependon the other'sincomein orderto
performhouseholdtasks and be availableemotionallyfor the partner
who has the demandingjob. Such decisions, which are by no means
limited to partners in a legally sanctioned marriage, leave the
economically and psychologically dependent partner even more
vulnerableto being abandonedthan if she had the legal protections
providedby marriage.
Thus marriage or living together is conducive to the kind of
dependencyrelationshipin which one gives part of the responsibility
for herselfto the other. It is easierto avoid this type of dependencyif
one lives alone, and thus has no alternativebut to take full respon-
sibility for herself in all areas: economic, professional,physicaland
psychological.Falling into the stereotypedroles, on the other hand,
leads to a failure to develop an autonomousself, a lack of equality
betweenthe partners,and curtailmentof one's freedom. While some
thinkersbelievethat this particulardangerdoes not exist in same-sex
living-togetherarrangements,even these relationships involve the
possibilityof destructivedependencyrelationships.For despite their
sexual preferences, the partners may have been socialized into
"masculine"or "feminine" roles (Martin1977, 67).
(b) Livingwith a personin a committedrelationshipgreatlyrestricts
individualchoice with regardto patternsof dailylife, formsof recrea-
tion and social life, and even profession. From the ultimatedecision

143
 hypatia

of whetherto sacrificeor endangerthe relationshipwhenone receives

a better job offer or opportunity for promotion in a different
geographicallocationthan that in whichone is livingwithher partner,
to such less immediatelysignificantdecisionsas whetherto give up a
ski weekendor an eveningof folk dancingin orderto spendtime with
one's partner,the individualcommittedto a "living together" situa-
tion is constantly faced with the need to compromise in matters
relatingto her choices, to limit her activitiesin orderto take into ac-
count the needs and preferencesof the partner.Insteadof being able
to develop or discover herself through free choice, her range of ac-
tivities is limitedto those acceptableto the partner.If the partnerhas
assumeda "dominant"role as describedin (a) this limitationmay be
very significant.To anyonewho has lived comfortablyby herself, the
necessity to constantly consider the other's interests, to constantly
consult with the other in workingout routinesregardingthe detailsof
daily life can be felt as a severeimpingementon herpersonalfreedom.
One feels the need for "breathing space," and treasures those
moments when she is alone in the house and can do whatevershe
pleases.
(c) Livingwith anotherin this kind of arrangementcan violate the
individual's need for physical and psychological "distance" from
others. This distance is importantto maintainingthe concept of the
self as separatefrom others(Goffman 1961,Ch. 1). The pervasiveness
of the livingtogethersituation,however,makesit difficultto distance
oneself from the roles played with the spouse in order to regainthe
sense of self whichmay have been "put down" or violatedin interac-
tions with the partner.6This factor is seen in its most extremeform in
the case of batteredwives, whose husbandsor boyfriendsoften keep
them at home and isolated. In this way the woman never gets away
from the effects of the abuseon her sense of self, and may stay in the
relationship for years because she sees no alternativeor feels she
deservesno better. The phenomenonof "battering" also occurs in
homosexual relationships(Martin 1977, 66-7). Thus in addition to
promoting the persistenceof sexually stereotypedroles, the "living
together"situationwill exacerbatethe effects of whateversex roles or
other inequalitiesdo persistbetweenthe partners.
(d) Livingtogetherin a committedrelationshipmay paradoxically
interferewith that aspect of self-developmentwhich comes through
relatingto other individuals.
(1) To the extent that one's commitmentto her partnerin her
primary, "living together," relationshipinterfereswith her entering
into or developingother relationships,sexual or otherwise,she loses
the spontaneityof discoveringthese new relationships,togetherwith

144
 marjorie weinzweig

the new discoveriesof the self that these would involve.

(2) Given their commitmentto and investmentin their shared
lives, the partnersmay tend to "put up with" each others' bad habits
for the sake of preservingthe relationship.In this way, however,each
individualis denied the opportunityto learn of and respond to the
naturalreactionsof othersto his or her behavior.The bad habits are
blindlyperpetuated,and each individual'sabilityto relateto otherin-
dividuals-who are not going to put up with them-is diminished
(Blum, Homiak, Housemanand Scheman1973-4,234-5). In this way
the partnersbecome furtherseparatedfrom other individuals.
(3) Becauseof the long-termcommitmentto the partner,one may
feel that she or he is stayingwith her partneror consideringhis or her
interestsbecauseshe is obligatedto, not becauseit feels rightand she
wants to. In this way the values of spontaneousaffection and freely
chosencompanionshipwhichare to be achievedin the relationshipare
interferedwith. While some writersregardthis as a specificdrawback
of marriage(Bishop 1979, 15; McMurtry1975, 170-1),the same sort
of effect could operate in an unmarried"living together" situation,
whetherlesbian or heterosexual.
These restrictionson personal developmentare not a contingent
fact about some living together arrangements which could be
remediedby simplyrestructuringthe arrangementso as to allow more
room for separate activities, separate relationships, and time and
space alone. Ratherit is the structureof the "living together" rela-
tionship, with respectto both "life-style" and commitment,whichis
the source of its incompatibilitywith individualself-development.7
The peculiarrestrictivenessof this institutionalarrangementis due
to two differentkindsof factors:(1) the essentialstructuralfeaturesof
the arrangementitself, and (2) the historicaland contemporarysocial
context in which the institutionoccurs. The featuresincludedunder
(1), in particularthe long-termcommitmentto a shareddestinycom-
bined with the intimaciesof householdsharingand sex, are sufficient
by themselves to broadly restrict choice and thus to impede self-
development. These effects become much worse, however, when
taken in combinationwith the second set of factors. For we choose
marriageor "livingtogether"today in the contextof a long historyof
sexual stereotypeswhich it has played a major role in perpetuating,
significantvestigesof whichstill persisttoday and haveinfluencedour
own upbringing. However egalitarian our intentions may be, the
structureof the institutionmakesit easierto slip backinto or persistin
these roles, and harderto break with them, than would a life-style
which deviatedfrom the past more drastically.
Factors(b) and (d) above are primarilydue to the structureof the

145
 hypatia

"living-together"relationship,while features (a) and (c) are due to

both the historicalpatriarchalinstitutionalizationof sexual love and
to the structuralfeaturesof the relationship.The problemswouldper-
sist, due to the structuralfeatures,however,even if the effects of the
past historyof patriarchywereeliminated,for the pervasivenessof the
contactand commitmentbetweenthe two partnersnecessarilyrestricts
choice and makes possible destructivedependencyrelationshipswith
their resultantpersonalitymutilation.
Thesequestionsof autonomyare relevantas well for childrengrow-
ing up in such a nuclearhousehold. This is the reasonwhy the tradi-
tional extendedfamily, in which a numberof differentadults in dif-
ferent roles are availableto the childrenfor advice, comfort and role
models, is often regardedas preferable to the two or one-parent
nuclearfamily as a settingfor child-rearing.In the biological family,
the child is "thrown" (Heidegger1962, 172-188)in with its particular
parentsby chance;in the nuclearbiological family thereis no escape
hatch for the child if its relationshipwith those particulartwo in-
dividualsis destructiveto it. For this reason many feministslook to
collectivehouseholdsas a preferablesettingfor child rearingthan the
nuclearbiological family (Firestone1970, 256-262).
For all these reasonsit appearsthat a person who chooses the life-
style which I have called "living alone": who chooses to satisfy her
needs for friendship,sex and companionshipin such a manneras to
avoid the broad restrictions on individual choice of "living
together"-may be betterable to developher sense of self or "identi-
ty." Such an individualwill be compelledto become independentby
assumingfull responsibilityfor herself. On the other hand she will be
free to choose activitiesand personalrelationshipson the basis of her
own interestsand inclinationsto a degreewhichis simplynot compati-
ble with a committed"living together" relationship.In this way she
will have opportunitiesto develop her "individuality"which do not
exist for those involved in "living together" relationships.

III. Autonomy and Commitment

On the otherhand, thereare importantreasonswhy developmentof
individualityseems to be better served by living with a significant
other in a committedrelationshipthan by living alone.
Such a relationshipcan provide:
(a) A stable frameworkin which one's needs for affection, sex and
companionshipare comfortablymet. This leavesthe individualfree to
devote herself to the kind of longer term projects which are con-
stitutiveof professionaland personalself-development.On the other
hand those who live alone often must either forgo gratificationof

146
 marjorie weinzweig

some of these needs or expendmore time and energyin findingways

of satisfyingthem.
(b) A caringperson who sees the individualfavorablyand is sym-
patheticto her basicvaluesand goals providesher with neededvalida-
tion which enhances her sense of her own identity. Although a
feministdoes not want to be dependenton others' perceptionsof her
for her senseof identity,it is difficultto maintaina self-conceptwhich
is completelyat odds with the way one is perceivedby others (Berger
& Luckmann1966, 149).
(c) A committed,day to day relationshipcan lead to "freedomto be
oneself," to expressoneself without fear of rejection(assumingthat
the relationshipis not basedon economicdependency).This can lead
to the kind of personalgrowth that comes from honest communica-
tion, and to the developmentof more egalitarianrelationshipsbased
on recognition of the other as the individualshe is, instead of on
deceptive"role playing"or "gameplaying."8An individualwho does
not undertaketo sharethe detailsof her life in a committedrelation-
ship with another may thus lack the opportunityfor an important
aspectof self-development,in whichthe self is enrichedthroughan in-
timate but open relationshipwith another based on mutual respect
and consideration.9

IV. Two Kinds of Autonomy?

Thus we seem to be faced with a dilemma, or "dialectic" in the
Hegelian sense of equally valid argumentsleading to contradictory
conclusions:
(1) Livingwith a significantother may interferewith the exerciseof
individualchoice and thus with the developmentof individualityin
Mill's sense. It seems that autonomy is best provided for by living
alone.
(2) On the other hand, the facts that (a) we have needs for such
things as affection, sex and companionshipwhichmust be satisfiedif
we areto "functionwell," (b) we havea need for externalvalidationof
our self-perception,and (c) we do commonly regard the ability to
relateto othersas part of what it is to be a well-developedindividual,
would suggest that autonomy requiresan intimate, committedrela-
tionshipwith another.It is possiblethat theserequirementsmightalso
be met in some other kind of living togethercommittedarrangement
such as group marriage,but they seem to be better served by living
with a significant other or others in an arrangementof intentional
long-termdurationthan by living alone.
These contradictoryconsiderationslead to the speculation that

147
 hypatia

there may be two different notions of autonomy underlying them. We

might call these two notions "autonomous being oneself" and
"autonomous relating to others." The former would be the notion
characterized by Mill and Sharon Bishop: the ability to make choices
which express the self and to develop one's own life plan. The latter
would take account of that sense of self-development which requires
the ability to have harmonious or satisfying intimate relations with
others. '
Behind these two notions of autonomy lie two different
metaphysical conceptions of the self which have been held by modern
philosophers.

1. The self as an independent substance:

On the views of such philosophers as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,
and John Stuart Mill, the self as mental substance is an independent
entity, identifiable in isolation or abstraction from its relations to
things other than it. Its relations to other entities are not logically con-
stitutive of its identity, but are super-added to an already constituted
entity. Thus for Mill, when an individual acts freely he will develop
into a strong person whose self-interested actions will result in good
consequences for others. The latter state of affairs, however, is regard-
ed as a desirable consequence of, not as an ingredient in, the develop-
ment of individuality.

The self as relational:

The view of the self as a relation appears in nineteenth and twen-
tieth century continental philosophy. For Hegel (1931, 229) self-
consciousness exists only by being recognized by another self-
consciousness. For the early Marx the self is defined in terms of its life
activity: spontaneous, creative, "production." In this activity a person
"externalizes" herself in the social product, and thus relates to nature,
to other people, and to the "species life" (1961, 95-103, 181-2). The
phenomenologists develop the concept of the intentionality of con-
sciousness, according to which the self is related through its cognitive
activities to objects in the world (Husserl 1931 #84-7, #90, #94, #124;
1960, #17, #44-5; Merleau Ponty 1962, Part I). This world is a social
world in which the presence of others like the self is essential to its
constitution (Husserl 1960, Meditation V; Heidegger 1962, 149ff).
On each of these views the individual is so closely connected with
certain things other than herself (other people, nature, her product
and other objects in the social world) that this connection is

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constitutiveof her identity. This casts light on the need for external
validationof the self, and on the importanceof being with others to
good functioningand to individualdevelopment.
These two concepts of the self lead to two different views of the
significanceof relationswith others to autonomy.
(1) If the self is conceivedof as an independent,self-subsistententi-
ty, one does not need a close committedrelationto anotherin orderto
be an individual,and sucha relationshipmay be a significantthreatto
independence.Two examplesof this view are the tracts of Ti-Grace
Atkinson(1969),who arguesthat feminismcalls for the eliminationof
sexuallove and of the institutionof sexualintercoursebecausesexual
love is a destructive dependency relationship incompatible with
human autonomy, and the contention of the psychologistLawrence
Casler(1973)that a healthypersonneed not love or be loved, that our
society's emphasison love is both an effect and a cause of insecurity,
dependencyand a lack of self-respect.This view of autonomy is at-
tractive to a budding feminist, because a person who has excessive
need of love and approval from others is unable to function in-
dependentlyon her own, and is vulnerableto exploitationby others
who can manipulateher by threateningto withdrawtheir love.
(2) On the "relational" concept of the self, on the other hand,
autonomy requiresrelation with others, since the proper relatingto
those things which are constitutiveof the individual'sidentityis part
of what it is to be a healthy,well-functioningperson. On this account
autonomousbeing with others must then be distinguishedfrom non-
autonomous being with others (Gilligan 1982, 61, 78, 82-5, 92-4).
Such an account is not easy to provide. For as every feministknows,
our relationshipswith othersare also notoriouslythe sourceof our not
being ourselves. Since society still defines women in terms of their
relationshipto a significantother, they still tend to do, think and be
what they think the significantother and society wants them to be in
this role.
The existenceof the two differentconceptionsof autonomyleaves
us with the question of the relationship between them. Are
autonomousbeingoneself and autonomousrelatingto otherstwo dif-
ferentwaysof living whichare incompatible,or can the claimbe made
that the relation to others is so essential to autonomous self-
developmentthat the latter necessarilyincludes autonomous being
with others? If the latter, then the claims of our right to individual
choice would be absorbedinto the accountof autonomousbeing with
others, and would have to be done justice to in that account.
We may shed some light on this question by consideringthe hints
concerningthe relationalconceptof autonomyset forth by Heidegger

149
 hypatia
in Being and Time. Heidegger begins with an account of non-
autonomousrelatingto the world and other.
In inauthenticityone (Dasein)is "disburdened"by the "they" and
loses herself in "average everydayness." When I am "lost in the
'they" I am concernedto do and be just what everyoneelse does and
is. It is not "I" who decides how to dress, talk, and think-it is
"they": the "generalizedother."" I do not have a self and am not an
individualbecause I do not make (or take responsibilityfor) my own
choices. This descriptionis a good characterizationof the situationof
women who have been brought up in and unthinkinglyaccept the
stereotypesof traditionalpatriarchalsociety withoutconsciouslycon-
sideringtheiralternatives.Such women do, choose and act in the way
that all women are told or "expected" to be: to please me'2to bear
children,to care for others, to be sex objects or beauty objects. No
one in particulartells them that they as individualsmust do these
things and act in these ways: it is just what everyoneexpects.
Heideggergives only suggestivehints as to the appropriateway of
relatingto othersand the world, whichwould constituteauthenticex-
istence. For Heideggerhuman existenceor "Dasein" is a relationto
the world, called "Being-in-the-world."Thus an isolated subject
without a world is nevergiven, and neitheris an isolated "I" without
others. The solution to inauthenticitythereforecannot be to "get out
of" relations with others as so to "become oneself." Authenticex-
istence ratherinvolvesa "modification"of the "they-self":a seizing
of "everydayness"in a differentway (1962, 224). In that shift, Dasein
brings itself back from the "they" in such a way that it becomes
authenticbeingoneself (1962, 313). This involvesa disclosureof one's
ownmost potentiality for being, from which one was alienated in
"falling" into "average everydayness"(1962, 222). Thus attaining
"authenticity"involves a modificationof both the way the world is
disclosed,and the way the Dasein-withof others(Being-with-others) is
disclosed.In attainingauthenticity("resoluteness")one perceivesand
relatesto the work worldand to other humansin a differentway than
when one was absorbedin the world of "averageeverydayness;"it is
only in such relatingthat one's "ownmost potentialityfor being" is
"disclosed."
Since we are in the world with others for Heidegger,our relations
with others are necessarilycharacterizedby "solicitude" (1962, 159).
The transition to authenticityinvolves the transition to "authentic
solicitude" in our relationswith others. Heidegger'sremarkson this
topic are particularlysuggestive for the issues under consideration
here. Authenticsolicitudeis termed "leapingahead of the other," in
contrast to inauthenticsolicitude, referredto as "leaping in for the

150
 marjorie weinzweig

other." In "leaping in for the other" one takes over for her and
throws her out of her position. In this form of solicitude the other
becomes dominatedand dependent:
. . . he steps back so that afterwards,when the matter
has been attended to, he can either take it over as
something finished and at his disposal, or disburden
himself of it completely.
In "leapingaheadof" the other, on the other hand, one gives back to
her "care" (her "being-in-the-world")authentically,and helps her to
be in her ownmost potentialityfor being:
. . .there is also the possibilityof a kind of solicitude
which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap
ahead of him-not in order to take away his care but
ratherto give it backto him authenticallyas such for the
first time. This kind of solicitude . . . helps the Other to
becometransparentto himselfin his careand to become
free for it. (1962 158-9)
In this kindof solicitude,one helps the otherto attainauthenticity:to
become her "own" self.
In the first kindof "caring"for others,one takesoverfor themand
dominatesor manipulatesthem. In this kind of care, one's concern
for the other is reallyconcernfor oneself: the "helper"becomesper-
sonally involved in seeing that the helped individualdoes what she
thinksis rightor best, or herconcernfor herselfdistortsin otherways
the qualityof the caring. In their article"Altruismand Women'sOp-
pression," Blum, Homiak, Housmanand Schemangive examplesof
this kind of "caring"in theirdiscussionof waysin whichthe unequal
power balance and the traditionalrole expectationsfor a woman in
marriagemay interferewith her exerciseof genuinealtruismtowards
her husband.Becausethe wife is expectedto be completelydependent
on her husbandfor her economicand social status, she may push him
to achievea kind of "success"he does not reallywant, or may fail to
give him constructivecriticismfor fear of alienatinghim and thus los-
ing her own status (Blum, Homiak, Housemanand Scheman 1973,
234-5). In both these casesthe wife's concernis to enhanceor preserve
her own economicand social position;this preventsher from genuine-
ly attendingto her husband'sneedsin the situationat hand. Similarly,
a woman in a traditionalmarriagemay wish to live "through her
children."Such a mothermay be unableto separateher needs for her
childrento be successful,well-adjusted,a certaintype of person, etc.
or her needs for the continuingpresenceof the childrenin proximity

151
 hypatia
to her, from their needs as individuals.In these circumstances,her
caringfor them will be of the "leapingin" type. SaraRuddick(1984,
223) uses Weil and Murdoch'snotion of "fantasy" to describethis
kind of caringin regardto children.
In the second kind of caringdescribedby Heidegger,"authentic"
caring, the first individualis able to genuinelysupportthe second in
termsof the latter'sneeds and circumstanceswithoutthe intervention
of her ownpersonalneeds. Thusshe is ableto be sympathetic,helpful,
available,and to give adviceout of concernfor the other alone, with
attention to'the latter's particularsituation, problems and needs.
Since she cares for the second individual,she is concernedabout and
personallyinvolved in the latter's well being. However, she is not so
personallyinvolvedin any one particularmeansto that well being or
solution to the cared for individual'sproblemsas to be incapableof
entertaining other alternatives which would be more genuinely
beneficialto that individual.Thus a wife may want her husbandor
childto be successfulif he or she wantsthat successbut she will also be
able to entertainthe alternativeof less ambitiousor prestigiousends
on the partof the caredfor personbecauseit is not essentialto her (the
carer's) self image or image in the community that her husband
and/or childrenbe successful.
It is obviouslyessentialto the possibilityof this kind of caringthat
the givernot sacrificeherselfor her own needsin her solicitudefor the
other, for it is only then that she will be able to retain the requisite
degreeof personaldetachmentto be able to genuinelyassist the reci-
pient. Ruddickcalls the capacityfor this kind of caringthe capacity
for "attentivelove":
Attention to real children ... seen by the 'patient eye of
love ... teachesus how realthings(realchildren)can be
looked at and loved without being seized and used,
without being appropriatedinto the greedyorganismof
the self'. (1984, 223)
The recipientof the first kind of caring, which involves manipula-
tion, domination and control, is likely to be diminishedratherthan
enhancedby the other's care, since such care is not centeredaround
the discoveryand satisfactionof her own individualneeds and con-
cerns. Thereforean individualwho has receivedonly the "leapingin
for" kindof caringis likelyto be suspiciousof close relationshipswith
others, and to feel a need for isolation from othersin orderto protect
his or her individualidentityand ability to act for herself.
The recipientof the second kind of caring,by contrast,can be open
to the solicitude of others, for he or she can be genuinely helped,

152
 marjorie weinzweig

enriched or supported by sharing his concerns with the giver of care.

This recipient is able to be comforted by the emotional support of the
carer, and to take or reject the latter's advice or help freely without the
suspicion that the giver has her own motives for the "care." If the
relationship is a close one, the caring will enable the recipient to grow
as an individual in the manner described above, providing support for
the recipient's creative activity and enhancement of her self concept.
The giver of the second kind of caring is enriched as well. The giving
of help which is directed solely towards the needs of one's friend,
family member or lover, just as to those of a client, student or pa-
tient) out of concern for the latter as an individual, is a creative pro-
ject of the type described by Marx as constitutive of personal identity.
As a result of her spontaneous activity, working together with the reci-
pient, the giver or carer is able to "produce" something in the social
world: an improved state of affairs for the recipient. This in turn
enhances the personal identity and well being of the "giver."
If the giver and recipient are partners in a close personal relation-
ship and are able to "reverse roles" so that giver becomes recipient on
other occasions, then their relationship will be one enriched by mutual
respect and reciprocity in sharing each others' concerns (cf. Held
1973-4, 172-3). It is under these circumstances that a close relationship
between two individuals is able to enhance the autonomous develop-
ment of each; this is the autonomous relating to others referred to
above.
In the context of his discussion of the difference between authentic
and inauthentic solicitude, Heidegger makes an observation which is
crucial for our question about the relation between autonomous being
oneself and autonomous relating to others. Not only is it the case that
authentic solicitude and authentic being-with allows the other to
"discover and become herself," but also it is only if I achieve indepen-
dent selfhood that I am able to help the others whose relation to me is
an aspect of my identity to discover and achieve their individuality.'3
The reason for this very important point is that only if I have my own
"identity" or "individuality" can I care for those close to me without
getting so tied up in them that the development of their individuality
becomes a threat to my concept of myself. Only if I am "secure" in
my own knowledge of who I am can I help those I care about to "be
free for" and develop their own independent identity.
Heidegger's point thus implies that it is only if I am already an
autonomous individual possessed of my own identity that I can relate
to others authentically and achieve the kind of "living together" rela-
tionship which would be consistent with feminist ideals. That is, only
if I have autonomy in the first sense ("autonomous being oneself") is

153
 hypatia
it possible for me to have autonomyin our secondsense (autonomous
relatingto others).
On the other hand, Heidegger'sclaim that I do not achieveauthen-
ticity by isolating myself from relations with others and with the
everydayworld, but only by "seizingupon these" in a differentway,
and his characterizationof "authentic solicitude," suggest that
autonomy is to be achievedonly throughrelatingwith others. These
two points would mean that the two senses of autonomyundercon-
siderationare intrinsicallyinterrelated:autonomousbeing with others
is both an essential ingredient in and a causal condition of
autonomousbeing oneself, but the latterin turn is a necessarycondi-
tion of autonomousbeing with others.
However,this interrelationshipand Heidegger'stwo-stageaccount
of the developmentof individualityleave us with a paradox. Heideg-
ger does not tell us exactlyhow one makesthe shift from "lostnessin
the 'they' " to seizing on the world of "averageeverydayness"in a
way whichdiscloseshis or her ownmostpotentialityfor being, or how
the authenticsolicitudeof othersmakesit possiblefor me to makethe
shift from inauthenticbeing-in-the-worldto authenticity.Presumably
he would not wantto claimthat I am dependenton beingthe recipient
of others' solicitude in order to achieve authenticity.When we ask
how I am able to make the shift, however,we find that I can achieve
my own identityonly throughrelatingto others;yet I needto havemy
own identityin orderto relateto them authentically.Thus we are left
with a circularaccountof the achievementof authenticity,according
to which we must alreadybe authenticin orderto become authentic.

V. Conclusion: A Three-Stage Model

For the Development of Individuality
I shall attemptto resolve this paradoxby suggestinga three-stage
account of the development of the self.'4 On this account an in-
termediatestage of developmentis interposedbetween Heidegger's
first stage (lostnessin the "they") and his final stage(authenticbeing-
in-the-worldand being-withothers).
I startwith Heidegger'sview that individualdevelopmentnecessari-
ly starts with "averageeverydayness":The public world into which
Dasein is "thrown." The "they" is the necessary first stage of
developmentin order for the individualto learnthe publicmeanings,
includingsocial norms and roles, which are constitutiveof a public
world (Dreyfus 1975). For womenthis meansthe genderrole expecta-
tions of current society: not as stark as those in previous eras or
decades, but still reflecting the influence of contemporarypatriar-

154
 marjorie weinzweig

chal, capitalistsociety.
At the secondstage, however,whichI will call "Being-for-oneself,"
one pulls oneself out of the "they" and being-withothersin the mode
of average everydaynessand in a certain manner withdrawsfrom
being-withothers. Insteadof doing and being what those around us
expect us to do and be, we now choose and actfor ourselvesalone, in
orderto discoverwhatwe ourselveswantand enjoy, whatwe aregood
at, and who we are. This stage will involve a certain healthy
"selfishness":we act for ourselvesratherthan for others. By aban-
doningthe "security"offered by the sociallydefinedrolesat the stage
of "average everydayness"and choosing "freely," the individual
discoverswho she is and achieveswhat I havecalled "autonomousbe-
ing oneself."
An appropriatelife style for this stage will be what I have called
"living alone," where the exerciseof individualchoice necessaryto
the discoveryand/or developmentof one's individualitywill not be
impededby the assumptionof a long termcommitmentto shareone's
life with a partnerwith whom one is intimatelyinvolved. The "living
together" arrangement is inappropriate at this stage, because for an
individualwho is just emergingfrom the "they," the ubiquitousness
of the sexualpartnerwill interferewith herabilityto choose freely.An
individualat this stageof developmentwill not be withoutrelationsto
others:friends,lovers, family, colleagues-but will not be involvedin
the particulartype of relationshipwhichis the subjectof this paper.In
Heidegger'slanguage,the self is still relationalontologically,for "be-
ing with" othersis an ontologicalor necessary,a priori,characteristic
of Dasein. The progressionto stage two ratherinvolves a change in
our particularmode of being with others:a changein what Heidegger
calls an "ontic" or "existential"characteristicchosen by a particular
Dasein at a particulartime (1962, 31-3).
If Heidegger'sversionof the relationalconcept of the self and the
argumentspresentedabove are correct, the developmentof full in-
dividualitywill requireautonomous or authenticbeing-withothers,
and thus the attainmentof stage III. At this stage the individualand
the world which is constitutiveof her identity are enhancedby the
mutualityof respectand concernin her relationswith others, in the
mannerdescribedabove. However, stage II, in which one withdraws
from the social expectationsof the "they," is a necessarypre-requisite
to stage III, for if individualautonomy is not achievedfirst, the in-
dividualwill be in dangerof being "takenover" by the careof others
and by self-sacrificein caringfor others.
In this way being-withothersmay becomea meansof avoidingthe
realizationof individualautonomy, in which one acquiresthe ability

155
 hypatia
to choose and be responsiblefor one's own courseof action, actingon
the basis of one's own interests,needs and sense of responsibilityto
others, rather than to please others, because others expect it, or
because we hope that somebodyelse will take care of us if we act as
they wish. Thus a provisional or partial individual autonomy is
achieved at the end of stage II. This provisional autonomy,
"autonomous being oneself," requirescompletion or confirmation
throughthe furtherdevelopmentof autonomousbeing with othersat
stage III, but it is the developmentof the formerwhichmakesthe lat-
ter possible.
Authenticbeing with otherscan be achievedin a varietyof types of
relationships,not just by being togetherwith a sexual partner.Such
relationshipsmight includethose with family, friends, children,pro-
fessional colleagues,or sexualpartnersin a non-livingtogethersitua-
tion. The claim that autonomousbeing oneself must be completedby
autonomousbeingwith othersdoes not implythat any particularform
of the latter type of relationshipis necesary, but only that an in-
dividualwho never learnsto care for and receivecare from others in
the manner described above, but whose relations with others are
characterizedby a struggle to dominate and control, or to create
distance in order to keep the other at bay, has failed to achieve the
highest level of developmentof which humans, as relationalbeings,
are capable.That is a relationshipwith anotherhumanbeingin which
each is enhancedby the concernand care of the other.
Whatthis accountaddsto Heidegger's,throughthe interpositionof
the intermediatestage, is an explanation of what makes the move
from "lostness" to authenticitypossible. By withdrawingfrom the
"they" and choosing for herself,the individualdoes somethingwhich
changesher: she "finds herself," or gains a sense of her own identity
which does not dependon the approvalof others. She now becomes
an independentperson, able to take responsibilityfor her own health
and growth,and to relateto othersfrom a positionof strength.15Since
she is differentthan at stage I, she can now relateto othersand to the
world in a different way than when "fallen": she can relate without
losing herself.
The account is different from Heidegger's in that stage II is a
necessarypre-requisiteof, but not identicalor necessarilyconcurrent
with, stage III. At stage II the individualchooses for herself alone
without her choices' being affected by close intimate involvements
with other people; at stage III she is able to choose together with
others in a way that still expressesand thus enhancesher "ownmost
potentialityfor being." She can now be part of a largersocial unit
without loss of her identity. While there is no guaranteethat stage II

156
 marjore we/nzweig

will be followed by stage III ratherthan a regressionto stage I when

one undertakesto relateto othersin a moreintimatemannerin a rela-
tionshipsuch as livingtogether-both stage II and stage III autonomy
can be lost as well as gained-the achievement of stage II is a
necessary condition for the achievement of stage III. Given the
developmentof autonomousbeingoneself, it is then both possibleand
desireableto enter into relations with others which enhance rather
than destroyindividualautonomy.
On Heidegger'saccount the two changes-discovery of self and
ability to relateautonomouslyto others-occur together,logicallyas
well as temporally.The interpositionof stage II does justice to Mill's
insight: that one develops an identity by making one's own choices.
The fact that autonomous being oneself must be completed by
autonomousbeing with others at stage III, however, does justice to
Heidegger'sinsight that the two senses of autonomy require each
other:that ultimatelya totallyself-orientedexistenceis not the highest
developmentof humanpotentiality.The accountis thus in accordance
with the relationalratherthan the atomisticconcept of the self.
Jessie Bernard(1972, 108, 308) claims that becausehuman beings
want and need both securityand freedom,thereare limits to the hap-
piness that may be achievedin marriage(which providessecurityat
the expense of freedom). The present three-stageschema gives us a
way of reconcilingtheseopposites,whichcorrespondto the contradic-
tory argumentsabout autonomyand livingtogetherin SectionsII and
III of this paper, in such a way as to avoid some of the more destruc-
tive aspectsof "security."Havingtakenadvantageof the possibilities
for individualdevelopmentat stage II, the individualcan then return
to a mode of livingwhichoffers "security"and makesomethingmore
enrichingand less destructiveout of it than at stage I.
At stage three, "living together"is one appropriatelife style, since
this arrangement is one socially available format in which
autonomousrelatingto othersis possible. HoweverI do not mean to
imply that autonomous being with others is possible only in what I
heredefine as a "livingtogether"situation-that is, as a memberof a
pair. Hopefully the women's and gay liberationmovementswill lead
to the developmentof a numberof psychologicallyand socially feasi-
ble alternativelife-styles in which individualsmay conjointly satisfy
their needs for affection, sex, companionship,"sharing," and self-
validation, and thus conjointly achieve autonomyand individuality.
The answer, then, to the question of whether a feminist should
choose a marriage-likerelationshipis as follows:
1. Only after achieving"autonomousbeingoneself" at what I have
describedas stage two of individualdevelopment.

157
 hypatia

2. Only if it is the kind of relationshipin whichthe partnerscan at-

tain autonomousbeing-together,as describedherein and designated
as stage three of individualdevelopment.
3. Not necessarily,even if conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, but
then she should choose some other form of close committedrelation-
ship in order to achieve the fullest human development through
"autonomousrelatingto others."'"

Notes
* I am grateful to Sandra Bartky, Virginia Warren, Vicki Levine and Merrill Ring
for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, which were read at the Societyfor
Women in Philosophy Southern California meeting, the Philosophy Department Collo-
quium at California State University, Fullerton, and the Society for the Philosophy of
Sex and Love meetings held in connection with the Eastern Division American
Philosophical Association meetings, Boston, Mass, December 1983.
1. "Oppression" has been defined in recent philosophical literature as the absence
of these three characteristics (Tormey 1973-4, 216; Bartky 1979, 34).
2. The notion is derived from such thinkers as John Stuart Mill (1962, 192) and the
existentialists, e.g. Camus (1955, 46-47); Sartre (1969, 67-72) and Kierkegaard (1956,
70-1, 122, 142). Bishop (1979, 68-77) argues that if children are to be able to exercise the
right to self-determination as adults they must be trained to develop those personality
traits which involve the capacity of making choice autonomously. Carol Gilligan (1982,
78, 82, 85, 165) has recently stressed the importance of a woman's taking responsibility
for herself to her moral development.
3. For examples of philosophers' espousal of the "double standard" of sexual
morality see Rousseau (1911, 321ff) and Fichte (1869, 398 ff).
4. Even such'a feminist as Mill assumes that this is the best arrangement for mar-
ried women (1970, 178-9).
5. Jessie Bernard (1972, 41-43, 56-7) argues that for women marriage involves a
"re-definition of the self." Studies show that personality changes take place involving a
"more negative self-image." See also Seidenberg 1973, 53ff).
6. Mill recognized this particular oppressiveness of the living together situation
when he claimed that the slavery to which women are subjected is worse than that of
other slaves: "'Uncle Tom' has his own life in his 'cabin'.... But it cannot be so with
the wife" (1970, 159-60).
7. Nor are these restrictions merely the same in nature as those which inevitably
accompany any choice, as MerrillRing has brought to my attention. While it is true that any
choice which one makes restrictsthe range of her other choices, the nature of this particular
social arrangementis such that it imposes, both by explicit fiat and as its unavoidable conse-
quences, a broad range of restrictionson other choices. These restrictionsare therefore of a
more profound nature than those which are implied in the making of just any choice.
8. This kind of role playing is central to Firestone's critique of "romantic love"
(1970, ch. 7). See also Masters and Johnson (1975, 203) on the benefit of the "sense of
being mutually commited" with respect to the sexual responsiveness of both partners.
9. These benefits of "committment" for the development of individuality give rise
to an argument for marriage over simply "living together." In marriage the commit-
ment of the partners is recognized and sanctioned by society, and is regarded as a more
substantial commitment than simply living together (O'Driscoll 1977, 260-1 and
Wasserstrom 1975, 244-5). On the other hand, there are various reasons why living

158
 marjorie weinzweig

together may be more conducive to the development of autonomy and individuality

than is marriage. (1) Since in having such a relationship the individuals are not doing
what society wants, they may feel less obligated to live up to society's expectations of
the format which a relationship should take. This would be particularly true of lesbian
relationships. (2) The legal restrictions placed by the state on the form a marriage rela-
tionship must take may interfere with the development of equality in the relationship.
For example, the state does not allow for complete financial independence of married
partners from each other. (3) There might be less "falling into bad habits" in the un-
married situation: since each individual is legally free to leave, one would be more
careful to behave well towards him or her.
10. Gilligan (1982, 131-2, 156-7, 159-160) discovers a similar duality between male
and female constructions of identity, where male identity is built on separateness from
others, self-expression and achievement, whereas female identity is based on care and
responsibility within the context of relationships.
11. "The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are . . . prescribes the
kind of Being of every-dayness .... That tendency of Being-with ... is grounded in the
fact that Being-with one-another concerns itself as such with averageness .... This care
of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the 'leveling
down' of all possibilities of Being . . . because the 'they' presents every judgement and
decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. ... In these
modes one's way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self."
(Heidegger 1962, 164-6).
12. Richards (1980, 184-193, 284) criticizes "feminists" for deliberately making
themselves unattractive to men, thereby making feminism an "unpopular movement."
For a critique of Richards' position, see Weinzweig (1983, 133-135).
13. "Dasein's resoluteness towards itself (its attaining authenticity) is what first
makes it possible for it to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potential-
ity for being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and
liberates. . . . Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people
authentically be with one another." (Heidegger 1962, 344, parenthetical addition mine).
14. This account is based on the model of the Hegelian dialectic, in which the de-
velopment of self and society proceeds by a series of moves from a given condition to its
opposite, and then back again to the first condition but in such a way that a higher posi-
tion is reached which "synthesizes" the two opposites. See e. g. Kierkegaard (1956);
Marx (1961, 1959).
15. According to Bernard (1972, 259-61) these characteristics are necessary to hav-
ing a good relationship with others. An account of this type could explain Carol
Gilligan's analysis of the development of morality and identity in females. Adopting
Chodorow's (1978, 174) discovery that the fact that women have been responsible for
child care results in females defining themselves in terms of their relations to other peo-
ple, Gilligan stresses the importance of women's learning to care for themselves as a
pre-condition to being able to truly care for others (1982, 78, 82, 85). Until this step is
taken, women lose themselves in self-sacrifice and equivocation (84-5, 157, 159).
However, Gilligan does not explain how it is possible for females, while still defining
themselves primarily in terms of their relationships, to make the move whereby the self
acquires importance instead of being subordinated to others. The interposition tem-
porally and logically of my intermediate stage explains how it is possible for a woman to
reclaim her self and thus reorient herself in her relationships so as to avoid loss of self.
Although the details of personal development are different for men and women, the
formal structure of the development process is the same: the individual first absorbs,
then rejects, society's generalized (and gender opposite) expectations for him or her,
finally making out of them something of "her own." At the third stage the results for

159
 hypatia

men and women thus converge, with men appreciating the importance of positive caring
in intimate relationships, and women the importance of self assertion and differentia-
tion. Furthermore, if the account of this paper is correct, males also "sacrifice
themselves'" at the initial stage of their development, denying the emotional and rela-
tional sides of their nature, and their true interests, in order to conform to the generaliz-
ed expectations that they "achieve", etc. in competitive society.
16. It is the position of this writer that a marriage type relationship is not an ap-
propriate setting for the raising of children, even if both partners have achieved the
third stage of autonomy and are thus able to care for chidren with what Ruddick calls
"attentive love." Because children necessarily begin by depending on others for their
sense of self, it is important not only that they be provided with a variety of role models
and ways to choose autonomy but that they be protected from the pressures of being
swept up into the parents' way of life when that is the only life style practiced in the
household. A household consisting of a number of adults is more likely to provide a
number of alternative ways of daily living, and thus ways of being, from which the child
may choose, and thus to provide the child with some protection from the pressures of
conformity to the life style of the couple. In addition to recognizing the danger of such
pressures to conformity in a dyad, Chodorow's work points to the importance of having
males as well as females in the roles of primary providers of child care (1978, 128, 227).
Such an arrangement is more likely to be realized in a household consisting of a number
of adults, as described by Firestone.

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Rowland,Robyn. 1984.Reproductivetechnologies:The final solution
to the woman question? In Test tube women. See Arditti, Klein
and Minden 1984.
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. The traffic in women. In Towarda new anthro-
pology of women, ed. RaynaReiter.NY: MonthlyReviewPress.
---. 1981. Sexual politics, the new right and the sexual fringe. In
Theage taboo: Gaymalesexuality,power and consent,ed. Daniel
Tsang. Boston: Alyson Publications.
Coming to Power. See SAMOIS 1982.
---. 1984. Thinkingsex: Notes for a radicaltheory of the politics
of sexuality.In Pleasureand danger:Exploringfemale sexuality.
See Vance 1984.
Rubin, Gayle, Deirdre English, and Amber Hollibaugh. 1981.
Talking sex. SocialistReview 11 (4): 43-62.
---. 1982.The leathermenace:Commentson politicsand S/M. In
Ruddick, Sara. 1984. Maternal thinking. In Mothering:Essays in
feminist theory. See Treblicot 1984.
---. 1984. Preservativelove and militarydestruction:Some reflec-
tions on motheringand peace. In Mothering:Essays in feminist
theories. See Trebilcot 1984.
Russ, Joanna. 1975. Thefemale male. NY: Bantam.
SAMOIS. ed. 1982. Coming to Power: Writingsand graphics on
lesbian S/M. Boston: Alyson Publications.
Sanday, Peggy Reeves. 1981. Female power and male dominance.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Sargent,Lydia, ed. 1981. Womenand revolution.Boston: South End
Press.
Sartre,Jean Paul. 1969.Beingand nothingness.Trans.Hazel Barnes.
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Sayers,Janet. 1984.Feminismand mothering:A Kleinianperspective.
Women'sStudies InternationalForum 7 (4): 237-242.
Schwarzer,Alice, ed. 1984.After the SecondSex: Conversationswith
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Scott-Smith, Daniel. 1974. Family limitation, sexual control and
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170
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Shanley, Mary Lyndon. 1982. Marriage contract and social contract

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171
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Wagner,Sally Roesch. 1982. Pornographyand the sexualrevolution:

The backlashof sadomasochism.In Againstsadomasochism,ed.
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Wasserstrom,Richard. 1975. Is adulteryimmoral?In Today'smoral
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172
 notes on contributors
CherylH. Cohenis a second-yeargraduatestudentin philosophyat the
Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst.She has a BS in philosophy
from PortlandStateUniversity,Portland,Oregon.Sheis also the single
motherof a six year old.

Anne Donchin is assistantprofessor of philosophyand former Co-

ordinatorof the Women'sStudiesProgramat IndianaUniversity/Pur-
due University at Indianapolis. A founding "mother" of the
SouthwesternSociety for Women in Philosophy, she teaches and
publishesprincipallyin the areasof feministphilosophyandbiomedical
ethics.Sheis the motherof fournon-technologically producedchildren.

Ann Fergusonteachesphilosophyand Women'sStudiesat the Univer-

sity of Massachusetts/Amherstwhere she is a member of a new
graduate program in .Social, Political and Recent Continental
Philosbphy.The latteris uniquein thatits students,severalof whosear-
ticles are in this volume, specializein feministphilosophyat the Ph.D
level. She is a lesbianmotherand step-mother,a socialist-feministand
an activistagainstU.S. interventionin CentralAmerica.Suchoverlap-
ping politicalcommunitiesas these createconstantstruggle,feelingsof
anxietyand ambivalence,yet greathope. She is currentlyworkingon a
book entitled Blood at the Root: A Tri-SystemsApproach to
Motherhood, Sexuality and Male Dominance (to be published by
Routledgeand KeganPaul).

CynthiaA. Freeland receivedher Ph.D from the Universityof Pitts-

burgh. Since 1978, she has been at the Universityof Massachusettsat
Amherst where she teaches and does researchin Greek philosophy,
aestheticsand philosophicalissues of psychoanalysis.

Reyes Lazarowas born in Bilbao, the BasqueCountry,in 1956. She

graduatedin philosophy from the Universityof Bilbao and studied
journalismin Barcelona.In 1979, she receiveda scholarshipto the
AmericanStudiesDiplomaProgramat SmithCollege.She is currently
a Ph.D candidate in the AlternativeTrack in Social and Political
Philosophyat the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst.

173
 hypati
Janice Raymond is Associate Professor of Women's Studies and
MedicalEthics at the Universityof Massachusettsin Amherst.She is
the authorof The TranssexualEmpire: The Makingof the She-Male
(Boston:Beacon Press, 1979)and of the recentlypublishedA Passion
for Friends:A Philosophyof FemaleAffection (Boston:BeaconPress,
1986).She is also a co-founderof FINRRAGE,the FeministInterna-
tional Network of Resisitance to Reproductive and Genetic
Technologies.

JanaSawickiteachescontinentalphilosophy,philosophyof scienceand
feministtheory at the Universityof Maineat Orono. She is currently
developing a feminst frameworkbased on hermeneuticand post-
structuralistmethods.

JanetFarrellSmithis AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat the Univer-

sity of Massachusettsin Boston. She receivedher Ph.D at Columbia
University.Her writingsinclude articles in philosophy of logic and
languageas well as articleson social philosophy.

MarjorieWeinzweig,formerlyprofessorof philosophyat California

StateUniversityat Fullerton,is an attorneywith the CaliforniaDepart-
ment of IndustrialRelations. She is co-editor of Philosophy and
Womenand author of various articlesin phenomenology,theory of
knowledgeand feministtopics in philosophy.Her presentinterestsin
law includelabor relations,employmentdiscrimination,and constitu-
tional law of equal protectionand due process. She graduatedfrom
StanfordLaw Schoolin 1981at the age of 46, the oldestmemberof her
class by several years. Her most interestingcases include a school
desegregationsuit againsta NorthernCaliforniaschool district,work
on the litigationregardingCalifornia'spregnancyleave requirement,
and a sexualharrassmentsuit againsta Bakersfieldcar dealer. She is
currentlyservingon a CaliforniaStateBarLaborLaw Sectioncommit-
tee on comparableworth and is working on a paper on pregnancy
leaves, comparableworth and the conceptof equality.

174
 announcements

Women, Work and Caring editors announce a call for papers

to be included in a collection of essays exploring both the experience
of providing care and the social context within which caregiving oc-
curs. They welcome essays which examine caregiving in both the infor-
mal sector and the formal wage labor force (in such occupations as
teaching, childcare, nursing and social work). Send papers or
abstracts to Emily K. Abel, Research Associate, UCLA Center for the
Study of Women, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024,
or to Margaret K. Nelson, Associate Professor, Department of
Sociology/Anthropology, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT
05753.

An Interdisciplinary Conference on Gender/Culture/Politics, April

10-12, 1987, is announced by The Program in Comparative Literature
and Theory and the Women's Studies Program at Northwestern
University. Sessions included will be on Masculinity, Femininity, and
Cultural Constructions of the Political; Sex, Race and Class; Women
as Culture-Makers and the Politics of Cultural Transmission; and The
Politics of Sexuality. For more information contact Program in Com-
parative Literature and Theory, 150 Kresge Hall, Northwestern
University, Evanston, IL 60201.

Women and health is the theme of the Upstate New York Women's
History Organization's annual meeting to be held October 24-25,
1986, at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh. The con-
ference will include a session where scholars may present works in pro-
gress for comment. To participate, send a brief description of your
work and note that it is for this special session. Proposals for papers,
panels and workshops should be sent to Anita Rapone, Department of
History, SUNY-Plattsburg, Plattsburg, NY 12901.

Feminist Teacher is a non-profit, multidisciplinary magazine com-

mitted to combatting sexism and other forms of oppression in the
classroom. The magazine is published three times a year and is design-
ed for teachers at all grade levels, preschool through graduate school,
and those in traditional as well as nontraditional settings. Feminist
Teacher is published by an editorial collective whose members believe
that politics and teaching do mix. For more information write to
Feminist Teacher Magazine, Ballantine 442, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405.

175
 hypatia
The Women's Bulletin Board is a free service for the women's com-
munity. While electronic communication will never replace face-to-face
interaction, it is another way to organize and publicize events, inform
ourselves about women's issues, and share technological skills. The WBB
is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, feminist computer network and does not
discriminate in terms of religion, color, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.
The Women's Bulletin Board can be reached at (212) 885-0969 at 300
or 1200 baud, 24 hours a day.
Women's organizations, as well as individuals, are encouraged to ac-
cess the WBB to organize us and inform us about your events. If you need
help getting on-line, call (212) 885-1687 (Angela: voice/answering
machine).

The Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis,

announces a faculty position for a distinguished philosopher at the senior
level. AOS: contemporary metaphysics or theory of knowledge. AOC:
philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Normal load: five
courses/year, quarter system, dissertation supervision. Candidate must
have a record of significant publications and a genuine interest in
teaching at the undergraduate as well as the graduate level. Salary to
$68,000 or overscale in special cases. Appointment begins September
1987. Send application to Joel Friedman, Chair, Philosophy Depart-
ment, University of California, Davis, CA 95616. 916/752-0607.

Society for Women in Philosophy:

Pacific SWIP: Executive Secretary Rita Manning, UC San Jose State;
San Jose, CA 95192. TreasurerRuth Doell, San Francisco State Univer-
sity, Dept. of Biological Sciences, 1600 Holloway Ave., San Francisco,
CA 94132. Midwest SWIP: Executive SecretaryNancy Skeen, University
of South Dakota, Dept. of Philosophy, Vermillion, SD 57069. Treasurer
Carol Van Kirk, Ohio University, Dept. of Philosophy, 310 Gordy Hall,
Athens, OH 45701. Eastern SWIP: Executive Secretary Libby Potter,
Hamilton College, Dept. of Philosophy, Clinton, NY 13323. Treasurer
Jana Sawicki, University of Maine, Dept. of Philosophy, Orono, ME
04469.
The Directory of Women in Philosophy is available from the Ex-
ecutive Secretary in each division. Cost is $2.00.
The fall meeting of the Midwest SWIP will be hosted by the University
of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin, and will take place Oct. 10-12,
1986. For information about local arrangements, contact Terry Winant
or Claudia Card, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, WI 53706.

176
 annorncements

The 1987 National Women's Studies Association Conference,

"WeavingWomen's Colors: A Decade of Empowerment,"will con-
vene at SpelmanCollege in Atlanta, Georgia, June 24-28, 1987. The
conference,sponsoredby SpelmanCollege, Agnes Scott College, and
EmoryUniversity,will explorethe intersectionof raceand gender.The
call for proposalsare availablefrom the conferenceoffice. Proposal
submissiondeadlineis October15, 1986. For more informationplease
contact NWSA '87, EmoryUniversity,P.O. Box 21223, Atlanta, GA
30322, (404) 727-7845.
TheCanadianJournalof FeministEthicsannouncestheirfirstissue.
The co-editors, who work in departmentsof religious studies and
English,have taughtcoursesin feministtheoryand feministethicsand
have felt a need for a forum in print in which to discussthese areas.
Sincethe contentsof this publicationare intendedto reflectthe needs
and interestsof the readers/participants,we might also includeshort
book reviews,abstractsof recentwork in the field, and communica-
tions aboutwomen'sstudiescoursesandaboutconferencesin this field.
To receivethe nexttwo issuesof CanadianJournalof FeministEthics
pleasesend $5.00 to: CanadianJournalof FeministEthics, Concordia
University,C/O Dept. of Religion,1455De MaisonneuveBlvd. West,
Montreal,QuebecH3G 1M8.
AIDS
The Societyfor the Philosophyof Sex and Love will be meetingin
San Francisco,CA, in March 1987, in conjunctionwith the Pacific
Divisionof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation.
The Societywill be devotingits sessionto AIDS. We welcomepapers
on the ethical,legal, social, cultural,and politicaldimensionsof AIDS.
Papersshouldhave a readingtime of roughlytwentyminutes(10-12
pages,excludingfootnotes,double-space).Sendtwo copiesof the paper
to the addressbelow, preparedfor blind reviewing.Includepostageif
returnof manuscriptsis desired.DEADLINE:October15, 1986.(May
be extendedin specialcases.) Alan Soble, P.O. Box 493, St. Joseph,
MN 56374-0493.

The 8th Annual PolarityTherapy,HealthyPsychologyand Tradi-

tional Mexican Healing Seminar,will be held near Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico January10-24, 1987. Taughtby Leslie Korn MA, MPH and
JanetSchreiber,two feministswho foundedthe Centerfor Traditional
Medicinein Mexico in 1975. For a brochureor informationon other
seminarscontact: Center for TraditionalMedicine;P.O. Box 1526;
Cambridge,MA 02238;(617)489-3806.

177
 hypatia

San Francisco State University announces a tenure-track opening in

the Philosophy Department. AOS: Philosophy and Religion, with
ability to teach a selection of courses on philosophy of religion,
religious thinkers,, and comparative religious thought. AOC: Ability
to teach courses in some philosophical fields and/or historical
periods. Also must be able to teach informal logic/critical thinking.
Ph.D. or ABD in Philosophy required. Earned doctorate required for
award of tenure. Responsibilities: Four courses a semester (distributed
among the Philosophy Department's three degree programs and the
University's Religious Studies minor), coordination of Philosophy
and Religion B.A. program and Religious Studies minor, some com-
mittee and research obligations. Rank: Assistant or Associate Pro-
fessor, depending on previous experience and record of achievement.
Salary: $24,168-$36,672. San Francisco State University is an Affir-
mative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. We especially en-
courage members of protected classes (minority, disabled, women,
and Vietnam veterans) to apply. We will interview on campus, and at
the 1986 Pacific Division and Eastern Division meetings. Please send
letter of application, vita, letters of recommendation, and any other
supporting materials to Professor Donald Provence, Chair, HRT
Committee, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State Universi-
ty, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132. Closing date:
November 10, 1986. Appointment to begin in the Spring semester,
1987, or, if successful candidate is unable to take up the appointment
at that time, in the Fall semester, 1987.

178
 __

submission guidelines
Hypatia solicitspaperson all topics in feministphilosophy.We will
regularlypublishgeneralissuesas wellas specialissueson a singletopic,
or comprisingtheproceedingsof a conferencein feministphilosophy.All
papersshouldconformto HypatiastyleusingtheAuthor/Datesystemof
citingreferences(seethe ChicagoManualof Style).Papersshouldbe sub-
mittedin duplicatewiththe author'snameon the titlepageonly for the
anonymousreviewingprocess.
The Forwm,edited by MariaLugones, will publishshort papers(2-3
pages)on a designatedtopic,in orderto furtherdialoguewithinfeminist
philosophy. Papers on the topic Celibacy should be submittedby
December1, 1986to MariaLugones,BoxY, Valdez,NewMexico,87580.
7he ook Review sectionwillpublishreviewsof publicationsin feminist
philosophy.To proposepublicationsfor review,querythe Book Review
Editor:JeffnerAllen,Women'sStudies,EasternMontanaCollege,1500
N. 30thSt., Billings,Montana,59101.

SpecialIssues
History of Womenin Philosophy. We welcomeabstracts,papers,and
proposals for guest editing issues on specific historical periods,
philosophers,or researchquestions. Papers should conform to the
Hypatiastyle.All materialsshouldbesubmittedin duplicateto: Margaret
A. Simons, Editor,Hypatia, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Edwards-
ville, Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437.Deadlinefor abstractsandissuepro-
posals:May 1, 1987.
French Feminist Philoophy, edited by Sandra Bartky and Nancy
Fraser.Paperson any aspectof Frenchfeministphilosophyshouldbe
submittedto: SandraBartky,Departmentof Philosophy,Universityof
Illinoisat Chicago,Chicago,IL60650;andto NancyFraser,Department
of Philosophy,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston,IL 60201.Deadline
for submissions:December1, 1986.
FeminnistPerspecives on Scince, edited by Nancy Tuana. We
welcomesubmissionson topicsin thehistory,philosophy,andsociology
of thenaturalandbehavioralsciencesapproachedfromfeministperspec-
tives. We are also interestedin discussionsand critiquesof current
feminist scholarshipin these areas. Papers should be submittedin
duplicateto: NancyTuana,Artsand Humanities,JO 3.1, Universityof
Texasat Dallas,Richardson,TX 75083-0688.Papersmustbe receivedby
October1, 1986.
Papersfor generalsubmissionand all othercorrespondence concerning
Hypatiashouldbe addressedto: MargaretA. Simons,Editor,Hypatia,
SouthernIllinoisUniversityatEdwardsville,
Edwardsville,IL62026-1437.

179
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DIALOGUE
Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie
Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring/printemps 1986
Editorial
Articles
Dialogue ou les bienfaits du pluralisme / Canadian Idealism, Philosophical
VENANT CAUCHY Federalism, and World Peace / J.
DOUGLAS RABB
Dialogue: 1961-1986/ H. M. ESTALL
Canadian Philosophy from a The Faces of Reason and Its Critics /
Cosmopolitan Point of View / ELIZABETH TROTT and LESLIE
J. T. STEVENSON ARMOUR
Two Concepts of Community or Moral Entre la philosophic et la science: le
Theory and Canadian Culture / reconstructionnisme hermeneutique
WESLEY CRAGG de J. Habermas / CLAUDE PICHE
The Natural History of Philosophy in Structuralisme et empirisme: l'approche
Canada / THOMAS MATHIEN ensembliste des theories physiques /
Canadian Philosophy: The Nature and JEAN LEROUX

History of a Discipline? A Reply to Le fascisme ne serait-il ni a gauche ni a

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