Republic of the Philippines vs.

Sandiganbayan
[G.R. No. 104768.  July 21, 2003]

Facts:
After the EDSA Revolution, Pres. Aquino issued EO 1 creating the PCGG, which thereafter
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board. PCGG is primarily tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
Marcos, his family and cronies.  The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Ramas (“Ramas”).  It issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, and concluded that a prima facie case
exists against him. It further recommended that he be tried for the violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 1379). Hence, the PCGG then filed a case in the SB against Ramas and Dimaano
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Ramas and Dimaano filed their Motion to
dismiss contending the ruling on Republic v. Migrino, which held that the PCGG does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a
showing that they are “subordinates” of Marcos. Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint but ordered
that the monies, equipment etc be returned to Dimaano. It remanded the case to the OMB for
appropriate action. PCGG argues (among others) that the search and seizure was legal because the two
cannot invoke their exclusionary right, as there was no Bill of Rights or Constitution in force at the time
of the seizure.

Issue: W/N the Search and Seizure was legal.

Ruling:

No. The court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, it ruled that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

Hence the correct issues should be: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to
24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during
the interregnum.

To rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent
a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render
all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of
individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant. However, the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor.