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SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERIA , J : p
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision rendered in this case led by
the respondent. Two attorneys at law, who were allowed to appear as amici curiae, have
also presented memoranda to discuss certain points on which the dissenting opinion
rely.
(1)It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the
Japanese was not actual and effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in
barrios and mountains and even towns and villages; and consequently, no government
de facto could have been validly established by the Japanese military forces in the
Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of
the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the
detachments of troops sent on patrol to these places, was not su cient to make the
military occupation ineffective nor did it cause that occupation to cease, or prevent the
constitution or establishment of a de facto government in the Islands. The belligerent
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became as accomplished fact
from the time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in
Luzon, and General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao,
surrendered and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the
Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicly exercising its authority,
and the invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government
in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
"According to the rules of Land Welfare of the United States Army, belligerent or
so-called military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as
a result of which has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising
its authority, and that the invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his
own authority for that of the legitimate government of the territory invaded."
(International Law Chie y as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by Hyde, Vol.
II, pp. 361, 362.) "Belligerent occupation must be both actual and effective. Organized
resistance must be overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures
to establish law and order. It doubtless su ces if the occupying army can, within a
reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the
occupied district." (Id., p. 364.) "Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . .. It
does not cease, however, . . .. Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of
guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless the legitimate government is reestablished and
the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla operations." (Id., p.
365.).
But supposing arguendo that there were provinces or district in these Islands not
actually and effectively occupied by the invader, or in which the latter, consequently, had
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not substituted his own authority for that of the invaded government, and the
Commonwealth Government had continued publicly exercising its authority, there is no
question as to the validity of the judicial acts and proceedings of the court functioning
in said territory, under the municipal law, just as there can be no question as to the
validity of the judgments and proceedings of the courts continued in the territory
occupied by the belligerent occupant, under the law of nations.
(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-
Briand Pact of war as an instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules
of international law authorizing the belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a
provisional or de facto government in the Philippines, because Japan started was
treacherously and emphasized war as an instrument of national policy; and that to give
validity to the judicial acts of court sponsored by the Japanese would be tantamount to
giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
In reply to this contention, su ce it to say that the provisions of the Hague
Conventions which imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the
courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented,
in order to reestablish and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and
safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for
the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and bene t of the people or inhabitants
of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them
Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised
Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow vs.
Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary consequence of
such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to their former
government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the
protection and bene t of others not in the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private
rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally
allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they
were administered before the occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S.,
158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was,
does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague
Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by
the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would
bene t the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much
harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice
the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or
invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals
of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of
treachery and aggression.
(3) We held in our decision that the world "processes," as used in the
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted
to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did
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not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in
sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say that
the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and
constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this
maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meaning , its meaning may be made clear and speci c by
considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed.,
pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes
of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the
Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that
are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the world "processes" is
associated.
To illustrate, "an English act required licenses for 'houses, rooms, shops, or
buildings, kept open for public refreshment, resort, and entertainment.' It was adjudged
that the word 'entertainment,' in this connection, did not necessarily mean a concert,
dramatic performance, or other divertisement, nor did it necessarily imply the furnishing
of food or drink, but that, judged from its associations, it meant the reception and
accommodation of the public. So where a policy of marine insurance is speci ed to
protect the assured against 'arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kinds, princes,
and people,' the word 'people' means the ruling or governing power of the country, this
signi cation being impressed upon it by its association with the words 'kings' and
'princes.' Again, in a statute relating to imprisonment for debt, which speaks of debtors
who shall be charged with 'fraud, or undue preference to one creditor to the prejudice of
another,' the word 'undue' means fraudulent. A statute of bankruptcy, declaring that any
fraudulent 'gift, transfer or delivery' of property shall constitute an act of bankruptcy,
applies only to such deliveries as ore in the nature of a gift — such as change the
ownership of the property, to the prejudice of creditors; it does not include a delivery to
a bailee for safekeeping." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, supra.)
(4) The statement of Wheaton (International Law, 7th ed., p. 245) that "when
it is said that an occupier's acts are valid, it must be remembered that no crucial
instances exist to show that if his acts should all be reversed (by the restored
government or its representatives) no international wrong would be committed,"
evidently does not mean that the restored government or its representatives may
reverse the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during the belligerent
occupation without violation of the law of nations does not always and necessarily
cause an international wrong. As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws,
that is, such as affect private rights or persons and property and provide for the
punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it
is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by
the restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is
nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused
to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of
nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the
occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there are
vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of such judgments, the
restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without
causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive
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them of their properties without due process of law.
In this connection, it may not be amiss to refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), quoted in
our decision as applicable by analogy. In said case, the Commander in Chief of the
United States forces in South Carolina, after the end of the Civil War and while the
territory was still under Military Government, issued a special order annulling a decree
rendered by a court of chancery in a case within its jurisdiction, on the wrong
assumption that he had authority to do so under the acts of Congress approved March
2, and July 19, 1867, which de ned his powers and duties. That Supreme Court
declared void the said special order on the ground "that it was an arbitrary stretch of
authority needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have
conferred power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is
an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power where the rights of the
citizens are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."
(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth
continued in the Philippines by the belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan,
and their judgments and proceedings being acts of foreign courts cannot now be
considered valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth Government after
the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our decision the fundamental
reasons why said courts, functioning during the Japanese regime, could not be
considered as courts of Japan, it is su cient now to invite attention to the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Admittance, Jecker vs.
Montgomery (13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240), which we did not deem necessary to
quote in our decision, in which it was held that "the courts, established or sanctioned in
Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more
than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered
territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was
occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and their
decision under its control, whenever the commanding o cer though proper to
interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon
a question of prize or no prize." (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How., 498;
14 Law. ed., 240.)
(6) The petition for mandamus in the present case is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. The mandamus applied for is not to compel the respondent judge to
order the reconstitution of the record of the case, because the record had already been
reconstituted by order of the court. It is sought to compel the respondent judge to
continue the proceedings in said case. As the judge refused to act on the ground that
he had no power or jurisdiction to continue taking cognizance of the case, mandamus
and not appeal is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. For it is well established rule
that "if a court has erroneously decided some question of law or of practice, presented
as a preliminary objection, and upon such erroneous construction has refused to go
into the merits of the case, mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed." (High on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, section 151; Castro Revilla vs. Garduño, 53 Phil., 934.)
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration led by the respondents
is denied. The petition for oral argument on said motions for reconsideration, based on
the resolution of division of this Court dated July 3, 2945, amendatory of section 2, Rule
54, of the Rules of Court, is also denied, since said resolution has not yet been adopted
by this Court in banc, and the respondents and amici curiae were allowed to le, and
they filed, their arguments in writing.
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Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, De Joya and Pablo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON , J., concurring :
I subscribe to the majority view, because it follows the trend of American juridical
thought on the legal consequences of liberation from enemy conquest; and because
General MacArthur's proclamation annulling all laws, regulations and "processes" other
than those of the Commonwealth did not include judicial proceedings.
In ordinary parlance, process means, "Act of proceeding; procedure; progress";
"something that occurs in a series of action or events"; "any phenomenon which shows
a continuous change in time." 1
In court language, process, of course, refers to the means whereby z court can
compels the appearance of a defendant before it or a compliance with its demands,
and may include in its largest sense, all proceedings of the court, from the beginning to
the end of a suit. 2
Here we have, not a judicial statement, but a military proclamation of the great
American liberator whose intent may be gleaned from his utterances and writings.
Speaking at the inauguration of President Quezon, December 31, 1941, he called the
occasion "symbolical of democratic processes." 3 Announcing the discontinuance of
United States Army's participation in Philippines affairs, he referred to "Government by
constitutional process." and Government under "constitutional process." In the very
proclamation of October 23, 1944, he promised to restore to the people "the sacred
right of Government by constitutional process." Therefore, the word "processes" in that
proclamation referred to orders or instructions, establishing governmental changes or
practices-directives that may not fall strictly within the category of laws or regulations.
I am forti ed in this conclusion by the auxiliary rules of interpretation, noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis.
Furthermore, General MacArthur could not have forgotten the classic Army
tradition that, upon military occupation, usually the "legislative, executive or
administrative" functions of the enemy Government are affected — not the judicial. 4
Unconvincing is the argument that no judicial act is touched by Judge Dizon's
order. The summons requiring the defendant to answer was a positive court action or
proceeding.
Untenable is the position that petitioner should be restricted to his remedy by
appeal. Considering the numerous persons and cases affected, and the pressing
importance of the issue, the Court may rightly entertain a petition for extraordinary legal
remedy. 5
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
We are of opinion that the motion for reconsideration should be granted, and the
petition denied.
We believe that the majority opinion in this case should be revoked and not be
given effect:
1. Because it ignores one of the speci c provisions of the October
Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur;
2.Neal-Millar C. vs. Owens (42 S. E., 266; 267; 115 Ga., 959); Rich vs. Trimble ([Vt.], 2 Tyler,
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349, 350).
3.41 Off. Gaz., 156.
4.Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (section
1, paragraph 6), quoted in the Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation,
Magoon's Reports, p. 14.
5.Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (47 Phil., 385).