Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RULING. It is evident from CEPHI's original and amended SALN that the
YES. It is provided under RA No. 9480 that upon the taxpayer's full information statutorily mandated in R.A. No. 9480 were all reflected in its
compliance with IRR of R.A. No. 9480, the taxpayer is immediately entitled submission to the BIR. While the columns for Reference and Basis for
to the enjoyment of the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty Valuation were indeed left blank, CEPHI attached schedules to its SALN
program. But when: (a) the taxpayer fails to file a SALN and the Tax (Schedules 1 to 7), both original and amended, which provide the
Amnesty Return; or (b) the net worth of the taxpayer in the SALN as of required information under R.A. No. 9480 and its implementing rules
December 31, 2005 is proven to be understated to the extent of 30% or more, and regulations.
the taxpayer shall cease to enjoy these immunities and privileges.
More importantly, CEPHI's SALN is presumed true and correct, pursuant
to Section 4 of R.A. No. 9480. This presumption may be overturned if the
CIR is able to establish that CEPHI understated its net worth by the
required threshold of at least 30%. However, aside from the bare allegations
of the CIR, there is no evidence on record to prove that the amount of
CEPHI's net worth was understated.
(3) CIR V. LANCASTER PHILS., INC. cited Lancaster for: 1) overstatement of its purchases for the fiscal year
G.R. NO. 183408, JULY 12, 2017 April 1998 to March1999; and 2) noncompliance with the generally
Martires, J. accepted accounting principle of proper matching of cost and revenue.
BIR disallowed the purchases of tobacco from farmers covered by
Purchase Invoice Vouchers (PIVs) for the months of February and March
FACTS:
1998 as deductions against income for the fiscal year April 1998 to March
BIR issued Letter of Authority (LOA) authorizing its revenue officers to
1999.
examine Lancaster's books of accounts and other accounting records for all
internal revenue taxes due from taxable year 1998 to an unspecified Lancaster disputed the PAN contending that for the past decades,
it has used an entire 'tobacco-cropping season' to determine its total
date. Thereafter, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) which
purchases covering a one-year period from 1 October up to 30 September of
the following year (as against its fiscal year which is from 1 April up to 31 Additionally, the CIR posits that Lancaster did not raise the issue on the scope
March of the following year);that it has been adopting the 6-month timing of authority of the revenue examiners at any stage of the proceedings before the
difference to conform to the matching concept (of cost and revenue); and that CTA and, consequently, the CTA had no jurisdiction to rule on said issue.
this has long been installed as part of the company's system and consistently
applied in its accounting books. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Subsequently, Lancaster received from the BIR a final assessment Lancaster argued that the February and March 1998 purchases should not have
notice (FAN) which assessed Lancaster's deficiency income tax as a been disallowed. It maintained that the situation of farmers engaged in
consequence of the disallowance of purchases claimed for the taxable year producing tobacco, like Lancaster, is unique in that the costs, i.e., purchases, are
ending. Lancaster duly protested the FAN. There being no action taken by the taken as of a different period and posted in the year in which the gross income
Commissioner on its protest, Lancaster filed on 21 August 2003 a petition for from the crop is realized. Lancaster concluded that it correctly posted the
review before the CTA Division. subject purchases in the fiscal year ending March 1999 as it was only in this
year that the gross income from the crop was realized. Maintaining that the
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: tobacco purchases in February and March 1998 are deductible in its fiscal year
CIR argues that the revenue officers did not exceed their authority when, upon ending 31 March 1999.
examination (of the Lancaster's books of accounts and other accounting
records), they verified that Lancaster made purchases for February and March
of 1998, which purchases were not declared in the latter's fiscal year from 1 ISSUE:
April 1997 to 31 March 1998. BIR insists that the purchases in question should 1) Whether or not CTA En banc erred in holding that petitioner’s
have been reported in FY 1998 in order to conform to the generally accepted revenue officers exceeded their authority to investigate the period
accounting principle of proper matching of cost and revenue. not covered by the LOA
2) Whether or not CTA can resolve an issue which was not raised by
the parties
3) Whether or not the order cancellation and withdrawal of the
deficiency assessment was proper
RULING:
1) NO. The CTA En Banc did not err when it ruled that the BIR
revenue officers had exceeded their authority.
However, in San Roque, while the Court reiterated the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day periods, it recognized as an
exception BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, issued prior to the promulgation
of Aichi, where the BIR expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims
with the CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period. The Court
held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 furnishes a valid basis to hold the
CIR in estoppel because the CIR had misled taxpayers into filing judicial
claims with the CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period.
In this case, records show that P&G filed its judicial claims for refund on
March 28, 2007 and June 8, 2007, respectively, or after the issuance of
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi was
promulgated. Thus, even though P&G filed its judicial claim without
waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA
may still take cognizance of the case because the claim was filed within
the excepted period stated in San Roque. In other words, P&G's judicial
claims were deemed timely filed and should not have been dismissed
by the CTA.
BIR denied respondent's request and reiterated that the FDDA had
become final and executory for the failure of the respondent to appeal
the FDDA with the CTA within the prescribed 30-day period. The BIR
demanded the full payment of the tax assessment and contended that
the respondent's availment of the tax amnesty under RA 9480 had no
effect on the assessment due to the finality of the FDDA prior to
respondent's tax amnesty availment.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The CIR contends that respondent is disqualified to avail of the tax
RULING: to extinguish its tax liability under the FDDA of the BIR.
YES. A tax amnesty is a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the
State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of Moreover, the Court ruled that Section 8(f) is clear: only persons with
evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law. It partakes of an absolute "tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts" are
forgiveness or waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due disqualified to avail of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480. There
it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean must be a judgment promulgated by a court and the judgment must
slate. A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor have become final and executory. There is none in this case. The FDDA
presumed in law. The grant of a tax amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, issued by the BIR is not a tax, case "subject to a final and executory
must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the judgment by the courts" as contemplated by Section 8(f) of RA 9480. ]
taxing authority.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 19 May 2014
On 19 September 2007, respondent availed of the Tax Amnesty Program Decision and the 5 January 2015 Resolution of the Court of Tax
under RA 9480, as implemented by DO 29-07. Respondent's completion of Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 994.
the requirements of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480 is sufficient
(6) NORTHERN MINDANAO POWER CORP. V. CIR therefore sufficient to substantiate Petitioner’s claim for
February 18, 2015 refund
Sereno, C.J.
RULING:
FACTS: (1) The Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print
Petitioner filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 the word “zero-rated” on the VAT invoices or official receipts
for the 3rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated
taxable year 2000. sales, even if the claims were made prior to the effectivity of
Thereafter, alleging inaction of respondent on these administrative R.A. 9337. Hence, the Court denied the petition.
claims, petitioner filed a Petition6 with the CTA on 28 September 2001.
CTA denied the petition for failure of Petitioner to substantiate its (2) Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997 provides that a VAT
claim for a refund and to strictly comply with the invoicing requirements of invoice is necessary for every sale, barter or exchange of
the law and tax regulations. The court ruled that for every sale of services, goods or
VAT shall be computed on the basis of gross receipts indicated on the
official receipt. Official receipts are proofs of sale of services and cannot be
interchanged with sales invoices as the latter are used for the sale of goods.
Further, the requirement of issuing duly registered VAT official receipts
with the term “zero-rated” imprinted is mandatory under the law and
cannot be substituted, especially for input VAT refund purposes.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RR No. 7-95 which expanded the statutory
requirements for the issuance of official receipts and invoices
found in Section 113 of the Tax Code by providing for the
additional requirement of the imprinting of the terms “zero-
rated” is unconstitutional
2) Whether or not company invoices are sufficient to establish the
actual amount of sale of electric power services to the NPC and
properties, while a VAT official receipt properly pertains to every sales were made within which such taxpayer may apply for the issuance of a tax
lease of goods or properties; as well as to every sale, barter or credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax.
Pursuant to Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, respondent had one hundred
exchange of services. twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application within which to decide on the administrative claim. The burden of proving
A VAT invoice is the seller’s best proof of the sale of goods or entitlement to a tax refund is on the taxpayer. Absent any evidence to the contrary, it is
services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the buyer’s best presumed that in order to discharge its burden, petitioner attached to its applications
complete supporting documents necessary to prove its entitlement to a refund. 12 Thus,
evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the the 120-day period for the CIR to act on the administrative claim commenced on 20 June
seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused 2000 and 25 July 2001.
and made to refer to one and the same thing. Certainly, neither As laid down in San Roque, judicial claims filed from 1 January 1998 until the
does the law intend the two to be used alternatively. present should strictly adhere to the 120+30-day period referred to in Section 112 of the
NIRC of 1997. The only exception is the period 10 December 2003 until 6 October 2010.
Within this period, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is recognized as an equitable estoppel,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. during which judicial claims may be filed even before the expiration of the 120-day
period granted to the CIR to decide on a claim for a refund.
SO ORDERED. The Court in San Roque has already settled that failure of the petitioner to
observe the mandatory 120-day period is fatal to its judicial claim and renders the CTA
***Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 laid down the devoid of jurisdiction over that claim. On 28 September 2001 – the date on which
manner in which the refund or credit of input tax may be made. For a VAT-registered petitioner filed its judicial claim for the period covering taxable year 2000 - the 120+30
person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated, Section 112(A) specifically day mandatory period was already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not
provides for a two-year prescriptive period after the close of the taxable quarter when the yet been issued. Considering this fact, petitioner did not have an excuse for not
observing the 120+30 day period.
(7) CHINA BANKING CORP. V. CIR petition and MR to them.
February 4, 2015
Sereno, C.J. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
CBC raised the argument of prescription for the first time in its
FACTS: Petition for Review under Rule 45 with the Court. Petitioner CBC
For the taxable years 1982 to 1986, CBC was engaged in states that the government only has three years from 19 April 1989,
transactions involving sales of foreign exchange to the Central Bank of the date the former received the assessment of the CIR, to collect the
the Philippines (now BSP), commonly known as SWAP transactions. tax. Within that time frame, however, neither a warrant of distraint or
Petitioner did not file tax returns or pay tax on the SWAP transactions levy was issued, nor a collection case filed in court.
for those taxable years.
BIR assessed CBC for deficiency DST on the sales of foreign bills ISSUE:
of exchange to the Central Bank. On 8 May 1989, petitioner CBC sent a Whether or not the right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST
letter of protest to the BIR. from CBC is barred by prescription
On 6 December 2001, more than 12 years after the filing of the
protest, the CIR rendered a decision reiterating the deficiency DST
assessment and ordered the payment thereof plus increments within 30
days from receipt of the Decision.
On 18 January 2002, CBC filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA. On 11 March 2002, the CIR filed an Answer with a demand for
CBC to pay the assessed DST.
CTA denied the petition of CBC and ruled that a SWAP
arrangement should be treated as a telegraphic transfer subject to
documentary stamp tax. CTA En Banc denied CBC’s subsequent
RULING:
YES. The right of the BIR to collect the assessed DST is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The BIR issued the assessment for deficiency DST on 19 April 1989, when
the applicable rule was Section 319(c) of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. In
said provision, the time limit for the government to collect the assessed tax
is set at three years, to be reckoned from the date when the BIR
mails/releases/sends the assessment notice to the taxpayer.
Further, Section 319(c) states that the assessed tax must be collected by
distraint or levy and/or court proceeding within the three-year period.
In this case, the records do not show when the assessment notice was
mailed, released or sent to CBC. Nevertheless, the latest possible date
that the BIR could have released, mailed or sent the assessment notice
was on the same date that CBC received it, 19 April 1989. Assuming
therefore that 19 April 1989 is the reckoning date, the BIR had three
years to collect the assessed DST. However, the records of this case
show that there was neither a warrant of distraint or levy served on
CBC's properties nor a collection case filed in court by the BIR within
the 3-year period.
The attempt of the BIR to collect the tax through its Answer with a
demand for CBC to pay the assessed DST in the CTA on 11 March 2002
did not comply with Section 319(c) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended.
The demand was made almost thirteen years from the date from which
the prescriptive period is to be reckoned. Thus, the attempt to collect the
tax was made way beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
In addition, the fact that the taxpayer in this case may have requested a
reinvestigation did not toll the running of the three-year prescriptive
period. A request for reinvestigation alone will not suspend the statute of
limitations. Two things must concur: there must be a request for
reinvestigation and the CIR must have granted it. In the present case, there
is no showing from the records that the CIR ever granted the request for
reinvestigation filed by CBC. That being the case, it cannot
be said that the running of the three-year prescriptive period was
effectively suspended.
One month later, while its administrative claim was pending, VGPC
filed its judicial claim via a petition for review with the CTA praying for
a refund or the issuance of a tax credit certificate covering the four
quarters of taxable year 2005.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
BIR argues that the CTA-Special First Division in accordance with
jurisprudence should disregard technicalities and allowed the motion despite
the lack of notice of hearing in order to resolve the case meritoriously.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Chevron asserted that non-compliance with the notice of hearing requirement
appropriate remedy to challenge the Resolution dated December 3, hearing and necessarily, the BIR likewise failed to set the motion for
2010 is an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari. hearing. It is clear therefore that the CTA-Special First Division simply
applied the applicable rules which the BIR concededly failed to
BIR had every opportunity to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc but observe. Accordingly, CTA-Special First Division's dismissal of the MR
chose not to avail itself of this remedy. Even on this ground alone, the was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
Court may already dismiss the present petition.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no grave abuse of
(2) NO. The Court finds that the CTA-Special First Division did not discretion on the part of the CTA-Special First Division in issuing the
gravely abuse its discretion. assailed resolutions. Neither can the BIR, having chosen not to avail
itself of the remedy of appeal, now substitute certiorari for an appeal as
BIR was unable to show that the resolutions of the CTA-Special First both remedies are mutually exclusive, and not alternative or
Division were patent and gross to warrant striking them down through a successive.38
petition for certiorari. No argument was advanced to establish that the
CTA-Special First Division exercised its judgment capriciously, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated September 24, 2010 and
December 3, 2010 of the Court of Tax Appeals-Special First Division in
It is not disputed that the BIR's MR dated August 3, 2010 failed to comply CTA Case No. 7358 are AFFIRMED in toto.
with the provisions provided for by the Revised Rules of the CTA.
Specifically, the motion filed by the BIR did not include a notice for SO ORDERED.
(10) PROTECTOR’S SERVICES, INC. V. CIR petitioner was filed out of time.
G.R. NO. 118176. April 12, 2000
Quisumbing, J. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
petitioner maintains that the assessments only became final on
FACTS: November 9, 1990, when the CIR denied the request for
Petitioner was assessed for deficiency percentage taxes including reconsideration.
surcharges, penalties and interests.
petitioner argues that the government's right to assess and collect
On December 7, 1987, respondent Commissioner sent by registered the 1983, 1984 and 1985 taxes had already prescribed. Petitioner
mail, demand letters for payment of the aforesaid assessments. insists that the reckoning period of prescription should start from
Petitioner protested the assessment and claimed that its gross receipts the date when the quarterly percentage taxes were paid and not
subject to percentage taxes should exclude the salaries of the security when the Final Annual Percentage Tax Return for the year was filed.
guards as well as the corresponding employer's share of SSS, SIP and Moreover, he denies having received the 1985 tax assessment.
Medicare contributions.
petitioner interposes the third issue claiming that since the CIR
Without formally acting on the petitioner's protest, the BIR sent a failed, until now, to commence the collection of the 1983, 1984, and
follow-up letter, ordering the settlement of taxes based on its 1985
computation. On November 9, 1990, BIR Deputy Commissioner
Eufracio Santos sent a denied with finality the latter's protests against
the subject assessments.
CTA dismissed the petition contending that the assessments were made
within the prescriptive period. It further ruled that the protest filed by
deficiency tax, the right to collect had, likewise, prescribed pursuant to
Section 219 of the NIRC.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction to act on the petition for
review
2) Whether or not the assessment against the petitioner for
deficiency percentage tax for taxable years 1983 and 1984 were
made after the lapse of the prescriptive period
3) Whether or not the period for the collection of taxes for taxable
years 1983, 1984 and 1985 has already prescribed
4) Whether or not the assessments are correct
RULING:
(1) NO. An assessment maybe administratively protested within 30
days from receipt thereof; otherwise, the assessment shall become
final and unappealable. In this case, on December 10, 1987,
petitioner received the BIR's assessment notices. On January 12,
1988, or 33 days from receipt thereof, petitioner protested the 1983
and 1984 assessments and requested for a reinvestigation. Hence,
the petitioner may no longer dispute the correctness of the
assessments. The Court ruled that CTA correctly dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
(2) NO. B.P. 700 was approved on April 5, 1984. The 3-year
prescriptive period for assessment and collection of revenue taxes
applied to taxes paid beginning 1984. Clearly, the tax assessment
made on December 10, 1987, for the year 1983 was still covered by
the 5-year statutory prescriptive period. This rule was emphasized
in RMC No. 33-84, published on November 12, 1984.
Further, in CIR V. CA (1999), the Court held that the 3-year
prescriptive period of tax assessment of contractors tax should
be computed at the time of the filing of the "final annual CIR has the power to "make judgments or opinions in connection with the
percentage tax return," when it can be finally ascertained if the implementation of the provisions of the internal revenue code." As such, the
taxpayer still has an unpaid tax, and not from the tentative opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute
quarterly payments. or implement administrative laws, command respect and weight.
(3) NO. Section 271 of the 1986 Tax Code provides for the
suspension of running of the statute of limitation of tax
collection.
In the instant case, PSI filed a petition before the CTA to prevent
the collection of the assessed deficiency tax. When the CTA
dismissed the case, petitioner elevated the case before the Court,
hoping for a review in its favor. The actions taken by the
petitioner before the CTA and now before the Court, suspended
the running of the statute of limitation.
SO ORDERED.
(11) UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC. – MANAGEMENT On 16 April 2007, petitioner filed its annual ITR for the year end
INC. V. CIR December 31, 2006. UPSI-MI chose the option, and marked the
G.R. NO. 205955, March 7, 2018 corresponding box, “To be issued a tax credit certificate” with respect
Martires, J. to the unutilized excess creditable taxes for the taxable year
ending 31 December 2006.
FACTS:
In 2007, UPSI-MI changed its taxable period from calendar year to fiscal ITR cannot undo UPSI-MI's actual exercise of the carry-over option in
year ending on the last day of March. Thus, UPSI-MI filed on November the original 2007 ITR, for to do so would be against the irrevocability
14, 2007 an annual ITR covering the short period from January 1, 2007 to rule.
March 31, 2007. The annual ITR reflected an income tax overpayment of
₱5,159,341.00 as “Prior Year’s Excess Credit”. On the same day, UPSI-MI ISSUE:
amended the Annual ITR for the short period by excluding the sum of Whether or not UPSI-MI may still be entitled to the refund of its 2006
₱2,927,834.00 under the line “Prior Year’s Excess Credits”. excess tax credits when it thereafter filed its income tax return (for the
short period ending 31 March 2007) indicating the option of carry-over
On 10 October 2008, UPSI-MI filed with the office of the CIR a claim for
refund and/or issuance of a TCC representing the alleged excess and OUR RULING
unutilized creditable withholding taxes for taxable year 2006. NO. The Court ruled that UPSI-MI is barred from recovering its excess
creditable tax through refund or TCC.
Due to respondent’s inaction, petitioner filed with a Petition for Review
on April l4, 2009 before the Court in Division. Sec. 76 of the NIRC provides:
xxx
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: In case the corporation is entitled to a tax credit or refund of the excess
UPSI-MI argued that the irrevocability rule under Section 76 of the estimated quarterly income taxes paid, the excess amount shown on its
NIRC is not applicable for the reason that it did not carry over to the final adjustment return may be carried over and credited against the
succeeding taxable period the 2006 excess income tax credit. estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the
succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carry-over and apply the
RESPONDENT’s CONTENTION: excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable
Respondent contends that UPSI-MI effectively exercised the carry-over quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option
option under Section 76 of the NIRC. It argued that UPSI-MI's alleged shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no
inadvertent inclusion of the 2006 excess tax credit in the 2007 original application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be
ITR belies its own allegation that it did not carry over the said amount allowed therefor.
to the succeeding taxable period; and that the amendment of the 2007
Under the law, there are two options available to the corporation
whenever it overpays its income tax for the taxable year: (1) to carry
over and apply the overpayment as tax credit against the estimated
quarterly income tax liabilities of the succeeding taxable years (also
known as automatic tax credit) until fully utilized (meaning, there is no
prescriptive period); and (2) to apply for a cash refund or issuance of
a tax credit certificate within the prescribed period.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The CIR claims that neither he nor his statutory counsel, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), received a copy of the CTA en banc’s resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration. It then came as a surprise to him when
he received on June 17, 2009 a copy of the CTA en banc’s Resolution dated June
10, 2009 which provided that the CTA Decision dated February 12, 2009 had
become final and executory. The CIR then filed on July 2, 2009 a Manifestation
with the Motion to Reconsider Resolution Ordering Entry of
Judgment,4 questioning the CTA’s entry of judgment. The CIR claimed that he
knew of the Resolution dated March 25, 2009 only on August 3, 2009, when he
received a copy of the Resolution dated July 29, 2009. He then claimed that the
sixty (60)-day period for the filing of the petition for relief should be reckoned
from August 3, 2009, giving him until October 2, 2009 to file it.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion
because the CIR's petition for relief was indeed filed out of time. Thus, the
Court added that there was no cogent reason to grant petitioner's plea for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari.
At the outset, this Court holds that a dismissal of the petition is warranted
in view of the petitioner’s failure to file before the CTA en banc a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution. The settled rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Even if procedural infirmity was set aside, the petition is dismissible. By
the CIR’s own evidence and admissions, it is evident that both the CIR and the
OSG had known of the CTA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009 long before
August 3, 2009. The CIR’s claim that it was only on August 3, 2009 that he
learned of the CTA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration is belied by records
showing that as of June 22, 2009, he already knew of such fact. The information
was relayed by the CTA to the CIR, when the latter inquired from the court
about the status of the case and the court’s action on his motion for
reconsideration. It was precisely because of such knowledge that he filed on July
2, 2009 the manifestation and motion pertaining to the CTA’s order of entry of
judgment.
Even as we reckon the 60-day period under Section 3, Rule 38 from said
date, the petitioner only had until August 21, 2009 within which to file a petition
for relief. Since August 21, 2009, a Friday, was a non-working holiday, the
petitioner should have filed the petition at the latest on August 24, 2009.
The CIR’s filing with the CTA of the petition for relief on October 2, 2009 then
did not conform to the 60-day requirement.
FACTS:
In January 2001, a revenue officer was authorized to examine the books
of accounts of Metro Star Superama, Inc. In April 2002, after the audit
review, the revenue district officer issued a formal assessment notice
against Metro Star advising the latter that it is liable to pay P292,874.16
in deficiency taxes. Metro Star assailed the issuance of the formal
assessment notice as it averred that due process was not observed when
it was not issued a pre-assessment notice. Nevertheless, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue authorized the issuance of a Warrant
of Distraint and/or Levy against the properties of Metro Star.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The CIR insists that Metro Star received the PAN, dated January 16,
2002, and that due process was served nonetheless because the latter
received the Final Assessment Notice (FAN)
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Metro Star contends that it was not accorded due process, denying that
it did not receive a Preliminary Assessment Notice prior to the issuance
of the Final Assessment Notice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due process was observed in the issuance of the formal
assessment notice against Metro Star
RULING:
NO. It is true that there is a presumption that the tax assessment was
duly issued. However, this presumption is disregarded if the taxpayer
denies ever having received a tax assessment from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the BIR to prove
by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the
addressee-taxpayer. The onus probandi was shifted to the BIR to prove
by contrary evidence that the Metro Star received the assessment in the
Star received the pre-assessment notice in January 2002. The CIR could have the CIR is void.
simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that
it mailed the pre-assessment notice, but failed. Neither did it offer any It is an elementary rule enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that no
explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of service of the pre- person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.[19] In
assessment notice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the sending of a pre- balancing the scales between the power of the State to tax and its
assessment notice is part of the due process requirement in the issuance of a inherent right to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law on one
deficiency tax assessment,” the absence of which renders nugatory any side, and the constitutional rights of a citizen to due process of law and
assessment made by the tax authorities. The use of the word “shall” under the the equal protection of the laws on the other, the scales must tilt in favor
law describes the mandatory nature of the service of a PAN. The persuasiveness of the individual, for a citizens right is amply protected by the Bill of
of the right to due process reaches both substantial and procedural rights and the Rights under the Constitution. Thus, while taxes are the lifeblood of the
failure of the CIR to strictly comply with the requirements laid down by law and government, the power to tax has its limits, in spite of all its plenitude.
its own rules is a denial of Metro Stars right to due process.[15] Thus, for its
failure to send the PAN stating the facts and the law on which the assessment WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
was made as required by Section 228 of R.A. No. 8424, the assessment made by
(15) CIR V. HAMBRECHT & QUIST PHILS., INC. apparently resulted from an adjustment made to respondents taxable
G.R. NO. 169225, November 17, 2010 income for the year 1989, on account of the disallowance of certain items of
Leaonardo-De Castro, J. expense, namely, professional fees paid, donations, repairs and
maintenance, salaries and wages, and management fees. The latter item of
expense, the management fees, made up the bulk of the disallowance, the
FACTS:
examiner alleging, among others, that petitioner failed to withhold the
Respondent received a letter from petitioner demanding for payment
of alleged deficiency income and expanded withholding taxes for the taxable appropriate tax thereon.
year 1989 amounting to P2,936,560.87. Prompting them to file a protest letter.
Nearly 8 years later, respondent received a letter from petitioner advising them ISSUES:
that CIR had rendered a final decision denying its protest on the ground that 1) Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction to rule the government’s
the protest against the disputed tax assessment was allegedly filed beyond the rights to collect tax has prescribed
30-day reglementary period prescribed in then Section 229 of the NIRC. 2) Whether or not the period to collect assessment has prescribed
CTA Original Division held that the subject assessment notice sent by
registered mail to respondents former place of business was valid and binding
since respondent only gave formal notice of its change of address after said
notice was give. Thus, the assessment had become final and unappealable for
failure of respondent to file a protest within the 30-day period provided by
law. However, the CTA (a) held that the CIR failed to collect the assessed taxes
within the prescriptive period; and (b) directed the cancellation and
withdrawal of assessment. CTA En banc denied CIR’s petitioner for review.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
CIR argues that the CTA had no jurisdiction over the case since the CTA itself
had ruled that the assessment had become final and unappealable.
Moreover, CIR insists that its right to collect the tax deficiency it assessed on
respondent is not barred by prescription since the prescriptive period thereof
was allegedly suspended by respondents request for reinvestigation.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondent’s argue that the alleged deficiency income tax assessment
RULING: (2) YES. Two requisites must concur before the period to enforce collection
(1) YES. The issue of prescription, being a matter provided for by the NIRC, is may be suspended: (a) that the taxpayer requests for reinvestigation,
well within the jurisdiction of the CTA to decide. and
(b) that petitioner grants such request.
The assailed CTA En Banc Decision was correct in declaring that there was
nothing in the foregoing provision upon which petitioners theory with The mere filing of a protest letter which is not granted does not operate
regard to the parameters of the term other matters can be supported or to suspend the running of the period to collect taxes. In the case at bar,
even deduced. What is rather clearly apparent, however, is that the term the records show that respondent filed a request for reinvestigation on
other matters is limited only by the qualifying phrase that follows it. Thus, December 3, 1993, however, there is no indication that petitioner acted
on the strength of such observation, the Court have previously ruled that upon respondents protest.
the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited to cases which involve
decisions of the CIR on matters relating to assessments or refunds. The WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
second part of the law covers other cases that arise out of the NIRC or Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated August 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
related laws administered by the BIR. ORDERED
2 years later CIR opined that petitioner was not liable for the 6% CGT
but for the 32% regular IT and 12% VAT, on the theory that the
properties petitioner sold were ordinary assets and not capital assets.
Respondent found petitioner to have misdeclared his income,
misclassified the properties and used multiple tax identification
numbers to avoid being assessed the correct amount of taxes.
CIR filed before the DOJ a complaint for tax evasion against petitioner.
DOJ then filed two criminal information for tax evasion against
petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the civil action to question the FDDA is
deemed instituted with the criminal case for tax evasion
2) Whether or not the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability for taxes and penalties that is deemed instituted
with the criminal action is the Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam filed by petitioner
3) Whether or not the petition for review should be dismissed
for non-payment of docket fees
RULING:
(1) NO. It is well-settled that the taxpayer's obligation to pay
the tax is an obligation that is created by law and does not
arise from the offense of tax evasion, as such, the same is
not deemed instituted in the criminal case.
Civil liability to pay taxes arises from the fact, for instance, that
one has engaged himself in business, and not because of any
criminal act committed by him. Further, it should be borne in
mind that the tax and the obligation to pay the same are all
created by statute; so are its collection and payment governed by
statute. The payment of taxes is a duty which the law requires to
be paid. Said obligation is not a consequence of the felonious
acts charged in the criminal proceeding nor is it a mere civil
liability arising from crime that could be wiped out by the
judicial declaration of non-existence of the criminal acts
charged.
(2) NO. The tax evasion case filed by the government against the
erring taxpayer has, for its purpose, the imposition of criminal
liability on the latter. While the Petition for Review filed by the
petitioner was aimed to question the FDDA and to prevent it
from becoming final. What is deemed instituted with the
criminal action is only the government's recovery of the taxes
and penalties relative to the criminal case. The remedy of the
taxpayer to appeal the disputed assessment is not deemed
instituted with the criminal case. To rule otherwise would be to
render nugatory the procedure in assailing the tax deficiency
assessment.
(3) NO. the mere failure to pay the docket fees at the time of the
filing of the complaint, or in this case the Petition for Review Ad
Cautelam, does not necessarily cause the dismissal of the case.
While the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the
time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically
cause its dismissal so long as the docket fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and that the party had no intention to
defraud the government.
BIR issued RMC No. 58-2008 which clarified among others, the time within
which to reckon the redem(p1t8i)oCn
IRpeVri.oUd NoIfTEreDalCOesCtaOtNe ISSUE:
UmoTrPtgLaAgNesT.EIRtS BANK
readsG: .R. NO. 179063, October 23, 2009 Whether or not the 3-month redemption period for juridical persons
For of reckoning the one-year should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale
pAurbpaods,eJ
s.
redemption period in the case of individual mortgagors, or the three-
month redemption period for juridical persons/mortgagors, the same
shall FACTS: RULING:
be reRckeosnpeodndfernotm UtChePBdaftoerecolfostehde several real estate used NO. Under Revenue Memorandum Circular 58-2008, I]f the
acmonofritrgmaagteiounpoonf
the a u ct i o n sa l e w hi c h i s t h e d a t e w h en th e and approved its issuance to UCPB as the highest bidder.[4]
t o of
certificate sesale
c uis re a l oa n g r an te d t o it s b o rr o w ers fo r failure of
issued.
the latter to pay the loans. UCPB filed a petition for extrajudicial
On July 5, 2002 the bank paid CWT and DST in relation to the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, and they made the highest
extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
winning bid for the whole lot.
UCPB was assessed by the CIR for deficiencies in the payment of
On March 1, 2002 the executive judge finally signed the certificate of sale
CWT and DST due from the foreclosure of mortgaged properties. It then
filed a Petition for Review with CTA where it was ruled that the property is an ordinary asset of the mortgagor, the creditable expanded
withholding tax shall be due and paid within ten (10) days following the
redemption period lapsed 3 months after the executive judge approved
end of the month in which the redemption period expires. x x x
the certificate of sale. It said that foreclosure under the law referred to
Moreover, the payment of the documentary stamp tax and the filing of
the whole process of foreclosure which included the approval and
the return thereof shall have to be made within five (5) days from the
issuance of the certificate of sale.
end of the month when the redemption period expires.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
CIR argues that the redemption period should be reckoned from the
date of the auction sale for, otherwise, the taxing authority would be left UCPB had, therefore, until July 10, 2002 to pay the CWT and July 5, 2002
to pay the DST. Since it paid both taxes on July 5, 2002, it is not liable for
at the mercy of the executive judge who may unnecessarily delay the
deficiencies.
approval of the certificate of sale and thus prevent the early payment of
taxes. It argued that CWT must be paid within 10 days after the end of
each month, and the payment of DST within 5 days after the close of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
month when the taxable document was made, signed, accepted or
transferred. SO ORDERED.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Redemption period should be reckoned from the approval of the
executive judge of manila of the issuance of the certificate of sale.
(19) SUPREME TRANSLINER INC. V. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS sum of P15,704,249.12. the mortgagors subsequently filed a
BANK complaint with the RTC Branch 57 of Lucena against the bank to
February 25, 2011 recover the allegedly unlawful and excessive charges.
G.R. NO. 165617 – SUPREME TRANSLINER, INC., MOISES ALVAREZ
& PAULITA ALVAREZ V. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS Trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and the
G.R. NO. 165837 – BPI FAMILY SAVINGS V. SUPREME TRANSLINER, banks counterclaims. The trial court held that plaintiffs-mortgagors
INC. MOISES ALVAREZ & PAULITA ALVAREZ are bound by the terms of the mortgage loan documents which
Villarama, Jr., J. clearly provided for the payment of interest, charges and expenses.
CA reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of mortgagors stating
FACTS: that attorney’s fees and liquidated damages were already included
On April 24, 1995, Supreme Transliner, Inc. obtained a loan from BPI in the bid price.
Family secured by a 714-square meter lot as collateral. For non-payment
of the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
property was sold to the bank as the highest bidder in the public auction Petitioner-mortgagors contend that the amounts representing the
conducted. interests, attorneys fees and liquidated damages and other
charges/expenses were already included in the bid price. Moreover,
Before the expiration of the 1-year redemption period, the petitioner- they pray for the return of all asset-acquired expenses consisting of
mortgagors notified the bank of their intention to redeem the property. DST, CGT, foreclosure fee, registration and filing fee.
On May 21, 1997, the mortgagors redeemed the property by paying the
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
The bank asserted that the redemption price reflecting the stipulated
interest, charges and/or expenses, is valid, legal and in accordance with
documents duly signed by the mortgagors. The bank further contended
that the claims are deemed waived and the mortgagors are already
estopped from questioning the terms and conditions of their contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreclosing mortgagee should pay CGT upon execution
of the certificate of sale and before the expiry of the redemption period
RULING:
NO. There is no legal basis for the inclusion of the payment of the CGT in
the redemption price. Considering that petitioners-mortgagors exercised
their right of redemption before the expiration of the statutory 1-year
period, petitioner bank is not liable to pay the capital gains tax due on the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. There was no actual transfer of title from the
owners-mortgagors to the foreclosing bank. Hence, the inclusion of the said
charge in the total redemption price was unwarranted and the
corresponding amount paid by the petitioners- mortgagors should be
returned to them.
In G.R. No. 165617, BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby ordered
to RETURN the amounts representing capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes as reflected in the Statement of Account To Redeem as of April
7, 1997, to petitioners Supreme Transliner, Inc.,
Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez, and to retain only the sum
provided in RR No. 4-99 as documentary stamps tax due on the
foreclosure sale.
In G.R. No. 165837, petitioner BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. is hereby
declared entitled to the attorneys fees and liquidated damages included
in the total redemption price paid by Supreme Transliner, Inc., Moises
C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez. The sums awarded as moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of Supreme
Transliner, Inc., Moises C. Alvarez and Paulita Alvarez are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
(20) CHINA BANKING CORP. V. CA
G.R. NO. ,,
336 SCRA178
Ponente
(21) WESTERN MINDANAO POWER CORP. Further, since there was no statutory requirement for imprinting the
G.R. NO. 181136, June 13, 2012 phrase zero-rated
672 SCRA 350
Sereno, J.
FACTS:
WMPC filed with the CIR applications for a TCC of its input VAT
covering the taxable 3rd and 4th quarters of 1999 and all the taxable
quarters of 2000.
Due to CIR’s inaction, WMPC, on September 28, 2001, filed with the
CTA in Division a Petition for Review seeking refund/TCCs for the
total amount of ₱9,324,283.30.
CTA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners VAT Invoices
and Official Receipts did not contain on their face the phrase zero-rated,
contrary to Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95. It held that the receipts and
evidence presented by petitioner failed to fully substantiate the
existence of the latter’s effectively zero-rated sales to NPC. It further
noted that petitioners Official Receipts and VAT Invoices did not have
the word zero-rated imprinted/stamped thereon, contrary to the clear
mandate of Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
WMPC countered that the invoicing and accounting requirements laid
down in RR 7-95 were merely compliance requirements, which were not
indispensable to establish the claim for refund of excess and unutilized
input VAT. Also, Section 113 of the NIRC prevailing at the time the sales
transactions were made did not expressly state that failure to comply
with all the invoicing requirements would result in the disallowance of
a tax credit refund. The express requirement that the term zero-rated
sale shall be written or printed prominently on the VAT invoice or
official receipt for sales subject to 0% VAT appeared in Section 113 of the
NIRC only after it was amended by Section 11 of R.A. 9337. This
amendment cannot be applied retroactively, considering that it took
effect only on 1 July 2005, or long after petitioner filed its claim for a tax
refund, and considering further that the RR 7-95 is punitive in nature.
on official receipts prior to 1 July 2005, the RR 7-95 constituted undue
expansion of the scope of the legislation it sought to implement.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
CIR filed its Comment on the CTA Petition, arguing that WMPC was not
entitled to the latter’s claim for a tax refund in view of its failure to comply
with the invoicing requirements under Section 113 of the NIRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA En Banc seriously erred in dismissing the claim of
petitioner for a refund or tax credit on input tax on the ground that the
latter’s Official Receipts do not contain the phrase zero-rated
RULING:
NO. The Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word
zero-rated on the VAT invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or
credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if the claims were made prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9337.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Luke's is liable for deficiency income tax in 1998
under Section 27(B) of the NIRC, which imposes a preferential tax rate
of 10% on the income of proprietary non-profit hospitals
RULING:
The Court finds that St. Luke's is a corporation that is not "operated
exclusively" for charitable or social welfare purposes insofar as its
revenues from paying patients are concerned. This ruling is based not
only on a strict interpretation of a provision granting tax exemption, but
also on the clear and plain text of Section 30(E) and (G). Section 30(E) and
(G) of the NIRC requires that an institution be "operated exclusively" for
charitable or social welfare purposes to be completely exempt from
income tax. An institution under Section 30(E) or (G) does not lose its tax
exemption if it earns income from its for-profit activities. Such income
from for-profit activities, under the last paragraph of Section 30, is merely
subject to income tax, previously at the ordinary corporate rate but now at
the preferential 10% rate pursuant to Section 27(B).
St. Luke's fails to meet the requirements under Section 30(E) and (G) of
the NIRC to be completely tax exempt from all its income. However, it
remains a proprietary non-profit hospital under Section 27(B) of the
NIRC as long as it does not distribute any of its profits to its members
and such profits are reinvested pursuant to its corporate purposes. St.
Luke's, as a proprietary non-profit hospital, is entitled to the preferential
tax rate of 10% on its net income from its for-profit activities.
St. Luke's is therefore liable for deficiency income tax in 1998 under
Section 27(B) of the NIRC. However, St. Luke's has good reasons to rely
on the letter dated 6 June 1990 by the BIR, which opined that St. Luke's
is "a corporation for purely charitable and social welfare purposes"59
and thus exempt from income tax. 60 In Michael J. Lhuillier, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 the Court said that "good faith
and honest belief that one is not subject to tax on the basis of previous
interpretation of government agencies tasked to implement the tax law,
are sufficient justification to delete the imposition of surcharges and
interest."
SO ORDERED.
(23) PILIPINAS TOTAL GAS, INC. V. CIR
G.R. NO. 207112, December 8, 2015 Due to the inaction of CIR, Total Gas elevated their claim to the CTA.
Mendoza, J.
CTA dismissed the petition for being prematurely filed, saying that
FACTS: Total Gas failed to complete necessary documents to substantiate a
Total Gas is engaged in the business of selling, transporting and claim for refund. Motion for reconsideration was denied too by the
distributing industrial gas, sale of gas equipment and other related CTA. CTA En Banc also denied the petition to review. It ruled that
business. For this purpose, Total Gas registered itself with BIR as VAT CTA division had no jurisdiction over the case because Total Gas
taxpayer. failed to seasonably file its petition.
For the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2007, Total Gas claimed VAT credits PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
from its domestic purchases of non capital goods and services. Later, Total Gas argues that its judicial claim was filed within the
they filed an administrative claim for refund of the unutilized VAT for prescriptive period for claiming excess unutilized input VAT refund
the 1st two quarters of 2007. as provided under Section 112 of the NIRC. It points out that on the
one hand, the CTA En Banc ruled that it filed the judicial claim interpretation of Section 112(D) would indefinitely extend the
belatedly as it was way beyond the 120+30 day period. Yet, it also prescriptive period as provided in favor of the taxpayer.
affirmed the findings of its division that its petition for review was
prematurely filed since the 120- day period did not even commence to ISSUES:
run for lack of complete supporting documents. 1) Whether or not the judicial claim for refund was belatedly filed;
and
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: 2) Whether or not the submission of incomplete documents at the
CIR contends that Total Gas filed its petition out of time. She countered adminstrative level (BIR) renders the judicial claim premature
that the 120-day period could not be counted from the time Total Gas and dismissible for lack of jurisdiction.19
submitted its additional documents on August 28, 2008 because such an
RULING:
(1) NO. The Court ruled that the judicial claim was timely filed.
The BIR did not give notice to Total with regard to the
documents submitted on August 2008. Thus the counting of the
120 day period should start from August 2008 or when Total
made its submission of complete documents to support its
application. The BIR had until December 2008 to decide. Because
of the BIR's inaction, Total had until January 25, 2009 to file their
judicial claim.
(2) Judicial claim not prematurely filed. The alleged failure of Total
Gas to submit the complete documents at the administrative
level did not render its petition for review with the CTA
dismissible for lack of jurisdiction. First, the 120-day period had
commenced to run and the 120+30 day period was, in fact,
complied with. As already discussed, it is the taxpayer who
determines when complete documents have been submitted for
the purpose of the running of the 120-day period. It must again
be pointed out that this in no way precludes the CIR from requiring
additional documents necessary to decide the claim, or even denying
the claim if the taxpayer fails to submit the additional Second, the CIR sent no written notice informing Total Gas
documents requested. that the documents were incomplete or required it to submit
additional documents. As stated above, such notice by way
of a written request is required by the CIR to be sent to Total Court of Tax Appeals En Banc, in CTA EB No. 776
Gas. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Neither was there any decision made denying the administrative
claim of Total Gas on the ground that it had failed to submit all The case is REMANDED to the CTA Third Division for trial
the required documents. It was precisely the inaction of the BIR de novo.
which prompted Total Gas to file the judicial claim. Thus, by
failing to inform Total Gas of the need to submit any additional SO ORDERED.ch
document, the BIR cannot now argue that the judicial claim
should be dismissed because it failed to submit complete
documents.
In the present case, however, Total Gas filed its judicial claim
due to the inaction of the BIR. Considering that the
administrative claim was never acted upon; there was no
decision for the CTA to review on appeal per se. Consequently,
the CTA may give credence to all evidence presented by Total
Gas, including those that may not have been submitted to the
CIR as the case is being essentially decided in the first instance.
The Total Gas must prove every minute aspect of its case by
presenting and formally offering its evidence to the CTA, which
must necessarily include whatever is required for the successful
prosecution of an administrative claim.40
However, Nippon Express filed its petition for review with the
CTA only on 31 March 2006, or 246 days from the inaction by the
CIR. In other words, the petition of Nippon Express was
belatedly filed with the CTA and, following the doctrine above,
the court ought to have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
(25) CIR V. MCGEORGE FOOD IND. respondent because by the time respondent filed its final adjustment
G.R. NO. 174157, October 20, 2010 return for 1997 on 15 April 1998, the 1997 NIRC was already in
Carpio, J. force, having taken effect on 1 January 1998.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioner contends that respondent is precluded from seeking a refund
for its overpayment in 1997 after respondent opted to carry-over and
apply it to its future tax liability, following Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC
which provides that "[o]nce the option to carry-over and apply the
excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable
quarters of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option
shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no
application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be
allowed therefor." Petitioner claimed that Section 76 applies to
excess tax to the next succeeding quarter, may likewise avail of the
remedy of refund, because the old Tax Code does not preclude the
exercise of one to the exclusion of the other.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to a tax refund for overpayment in
1997 after it opted, but failed, to credit such to its tax liability in 1998
RULING:
NO. The Court held that the respondent is not entitled to a refund under
Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC, the law in effect at the time respondent
made known to the BIR its preference to carry over and apply its
overpayment in 1997 to its tax liability in 1998. In lieu of refund,
respondent’s overpayment should be applied to its tax liability for the
taxable years following 1998 until it is fully credited.
Thus treated, Section 76 and its companion provisions in Title II, Chapter
XII should be applied following the general rule on the prospective
application of laws12 such that they operate to govern the conduct of
corporate taxpayers the moment the 1997 NIRC took effect on 1 January
1998. There is no quarrel that at the time respondent filed its final
adjustment return for 1997 on 15 April 1998, the deadline under Section 77
(B) of the 1997 NIRC (formerly Section 70(b) of the 1977 NIRC), the 1997
NIRC was already in force, having gone into effect a few months earlier on
1 January 1998. Accordingly, Section 76 is controlling.
SO ORDERED.
(26) CIR V. STANLEY WORKS SALES (PHILS.) INC.
G.R. NO. 187589, December 3, 2014 PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Sereno, CJ. CIR mainly argues that in view of respondent’s execution of the
Waiver of the statute of limitations, the period to collect the assessed
FACTS: deficiency income taxes has not yet prescribed.
On April 16, 1990, respondent filed with the BIR its Annual Income Tax
Return for taxable year 1989.
CTA First Division found that although the assessment was made
within the prescribed period, the period within which petitioner may
collect deficiency income taxes had already lapsed. It ruled that there
was no valid waiver of the statute of limitations since there was no
conformity, either by respondent or his duly authorized representative
and there was no date of acceptance to show that both parties had
agreed on the Waiver before the expiration of the prescriptive period.
However, petitioner argues that the actual approval of the Waiver is
apparent from the proceedings that were additionally conducted in
determining the propriety of the subject assessment
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner’s right to collect the alleged deficiency income tax has
prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to collect the deficiency income tax of
respondent for taxable year 1989 has prescribed
RULING:
YES. The statute of limitations on the right to assess and collect a tax
means that once the period established by law for the assessment and
collection of taxes has lapsed, the government’s corresponding right to
enforce that action is barred by provision of law.
The period to assess and collect deficiency taxes may be extended only
upon a written agreement between the CIR and the taxpayer prior to the
expiration of the 3-year prescribed period in accordance with Section 222
(b) of the NIRC.
The waiver was not a unilateral act of the taxpayer; hence, the BIR must act
on it, either by conforming to or by disagreeing with the extension. A
waiver of the statute of limitations, whether on assessment or collection,
should not be construed as a waiver of the right to invoke the defense of
prescription but, rather, an agreement between the taxpayer and the BIR to
extend the period to a date certain, within which the latter could still assess
or collect taxes due. The waiver does not imply that the taxpayer
relinquishes the right to invoke prescription unequivocally.
(27) CIR V. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. Whether or not the respondent is exempt from tax
G.R. NO. 188497, February 19, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J. RULING:
YES. Under Section 129 of the NIRC, excise taxes are those applied to
FACTS: goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sale
Respondent in this case sold aviation fuel to international carriers and or consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported.
paid the excise tax thereon. Shell now seeks a refund of the same relying Excise
on Section 135 of the Tax Code.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Solicitor General underscores the statutory basis of this Court’s ruling
that the exemption under Section 135 does not attach to the products.
Solicitor General points out that there was no pronouncement in cases
decided by the Supreme Court that petroleum manufacturers selling
petroleum products to international carriers are exempt from paying
excise taxes.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Pilipinas Shell argues that a plain reading of Section 135 of the NIRC
reveals that it is the petroleum products sold to international carriers
which are exempt from excise tax for which reason no excise taxes are
deemed to have been due in the first place. It points out that excise tax
being an indirect tax, Section 135 in relation to Section 148 should be
interpreted as referring to a tax exemption from the point of production
and removal from the place of production considering that it is only at
that point that an excise tax is imposed. Respondent also contends that
our ruling that Section 135 only prohibits local petroleum manufacturers
like respondent from shifting the burden of excise tax to international
carriers has adverse economic impact as it severely curtails the domestic
oil industry.
ISSUE:
taxes as used in our Tax Code fall under two types – (1) specific tax which
is based on weight or volume capacity and other physical unit of
measurement, and (2) ad valorem tax which is based on selling price or
other specified value of the goods. Aviation fuel is subject to specific tax
under Section 148 (g) which attaches to said product "as soon as they are in
existence as such."A tax is not excise where it does not subject directly the
produce or goods to tax but indirectly as an incident to, or in connection
with, the business to be taxed.
SO ORDERED
(28) KEPCO ILIJAN CORP. V. CIR (COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL Whether or not CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over the judicial claim
PROMULGATED: REVENUE) for being filed prematurely
G.R. NO. 205185, September 26 ,2018
Bersamin, J. RULING:
The petitioner brought its judicial claim in the CTA on April 22, 2004 or
FACTS: nine days after filing the administrative claim in the BIR. It did not
Petitioner filed its quarterly VAT returns for the four quarters of taxable await the lapse of the 120-day period provided under the NIRC, leading
year 2002, thereby showing the incurred expenses representing the the CTA En Banc to declare that the petitioner had prematurely brought
importation and domestic purchases of goods and services, including its appeal. Indeed, under Section 112 (c) of the NIRC, the respondent
the input VAT thereon. On April 13, 2004, it brought its administrative had 120 days from the submission of the complete documents in
claim for refund with RDO of the BIR, claiming excess input VAT support of the application of the respondent for the tax refund or tax
amounting to P74,658,481.68 for taxable year 2002. credit within which to decide whether or not to grant or deny the claim.
In case of the denial of the claim, or in case of the failure of the
On April 22, 2004, 9 days after filing the administrative claim, the respondent to act on the application within the period prescribed, the
petitioner filed its petition for review. taxpayer has 30 days from the receipt of the decision or from the
expiration of the 120-day period within which to file the petition for
CTA Second Division partly granted the petition for review, and review in the CTA.
ordered the respondent toUrletfiumnadtoerlyto issue a TCC for the
petitioner's unutilized excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and
sales to NPC jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a
for the second, third and fourth quarters of taxable year 2002, but judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period.
denying the petitioner's input VAT claim for the first quarter of taxable There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if
year 2002 on the ground of prescription, and the other input VAT claims the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular
for lack of the required documentary evidence. On MR of petitioner, taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific
CTA amended its decision and denied the entire claim on the ground of ruling is applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second One
prematurity. It opined that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative
petition for review because of the petitioner's non-observance of the rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into
periods provided under the NIRC filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the
Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA's
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner submits that the CTA acquired jurisdiction over the case and a sIsunmtphtiiosncoafsjuuch
e,riclaim
tshdeicsince equitable estoppel has
that the two-year period for filing the claim for refund of unutilized e tion over s
s t in as expressly authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.23
input taxes was to be reckoned from the filing of the return and the The petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund on
payment of the tax due. April 13, 2004 and April 22, 2004, respectively. Both claims were filed
after BIR Ruling No. DA-589-03 was issued on December 10, 2003, but
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: before the promulgation of the Aichi pronouncement on October 06,
Petitioner not liable for tax refund or tax credit. 2010. Thus, notwithstanding the petitioner's having filed its judicial
claim without waiting for the decision of the respondent or for the
ISSUE: expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA could still take
cognizance of the claims because they were filed within the period
exempted from the mandatory and jurisdictional 120-30 period rule.
SO ORDERED.
(29) TEAM SUAL CORP. V. CIR On March 31, 2003, without waiting for the resolution of its
CTA Division partially granted TSC's claim by allowing the refund of administrative claim for refund or tax credit, TSC filed with the CTA
unutilized input VAT for the first, third, and fourth quarters of taxable Division a petition for review. It prayed for the refund or issuance of
year 2001, but disallowed the refund for the second quarter. CTA a tax credit certificate for its alleged unutilized input VAT for the first
Division ruled that the claim for the second quarter did not fall within quarter of taxable year 2001. On July 23, 2003, TSC filed another
the two-year prescriptive period. CTA En Banc likewise granted petition for review seeking the refund or issuance of a tax credit
petitioner's claim for refund of input VAT for the second, third, and certificate for its alleged unutilized input VAT for the second, third,
fourth quarters of taxable year 2001, but in addition ruled that the CTA and fourth quarters of taxable year 200.
did not acquire jurisdiction over it as it had been filed prematurely.
G.R. NO. 201225-26 (from CTA-EB Nos. 649 & 651) – TEAM SUAL
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
CORP. (FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORP.) V. CIR
TSC insists that the judicial claim for refund over the first quarter
G.R. NO. 201132 (from CTA-EB No. 651) – CIR V. TEAM SUAL CORP. of 2001 was not prematurely filed and that the CTA Division did
(FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORP.)
in fact have jurisdiction to act on it.
G.R. NO. 201133 (from CTA-EB No. 649) – CIR V. TEAM SUAL CORP.
(FORMERLY MIRANT SUAL CORP.)
April 18, 2018
Reyes, Jr.,J.
FACTS:
On December 6, 2000, TSC filed with the BIR RDO an application for
zero-rating arising from its sale of power generation services to NPC for
the taxable year 2001.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
CIR argued that TSC has not sufficiently proven its entitlement to refund
and that the CTA had no jurisdiction to act on the judicial claim for
refund because the same was prematurely filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction to act on TSC's two judicial
claims for refund.
RULING:
In order for the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over a judicial claim for
refund or tax credit arising from unutilized input VAT, the said claim
must first comply with the mandatory 120+30-day waiting period. Any
judicial claim for refund or tax credit filed in contravention of said period
is rendered premature, depriving the CTA of jurisdiction to act on it.
Any taxpayer seeking a refund or tax credit arising from unutilized input
VAT from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales should first file an
initial administrative claim with the BIR. This claim for refund or tax
credit must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made. The CIR is then given a period of 120-days
from the submission of complete documents in support of the application
to either grant or deny the claim. If the claim is denied by the CIR or the
latter has not acted on it within the 120-day period, the taxpayer-claimant
is then given a period of 30 days to file a judicial claim via petition for
review with the CTA.
As such, the law provides for two scenarios before a judicial claim for
refund may be filed with the CTA: (1) the full or partial denial of the
claim within the 120-day period, or (2) the lapse of the 120-day period
without the CIR having acted on the claim. It is only from the happening
of either one may a taxpayer-claimant file its judicial claim for refund or
tax credit for unutilized input VAT. Consequently, failure to observe the
said period renders the judicial claim premature, divesting the CTA of
jurisdiction to act on it.
Given the fact that TSC's administrative claim was filed on March 20,
2003, the CIR had 120 days or until July 18, 2003 to act on it. Thus, the
first judicial claim was premature because TSC filed it a mere 11 days
after filing its administrative claim.
On the other hand, the second judicial claim filed by TSC was filed on
time because it was filed on July 23, 2003 or five days after the lapse of
the 120-day period.40 Accordingly, it is clear that the second judicial
claim complied with the mandatory waiting period of 120 days and was
filed within the prescriptive period of 30 days from the CIR's action or
inaction. Therefore, the CTA division only acquired jurisdiction over
TSC's second judicial claim for refund covering its second, third, and
fourth quarters of taxable year 2001.
Being a mere scrap of paper, TSC's judicial claim for refund filed on
March 31, 2003 covering the first quarter of taxable year 2001 cannot be
the source of any rights.
Thus, considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
CTA En Banc which held that between the March 31 and the July 23
petitions for review filed by TSC, the CTA Division only acquired
jurisdiction over the latter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are DENIED.
The Consolidated Decision dated September 15, 2011 and the Resolution
dated March 21, 2012 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB
No. 649 and CTA EB No. 651 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
(30) CBK POWER CO. LTD. V. CIR Alleging inaction of the CIR, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
G.R. NO. 198729-30, January 15, 2014 with the CTA on 18 April 2007.
Sereno, Cj.
CTA Second Division denied the claim for the first quarter of 2005
FACTS: for having been filed out of time. For the second and third quarters
Petitioner filed its administrative claims for the issuance of tax credit of 2005, the court a quo partly granted the claim and ordered the
certificates for its alleged unutilized input taxes on its purchase of issuance of a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner. CTA En Banc
capital goods and alleged unutilized input taxes on its local purchases ruled that petitioner’s judicial claim for the first, second, and third
and/or importation of goods and services, other than capital goods, quarters of 2005 were belatedly filed.
pursuant to Sections 112(A) and (B) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
with BIR Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 55 of Laguna ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is barred from claiming for
refund of unutilized input VAT for the first to third quarters of observe the 30-day prescriptive period to appeal to the CTA counted
2005 from the lapse of the 120-day period.
However, the Court emphasizes that the is not a case of premature filing
of a judicial claim. Although petitioner did not file its judicial claim with
the CTA prior to the expiration of the 120-day waiting period, it failed
to
(32) CIR V. PL MGMT. INT’L. PHILS., INC. judicial action for refund with the CTA, the year 2000 being a leap
G.R. NO. 160949, April 4, 2011 year.
647 SCRA 72
Bersamin, J. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Respondent counters that it filed its judicial action for refund within
FACTS: the statutory two-year period; that the two-year prescriptive period
On April 12, 2000, the respondent filed with the petitioner a was also not jurisdictional and might be relaxed on equitable
written claim for the refund of the P1,200,000.00 unutilized creditable reasons.
withholding tax for taxable year 1997. [4] However, the petitioner did not
act on the claim. ISSUES:
The inaction of petitioner CIR on the respondents written claim Whether or not respondent is entitled to a tax refund of the
for tax refund or tax credit impelled the latter to commence judicial unutilized creditable withholding tax
action for that purpose in the CTA. However, the CTA denied the claim
on December 10, 2001 for being brought beyond two years from the
accrual of the claim.
On appeal, the CA reversed the CTAs denial, and directed the
petitioner to refund the unutilized creditable withholding tax to the
respondent.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
The petitioner argues that the decision of the CA suspending the
running of the two-year period set by Section 229 of the NIRC on
ground of equity was erroneous and had no legal basis; that the
respondents 2-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC
commenced to run on April 13, 1998, the date it filed its ITR for taxable
year 1997; that by reckoning the period from April 13, 1998, the
respondent had only until April 12, 2000 within which to commence its
RULING: irrevocability rule provided in Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997. Thereby,
NO. The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA to the extent the respondent became barred from claiming the refund.
that it orders the petitioner to refund to the respondent the
P1,200,000.00 representing the unutilized creditable withholding tax in However, in view of it irrevocable choice, the respondent remained
taxable year 1997, but permit the respondent to apply that amount as tax entitled to utilize that amount of P1,200,000.00 as tax credit in
credit in succeeding taxable years until fully exhausted. succeeding taxable years until fully exhausted. In this regard,
prescription did not bar it from applying the amount as tax credit
Inasmuch as the respondent already opted to carry over its unutilized considering that there was no prescriptive period for the carrying over
creditable withholding tax of P1,200,000.00 to taxable year 1998, the carry- of the amount as tax credit in subsequent taxable years.[14]
over could no longer be converted into a claim for tax refund because of the
(33) MICROSOFT PHILS., INC. V. BIR Microsoft failed to comply with the invoicing requirements of
G.R. NO. 180173, April 6, 2011 Sections 113 and 237 of the NIRC as well as Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-
647 SCRA 398 95.
Carpio, J.
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not Microsoft is entitled to a claim for a tax credit or
On 27 December 2002, Microsoft filed an administrative claim refund of VAT input taxes on domestic purchases of goods or
for tax credit of VAT input taxes with the BIR. The administrative claim services even if the word zero-rated is not imprinted on Microsoft's
for tax credit was filed within two years from the close of the taxable official receipts
quarters when the zero-rated sales were made. On 23 April 2003, due to
the BIR's inaction, Microsoft filed a petition for review with the CTA.
Microsoft claimed to be entitled to a refund of unutilized input VAT
attributable to its zero-rated sales and prayed that judgment be
rendered directing the claim for tax credit or refund of VAT input taxes
for taxable year 2001.
CTA Second Division denied the claim for tax credit of VAT
input taxes. The CTA explained that Microsoft failed to comply with the
invoicing requirements as their official receipts do not bear the
imprinted word zero-rated on its face, thus, the official receipts cannot
be considered as valid evidence to prove zero-rated sales for VAT
purposes. CTA En Banc affirmed in toto the decision of the CTA Second
Division.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Microsoft insists that Sections 113 and 237 of the NIRC and
Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 do not provide that failure to indicate the
word zero-rated in the invoices or receipts would result in the outright
invalidation of these invoices or receipts and the disallowance of a claim
for tax credit or refund.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
RULING: provided in the NIRC and revenue regulations are clear. A VAT-
NO. The Court ruled that the printing of the word zero-rated is registered taxpayer is required to comply with all the VAT invoicing
required to be placed on VAT invoices or receipts covering zero-rated sales requirements to be able to file a claim for input taxes on domestic
in order to be entitled to claim for tax credit or refund. purchases for goods or services attributable to zero-rated sales. A VAT
As correctly held by both the CTA Second Division and CTA En invoice is an invoice that meets the requirements of Section 4.108-1 of
Banc found, Microsoft's receipts did not indicate the word zero-rated on its RR 7-95. Contrary to Microsoft's claim, RR 7-95 expressly states that
official receipts. Indisputably, Microsoft failed to comply with the invoicing [A]ll purchases covered by invoices other than a VAT invoice shall not
requirements of the NIRC and its implementing revenue regulation to give rise to any input tax. Microsoft's invoice, lacking the word zero-
claim a tax credit or refund of VAT input tax for taxable year 2001. rated, is not a VAT invoice, and thus cannot give rise to any input tax.
The invoicing requirements for a VAT-registered taxpayer as
(34) RCBC V. CIR ISSUE:
G.R. NO. 170257, September 7, 2011
657 SCRA 70
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) is a
corporation engaged in general banking operations. It received Letter of
Authority issued by then Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, authorizing a special audit team to examine
the books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal
revenue taxes from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1995.4
On January 23, 1997, RCBC executed two Waivers of the Defense
of Prescription Under the Statute of Limitations of the National Internal
Revenue Code covering the internal revenue taxes due for the years
1994 and 1995, effectively extending the period of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) to assess up to December 31, 2000.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
RCBC argued that the waivers of the Statute of Limitations
which it executed on January 23, 1997 were not valid because the same
were not signed or conformed to by the respondent CIR as required
under Section 222(b) of the Tax Code.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
By receiving, accepting and paying portions of the
reduced assessment, RCBC bound itself to the new assessment,
implying that it recognized the validity of the waivers. RCBC
could not assail the validity of the waivers after it had received
and accepted certain benefits as a result of the execution of the
said waivers.
RULING: assessment. RCBCs subsequent action effectively belies its insistence
YES. Petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of the that the waivers are invalid. The records show that on December 6, 2000,
waivers. RCBC, through its partial payment of the revised assessments upon receipt of the revised assessment, RCBC immediately made
issued within the extended period as provided for in the questioned payment on the uncontested taxes. Thus, RCBC is estopped from
waivers, impliedly admitted the validity of those waivers. Had petitioner questioning the validity of the waivers. To hold otherwise and allow a
truly believed that the waivers were invalid and that the assessments party to gainsay its own act or deny rights which it had previously
were issued beyond the prescriptive period, then it should not have paid recognized would run counter to the principle of equity.
the reduced amount of taxes in the revised
Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the
validity of the said waivers with respect to the assessment of
deficiency onshore tax
(35) CIR V. FILINVEST DEV’T. CORP.
G.R. NO. 163653, July 19, 2011 RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Perez, J. Filinvest disputed this by saying that the CIR lacks the
authority to impute theoretical interest and that the rule is that
FACTS: interests cannot be demanded in the absence of a stipulation to the
Respondent Filinvest Development Corporation extended effect. FDC claimed that the cash advances it extended to its affiliates
advances in favor of its affiliates and supported the same with were interest-free in the absence of the express stipulation on interest
instructional letters and cash and journal vouchers. required under Article 1956
On 3 January 2000, FDC received from the BIR a Formal Notice
of Demand to pay deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes,
plus interests and compromise penalties. The BIR assessed Filinvest for
deficiency income tax by imputing an “arm’s length” interest rate on its
advances to affiliates. FAI similarly received from the BIR a Formal
Letter of Demand for deficiency income taxes on the taxable gain
purportedly realized by FAI from the Deed of Exchange it executed
with FDC and FLI. CTA enunciated that the CIR was justified in
assessing undeclared interests on the same cash advances pursuant to
his authority
under Section 43 of the NIRC in order to forestall tax evasion.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CIR claimed that the transfer of property in question should not
be considered tax free since, with the resultant diminution of its shares
in FLI, FDC did not gain further control of said corporation. Likewise
calling attention to the fact that the cash advances FDC extended to its
affiliates were interest free despite the interest bearing loans it obtained
from banking institutions, the CIR invoked Section 43 of the old NIRC
which, as implemented by RR No. 2, Section 179 (b) and (c), gave him
"the power to allocate, distribute or apportion income or deductions
between or among such organizations, trades or business in order to
prevent evasion of taxes."
of the Civil Code, FDC questioned the imposition of an arm's-length interest the lending entity. The term in the definition of gross income that even
rate thereon. those income “from whatever source derived” is covered still requires
that there must be actual or at least probable receipt or realization of the
ISSUE: item of gross income sought to be apportioned, distributed, or allocated.
Whether or not CIR can impute theoretical interest on the advances Finally, the rule under the Civil Code that “no interest shall be due
made by Filinvest to its affiliates unless expressly stipulated in writing” was also applied in this case.
In this case, there is no evidence of actual or possible showing
RULING: that the advances taxpayer extended to its affiliates had resulted to
NO. Despite the seemingly broad power of the CIR to distribute, interests subsequently assessed by the CIR. Even if the Court were to
apportion and allocate gross income under Section 50 of the Tax Code, the accord credulity to the CIR’s assertion that taxpayer had deducted
same does not include the power to impute theoretical interests even with substantial interest expense from its gross income, there would still be
regard to controlled taxpayers’ transactions. This is true even if the CIR is no factual basis for the imputation of theoretical interests on the subject
able to prove that interest expense (on its own loans) was in fact claimed by advances and assess deficiency income taxes thereon.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Silicon claimed that it was entitled to a refund/credit as it
complied with all the requirements provided for under the law.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR asserted that Silicon’s claim for refund/tax credit was not
duly substantiated and that said claim for refund is not subject to zero-
percent (0%) rate of VAT. Further, the claim for refund has already
prescribed pursuant to Section 112(A) and (B)18 of the NIRC.
Silicon failed to file an appeal within 30 days from the lapse of the was deemed a denial of the claim for tax credit or refund, Silicon had
120-day period, and it only filed its petition for review with the CTA on until January 7, 2001 or 30 days from December 8, 2000 to file its petition
March 30, 2001 which was 451 days late. Thus, Silicon’s judicial claim for for review with the CTA. However, Silicon again failed to comply with
tax credit or refund should have been dismissed for having been filed late. the 120+30 day period provided under Section 112(C) since it filed its
The CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by judicial claim only on June 28, 2002 or 536 days late. Thus, the petition
Silicon. Similarly, Silicon’s claim for tax refund for the second quarter of for review, which was belatedly filed, should have been dismissed by
2000 should have been dismissed for having been filed out of time. the CTA which acquired no jurisdiction to act on the petition.
Records show that Silicon filed its claim for tax credit or refund on August
10, 2000. The CIR then had 120 days or until December 8, 2000 to grant or
deny the claim. With the inaction of the CIR to decide on the claim which
(37) CIR V. TOLEDO POWER, INC. I. Whether or not TPI complied with the 120+30 day rule
G.R. NO. 183880, January 20,2014 II. Whether or not TPI sufficiently complied with
Peralta, J. the invoicing requirements under the Tax Code.
FACTS:
On June 20, 2002, respondent filed an application with the ERC
for the issuance of a Certificate of Compliance pursuant to the IRR of the
EPIRA law.
On September 30, 2003, respondent filed with the BIR RDO No.
83, an administrative claim for refund or unutilized input VAT for the
aggregate amount of ₱9,129,370.27. Due to CIR’s inaction on their claim,
TPI filed a Petition for Review on October 24, 2003 and January 22, 2004
for the third and fourth quarter of 2001, respectively, for the refund or
issuance of a TCC for its unutilized input VAT paid by petitioner on its
domestic purchases of goods and services and importation of goods
attributable to zero-rated sales.
Acting on the petition, the CTA First Division issued a Decision
dated May 17, 2007 partially granted TPI’s refund claim or issuance of
tax credit certificate. CTA en banc affirmed with modification.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CIR argues that TPI failed to comply with the invoicing
requirements to prove entitlement to the refund or issuance of tax credit
certificate. In addition, he challenged the jurisdiction of the CTA First
Division to entertain respondent’s petition for review for failure on its
part to comply with the provisions of Section 112 (C) of the Tax Code.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
TPI claims that they are entitled to a refund/tax credit after
complying with the requirements provided for by law.
ISSUES:
RULING: to October 6, 2010 (promulgation of the Aichi doctrine).
I. TPI’s refund claim of unutilized input VAT for the third
quarter of 2001 is denied for being prematurely filed with the CTA, II. The Court agreed with the CTA’s findings that the words
while its refund claim of unutilized input VAT for the fourth "zero-rated" appeared on the VAT invoices/official receipts
quarter of 2001 may be entertained since it falls within the presented by the TPI in support of its refund claim. Although the
exception provided in the Court’s most recent rulings. same was merely stamped and not pre-printed, the same is
sufficient compliance with the law, since the imprinting of the
As held in the San Roque case, strict compliance with the 120+30 word "zero-rated" was required merely to distinguish sales
day mandatory and jurisdictional periods is not necessary when the subject to 10% VAT, those that are subject to 0% VAT (zero-
judicial claims are filed between December 10, 2003 (issuance of BIR rated) and exempt sales, to enable the BIR to properly implement
Ruling No. DA-489-03 which states that the taxpayer need not wait and enforce the other VAT provisions of the Tax Code.
for the 120-day period to expire before it could seek judicial relief)
(38) CIR vs. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
G.R. NO. 172129, September 12, 2008 MPC claimed that they are entitled to a refund/tax credit for
Velasco, Jr., J. its unutilized input VAT.
FACTS:
In the light of the NPCs tax exempt status, MPC, on the belief
that its sale of power generation services to NPC is zero-rated for VAT
purposes, filed on December 1, 1997 an Application for Effective Zero
Rating. Not getting any response from the BIR , MPC refiled its
application in the form of a request for ruling with the VAT Review
Committee at the BIR.
MPC filed on December 20, 1999 an administrative claim for
refund of unutilized input VAT in the amount of PhP 148,003,047.62.
Since the BIR Commissioner failed to act on its claim for refund, MPC
went to the CTA via a petition for review.
CTA granted MPCs claim for input VAT refund or credit, but
only for the amount of PhP 10,766,939.48. CA rendered its assailed
decision modifying that of the CTA decision by granting most of MPC’s
claims for tax refund or credit, amounting to PhP 135,993,570.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
BIR Commissioner asserted that MPC’s claim for refund cannot
be granted on the ground that MPCs sale of electricity to NPC is not
zero- rated for its failure to secure an approved application for zero-
rating.
RULING: of the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the period covering April 7,
NO. The Court ordered the CIR to refund or issue a TCC in favor 1993 to September 6, 1996. Moreover, the claim for refund/tax credit for
of MPC for its unutilized input VAT payments directly attributable to its the creditable input VAT payment made by MPC embodied in OR No.
effectively zero-rated sales for the second quarter only in the total amount 0189 was filed beyond the period provided by law for such claim. In
of PhP 10,766,939.48. addition, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C)
Records show that there was belated payment by MPC of its or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of refund, prescribes a
obligation for creditable input VAT. MPC did not, for the VATable MPC- different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing
Mitsubishi 1993 to 1996 transactions adverted to, immediately pay the of a claim therefor as both provisions apply only to instances of
corresponding input VAT. OR No. 0189 issued on April 14, 1998 clearly erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes. In this
reflects the belated payment of input VAT corresponding to the payment case, MPC’s creditable input VAT was not erroneously paid.
FACTS:
Respondent Aichi Forging, is engaged in the manufacturing,
producing, and processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered
with the BIR) as a VAT entity4 and its products are registered with the
BOI as a pioneer status.
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for
refund/credit of input VAT in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with
the petitioner CIR, through the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioner agued that the administrative and the judicial claims
were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit. He
reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim
for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004. In addition, petitioner
argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
Respondent contended that the non-observance of the 120-day
period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in
Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims
are filed within the 2-year prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the
RULING: (2) YES. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA
(1) YES. As ruled in the case of CIR v. MPC, the 2-year period should premature. Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that
be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales “any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
were made. In CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc, the Court effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of the
said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance
equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is paid attributable to such sales.” The phrase “within two (2) years
the latter that must prevail being the more recent law. x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund”
refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and
Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to not to appeals made to the CTA. The premature filing of
file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the
September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was
respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed. acquired by the CTA.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CIR claimed that respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid application for a tax refund. Hence, the judicial
claim made before the CTA deserve outright dismissal for being
premature.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Respondent asserted that they are entitled to a refund/tax credit
for complying with all the requisites for claiming a refund under the
NIRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s petition was prematurely filed with the
CTA
2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where No. DA-489-03.
this Court held that the 120+30 day periods are mandatory and
jurisdictional. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
Therefore, respondent's filing of the judicial claim barely two SO ORDERED.
days after the administrative claim is acceptable, as it fell within the
period during which the Court recognized the validity of BIR Ruling
(41)AICHI FORGING V. CIR action.
G.R. NO. 193625, August 30, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
On 26 September 2002, AICHI filed with the BIR a written claim
for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilized input VAT credits for the
third and fourth quarters of 2000 and the four taxable quarters of 2001.
As respondent CIR failed to act on the refund claim, AICHI filed, on 30
September 2002, a Petition for Review before the CTA Division.
CTA Division partially granted the refund claim of AICHI. CTA
En Banc affirmed on the ground that the law does not prohibit the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for refund.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Citing the Revised CTA Rules, AICHI claimed that it has 15 days
from receipt of the decision of the CTA En Banc within which to file an
MR. Considering that it received the 18 February 2010 Decision of the
CTA En Banc on 25 February 2010, and that it filed the MR on 12 March
2010, AICHI asserts that the filing of the said motion was made within
the prescriptive period provided in the law.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
refund claim in view of AICHI's failure to observe the 30-day period to
claim refund/tax credit as specified in Sec. 112 of the Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AICHI sufficiently proved its entitlement to the refund
or tax credit
RULING:
NO. The Court denied AICHI’S claim for refund. The CTA had
no jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
AICHI's judicial claim was filed prematurely and, thus, without cause of
credit of input taxes covering the six separate taxable periods was made on In addition, petitioner adopted the wrong remedy in assailing
26 September 2002. Both the CTA Division and CTA En Banc correctly the decision of the CTA En Banc. What the petitioner should have done
ruled that it fell within the two-year statute of limitations. However, its to question the decision of the CTA En Banc was to file before this Court
judicial claim was filed a mere four days later on 30 September 2002, or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the same Rules of Court. This is in
before the window period when the taxpayers need not observe the 120- conformity with Section 11 of R.A. No. 9282
day mandatory and jurisdictional period. Consequently, the general rule
applies.
AICHI had timely filed its administrative claim for refund or tax
credit before the BIR. The records show that the claim for refund/tax
(42)TAGANITO MINING CORP. V. CIR I. Whether or not Taganito’s judicial claim for refund of excess
G.R. NO. 201195, November 26, 2014 input VAT should be allowed
Mendoza, J. II. Whether or not Taganito should be entitled to its entire claim
for refund
FACTS:
On March 26, 2008, Taganito filed with CIR a claim for credit/refund of
input VAT paid on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services and
importation of goods.
On April 17, 2008, as respondent CIR had not yet issued a final decision
on the administrative claim, Taganito filed a judicial claim before the CTA
Division to judicially claim a tax credit/refund under Section 229 of the NIRC.
On May 26, 2009, in accordance with the order of the CTA, Taganito
filed a supplemental petition for review limiting the issue of the case to the
remaining amount of ₱4,611,123.00, representing alleged excess input VAT paid
on the importation of capital goods from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006.
CTA Division denied Taganito’s petition for review holding that it
failed to prove that it complied with the substantiation requirements.
Moreover, considering that Taganito filed its judicial claim before the
expiration of the 120- day period, the CTA En Banc ruled that the judicial claim
was prematurely filed and, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Taganito argued that prior to Aichi, a taxpayer need not wait for the
decision of the CIR on its administrative claim for refund before filing its
judicial claim, in accordance with the period provided in Section 229 of the
NIRC. Moreover, it insisted that the official receipts issued by the authorized
agent banks acting as collection agents of the respondent, constituted more
than sufficient proof of payment of the VAT.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR countered that Aichi is a sound decision and that pursuant thereto,
the petitioner’s judicial claim for refund was prematurely filed. The CIR further
argues that Taganito failed to comply with the necessary substantiation
requirements to prove actual payment of the claimed input VAT.
ISSUE:
RULING: II. NO. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to comply with
I. YES. The Court ruled that the judicial claim timely filed. The Court agreed substantiation requirements. The Court agreed with the finding of the
with petitioner that the prevailing doctrine pertinent to the issue at hand is CTA Division that petitioner failed to duly substantiate its claim. As
CIR v. San Roque. The general rule is that the 120+30 day period is noted by the CTA, there was no year indicated in OR No. 0028847, in
mandatory and jurisdictional from the effectivity of the 1997 NIRC on support of the claim of ₱1,131,431.00. It is plain that this claim cannot
January 1, 1998, up to the present. As an exception, judicial claims filed be deemed to have been properly substantiated. Moreover, under the
from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 need not wait for the law, any input tax that is subject of a claim for refund must be
exhaustion of the 120-day period. evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt. An IEIRD is required to
properly substantiate the payment of the duties and taxes on imported
In the present case, Taganito filed its judicial claim with the CTA on April goods. Considering that the petitioner failed to submit the import
17, 2008, clearly within the period of exception of December 10, 2003 to entries relevant to its claim, the CTA did not err in ruling that the
October 6, 2010. Its judicial claim was, therefore, not prematurely filed. petitioner’s claim was not sufficiently proven.
PETITIONER’s ARGUMENT
Petitioners argued that they did not form an unregistered
partnership solely on the basis of an isolated sale transactions.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
There was merely a co-ownership between the petitioners. There
RULING: is no adequate basis to support the proposition that they thereby formed
NO. The Court ruled that there is no evidence that petitioners an unregistered partnership. The two isolated transactions whereby
entered into an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a they purchased properties and sold the same a few years thereafter did
common fund, and that they intended to divide the profits among not thereby make them partners. They shared in the gross profits as co-
themselves. Respondent commissioner and/ or his representative just owners and paid their capital gains taxes on their net profits and availed
assumed these conditions to be present on the basis of the fact that of the tax amnesty thereby. Under the circumstances, they cannot be
petitioners purchased certain parcels of land and became co-owners considered to have formed an unregistered partnership which is thereby
thereof. The transactions conducted by the petitioners were isolated. The liable for corporate income tax, as the respondent commissioner
character of habituality peculiar to business transactions for the purpose of proposes.
gain was not present.
(44)OBILLOS V. CIR
G.R. NO. L-68118 October 29, 1985 ISSUE:
139 SCRA 436 Whether or not the petitioners had indeed formed a partnership or
Aquino, J. joint venture and thus liable for corporate tax
FACTS: RULING:
In 1973, Jose Obillos completed payment on two lots located in NO. To regard the petitioners as having formed a taxable
Greenhills, San Juan. Thereafter, he transferred his rights to his four unregistered partnership would result in oppressive taxation and
children for them to build their own residences. The Torrens title would confirm the dictum that the power to tax involves the power to
show that they were co-owners of the two lots. However, the petitioners destroy. That eventuality
resold them to Walled City Securities Corporation and Olga Cruz
Canda. They treated the profit as capital gains and paid an income tax
thereon.
The CIR requested the petitioners to pay the corporate income
tax of their shares, as this entire assessment is based on the alleged
partnership since they contributed each to buy the lots, resold them and
divided the profits among them. Thus, the petitioners are being held
liable for deficiency income taxes and penalties on their profit, in
addition to the tax on capital gains already paid by them.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Obillos testified that they have no intention to form the
partnership and that it was merely incidental since they sold the said
lots due to high demand of construction. Naturally, when they sell them
as co-partners, it will result to the share of profits. Further, their
intention was to divide the lots for residential purposes.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR acted on the theory that the four petitioners had formed an
unregistered partnership or joint venture.
should be obviated. They were co-owners pure and simple. To consider incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership which was in the
them as partners would obliterate the distinction between a co-ownership nature of things a temporary state. It had to be terminated sooner or
and a partnership. The petitioners were not engaged in any joint venture later.
by reason of that isolated transaction. The division of the profit was merely
(45)CIR V. MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC. emphasized that the normal VAT-registered activity of NDC is
G.R. NO. 146984, July 28, 2006 leasing personal property. Any
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Because of a government program of privatization, NDC
decided to sell its NMC shares and five of its ships. In a VAT Ruling,
BIR held that the sale was subject to VAT since NDC was a VAT-
registered enterprise and the transaction is incident to its normal VAT-
registered activity of leasing out personal property.
CTA and CA ruled that the sale is not subject to VAT.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CIR also squarely defended the VAT rulings holding the sale of
the vessels liable for VAT. The CIR argued that the sale of the vessels
were among those transactions "deemed sale," as enumerated in
Section 4 of
R.R. No. 5-87. CIR particularly emphasized Section 4(E)(i) of the
Regulation, which classified "change of ownership of business" as a
circumstance that gave rise to a transaction "deemed sale."
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Private respondents argued that what occurred was an isolated
transaction not subject to VAT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by the NDC of its vessels to the private
respondents is subject to VAT
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that the sale of the vessels is not subject to VAT
since it was not in the ordinary course of trade or business of NDC.
“Course of business” is what is usually done in the management of
trade or business. It connotes regularity. In the case at bar, the sale was
an isolated transaction. The sale which was involuntary and made
pursuant to the declared policy of government for privatization could
no longer be repeated or carried on with regularity. It should be
sale, barter, or exchange of goods or services not in the course of trade or
business is not subject to tax.
(46) MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP V. CIR CIR claimed that Mindanao I failed to exhaust administrative remedies
MINDANAO II GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL before it filed its petition for review.
REVENUE
G.R. No. 193301
ISSUE:
MINDANAO I GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE Whether or not Mindanao I and II are entitled to its claims for tax refund or tax
G.R. No. 194637 credit
March 11, 2013
Carpio, J. RULING:
The claims of Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership for the first quarter
FACTS: of 2003 is DENIED while its claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of
Mindanao I and II (Mindanao) are value-added taxpayers, and Block 2003 are GRANTED.
Power Production Facilities accredited by the Department of Energy. They had The claims of Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership for the first, third,
a Build-Operate-Transfer contract with PNOC-EDC, whereby Mindanao and fourth quarters of 2003 are DENIED while its claim for the second quarter
converts steam supplied to it by PNOC-EDC into electricity, and then delivers of 2003 is GRANTED.
the electricity to the NPC in behalf of PNOC-EDC. The Court cannot disregard mandatory and jurisdictional conditions
The EPIRA Law amended the Tax Reform Act of 1997 when it decreed mandated by law simply because the Commissioner chose not to contest the
that sales of power by generation companies shall be subjected to a zero-rate of numerical correctness of the claim for tax refund or credit of the taxpayer. Non-
VAT. Pursuant to EPIRA, Mindanao I and II filed their claims for the issuance compliance with mandatory periods, non-observance of prescriptive periods,
of tax credit certificates on unutilized or excess input taxes from their sales of and non-adherence to exhaustion of administrative remedies bar a taxpayer’s
generated power and delivery of electric capacity and energy to NPC. claim for tax refund or credit, whether or not the Commissioner questions the
CTA En Banc denied Mindanao II’s claims for refund tax credit for the numerical correctness of the claim of the taxpayer. The Court should not
first and second quarters of 2003, and Mindanao I’s claims for refund/tax credit establish the precedent that non-compliance with mandatory and jurisdictional
for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2003, for being filed out of conditions can be excused if the claim is otherwise meritorious, particularly in
time claims for tax refunds or credit. Such precedent will render meaningless
compliance with mandatory and jurisdictional requirements, for then every tax
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT refund case will have to be decided on the numerical correctness of the
Mindanao II argued that the sale of the fully depreciated Nissan Patrol amounts claimed, regardless of non-compliance with mandatory and
is a one-time transaction and is not incidental to its VAT zero-rated operations. jurisdictional conditions.
Moreover, the disallowed input taxes substantially complied with the
requirements for refund or tax credit.
Mindanao I claimed that the CTA Second Division should not have
allocated proportionately Mindanao I’s unutilized creditable input taxes for the
taxable year 2003 because the proportionate allocation of the amount of
creditable taxes in Section 112(A) applies only when the creditable input taxes
due cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any of the zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sales.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR argued that Mindanao II’s judicial claims were filed beyond the
period allowed by law, as stated in Section 112(A) of the 1997 Tax Code. The
CIR further stated that Section 229 is a general provision, and governs cases not
covered by Section 112(A).
(47) PNB V. CARMELITA SANTOS, ET AL. PNB vs. CARMELITA S. SANTOS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 208293 Whether Philippine National Bank was negligent in releasing the deposit
LINA B. AGUILAR vs. CARMELITA S. SANTOS, ET AL., Respondents. to Bernardito Manimbo
G.R. No. 208295
December 10, 2014 RULING:
Leonen, J. YES. The Court held that Tthe trial court and the CA correctly
found that petitioners PNB and Aguilar were negligent in handling the
FACTS: deposit of Angel C. Santos.
Sometime in May 1996, respondents discovered that their father Petitioners PNB and Aguilar’s treatment of Angel C. Santos’
maintained a premium savings account with Philippine National Bank account is inconsistent with the high standard of diligence required of
(PNB), Sta. Elena-Marikina City Branch. banks. They accepted Manimbo’s representations despite knowledge of
Respondents went to PNB to withdraw their father's deposit. the existence of circumstances that should have raised doubts on such
However, Aguilar informed them that the deposit had already been representations. As a result, Angel C. Santos’ deposit was given to a
released to a certain Bernardito Manimbo on April 1, 1997. person stranger to him. Petitioners PNB and Aguilar released Angel C.
On May 20, 1998, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Santos’ deposit to Manimbo without having been presented the BIR-
Court of Marikina City a complaint for sum of money and damages issued certificate of payment of, or exception from, estate tax. This is a
against PNB, Lina B. Aguilar, and a John Doe. legal requirement before the deposit of a decedent is released.
On May 20, 1998, respondents filed before the RTC of Marikina PNB and Aguilar either have no fixed standards for the release
City a complaint for sum of money and damages against PNB, Lina B. of their deceased clients’ deposits or they have standards that they
Aguilar, and a John Doe. disregard for convenience, favor, or upon exercise of discretion. Both are
RTC held that PNB and Aguilar were jointly and severally liable inconsistent with the required diligence of banks. These threaten the
to pay respondents. CA sustained RTC’s decision. safety of the depositors’ accounts as they provide avenues for
fraudulent practices by third persons or by bank officers themselves.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
PNB and Aguilar denied that Angel C. Santos had two separate
accounts (premium deposit account and time deposit account with
PNB.15 They alleged that Manimbo was able to submit an affidavit of
self- adjudication and the required surety bond, that he also submitted a
certificate of payment of estate tax. All documents he submitted
appeared to be regular.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Angel C. Santos had only one account with PNB. 31 The account
was originally a time deposit, which was converted into a premium
savings account when it was not renewed on maturity.
ISSUE:
(48)MARCELO INVESTMENT & MANAGEMENT CORP. V. On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was
MARCELO, JR. survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3)
G.R. NO. 209651, NOVEMBER 26, 2014 Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner MIMCO filed a
Perez, J. Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of
Jose, Sr. before the RTC. Pending issuance of letters of
FACTS: administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special
administrators. Thereafter, RTC appointed Edward as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. ISSUE:
A project partition was submitted, Edward manifested that Whether or not the appointment of a regular administrator is still
oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. had already expressed his conformity to necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution stage of the
the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.’s estate
of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by his signature. He therefore prays that
the said document which bears the conformity of all 4 compulsory heirs RULING:
be approved. YES. The settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate is not yet through and
RTC approved the proposed partition. However, the distribution complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage.
was deferred pending submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. The Court observed that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the
At this state, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive Estate, approved by the RTC, is not yet in effect and complete. The
for his appointment as new regular administrator, which the RTC Court further note that there has been no manifestation forthcoming
approved. from any of the heirs, or the parties in this case, regarding the
completion of the proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In
PETTIONER’S ARGUMENT fact, as all parties are definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate
The appointment of a regular administrator is unnecessary proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes. The liquidation
where there remains no pending matter in the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual partition of the estate,
estate requiring attention and administration. There is no existing or where each heir separately holds his share in the estate as that which
unliquidated debt against the estate of Jose, Sr, the settlement thereof already belongs to him, remains intangible and the ultimate distribution
being already at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage. Further to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate taxes.
on that, the liquidation and proposed partition had long been approved
by the probate court.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary because the
estate is left with no one who will administer the estate, i.e., to liquidate
the estate and distribute the residue among the heirs.
(49)DIZON V. CTA demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax.
G.R. NO. 140944, April 30, 2008 This was subsequently reduced by CTA to P37,419,493.71 .
Nachura, J. The CA affirmed the CTA’s ruling.
RULING.
YES. The date-of-death valuation rule shall apply in this case.
(50)PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE than their book value based on the financial statements of Philam
COMPANY (PHILAMLIFE) V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE & CIR Care as of the end of 2008. CIR held donor’s tax became imposable
G.R. NO. 210987, NOVEMBER 24, 2014 on the price difference pursuant to Sec. 100 of the NIRC.
Velasco, Jr., J.
ISSUES:
FACTS: I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the CA Petition
Philamlife sold its shares in Philam Care Health Systems to STI for lack of jurisdiction; and
Investments Inc., the highest bidder, for PhP 104,259,330. After the sale
was completed and the necessary documentary stamp and capital gains
taxes were paid, Philamlife filed an application for a certificate
authorizing registration/tax clearance with the BIR to facilitate the
transfer of the shares. It was informed by BIR that there is a need to
secure a BIR ruling in connection with its application due to potential
donor’s tax liability.
Respondent SOF affirmed CIR’s ruling on the assessment. CA
dismissed Philamlife’s petition reasoning that it is CTA which has
jurisdiction.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
The transaction cannot attract donor’s tax liability since there
was no donative intent and, ergo, no taxable donation; that the shares
were sold at their actual fair market value and at arm’s length; that as
long as the transaction conducted is at arm’s length––such that a
bonafide business arrangement of the dealings is done in the ordinary
course of business––a sale for less than an adequate consideration is not
subject to donor’s tax; and that donor’s tax does not apply to sale of
shares sold in an open bidding process.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CIR argued that the selling price of the shares sold was lower
II. Whether or not the price difference in petitioner’s adverted sale of rule on the validity of a particular administrative rule or
shares in PhilamCare attracts donor’s tax regulation so long as it is within its appellate jurisdiction. Hence,
it can now rule not only on the propriety of an assessment or tax
RULING: treatment of a certain transaction, but also on the validity of the
I. NO. Reviews by the Secretary of Finance pursuant to Sec. 4 of the revenue regulation or revenue memorandum circular on which
NIRC are appealable to the CTA. the said assessment is based.
Admittedly, there is no provision in law that expressly provides II. YES. The price difference is subject to donor’s tax. The absence of
where exactly the ruling of the Secretary of Finance under the donative intent, if that be the case, does not exempt the sales of
adverted NIRC provision is appealable to. However, Sec. 7(a)(1) of stock transaction from donor's tax since Sec. 100 of the NIRC
RA 1125, as amended, addresses the seeming gap in the law as it categorically states that the amount by which the fair market
vests the CTA, albeit impliedly, with jurisdiction over the CA value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration
petition as "other matters" arising under the NIRC or other laws shall be deemed a gift. Thus, even if there is no actual donation,
administered by the BIR. CTA, through its power of certiorari, to the difference in price is considered a donation by fiction of law.
(51)BIR V. CA AND SPOUSES ANTONIO VILLAN MANLY & CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and
RUBY ONG MANLY denied its subsequent MR.
G.R. NO. 197590, November 14, 2014
Del Castillo, J. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
In filing a criminal case for tax evasion, a prior computation
There is grave abuse of discretion when the determination of probable or assessment of tax is not required because the crime is complete
cause is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, due to passion or when the violator knowingly and willfully filed a fraudulent return
personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a with intent to evade a part or all of the tax. Since the spouses failed to
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.1 explain the alleged unreported or undeclared income, petitioner
asserts that criminal charges for tax evasion should be filed against
FACTS: them.
BIR issued a Letter of Authority authorizing the investigation of
respondent spouses’ IR tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior
years. They were required to submit documentary evidence to
substantiate the source of their cash purchase of a 256-square-meter log
cabin in Tagaytay worth P17,511,010. However, respondents failed to
comply.
The revenue officers found that the modest income declared in
his ITRs, he was still able to purchase in cash several properties and
thus concluded that Antonio’s ITRs for taxable years 2000, 2001, and
2003 were underdeclared. And since the underdeclaration exceeded 30%
of the declared income, it was considered prima facie evidence of fraud
with intent to evade payment of proper taxes due.
The State Prosecutor recommended the filing of criminal charges
against the spouses. The latter moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. On appeal, the SOJ reversed the Resolution of the State
Prosecutor.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT respondent spouses for tax evasion as petitioner was able to show that a
Petitioner failed to prove that a tax is actually due. Neither was it tax is due from them. the underdeclaration of the respondent spouses is
able to show the source of the alleged unreported or undeclared income as more than 30%of their reported or declared income, which under
required in RM No. 15-95. Section 248(B) of the NIRC constitutes as prima facie evidence of false or
fraudulent return. As such, petitioner recommended the filing of
ISSUE: criminal cases against respondent spouses under Sections 254 and 255,
Whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondent spouses in relation to Section 248(B) of the NIRC is proper.
liable for tax evasion In completely disregarding the evidence presented and in
affirming the ruling of the Acting Justice Secretary Devanadera that no
RULING: probable cause exists, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
YES. The Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(52)WINEBRENNER & INIGO INSURANCE BROKER, INC. V. CIR excess CWT for the 4 quarters of CY 2003 to the succeeding 4
G.R. NO. 206526, January 28, 2015 quarters of CY 2004 was made. In the absence of said ITRs, no refund
Mendoza, J. could be granted
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
The submission of quarterly income tax returns for the
subsequent taxable period was unnecessary. It further submits that
despite the non-presentation of the quarterly ITRs, it has sufficiently
shown that the excess CWT for CY 2003 was not carried over or applied
to its income tax liabilities forCY 2004, as shown in the Annual ITR for
2004 it submitted.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Petitioner failed to present the quarterly ITRs for CY 2004 which
is indispensable in proving petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed
amount because it would prove that no carry-over of unutilized and
succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carry-over and apply the
excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters RULING:
of the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be NO. Proving that no carry-over has been made does not
considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash absolutely require the presentation of the quarterly ITRs.
refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor. What Section 76 requires is to prove the prima facie entitlement to
a claim, including the fact of not having carried over the excess credits
ISSUE: to the subsequent quarters or taxable year. As such, any document,
Whether or not the submission and presentation of the quarterly ITRs of other than quarterly ITRs may be used to establish that indeed the non-
the succeeding quarters of a taxable year is indispensable in a claim for carry over clause has been complied with, provided that such is
refund competent, relevant and part of the records.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Petitioner argued that since the CA does not have jurisdiction
over respondent’s appeal, it cannot perform any action on it except to
order its dismissal.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Respondent maintained that petitioner’s TCCs were fraudulently
RULING: on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50
NO. The Court finds that the CA erred in referring the records of the of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the act of the CA in referring
collection case to the CTA for proper disposition of the appeal taken by respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the guise of
respondent. CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and
cases originally decided by the RTC. In the instant case, the CA has no thus, stands to be corrected.
jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action
(54)CIR V. CTA SECOND DIVISION & PETRON CORP.
G.R. NO. 207843, July 15, 2015 RULING:
Perlas-Bernabe, J. NO. Petron's tax liability was premised on the COC's
issuance of CMC No. 164-2012, which gave effect to the CIR's June
FACTS: 29, 2012 Letter
In June 2012, Petron imported alkylate and paid VAT. Based on
the Final Computation, said importation was subjected to excise taxes,
and consequently, to an additional VAT of 12% on the imposed excise
tax. The imposition of the excise tax was supposedly premised on CMC
No. 164-2012 dated July 18, 2012, implementing the Letter issued by the
CIR, which states that: Alkylate which is a product of distillation similar
to that of naphta, is subject to excise tax under Section 148(e) of the
NIRC of 1997. 9
In view of the CIR's assessment, Petron filed before the CTA a
petition for review raising the issue of whether its importation of
alkylate as a blending component is subject to excise tax. CTA
eventually denied the CIR's MR. In effect, the CTA gave due course to
Petron's petition
PETITIONER’s ARGUMENT
CIR alleged that the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it assumed authority to take cognizance of the case despite its lack
of jurisdiction to do so.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
CTA explained that Petron's petition filed before it simply puts
in question the propriety of the CIR's interpretation and application of
Section 148 (e); thus, the CTA posits that the case should be regarded as
"other matters arising under the NIRC" therefore falling within the
CTA's jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA properly assumed jurisdiction over the petition
assailing the imposition of excise tax on Petron's importation of alkylate
based on Section 148 (e) of the NIRC
interpreting Section 148 (e) of the NIRC as to include alkyl ate among the ruling expressed in CMC No. 164-2012 is a review by the Secretary of
articles subject to customs duties, hence, Petron's petition before the CTA Finance and ultimately the regular courts. As the CIR aptly pointed out,
ultimately challenging the legality and constitutionality of the CIR's the phrase "other matters arising under this Code," the subject phrase
aforesaid interpretation of a tax provision. In line with the foregoing should be used only in reference to cases that are, to begin with, subject
discussion, the CIR correctly argues that the CTA had no jurisdiction to to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, i.e., those
take cognizance of the petition as its resolution would necessarily involve a controversies over which the CIR had exercised her quasi-judicial
declaration of the validity or constitutionality of the CIR's interpretation of functions or her power to decide disputed assessments, refunds or
Section 148 (e) of the NIRC, which is subject to the exclusive review by the internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
Secretary of Finance and ultimately by the regular courts. relation thereto, not to those that involved the CIR's exercise of quasi-
As the CIR's interpretation of a tax provision involves an exercise of legislative powers.
her quasi-legislative functions, the proper recourse against the subject tax
(55)THE CITY OF MANILA V. HON. CARUDAD GRECIA- No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had
CUERDO already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the DOJ.
G.R. NO. 175723, February 4, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner, through its treasurer, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against private respondents. In
addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents, said
assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized
to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the
taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business
permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the assessment
under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed with the RTC of
Pasay City a complaint for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or
Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to
Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari
holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled
that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the CTA.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Petitioners maintained that the assessment covering the local
business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of
the NIRC.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Private respondents averred the that petitioner city’s Ordinance
RULING: Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of
YES. The Court agreed with the ruling of the CA that since the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in
vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an
absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while
another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case
(56)PAGCOR V. CA & ANGELINE V. PAEZ PAGCOR argued that the gross negligence of its former handling
G.R. NO. 230084, August 20, 2018 lawyer should not bind it as it would be tantamount to a deprivation
Gesmundo, J. of its right to due process and to be rightfully heard on the merits of
the case.
FACTS:
In a random drug testing conducted by PAGCOR to all its RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
employees, respondent allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine. Respondent alleged that PAGCOR failed to demonstrate a
Thus, in its March 30, 2006 Letter, respondent was informed that highly meritorious ground for the relaxation of the rules of
she was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and violation procedure in its favor.
of company rules and regulations.
On May 19, 2006, respondent appealed her dismissal with the
CSC. The CSC ultimately granted respondent’s appeal and reinstated
respondent into service. The CSC exonerated respondent from the
administrative charges on account of PAGCOR's failure to comply with
the requirements of Section 38 of RA No. 9165. Thus, it exonerated her
of the administrative charges.
On August 17, 2012, PAGCOR filed a petition for review before
the CA. However, the copies of all resolutions of the CA furnished to
counsel for respondent, were returned unserved. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground of PAGCOR's failure to provide the exact
addresses of respondent and her counsel resulting to the failure to
acquire jurisdiction over respondent as provided for under Section 4,
Rule 46 of the ROC.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition. PAGCOR argued
that its failure to comply with the CA's resolution was unintentional.
ISSUE: instead, filed herein petition for certiorari on March 13, 2017. Evidently,
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review of PAGCOR the present petition is a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Since PAGCOR filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
RULING: instead of the lost remedy of appeal by certiorari , the petition should be
NO. PAGCOR's disregard for technical procedure is made manifest dismissed.
by the fact that the instant petition is a substitute for a lost appeal. The petition necessarily fails even if the Court were to consider it as a
PAGCOR received the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA denying its petition for certiorari . It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds
motion for reconsideration on January 11, 2017. Hence, PAGCOR had 15 the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may
days, or until January 26, 2017, to file its appeal. It let this period lapse and, result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client.
FACTS:
Upon acquisition via execution sale, 13 parcels of land are
registered, since 2006, in the name of petitioners Herarc Realty. From 2
March 2006 up to 12 August 2009, private respondents have been in
possession of the subject properties in their capacities as assignees in an
involuntary insolvency proceeding. It was only on August 13, 2009 that
petitioner was able to take full possession and control of the subject
property by virtue of an Order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Public respondent Provincial Treasurer of Batangas sent
petitioner a Statement of RPT Liabilities, which included the unpaid
RPT on the subject property for 2007, 2008, and January to August 2009.
The assessment was paid under protest on 20 November 2012.
Less than a month later, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus against respondents. RTC denied the petition ruling
that petitioner is liable to pay the RPT for the covered period. When
petitioner’s MR was denied, it directly filed before the SC a petition via
Rule 45.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
The RPT assessment is illegal and erroneous, because the subject
property was not in its possession during the covered period.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Petitioner, as registered owner of the property, is liable to pay
the RPT thereon.
RULING:
I. NO. Petitioner's direct recourse to the RTC is warranted since the In real estate taxation, the unpaid tax attaches to the property.
issue of the legality or validity of the assessment is a question of The personal liability for the tax delinquency is generally on
law. However, as a taxpayer not satisfied with the RTC decision, it whoever is the owner of the real property at the time the tax
should have filed a petition for review before the CTA. The accrues. This is a necessary consequence that proceeds from the
decision, ruling or resolution of the CTA, sitting as Division, may fact of ownership.
further be reviewed by the CTA En Banc. It is only after this
procedure has been exhausted that the case may be elevated to this The tax exemption of real property owned by the Republic, its
Court. political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities carries,
however, ceases if the beneficial use of the real property has been
II. YES. Petitioner, an entity that is not tax exempt under the law, is the granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. In
registered owner of the real property. Therefore, it is personally such case, the corresponding liability for the payment of the RPT
liable for the RPT at the time is accrued. devolves on the taxable beneficial user.
(58)INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. petitioner’s causes of action in the RTC and CTA Second Division
V. CITY OF MANILA were different from each other.
G.R. NO. 185622, October 17, 2018
Leonen, J PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
It argued that it raised the issue of the refund at the earliest
possible instance at the administrative level, and later, before the
FACTS: RTC, and not only on appeal. It demanded a refund and expressly
International Container was assessed for 2 business taxes: one cited Section 196 of the LGC. Petitioner argued that it complied with
for which it was already paying, and another for which it was newly the requirements of Section 196.
assessed. It was already paying a local annual business tax for
contractors pursuant to Section 18 of Manila Ordinance No. 7794. The
newly assessed business tax was computed pursuant to Section 21 (A) of
said ordinance. It paid the additional assessment under protest.
When the City Treasurer failed to decide petitioner’s protest
within 60 days therefrom, the latter filed before the RTC of Manila its
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against respondent.
While the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was pending,
the City of Manila continued to impose the business tax under Section
21 (A), in addition to the business tax under Section 18, petitioner paid
so that it would be issued business permits.
RTC dismissed the Amended and Supplemental Petition finding
that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Section 195 of
the LGC.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA praying
that they order the City of Manila to refund the business taxes assessed,
demanded, and collected.
CTA Second Division set aside RTC decision. CTA En Banc
issued dismissed the petition for lack of merit, finding that that
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT Sec 196.
It found that petitioner raised the applicability of Section 196 of the Records show that written claims for refund were made by
LGC for the first time on appeal. Respondents argue that petitioner invoked petitioner. As for the taxes paid thereafter and were not covered by
said provision when it filed its original action, and only belatedly these letters, petitioner readily admits that it did not make separate
introduced its cause of action before the CTA. Moreover, even if it may written claims for refund, citing that "there was no further necessity" to
validly invoke Section 196, it failed to comply with the requirement since it make these claims. It argues that to file further claims before respondent
already filed the case for refund even before it paid the taxes owed to City Treasurer would have been "another exercise in futility" as it would
respondents beginning the fourth quarter of 1999. have merely raised the same grounds that it already raised.
Similarly, petitioner complied with the requirement under Section
ISSUE: 196 of the LGC that it must file its judicial action for refund within 2
Whether or not petitioner complied with the requirements that would years from the date of payment, or the date that the taxpayer is entitled to
entitle it to the refund it claims the refund or credit. Among the reliefs it sought in its Amended and
Supplemental Petition before the Regional Trial Court is the refund of
RULING: any and all subsequent payments of taxes under Section 21 (A) from the
YES. Petitioner complied with the procedural requirements under time of the filing of its Petition until the finality of the case.
(59)CITY OF MANILA & THE CITY TREASURER V. COSMOS governed by Section 195 of the LGC.
G.R. NO. 196681, June 27, 2018
Martires, J RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
Cosmos argued that the rules should not be lightly
FACTS: disregarded by harping on substantial justice and the policy of liberal
For the first quarter of 2007, the City of Manila assessed Cosmos construction. It also insists that it is not Section 195 of the LGC that is
local business taxes and regulatory fees. applicable to it but Section 196 of the same code.
Cosmos protested the assessment arguing that Tax Ordinance
Nos. 7988 and 8011, amending the RCM, have been declared null and ISSUE:
void. Cosmos also argued that the collection of local business tax under Whether a taxpayer who had initially protested and paid the
Section 21 of the RCM in addition to Section 14 of the same code assessment may shift its remedy to one of refund
constitutes double taxation.
City Treasurer denied their protest. Cosmos was thus
constrained to pay the assessment of P1,226,78,1.05. On March 1, 2007,
Cosmos filed a claim for refund of P1,094,786.82 with the Office of the
City Treasurer raising the same grounds as discussed in their protest.
On March 8, 2007, Cosmos filed its complaint with the RTC of
Manila praying for the refund or issuance of a TCC.
RTC ruled in favor of [Cosmos] but denied the claim for refund.
CTA Division essentially ruled that the collection by the City Treasurer
of Manila of local business tax under both Section 21 and Section 14 of
the Revenue Code of Manila constituted double taxation.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
Petitioner’s claimed that Cosmos' remedy was one of protest
against assessment. Being so, Cosmos' adopted remedy should be
RULING: There is nothing to prevent the taxpayer from paying the tax
YES. A taxpayer who had protested and paid an assessment may under protest or simultaneous to a protest. There are compelling reasons
later on institute an action for refund. Cosmos was fully justified in asking why a taxpayer would prefer to pay while maintaining a protest against
for the refund of the assailed taxes after protesting the same before the local the assessment For instance, a taxpayer who is engaged in business
treasurer. Moreover, Cosmos may resort to, as it actually did, the would be hard-pressed to secure a business permit unless he pays an
alternative procedure of seeking a refund after timely protesting assessment for business tax and/or regulatory fees.
and paying the assessment. Considering that Cosmos initiated the judicial Thus, Cosmos, after it had protested and paid the assessed tax, is
claim for refund within 30 days from receipt of the denial of its protest, it permitted by law to seek a refund having fully satisfied the twin
stands to reason that the assessment which was validly protested had not conditions for prosecuting an action for refund before the court.
yet attained finality.
(60)CIR V. NEGROS CONSOLIDATED FARMERS MULTI- RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE COFA countered that the instant case involves advance VAT
G.R. NO. 212735, December 5, 2018 assessed on its withdrawal of sugar from the refinery/mill, and not
Tijam, J. on its sale of sugar to members or non-members. Thus, COFA
argued that the payment in advance of VAT for the withdrawal of
FACTS: sugar from the refinery/mill was without basis.
COFA's farmer-members deliver the sugarcane to be milled and
processed in COFA's name with the sugar mill. Before the refined sugar
is released by the sugar mill an authorization allowing the release from
the BIR is required from COFA.
For several instances upon COFA's application, the BIR issued
the AARRS without requiring COFA to pay advance VAT pursuant to
COFA's tax exemption under the law. However, beginning 2009 the BIR
required as a condition for the issuance of the AARRS the payment of
"advance VAT' on the premise that COFA, as an agricultural
cooperative does not fall under the term "producer."
COFA was thus, constrained to pay advance VAT under protest.
The BIR held that only the sales of sugar produce by COFA to its
members and non-members are exempt from VAT. Thereafter, COFA
lodged with CIR an administrative claim for refund for the advance
VAT it paid however because of the CIR's inaction, COFA filed a
petition for review before the CTA Division.
CTA Division found COFA to be exempt from VAT and thus,
ordered the refund of the advance VAT it erroneously paid. CTA En
Banc affirmed.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
CIR maintained that COFA failed to present evidence to prove
that the refined sugar withdrawn from the sugar mills were actually
produced by COFA through its registered members as required under
RA 8424, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COFA, at the time of the subject transactions, is VAT-
exempt and therefore entitled to a tax refund for the advance VAT it
paid
RULING:
YES. COFA is a VAT-exempt agricultural cooperative.
Exemption from the payment of VAT on sales made by the agricultural
cooperatives to members or to non-members necessarily includes
exemption from the payment of "advance VAT" upon the withdrawal of
the refined sugar from the sugar mill.
As correctly established by the CTA that COFA is a cooperative in
good standing and duly registered with the CDA and is the-producer of
the sugar, its sale then of refined sugar whether sold to members or non-
members, following the express provisions of Section 109(L) of RA 8424,
as amended, is exempt from VAT. As a logical and necessary consequence
then of its established VAT exemption, COFA is likewise exempted from
the payment of advance VAT required under RR No. 13- 2008.
Lastly, COFA's entitlement to tax exemption cannot be made
dependent upon the submission of the monthly VAT declarations and
quarterly VAT returns, as the CIR suggests. It was established that COFA
satisfied the requirements under Section 109(L) of RA 8424, as amended,
to enjoy the exemption from VAT on its sale of refined sugar; its
exemption from the payment of advance VAT for the withdrawal it made
from May 12, 2009 to July 22, 2009 follows, as a matter of course.