Managing Geotechnical Risks in DBMOT

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Managing Geotechnical Risks in Design Build Projects
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ISBN 978-0-309-48465-7 | DOI 10.17226/25261
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GET THIS BOOK Douglas D. Gransberg, Michael Loulakis, Ali Touran, Ghada Gad, Kevin McLain,
Shannon Sweitzer, Dominique Pittenger, Ivan Castro Nova, Ricardo Tapia Pereira,
and Milagros Pinto-Nunez; National Cooperative Highway Research Program;
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Managing Geotechnical Risks in Design–Build Projects
NCHRP
Web-Only Document 247:
Managing Geotechnical Risks in Design-Build Projects
Douglas D. Gransberg Kevin McLain
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY MISSOURI DOT
Ames, IA Jefferson City, MO
Michael Loulakis Shannon Sweitzer

CAPITAL PROJECT STRATEGIES, LLC S&ME
Reston, VA Raleigh, NC
Ali Touran Dominique Pittenger

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY ARBOR SERVICES, LLC
Boston, MA Norman, OK
Ghada Gad Ivan Castro Nova

CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC Ricardo Tapia Pereira
UNIVERSITY Milagros Pinto-Nunez
Pomona, CA IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY
Ames, IA
Contractor’s Final Report for NCHRP Project 24-44

Submitted February 2018
ACKNOWEDGMENT
This work was sponsored by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), in cooperation
with the Federal Highway Administration, and was conducted in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP),
which is administered by the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine.
COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
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persons who own the copyright to any previously published or copyrighted material used herein.
Cooperative Research Programs (CRP) grants permission to reproduce material in this publication for classroom and not-for-profit
purposes. Permission is given with the understanding that none of the material will be used to imply TRB, AASHTO, FAA, FHWA,
FMCSA, FRA, FTA, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, PHMSA, or TDC endorsement of a particular
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request permission from CRP.
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The information contained in this document was taken directly from the submission of the author(s). This material has not been
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Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

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Contents
Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Background ............................................................................................................... 3
1.1. The Research Problem ..................................................................................................... 3
1.2. Background ...................................................................................................................... 7
1.3. Choosing Alternative Project Delivery ............................................................................ 8
1.4. Research Problem Statement .......................................................................................... 11
1.5. Research Objectives ....................................................................................................... 12
Chapter 2: Research Approach ................................................................................................. 16
2.1. Research Framework ...................................................................................................... 16
2.1.1. Phase 1: Benchmark the State-of-the-Practice in Geotechnical Risk ..................... 18
2.1.2. Phase 2: Geotechnical Risk Assessment ................................................................. 28
2.2. Phase II Work Plan Task Completion ............................................................................ 35
2.2.2. Risk Quantification Approach ................................................................................ 36
Chapter 3: Findings and Applications ...................................................................................... 49
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 49
3.2. Summary and Analysis of the Literature Review and Content Analysis. ...................... 49
3.2.1. Geotechnical Risk Literature .................................................................................. 49
iii

3.2.2. Design-Build Literature .......................................................................................... 54
3.2.3. Findings from the Literature ................................................................................... 55
3.2.4. Findings from the Content Analysis ....................................................................... 56
3.3. Summary and Analysis Surveys ..................................................................................... 65
3.3.1. Findings from Survey of State DOTs (Survey 1) ................................................... 65
3.3.2. Survey of DB Geotechnical Risk Experts (Survey 2) ............................................. 96
3.4. Summary and Analysis of Case Study Interviews ....................................................... 109
3.5. Summary and Analysis of Legal Review ..................................................................... 111
3.6. Application of the Findings .......................................................................................... 112
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Suggested Research ................................................................... 117
4.1. Benchmarks: ................................................................................................................. 117
4.2. Perception of the Geotechnical Risk ............................................................................ 118
4.3. Strategies for Aligning the Perceived Geotechnical Risk. ........................................... 119
4.4. Tools for Managing Geotechnical Risks ...................................................................... 120
4.5. Potential Solutions to Achieve an Aligned Approach to Geotechnical Risk. .............. 122
4.6. Suggested Future Research and Implementation ......................................................... 123
References ................................................................................................................................... 125
Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................... 130
Appendix A: State of the Practice ............................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B: Case Study Reports .............................................................................................. B-1
iv

Appendix C: Details of Geotechnical Risk Management Tools ................................................ C-1
Appendix D: Final Guidelines ................................................................................................... D-1
Appendix E: Detailed Results of the Geotechnical Legal Review .............................................E-1
Appendix F: Interview and Survey Forms.................................................................................. F-1
Table of Figures
Figure 2.1 – Phase 1 Research Work Plan.................................................................................... 17
Figure 2.2 – Phase 2 Research Work Plan.................................................................................... 18
Figure 2.3 – Conceptual Research Framework for Quantitative Geotechnical Risk Analysis..... 26
Figure 2.4 – Risk Quantification Approaches .............................................................................. 37
Figure 2.5 – The Proposed Two-step Procedure for Estimating Project Risk Score.................... 39
Figure 2.6 – Risk Register for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Adapted from VDOT Risk
Management Matrix) .................................................................................................................... 44
Figure 2.7 – Partially Filled-out Risk Register with Identified Risk Factors ............................... 44
Figure 2.8 – Cost Estimate for Risk Factors .................................................................................45
Figure 2.9 – Total Cost for Geotechnical Risks (a- Probability distribution; b- Cumulative
distribution) .................................................................................................................................. 45
Figure 2.10 – The Effect of Mitigation Effort .............................................................................. 46
Figure 3.1 – Differing Site Conditions Risk Liability Flow Chart (Hanna et al. 2015). .............. 51
Figure 3.2 – Color Coding for a Section of the Borinquen Dam 1E Foundation Geological Profile
(Tapia et al. 2017). ........................................................................................................................ 52

Figure 3.3 – Example of DB Decision Change Based on Geotechnical Risk Assessment (Tapia et
al. 2017). ....................................................................................................................................... 53
Figure 3.4 – Respondent Group/Section Assignment. .................................................................. 66
Figure 3.5 – Use of Alternative Contracting Methods .................................................................. 67
Figure 3.6 – How many DB projects has your agency delivered?................................................ 68
Figure 3.7 – How long has your agency been using DB projects delivery? ................................. 69
Figure 3.8 – How much preliminary geotechnical investigation is completed before making the
decision to use DB project delivery for a given project? .............................................................. 70
Figure 3.9 – Steps Taken to Address Geotechnical Issues in the DB RFQ/RFP Where the
Geotechnical Risks Are Considered Significant ........................................................................... 71
Figure 3.10 – Is a formal geotechnical risk analysis conducted on a typical project in any of the
following areas? ............................................................................................................................ 72
Figure 3.11 – Within the geotechnical risk management process that is conducted by the agency
or required of the design builder? ................................................................................................. 73
Figure 3.12 – Which of the following best describes the content of the risk register of geotechnical
issues? ........................................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 3.13 – What types of geotechnical risks do you typically encounter on DB projects and how
are they allocated?......................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 3.14 – DOTs and Geotechnical Factors Weight in the Evaluation Plan. .......................... 76
Figure 3.15 – DOT Survey Response Results Regarding Geotechnical Content Provided RFP. 77
Figure 3.16 – RFP Additional Geotechnical Information by Design Builders. ............................ 78
Figure 3.17 – DOTs Procurement Phase Practices DB Project with Significant Geotechnical Risks
....................................................................................................................................................... 78
vi

Figure 3.18 – Average Scores of Importance of Geotechnical Areas to the Success of the Project
During the Procurement Process ................................................................................................... 80
Figure 3.19 – Type of Payments in a DB Project ......................................................................... 81
Figure 3. 20 – Geotechnical Aspects of DB Contracts ................................................................. 82
Figure 3.21 – What document, if any, is used to define a differing geotechnical site condition? 84
Figure 3.22 – How do you rate the final quality of geotechnical work on DB projects compared to
DBB projects? ............................................................................................................................... 86
Figure 3.23 – Please rate the following geotechnical factors for their impact on the final
quality/performance of the DB project. ........................................................................................ 87
Figure 3.24 – Geotechnical Evaluation Criteria Weighting.......................................................... 89
Figure 3.25 – Impact of Geotechnical Risk Factors ..................................................................... 90
Figure 3.26 – Geotechnical Risk Allocation ................................................................................. 91
Figure 3.27 – Formal Geotechnical Risk Analysis ....................................................................... 92
Figure 3.28 – Perception of Geotechnical Risk Impact .............................................................. 102
Figure 3.29 – Importance Index of Geotechnical Risk Factors .................................................. 104
Figure 3.30 – Geotechnical Risk Allocation in DB Contract. .................................................... 107
Figure A. 1 – Changes vs Ratio of Borehole Length to Tunnel Length (Hoek and Palmeiri 1998)
..................................................................................................................................................... A.6
Figure A. 2 – Cost Overrun vs Site Investigation Expenditures (Mott McDonald & Soil Mechanics
Ltd 1994)..................................................................................................................................... A.7
Figure A. 3 – Development of Geotechnical Investigation Program.......................................... A.8
Figure A. 4 – Use of Geotechnical Baseline in DB projects .................................................... A.12
Figure A. 5 – Sources of Error or Uncertainty in Soil Property Estimates (Baecher 1987) ..... A.14
vii

Figure A. 6 – A Risk-based Design Approach for Slope Stability (Clayton 2001) ................... A.15
Figure A. 7 – Proposed Modeling Approach for Geotechnical Risk Analysis in DB Projects.... A.16
Figure A. 8 – Risk Assessment Process .................................................................................... A.17
Figure A. 9 – Generic DB Timeline .......................................................................................... A.19
Figure B.1 – Plan View of Dallas Horseshoe Project ................................................................. B.25
Table of Tables
Table 1.1 – Project Characteristics that Indicate a Given Project Is a Poor Candidate for DB Project
Delivery Found in the Literature (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011)….……………………………… 12
Table 3.1 – List of Projects in Content Analysis ........................................................................... 57
Table 3.2 – Content Analysis: Scope of Information Provided Pre-bid........................................ 59
Table 3.3 – Content Analysis: Extent to Which the Geotechnical Gathering Process Is
Interactive .…..……………………………………………………………………...................... 59
Table 3.4 – Content Analysis: Description of Project with Significant Geotechnical Issues ....... 60
Table 3.5 – Content Analysis: Information Required from Contractors in Post-award ............... 60
Table 3.6 – Content Analysis: Evaluation Criteria in Selection Process ....................................... 61
Table 3.7 – Content Analysis: Weight of Geotechnical Factors in Proposal Evaluation .............. 61
Table 3.8 – Content Analysis: Design and Performance Criteria to be Submitted in Proposal..... 62
Table 3.9 – Content Analysis: Use of Performance Verification and Measurement Methods ...... 62
Table 3.10 – Content Analysis: Differing Site Conditions Clause................................................. 63
Table 3.11 – Content Analysis: Warranties used for Geotechnical Performance .......................... 63
Table 3.12 – Content Analysis: Provisions for Alternative Technical Concepts (ATCs).............. 64
Table 3.13 – Content Analysis: Methods for Mitigating High-risk Geotechnical Conditions ....... 64
Table 3.14 – Survey Respondent and Categorization Based on Experience in DB Projects.......... 88
viii

Table 3. 15 – Summary of Chi-Square Test Results–Experienced vs Non-experienced ............. 90
Table 3.16 – Frequency of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects .......................................... 98
Table 3.17 – Impact of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects ................................................ 99
Table 3.18 – Importance Index of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects............................. 101
Table 3.19 – List of Geotechnical Risk Factors .......................................................................... 103
Table 3.20 – Geotechnical Risk Factors that Make Not to Pursue/Recommend a DB Project .. 106
Table 3.21 – Ten Most Encountered Geotechnical Risk Factors................................................ 107
Table 3.22 – Case Studies and Interviews .................................................................................. 110
Table 3.23 – Summary of Case Studies–Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Actions. ...................... 111
Table 3.24 – Implement Early Contractor Design Involvement ................................................. 114
Table 3.25 – Involve Third Party Stakeholders as Early as Practical ......................................... 115
Table 3.26 – Raise the Visibility of Geotechnical Issues ........................................................... 115
Table 3.27 – Enhanced DB Geotechnical Contract Mechanisms ............................................... 116
Table 3.28 – Life Cycle-based Design and Construction Decision-making .............................. 116
Table 4.1 – List of Tools …..……………………………………………………………………125
ix

Author Acknowledgments
The research reported herein was performed under NCHRP Project 24-44 by the Institute for
Transportation Research (InTrans) at Iowa State University. Additionally, Northeastern
University (NU) and California Polytechnic University at Pomona (CPP) provided Co-Principal
Investigators (Co-PI). InTrans was the prime contractor for the study.
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of the Missouri Department of
Transportation furnished by making Dr. Kevin McLain, PE, its Director of Geotechnical
Engineering, available to the project at no cost. Michael Loulakis, JD Capital Project Strategies,
LLC, Reston, VA, Shannon Sweitzer, PE of SM&E, Inc., Raleigh, NC, and Dr. Dominique
Pittenger of Arbor Services, Inc. Norman, OK all served as Co-PIs. Dr. Douglas Gransberg, PE
of ISU led the team as PI with Drs. Ali Touran, PE (NU) and Ghada Gad (CPP) were Co-PIs.
The ISU Graduate Research Assistants on the project were Ivan Castro Nova now of Manatts
Construction, Des Moines, Iowa and Dr. Ricardo Tapia Pieria, now of the Panama Canal
Authority, and Dr. Milagros Pinto Nunez of the Technical University of Panama.

Abstract
This research developed a set of geotechnical risk management guidelines for design-build (DB)
transportation projects. Geotechnical uncertainty is always high in DB projects where foundation
conditions are unknown at the time the contract is awarded and where the design-builder is
expected to conduct the subsurface investigations necessary to complete the design after
establishing the project contract price. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that public agencies
typically select DB project delivery when they want to accelerate project delivery. The guidelines
are based primarily on the data gathered by a survey of state DOTs, a second survey of both DOT
and industry respondents with experience in DB geotechnical risk mitigation experience, and 20
case study projects. The major finding was a significant disparity in the perceptions of geotechnical
risk of DOT engineers versus the industry experts. This led to the conclusion that DB geotechnical
risk management strategies must necessarily permit an opportunity to align perceptions of risk and,
if possible, mutually apportion the project’s geotechnical risk profile. The use of progressive DB,
scope validation periods, and multiple notices to proceed are recommended as contractual tools to
achieve this purpose.
xi

Summary
NCHRP 24-44 completed an extensive investigation into the issue of geotechnical risk in design-
build (DB) projects. The Phase I and II research are complete and the results are contained in this
report. The primary deliverable is a set of guidelines for managing geotechnical risk in DB
projects.
At this point, a number of questions regarding this topic have been answered. The major
findings detailed in this report are summarized as follows:
 The bulk of US construction case law demonstrates that owners are rarely successful in
winning differing site conditions (DSC) claims.
 Nevertheless, DOTs continue to rely on exculpatory language to try to shed geotechnical
risk in DB projects.
 The industry recognizes the risk shedding bias and perceives geotechnical risk to be much
higher than the authors of DOT DB requests for proposal (RFP).
 The result is the inclusion of contingencies for risks that may not be realized, which must
logically increase the overall cost of the project.
 The solution is to align the perceptions of geotechnical risk of the DOT and the DB team
early in the process.
 The study has identified progressive DB, DB with multiple notices to proceed, and DB
with some fixed scope validation period as potential mechanisms to permit the early
alignment of geotechnical risk perceptions.
In other words, the surest way to quantify subsurface risk effectively is to start the digging
and uncover the actual site conditions on which the project must be built. This can be accomplished
through early contractor involvement and joint development of the geotechnical risk profile for the

DB project. That being said, this report details the research completed to find and or develop
methodologies that permit the DOT and its industry partner to align their perception of
geotechnical risks and perhaps their business objectives as well as early as practical during the
delivery of a DB transportation project.
The guidelines that accompany this final research report provide the following five
strategies for aligning the DOT’s and its design-builder’s perception of geotechnical risk.
1. Implement early contractor design involvement through encouraging geotechnical ATCs
during procurement.
2. Use DB process to address other subsurface issues involving third party stakeholders as
early as practical in project development and delivery.
3. Raise the visibility of geotechnical issues in DB projects to ensure competing contractor
teams understand the level of criticality on each project.
4. Avoid differing site conditions claims through enhanced contract mechanisms designed
specifically for addressing geotechnical risks.
5. Promote an atmosphere of life cycle-based design and construction decision-making with
respect to geotechnical risk on DB projects.
The guidelines also furnish 25 geotechnical risk management tools that can be used to
implement the above strategies on typical DB projects. Each tool was found to be proven as
effective in the field.

Chapter 1: Background
1.1 The Research Problem
According to NCHRP Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build
Projects (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011) and the most recent American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) Report Card on America’s Infrastructure (ASCE 2014) the nation’s highways and bridges
are rated as D and C+, respectively. This is just one of many reports that have documented the
“urgent need to replace aging infrastructure” (Dowall and Whittington 2003). Design-build (DB)
project delivery has proven itself to be one method to accelerate the construction, reconstruction,
and rehabilitation of aging, structurally deficient infrastructure because it allows construction to
begin before the design is 100 percent complete (FHWA 2006). DB also allows the DOT to shift
some of the responsibility for completing the geotechnical investigations necessary to support the
geotechnical design to the design-builder after the award of the DB contract. This creates a
different risk profile than when the project owner has full responsibility for design (and hence
geotechnical investigations) in a traditional design-bid-build (DBB) project.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) mandates the use of a differing site
conditions (DSC) clause for DBB projects on federal aid highway projects, unless the use of such
a clause is contrary to state law (23 CFR 635.109). The typical DSC clause provides broad relief
to a contractor for physical conditions that materially differ from what is anticipated by the
contract. FHWA does not, however, have the same mandate for DB projects. Instead, FHWA
encourages state DOTs to use these clauses when appropriate for the risk and responsibilities that
are shared with the design-builder. On DBB projects, the risk of differing site conditions is almost
always the responsibility of the owner (Tufenkjian 2007). While this is largely due to the presence
of a DSC clause, it is also caused by the fact that prevailing case law and sound contract

management principles require the owner to disclose to bidders virtually all geotechnical
information in the control of the owner.
On DB projects, the risk of differing site conditions is not as clear (Clark and Borst 2002).
The DB contract can be awarded before a full geotechnical site investigation is made by either the
owner or the design-builder (Smith 2001). This leads to a question of how to identify an
appropriate baseline for the DSC clause (if one is included in the contract) (Hatem 2011). There is
also a policy question for the DOT as to how much information it should furnish about the
geotechnical site conditions (Blanchard 2007; Dwyre et al. 2010). The more information that is
provided, the more likely it is that the design-builder can submit a competitive price proposal since
the design-builder will be able to reduce the contingencies contained in the price proposal
(Christiansen and Meeker 2002). Additionally, this will enable the DOT to have a better sense of
its program and expected costs. However, because the DB delivery process has proven to be an
effective means of compressing project delivery periods to their shortest states (FHWA 2006),
there is frequently an incentive for the DOT to start the procurement process before a thorough
geotechnical investigation and analysis have been performed (Higbee 2004; Kim et al. 2009). In
all, potential risks are created for both parties on a DB project that are not present in a DBB delivery
process (WSDOT 2004).
According to the NCHRP 24-44 Request for Proposals (RFP): “The objective of this
research is to develop guidelines for the implementation of geotechnical risk management
measures for DB project delivery related to geotechnical investigation, design, and construction.”
In light of the above discussion, the proposed research will be both valuable and timely. As such,
the following are the objectives of the proposed research plan.

• To quantify and compare the costs and benefits of the owner completing the
geotechnical investigation before advertising a DB project versus assigning that
responsibility to the design-builder on a post-award basis.
• To prepare a recommended guideline for managing geotechnical risk in DB projects.
The guidelines will address the following topics as a minimum:
o Geotechnical risk identification, allocation, and mitigation in practice
o Legal and commercial issues
o Geotechnical baseline report (GBR) usage
o Emerging technology and practices for appropriate risk transfer
o Geotechnical considerations for both best value and low bid procurements
o Development and maintenance of a geotechnical risk register
o Development & scoring of geotechnical evaluation criteria
o Geotechnical characteristics that preclude the project from DB delivery
o Geotechnical considerations in the alternative technical concepts (ATC)
process
o Geotechnical contract provisions and specifications
o Domestic and international best practices
o Geotechnical data collection, timing, and risk allocation
The following four issues are of primary concern to all public transportation agencies during
project development and delivery:
• Selecting the appropriate project delivery method
• Maximizing project cost/time certainty while minimizing disruptions due to disputes
• Ensuring proactive project quality management

• Creating a safe environment for workers and the traveling public.
The increased use of alternative project delivery methods has caused the above issues to become
increasingly interrelated and created a project management challenge for DOTs. These projects
allow concurrent design and construction, thereby moving at a faster pace, which demands a much
higher degree of both integration and active collaboration to meet the demands of the aggressive
schedule. Synthesis 429 found that “high-level federal encouragement via the FHWA Every Days
Counts program for state departments of transportation (DOT) to accelerate project delivery by
using DB elevates the need to manage geotechnical risk while expediting geotechnical design to a
critical project success factor” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011), which makes the results of this
research both timely and valuable.
In light of this discussion, the research team proposed:
• To identify, analyze, and understand existing models for successful delivery of DB
projects with significant geotechnical considerations and
• Secondly, to develop guidelines to implement industry best practices on DB projects
that rationally manage the risk of pre-award geotechnical uncertainty.
Finally, since the typical DOT has the ability to complete the preliminary design required to
produce DB RFPs using in-house resources, this project will extend the work performed by the
team on NCHRP Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information Practices by developing guidelines for
managing geotechnical risk projects delivered using both in-house and outsourced design services
for RFP development.

1.2 Background
One of the most important issues confronting owners, designers and contractors on any
transportation project is the nature and predictability of geotechnical conditions. Geotechnical
conditions not only have an enormous impact on project design, but they directly impact project
cost and schedule. This is particularly true for “differing site conditions,” also sometimes called
“changed conditions.” In essence, these are conditions that materially differ from what the
contractor should have reasonably expected when it priced its contract. Differing site conditions
create project challenges, all of which lead to a fundamental question: Who should bear the
financial risk of these conditions?
The major issue during the procurement stage of a project relates to how much geotechnical
data will be provided to the proposers to allow them to submit competitive pricing without
excessive contingencies to cover the risks of uncertainties. This particular issue is exacerbated by
the fact that most public owners select DB project delivery to accelerate the delivery of a particular
project (Songer and Molenaar 1996). As a result, including extensive geotechnical investigations
in the preliminary engineering completed as part of the RFP development process is often
impossible. (Beard et al. 2001). For this and other reasons, the problem basically boils down to
answering the following questions:
• Will the geotechnical aspects of the given site be a major factor in the project design
process?
• How much time is available for geotechnical investigations and preliminary
geotechnical engineering?
• How uncertain are the subsurface conditions on the project site?

• What are the critical geotechnical variables that must be known for the DOT to develop
a preliminary design for funding and bidding purposes?
• What critical geotechnical variables must be known for the design-builder to complete
a workable design?
• Can the geotechnical risk be shared with the design-builder to reduce the project’s cost?
• Is there flexibility in the procurement and contracting process to enable the design-
builder to advance the geotechnical investigation before finalizing a price?
1.3 Choosing Alternative Project Delivery
The predominant way that DB is procured in the public sector requires that the design-
builder commit to a firm fixed price before the project’s design is complete (Mahdi and Alreshaid
2005). Thus, the risk of cost overruns for unforeseen geotechnical site conditions is increased,
since the full geotechnical investigations necessary for each project will likely be completed after
contract award, as part of the design process. Given this, the first question a DOT will address is
whether or not a given project is a good candidate for DB project delivery given the influence of
geotechnical conditions on the preliminary design, price, and schedule. Table 1.1 is a synopsis of
the risk profiles for DBB and DB found in Koch et al. (2010) and adapted for geotechnical risks.
One can see that the major change in the risk profile is due to the shift in design responsibility to
the design-builder (Black et al. 2000). The owner’s new DB risks result in many cases from the
failure to relinquish the design responsibility to the design-builder. The owner’s DB scope risk for
geotechnical design review comments and directives is an example of this. The direct and tacit
approval of constructive changes to the geotechnical design during construction is another
example.

Table 1.1 Project Characteristics that Indicate a Given Project Is a Poor Candidate for DB
Project Delivery Found in the Literature (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011)
Project Characteristic Source
• High risk of differing site conditions Blanchard 2007
• Low probability to be able to expedite design and construction schedule
• High possibility of change to phases of work
• The design must be complete for accurate pricing Gransberg et al. 2006
• The design must be complete for permitting or third party issues
• Project scope is difficult to define or quantify Christensen and Meeker 2002
• Project scope has high probability of change in permitting process
• Missing “sound geotechnical and environmental data prior to the bid phase”
• “inability of design-stage investigation to eliminate risks from unknown Hoek and Palmieri 1998
geological conditions for construction of underground works”
• Risk shedding is owner’s primary motivation for using alternative project Scheepbouwer and Humphries
delivery methods 2011
If accelerating the project’s schedule is not an objective, then the owner’s ability to portray
the geotechnical scope of work accurately without completing the typical geotechnical
investigation will determine whether DB is an appropriate delivery method. Ideally, the DOT’s
RFP packages should provide proposing design-builders with sufficient subsurface information to
permit them to generate conceptual designs for the foundation, embankment, and other features of
work that are dependent on the geotechnical conditions of the site. The amount of geotechnical
information may vary drastically depending on the project’s location and characteristics.
If the subsurface and geologic project information is inadequate, then the proposing design-
builder has two options (Christensen and Meeker 2002). First, it can include a contingency in the
price to cover what its geotechnical designers would believe to be the worst possible case. The
second option is to declare the project as too risky and choose not to bid (Dwyer et al. 2010). Either
way the owner is negatively impacted. In the first case, the contingency could drive the price
outside the available budget and make it impossible to award. In the second case, the pool of
qualified competitors becomes shallower, possibly leaving only competitors that do not recognize
(or have chosen not to price) the actual geotechnical scope risk. This may result in an award to a
design-builder that does not realize it is in trouble until the geotechnical risks are quantified during

the design process. The issue also exposes the DOT to either a major differing site conditions claim
or a design-builder that has underpriced the job and is in financial trouble – possibly to the point
of default. For the above reasons, it is critical that the project delivery method selection decision
be made after careful consideration of the risk associated with the site’s subsurface and geological
conditions.
The Synthesis 429 DOT survey asked the respondents their reason for not selecting DB
project delivery. Two respondents indicated that they did not use DB because the liability for
geotechnical aspects was unfavorable for the agency. Another two cited the lack of time to
complete geotechnical investigations to a point where they could reasonably quantify the
geotechnical scope. Table 1.1, previously listed contains a list of project characteristics found in
the literature that indicate that a given project is NOT a good candidate for DB project delivery.
The above discussion illustrates that the literature is rich with information to support the
assertion that projects with unknown or uncertain geotechnical conditions that must be defined and
resolved during the design process should not be delivered using DB. However, the exigencies of
the typical DOTs annual construction program often override the technical considerations creating
unwanted geotechnical risk for the owner. A typical example is the Hastings Bridge project in
Minnesota. The bridge in question had known foundation problems, and as the subsurface
investigation was going to be extensive, the DOT had decided to use DBB. However, a newly
appointed highway commissioner accelerated the project into the current year’s program, and
MnDOT had no choice but to turn to DB delivery to meet the new construction start date. They
also included ATCs in the procurement and were able to transfer the geotechnical risk to the
winning design-builder when it proposed to replace the problem foundation with a column-
supported fill. The result was a cost savings and a 3-year warranty against settlement with the
10

contractor installing instrumentation in the fill to permit MnDOT to monitor settlement after
construction.
Not all projects delivered by DB have the happy ending described above. Synthesis 429
also reported an interview of 11 design-build contractors to get their perspective on geotechnical
risks on DB projects. The results were synopsized as follows:
“During the interview each design-builder was asked to comment on the impact of the DSC
[differing site conditions] clause with respect to geotechnical uncertainty. There was a
nearly unanimous agreement (10 of 11) that interpreting the agency’s DSC was a challenge
on all DB projects. The issue was not in understanding the clause’s legal verbiage, but
rather on how the agency would actually apply the clause to identify what constitutes a
DSC.” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011).
Thus, the research problem in the NCHRP 24-44 project is not purely technical, but a multi-
dimensional one that must be approached by a multidisciplinary team of experienced practitioners
as well as academics and legal experts. The research plan detailed in subsequent sections will
include a review of case law, a sophisticated geotechnical risk analysis, a detailed content analysis
of DOT DB documentation and in-depth case studies of successful DB projects, like the Hastings
Bridge project cited above.
1.4 Research Problem Statement
The term geotechnical risk evokes different meanings to different stakeholders of the
transportation engineering and construction industry. To be successful, this research must reach
beyond the constraints that are assumed in traditional project delivery in the US and tackle
questions that have not been addressed like the following:
11

• How should the format of the traditional geotechnical risk register/analysis change
when the owner is no longer the consulting engineer’s client on DB contracts?
• At what point is the geotechnical uncertainty so great that it precludes DB project
delivery?
• Can variations of DB delivery in use by other sectors like airport and transit, such as
progressive DB, be adapted to the highway sector and used to mitigate geotechnical
risk?
• Are insurance products like a single-premium, named peril policy for geotechnical
performance adequate to mitigate the risk to the owner and what do those specialty
products cost?
The above questions are just a sampling of the many that will be addressed in the proposed
research. The ultimate objective of the proposed research is to identify and evaluate opportunities
to measurably reduce the levels of geotechnical uncertainty for both the owner and the competing
design-builders where possible before project advertisement and award, as well as to equitably
distribute the remaining geotechnical risk between the parties. Given the above discussion, the
specific research objectives and the plan to achieve them are described in the remainder of this
report.
1.5 Research Objectives
To ensure the research satisfies the need for geotechnical risk management guidance in projects
delivered by the DB project delivery method and that it can be implemented expeditiously, the
following research objectives have been established:
12

1. Identify, analyze, and understand the current models for successful geotechnical risk
management on projects delivered by the DB delivery method.
2. Quantify the costs and benefits of successful approaches to managing geotechnical risk in
DB.
3. Prepare a set of Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on Design-Build Projects for
agency implementation on highway construction projects.
Accomplishing these objectives will yield a geotechnical risk model that is specifically
adapted for DOT projects delivered using DB project delivery. The specific model will be flexible
enough to be tailored for implementation within the statutory constraints of a given jurisdiction,
as well as responsive to the concerns for equity and transparency of that state’s design and
construction industry partners.
The proposed research will produce these deliverables:
1. Draft Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on Design-Build Projects for initiating
and implementing both formal and informal geotechnical risk assessments on traditional
projects and those delivered using alternative methods.
2. Interim and final research reports addressing the implications of adopting the proposed
draft guidelines and recommendations for surmounting barriers to implementation, as well
as documenting the details of the research methods used to arrive at the study’s findings.
3. Interim emerging practice memorandums, as applicable and approved by the NCHRP
panel, that document findings that can be implemented before the final guidelines is
produced.
These objectives will be further explored by focusing on the following questions and associated
sub-objectives:
13

1. What project characteristics indicate that a substantial return on investment on the cost of
formal geotechnical risk investigation can be achieved?
Document and discuss the project characteristics previously used to select projects
for formal geotechnical risk assessment through exploration of the literature and analysis
of agency solicitation documents. Determine the underlying motivation for describing
geotechnical risks, advantages and disadvantages, via detailed case study interviews.
2. What, if any, changes to the traditional geotechnical risk process should be made to
maximize the benefits of geotechnical risk on projects delivered using alternative methods?
Document and synthesize the experiences of DOTs and other transportation
agencies regarding the path to implementing geotechnical risk assessments on DB projects
as found in the literature and case studies. Identify the culture shift necessary to execute
geotechnical risk management process and realize its benefits on projects delivered using
alternative methods. Explore the roles of both in-house and outsourced design services in
the geotechnical risk process.
3. What are the quantified costs and benefits of formal geotechnical risk?
Identify methods to quantify the benefits and costs of geotechnical risk
management from the literature. Document and synthesize the tangible and intangible costs
and benefits of geotechnical risk documentation found in agency solicitation/policy
documents and case study interviews. Analyze documented costs and benefits using the
methods found in the literature and develop a model to calculate the return on investment
that can be adapted by a given agency and tailored to its specific constraints and/or
preferences.
14

4. Does a geotechnical risk management program actually increase collaboration and
integration and if so, how can a valuation be assigned to the increase?
Analyze the behavioral changes associated with the various approaches in use
during geotechnical risk management workshops found in the case study interviews and
develop a generic geotechnical risk collaboration performance measure that can be adapted
by a given agency and tailored to its specific constraints and/or preferences to measure the
performance of geotechnical risk assessment efforts at the project level.
15

Chapter 2: Research Approach

2.1 Research Framework
The research framework springs directly from the NCHRP 24-44 RFP and is divided into
two phases:
• Phase 1 – Benchmark the state of the practice in geotechnical risk management
• Phase 2 – Quantify the costs and benefits and Develop the proposed Guidelines for
Managing Geotechnical Risk on Design-Build Projects. Hereafter referred to as the
“Guidelines.”
The outcome of the research is a set of guidelines, an interim research report, which was
submitted in January 2017 and approved by the NCHRP panel in April 2017, and this final research
report based on a rigorous analysis of a state-of-the-practice review. The state-of-the-practice
findings function as a baseline from which the new contributions to this area are built.
The research approach was founded on the following research instruments:
 Comprehensive review of the literature on the topics of geotechnical risk and DB contract
formation and administration.
 A content analysis of DOT DB and geotechnical engineering manuals of practice,
guidelines, and policies from 36 states.
 A content analysis of 59 DOT DB project solicitation documents.
 A legal review of the case law on the subject: 17 cases that establish the legal foundations
for the issue of subsurface risk allocation and responsibility.
 A nation-wide benchmarking survey of state DOTs that received 38 responses for an
overall response rate of 76%.
16

 A directed survey of DOT (22 responses) and industry experts (24 responses) on managing
geotechnical risks in DB projects (overall response rate of 31%).
 Case study data collection, synthesis, and analysis on 11 projects in nine states.
The details of Phase 1 and 2 research approaches are shown in graphic form in Figure 2.1
and Figure 2.2 below.

Phase 1: Benchmark the State-of-the-Practice and Outline Proposed Handbook Update
Figure 2.1 Phase 1 Research Work Plan
17

NCHRP 24-44: Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risks in Design-Build Projects

Research Framework
Phase 2: Tasks 5, 6, and 7
PRODUCE GEOTECHNICAL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
From Task 5
Phase 1 Quantitative Risk
Analysis
Develop Assemble
Risk Analysis Risk Analysis
Plan Input Data
Generic Document
Case Study
Geotechnical Risk Content Analysis
Project Output
Register Output
Geotechnical Risk Literature Review

Survey Output
Model Output
Phase 2: Develop and Vet Proposed Guidelines
Conduct Geotechnical Risk Simulation – Evaluate Output Data – Quantify Geotechnical Risk
Task 6
Prepare Geotechnical
Risk Management
Guidelines
Develop 1st Develop
Draft Guideline
Guidelines Vetting Plan
Draft
Geotechnical Risk Industry Draft Guideline
Management Advisory Panel Vetting Plan
Guidelines Review
Revise Conduct
Guidelines DOT Vetting
as required Workshops
Final Draft
Geotechnical Risk Industry
Management Advisory Panel
Guidelines Review
Task 7
Final Research Report NCHRP
Project
& Recommended Panel Complete
Guidelines Review
Figure 2.2 Phase 2 Research Work Plan
2.1.1 Phase 1: Benchmark the State of the Practice in Geotechnical Risk
Phase 1 evaluated current applications of geotechnical risk in traditional low bid DBB
transportation projects, while maintaining a keen focus on how DOTs have modified the traditional
18

process to accommodate alternative project delivery. It evaluated the state of the practice with
respect to alternative project delivery selection and the way it is applied on a variety of project
types.
Due to the interdependent nature of the tasks in Phase I, the research overlapped Tasks 1
and 2 with much of the work performed concurrently. The output of the literature review, the
content analyses of DOT DB solicitation documents, agency risk management policy guidelines,
and the information contained in agency geotechnical design manuals were synthesized and
documented in Task 3b. Task 2 involved of a survey of DOTs to provide direction on how to
proceed with Task 3a case study interviews, document and data collection. The survey also
captured real-time perceptional data regarding practitioner’s definitions of the tangible and
intangible costs and benefits associated with geotechnical risk management on their typical DB
projects.
2.1.1.1 Task 1 Review of the Literature and Relevant Case Law
The Task 1 effort focused on updating the NCHRP Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information
Practices in Design-Build Projects (2011) and 455: Alternative Technical Concepts for Contract
Delivery Methods (2013) literature reviews and content analyses of US DOT geotechnical risk
policy documents and guidelines. Additionally, the review and analysis of US case law that is
pertinent to geotechnical risk was completed, which served to identify legal barriers to US
implementation of promising geotechnical risk practices found in the international literature.
2.1.1.2 Task 2 Survey of Current Practice
Task 2 involved a survey concerning the use of geotechnical risk with a keen focus on its variants
applied to alternative project delivery methods. The team used the Synthesis 429 DB geotechnical
19

risk survey as a starting point, and modified it to include the cogent findings of the Synthesis 455
ATC survey. The survey for this study was industry-wide, so the team could compare highway
agency practices with those of other agencies and private sector firms. The research team used the
following as sources of contacts for the web-based survey:
 Appropriate AASHTO committees  Design-Build Institute of America
 Appropriate TRB committees  Austroads (the Australia-New Zealand version of
 International Society for Soil AASHTO)
Mechanics and Geotechnical  ASCE Geo-Institute
Engineering  National Council for Public Private Partnerships
An invitation to volunteer potential case study projects was included in the survey. Finally,
a set of potential case study projects and case study agencies was assembled for use in Task 3a.
Both the draft survey and the draft case study interview questionnaires were submitted for panel
approval before they were issued. The forms are contained in Appendix C.
A second survey of practicing professionals experienced in DB geotechnical risk
management was added to the experimental plan. Since “risk” in its purest form is a matter of
perception, research has shown that the perception of DB risk decreases as experience increases
(D’Ignazio et al. 2011). It was felt that a survey of experienced experts’ risk perceptions would
provide an insight that would assist practitioners that are new to DB with a benchmark from which
to develop geotechnical risk management plans for their initial DB projects. The details of the
second survey are found in Appendix C.
The output from both surveys was used to form a set of geotechnical risks that are common
to DB projects. Additionally, the second survey’s perceptional output was used to rank those risks
on a basis of importance indices. The assumption that the risk perceptions of survey respondents
20

with ten or more DB projects worth of experienced was tested statistically against the respondent
that reported experience with less than ten DB projects using the Pearson Chi-Square Test and
found to be statistically significant. Details on this are found in Chapter 3.
2.1.1.3 Task 3 State-of-the-Practice Summary for DB Project Geotechnical Risk Management
 Task 3a. Case study project data collection and interviews,
 Task 3b. A summary of the state of the practice for highway transportation project
geotechnical risk management, both formal and informal, and
 Task 3c. A detailed outline for the Geotechnical Risk Management Guidelines.
Task 3a. Case study project data collection and interviews
The output from Tasks 1 and 2 were used to develop a case study protocol and a framework upon
which the coding structure was developed by the research team. Ultimately, the documentation
was used as a basis from which questionnaires for the case study structured interviews were built.
The interview results was used to identify the high-level issues regarding industry acceptance and
barriers to implementation that need to be addressed. It also sought to identify and document
effective practices to manage risk, such as the use of geotechnical ATCs, which were carried
forward into the content of the Guidelines. Lastly, pre-bid pricing implications and their relation
to geotechnical risk management and mitigation were also investigated during the case study data
collection and interviews. Once the important issues were identified, structured interviews with
DOT, consultant, and contractor project participants were conducted to gather information on the
concerns and preferences of the stakeholders in DB projects.
21

The first step was to assemble the possible case studies identified in Task 1 and pass them
through a filter to ensure that the case study population covered the full spectrum of the research
interest. The goal was to have a set of possible case study projects that furnish these attributes:
 Range of project types – roads, bridges, tunnels,  Range of project location
ITS, etc.  Range of project delivery methods
 Range of project size – typical small project to  Other factors that may be found in
mega-project Tasks 1 & 2
 Range of project complexity – simple to highly
complex
Once the potential case study population was developed, the final list, with the rationale for
selecting each case, was submitted to NCHRP for approval in a quarterly report. The final
approved population consisted of 11 individual case studies were conducted on projects involving
significant geotechnical risk on traditional and alternative project delivery methods throughout the
country. The case study protocol followed the guidance provided by Yin (2008). Case studies are
empirical inquiries that investigate contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context. The case
studies protocol was developed to adequately evaluate how the various agencies have successfully
implemented geotechnical risk management on projects delivered using alternative methods.
These are the primary efforts needed to accomplish this objective:
1. Develop a case study protocol for conducting the case study interviews
2. Conduct the case study interviews
3. Document the raw information collected and integrate it with data from the literature
review
22

The key step in Task 3a is the first one: develop a case study protocol for the case study
interviews and data collection plan. The protocol (See Appendix C) included a research synopsis
of objectives, projects, field procedures that detail the logistical aspects of the investigation,
interview questions, and documentation to collect as well as the format for documenting and
analyzing the individual case studies (Eisenhardt 1989, 1991; Yin 2008). In addition, a plan was
developed for cross-case comparisons to determine similarities and differences between cases
(Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994). The case study protocol permitted the research team
to conduct case studies separately in different parts of the country, while maintaining the reliability
of the case study results. Internal validity is addressed by attending to multiple sources of evidence
and the use of multiple case studies improves the external validity of the project delivery.
The case study protocol was pre-tested with the Missouri DOT to ensure that it would
provide the desired information. As part of the pre-test, case study participants were asked to
comment on the protocol, covering topics such as ease of understanding, ease of response, amount
of required pre-interview preparation required, etc. The protocol was then modified to reflect the
feedback provided. With limited data found in NCHRP Synthesis 429 concerning the cost
effectiveness of geotechnical risk management in alternative delivery, a primary objective of these
case studies was to build solid theory for each delivery method.
The goal for case study selection is to generate a cross section of cases that permits the
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the various geotechnical risk models across the
various project characteristics. To ensure that this goal is met, the following criteria were placed
on the case study selection.
 Projects delivered using DB
 Agency solicitation documents are available for content analysis
23

 Financial and schedule progress data available
 Design consultant and construction contractor available for interviews
 Agency information – construction volume, outsourcing of design, seasonal issues, and so
forth
 Alternative project delivery experience data – number, type, cost/schedule performance,
project-specific legal issues, claims, protests, and so forth
The case study data collection plan included the procedures for assembling the necessary
input data to calculate metrics that quantify the geotechnical risk management cost and benefits
for use in Task 5, the quantitative risk analysis. During each case study interview, the DOT was
asked to furnish quantitative data on the case study project as well as other past projects that had
significant geotechnical issues. The focus was on projects where differing site conditions resulted
in delays, change orders and/or claims. The outcomes were mapped to the tools used to mitigate
geotechnical risk in Task 5 to furnish definitive guidance that was provided in the final Guidelines.
This ancillary goal was not met as all the case study projects were successful and resulted in no
DSC claims.
Upon completion of the case studies, the team reduced and analyzed the case study data to
identify trends and disconnects, gaps in the body of knowledge, needs for contract clause guidance,
examples of successful practices, and lessons learned. The primary focus was to matrix specifics
of the geotechnical risk model used for each case study for use in the Task 5 quantitative risk
analysis. The synthesis of Task 3a findings were also used to develop the state-of-the-practice
summary and the annotated outline of the Guidelines in Tasks 3b and 3c respectively.
24

Task 3b. Summary of the state of the practice for managing highway transportation project
geotechnical risk on DB projects
The state-of-the-practice summary was devoted to the system-level and detailed effective
practices for managing geotechnical risk on DB projects. It included such subjects as policy and
guidance documentation, design documentation, quality management regulations, resource
requirements, training, and contract administration. The summary was included in the interim
report and focused on individual methods and specific tools that were found to be effective in the
research. It was submitted and reviewed by the NCHRP panel.
Task 3c. Prepare annotated outline for the Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on
Design-Build Projects
The Guidelines were specifically tailored for the AASHTO audience by the practitioner members
of the research team. They also included discussion of the legal pitfalls and remedies, as well as
contract DSC clause development and cogent lessons learned from legal case law. Additionally,
the findings from the DOT geotechnical engineering design and quality management review and
salient information on geotechnical risk analysis was covered.
2.1.1.4 Task 4 Prepare an Interim Research Report and an Updated Phase II Work Plan
The objective of Task 4 was to produce a comprehensive summary of findings and conclusions
from Tasks 1, 2 and 3, and the updated work plan for Phase II of the research. The interim report
was approved by the oversight panel, so that the research could proceed. Team members have
prepared numerous interim reports and employed lessons learned from past projects to prepare all
documents. Based on the results of Tasks 1 through 3, the research team developed the Phase 2
25

work plan in detail. The Phase 2 work plan included the steps necessary to advance the panel-
approved draft Guidelines outline and Final Research Report.
2.1.1.5 Task 5 Quantify Geotechnical Risk Costs and Benefits and Develop the Guidelines
The Task 5 data collection plan is founded on the principle of measuring input parameters and
correlating them with output metrics. Figure 2. 3 is a conceptual illustration of the process that was
be followed to complete Task 5 and shows the research team’s belief that geotechnical risk’s costs
and benefits are unique to a give project’s attributes and the goals of the project team. The figure
describes the notion that given a project’s description, the analyst can then create a correlation
matrix (Rebonato and Jäckel 1999) containing input measures that describe the resources, such as
the cost of additional geotechnical investigation or purchasing a named peril insurance, that will
be consumed by adding formal geotechnical risk analysis to the DB project delivery process and
the output metrics, like cost or time growth, and statistically evaluate the two data sets in a manner
that produces a statistical measure of correlation.
DB/P3
Project Description
Drop from
Level of
Analysis
Project Location
Definition Complexity
Project Input Input does not correlate to output
Measures Correlation Factor
Project Attributes Input correlates to output
Output Metrics
Required schedule Completion Return on Pre-Advertising

Requirement
Project
Urban location Geotechnical Investigation

Foundation conditions
Slope stability
Investment
Positive Return
Utilities
OR
Environmental
Negative Return
Additional Investigation
Min. Min. Max.
Duration Disruption Life
Associate Outcome with Project Attributes Justified
Yes OR No
Project Goals
Figure 2. 3 Conceptual Research Framework for Quantitative Geotechnical Risk Analysis

The team found that importance index theory (Assaf and Al Hejji 2006; Santoso and Soeng
2016) furnished the most robust methodology for identifying trends among the risk data points and
26

used it to represent a “correlation factor” (Hong et al. 2012). Those cases where the input is not
well correlated to the output are dropped from the analysis. The cycle then completes itself when
the outcomes are associated with the project attributes.
2.1.1.6 Importance Index Methodology
The analysis of the data for the second survey was conducted in accordance with importance index
methodology (Assaf and Al Hejji 2006; Santoso and Soeng 2016). This approach requires the
analyst to initially calculate a frequency index and an impact index based on the perceptions of the
expert survey respondents. These are then combined mathematically to calculate an importance
index for each factor. The underlying theory is that a risk with a high impact that frequently occurs
is more important than a low impact risk that rarely occurs.
The approach proposed by Assaf and Al Hejji (2006) was adapted for use in this specific
context. The importance index is a function of the frequency index (FI) and impact index (II). The
indices are computed as shown in equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 below:
Frequency Index: This formula was used to rank the geotechnical factors based on the
frequency of occurrence as indicated by the contestants
% ∑ ∗ 100/5 (Eq. 2.1)
Where = is a constant defining the weighting assigned to each response
(ranges from 0 for Never up to 4 for Very Often),
= is the frequency of the responses, and
= is the total number of responses.
Impact Index: This formula was used to rank the geotechnical factors based on the impact of
as indicated by the respondents.
27

% ∑ ∗ 100/5 (Eq. 2.2)
Where: = is a constant defining the weighting assigned to each response
(ranges from 0 for No Impact up to 4 for Catastrophic impact),
= is the frequency of the responses, and
= is the total number of responses.
Once having these two indices the importance index (IMPI) can be calculated by the following
formula:
% % ∗ % /100 (Eq. 2.3)
2.1.2 Phase 2 Geotechnical Risk Assessment
The purpose of geotechnical risk assessment in the Phase 2 research is twofold:
1. To provide a project-specific inventory of geotechnical risks, along with each risk’s
probability of occurrence and estimated impact on budget and schedule, and
2. To develop an effective plan for coping with geotechnical risks and reducing geotechnical
uncertainties where possible.
The outcome of this effort is a comprehensive geotechnical risk mitigation plan which
would include major geotechnical risks, their impact on cost and schedule and the proposed
mitigation method. A by-product of this effort is the risk allocation process through the DB
contract. The risk assessment should help the owner establish thresholds for DSC clauses and the
limits of liability that can be reasonably expected from the contractor without causing bidders to
unduly increase their bids.
The Phase 1 research concluded that the presence of significant geotechnical risk did not
deter the decision to employ DB delivery, and that DB selection decision is more a function of
28

schedule demands and other non-technical considerations. Therefore, a formal risk analysis to
identify and quantify major geotechnical risk factors becomes critical to setting the DB project up
for success. Geotechnical risk assessment is conducted using the process set by FHWA (2006).
The purpose of a risk assessment is to identify, quantify, and mitigate the significant risks that may
affect the project. Phase 2 research used the same geotechnical risk assessment framework
concentrated on those specific geotechnical risk factors required to estimate the scale of
geotechnical uncertainty. Depending on the magnitude, a decision must be made whether or not to
invest in more geotechnical investigation before requesting DB proposals. The general process of
risk assessment is well documented and has been described in numerous sources (Touran et al.
2009). Here, the team will follow the below geotechnical risk assessment steps:
1. Identify Risks: For a geotechnical risk assessment, the attention is focused on relevant risk
factors. One of the tools used for risk identification is the use of a risk catalog. Developing a
catalog of geotechnical risks can facilitate the process of risk identification. The proposed risk
catalog was established using information gleaned from the Task 2 survey and Task 3a case
study interviews. The catalog was organized according to the ASCE (2011)
Geoconstructability Guidelines: dewatering, deep foundations, mass excavation, tunneling,
etc. As the risks are identified during this step, they will be added to a template for geotechnical
risk register that is part of the final Guidelines.
2. Assess/Analyze Risks: This step involves the analysis of geotechnical risk magnitude and its
probability of occurrence. The risk analyst quantifies the cost or schedule impact of the risks
in the risk register. The cost and schedule impact of major risks will then be modeled and
estimated. The assessment and analysis of geotechnical risks included analysis of the impact
of investing in early enhanced site investigative techniques related to geotechnical conditions.
29

This involves the development of an index, like a benefit-cost ratio or other more appropriate
parameter, that will provide a quantified value for risk reduction as the investment in early
subsurface investigation is increased. This analysis used data collected in Task 3a for the case
study projects. A “what-if” analysis was conducted for each project testing the hypothesis of
whether enhanced investigation and analysis, like developing a GBR, would justify the cost of
the additional pre-bid investigation by a reduction in the geotechnical risk contingencies in the
design-builder’s price proposal.
3. Mitigate and Plan: This step involves studying each major risk factor and deciding what action
should be taken to mitigate the negative effect of risk. In a DB geotechnical risk assessment,
the action may include accepting, reducing, sharing, transferring, or avoiding the risk.
Furthermore, the owner can then decide what portion of the risk has to be assigned to other
parties in the DB RFP. The final decision must include differing site condition risks, as well
as geotechnical-related design items and temporary works.
4. Allocate: This step consists of assigning the responsibility of major risk factors to various
parties, usually through contract documents. A comprehensive allocation of geotechnical risks
including differing site condition risks, as well as geotechnical-related design items and
temporary works should be included in the DB RFP.
5. Monitor and Control: This last step is to ensure that the identified geotechnical risks listed in
the register and proposed mitigation strategies are being implemented. Also, contingency
tracking and setting points where risks can be retired as more data becomes available are
included.
Once the “number crunching” was complete, the team moved into the analysis portion of
this task. The idea was to interpret the correlation output by developing a simplified method to
30

rationally determine a well-understood financial measurement such as return on investment or
benefit-cost ratio that can be applied to each case study project. The result is a means to determine
whether the resources needed to reduce geotechnical risk for each case study project provided a
measurable outcome that justified their expenditure.
Lastly, the findings were categorized, permitting a comparison of costs and benefits of
geotechnical risk on traditional DBB projects to those found in projects delivered using DB. That
comparison included the perceptional data acquired in the Task 2 survey and the Task 3a case
studies, and allowed the researchers to identify trends and disconnects between what the
respondents “think” is beneficial and what the quantitative analysis “finds” adding value.
2.1.2.1 Task 6 Develop Proposed Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on DB Projects
Task 6 entails the research team’s efforts to flesh out the approved annotated outline for the
Guidelines from Task 4 into a fully implementable practice document that can be adapted to align
with agency local constraints and preferences. The industry advisory panel was involved in this
phase, furnishing direction to the team and an all-important reality check to ensure that the final
Guidelines will add value to those agencies that wish to the implement geotechnical risk
management tools and techniques contained in the Guidelines.
The content of the Guidelines is presented in a manner that fulfills the needs of a typical
DOT with little formal DB risk management experience, while adding value for DOTs with
longstanding formal risk management programs that may benefit from refining their process. This
effort is based on a critical analysis of the case study output, as seen through the lens of the Task
1 literature review and content analysis and the Task 2 survey. Lastly, the results of the US and
international effective practice evaluation was used to provide content to the final draft Guidelines.
31

A highly structured approach was taken to author the Guidelines. First, the team revised
the Task 3 annotated outline, as reviewed by NCHRP panel as required to comply with panel
comments. The team then developed the various sections described in the previous paragraphs.
The first section of the Guidelines was written for agency upper management and contains the
business case and key management messages. The next sections explain the key principles of
geotechnical risk identification and management, as currently practiced, including a selection tool
that will match project-specific geotechnical risk characteristics with agency project delivery
method constraints. An appendix of contract administration tools and commonly used practices
was also included for implementation examples.
To ensure that the materials are applicable for practice, a facilitated vetting of the draft
Guidelines is scheduled with the Georgia DOT, an agency with significant DB delivery experience.
It will then be revised as required and vetted with the California DOT, an agency with limited DB
experience. The industry advisory panel furnished oversight and guidance for the vetting session
as it was developed. The framework described in the next section is used for both vettings.
2.1.2.2 Guidelines Vetting Framework
The framework is based on the five steps in program evaluation developed by UWex (2006) for
extension programs. It has been adapted to apply to the evaluation of highway agency guidelines.
This section describes the specific tasks that are completed by Guidelines’ authors.
Step 1: Engage Stakeholders
The audience for a guidebook is typically DOT employees or independent practitioners.
This audience should be involved throughout the evaluation process. This includes
considering where and how to conduct the evaluation. Due to restricted funding within
a DOT, it is often logical to undertake the evaluation on site, rather than expect staff to
32

travel. Generally, there are multiple people within an organization who will be
impacted by the contents of a guidebook; therefore it is wise to include all of these
people in the vetting.
Step 2: Create a Logic Model
A logic model that describes the research projects is created to determine the purpose
of the evaluation and what it will indicate when this purpose has been fulfilled. Having
a clear idea about what the evaluation results will be used for is important to ensure the
entire process stays on track and produces useful information.
Step 3: Collect Data
The first step is to identify specific DOT staff and practitioners as a key source of data
and feedback. Next a workshop to present the key features of the guidebook to this
audience was created, ensuring that participants are provided with a copy of the
guidebook two weeks before the workshop to allow time for workshop attendees to
read it prior.
Three methods of data collection were used to establish whether key concepts of the
guidebook have been effectively communicated to participants:
‐ End of sessions survey
‐ Observation of participants during the workshop
‐ Focus Group to discuss the practicality of the guidebook
Using three data collection/evaluation methods allows the information gathered to be
triangulated. Triangulation helps reduce or eliminate the disadvantages of each
individual method, while benefiting from the advantages of each (Fellows and Liu
33

2008). Additionally, reoccurring patterns within the feedback should be detectable by
the vetting evaluators (Abowitz and Toole 2010).
Step 4: Analyze and Interpret
First, the collected data was processed into a useful format and analyzed to interpret
the key messages from the workshop participants. Next the team established what
could be learned from this information within the limitations of the results collected.
Step 5: Use Results
The knowledge gained from the collected information was used to make decisions on
improving the Guidelines. The insights were documented to record how the insights
influenced the guidebook revisions. Assess whether the key objectives of the research
project have been met. Ask your vetting team the question: Does it fulfill some or all
of the outcomes prescribed in within the logic model?
The vetting workshop are scheduled take one and a half days, involving a range of
stakeholders from the selected DOT such as DOT upper management, design, construction, and
contracting personnel; consulting engineering firms with whom the DOT routinely does business;
and local construction contractors that would likely compete for the DOT’s DB work. The
participants will be divided into integrated teams containing stakeholders from each group and
asked to brainstorm through the implementation of a given topical area of a typical project in each
project delivery method with which that agency has past experience. For example, the group
looking at subsurface utility risk will focus its efforts on ironing out the Guidelines content in that
area and identifying those places where the DOT would need to revise the content of geotechnical
risk register on the given DB project. The next stage of the vetting would be to prepare feedback
detailing recommendations for changes to the draft Guidelines content. The final vetting stage
34

involves presenting the group’s findings to all the workshop participants and coordinate each
topical area’s feedback with all other areas. The day after the workshop, a meeting with the DOT
representatives will be held to assess the previous day’s results and separate the feedback that
applies only to the given DOT and that content which has broader application.
2.1.2.3 Task 7 Prepare Recommended Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on Design-
Build Projects and Final Report
Task 7 involves finalizing the Guidelines and the final report. The key deliverable is the
Guideline itself. Our team expects that it will be published by either NCHRP or AASHTO. The
Final Research Report will likely be a web-based document, to expedite the dissemination of the
project results.
2.2 Phase II Work Plan Task Completion
The next sections describe how the Phase II work was completed.
Identification of major geotechnical risks in NCHRP 24-44
The research team conducted a comprehensive survey of state DOTs followed by interviews of
nine DOTs for this effort. One component of this effort was to identify the most significant
geotechnical risks in transportation (and specifically highway) projects. The research team then
followed through by conducting another survey of geotechnical engineers in various DOTs and
contractors and asked them to rank the identified geotechnical risk factors and added any risks as
appropriate. A ranked list of risk factors was developed as a result of this effort and is shown in
35

Table 3.18. This ranking is based on responses from 22 DOT employees and 24 contractors. While
there were discernible differences between the responses of owners and contractors, this ranking
is based on the aggregate rating by the respondents (46 responses). Each respondent was asked to
rate the risk factor in terms of frequency and impact on a 1 to 5 scale. A risk score was calculated
for each risk factor by multiplying the frequency by impact and risks were ranked according to
their risk score. While this listing can be used as an effective checklist to ensure that project team
does not disregard major risks, a project risk listing may have more risks identified depending on
the project’s characteristics. Also, interaction between identified risk factors should be considered
and accounted for.
2.2.1 Risk Quantification Approach
The literature review showed that a range of established methods are available for assessing
the geotechnical risk impacts. These methods can largely be divided into two groups: qualitative
and quantitative (Figure 2. 4). Risk assessments conducted at the conceptual design level generally
involves a qualitative risk assessment where major risks are identified and ranked. Risk
assessments conducted in the later design phases require a higher level of detail and the risks are
quantified by the risk analysis team. Evaluation of risks from the preliminary design, to the final
design phases (or in the case of DB projects from conceptual to preliminary engineering) which
goes beyond merely identifying and rating of risk factors and involves quantification of each risk
factor, is called quantitative risk assessment. Detailed descriptions of these processes are described
in several sources including state DOT risk manuals (WSDOT 2014; VDOT 2015). These
approaches are well established and have demonstrated success.
36

Figure 2. 4 Risk Quantification Approaches
2.2.1.1 Qualitative Risk Assessment
The qualitative approach is quite subjective and based on the perception of the project development
team regarding the type of risks to be encountered and their impact on project. At the very early
stages of development, the best that the team can do is to identify some potential risks based on
their knowledge of the site conditions and maybe some indication that the risk is a major or a minor
one. As more data becomes available and scope gains clarity, the project team might be in a
position to rate the risk in terms of frequency and impact. Note that at this early stage, it may not
be possible to put a dollar value or delay time on the risk factor so a rating similar to Likert scale
(for example from 1 to 5 for frequency and impact) is assigned to each risk factor. A risk score is
commonly calculated based on these two factors. This risk score is the expected magnitude of the
identified risk (Equation 2.4).
Risk score = Risk frequency x Risk impact Eq. 2.41
37

The results of the NCHRP 24-44 survey was used to validate that geotechnical risk
assessment is performed as part of the overall project risk assessment by most DOTs. In other
words, no independent formal geotechnical risk assessment is conducted. If the appropriate
personnel are present at the risk assessment, this approach work wells, as long as the geotechnical
risk assessment results are highlighted and used in the decision to identify primary geotechnical
design requirements. The traditional risk assessment methods are acceptable for quantifying and
mitigating geotechnical risks.
2.2.1.2 Proposed Two-step Approach for Calculating Project Risk Score
This approach is developed to help the agency assess the level of geotechnical risk in the
project and to determine the approximate cost of developing the geotechnical design document to
the level that can be released for DB bidding. Based on this analysis, the project team will be able
to assess the magnitude of the geotechnical risk picture very early in project development phase
and determine if the DB approach is advisable.
The process for calculating the project risk score could be classified as a semi-quantitative
approach, because it uses a qualitative approach for rating the risk and then attempts to estimate
the cost and schedule impacts. The NCHRP research team has developed a tool for calculating the
project risk score by combining a preliminary risk assessment with a conceptual cost estimate
(Figure 2. 5). The proposed impact-likelihood matrix is prepared according to practices of various
DOTs. The purpose here is twofold: (1) to assess a preliminary risk score for a project and classify
the project as high risk, medium risk, or low risk, all in the context of geotechnical risks, and (2)
to evaluate the identified risks in terms of their potential impact on the cost and time of required
for additional geotechnical investigation.
38

Two-step procedure:
STEP 1 Likelihood
First start with a two‐dimensional matrix. 5 5 10 15 20 25
Consider all risks with impact of 5 as high risk. 4 4 8 12 16 20
Risk scores of 15 or higher will be considered high risk. 3 3 6 9 12 15
Risks with likelihood of 5 are rated as at least medium. 2 2 4 6 8 10
Risk scores of 8 to 12 is considered medium. 1 1 2 3 4 5
Risk scores of 6 or less are considered low unless the likelihood is 5. 1 2 3 4 5
Risk Likelihood (1-5) Impact (1-5) Risk score (1-25)
Liquifaction 1 2 2 High Risk
Scour of bridge piers 2 2 4 Medium Risk
Settlement 2 2 4 Low Risk
Rock and boulders 4 4 16
Contaminated materials 2 4 8
0
0
0
0
SUM 34
Rate Overall Project Geotechnical Risk
If the total project risk score is 40 or larger, the project is classified as high risk.
If the total project risk score is between 20 and 39, the project is classified as medium risk.
If the total project risk score is less than 20, the project is classified as low risk.
STEP 2
In this case, first the most important risks are identified. Only those significant risks will be evaluated for the potential
DSC cost. This potential cost can be estimated either as a $ value or percent of project cost.
This potential cost is the cost of further geotech investigations before letting the DB contract.
Effort to
Risk Risk Score Effort to mitigate
mitigate risk ($)
risk (duration)
Rock and boulders 16 $ 50,000 2 months
Contaminated materials 8 $ 190,000 3 months
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total $ 240,000 3 months*
* The total duration impact will be the largest of individual mitigation durations assuming concurrent investigation.
Figure 2. 5 The Proposed Two-step Procedure for Estimating Project Risk Score
The zones of high, medium, and low risk in the matrix shown are based a synthesis DOT
risk management documentation and published research (WSDOT 2014; Clayton 2001). The
synthesis proposes the initial score boundaries shown in Figure 2. 5, which can be fine-tuned in
accordance with local policy/practice. For example, Washington State DOT considers every risk
factor with very high impact as a high risk and that approach is reflected in the proposed model.
39

The method adds the “Effort to mitigate risk” as the third factor for rating a major risk factor. This
came from Missouri DOT practice. It allows the analyst to assess the cost and time impact of
rectifying any major risk. As an alternative, one can use this matrix to assess the exposure to budget
and schedule changes if further geotechnical investigation is not carried out before finalizing the
DB contract.
In the first step, the focus is on identifying geotechnical risks and assigning a Likert score
of 1 (low) to 5 (high) to the risk likelihood and risk impact. The product of these two ratings (that
can be a number between 1 and 25) is the risk score for that specific risk factor. In the second step,
those risk factors with a risk score of higher than the desired threshold will be investigated as to
the level of effort and cost needed to obtain more geotechnical data and testing before the project
can be advertised for DB bidding. This two-step process can be repeated after new information
and data becomes available for the geotechnical design. The process is complete when the total
project risk score falls below an established threshold. It is believed that this qualitative risk
assessment process should be sufficient for projects that are either small in size or less complex in
nature.
Project complexity has a significant effect on the depth and extent of risk analysis and can
be measured along several facets. As an example, the SHRP2 R10 project developed a method for
measuring project complexity which depended on cost, schedule, financing, technical issues, and
context (Gransberg 2015). While complexity of the project will have a bearing on overall project
risk assessment, this research is interested in the geotechnical risks and hence focused on
geotechnical complexity.
While the two-step process described above should be sufficient for dealing with
geotechnical risks in routine projects with limited size and scope, for larger more complex projects
40

it might be necessary to conduct a more detailed quantitative geotechnical risk assessment. The
next section describes this process.
2.2.1.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment
The proposed quantitative risk assessment approach is a more involved process; however, the basic
tools are still the same. The team starts with the list of identified geotechnical. The most significant
risks are entered into a risk register. Several examples of risk registers are given in Clayton (2001).
For each risk factor in the risk register, the team has to estimate the probability of occurrence
(based on subjective knowledge of the geotechnical experts and possibly some statistics from
similar past projects) and the impact of risk on project cost and schedule. The cost and schedule
impact may be estimated by a single value (deterministic) or with a range (probabilistic). The
combined impact of all these risks is the total risk impact on the project. There are several
mathematical approaches for calculation of total risk impact, including approximate analytical
methods and Monte Carlo simulation techniques. Detailed descriptions of these methods are given
in DOT manuals and published books and reports (WSDOT 2015; Hollman 2016; MBTA 2011).
The purpose of risk assessment in this research is to quantify the risk of geotechnical factors
on project cost and schedule. As such, the same general methodology for whole-project risk
assessment can be used, but with emphasis on geotechnical risks. We propose to use a risk register
for this purpose. A sample risk register, adapted from Virginia DOT and shown in Fig 2.7 is
suggested for this purpose. Any significant geotechnical risks identified for the project should be
listed in this table. For each risk, the likelihood (probability of that risk event happening) should
be estimated along with the potential cost and schedule of the risk impacts. Probability of
occurrence is estimated using established protocols to estimate the likelihoods (Van Staveren
41

2007; Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). One approach commonly used by the risk analysis
team is to poll the experts and calculate the average value of the opinions. The impact of the risk
if realized, is estimated by a range of possible values. Various probability distributions have been
used to estimate the cost and schedule impact of risks. A full discussion of these distributions is
beyond the scope of this report but normal distribution, lognormal distribution, PERT, uniform
and triangular distributions have been used for this purpose. A common approach is to bracket the
cost or delay by providing a pessimistic and an optimistic value and then identify the most likely
cost or delay. So, each risk cost or delay is estimated with three estimates representing optimistic,
most likely, and pessimistic scenarios.
An example of a hypothetical analysis is provided in Fig 2.6. Four risk factors are listed
and the probability of occurrence is estimated. The cost impact is modeled as triangular
distributions with ranges elicited from subject matter experts (Fig. 2.9). As an example, the
potential cost of the risk factor “Damage caused by differential settlements” is modeled with a
triangular distribution with the following values:
Optimistic cost = $25,000; most likely cost = $100,000; pessimistic cost = $250,000.
Such estimates are provided for all the risk factors. The estimated costs are arrived at by
the subject matter experts that conduct the risk assessment in a workshop setting. Sometimes these
values are completely subjective based on subject matter experts’ personal experience with
previous projects and sometimes these costs are estimated based on reasonable assumptions. For
each risk factor probability of occurrence is multiplied by the cost distribution. This will result in
the expected value of the risk factor. These expected values are summed up. The sum of these
expected values is simulated using a Monte Carlo simulation approach and is presented in Fig 2.8.
Commercial software is available that can perform Monte Carlo simulation. There are non-
42

simulation options for calculating the total impact of risk also. A detailed discussion of these
computational methods is beyond the scope of this discussion. The results in Fig 2.8.a show that
the total geotechnical risks can have a cost impact ranging from $0k (in case none of the four risk
factors materializes) to $740k with the most likely cost impact being about $200k. This is the
extent of damage if project risks are not mitigated. In case the agency is interested in setting up a
contingency exclusively for geotechnical risks, then a $300k contingency will provide a
confidence level of 80% against geotechnical risks (Fig 2.8.b). This analysis can also be used as a
tool to assess the necessity of further geotechnical investigations before going to bid. If the
magnitude of risk is beyond the risk tolerance of the agency, then it would make sense to develop
the geotechnical risk further and clarify the risk picture. Going back to the flowchart of (Stage 3),
one can see that in case the project is classified as high risk, and if the letting of the DB project as
a progressive DB is permitted by law, then it could provide a reasonable approach to deal with
geotechnical risks.
43

RISK REGISTER
PROJECT #
Date
RESIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT RISK RESPONSE (AFTER APPLIED STRATEGY)
No. Risk Factor Probability * Responsible Time/Budget Probability x
Probability Impact Method Comments/Notes Mitigation Strategy Probability Impact
Impact Team Member Impact Impact
TOTAL
44
Figure 2. 6 Risk Register for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Adapted from VDOT Risk Management Matrix)
RISK REGISTER
PROJECT # EXAMPLE
Date Geotechnical Extract
RESIDUAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
No. Risk Factor RISK ASSESSMENT RISK RESPONSE (AFTER APPLIED STRATEGY)
Time/
Prob- Probability * Responsible Prob- Probability *
Geotechnical/Subsurface Risks Impact Method Budget Impact
ability Impact Team Member ability Impact
Impact

Unidentified utilities causing delays
1 50% $ 250,000 $ 125,000 Utility SUE $ 50,000 10% $ 100,000 $ 10,000
during construction
Damage caused by differential
Additional
2 settlements within bridge footprint after 20% $ 125,000 $ 25,000 Geotech $ 10,000 10% $ 50,000 $ 5,000
testing
construction
3 Unknown groundwater flow direction 5% $ 58,333 $ 2,917 Site Team Accept $ - 5% $ 58,333 $ 2,917
Damage to neighboring properties by
4 10% $ 166,667 $ 16,667 Geotech Transfer $ 20,000 10% $ - $ -
heave due to excavation
TOTALS $ 169,583 $ 80,000 $ 17,917
Figure 2. 7 Partially filled-out Risk Register with identified Risk Factors

Figure 2. 8 Cost Estimate for Risk Factors
45

Figure 2. 9 Total Cost for Geotechnical Risks (a- Probability distribution; b- Cumulative distribution)
2.2.1.4 Risk Mitigation and Monitoring
The last phase of risk management exercise is risk mitigation and monitoring. In the design-build
approach, the owner’s control is somewhat limited compared to the traditional DBB or
construction manager/general contractor (CMGC) delivery methods. However, it is imperative that
the contractor keep track and implement the risk mitigation measures during the construction. The
general objective of risk mitigation is shown in Fig 2.10. The collective effect of mitigation
measures is to reduce the uncertainty in project costs. The graph shows that due to risk mitigation
efforts, the owner hopes to reduce the overall costs. More realistic (and maybe more important) is
to expect that mitigation efforts will reduce the overall risk variance and in effect reduce project
uncertainty.
Distribution for Expected Values
1.000
Mean=4.198461E+05
0.800
0.600
Mitigated
0.400 cost distribution
0.200 Original
Cost Distribution
0.000
Values in Thousands
5% 90% 5%
414.0026 425.8417
Figure 2.10 The Effect of Mitigation Effort
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The DOT survey found that the owners usually do not often require the contractor to
maintain a risk register and to implement and monitor the owner’s risk management program. The
premise that optimizing the exposure to geotechnical risk demands that the owner involve the DB
Contractor, resulting in a joint post-award formal risk assessment and implement the mitigation
efforts will benefit both the owner and the contractor.
There are a number of strategies for mitigating the negative impact of risks on project
schedule and cost. These include:
 Avoiding the risk: this strategy can be used in cases where the risk is of such magnitude
that re-planning the design is required, for example not using a ground stabilization
technique, such as ground freezing, because of lack of precedence or expertise in an area.
This can apply to risks with high probability of occurrence and serious consequences.
 Sharing the risk: the agency can share the risk with the design-builder. As an example,
many DOTs will not compensate the contractor for DSC claims unless the amount
surpasses a certain threshold.
 Reducing the risk: this strategy can help the project move forward in the face of uncertainty.
If the site characterization is incomplete, the owner may opt to perform more testing and
spend some upfront money to better scope out the site conditions. This results in more
competitive bids and a reduction of contingency by the bidders.
 Transferring the risk: typical example is the use of insurance. Damage to adjacent
properties due to settlements, catastrophic events, etc. could be examples of risk transfer
insurance. It should be noted that insurance only transfers the ownership of risk and the
associated liability but does not reduce the effect of risk factor (or hazard) on the project.
47

 Accepting the risk: finally, this strategy can be used by the owner to deal with risks that are
relatively rare and/or have limited impact. The owner usually accepts some risks by
establishing a contingency budget. A DSC clause in DBB contracts is an example of risk
acceptance by the owner.
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Chapter 3: Findings and Applications

3.1 Introduction
The completed research developed a number of findings as a result of the research instruments
listed in Chapter 2. These will be presented in this chapter by research instrument.
3.2 Summary and Analysis of the Literature Review and Content Analysis.
The literature was comprehensively covered in NCHRP Synthesis 429 up to its 2011
publication date. Therefore, the research team merely needed to update it to account for new
developments since that time. Two additional bodies of information were analyzed: geotechnical
risk and alternative project delivery with a focus on DB.
3.2.1 Geotechnical Risk Literature
NCHRP Synthesis 484: Influence of Geotechnical Investigation and Subsurface Conditions
on Claims, Change Orders, and Overruns, (Boeckmann and Loehr 2016) provided the broad
coverage of project types and was specific to highway construction. Therefore, its findings were
deemed to be valuable to the NCHRP 24-44 project.
NCHRP Synthesis 484 had several findings that directly relate to the DB context of
geotechnical risk management. They are summarized as follows:
 The majority of DOTs have published minimum subsurface investigations standards that
comply with those provided in the AASHTO guide specifications.
 “The total share of claims, change orders, and cost overruns attributed to subsurface
conditions out of all claims, change orders, and cost overruns was 5% by number and 7%
by cost” (Boeckmann and Loehr 2016).
49

 “The cost of subsurface condition change orders approaches 1% of the agencies’ total
budgets for new construction” (Boeckmann and Loehr 2016).
 Increasing the amount of subsurface investigation, while beneficial to the design process,
had no impact on the claims, change orders, and cost overruns.
 “Implementing minimum standards for subsurface investigation and site characterization
was reported to reduce claims, change orders, and cost overruns” (Boeckmann and Loehr
2016).
 Increased communication and training on the topic “appear to be a critical component to
realizing the benefits of improvements to site characterization practices” (Boeckmann and
Loehr 2016).
A paper that analyzed the “misallocation of risk” on highway projects (Hanna et al. 2015)
found that five of the top nine misallocated risks were associated with subsurface conditions. Those
risks are: inadequate geotechnical investigations, differing site conditions, unstable subgrade
material, unforeseen utilities, and relocations due to utilities. All of these risks apply in the DB
context, and the paper reinforces the findings of the two NCHRP syntheses with regard to the need
to apply a high standard of care in the allocation of risk in DB contracts. Figure 3.1 comes from
the paper and provides a succinct methodology for evaluating the potential for differing site
conditions claims. The figure’s logic can be used to determine where the subsurface risk can best
be allocated based on answering the questions posed in the flow chart.
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Figure 3.1 Differing Site Conditions Risk Liability Flow Chart (Hanna et al. 2015).
Another paper contributed a tool for developing a sequence of construction that is
cognizant of geotechnical risk (Tapia et al. 2017). The approach comes out of the recently
completed Panama Canal DB project where linear scheduling was used on major features of work
that involved significant amounts geotechnical engineering and construction. The example, the
Borinquen Dam 1E, used in the paper was a 2.3-kilometer long rockfill dam with a residual soil
impervious core and several zones for filters and blankets. It featured extensive foundation
treatment works and a 16-meter deep grout curtain. The approach involved first converting the
subsurface geotechnical conditions expressed in the project’s geotechnical baseline report (GBR)
into color-coded risk category zones as shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 Color Coding for a Section of the Borinquen Dam 1E Foundation Geological Profile
(Tapia et al. 2017).
Figure 3.3 is an actual as-built linear schedule from the Borinquen Dam projects where
the geotechnical risk profile is shown on the bottom of the linear schedule. Without getting into
the details of linear scheduling, the figure shows that the contractor’s approved baseline schedule
showed it planned to start grouting at either end of the project and work towards the middle. After
evaluating the construction sequence in light of the geotechnical risk, a decision was made to
reverse the process as shown in the solid blue line and start grouting in the zone of highest
geotechnical risk and work from the middle to both sides. The time scale is on the y-axis and the
height of the blue-colored areas indicates how long it took to actually complete the grout curtain.
Thus, this tool provides a means to relate the geotechnical risk visually to the planned construction
means and methods. The decision to reverse the directions of the grout curtain crews in this DB
project reinforces the major finding of NCHRP Synthesis 429 that the best way to manage DB
52

geotechnical risk is to start the subsurface work (in this case the grout curtain) as soon as practical.
It must be noted that the design-builder was compensated for the differing site conditions shown
in the red zones.
Figure 3.3 Example of DB Decision Change Based on Geotechnical Risk Assessment (Tapia et
al. 2017).
This particular tool holds promise for use in other types of DB projects. Figure 3.3 is an
example of construction visualization that permits the transfer of detailed geotechnical information
in a manner that can be easily understood by DB project participants that do not have a specialty
in geotechnical engineering. On a slightly different level, since DSC claims generally involve
quantifying the delays experienced after the DSC was identified, the production-based schedule
produced using linear scheduling also provides a direct check on the contractor’s progress prior to
53

the DSC delay. The analyst can compare the pre-DSC production rate with the planned production
rates in the approved baseline schedule and quickly determine whether the contractor was
achieving its as-bid production and whether it was behind schedule at the time the DSC was
discovered (McLain et al. 2014; Lopez del Puerto and Gransberg 2008).
3.2.2 Design-Build Literature
The major finding in the DB literature was the advent of the use of progressive DB (PDB)
to the suite of project delivery methods available to state DOTs. PDB is organized in much the
same structure as construction manager/general contractor (CMGC), except that the construction
contractor and design consultant have contract privity. The PDB procurement can be either a
qualifications-based selection of the design-builder followed by a negotiation of a guaranteed
maximum price (GMP) during design development, or a “qualifications-driven” approach where
the design-builder is asked to quote its fees for preconstruction, design, and construction
management are included as a lump sum with the remainder of the construction cost being a
negotiated GMP (MSHA 2016). The Maryland State Highway Administration (MSHA) was the
first state DOT to experiment with the process and a case study of that project is contained in this
report. However, PDB is not new to the transportation industry having been used successfully for
years in the airport and rail transit sectors (Touran et al. 2010).
PDB’s attraction in the geotechnical risk management realm is the ability to negotiate the
geotechnical risk after award and after the geotechnical investigation has been completed rather
than depending on the DSC clause to allocate the subsurface risk. With PDB, the first design and
construction package released for construction could be to commence the subsurface investigation
and conduct selected excavation on the project site to identify where the geotechnical issues will
be encountered and their magnitude. Thus, a fair and equitable amount for the realized subsurface
54

risk can be established. On the owner’s side, PDB provides a means to avoid paying for unrealized
contingencies in the design-builder’s lump sum price. On the design-builder’s side, since the
contract has been awarded, there is no longer a possibility that over-pricing the geotechnical risk
will cause a loss of the project to a less sophisticated or less well-informed competitor.
According to Loulakis et al. (2016), the states of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maryland
Nebraska, North Carolina, and Virginia have legislation that would permit them to use PDB if it
was desired. The same source lists the following “reasons” owners choose PDB over lump sum
DB:
 “Ability to introduce design-builder to the project as early as possible
 Design-builder as strategic partner
 Enhanced risk transfer – avoidance of Spearin liability
 Facilitates having design-builder involved in permit and other development activity
 Substantially reduced cost and time for procurement helps everyone, including small
design firms
 Owner interest in being involved in design and procurement
 Owner access to real-time [pricing] information
 Open book pricing allows transparency into design-builder’s costs
 Process fosters collaborative relationships” (Loulakis et al. 2016).
3.2.3 Findings from the Literature
An analysis of the literature supports two findings and adds several possible tools for inclusion in
the Guidelines developed by the NCHRP 24-44 research team.
1. As will be demonstrated in the survey findings, the decision to use DB project delivery is
rarely, if ever, influenced by the perceived risk of geotechnical conditions on the project
55

site. Given that, the question is no longer whether DB is an appropriate procurement
method, but rather how to mitigate the risks posed by geotechnical uncertainty at the time
of DB contract award. The work completed by Boeckmann, and Loehr (2016) and Hanna
et al. (2015) clearly supports the need for guidance on geotechnical risk management and
underscores the importance of that guidance when the project’s delivery schedule is
accelerated by the decision to use DB.
2. The literature strongly supports the notion that the DB procurement process should be
planned in a manner the permits the early start of subsurface investigation, design and
construction by the winning DB team. While not conclusive, the analysis appears to
suggest that DB projects with high levels of geotechnical uncertainty would benefit from
separating the analysis of geotechnical risk from the rest of the project. This in turn
would raise the visibility of the geotechnical effort as well as permit short-term decisions
regarding risk mitigation measures, such as additional investigation or the early start of
site construction, to be made before the rest of the project’s risk profile is determined.
3. Tools like linear scheduling (Tapia et. al 2017), construction geotechnical risk
visualization (McLain et al. 2014), and PDB (Loulakis et al. 2016; MSHA 2016) seem to
offer potential approaches to mitigating geotechnical risk.
3.2.4 Findings from the Content Analysis
This section summarizes the findings from the analysis of 59 different RFP’s across the
United States regarding the way geotechnical risks are managed in DB projects at the time of
advertising. Table 3.1 shows the list of projects that were analyzed, its contract value, and the type
of document that was used.
56

Table 3.1 List of Projects in Content Analysis

Value of
Type Publish
State Agency Project project
document Year
(thousands $)
AK ADOT&PF 7 Mile ADA Accessibility 1,000 RFP 2011
Alaska RR
AK Northern Rail Extension 100,000 RFP 2010
Corporation
CA Riverside County State Route 91 Corridor Projects 1,700,000 RFP 2012
California High
CA Speed Rail California High Speed Train Project 1,800,000 RFP 2012
Authority
CA Caltrans Fresno 180 55,000 RFP 2011
CA Caltrans Los Angeles I-10/605 Interchange 61,800 RFP 2011
CA Caltrans Cajon Pass 115,000 RFP 2013
DE DelDOT Indian River Inlet Bridge 150,000 RFP 2008
DE DelDOT Dover Transit Center 5,000 RFP 2009
FL Florida DOT Central Florida Commuter Rail Transit 158,000 RFP 2008
Hillsborough
FL Tampa Airport 925 RFQ 2009
County
FL FlaDOT Hathaway Bridge 86,000 RFP 2000
FL FlaDOT Southbound I-95 Weigh Station 15,500 RFP 2008
FL FlaDOT I-75 Freeway Management System 7,000 RFP 2008
FL FlaDOT Central Florida Commuter Rail Transit 158,000 RFP 2008
GA GaDOT P.I. #'s 410240, 410500, 511084 33,000 RFQ -
GA Corps of Engineers Aircraft Support Equip Paint Facility 5,000 RFP -
Idaho
ID Transportation SH-44 Linder Road to Ballantyne Lane 10,000 RFP 2012
Department
Indiana
IN Transportation I-90 Indiana Toll Road Fiber Optics 3,000 RFP 2000
Finance Authority
KS Kansas DOT Johnson County Gateway 288,165 RFP 2013
KY KTC US 27 Widening & Relocation 12,000 LOI 2007
KY KTC Wilson Road 3,200 RFP 2006
ME MaineDOT Howland Piscataquis Bridge #3040 - RFP 2010
South Portland Vetran's Memorial
ME MaineDOT - RFP 2009
Bridge #3945
ME MaineDOT Caribou Connector - RFP 2010
MD MDSHA InterCounty Connector 40,000 RFP 2006
MI MDOT M-222 Slope Stability Project 4,000 RFQ 2011
MN MnDOT TH 100 20,000 RFP 2001
MN MnDOT TH 52 200,000 RFQ 2002
MN MnDOT TH-14 10,000 RFP 2001
MS MissDOT I-59 Bridge Widening Project 10,000 RFP 2009
57

Value of
Type Publish
State Agency Project project
document Year
(thousands $)
MO MoDOT "The New I-64" 535,000 RFP 2005
MT MDT US-2 Rockfall Mitigation 3,000 RFQ 2011
NV City of Reno ReTrac Reno Railway 157,000 RFP 2001
NV Nevada DOT Project NEON DB 550,000 RFP 2015
NM NMDOT I-40/Coors interchange 92,000 RFP 2006
NC NCDOT C2011288 Mecklenburg County - RFP -
NC NCDOT Rec. I-85 from NC150 to I-85 Business 65,000 RFP 2010
Highway 13 Box Culvert Replacement
ND NDDOT 600 RFQ -
Project
OH ODOT I-70/I-670 Interchange - RFP 2011
OR Private Owner Willamette Auto Dealership - RFP -
SC SCDOT Cooper river Bridge 540,000 RFP 2001
SC SCDOT Port Access Road - RFP 2015
TN TNDOT SR-317 - RFP 2009
TX TxDOT Dallas Horseshoe 620,000 RFP 2012
UT UDOT I-15 Salt Lake City 1,590,000 RFP 1997
UT UDOT SR 201 Design-Build 43,000 RFP 2003
UT UDOT SR-265 University Parway at UVSC 1,400 RFP 2004
UT UDOT I-215 Tunnel - RFP 2004
VT Vtrans Richmond Checkerhouse Bridge 14,000 RFQ 2010
VA VDOT Rest and State Welcome Center - RFP 2002
VA VDOT Garden Creek Canal Bridge 1,100 RFP 2006
VA VDOT I-295 Interchange Meadowville Road 13,500 RFP 2010
VA VDOT 713 Bridge 600 RFP 2006
VA VDOT Buffalo Creek Bridge 2,900 RFP
WA WSDOT SR520 Pontoon Bridge 600,000 RFP 2009
WA WSDOT SR 167 South Hot Lane Project 54,000 RFP 2014
I-405 NE 6th to I-5 Widening and
WA WSDOT 250,000 RFP 2006
Express Toll Lane
WA WSDOT SR 9 / SR 92 Intersection 10,000 RFP 2011
The content analysis consisted of 18 geotechnical-related aspects that were thoroughly
reviewed in each of the contractual documents shown in Table 3.1. This section details the results
from analyzing these aspects in terms of the frequency in which they appeared.
The first aspect analyzed was the amount of information included by the owner in the
contract for proposers to use in their bids. Eight different ‘levels’ of geotechnical investigations
58

were identified by the research team and their frequency of occurrence in the analyzed documents
is shown in Table 3.2. It was found that 24 out of 53 occurrences were at the level of geotechnical
data report. This means that owners most often do not include any type of analysis of the subsurface
exploration data in their DB contracts, limiting the studies to only provide raw data without
interpretation or engineering behind it.
Table 3.2 Content Analysis: Scope of Information Provided Pre-bid.

Description Freq.
No geotechnical data 0
Nonbinding geotechnical data - Reconnaissance Report (Review of records
observations from site) 4
Scope of Geotechnical Data Report (Review of records and limited investigation data) 24
information Geotechnical summary report (Review of records and Boring logs) 9
provided Preliminary geotechnical design report (Partial geotechnical investigation) 9
pre-bid
Final geotechnical design report - Full subsurface investigation for all structures and
geotechnical features 2
Geotechnical baseline report (GBR) 5
Geotechnical Interpretive Report (GIR) 0
Knowing the type of information included in the contractual documents for each of the
analyzed projects, the next aspect of interest was whether or not the owner allows interaction in
the geotechnical information gathering process, i.e., if proposers are allowed to request additional
borings or information. Out of the 59 projects, interaction was specifically not allowed in 19
projects. Considering that there were 14 instances where the analyzed documents did not allow for
that determination, it was found that the majority of the projects did allow some level of interaction,
as can be shown in Table 3.3 below.
Table 3.3 Content Analysis: Extent to Which the Geotechnical Gathering Process Is Interactive
Description Freq.
Extent to which the geotechnical Specific geotech requests allowed 15
gathering process is interactive (e.g., Pre-bid RFIs could include geotech 11
Can proposers request supplemental No interaction 19
borings?) Can't tell 14
59

Another aspect analyzed was whether or not owners explicitly describe a project as one
with significant geotechnical-related issues. By doing so, the owner might be able to obtain insight
from the proposers as to identify ways to mitigate the risk, or avoid having proposers that did not
consider a potential problem in their proposals. Table 3.4 shows the findings of this inquiry where
it stands out that in a total of 14 projects, the owner did expressly identify the project as one with
significant geotechnical issues in the contract, which makes this a practice to consider.
Table 3.4 Content Analysis: Description of Project with Significant Geotechnical Issues
Description Freq.
yes 14
Does scope describe project as one with
no 30
significant geotechnical issues?
can't tell 13
One key characteristic of the DB project delivery method is that the design effort is
performed after the contract is awarded. This creates the need for additional (or complete)
geotechnical studies to be performed by the contractor to accompany the design. The owner may
require the contractor to submit specific geotechnical reports after the contract is awarded. Four
different types of documents were identified by the research team to be commonly required. Table
3.5 shows the results of this inquiry on the 59 selected projects.
Table 3.5 Content Analysis: Information Required from Contractors in Post-award

Description Freq.
Final geotechnical investigation 35
Post-award information required Final geotechnical report 34
from contractors, including Geotechnical as schedule milestone 7
submittals. Geotechnical in quality plan 11
None found 18
60

Since the owner allocates design responsibilities to the contractor in DB delivery, contracts
often include qualification requirements as a way to ensure the design is performed up to certain
standards. The research team identified 11 different geotechnical-related aspects that owners can
include in the evaluation as part of the contractor selection process. The results from analyzing the
content from the selected contracts are shown in Table 3.6 below.
Table 3.6 Content Analysis: Evaluation Criteria in Selection Process

Description Freq.
Specific geotechnical qualifications 28
Specific geotechnical experience 25
Proof of local experience 21
Geotechnical designer - of record 19
Geotechnical narrative 10
Selection process-
Geotechnical in evaluation plan 14
evaluation of:
Geotechnical risk narrative 8
Warranties scored - not specific to geotechnical but could be 5
Geotechnical warranties scored 0
Geotechnical in price proposal 8
References required from past project geotechnical 3
Another way to incorporate geotechnical considerations into the contractor selection
process is to directly assign a weight for geotechnical factors in the evaluation of proposals. The
content analysis of contractual documents showed that 41 out of 57 projects did not include any
type of geotechnical considerations in the evaluation of proposals. However, 16 projects did
incorporate geotechnical factors in their evaluations in varying degrees (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7 Content Analysis: Weight of Geotechnical Factors in Proposal Evaluation

Description Freq.
None 41
Weight of geotechnical factors Minor <10% 12
Some 11-20% 1
Heavy >20% 3
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A way in which owners seek to obtain information regarding the assumptions and
interpretations that the contractor has made in order to submit a proposal is to require specific
geotechnical-related supporting documents. The research team identified five different types of
supporting information that are required by some owners in the requests for proposal, Table 3.8
shows the frequency in which these requirements were found in the 59 projects that conform the
content analysis; 34 projects did not include any explicit requirement and varying instances of
required design and performance criteria were found in 47 projects.
Table 3.8 Content Analysis: Design and Performance Criteria to Be Submitted in Proposal
Description Freq.
Safety factors 6
Geotechnical design values 11
Design and performance criteria to
Preliminary design of geotechnical 12
be submitted in proposal.
Geotechnical design approach narrative 14
List of geotechnical assumptions 4
None found 34
Some of the analyzed contracts required the use of geotechnical-related performance verification
as a way to document and verify the actual conditions met on site once the work starts; 52
instances were found where the owner required either test piling, a foundation certification
package, or instrumentation to measure the performance of the subsurface.
Table 3.9 shows the frequency in which these instances were found.
Table 3.9 Content Analysis: Use of Performance Verification and Measurement Methods
Description Freq.
Test piling 18
Use of performance verification and Foundation certification package 10
measurement methods
Instrumentation 24
As explained in other sections of this report, the differing site conditions clause is the
contractual way to compensate the contractor for actual conditions on the site that materially differ
62

from those expected. There are many different wordings for this DSC clause in construction
contracts. For instance, the geotechnical studies performed by the owner could be directly
referenced in the clause as basis for determining the occurrence of a differing site condition or not;
the referred document can be a geotechnical baseline or only the raw data; or there is not a DSC
clause in the contract. Table 3.10 shows the findings from the 59 analyzed projects in the content
analysis, it is important to note that a significant number of projects (24) where found to not include
any differing site conditions clause, which is a significant finding that separated geotechnical risk
management practices from those in DBB delivered projects.
Table 3.10 Content Analysis: Differing Site Conditions Clause

Description Freq
yes 35
no 24
includes reference to RFP geotechnical data 10
Differing site
reference to RFP GBR 5
conditions clause
reference to post-award geotechnical reports 2
no specific geotechnical reference in clause 16
other 0
As a way to mitigate potential geotechnical-related failures in the operation phase of the
project an owner might include a requirement for specific geotechnical-related performance
warranties by the contractor. The performed content analysis found that it is not a common practice
in the industry, with only four identified instances out of the 59 projects where this type of
requirement was included in the contract (Table 3.11).
Table 3.11 Content Analysis: Warranties Used for Geotechnical Performance

Description Freq.
yes 4
Warranties used for geotechnical performance
no 55
In order to seek the early involvement of contractors, owners have the option of including
provisions for alternative technical concepts (ATC) in the contract. ATCs allow proposers to
63

submit alternative solutions to potential problems before the contract is awarded. As shown in
Table 3.12, the content analysis found that the majority of the projects (32) allowed the submission
of ATCs to identify and solve geotechnical issues.
Table 3.12 Content Analysis: Provisions for ATCs

Description Freq.
Yes - can offer different geotechnical design 32
Propriety only 0
Provisions for ATCs
Select from approved list 2
No 24
In some projects that are considered to have high geotechnical risks, the owner might
include specific methods for mitigating geotechnical conditions in the project as a way to ensure
that, if an event occurs, the contractor will solve the problem according to the owner’s requirement.
As shown in Table 3.13, the content analysis found projects where this was implemented; however,
it is not common practice in DB projects as only eight out of the 59 projects included this type of
measure.
Table 3.13 Content Analysis: Methods for Mitigating High-risk Geotechnical Conditions
Description Freq.
Methods for mitigating high-risk geotechnical conditions yes 8
(e.g., landslides and contaminated soils). no 51
The content analysis supports three major findings as well as a number of less important trends.
 Despite the lack of a federal mandate requiring a DSC, more than half the documents
included one.
 The qualifications and past performance of the design-builder’s geotechnical and
construction staff were the most often evaluated aspects.
 Most of the 59 project documents assigned no weight to geotechnical evaluation criteria.
64

3.3 Summary and Analysis Surveys
This section discusses the findings of the two surveys conducted as part of this project. The
complete questionnaires are attached in Appendix C. The surveys were developed based on survey
methods suggested by Oppenheim (2000). The purpose of the first survey was to identify DOT
policies and procedures for articulating geotechnical information and requirements on DB projects.
The surveys also furnished real-time perceptional data regarding practitioner definitions of the
importance of geotechnical factors associated with geotechnical risk management on typical DB
projects. It sought to identify successful approaches for managing geotechnical risks across the
DB project’s life cycle as well as discuss those practices that did not adequately address the
geotechnical requirements and caused the agency to hold geotechnical liability that it had hoped
to shed. Similarly, the purpose of a second questionnaire was to gauge the impact of geotechnical
risk factors on DB projects. The obtained results were used to identify those geotechnical factors
that could preclude a given project from being delivered using DB. The results are divided into the
following categories, for each of the two surveys:
1. Respondent agency demographics.
2. Findings and analysis
3. Conclusions
3.3.1 Findings from Survey of State DOTs (Survey 1)
The first survey was addressed to all state DOTs, and was aimed at identifying DOT
policies and procedures for articulating geotechnical information and requirements on DB projects.
65

The survey was initially issued to the members of the AASHTO Subcommittees on Construction
and Design in each of the 50 DOTs. The subcommittee members were asked to then forward the
survey to the person best qualified to respond on an overall department basis.
The survey consisted of four major sections; general information about the participant and
DB use by the agency, geotechnical risk management information, geotechnical aspects of the DB
procurement process, and geotechnical aspects of DB contracts (refer to Appendix F for details on
survey design). The findings are organized in the following subsections based on the survey
organization.
3.3.1.1 Respondent Agency Demographics
Responses were received from 38 DOTs yielding an overall response rate of 76%. Around
80% of the respondents work in the departments’ geotechnical/foundations sections (Figure 3.4).
Hence, the survey results reflect the perceptions of the most technically qualified group within
each agency.
2%
3% 3% 3% Design group/section
Construction group/section
10%
Operations group/section
Geotechnical /foundations group/section
Alternative project delivery

group/section
Materials group/section
Contracts/procurement group/section
79%
Other. Please specify:
Figure 3.4 Respondent Group/Section Assignment.
66

3.3.1.2 General Information and DOT Alternative Contracting Methods Use and Experience
Figure 3.5 shows the contracting methods that the responding 38 states are allowed to use.
As seen, all state DOTs are allowed to use DBB. DB Best Value is allowed in 22 states of the 38
states. DB Low Bid is allowed by 17 DOTs, and CMR/CMGC is allowed by 11 DOTs. Ohio and
West Virginia DOTs reported the use of Public Private Partnership, while California DOT
(Caltrans) reported the use of Design-Sequencing. Connecticut DOT reported that DB and CMGC
were only authorized for use in limited number of projects. The state DOTs that did not use DB
best value or DB low bid were then allowed to exit the survey with a final hypothetical question
regarding their major concern regarding the development of geotechnical requirements for the
advertisement and letting of DB contracting, if their DOT would decide to implement DB
contracting techniques. The responses, received from the other states centered on the uncertainty
of geotechnical conditions prior to bidding, locations and depths of the borings, and whether the
test conducted are what the design-builders will need. In addition, concerns were expressed about
liability and change orders when actual conditions differ from the owner-supplied information.
Other
DB Low Bid
DB Best Value
Construction Manager‐at‐Risk or Construction
Manager/General Contractor?
DBB
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.5 Use of Alternative Contracting Methods
67

Of the 27 DOTs remaining that use at least a form of DB project delivery, 18 reported
delivering more than 10 DB projects, 4 had 6-10 projects, 1 DOT had 3-5 projects, 3 DOTs had 1-
2 projects, and one failed to report this data (Figure 3.6).
>10
No. of projects delivered
6-10
3-5
1-2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.6 How many DB projects has your agency delivered?
As illustrated in Figure 3.7, respondents were asked about the years that the agency has
been using DB; 12 DOTs reported using DB for more than 10 years, 10 DOTs between 6-10 years
2 DOTs (Montana and New York) between 3-5 years, and 2 DOTs (Connecticut and Kansas)
between 1-2 years. In terms of respondents’ experience with DB projects, 7 of the respondents
have more than 10 years of experience, 8 with 6-10 years of experience, 6 with 3-5 years of
experience, and 5 with 1-2 years of experience with DB projects.
68

> 10 years
No. of DOTs 6-10 years
3-5 years
1-2 years
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
No. of years agency has been using DB
Figure 3.7 How long has your agency been using DB projects delivery?
3.3.1.3 Geotechnical Risk Management Information
This section presents how agencies manage the geotechnical risk in their DB projects.
Agencies were asked about the use of a manual or document that specifically describes the
procedures to be used with the geotechnical requirements of DB and/or DBB projects. Of 27
DOTs, 11 DOTs had a manual, while 11 DOTs did not use manual, and 33 respondents did not
know. Colorado DOT expressed that the manual is in development and is not ready for distribution.
Agencies were then asked regarding the amount of preliminary geotechnical investigation
performed before making the decision to use DB for a given project. Most of these agencies
selected at least two types, indicating that the type of study depends on each project. Out of the 27
DOTs that responded, six DOTs reported not conducting any preliminary investigations (Figure
3.8). Of the remaining DOTs, eight DOTs selected preliminary geotechnical design report. Only
Massachusetts DOT reported Geotechnical Interpretation Report. Furthermore, some DOTs like
Colorado DOT, for instance, stated that the decision to do geotechnical studies is made by regional
program managers, while Maryland SHA pointed out that the use of DB delivery is independent
of geotechnical information available. In general, DOTs varied in the amount of geotechnical
investigations they performed prior to deciding to use DB.
69

Other
Geotechnical Interpretation Report (GIR) (A report that
interprets the findings of the GBR)
Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) (A report that
establishes the contractual understanding of subsurface…
Geotechnical Design Report (Full subsurface investigation
for all structures and geotechnical features)
Preliminary Geotechnical Design Report (Partial
geotechnical investigation)
Geotechnical Summary Report (Review of records and
geotechnical investigation of critical areas)
Geotechnical Data Report (Review of records and limited
investigation data)
Reconnaissance Report (Review of records and observations
from site)
None
0 2 4 6 8 10
Frequency
Figure 3.8 How much preliminary geotechnical investigation is completed before making the
decision to use DB project delivery for a given project?
Of the DOTs that responded that they use DB project delivery on projects where the
geotechnical risks are considered to be significant, almost 80% affirmed they used DB and only
five DOTs did not. It is notable that DOTs who do not do any preliminary geotechnical studies
before making the decision to use DB project delivery, except Hawaii DOT, also stated that they
will use DB where the geotechnical risks are considered to be significant. As shown in Figure
3.9, DOTs that use DB project delivery when the geotechnical risk is considered to be significant
reported addressing the significant geotechnical issues in their RFP/RFQ mostly by developing
GBR (45%), followed by the allowance, restriction, or elimination of DSC rights and mandatory
design (20%). 19% of the DOTs reported other measures. For example, Nevada DOT reported
allowing short-listed teams to perform their own geotechnical investigations prior to finalizing the
RFP and Maine DOT reported allowing for a supplemental boring and lab testing program during
the bidding period based on boring requests from bidders/proposers. Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
70

Minnesota, and Ohio DOTs reported managing these geotechnical issues not only by GBR or by
DSC clause, but also by mandatory design.
Other
Mandatory design
Allowance, restriction or elimination of Differing Site

Conditions (DSC) rights
Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) A report that

establishes the contractual understanding of…
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.9 Steps Taken to Address Geotechnical Issues in the DB RFQ/RFP Where the
Geotechnical Risks Are Considered Significant
DOTs who do not use DB project delivery where the geotechnical risk is significant
reported reasons such as liability consideration, political issues preventing its use. These responses
support the idea that DB delivery selection is mainly governed by schedule and funding instead of
geotechnical risk. The survey continued to ask DOTs about geotechnical characteristics or factors
that can preclude a given project from being a DB project delivery. The majority of the responses
pointed out that geotechnical factors and/or geotechnical risks do not prevent a project from being
delivered using DB. New York DOT, for instance, stated that the DB project delivery decision is
made by policy makers, not engineers.
Regarding geotechnical risk analysis in a typical DB project, respondents were asked about
conducting a formal geotechnical risk assessment covering project scope, project schedule, project
cost, contracting risk, etc. The responses revealed that most of the DOTs do not conduct a formal
risk analysis in any of these areas. The Colorado and Nevada DOTs are the exception, including a
formal analysis of geotechnical risk. Also, responses illustrated that a qualitative analysis is more
common compared to a quantitative analysis (Figure 3.10). Some comments regarding formal
71

geotechnical risk analysis pointed out that risk analysis is only carried out for major projects or
those who have a high cost, and that geotechnical aspects are considered within the overall project
risk analysis.
16
14
12
No. of DOTs
10
8
6
4
2
0
Non-Formal Geotechnical
Qualitative
Quantitative
Qualitative
Quantitative
Qualitative
Quantitative
Qualitative
Quantitative
Qualitative
Quantitative
Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis
Project Scope Project Schedule Project Cost Contracting Risk Other
Figure 3.10 Is a formal geotechnical risk analysis conducted on a typical DB project in any of
the following areas?
The 14 DOTs, which conduct a formal geotechnical risk analysis were asked to detail their
geotechnical risk management process. Figure 3.101 shows that 10 DOTs reported conducting
formal risk analysis in typical DB projects, while 7 DOTs reported conducting formal risk analysis
in a DB projects with significant geotechnical risk prior to bid. Figure 3.11 also shows that all of
the geotechnical risk management processes for DB projects with significant geotechnical risks
were conducted either by the agency or required of the design-builder. Only the Georgia and
Nevada DOTs responded that they request the design-builder to maintain a risk register during the
course of the project that includes anticipated geotechnical risks and mitigation measures.
72

Design-builder has to maintain a risk register during the

course of the project that includes the geotechnical risks DB Project with
anticipated and mitigation measures. Significant
Geotechnical Risk
Design-builder has to develop a risk management plan to be
submitted in the proposal to the agency DB Typical project
Risk mitigation report which includes procedures for

mitigating risks identified during the risk analysis process is
developed
Risk register, encompassing geotechnical risks, is developed
by the agency
Formal risk identification meetings are conducted by the

agency's project team prior to bid
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
No.of DOTs
Figure 3.11 Within the geotechnical risk management process that is conducted by the agency or
required of the design-builder?
Regarding risk register content, 8 DOTs reported using both a risk register containing
geotechnical risks with probabilistic estimate of cost and schedule impact of risk, and that the risk
register developed by the agency determines the risk management mitigation strategies applicable
to the geotechnical risks identified (such as share, transfer, and avoid). It should be noted that New
York DOT is the only DOT in this pool which doesn’t do preliminary geotechnical investigations
before making the decision to use DB delivery nor develop a geotechnical risk register.
Additionally, the Colorado, Ohio, nor New Hampshire DOTs also reported no need to develop a
risk registers. New Hampshire DOT reported that it does not use DB delivery method on projects
where the geotechnical risk is considered to be significant. Figure 3.12 represents the differing risk
register content and the number of DOTs using each.
73

Risk register developed contains geotechnical risks with a

deterministic estimate of the cost and schedule impact of risk
Risk register developed by the agency determines the risk
management mitigation strategies applicable to the…
Other
Risk register containing geotechnical risks and probabilistic

estimate (range) of cost and schedule impact of risk
Risk register developed by the agency- encompassing
geotechnical risks- is maintained during the course of the…
0 2 4 6 8 10
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.12 Which of the following best describes the content of the risk register of geotechnical
issues?
Figure 3.13 illustrates geotechnical risks encountered during the process and how such risk
is allocated. In general, most DOTs allocated the design risks to the design-builder as the contractor
is responsible to complete the design. No DOTs took the risk when assumptions are involved;
however, incorrect geotechnical design information was the most common risk assumed by the
DOTs. Only Hawaii DOT took the risk of ‘bias and or variation in design parameters being
different than estimated’. It is noteworthy that DOTs with high seismic risks such us California
and Washington, and those who are in the same seismic niche like Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky,
and Arizona, did not assumes the risk of seismic design assumptions and recommendations. Only
South Carolina, which is considered to have high seismic risk, Kansas, and Massachusetts DOTs
allocated this type of risk to the owner. As for the allocation of the geotechnical risk in the
procurement phase or in contract, most DOTs either shared the risk via a DSC contract clause or
allocated the risk to the design-builders,
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OWNER
DB CONTRACTOR
Risk in seismic design assumptions and recommendations SHARED
Risk in ground improvement technique recommendations
(wick drains, lightweight fill, vibro-compaction, dynamic…
Risk in structure foundations assumptions and
recommendations (footings, driven piles, drilled shafts,…
Risk in retaining structures assumptions and
recommendations - geotechnical aspects
Inaccurate earthwork assumptions- soil or rock cuts or fills
Bias and/or variation in design parameters being different
than estimated, in general
Incorrect geotechnical design information, in general
Inadequate geotechnical investigation
0 5 10 15 20 25
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.13 What types of geotechnical risks do you typically encounter on DB projects and how
are they allocated?
Respondents were asked whether their project cost estimates included a quantitative
analysis of geotechnical uncertainty. Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington DOTs
affirmed that they did. Of those, only Nevada DOT does a quantitative formal geotechnical risk
analysis in project scope, schedule, cost and contracting risk. Of the four DOTs, Nevada had the
least DB experience with the remaining DOTs having completed more than 10 DB projects. As
for developing a line item, risk-based, cost estimate of geotechnical risks, only Georgia, Nevada,
and South Carolina responded that their quantitative analysis of geotechnical uncertainty includes
this factor, while Washington did not.
In the last question addressing geotechnical risk management, the respondents were asked
if they employed any formalized geotechnical risk allocation technique to draft the contract
provision. Five state DOTs (Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, and South Carolina) out
of 18, reported they use a formalized geotechnical risk allocation technique to draft the contract
provision. These techniques included sharing the cost sharing and a unit price pay items.
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Geotechnical Aspects of DB Procurement Process
This section of the report presents the results on how DOTs perceive geotechnical factors
in DB projects, and details the amount of geotechnical information provided by DOTs. Figure 3.14
shows that 10 DOTs reported assigning a weight to geotechnical factors with regard to all other
evaluated factors. The California, Kansas, and New Hampshire DOTs stated that these factors
carry no weight. It is notable that only California out of the three DOTs reported using DB delivery
on projects where the geotechnical risk is considered to be significant. Virginia DOT was the only
DOT to report assigning geotechnical factors a heavy weight compared to other evaluated factors.
In general, geotechnical factors in DB RFP evaluation plans are not heavily weighted when
compared to all evaluated factors.
Heavy weight
Some weight
Minor weight
No weight
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.14 DOTs and Geotechnical Factors Weight in the Evaluation Plan
Figure 3.15 shows the geotechnical content that DOTs provide in their RFPs in a DB
project with significant geotechnical issues. The majority of the DOTs (Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, and Washington) provide a
geotechnical data report. Connecticut, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, and Washington DOTs
provide geotechnical baseline report in their RFPs, while Arizona, Kansas, and New Hampshire
do not provide any geotechnical information in their RFPs. Only Massachusetts DOT answered
they provided GIR in their RFPs. Many respondents noted that the type and amount of RFP
geotechnical information provided in the RFPs varies; the higher the geotechnical risk, the greater
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level of investigation. Other DOTs indicated that all subsurface uncertainties should be addressed
in the pre-award phase because after the contract is awarded, the design-builder is responsible to
develop geotechnical solutions.
Other
Geotechnical baseline report (GBR)
Geotechnical Design Report (Full subsurface…
Preliminary Geotechnical Design Report (Partial…
Geotechnical Summary Report (Review of records…
Geotechnical Data Report (Review of records and…
Reconnaissance Report (Review of records…
None
0 2 4 6 8 10
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.15 DOT Survey Response Results Regarding Geotechnical Content Provided in the
RFP.
Figure 3.16 shows the additional information that design-builders solicit during proposal
preparation in a DB project with significant geotechnical issues. As seen, 11 DOTs agree that
alternative technical concepts for geotechnical features of work, and proposed mitigation
approaches for known or potential risk areas are the most common additional information that
design-builders request. Minnesota and Ohio DOTs provide a geotechnical design report as a part
of RFPs for projects with significant geotechnical issues and South Carolina provides a GBR. This
infers that the more geotechnical information DOTs provide in their RFPs, the less information is
required by design-builders. Utah DOT selected “other” option stating “additional subsurface
investigation and lab testing required to fulfill (as a minimum) the requirements set forth in our
Geotechnical Manual of Instruction; and development of ALL geotechnical design parameters,
using both the agencies’ preliminary data report, and the design-builders’ additional investigation.”
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Other
Alternative technical concepts for geotechnical features of
work
Proposed mitigation approaches for known or potential
geotechnical risk areas
Preliminary designs for foundation features of work
Geotechnical design values to be used

Pre-award geotechnical investigation of critical areas by
design-builders
Limited additional testing as requested by the design-
builders
List of assumptions made regarding geotechnical conditions
None
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.16 RFP Additional Geotechnical Information by Design-Builders.
DOTs were asked about what they allow and/or give during the bidding stage for DB
projects with significant geotechnical issues. Most DOTs except New York and North Carolina
DOTs stated they allow ATCs during the DB procurement (Figure 3.17). However, North Carolina
DOT reported that ATCs for geotechnical features or work are required as additional geotechnical
information in DB proposals. Around 83% DOTs give the bidders general access to the project
site and the results of the borings they had conducted.
Allows alternative technical concepts (ATC)

during the DB procurement process
Gives the bidders general site access and the
results of the borings it had conducted.
Allows the proposers to do their own boring
at the site
0 5 10 15 20 25
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.17 DOTs Procurement Phase Practices in a DB Project with Significant Geotechnical
Risks
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Figure 3.18, details the results of the survey with regard to the impact on project success
of various aspects that are part of the procurement process. One and see that ‘sufficient
geotechnical information to allow the competitors to price the project without excessive
contingencies’ was rated the highest with an average of 2.84, followed by ‘highly qualified
geotechnical design engineers’ with an average of 2.52. The least important factor was the “peer-
review of geotechnical design reports (GDR) and supplemental GDRs” followed by “formal
geotechnical risk analysis conducted by agency”, “formalized geotechnical risk allocation
techniques to draft the contract provisions”, and “geotechnical risk mitigation plan in proposal.”.
Looking closer at the individual DOT responses, only Arizona, Maine, Missouri, Virginia, and
Washington rated the “formal geotechnical risk analysis conducted by the agency” as very
important. It should be noted that the Maine and Washington DOTs do a qualitative formal
geotechnical risk analysis for developing project scope, schedule, cost, and contracting risks. Some
outliers were observed in terms of rating the factors’ importance, such as Ohio DOT being the only
DOT that selected “geotechnical ATCs with confidential one-on-one meetings” as not important,
and Kansas DOT also being the only DOT selecting “correct weight of geotechnical issues in
relation to other project requirement area” as not important.
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Peer-review of GDR and supplemental GDRs
Geotechnical risk mitigation plan in proposal

Formalized geotechnical risk allocation techniques to draft the
contract provisions
Formal geotechnical risk analysis conducted by agency
Detailed GBR in RFP
Geotechnical construction QA plan in proposal
Geotechnical design QA plan in proposal

Correct weight of geotechnical issues in relation to other
project requirements
Opportunity for competitors to conduct some form of
subsurface investigation during proposal preparation
Verification of knowledge and experience working in the
project area
Geotechnical ATCs with confidential one-on-one meetings
Mandated use of agency design criteria
Highly qualified geotechnical design engineers

Sufficient geotechnical information to allow the competitors
to price the project without excessive contingencies
0 1 2 3
No. of DOTs
Figure 3.18 Average Scores of Importance of Geotechnical Aspects During the Procurement
Process to the Overall Success of the Project
3.3.1.4 Geotechnical Aspects of DB Contracts
This section reports the results of the last section of the survey that addresses the
geotechnical aspects of DB contracts. Respondents were asked to select what type of payment
provisions are contained in both typical DB projects and those with significant geotechnical issues.
Figure 3.19 shows that lump sum is the most common contract payment provision for both in a
project types, with eleven and nine respondent selections respectively, followed by the
“combination lump sum and unit price” contract payment provision. The least used types of
payment provisions were unit price GMP, unit price, and cost reimbursable, and only the Georgia
DOT selecting unit price GMP for DB projects with significant geotechnical issues.
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12
10
No. of DOTs
8
6
4
2
0
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Typical Project
DB Project with Significant

Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Geotechnical Issue
Lump sum Lump sum Unit price GMP Unit price Cost Combination Other
guaranteed reimbursable lump sum and
maximum price unit prices
(GMP)
Figure 3.19 Type of Payments in a DB Project

DOTs were asked a question on how the contract document is set up to address various
geotechnical aspects (with ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘don’t know’ response options). A total of 25 DOTs
responded to this question. As shown in Figure 3. 20, 20 DOTs (out of 25) stated that they provide
and require geotechnical design criteria in their DB contracts, and use performance verification or
measurement methods for geotechnical features. This was followed by 19 DOTs who stated that
they require geotechnical design criteria in their DB contracts; however, New York and Utah
DOTs do not require and provide geotechnical design criteria. The least common way by which
DOTs address geotechnical risks in contracts - with more than 50% of the DOTs (14 out of 24
DOTs) responding ‘no’- was having ‘incentives that are used to align owner and contractor
geotechnical risks and rewards’. This was followed by the use of warranties which was the second
least commonly used. It is interesting to note that South Carolina DOT, for instance, does not use
GBR as a contract document, but the agency completes a GBR study before making the decision
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to use a DB project and also provides a GBR study in the RFP in a project with significant
geotechnical issue. On the other hand, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington DOTs, for example,
are agencies that not only use GBR as a contract document, but also include the GBR in their RFP
for a DB project with a significant geotechnical issue.
Figure 3. 20 Geotechnical Aspects of DB Contracts

When asked whether their DB contracts contain a clause regarding geotechnical differing
site conditions, 89% reported that they did. The Arizona, Kansas, and Ohio DOTs reported they
did not. Of the three, only the Ohio DOT uses DB delivery on projects with significant geotechnical
and on those, the agency addresses the geotechnical issue in RFP/RFQ by including a GBR and
prescriptive design criteria. The agencies that used a geotechnical differing site conditions clause
were asked to rate how often design-builders’ claims of a differing geotechnical site condition
result in a compensable change order and more than 50% of the DOTs responded “occasionally”
while none of these marked “always”. Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New York, and
Utah DOTs responded that they have “never” had a claim that would result in a compensable
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change order. Of that group, the Connecticut DOT is the only agency that does not use DB delivery
when the geotechnical risks are considered to be significant. In contrast, Hawaii, Kentucky, and
Massachusetts DOTs selected “usually” for a frequency of design-builder’s DSC claims. It should
be noted that Massachusetts DOT is the only agency that allocates the risk of differing site
conditions contract clause to the owner.
Respondents whose contracts contain a clause regarding geotechnical differing site
condition were further asked if the clause explicitly delineate the contractor’s right to submit a
claim for specific types of unforeseen conditions. California, Connecticut, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington DOTs affirmed the clause did,
while Massachusetts and New Hampshire DOTs reported the clause did not, and Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, and Utah DOTs
reported “no opinion”. Some DOTs clarified that differing site conditions expressly do not include
conditions related to geology or hydrology; it includes bedrock, soils, groundwater, or other natural
conditions. It was also noted by one DOT that contracts typically state that geotechnical conditions
are not considered a differing site conditions.
Next, DOTs that work with contracts containing a differing site conditions clause were
asked to estimate the percentages of their DB projects that have ended up with a compensable
differing site conditions change/claim. The percentages were divided into five categories, none; 1-
10%; 11-25%; 26-50%, and more than 50%. Only California DOT selected more than 50%. It is
interesting that Caltrans was the only agency that reported that more than half of its DB projects
have ended up with a compensable differing site condition with the agency having more than 10
DB delivered and more than 10 years of having using DB as a delivery method. This answer can
be explained based on the fact that Caltrans neither allocates any weight to geotechnical factors in
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the evaluation plan, nor completes a formal geotechnical risk analysis. On the other hand,
Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New York, and Utah marked none as a percent of its
projects. Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Nevada DOTs marked 11-25%. From 19 DOTs that
responded to this question, none selected 26-50%, and nine DOTs marked 1-10%.
Agencies were asked to select what document, if any, is used to define a differing
geotechnical site conditions. There were six options where “no document” and “other options”
were included as an answer (Figure 3.21). Most DOTs (7 DOTs) reported that the contract differing
site condition clause was the only source. Four DOTs (California, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Utah DOTs) selected the geotechnical information contained in the RFP, while the same number
of DOTs (Connecticut, Missouri, Virginia, and Washington) selected GBR contained in the RFP..
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Geotechnical GBR GDR Contract No document Other
information contained in produced by differing site
contained in RFP design-builder conditions
RFP clause
definition only
Figure 3.21 What document, if any, is used to define a differing geotechnical site condition?
To seek potential case studies for DB projects involving geotechnical issues, the
questionnaire asked DOTs if their agency had a major claim regarding geotechnical problems.
Seven DOTs responded that they did; those included California, Georgia, Maine, New Hampshire,
Utah, Virginia, and Washington. That group indicated that geotechnical issues included a failure
of foundation due to inaccurate subsurface information, unexpected obstruction encountered
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during mini-pile installation, karst terrain, landslide during construction, and tunnel launch pit
dewatering.
In order to compare DB and DBB projects, agencies were asked to rate the final quality of
geotechnical work on DB projects compared to DBB projects. The options were: Better, Same,
Worse, and No Opinion (Figure 3.22). From 25 DOTs, only South Carolina marked “Better”
providing justifications such as “our DB projects are generally higher profile and higher
complexity projects. Because a quality component is included in both the short-listing of the DB
teams in the RFQ process and quite often in price adjustments based on a quality score in the RFP
and bid process, there is an incentive for the contractors to assemble the best quality team
possible”. In addition, it is notable that South Carolina is one of the three DOTs that perform a
complete GBR investigation before making the decision to use DB as a delivery method, it is also
one of the three DOTs that bear the risk of inadequate geotechnical investigation, and is one of the
five DOTs that provides GBR in a project with significant geotechnical issue. Thirteen DOTs rated
the quality of geotechnical work to be the same as DBB projects, while California, Kentucky,
Montana, New York, Ohio, Utah, and Washington DOTs considered it “worse”. Some reasons
provided as to why the final work of geotechnical quality is worse were as follows:
 Contractor-designers like consulting engineers are unwilling to take on any risk at all in
their deigns, thus the agency gets functional but conservative and expensive geotechnical
solutions.
 Contractors want to “cheapen up” the geotechnical work; and sacrifice of some degree of
quality due to the lack of authority of the agency over design-builder.
 Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, and Nevada selected “no opinion.”
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It should be noted that South Carolina DOT formally assesses design-builder’s performance
and uses that for the future DB selection. SCDOT was the only agency that selected better on
comparing the final quality of geotechnical work on DB projects with DBB projects.
14
12
10
0
Better Same Worse No Opinion
Figure 3.22 How do you rate the final quality of geotechnical work on DB projects compared to
DBB projects?
The next question asked if agencies formally evaluated the design-builder’s performance
quality and use that for future DB selections. From 25 DOTs that responded to this question, only
Connecticut and South Carolina marked “yes.” The remaining responses were almost equally
divided between “no” and “do not know” answers; twelve and eleven DOTs marked “no” and “do
not know”, respectively.
The last question regarding geotechnical aspects of DB contracts asked agencies to rate 11
geotechnical factors from 1 to 5 for their impact on the final quality/performance of the project,
with 1 being very low impact to 5 being very high impact. Figure 3.23 shows that the highest
factors rated were the “qualifications of the design-builder’s geotechnical staff” and the “agency
interactivity with geotechnical design team during design phase”. This was followed by the
“amount of geotechnical information expressed in procurement documents” and “design-builders
past project experience with geotechnical issues”. The lowest factor rated was “warranty
provisions.”
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Warranty provisions
Confidential one-on-one meetings
Agency interactivity with geotechnical design team during

proposal phase
Geotechnical ATCs
Early contractor involvement in geotechnical design
Use of agency geotechnical specifications and/or design

details
Use of geotechnical performance criteria/specifications
Design-Builder's past project experience with geotechnical

issues
Amount of geotechnical information expressed in the
procurement documents
Agency interactivity with geotechnical design team during
design phase
Qualifications of the Design-Builder's geotechnical staff
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5

Average Score with 5 being
Figure 3.23 Please rate the following geotechnical factors for their impact on the final
quality/performance of the DB project.
Finally, the questionnaire asked DOTs that work with DB project delivery method if there
is something that they would like to share regarding geotechnical aspects on their DB projects.
One of the main recurring comments was the importance of having adequate exploration that
defines the likely geotechnical issues and allows the DB contractors to properly scope and bid the
project.
Comparing Experienced and Non-Experienced DOT’s Geotechnical Risk Management Strategies
The research team decided to take a closer look at the results detailed above, pertinent to
the experience of the different DOTs in DB project delivery and categorized the respondent into
experienced and non-experienced (Table 3.14 - Survey Respondent and Categorization Based on
Experience in DB Projects), to investigate the differences between these two groups in managing
87

geotechnical risks on their DB projects. Experienced agencies are defined as those having
completed more than 10 DB projects.
Table 3.14 Survey Respondent and Categorization Based on Experience in DB Projects

Category Responding States
Experienced DOTs Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine,
( >10 DB projects) Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia
Non-experienced DOTs Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana,
( <10 DB projects) Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire
This investigation led to some major findings, as detailed below:
Many DOTs believe that contractors should assume full risk of differing site conditions
(Christensen and Meeker 2002). However, the results of the online-survey for this research show
that not all agencies share the same thought. Particularly, the study found that experienced and
non-experienced DOTs allocate unknown geotechnical conditions differently. Experienced
agencies tend to share geotechnical risk; whereas non-experienced agencies tend to either accept
or shed all of it.
In terms of the weight of geotechnical factors, it was observed that while more than 80%
of non-experienced DOTs indicated that geotechnical factors have “No/Minor Weight” in their
evaluation plans. However, more than 60% of the experienced DOT’s placed a Some/Heavy
weight to geotechnical factors (Figure 3.24). This leads one to infer that experienced DOTs realize
the importance of giving weight to geotechnical factors in DB evaluation plans.
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100.0%
Percentage of Agencies
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
No / Some /
Minor Heavy
Weight Weight
Less than 10 DB
83.3% 16.7%
projects delivered
More than 10 DB
37.5% 62.5%
projects delivered
Figure 3.24 Geotechnical Evaluation Criteria Weighting

As for the three geotechnical factors, shown in Figure 3.25, in terms of their impact on the
final quality/performance of the DB project, a consistent difference is observed in the higher
consideration of experienced DOTs when compared with the non-experienced DOTs. For instance,
100% of experienced DOTs not only agree in rating the qualification of the design-builder’s
geotechnical staff as a very/high impact, but also agree in rating the design-builder’s past project
experience with geotechnical issues as very/high impact. In contrast, non-experienced DOTs
results are dispersed across the range of impacts. Non-experienced DOTs do not perceive the
importance of qualifying the design-builder’s geotechnical experience and workforce as being as
important as the experienced DOTs. Experienced DOTs see the amount of geotechnical
information included in RFPs as important thereby decreasing geotechnical uncertainty during
procurement, and making the proposals received more competitive (Christensen and Meeker
2002).
89

100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
20.0%
0.0%
Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than
10 DB 10 DB 10 DB 10 DB 10 DB 10 DB
projects projects projects projects projects projects
delivered delivered delivered delivered delivered delivered
Amount of
Design-Builder's geotechnical
Qualifications of the
past project information
Design-Builder's
experience with expressed in the
geotechnical staff
geotechnical issues procurement
documents
Very High/ High Impact 57.1% 100.0% 42.9% 100.0% 57.1% 88.2%
Some Impact 28.6% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 42.9% 11.8%
Slight/No Impact 14.3% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Figure 3.25 Impact of Geotechnical Risk Factors

Further statistical analysis was conducted using the Pearson Chi-Square Test to see if there
is a statistical significant difference in the perception of DB’s geotechnical aspects between
the two groups. Table 3.15 shows the different aspects tested. A significant difference was
observed in the importance of the qualifications and past experience of the design-builder’s
geotechnical staff.
Table 3.15 Summary of Chi-Square Test Results for Experienced vs Non-experienced DOTs
Chi-Square Significance
Aspects tested
( ) (p)
Impact of the design-builder's geotechnical staff qualifications on DB project
8.327 0.01*
quality/performance.
Impact of the design-builder's past project experience with geotechnical issues on
11.657 0.00*
DB project quality/performance.
Impact of the amount of geotechnical information expressed in the procurement
2.906 0.08
documents on DB project quality/performance
Geotechnical factor weighting in the evaluation plan compared with other
3.667 0.05
evaluation factors
Unknown geotechnical condition risk allocation 4.200 0.12
Another interesting difference between experienced and non-experienced DOTs is related
to the allocation of geotechnical uncertainty. Figure 3.26 illustrates that while 57% of experienced
90

DOTs are more willing to share the geotechnical risk uncertainty rather than bear it, more than
50% of non-experienced DOTs are willing to bear the geotechnical risk rather than share it, and
only 14% of these DOTs allocate it to the owner. This could be attributed to the better
understanding of the DB project delivery method as compared to the traditional methods in terms
of risk allocation.
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
DB
Owner Shared
Contractor
Unknown geotechnical condition
Less than 10 DB
57.1% 14.3% 28.6%
projects delivered
More than 10 DB
14.3% 28.6% 57.1%
projects delivered
Figure 3.26 Geotechnical Risk Allocation
Finally, Figure 3.27 shows another prominent difference between experienced and non-
experienced agencies, which is the perception of the level of importance of completing a formal
geotechnical risk. Over 70% of experienced DOTs rated a formal geotechnical risk analysis as
either “important” or “very important,” while 50% of non-experienced DOTs gave the formal
analysis of geotechnical risk “no importance.”
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60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Not
Very Important Important Important/Does
not apply
Less than 10 DB projects
0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
delivered
More than 10 DB projects
29.4% 41.2% 29.4%
delivered
Figure 3.27 Formal Geotechnical Risk Analysis

3.3.1.5 Consolidated DOT Survey Findings
Based on the survey findings and the comparison between experienced and non-experienced
DOTs, the following conclusions are drawn:
Before Making a Decision to Use DB Project Delivery
1. Geotechnical factors, as well as geotechnical information available before making the
decision to use DB delivery, not only are independent of the use of DB delivery in agencies,
but also do not preclude a given project from using a DB contract. This is supported by the
fact that most agencies reported using DB project delivery even when geotechnical issues
are considered significant. It was, however, noted that agency direction, policy, schedule,
and funding are factors that could preclude a project from being DB.
2. In terms of geotechnical investigation prior to bidding, 76% of DOTs reported conducting
a preliminary geotechnical investigation before making the decision to use the DB delivery
method. It is interesting that 7 DOTs reported not performing any geotechnical
investigations prior to making the decision to use DB, and 80% of the DOT respondents
reported using DB in projects with significant geotechnical risks.
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3. A formal geotechnical risk analysis affords the DOT project staff the ability to identify,
quantify and mitigate the geotechnical risk before the procurement process starts and thus
adds value to the DB project delivery process.
4. US case law shows that the owner cannot fully shed geotechnical risk by relying on
exculpatory DSC clauses alone. Therefore, geotechnical risk must be confronted early in
the project development process, producing thoughtful geotechnical risk management
plans that rationally share the project-specific risks with the competing design-builders
during procurement and after award of the DB contract.
Included in DB Solicitation Documents
5. Uncertainty is reduced by increasing the amount of information available at the time a
decision is made. Therefore, the DOT should provide as much information on subsurface
conditions as it has at the time the DB project is advertised to permit competing DB teams
the greatest information benefit as they make risk pricing decisions during bidding.
6. Majority of the DOTs provide a geotechnical data report followed by preliminary
geotechnical design reports in their RFPs.
7. States that reported using DB in projects with significant geotechnical risks mostly used
Geotechnical Baseline Reports (GBR) to address geotechnical issues in the RFQ/RFP.
8. Results show that geotechnical factors, if included in the evaluation plan, carry at least
some weight with regard to all other evaluated factors. However, agencies are aware that
geotechnical factors have an impact not only on schedule and cost of the project, but also
on project’s overall success.
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9. One major concern that was repeatedly reported by DOTs related to the success of the
project is to have sufficient geotechnical information during the procurement phase to
allow competitors to price the project without excessive contingencies.
10. Based on the comparison conducted between experienced and non-experienced DOTs in
managing geotechnical risks, it was seen that more experienced DOTs give more emphasis
to the qualifications and past experience of the design-builder’s geotechnical staff and their
effect on the final quality/performance of the DB project.
11. The cost of geotechnical uncertainty at the time of bidding can be mitigated by the
thoughtful allocation and sharing of project-specific geotechnical risks detailed in the DB
RFP.
During Bidding
12. Supplemental studies such as allowing proposers to perform their own geotechnical
investigations and laboratory testing, prior to the bid, are steps that agencies implement to
address geotechnical issues in the DB RFQ/RFP.
13. There is a general agreement in regards to the importance of the interactivity between the
agency and the design-builder prior to the bid. This is evident by many agencies requesting
ATCs, which propose mitigation approaches for known or potential geotechnical risk areas.
14. In general, the geotechnical risk management process conducted by the agency, prior to
bid, is more common in DOTs rather than a risk management process required of the
design-builder.
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Geotechnical Risk Management Process and Risk Allocation
15. Based on the results, it seems that DOTs, in general, do not conduct a formal geotechnical
risk analysis in the preparation of the project scope, schedule, and costs. When a
geotechnical risk analysis is conducted, a qualitative analysis predominates over
quantitative analysis.
16. In general, DOT project cost estimates do not involve a quantitative analysis of
geotechnical uncertainty supporting that qualitative analysis of geotechnical risk is more
likely developed.
17. Unknown geological conditions were reported as the most typical risk encountered on DB
projects, with it mostly shared between agency and design-builder. Settlement was the next
highly reported form of risk in ground conditions and was mostly borne by the design-
builder. In terms of design uncertainty, incorrect geotechnical information was reported as
the highest risk, with it being mostly borne by the design-builder. In terms of risk allocation
in the DSC clause, most DOTs had the clause drafted to share or transfer DSC risk to the
design-builder.
18. Agencies generally are not willing to bear geotechnical risk during the post-award design
process intending to make the design-builder responsible for developing geotechnical
solutions after the contract is awarded.
19. In general, DOTs are not only providing, but also requiring geotechnical design criteria in
their DB contracts.
Project Execution
20. Less than 10% of the DOT DB projects end with a claim regarding differing site condition.
21. Only 4 DOTs formally evaluate the design-builder’s performance and use this information
for future DB selection. However, most DOTs agree that highly qualified geotechnical
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design engineers are important to the success of the project. Also that the qualifications of
the design-builder’s geotechnical staff and its past project experience with geotechnical
issues have a high impact on the final quality/ performance of the DB project.
3.3.2 Survey of DB Geotechnical Risk Experts (Survey 2)
The second survey was conducted to gain an expert perception on the frequency and impact
of geotechnical risk factors on DB projects. It was conducted as a follow-up on the results of
Survey 1 which only included 11 common elements of geotechnical uncertainty typically found
on DB projects. This survey was also combined with data from the content analysis of DOT
geotechnical design manuals that gained from subject matter experts interviewed in conjunction
with the development of agency case studies. The result was an expanded list of 27 final
geotechnical risk factors. Two examples of the documents reviewed for the content analysis are
Checklist and Guidelines for Review of Geotechnical Reports and Preliminary Plans and
Specifications (FHWA 2003) and the GeoConstructability Report (GeoConstructability 2011).
These were used to identify geotechnical factors that were not included in first 11-factor list from
Survey 1.
The survey asked respondents to rate the frequency of 27 risk factors on DB transportation
projects using a Likert scale for occurrence and impact ranging from never occurs (0) to occurs
very often (4) and from no impact (0) to catastrophic impact (4). Because of the highly specific
information sought in the second survey, a pilot questionnaire was sent to one DOT and one
industry expert to test the understandability and clarity of the survey. The detailed questionnaire
is shown in Appendix F. The pilot test resulted in important modifications to the questionnaire.
The survey measured the perceptional differences using DB geotechnical factors impact and
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frequency assessment and to provide the necessary data to develop an objective ranking of those
factors based on importance index theory (Assaf and Al Hejji 2006).
3.3.2.1 Respondent Demographics
This survey was sent to DOT and industry geotechnical professionals with DB experience.
A total of 46 valid responses were received from 22 DOTs and 24 industry experts, yielding an
overall response rate approximately 31%.
3.3.2.2 Results and Analysis of the Expert Survey
The analysis of the data was conducted in accordance with importance index methodology
(Assaf and Al Hejji 2006; Santoso and Soeng 2016). This approach requires the analyst to initially
calculate a frequency index and an impact index based on the perceptions of the expert survey
respondents. These are then combined mathematically to calculate an importance index for each
factor. The underlying theory is that a risk with a high impact that frequently occurs is more
important than a low impact risk that rarely occurs. These indices were then used to objectively
rank geotechnical risk factors in DB projects.
3.3.2.3 Frequency of Geotechnical Risk Factors
Table 3.16 shows the results of the experts’ perception of the frequency of the 27 factors
from the survey. Results were compared against the output from the initial survey which contained
11 of the 27 factors. From both owner and industry perspectives, groundwater/water table issues
were rated as the most frequent geotechnical factor. It is notable that the three geotechnical factors
(groundwater/water table, settlement, and contaminated material) from the initial survey are within
the top 11 factors shown in Table 3.16. In addition, it should be noted that the Table 3.16 factors
range from the 20% to 68% frequency occurrence, meaning that subsurface conditions and
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underground construction activities risks are broadly recognized as being one of the major areas
of risk exposure in DB contracts to all parties (Dwyre 2012).
Table 3.16 Frequency of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects

Frequency Freq. 11-Factor
FACTOR/RISK
Index [%] Rank List Rank
Water table changes 67.56 1 2
Settlement in general 60.93 2 1
Settlement of bridge approaches 56.82 3 NA
Soft compressible soil 55.35 4 NA
Replace in situ material with borrowed material 54.76 5 NA
Presence of rock/boulders 54.42 6 NA
Scour of bridge piers 54.00 7 NA
Unsuitable material 53.02 8 NA
Contaminated material 51.43 9 4
Ground water infiltration 51.16 10 NA
Seismic Risk 50.73 11 NA
Highly compressive soils 49.33 12 NA
Existing structures likely to be impacted by the work (other than utilities) 48.84 13 NA
Slope instability 48.37 14 3
Soft clays, organic silts, or peat 48.26 15 2
Underground manmade debris 47.73 16 NA
Settlement of adjacent structure 46.36 17 NA
Sensitiveness of public consideration (Parks, historic building, etc.) 46.19 18 NA
Liquefaction 44.29 19 NA
Landslides 43.00 20 6
Lateral spreading 42.93 21 NA
Rock faults/ fragmentation 42.93 22 7
Eroding/mobile ground conditions 39.51 23 NA
Subsidence (subsurface voids) 39.07 24 5
Karst formations 38.60 25 9
Caverns/voids 37.62 26 NA
Chemically reactive ground 34.87 27 8
3.3.2.4 Impact Geotechnical Risk Factors
Table 3.17 shows the impact of geotechnical factors in DB project cost and schedule
performance. It is striking that the top five factors are difficult to quantify prior to the execution of
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the project. These factors, in order, are contaminated material, slope instability, landslides,
settlement of adjacent structure, and highly compressive soils.
Table 3.17 Impact of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects

Impact Impact 11-Factor List
FACTOR/RISK
Index [%] Rank Rank
Contaminated material 72.38 1 4
Slope instability 72.09 2 3
Landslides 71.50 3 6
Settlement of adjacent structure 68.64 4 NA
Highly compressive soils 68.44 5 NA
Subsidence (subsurface voids) 66.98 6 5
Soft clays, organic silts, or peat 66.52 7 2
Sensitiveness of public consideration (Parks, historic building, etc.) 65.71 8 NA
Scour of bridge piers 65.50 9 NA
Soft compressible soil 65.12 10 NA
Seismic Risk 63.90 11 NA
Existing structures likely to be impacted by the work (other than utilities) 63.72 12 NA
Water table changes 63.11 13 2
Lateral spreading 62.93 14 NA
Liquefaction 62.86 15 NA
Caverns/voids 62.38 16 NA
Karst formations 62.33 17 9
Settlement in general 61.86 18 1
Settlement of bridge approaches 61.36 19 NA
Rock faults/ fragmentation 60.98 20 7
Underground manmade debris 60.91 21 NA
Presence of rock/boulders 60.00 22 NA
Unsuitable material 58.60 23 NA
Chemically reactive ground 57.95 24 8
Eroding/mobile ground conditions 56.59 25 NA
Ground water infiltration 56.28 26 NA
Replace in situ material with borrowed material 51.43 27 NA
Generally, these factors are encountered after the design-builder has commenced
construction on site. One can see that the results of the impact index calculation are generally
higher than the frequency index calculations. The impact indices range from the 51% up to 72%.
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The results are consistent with the findings of NCHRP Synthesis 429 (Gransberg and Loulakis
2012), affirming that geotechnical conditions not only have an enormous impact on DB projects,
but also directly affect project cost and schedule.
3.3.2.5 Ranking the Importance of Geotechnical Factors
The importance index of each geotechnical risk factor is shown in Table 3.18 in descending order.
It is noteworthy that the top two geotechnical factors importance index which are
groundwater/water table and settlement in general, are also the first two in the frequency index
ranking suggesting that the majority of DB projects are exposed to these two types of risks. It can
then be inferred that certain geotechnical factors should be addressed and clarified during the
preliminary geotechnical investigation of a DB project. Furthermore, it is interesting note that the
first factor (groundwater/water table) based on importance index, seems to be an outlier in regards
to all factors. This corroborates the notion that groundwater is an inherent geotechnical factor in
transportation projects.
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Table 3.18 Importance Index of Geotechnical Factor Risk in DB Projects

Importance
Rank
FACTOR/RISK Index [%]
Groundwater/ Water table 42.64 1
Settlement in general 37.69 2
Contaminated material 37.22 3
Soft compressible soil 36.04 4
Scour of bridge piers 35.37 5
Slope instability 34.87 6
Settlement of bridge approaches 34.87 7
Highly compressive soils 33.77 8
Presence of rock/boulders 32.65 9
Seismic risk 32.42 10
Soft clays, organic silts, or peat 32.10 11
Settlement of adjacent structure 31.82 12
Existing structures likely to be impacted by the work (other than utilities) 31.12 13
Unsuitable material 31.07 14
Landslides 30.75 15
Sensitiveness of public consideration (Parks, historic building, etc.) 30.35 16
Underground manmade debris 29.07 17
Ground water infiltration 28.79 18
Replace in situ material with borrowed material 28.16 19
Liquefaction 27.84 20
Lateral spreading 27.01 21
Rock faults/ fragmentation 26.17 22
Subsidence (subsurface voids) 26.17 23
Karst formations 24.06 24
Caverns/voids 23.47 25
Eroding/mobile ground conditions 22.36 26
Chemically reactive ground 20.21 27
3.3.2.6 Differences Between Agency and Industry Perceptions of the Impact of Geotechnical
Risk Factors in DB Projects
In addition to ranking risks, it was also important to identify and report the differences between
agency and industry perceptions of the impact of geotechnical risk factors in DB projects. Figure
3.28 shows the results based on the impact index between DB industry and DOTs, and
Table 3.19 presents each factor by its corresponding number. Figure 3.28 shows the
similarities and differences with respect to geotechnical impact. It is interesting to note that the
DB industry’s perspective of overall geotechnical risk factors results in medium impacts with a
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trend towards high impact, while DOTs’ view the majority of these factors to have low impact.
Only “replace in situ material with borrowed material” and “unsuitable material” are common
factors belonging to the low impact zone, while “contaminated material” and “landslides” are the
highest impact from only DB industry’s perspective. “Slope instability” seems to be a concerning
factor for both parties. It is striking that caverns/voids have opposing views from the DB industry
and DOTs, with the DB industry rating it a medium/high impact, while DOTs rate it as the lowest
impact factor.
4.50
IMPACT
17
HIGH
18
4.00
15 19 27
1
5
4 6 20
3
MEDIUM IMPACT
7
3.50 24 25
8 16 21
INDUSTRY
10 11 22
2 26
9 23
12
3.00
14
13
LOW IMPACT
2.50
2.00
2.00 2.50
LOW IMPACT 3.00 3.50 IMPACT
MEDIUM 4.00 HIGH IMPACT 4.50
AGENCIES
Figure 3.28 Perception of Geotechnical Risk Impact
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Table 3.19 List of Geotechnical Risk Factors

Factor/Risk Number Factor/Risk Number
Caverns/voids 1 Subsidence (subsurface voids) 15
Existing structures likely to be impacted
Chemically reactive ground 2 16
by the work (other than utilities)
Liquefaction 3 Contaminated material 17
Karst formations 4 Landslides 18
Rock Faults/ Fragmentation 5 Settlement of adjacent structure 19
Sensitiveness of public consideration
Lateral spreading 6 20
(Parks, historic building, etc.)
Seismic Risk 7 Soft compressible soil 21
Underground manmade debris 8 Groundwater/ Water table 22
Ground water infiltration 9 Settlement in general 23
Presence of rock/boulders 10 Soft clays, organic silts, or peat 24
Settlement of bridge approaches 11 Highly compressive soils 25
Eroding/mobile ground conditions 12 Scour of bridge piers 26
Replace in situ material with borrowed material 13 Slope instability 27
Unsuitable material 14
Considering that DOTs and DB industries are both exposed to some degree of DB
geotechnical risk, the difference in the frequency results, were fairly similar between the two
parties. Seismic risk, liquefaction, and lateral spreading are the highest and had the widest
difference in perceived frequency. This difference is probably because most of the DOT
respondents were located in regions of the country where the likelihood of an earthquake is low.
Whereas, most of the industry experts work in multi-state areas, which logically increases their
exposure to gauging seismic risk on their DB projects.
The computation of the importance index is shown in Figure 3.29. One can see that
perceptions differ between the DB industry and DOTs. Industry perceives that most geotechnical
risk factors are more important than the DOTs. Although the DB industry and DOTs differ on level
of importance, both groups agree that the top risk factors are “groundwater/water table,”
“settlement in general,” and “scour of bridge piers.”
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IMPORTANCE
INDEX [%]
47.00-51.00 Groundwater/ Water table
Seismic Risk
43.00-47.00 Settlement in general
Contaminated material
Scour of bridge piers

Soft compressible soil
39.00-43.00 Settlement of bridge approaches
Settlement of adjacent structure
Liquefaction
Ground water infiltration

Presence of rock/boulders
Underground manmade debris
Soft clays, organic silts, or peat
35.00-39.00 Groundwater/ Water table Slope instability
Landslides
Lateral spreading
Highly compressive soils
Existing structures likely to be impacted by
the work (other than utilities)
Settlement in general Rock Faults/ Fragmentation

Soft compressible soil Subsidence (subsurface voids)
31.00-35.00 Slope instability Unsuitable material
Settlement of bridge approaches Karst formations
Scour of bridge piers Caverns/voids
Highly compressive soils

Presence of rock/boulders
Unsuitable material
Replace in situ material with
27.00-31.00 Sensitiveness of public consideration
borrowed material
Existing structures likely to be impacted by
the work (other than utilities)
Contaminated material
Landslides
Underground manmade debris Eroding/mobile ground conditions
23.00-27.00
Settlement of adjacent structure Chemically reactive ground
Ground water infiltration
Subsidence (subsurface voids)

19.00-23.00
Rock Faults/ Fragmentation
Eroding/mobile ground conditions

Karst formations
Seismic Risk
15.00-19.00 Liquefaction
Lateral spreading
Chemically reactive ground
Caverns/voids
DOTs PERSPECTIVE SIMILAR PERSPECTIVE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
Figure 3.29 Importance Index of Geotechnical Risk Factors
Similarly, “eroding/mobile ground condition” and “chemically reactive ground” are factors
that have the lowest importance for both groups. The DOTs and industry only rated “replace in
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situ material with borrowed material” at the same level of importance. On the other hand, Figure
3.29 shows that “seismic risk” had the highest difference of perceived risk. As previously
mentioned the difference may be due to the effect of the frequency index calculated for those
agencies located in regions with low earthquake risk.
A statistical analysis was further conducted using the pooled t-Test to determine if there is
a statistically significant difference between the perception of DOTs and DB industry in evaluating
the relative magnitude of the 27 geotechnical risk factors in DB projects. Because of the bias found
in perceptions of the “seismic” risk factor due to locational impacts, it was dropped from the
analysis to give more rigor to the study and provide a more generalizable result. Table 9 shows the
two aspects tested. The hypotheses tested were the following:
Ho1: There is no statistical difference between DOTs and DB industry in their perception
of geotechnical risk factors in DB projects.
Ha1: There is a statistical difference between DOTs and DB industry in their perception of
geotechnical risk factors in DB projects.
The null hypothesis was rejected given that p-value < 0.05 (pooled t-Test = 6.616 and p-
value = 0.0001). Thus, there is statistically significant difference between how DOTs and the DB
industry perceive geotechnical risk factors in DB projects, with the DB industry perceiving more
importance on geotechnical factors.
Another purpose of the DB geotechnical factors assessment survey was to identify those
factors identified as having “major” or “catastrophic” impact on DB projects, which may cause a
DOT expert to recommend foregoing DB delivery and/or an industry practitioner to choose not to
bid on a DB project. As seen from Survey 1, geotechnical risk is not currently a critical factor in a
DOT’s DB project delivery selection decision. In other words, DOTs will use DB delivery
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regardless of the level of geotechnical risk. However, the importance index analysis results lead to
recommending that the prioritized list of geotechnical risk factors can be used to guide the
preliminary investigations for inclusion in the DB RFP. In this context, knowing the geotechnical
risk factors that are perceived as critical by the DB industry provides the DOT an understanding
of whether to include specific investigations to increase the amount of subsurface information in
those areas. This constitutes the pre-award mitigation of the procurement risk of excessive
contingencies, which may prevent a DB project award because the bids are too high (Gransberg
and Loulakis 2012). Table 3.20 presents a comparison of perceived DOT and industry geotechnical
factor risks, which leads one to conclude that the perceptions of critical geotechnical risks is not
aligned. Thus, there is a high potential that DOT contingencies will be inadequate as a result of
differing perceptions. Christenson and Meeker (2002) would also argue that the pool of potential
competitors will be shallower due to the misalignment of perceived geotechnical risk.
Table 3.20 Geotechnical Risk Factors that Would Make Not to Pursue/Recommend a DB Project
DOTs and DB DOTs and DB Industry
Geotechnical Risk Factor
Industry Agreement Disagreement
Landslides X
Subsidence (subsurface voids) X
Contaminated material X
Prediction of subsurface condition due
X
to inaccessible drilling locations
X
(Parks, historic building, etc.)
Karst formation X
Slope instability X
3.3.2.7 Geotechnical Risk Sharing Mitigation Identification
The initial survey asked DOTs respondents how geotechnical risks are typically allocated
in DB project RFPs. The ten most common geotechnical risks encountered in DB projects are
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shown in Table 3.21. The ten factors were then plotted against the differences in the importance
index of the two groups found in Figure 3.30, which illustrates the percentage of risk allocation
versus the difference in importance index for the ten factors. It also indicates that DOTs shed nine
of the 10 most important geotechnical risks. Only “contaminated material” is shared by the DOTs.
Settlement in general is the highest geotechnical risk factor that is allocated to the DB builder.
Table 3.21 Ten Most Encountered Geotechnical Risk Factors

Factor/Risk Number Factor/Risk Number
Slope instability 1 Landslides 6
Soft clays, organic silts, or peat 2 Rock Faults/ Fragmentation 7
Chemically reactive ground 3 Settlement in general 8
Subsidence (subsurface voids) 4 Contaminated material 9
Groundwater/Water table 5 Karst formations 10
80.0
1 3 7 8
70.0 2 5
10
Risk Allocation [% ]
60.0 6
50.0 4
40.0 2 9
3 10
5 7
30.0 1 4 6 8
20.0 9
10.0
0.0
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00
∆ Importance Index
Shared DB Contractor
Figure 3.30 Geotechnical Risk Allocation in DB Contract.
Figure 3.30 graphically illustrates an opportunity to mitigate geotechnical risk prior the
award of a DB contract. A high difference in importance index means that the DB industry
perceives a particular risk to be more important to project success during the execution phase, and
will reflect that perception in the size of the geotechnical contingency in their bid. If those risks
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are shared in some manner, the DOT could potentially benefit from reduced price contingencies,
mitigating the risk of not awarding in timely manner because all proposals are over budget or the
engineer’s estimate.
3.3.2.8 Geotechnical Risk Expert Survey Findings
Based on the survey findings and the comparison between the perceptions of DOTs and industry
professional ranking of DB geotechnical risks, the following conclusions are drawn:
1. Twenty-seven DB geotechnical risk factors were identified by the analysis of the literature
review, case studies, and expert geotechnical engineers.
2. Water table and settlement issues are the most frequent, highest impact, and most important
geotechnical risks that should be addressed in a DB RFP.
3. Contaminated materials and soft compressible soils are the 3rd and 4th ranked geotechnical
risks.
4. Table 3.18 can be used as a checklist during DB project development to ensure that
geotechnical risk is adequately address in the DB RFP.
5. The perception of geotechnical risk factors between DOTs and industry differ in most of
the 27 analyzed factors. Both descriptive and inferential analysis show that industry
respondents tend to be more conservative in their perception of the relative importance of
geotechnical risk factors than DOTs respondents.
6. The research results in Table 3.20 found similar perspectives on those geotechnical risk
factors that DB delivery is not optimum a given project are:
a. Landslides
b. Subsidence (subsurface voids)
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c. Contaminated material
d. Prediction of subsurface conditions due to inaccessible drilling locations
e. Sensitiveness of public considerations (Parks, historic building, etc.)
f. Karst formations
g. Slope instability
The study recommends that these factors should be addressed in the RFPs and suggests
they should optimally be shared between DOTs and industry in order to decrease potential
contingencies in proposals.
7. Results show that DOTs currently shed nine of the ten top geotechnical risks. Thus,
geotechnical risk sharing provides an opportunity to manage geotechnical uncertainties
with an expected decrease in the amount of proposal price contingencies. The results
support sharing geotechnical risk as a viable means to manage geotechnical uncertainty
during the procurement phase. Finally, the findings of this study can be used to mitigate
geotechnical risk by focusing the conduct of specific underground preliminary
investigations on critical geotechnical risk factors.
3.4 Summary and Analysis of Case Study Interviews
As part of Task 3a, a case study protocol was developed based on the findings from the
surveys, the content analysis and the literature review with the objective of identifying, analyzing
and understanding the current models for successful geotechnical risk management on projects
delivered using DB project delivery. This protocol is then used to conduct structured face-to-face
interviews, producing results with established points of comparison and a high level of reliability.
Interviews were performed on eleven (11) case study projects identified by the research
team across nine (9) states: California, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South
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Carolina, Texas and Utah. All of these case studies are projects that involved significant
geotechnical risks and several differences and similarities were found in the way the DOTs
managed them, which provided valuable insight towards identifying different strategies, tools and
methods that are currently being used to handle the geotechnical risk. Table 3.22 shows a summary
of all the case studies performed in the research.
Table 3.22 Case Studies and Interviews

Contract
Case Interview
Agency Case Study Project Award Contract Amount
No. Date
Year
Missouri I-64 Daniel Boone Bridge over the
1 Feb-16 2012 $111,000,000
DOT Missouri River
2 Caltrans May-16 I-15/I-215 Interchange at Devore 2012 $208,000,000
Indiana PR 69 from Taylor Ridge Road to
3 Jun-16 2013 $110,000,000
DOT 1435 west of CR 750E
4 Utah DOT Jun-16 I-15 Corridor Reconstruction Project 1997 $1,600,000,000
5 Utah DOT Jun-16 SR-73 Pioneer Crossing, Lehi 2009 $282,361,000
6 Texas DOT Jul-16 Dallas, Horseshoe Project 2012 $818,000,000
Maryland IS-270 Innovative Congestion
7 Jul-16 ~2017 $100,000,000
DOT Management Project
8 Ohio DOT Jul-16 Columbus Crossroad - Project 1 2011 $200,350,000
Cleveland Innerbelt CCG1 (I90WB
9 Ohio DOT Jul-16 2010 $287,400,000
Bridge)
South
10 Carolina Aug-16 Port Access Road 2016 $220,700,475
DOT
North
11 Carolina Aug-16 I-40 Landslide Project 2004 $10,574,740
DOT
This section details the findings from the case study interviews and provides supporting
information on the way the geotechnical risks were contractually handled by the different agencies.
Table 3.23 shows a summary of the distinct characteristics representing how the risk was managed
in terms of mitigation actions implemented pre-award.
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Table 3.23 Summary of Case Studies–Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Actions

Case
State Case Study Mitigation Action
No.
Provide as much information as possible to proposers, accepting
1 Missouri I-64 Daniel Boone
requests for additional investigation.
Perform additional studies if the project requires it. Prescriptive
2 California I-15/I-215 Devore
requirements.
Perform as much geotechnical investigation as DBB. Mandatory
3 Indiana PR 69
soil improvement design.
I-15 GDR nearly 100% AASHTO. Increase settlement warranty
4
Reconstruction requirement.
Utah
Exclude owner's studies from DSC clause. Mandatory
5 SR-73 Pioneer
specifications and extended warranty for settlement.
DSC clause with caps. Two NTPs. Not limiting contractor's
6 Texas Dallas Horseshoe
geotechnical investigation. Mandatory pavement designs.
IS-270 Innovative Progressive DB. Scope validation period. Appropriate amount of
7 Maryland
C studies (not too much).
Columbus First $250,000 of DSC is considered incidental. Requirement for
8
Crossroad contractor to provide GBR for tunneling.
Ohio
Cleveland Robust subsurface exploration. Requirements for deep foundations
9
Innerbelt and drilled shafts. A $500,000 DSC threshold was included.
Extensive geotechnical and environmental investigation (including
South
10 Port Access Road deep boring). Threshold for Hazmat. Seismic parameters provided.
Carolina
Elimination of geotechnical DSC.
North Provide as much raw data as possible in the contract. Allow
11 I-40 Landslide
Carolina requests for more borings. No DSC clause. Nested DB.
The details of each case study project are contained in Appendix B.
3.5 Summary and Analysis of Legal Review
The legal review analyzed the following major issues that impact the agency’s ability to both
manage and mitigate geotechnical risk in DB projects:
 Differing site conditions
 Geotechnical liability issues on DB projects
 Responsibility for geotechnical design decisions on DB projects
 Contractual geotechnical risk tools.
The complete details of the analysis are found in Appendix E. The important findings of the legal
review are as follows:
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 The courts generally hold the owner in a DB project liable for differing site conditions
regardless of the presence of exculpatory language that attempts to shift the differing site
conditions risk to the design-builder. In those cases where the owner prevailed, it was
generally due to a technicality such as untimely notification rather than contract risk
shedding verbiage.
 Absent a DSC, the liability for differing site conditions is theoretically shifted to the
contractor, who will bid the DB project accordingly. However, given the result of the
previous finding regarding the efficacy of exculpatory clauses, if a differing site condition
is realized, the owner rarely prevails in the courts. Therefore, the inclusion of a DSC in a
DB project was found to be an effective practice for mitigating geotechnical risk.
 Three contractual tools were identified as effective geotechnical risk management
approaches. All three provide a mechanism to negotiate the actual distribution of
geotechnical risk after award based on a full geotechnical engineering investigation.
1. Scope validation period
2. Multiple notices to proceed
3. Progressive DB
3.6 Application of the Findings
The analysis of DOT versus industry expert perceptions of geotechnical risk in DB projects
demonstrated the need to align differences in perception of the geotechnical risk between owner
and contractor to avoid over- or under-estimating the risks by either party and reduce conflicts by
effectively sharing the risk. This is done by establishing a set of geotechnical risk management
strategies that are then implemented using risk management methods and mitigation tools. This
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section will synthesize the effective practices (tools) identified in the research within the context
of available strategies and methods for managing geotechnical risk for DB projects.
The major factors for which a risk mitigation strategy is needed to resolve common
geotechnical issues present in most DB projects is shown in the list below. This list is not intended
to be comprehensive, but rather to be general enough to apply to most, if not all, DB project
delivery environments.
 Delays due to untimely actions by third party stakeholders.
 Inefficiencies in the project delivery process due to failure to include salient geotechnical
risk issues in the procurement process.
 Lost opportunities to avoid difficult geotechnical conditions.
 Claims due to differing site conditions.
 Poor quality post-award geotechnical investigations.
The corresponding list of respective strategies to align differences in perception of the
geotechnical risk between owner and contractor and address the causes of geotechnical-related
issues on DB projects is as follows:
 Implement early contractor design involvement through encouraging geotechnical ATCs
during procurement.
 Use the DB process to address other geotechnical involving third party stakeholders as
early as practical in project development and delivery.
 Raise the visibility of geotechnical issues in DB projects to ensure competing DB teams
understand the level of criticality on each project.
 Avoid differing site conditions claims through enhanced contract mechanisms designed
specifically for addressing geotechnical risks.
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 Promote an atmosphere of life cycle-based design and construction decision-making with
respect to geotechnical risk on DB projects.
The tools identified in the research can be implemented using the specific methods for the
purpose of executing the five risk mitigation strategies, as presented in this section. Table 3.24
through 3.28 matrix methods and tools necessary for implementing each of the five strategies
identified in the Phase research. The source column lists at least one source from the literature,
surveys, content analysis, and case studies. A two-letter state postal abbreviation notation shows
the specific DOT where the tool was found in the surveys, content analysis, and case studies. A
notation of state abbreviation plus (XX+) indicates the tool was found to be in use by more than
one DOT. The entries in the source column are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to provide
the evidence of where the specifics tools were found to be effective.
Table 3.24 Implement Early Contractor Design Involvement

Method Tool Source
Pre-advertising  Include GBR-C provision  OH
 Provide a mechanism to conduct competing team requested additional  FL+
borings, i.e. permits, rights of access, etc.
 Collect potential contaminated material information during ROW  Literature
acquisition
Procurement  Request geotechnical ATCs on DB projects  WA+
 Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs  CA+
 Competitor designated boring locations  UT+
 Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense  MN+
 Progressive DB  MD
 Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc.  MT+
Preconstruction  Scope validation period  VA
 Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation,  MO
design, and a second specifically to commence excavations, utility work,
etc.  OH
 Contractor produced GBR-C  WA+
 Negotiated GBR interpretation
Construction  Not applicable
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Table 3.25 Involve Third Party Stakeholders as Early as Practical

Method Tool Source
Pre-advertising  Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance  MO
 Site conditions history from property owners during ROW acquisition  Literature
Procurement  Request of utility-related ATCs  GA
Preconstruction  Assign design-builder responsibility for utility coordination  TX+
 Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation,  Literature
etc.
Construction  Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation,  Literature
etc.
Table 3.26 Raise the Visibility of Geotechnical Issues

Method Tool Source
Pre-advertising  Geotechnical conditions database  VA
 Furnish GBR  WA+
 Include GBR-C provision  WA+
 Provide a mechanism to conduct competing team requested additional  OH
borings, i.e. permits, rights of access, etc.
 Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance  MO
 Performance specifications for post-construction performance  MN+
(subsidence, etc.)
Procurement  Include differing site conditions clause  SC+
 Request of geotechnical ATCs  CA+
 Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs  UT+
 Competitor designated boring locations  MN+
 Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense  MD
 Progressive DB  MT+
 Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc.  VT+
 Weight geotechnical evaluation criteria  MI+
Preconstruction  Scope validation period  VA
 Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation,  Literature
etc.
 Contractor produced GBR-C  OH
 Negotiated GBR interpretation  WA
Construction  Differing site conditions allowance  WA+
 Contaminated material allowance  .MN+
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Table 3.27 Enhanced DB Geotechnical Contract Mechanisms

Method Tool Source
 Furnish GBR  WA+
 Include GBR-C provision  OH
 Prescriptive geotechnical design  OR
 Performance specifications for post-construction performance  DE+
(subsidence, etc.)
Procurement  Request of geotechnical ATCs  SC+
 Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs  MO+
 Competitor designated boring locations  HI+
 Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense  MD
 Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc.  MT+
Preconstruction  Assign design-builder responsibility for utility coordination  AZ+
 Contractor produced GBR-C  WA
 Negotiated GBR interpretation  OH
Construction  Differing site conditions allowance  WA+
 Contaminated material allowance  MN
Table 3.28 Life Cycle-based Design and Construction Decision-making

Method Tool Source
 Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance  MO
 Performance specifications for post-construction performance  VA+
(subsidence, etc.)
Procurement  Request of geotechnical ATCs  UT+
 Include life cycle criteria in best value award scheme  TX+
Preconstruction  Validate proposed life cycle elements during design  Literature
Construction  Encourage life cycle related value engineering proposals from  Literature
subcontractors
To summarize the application of research findings, aligning differences in perception of
the geotechnical risk between owner and the design-builder can potentially avoid geotechnical risk
issues, such as unnecessary contingencies and differing site conditions claims. The ultimate goal
is to mitigate the geotechnical risks by applying strategies and tools in each stage of the DB
delivery process that encourage collaboration between the parties in a DB contract.
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Suggested Research
The emerging findings that have been identified and analyzed so far in this research can be
summarized in five interrelated elements: Benchmark of current practices; Perceptions of the
geotechnical risk; Strategies for aligning the perceived the geotechnical risk; Tools for managing
geotechnical risks; and potential Solutions that have been identified to achieve an aligned approach
towards managing the geotechnical risks in DB projects.
4.1 Benchmarks:
Using the different research instruments explained throughout this report, the following
practices of the industry have been identified as the most relevant to depict how the geotechnical
risks are being managed:

1. Significant geotechnical risks do not constrain the selection of DB as the project
delivery method: The surveys and case study interviews performed in this research
have shown owners do not consider the geotechnical risk as a factor in deciding if a
project will be delivered using DB. Moreover, the most common factor expressed by
DOTs is time savings, and that geotechnical studies are being performed after the
fact.
2. Owners seek to shed geotechnical risks in DB projects: The surveys, case studies and
content analysis have shown that the predominant approach towards the allocation of
the geotechnical risk in DB projects is for the owner to allocate the risk to the design-
builderr as much as possible. The only clear exception relates to contaminated soil,
which owners tend to assume.
3. Some owners seek to limit the scope of the DSC Clause: The content analysis and
case study interviews showed that some owners attempt to shed the risk by excluding
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geotechnical/geological conditions from the differing site conditions clause and/or
include statements indicating that the geotechnical studies performed by the owner
are for reference only and do not constitute basis for a DSC claim.
4. Some DOTs have eliminated the DSC clause entirely: A DSC clause is not required
for federal aid DB projects. This creates the opportunity for owners to eliminate the
DSC clause if state law permits it. Without a DSC clause, the DB Contractor is
potentially at risk for changed conditions.
5. The case law demonstrates that it is very difficult for the owner to effectively shed
the DSC risk: The legal review performed in this research and for Synthesis 429
demonstrated that regardless of qualifying and exculpatory language, owners are not
always able to effectively shed the risk of differing site conditions.
4.2 Perception of the Geotechnical Risk
There is a disconnect between the DOTs desire to transfer the lion’s share of the
geotechnical risk to the design-builder and the case law on the matter. The study found numerous
examples of contractors prevailing on DSC claims and obtaining compensation despite the owner’s
best legal efforts to contractually transfer the risk. This led to the research team issuing an extra
survey that measured the DB geotechnical perception of risk difference between owners and
design-builders. The results of that analysis led to in the following findings:
1. The perceptions of geotechnical risks between owners (DOTs) and the construction
industry are markedly different. The survey found that that experienced DB
contractors perceive the geotechnical risks to be higher than experienced DOT
geotechnical personnel. Tying back to the earlier finding that DOTs preferred
approach is to attempt to shed risk, the finding is consistent with the idea that the
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owner thinks it is allocating the geotechnical risks to the contractor in its DB RFP,
causing the design-builders to perceive a higher level of risk
2. Previous research proved that higher levels of perceived risk result in inclusion of
higher contingencies to cover that risk. When that thought is coupled with the case
law finding that owners usually lose DSC claims, the notion that DOTs are actually
paying to unsuccessfully shed geotechnical risk becomes logical. That logic leads to
the idea that to reduce or eliminate this issue, if one could find a way to align the
perceptions of both the owner and industry on a project-by-project basis, the
geotechnical risk premium could potentially be reduced.
4.3 Strategies for Aligning the Perceived Geotechnical Risk
Having identified the difference in perception of the geotechnical risks between the owner
and design-builder, and the conflicting strategies of owners shedding the risks and design-builders
claiming differing site conditions regardless of contractual wording; the need for aligning the
perception of the geotechnical risk emerged as a point of focus for the research team during Phase
2. As a way to address those needs, five different strategies have been identified and are being
proposed as part of this research project:
1. There is a need to align differences in perception of the geotechnical risk between
owner and design-builder to avoid over- or under-estimating the risks by either party
and reduce conflicts by effectively sharing the risk. Five strategies have been
identified for that purpose:
a. Implement early contractor design involvement through encouraging geotechnical
ATCs during procurement.
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b. Use DB process to address other geotechnical issues by involving third party
stakeholders as early as practical in project development and delivery.
c. Raise the visibility of geotechnical issues in DB projects to ensure competing
contractor teams understand the level of criticality on each project.
d. Avoid differing site conditions claims through enhanced contract mechanisms
designed specifically for addressing geotechnical risks.
e. Promote an atmosphere of life cycle-based design and construction decision-
making with respect to geotechnical risk on DB projects.
4.4 Tools for Managing Geotechnical Risks
By means of all the research instruments explained in this report, the research team has identified
a set of tools that provide different approaches to manage the geotechnical risk in design-build
projects. A set of tools has been identified as effective practices being implemented by DOTs
across the nation, considering that there is no unified approach towards managing the geotechnical
risk in DB projects, this compilation of tools is considered an emerging finding as it is made
available for DOTs to implement and improve their practices as necessary.
Table 4.1 shows a list of all the identified tools to manage geotechnical risks and their
sources.
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Table 4.1 List of Tools
Tool Source
Competitor designated boring locations UT+
Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense MN+
Contractor produced GBR-C OH
Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs UT+
Include differing site conditions clause SC+
Include life cycle criteria in best value award scheme TX+
Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation, design, and a
Literature
second specifically to commence excavations, utility work, etc.
Negotiated GBR interpretation WA+
Progressive DB MD
Request of geotechnical ATCs CA+
Scope validation period VA
Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc. MT+
Validate proposed life cycle elements during design Literature
Weight geotechnical evaluation criteria MI+
Collect potential contaminated material information during ROW acquisition Literature
Contaminated material allowance MN+
Differing site conditions allowance WA+
Encourage life cycle related value engineering proposals from subcontractors Literature
Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance MO
Furnish GBR WA+
Geotechnical conditions database VA
Include GBR-C provision WA+
Performance specifications for post-construction performance (subsidence, etc.) MN+
Provide a mechanism to conduct competing team requested additional borings, i.e.
FL+
permits, rights of access, etc.
Site conditions history from property owners during ROW acquisition Literature
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4.5.Potential Solutions to Achieve an Aligned Approach to Geotechnical Risk
The primary emerging finding of this research is that there is a need to achieve an aligned
approach towards managing geotechnical risks in DB projects. The disconnect between owners
and contractors as to who owns the geotechnical risk in DB projects creates an overestimation of
the risks that lead to unnecessary contingencies as a measure of protection from overexposure.
Therefore, the focus moving forward is to mitigate the geotechnical risks by encouraging
collaboration between the parties in a DB contract. For that purpose, three emerging procurement
practices are highlighted as potential solutions to the problem:
1. Progressive Design-Build (PDB): PDB’s attraction in the geotechnical risk
management realm is the ability to negotiate the geotechnical risk after award and
after the geotechnical investigation has been completed rather than depending on the
DSC clause to allocate the subsurface risk. With PDB, the first design and
construction package released for construction could be to commence the subsurface
investigation and conduct selected excavation on the project site to identify where the
geotechnical issues will be encountered and their magnitude. Thus, a fair and
equitable amount for the realized subsurface risk can be established. This eliminates
the need for adding unnecessary contingencies in the price, as the uncertainty of the
subsurface conditions is eliminated early in the project.
2. Multiple Notices to Proceed (NTP): Similar to PDB, using multiple NTPs allows the
owner to reduce the risk of differing site conditions by issuing an NTP only for
contractor’s subsurface exploration and underground work before releasing the entire
scope of work. This way, there is a prioritization in removing the uncertainty of the
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subsurface conditions early on the project so any differing site condition is dealt with
before advancing on the next stages of the project.
3. Scope Validation Period: By means of this contractual provision implemented by
VDOT, the design-builder can, during the design development process, present
claims that relate to deficiencies in owner-furnished information. The scope
validation period, as implemented by the VDOT, is generally 120 days after contract
award, although this can be adjusted for more complicated projects. After the end of
the scope validation period, the design-builder’s claim rights are waived for items not
previously raised. This approach allows for an early resolution of geotechnical-
related issues and establishes a limit for the owner’s liability by assigning a specific
timeframe for differing site conditions claims.
4.6. Suggested Future Research and Implementation
The study found very few significant gaps in the body of knowledge that would require future
research to fill. This area is reasonably mature and as a result, future research is recommended in
the area of implementing the effective practices identified in this report and validating their
effectiveness across different types of projects, in different geographic areas, and under different
sets of statutory/legislative constraints. The following are two potential research projects that will
extend the findings of the NCHRP 24-44 work to enhance implementation in state DOTs.
1. Comparative evaluation of DB project performance outcomes of pilot projects
delivered using PDB, multiple notices to proceed, and scope validation periods. The
project would solicit interest from DOTs that have not used these three tools to
implement them as pilot projects. The research would consist of a retrospective
longitudinal study of each pilot project from inception to completion followed by a
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cross-case analysis of the benefits, costs, and quality. This would be coupled by an
analysis of a detailed record of geotechnical issue resolution kept during the pilot
project’s life cycle. The project would also include a requirement by the winning
design-builder to disclose its rationale for all geotechnical/subsurface contingencies
included in the bid price. The objective would be to not only compare the efficacy of
the three approaches but also to identify those stages of the project development
process which may be revised to result in a better geotechnical risk outcome. The
result would be a measurement of how well DOT and design-builder’s geotechnical
risk perceptions were aligned by implementing the three tools.
2. The second research recommendation is to develop guidelines for calculating the
amount of contingency that would be required to cover geotechnical uncertainty in
DB projects. The research would involve quantitative analysis of past DB price
proposals submitted by all bidders and correlated with actual outcomes including
DSC change orders, claims, etc. A classic Monte Carlo analysis of risk based on
probability density functions developed from actual observed performance in the
field may be one possible approach to develop an algorithm for this purpose. Multi-
Attribute Utility Analysis might also provide a means to solve this problem.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

a - Constant defining the weight assigned to each survey response
ASCE - American Society of Civil Engineers
ATC - Alternative Technical Concepts
Austroads - Australia-New Zealand version of AASHTO
Caltrans - California DOT
CMGC - Construction manager/general contractor
CMR - Construction manager-at-risk
DB - Design-build
DBB - design-bid-build
DOT - Department of transportation
DSC - differing site conditions
Eq. - Equation
FHWA - Federal Highway Administration
FI - Frequency Index
GBR - Geotechnical baseline report
GDR - Geotechnical design report
GIR - Geotechnical Interpretive Report
GMP - Guaranteed maximum price
Ho - Hypothesis
II - Impact Index
IMPI - Importance Index
MnDOT - Minnesota DOT
N - Total number of survey responses.
130

n - Frequency of the survey responses
NCHRP - National Cooperative Highway Research Program
PDB - Progressive design-build
RFP - Requests for proposal
RFQ - Requests for qualifications
XX+ - State postal abbreviation plus; indicates more than one state
131

Appendix A: State of the Practice

Introduction
This section reports on the evaluation of current applications of geotechnical risk
management practices using DB project delivery and the way these practices are applied on a
variety of project types. For that purpose, several research instruments are utilized: extensive
literature review, legal review of case law in the subject, content analysis of 59 issued letting
documents from DOTs across the US, two nation-wide surveys to furnish real-time perceptional
data regarding current practices managing geotechnical risks, and 11 case study interviews to
collect detailed practices from completed DB projects with significant geotechnical risks.
Brief Summary of Synthesis 402 Findings
NCHRP Synthesis 429: Geotechnical Information Practices in Design-Build Projects, was
the genesis of this research, identifying the need for DB geotechnical risk guidelines. The synthesis
benchmarked the state of the practice with regard to the content of the geotechnical technical
information found in DB solicitation documents. It concluded that the high-level federal
encouragement via the Every Day Counts initiative (Mendez 2010) that state DOTs adopt DB
project delivery made the need to thoughtfully manage geotechnical risk a critical project success
factor. Previous research found that owners use DB delivery as a means for accelerating a project’s
delivery (Songer and Molenaar 1996), and that the major barrier to expedited project delivery is
the owner’s permission to release design product for construction (Higbee 2004). Geotechnical
site investigation that drives the project’s design is usually the first task that must be completed.
Geotechnical uncertainty is usually high at the time of DB contract award, putting the design-
builder’s geotechnical team under pressure to produce a produce that can be released for
construction so that site drainage, foundation and other subsurface construction can begin.
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Therefore, “successfully managing the geotechnical risk in a DB project is imperative to achieving
the requisite level of quality in the finished product.” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011).
Table A.1consolidates the effective practices reached NCHRP Synthesis 429 based the
phase of project delivery in which they are found.
Table A.1- Summary of Synthesis 429 Findings.

Delivery
Effective Practices Literature Cite
Phase
Require highly qualified geotechnical personnel Scott et al 2006
Assigning the agency’s most qualified geotechnical personnel to DB Potter and McMahon
Procurement
project oversight 2006
RFQ
FDOT 2011, VDOT
Tailor relative geotechnical weight for each DB project
2010, WSDOT 2004
Loulakis and Shean
Explicit differing site conditions clauses
Procurement 1996
Legal Risk sharing clauses that quantify the geotechnical risk a design-builder is
WSDOT 2004
exposed to with the DOT assuming everything above that threshold
Confidential one-on-one meetings to clarify request for proposal (RFP)
Carpenter 2010
Procurement intent and to present potential alternative technical concepts (ATC)
ATCs Utilizing confidential pre-approved ATCs to enhance innovation in
MnDOT 2003
geotechnical design and subsurface construction means and methods
Mandating the use of geotechnical design solutions with which the agency Papernik and Farkas
is confident 2011
Pre-proposal approval of geotechnical design approach UDOT 2005
Permitting design-builders to request/obtain additional site investigation
Procurement WSDOT 2000
prior to submitting a proposal
Technical
Allow competing design-builders to conduct their own pre-bid
UDOT 2005
geotechnical investigations before developing their proposals
Issue a draft DB RFP and ask for comments VTrans 2010
Require the geotechnical engineering design QA plan in proposal TTA 2001
Expedited geotechnical design review and acceptance procedures WSDOT 2004
Restricting the DOT to a single interim design review before final release
Mississippi 2005
for construction review
Maximizing the use of formal and informal over-the-shoulder design
MnDOT 2001
Design reviews
Permitting release of geotechnical design packages for construction before Arizona DOT 2001;
remainder of design is complete Maine DOT 2010
Early design-builder-requested design reviews on the adequacy of the TTA 2001; NCDOT
geotechnical design 2009
Treat the geotechnical QM program differently than the remainder of the Schaefer et al. 2001;
project by increased agency involvement Smith 2008
Early notice to proceed to conduct site investigation and physically locate
Hatem 2011
Construction utilities
Use of selective unit pricing as done by the Montana, Delaware, and
Virginia DOTs provides an effective means for managing geotechnical MDT 2011
quantity risk
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The major conclusions along with the primary literature source from NCHRP Synthesis 429 are
as follows:
 “DOTs typically select DB to accelerate project delivery (FHWA 2006).
 DOT geotechnical design approval is a major hurdle to starting construction (Christensen
and Meeker 2002).
 Geotechnical uncertainty is always high until the post-award site investigation and
geotechnical design report can be completed (Hatem 2011).
 Geotechnical and site engineering is the first major design package and the one with the
highest pre-award uncertainty (Higbee 2004). Therefore:
o It must be completed as expeditiously as possible (Koch et al 2010).
o The DOT needs to reduce the impact of geotechnical uncertainty as expeditiously
as possible (Kim et al 2009).” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011).
Those findings can be consolidated and summarized in the following manner:
DB geotechnical is best mitigated by making every effort to get to the point where the
construction contractor can start excavations to physically identify actual site conditions.
Geotechnical Risk in DB Projects
DB vs DBB delivery
In this section, we highlight the effect of project delivery (DB vs traditional DBB) on risk
allocation among the parties to the contract. In DBB delivery system, the design is complete before
the construction phase starts. The owner assumes the responsibility for accuracy of design. Much
of the geotechnical claims falls under changes due to Differing Site Conditions (DSC). The FHWA
mandates the use of a DSC clause for DBB projects on federal aid highway projects, unless its use
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is contrary to the state law. The typical DSC clause provides broad relief to a contractor for site
conditions that differ materially from what is expected according to the contract documents. So in
DBB projects, the risk of differing site conditions is almost always borne by the owner (Tufenkjian
2007). In DB delivery however, the design-builder is responsible for completing the design and
construction under a single contract. FHWA does not have a similar DSC mandate for DB projects,
but encourages state DOTs to use DSC clauses when appropriate. The liability of the contracting
parties due to the risk of differing site conditions is far from clear (Clark and Borst 2002; Loulakis
et al 2016). In the absence of DSC clause, many DB contracts require that the design-builder
conduct a comprehensive geotechnical study of the site. Some of these contracts, in the absence of
DSC clause, include disclaimers of liability for the geotechnical information furnished by the
owner during the procurement process due to the preliminary nature of the information and data.
As a result, when the design-builder claims that it encountered a DSC based on owner-furnished
geotechnical data, the owner may deny the claim because it contends the furnished information
was preliminary and the design-builder should have done its own complete geotechnical
assessment of the site. Many state DOTs however, use DSC clause in their DB contracts. A
comprehensive survey of state DOTs conducted for this research showed that out of 24
respondents, only four states indicated that they do not use DSC clause in their DB contracts. A
comprehensive description of this survey and analysis of contents is provided in this interim report.
One important issue is how to establish an appropriate baseline for the DSC clause, if the
owner decides to include such clause in the contract. The use of DB delivery system by public
agencies goes back almost 50 years on building projects but it was not used in highway projects
until the beginning of the 21st century (Gransberg et al 2016). One major reason was the difference
in the scale of site conditions. While building site is limited to little more that the building footprint,
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the site for highway project extends the length of the highway and may cover many different
geotechnical conditions. The question in establishing the geotechnical baseline for DSC clause
then becomes one of the scope and extent of geotechnical information furnished by the owner.
Generally speaking, if the geotechnical information is limited, the design-builder may try to protect
itself against geotechnical uncertainty by inclusion of higher contingencies in the contract price,
especially in the case of fixed price contracts. Conducting a more comprehensive geotechnical
investigation by the owner not only encourages the bidders to reduce their contingencies, it
provides the owner more information about the project, its challenges, and expected costs.
However, some owners may believe that providing more of the design data may somehow relieve
the contractor of its obligation to do a comprehensive geotechnical assessment and to provide more
opportunities for claims. Also, because in many DB projects, the speed of delivery is a major
factor, extensive geotechnical investigation by the owner may delay project start time (Gunalan
2016). Accelerated procurement schedules may not allow the owner to research, collect, and share
all the available geotechnical information to the bidders. So, in general, potential risks are created
for both parties on a DB project that are not present in a DBB delivery system (WSDOT 2004).
The owner is faced with the question of how much information and data is adequate for the
geotechnical characterization and design of a highway, bridge or tunnel project. Hoek and Palmeiri
(1998) present. Figure A. 1 is based on the data collected by the U.S. National Committee on
Tunnel Technology (USNCTT 1984) on 84 tunnel projects. The plot shows the variations in cost
against the ratio of borehole length to tunnel length. The outcome suggests that more extensive
exploration and testing leads to reduced changes in the tunnel projects.
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Figure A. 1 - Changes vs ratio of borehole length to tunnel length (Hoek and Palmeiri 1998)
Cost of geotechnical investigation
Needless to say, the extent of geotechnical investigation should be considered vis-a-vis the cost of
this effort. While data on the cost of geotechnical investigations is scarce for DB projects, there
are some suggestions for projects regardless of delivery method. Smith (1996) estimates the cost
of ground investigation at less than 1% of construction costs. Van Staveren (2006) reports on
several authors that estimate this cost to be in the range of 0.1% to 1%. The US Subcommittee on
Geotechnical Site Investigations suggested a ground investigation budget of around 2% of total
costs in order to keep the final cost within a margin of ±10% in tunneling projects. Clayton (2001)
describes a study by Mott McDonald and Soil Mechanics Ltd (1994) that reported on the cost
overruns as a function of expenditure on site investigation for UK highway projects (Figure A. 2).
According to Clayton, less than 1% of project costs is expensed on ground investigations and it is
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evident that spending more upfront helps to reduce the final cost of the project. The research effort
concluded that the 1% level was often not sufficient to prevent large cost overruns in British
highway projects.
Figure A. 2 - Cost overrun vs site investigation expenditures (Mott McDonald & Soil Mechanics
Ltd 1994)
The research team interviewed nine state DOTs and collected data on the cost of
geotechnical investigations for 11 DB projects. The range was reported to be between 0.25% to
0.5% of total project budget. Mostly, these efforts resulted in preparation of the Geotechnical Data
Report (GDR) which contains the test data without detailed interpretation. Probably more
important was the time impact. Duration of investigations varied between six months to 1.5 years
depending on the size and scope of the project and the level of effort. A more detailed description
of these interviews is provided in this Appendix C of the report.
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Figure A. 3 provides a flowchart for the process of developing a geotechnical investigation
plan as envisaged in this research. It is understood that extensive risk assessment may not be
necessary for routine and simple projects. However, evidence shows that most of DB projects in
transportation sector tend to be larger projects and their complexity is often increased because of
the need to deliver them quickly. In the case of complex projects, risk assessment becomes an
important step in the process. Its purpose is to identify major geotechnical risk factors and their
magnitude. Based on the collective impact of geotechnical risks, a decision can be made regarding
the extent of further investigation by the agency, allowing the bidder to request more testing
conducted by the agency or by the bidder, or in rare cases, consider an alternative delivery method.
Figure A. 3 - Development of geotechnical investigation program
In cases where the level of risk is high, or the impact of full investigation on cost and
schedule is prohibitive, and if the local laws permit, the use of progressive DB could be considered.
This approach allows the contractor to proceed with the project and the final contract value will
be determined as the scope becomes clear. However, many states may not allow any delivery
method that is not based on a fixed price contract. Another related question is to establish the
optimum level of geotechnical investigation from the owner’s point of view. If the risk assessment
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process can establish the expected cost of unmitigated geotechnical risks and these costs can be
compared to the benefits of reducing these risks given certain expenditure on testing and
investigation, it would then be possible to establish the optimal level of geotechnical investigation.
Observational Method
The observational method in applied soil mechanics was first introduced by Peck (1969) and is
based on utilizing field measurements and observations to validate or modify design assumptions
during construction. Using this approach, the builder can start the construction phase assuming
realistic (and not pessimistic) values for ground related parameters and depending on what will be
unearthed during the construction phase, adjust the design values. Although the concept of design
modification based on fresh information appears to be logical, the traditional DBB delivery poses
obstacles in its implementation. The owner has to fully design the project without the benefit of
what comes to light during construction and any deviation from the original design will be the
responsibility of the owner and should be implemented through change orders. In DB delivery
system, part of design and construction can be overlapped and the design-builder can use the
observational method to identify, quantify and mitigate risks as they occur. In fact, observational
method extends the design phase into the construction phase (Nossan 2006). Farnsworth (2016)
summarizes the observational method into the following steps: (1) investigation of subsurface
conditions, (2) assessing the most probable conditions and potential deviations, (3) designing for
probable conditions, (4) selecting the required observations and calculate the anticipated values,
(5) calculate the outcomes associated with each unfavorable condition, (6) selecting a mitigation
action for each significant unfavorable event, (7) gathering actual observations during the
construction phase, and (8) modifying the design as necessary. In other words, the observational
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method follows the traditional steps in risk management, i.e., identification, measurement, and
mitigation of risks. So while DB approach creates a challenge for the owner in terms of level of
geotechnical investigations needed, it also provides some flexibility in terms of dealing with
geotechnical risks and mitigating them. With this background on the distinctions between DBB
and DB deliveries in the context of geotechnical risks, we now embark on describing various
aspects of geotechnical risk management.
Geotechnical Baseline
In order to assist in administration of the DSC clause the owner needs to establish baseline
statements in the contract documents. There are multitude of reports used in the industry to
characterize and baseline geotechnical conditions. As an example NYSDOT uses two main
documents for managing their DB projects: (1) Geotechnical Data Report (GDR) that contains all
the factual geotechnical data collected for the project including the test results conducted by the
agency and (2) Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) which is an interpretive document used for
establishing “a common understanding between the contractor and the Owner of the subsurface
conditions and their potential impact and effect of risk on the design and construction of the project
design concept.” (NYSDOT 2013). A more detailed description of these reports are provided
elsewhere in this interim report. The Technical Committee on Geotechnical Reports of the
Underground Technology Research Council of the U.S.A. developed the concept of GBR in the
1990s (Essex 2007; Van Staveren 2006). The primary purpose of the GBR is to develop a set of
contractual statements that describe geotechnical conditions anticipated during the construction
phase. This becomes a risk allocation device because risks related to geotechnical conditions
consistent or less adverse than the baseline values are allocated to contractor and risks resulting
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from more adverse values defined by the baseline are allocated to the owner. Without the GBR or
some other source for the design baseline it would be difficult if not impossible to assign risk
responsibility to contract parties. In the extensive interviews conducted for this research, 11
projects in nine DOTs were investigated. In the majority of these projects, the agency only
provided the GDR for characterization of geotechnical conditions. It could be due to the fact that
the agency does not want to commit itself to interpretation of geotechnical conditions and feels
that is the responsibility of the contractor. It seems however that in order to enforce a DSC clause
presence of the GBR would facilitate the allocation of risk and reduce the contingency that design-
builder may want to include in the price.
Essex (2007) provides a procedure for using DB delivery method in dealing with
geotechnical design issues. Figure A. 4 summarizes the proposed approach. The owner collects all
the relevant data from similar previous projects and the test results for the current project (GDR).
This information is made available to bidders and they are afforded the opportunity to request more
information or tests which will be carried out by the agency if deemed appropriate, and made
available to all bidders. The data is mainly gathered by the owner and interpreting the results and
design decision-making is left to the bidder. Based on the data collected and test results the owner
prepares a GBR for Bidding (GBR-B). The main emphasis of this document is the physical nature
of the underground conditions, and much less the on the behavioral baselines that depend on
equipment, and means and methods used by the contractor. The owner shall update sections of
GBR-B during the bidding process to include the results of any additional testing carried out by
owner based on bidders' request.
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Figure A. 4 - Use of Geotechnical Baseline in DB projects

The bidder will use the GBR-B and augment it by their approach and design to come up
with a new version of the GBR for Construction (GBR-C). GBR-C will then serve as the baseline
for allocating risks encountered during construction. It will incorporate the contractors’
interpretation and approach and its proposed means and methods.
The owner should review the GBR-Cs prepared by bidders and seek clarification on any
issues as needed. Based on this review, the owner will have the opportunity to seek adjustment of
contract price if appropriate. After the bidder is selected, its GBR-C will be incorporated into the
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DB contract documents and forms the basis for risk allocation during the design-construction
phase.
From the above discussion, it becomes evident that baselining the geotechnical conditions
is a prerequisite for a fair and balanced risk allocation, especially in case a DSC clause is used in
the DB contract. When a risk is encountered, in presence of a carefully developed GBR-C, it would
be possible to assign the risk to the party who is responsible and to plan for mitigating the
consequences of the risk event.
Geotechnical Risk and Uncertainty
Much of geotechnical risk is due to uncertainties in soil characteristics. Engineering properties of
soils vary from one location to another. This variability becomes significant in transportation
projects as they encompass large areas and long distances such that measuring soil properties and
characterizing soil behavior will be fraught with uncertainties. Baecher (1987) and Christian and
Baecher (2011) divide uncertainties of soil response to design loads into two categories: (1) data
scatter and (2) systematic uncertainty (Figure A. 5). Data scatter is composed of actual spatial
variability from one point to another in soil mass, and the noise introduced by measurement
methods. Systematic uncertainty is due to statistical error because of limited number of
observations and model error due to the approximate nature of mathematical models used for soil
behavior prediction.
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Figure A. 5 - Sources of error or uncertainty in soil property estimates (Baecher 1987)

The traditional approach has been to use factors of safety to deal with these uncertainties.
There are fundamental issues with the traditional approach which is beyond the scope of this
research. One way to deal with geotechnical uncertainty is to use a risk-based design approach. In
this approach, variability of design parameters is explicitly considered and using probabilistic
approaches, the uncertainty in the outcome of the analysis is quantified. The designer can then
decide on the design dimensions in such ways to meet desired confidence levels against various
events. A conceptual example is shown in Figure A. 6. In evaluating the slope stability, the
uncertainties in input values such as soil properties, water table level, and site geometry is modeled
using probability distributions and the probability of failure for the slope is calculated. Based on a
desired confidence limit (such as probability of failure lower than 0.001), the embankment can be
designed. There is a cost to design conservatively and while using higher confidence levels will
result in relatively safer structures, this cost should be evaluated against the benefits of such
decisions. The uncertainties in geotechnical properties should ideally be translated into the
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uncertainties affecting the project cost and duration. The current practice in designing routine earth
structures encountered in highway work, does not involve probabilistic approaches. This is due to
lack of sufficient data, complexity of approaches, level of effort required, and the unresolved
theoretical issues (Christian and Baecher 2011).
Figure A. 6 - A risk-based design approach for slope stability (Clayton 2001).
However, it is important to keep in mind that these uncertainties may impact the cost and
schedule of the project. Identifying, measuring, and mitigating risks arising from these
uncertainties is the subject of geotechnical risk assessment discussed in the following sections.
The Proposed Risk Approach
Previous sections provided some background regarding geotechnical investigations and their
related risks in design-build projects. Differences of DB delivery system vs traditional DBB were
highlighted and the role of DSC clause, an augmented GRB, and the nature of geotechnical
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uncertainties were described. This information sets the stage for posing the main question for this
research. With design-build comes the distinct possibility that underground investigations will be
undertaken by the contractor after the price of the project has been established. “Therein lies the
question: how much investigation, if any, should the owner conduct prior to advertising the DB
contract to characterize the geotechnical conditions upon which the competing design-build teams
must base their price?” (Gransberg et al 2016a). The research team has developed a modeling
approach summarized in the following flowchart ( Figure A. 7).
Figure A. 7 - The proposed modeling approach for geotechnical risk analysis in DB projects
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The proposed modeling approach follows the conventional risk assessment approach used
in various state DOTs and transit agencies. The process has been described in several sources
(Allen and Touran 2005; Molenaar 2010; D’Ignazio 2011) and can be summarized in three basic
steps as depicted in Figure A. 8.
1. Risk
Identification
3. Risk
2. Risk
Mitigation &
Quantification
Monitoring
Figure A. 8 - Risk Assessment Process
Each of the three steps shown in Figure A. 8 can be broken down into further components.
Here, our main emphasis is geotechnical risks and we have incorporated these three steps in the
flowchart. Note that the whole process can be thought of as a loop. This means that mitigation
effort can rearrange the risks in ways that identification and assessment of this rearranged risks
may become necessary.
Risk Identification
Risk identification is the process of identifying risks that can adversely affect the project
cost and schedule and also the opportunities that can reduce project costs or result in a reduction
in project duration. In general, a comprehensive risk management approach encompasses all risks
and opportunities that can affect a project. One suggested approach is to develop a Risk Breakdown
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Structure (RBS) to categorize risks and to cross-reference risk factors to individuals responsible.
RBS was first introduced by Hillson (2002) and offers a WBS-style format for structuring the risks.
It organizes the risks into a number of source-oriented groupings in a hierarchical manner. The
project risks at the highest most aggregate level could be divided into (1) External, (2)
Organizational, (3) Project-specific, (4) Legal and contractual, etc. The complete risk assessment
will cover all these areas in order to assess the project’s risk profile and arrive at reasonable
mitigation measures. In this research, our emphasis is much more limited and focused on
geotechnical risks that can be identified through site investigation and testing. As such, most of
the types of risks that are of interest in this work fall under the category of Project-specific design-
related technical risks.
Risk identification should start at the very earliest phases of project development. Early
identification of major project risks will help in avoiding the selection of problematic project
solutions and costly remedial action in later phases. It is a well-established fact that as the project
design gets further along, changes to project scope will become more costly. Considering various
phases of project development (Figure A. 9), risk identification by owner’s team should start
during the Conceptual Design phase. In most transportation projects, the owner tends to perform
a fair amount of design before going to DB Contractor selection. Much of Preliminary Engineering
is done by the owner. Needless to say, a comprehensive project risk assessment must be done by
the end of preliminary design phase.
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Figure A. 9 - Generic DB Timeline
In terms of categories of geotechnical risks, Van Staveren (2006) suggests the following
for the main elements of ground and their related risks:
1. Ground (soil, rock) – geotechnical risk
2. Groundwater – geohydrological risk
3. Contamination of soil or water – environmental risk
4. Manmade structures (such as buried piles, archeological sites) – manmade obstruction risk
Another categorization could be based on the general area of geotechnical design effort.
Geo-Institute of ASCE has divided geotechnical design into the following nine areas:
1. Dewatering
2. Deep foundations
3. Shallow foundations
4. Mass excavation and grading
5. Marine construction
6. Ground improvement
7. Slope instability
8. Anchored earth retention
9. Tunneling
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Risks can be identified based on the areas listed above. There will be many ways the project
team can categorize geotechnical risks. The purpose of having a reasonable system for risk
breakdown is to ensure that no significant risk is disregarded. An effective method would be to
develop a detailed Risk Catalog prepared to the desired format and use it on every project. As the
time goes by, the agency will be able to prune the developed risk catalog by deleting irrelevant
risk factors and add newly identifed risks to the list.
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Appendix B: Case Study Reports
As part of Task 3a of the research proposal, a case study protocol was developed based on the
findings from the surveys, the content analysis and the literature review with the objective of
identifying, analyzing and understanding the current models for successful geotechnical risk
management on projects delivered using DB project delivery. This protocol is then used to conduct
structured face-to-face interviews, producing results with established points of comparison and a
high level of reliability.
Interviews were performed on eleven (11) case study projects identified by the research
team across nine (9) states: California, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina, Texas and Utah. All of these case studies are projects that involved significant
geotechnical risks and several differences and similarities were found in the way the DOTs
managed them, which provided valuable insight towards identifying different strategies, tools and
methods that are currently being used to handle the geotechnical risk. Table B.1 shows a listing of
all the performed case studies.
Table B.1 - List of Performed Case Studies (Task 3a)

Contract
Case Contract
Agency Case Study Project Award
No. Amount
Year
1 Missouri DOT I-64 Daniel Boone Bridge over the Missouri River 2012 $111,000,000
2 Caltrans I-15/I-215 Interchange at Devore 2012 $208,000,000
PR 69 from Taylor Ridge Road to 1435 west of CR
3 Indiana DOT 2013 $110,000,000
750E
4 Utah DOT I-15 Corridor Reconstruction Project 1997 $1,600,000,000
5 Utah DOT SR-73 Pioneer Crossing, Lehi 2009 $282,361,000
6 Texas DOT Dallas, Horseshoe Project 2012 $818,000,000
7 Maryland SHA IS-270 Innovative Congestion Management Project ~2017 $100,000,000
8 Ohio DOT Columbus Crossroad - Project 1 2011 $200,350,000
9 Ohio DOT Cleveland Innerbelt CCG1 (I90WB Bridge) 2010 $287,400,000
South Carolina
10 Port Access Road 2016 $220,700,475
DOT
North Carolina
11 I-40 Landslide Project 2004 $10,574,740
DOT
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This appendix details the findings from each of the performed case study interviews and
provides supporting information on the way the geotechnical risks were contractually handled by
the different agencies. Table B. 2 shows a summary of the distinct characteristics representing how
the risk was managed in terms of mitigation actions implemented pre-award.
Table B. 2 - Summary of Case Studies - Geotechnical Risk Mitigation Actions

Case
State Case Study Mitigation Action
No.
Provide as much information as possible to proposers, accepting
1 Missouri I-64 Daniel Boone
requests for additional investigation.
Perform additional studies if the project requires it. Prescriptive
2 California I-15/I-215 Devore
requirements.
Perform as much geotechnical investigation as DBB. Mandatory
3 Indiana PR 69
soil improvement design.
I-15 GDR nearly 100% AASHTO. Increase settlement warranty
4
Reconstruction requirement.
Utah
Exclude owner's studies from DSC clause. Mandatory
5 SR-73 Pioneer
specifications and extended warranty for settlement.
DSC clause with caps. Two NTPs. Not limiting contractor's
6 Texas Dallas Horseshoe
geotechnical investigation. Mandatory pavement designs.
IS-270 Innovative Progressive DB. Scope validation period. Appropriate amount of
7 Maryland
C studies (not too much).
Columbus First $250,000 of DSC is considered incidental. Requirement for
8
Crossroad contractor to provide GBR for tunneling.
Ohio
Cleveland Robust subsurface exploration. Requirements for deep foundations
9
Innerbelt and drilled shafts. A $500,000 DSC threshold was included.
Extensive geotechnical and environmental investigation (including
South
10 Port Access Road deep boring). Threshold for Hazmat. Seismic parameters provided.
Carolina
Elimination of geotechnical DSC.
North Provide as much raw data as possible in the contract. Allow
11 I-40 Landslide
Carolina requests for more borings. No DSC clause. Nested DB.
Case Study 1: I-64 Daniel Boone Bridge over the Missouri River – St. Louis, Missouri
This project was selected as a case study to illustrate the benefits of incorporating the
proposers’ criteria in the geotechnical risk identification before awarding the contract and how the
Missouri DOT (MoDOT) handles projects with high potential of geotechnical risks. Although
MoDOT treats every major bridge as a project with significant geotechnical risks, in this case study
the proposers identified the risk of liquefaction in one of the abutments during the two-phase letting
process.
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Location: St. Louis, Missouri Award Year: 2012
Contract Amount: $111,000,000 Status: Completed
Scope of work: The project consists of building a new bridge over the Missouri River to
connect St. Charles and St. Louis, replacing the existing 80-years old structure which is required
to be removed, and constructing a bicycle pedestrian facility to connect the Katy Trail State Park
to the Monarch Levee Trail.
Geotechnical Risks: MoDOT considers that every bridge project has a higher geotechnical
risk as compared to other projects. The risk analysis initially performed by MoDOT included the
identification of Differing Site Conditions, Scour and Settlement as geotechnical risks related to
this project. Table B. 3 shows MoDOT’s Risk Assessment Worksheet for this project where a
quantitative analysis was performed for each identified risk. This case study stands out for analysis
since a complex geotechnical risk such as the potential for liquefaction was identified by the
proposers during the procurement process. Additionally -during construction- the design-builder
found metallic underground debris (sheet piles) and boulders near the bridge piers, which impacted
the foundation works.
Table B. 3 - MoDOT Risk Assessment Worksheet – Geotechnical / Daniel Boone Bridge Project
Impact to Effort to Probability Risk

Project Goals Mitigate Risk of Impact (if Factor
Risk Element Low—Med— Low—Med— no action
High High taken)
0 3 6 0 3 6 0—1.00 A*B*C
Differing Site Conditions 6 6 .3 10.8
Scour 6 3 .3 5.4
Subsurface Investigations 6 6 1 36
Settlement of STL Approach 4 3 1 12
Settlement of STC Approach 2 2 .5 2
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Project Delivery Method: MoDOT performed an initial Risk Assessment on the I-64 Daniel
Boone Bridge Project and determined that Design-Build Delivery Method was an appropriate
delivery method for the project risks. The advantages of MoDOT’s innovative Design-Build
contracting method are as follows: Design-Build (DB) contracts include design and construction
under one contract, which is procured using a two-phased, contractor selection process. MoDOT
scores proposals using a best value or “build-to-budget” scoring scenario. Nationally, Design-
Build projects are completed 33 percent faster and 6 percent cheaper than conventional Design-
Bid-Build.
Contractual Provisions:
Alternative Technical Concepts (Additional Applicable Standards): An Additional
Applicable Standard (AAS) was received to request additional subsurface investigation, the
proposers identified the potential for liquefaction in one of the abutments of the bridge. MoDOT
performed and provided more borings to the proposers as a result.
- Contractual clause extract:
“3.5 Contents and Evaluation of Part 3 - Additional Applicable Standards and
Proposer Defined Elements
The Proposers shall meet MoDOT, AASHTO, and FHWA requirements unless
alternative requirements are proposed and accepted by MoDOT and FHW A. The
Proposers are encouraged to propose alternative technical requirements and
Additional Applicable Standards for the Project that strive to meet or exceed the
Project goals. All Additional Applicable Standards accepted by MoDOT and
FHWA will be incorporated into Book 3 of the Contract Documents.
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The Proposers shall provide the Additional Applicable Standards that include
construction specifications, special provisions, design requirements (by discipline),
standard drawings, materials and testing requirements, and manuals proposed for
the Project.”
Differing Site Conditions (DSC) clause: The contract includes a DSC clause but does not
refer directly to the geotechnical studies provided by the owner. A change order was awarded to
the contractor under this clause due to the finding of Metallic underground debris (sheet piles) and
boulders near one of the bridge piers, which interfered with the foundation works. The impact of
the change was an additional cost of $672,000.00 in the project cost and the additional resources
that were required for the solution, which consisted in changing the sheet-pilling configuration to
avoid the debris. The change is related to different subsurface conditions, which is directly related
to the amount of investigation performed so it is considered a geotechnical-related change.
“5.3 Process to be followed for Discovery of Certain Site Conditions
5.3.1 Notification to the Commission
If the Contractor becomes aware of: (i) any on-Site material that the Contractor
believes may contain Hazardous Substances that is required to be removed or
treated (other than on-Site materials that are included in the re-use or beneficial
use permits attached in Book 4) (ii) any human remains, artifacts, and/or other
items of historical, archaeological or geological significance within the Right of
Way; or (iii) any Differing Site Conditions, as a condition precedent to the
Contractor’s right to a Change Order, the Contractor shall immediately notify the
Commission thereof by telephone or in person, to be followed by written
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notification as soon as practicable. The Contractor shall immediately stop Work
and secure the area…”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: The overall approach to manage the
geotechnical risks in this project was to provide as much information as possible to the proposers
in the form of a GBR. This includes performing additional borings -as requested by the proposers-
before awarding. Additionally, the difference between available budget and the price of the
awarded contract was allocated for contingencies and early completion incentives. During
construction, the agency approached the debris problem by issuing a contractual modification
under the DSC clause for $672,000.00, along with the supporting resources that were required for
the solution which consisted in changing the sheet-pilling configuration to avoid the debris.
The agency considers that the main geotechnical risk factor in DB contracts is the lack of a detailed
design when the contract is awarded. In this case, the agency had to estimate the location of the
piers or the final alignment of the bridge to perform the geotechnical studies
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: The agency considers that the main geotechnical
risk factor in DB contracts is the lack of a detailed design when the contract is awarded. In this
case, the agency had to estimate the location of the piers or the final alignment of the bridge to
perform the geotechnical studies. The estimated location ended up being different than the final
position of the foundation, hence the finding of unexpected underground debris. However, in order
to manage geotechnical risk, Missouri DOT believes that the agency should provide as much
information as reasonably possible and perform additional explorations required by the proposers.
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Case Study 2: I-15/I-215 Interchange – San Bernardino, California
This project was selected as a case study due to the highly complex geotechnical conditions
that were identified and addressed prior to advertising the RFP. This project is located in an area
between two major faults (San Andreas and Jacinto) and the geotechnical report that was prepared
during preliminary engineering identified two potential faults within the project limits. Therefore,
it was decided to perform a fault trench study to confirm the presence of a fault and estimate the
degree of fault rupture. In addition, adequate subsurface explorations (borings) were conducted at
strategic locations to help provide reasonable geotechnical parameters to the bidders. This was
expected to reduce the geotechnical risks.
Location: San Bernardino, California Award Year: 2012
Scope of work: The project consists of designing and building improvements to the I-15/I-
215 interchange by eliminating existing lane reductions on I-15, reducing operational issues due
to weaving trucks, reducing interchange operational deficiencies such as non-standard design
features, and correct arterial highway deficiencies.
Geotechnical Risks: The project site is located in the highly seismic Southern California
region within the influence of two fault system (San Jacinto and San Andreas) that are considered
to be potentially active. The owner anticipates that the project site will periodically experience
ground acceleration due to of small to moderate magnitude earthquakes. The geotechnical report
prepared by the owner during the preliminary engineering design identified the two potential faults
within the project limits as well.
Project Delivery Method: Lump Sum, Best Value Design-Build.
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Alternative Technical Concepts: ATCs were received from non-winning proposers
utilizing spread footings.
“3.7 Alternative Technical Concepts
Department has chosen to use the Alternative Technical Concepts (ATC) process
set forth in this Section 3.7 to allow innovation and flexibility, to allow the design
and construction to be completed together thereby minimizing conflicts and
maximizing speed and efficiency, and ultimately to obtain the best value for the
motoring public.
Department will only entertain ATC submittals that propose alternatives to the
following Books and Sections:
Book 2, Section 10 Earthwork
Book 2, Section 12 Drainage
Book 2, Section 13 Structures
Book 2, Section 18 Maintenance of Traffic
Proposers may propose up to twelve (12) alternatives that are equal to or better in
quality or effect as determined by Department in its sole discretion and that have
been used elsewhere under comparable circumstances. Rejected ATCs and
submitted ATCs that are deemed by Department to not qualify as an ATC are
included in the maximum number of ATCs allowed.”
Differing Site Conditions (DSC) clause:
“Differing Site Conditions
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(a) subsurface or latent physical conditions that differ from those reasonably
assumed by Design-Builder based on incorrect boring logs provided in Book 2 to
the extent that correct boring logs would have resulted in accurate assumptions, or
(b) physical conditions of an unusual nature, differing materially from those
ordinarily encountered at the Site and generally recognized as inherent in the Work
provided for in the Contract, provided in all cases that Design-Builder had no
actual or constructive knowledge of such conditions as of the Proposal Due Date.
The foregoing definition shall not apply to Utilities, or Force Majeure events, nor
shall it include any differences in groundwater depth or subsurface moisture
content from that identified in the RFP. Clause (a) of this definition shall
specifically exclude situations in which accurately reported boring data does not
represent prevailing conditions in the area.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Although this project was the first
design-build project in their district, the agency knew that there was an inherent risk that needed
to be dealt with. In order to manage the geotechnical risk, the agency decided to do a fault trench
study to determine and confirm the presence of a fault and to estimate the degree of fault rupture.
In addition, adequate subsurface exploration such as borings, were conducted at strategic location
to help to provide reasonable geotechnical parameters to the proposers.
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: One main concern about geotechnical
risk in DB projects is the lack of a comprehensive geotechnical design meaning that geotechnical
parameters and data available are not complete and identified during the procurement phase. The
agency also suggested that a project with significant geotechnical issues would be better served by
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using design-bid-build or CM/GC contract. In the case of DB project, a detailed geotechnical
exploration and design parameters should be provided up front prior to the release of the RFP.
Case Study 3: PR 69 from Taylor Ridge Road to 1435 west of CR 750E– Greene County,
Indiana
This project was selected for a case study being a DB contract that had significant
geotechnical challenges that were identified in the preliminary engineering. These arise from the
geology of the site, consisting of bedrock hills with a thin layer of windblown and residual soils,
which includes depositions during post-glacial recession of deep lacustrine deposits from the
glacial slack water from tributaries to the White River valley. The construction in the valley
included stage construction of embankments with high strength geotextile, ground
modifications/improvements, Bridge with 13 spans spanning this valley and an array of
geotechnical instrumentation monitoring. The variability of the soil profile and the combination
of extremely high embankments with extremely weak soil made this project a good example of a
geotechnically-complex DB project.
Location: Greene County, Indiana Award Year: 2013
Scope of work: The project consisted of the construction of embankments with high
strength geotextile, ground modifications/improvement (mandatory design), the construction of a
bridge with 13 spans, and an array of geotechnical instrumentation monitoring which was a strong
aspect of the design.
Geotechnical Risks: The agency considered the project as a high geotechnical risk given
the project site which is a valley. The geological profile not only was variable, but also was not
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adequate to support future structures such as the combination of extremely high embankment with
extremely weak soil. In addition, the design of environmental specifications to be made was
considered as a geotechnical risk.
Project Delivery Method: Originally, the project was procured as a DBB but the agency
after having received complaints regarding the schedule and proposals to do activities as a DB
delivery from bidders, the agency decided to procure the project as a DB.
Alternative Technical Concepts: Several ATCs were received from the proposers for this
project with various objectives and methods, including 1) realignment of the structure to put all
the bridge over the rock, 2) change the location of the embankment due to the ground conditions,
3) reduce the weight of the embankment, 4) replace the weak soil with borrow material for
stabilization (Lime stabilization), 5) reduce the weight of the embankment by shifting the bridge
6) replace the weak soil with pea material.
“DESIGN ALTERNATES
The Design/Builder may schedule up to 2 design alternate meetings with the
Department and their representatives for the purpose of proposing and discussing
proprietary design alternates. The Department will review proposed design
alternates and provide a written response to the Design/Builder. Proposed design
alternates, except for proposed Traffic Control Plan alternates, shall not
necessitate a revision to the Scope of Services, Special Provisions, or
Specifications. Proposed design alternates discussed in design alternate meetings
will be held confidential by the Department.
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The Design/Builder shall present proposed concepts for variation to vertical and
horizontal alignment shown in the contract plans, variations to median widths and
variations to the Black Ankle Valley bridge at the Design Alternate Meetings.
The Design/Builder may also propose revisions to the contract, including the Scope
of Services, Special Provisions, or Specifications, for review by the Department. If
approved, the Department may elect to revise the contract documents. Such
revisions will be issued to all bidders prior to letting.
The Design/Builder will be notified of approved and rejected proposed design
alternates and proposed contract revisions. The decision of the Department will be
final.
The Design/Builder’s Project Schedule shall incorporate all major design and
construction activities. Milestones shall include all witness and hold points,
controlling items of work, intermediate completion dates, the contract completion
date, contract closure periods and earliest or latest dates to start work. The
schedule shall be shown in chronological order with the witness and hold points
incorporated with the associated construction activities. The schedule shall
indicate the critical path for completion of the project.
During the course of design and construction of the project, the schedule shall be
adjusted to reflect realistic anticipated progress of the project. The Design/Builder
shall furnish updates of the schedule to the Engineer in accordance with the
requirements herein.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Knowing that the project was
considered to have a high geotechnical risk profile, the agency approach was not only to conduct
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as much geotechnical investigation is made as DBB project delivery, but also to do it right. INDOT
consulted the geotechnical risk with its pre-qualified consultants, and specified a mandatory soil
improvement design in the contract.
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: One consideration of INDOT to use DB
delivery method is when the project requires innovation. Usually, a problematic area or significant
issue is inherent to a non-common project. INDOT considers the lack of accurate and quality of
geotechnical data and its interpretation as one of the main geotechnical factors associated with DB
contracts.
Case Study 4: I-15 Corridor Reconstruction Project – Salt Lake City, Utah
This project was the first large Design-Build project developed by Utah DOT, it was
selected for inclusion to illustrate the differences in managing the geotechnical risks as compared
with a more recent case study in this research. The project consisted of reconstructing 16 miles of
the I-15 Corridor in Salt Lake City, widening to five lanes each way by including a High
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane and a general purpose lane, the construction of a new interchange
and significantly reconfigure all existing interchanges. The project was considered to have a high
geotechnical risk due to the presence of soft compressive soil and the overall magnitude of the job.
Location: Salt Lake City, Utah Award Year: 1997
Contract Amount: $1,600,000,000 Status: Completed
Scope of work: The detailed scope of work is extracted from the contract as follows.
“The I-15 Corridor Reconstruction project extends approximately 26 km (16 miles) from
10800 South to 600 North along the existing I-15 Corridor. The I-15 Mainline will be widened to
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5 lanes in each direction with the addition of a high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane and a general
purpose lane. In selected areas, auxiliary lanes are to be added between interchanges.
One new interchange will be added at 400 South. All existing interchanges and junctions
will be significantly reconfigured. Most of the local street interchanges will be converted to
“single point urban interchanges” (SPUI’s) from the existing “diamond” configuration. The
exceptions are the interchanges at 10600 South and 1300 South.
The reconstruction will include modifications to I-215 in the vicinity of 6400 South between
State Street and 700 West; I-80 in the vicinity of 2400 South between State Street and I-15; State
Route 201 from I-15 to a point just west of the Jordan River crossing; and I-80 in the vicinity of
North Temple from I-15 to 1000 West. The project will include replacement or construction of all
pavements and all structures (except the I-80 Eastbound bridges over 900 West and 1000 West
and the 10600 South bridge over I-15) along the corridor, including the reconstruction of all of
the interchanges, the railroad grade separation structures in the vicinity of 9000 South and 10600
South, and the 400 South, 500 South and 600 South and 600 North viaducts leading in and out of
the Salt Lake City central business district. Numerous frontage roads and local streets will be
modified, relocated and/or reconstructed along the corridor.”
Geotechnical Risks: This project was considered to have a high geotechnical risk because
the presence of soft compressive soil was identified in the preliminary studies, which creates the
potential for settlement. Despite the accuracy of the information provided in the RFP, a change
order had to be issued by the DOT after a claim was filed due to the occurrence of settlement in
the structures adjacent to the project due to the weight of the embankment. The solution to the
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problem was to redesign the embankment so the dimensions are reduced and the load on the soil
lowered.
Project Delivery Method: The decision to use DB was motivated by 1) the strong pressure
from the public for completing the project as soon as possible to minimize the congestion time
associated with traffic redirection on I-15, and 2) by the need to have the project completed before
the 2002 Winter Olympics that were to be hosted in Salt Lake City. DB was selected as the
appropriate project delivery method to accomplish those goals.
Alternative Technical Concepts:
“3.3.8.1 Technical Concept Review
Each proposer may submit its technical concepts for aesthetics, pavement,
structures, geotechnical design and construction, and maintenance of traffic to the
Department between October 23 and December 1, 1996 for initial review and comment.
The Proposer may also submit proposed changes to the Phase I design basic alignment
configuration and its work breakdown structure and Baseline Plan concepts. Submit the
Technical Concepts to the address shown in RFP Section 3.3.9.1.
The review of concepts will be “blind”; i.e., those reviewing the concepts will not
know the identity of the proposer(s). See RFP Section 3.4.2 for instructions. The proposer
shall submit five (5) copies of each technical concept identified by a separate cover letter
that identifies the proposer. See Form 0, Technical Concepts Cover Sheet. No information
on text or drawings shall identify the Proposer or any member of its organization. If the
information is provided in 3-ring binders, the binders shall be plain with no names,
graphics, symbols, or logos appearing on the binders.
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Department comments will be limited to a statement that the proposer’s approach
appears to be generally acceptable and within the requirements of the RFP documents, or
identification of areas in which the approach appears to be inconsistent with the RFP
requirements. Department comments will be returned to the proposer not later than two
(2) weeks after receipt of the concepts. The contents of the technical concepts package
and all communications regarding such concepts will be kept in the strictest confidence,
subject to the provisions in RFP Section 3.2.5 pertaining to future use of ideas submitted
by proposers who receive the stipend.
3.3.10.1.2 Geotechnical
The proposal shall address:
a) Geotechnical design
 Earthwork
 Embankments (i.e. types, material source, quality and stability)
 Settlements (i.e. total, differential, secondary, monitoring and mitigation
plans)
 Walls (i.e. types, foundation systems, settlements and stability)
 Fondation types (i.e., pile, caissons, etc.) and installation techniques”
“13.9 Differing Site Conditions, Utilities and Certain Force Majeure Events
13.9.1 Differing Site Conditions.
Subject to the limitations contained in this Section 13.9, and upon Contractor’s fulfillment
of the requirements of this Section 13 regarding requests for Change Orders, Department
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shall be responsible for, and agrees to issue Change Orders for additional costs due to
changes in the Work directly attributable to Differing Site Conditions and not reasonably
avoidable by Contractor.
13.9.1.1 Burden of Proof.
Contractor shall bear the burden of proving that a Differing Site Condition exists
and that it could not reasonably have worked around the Differing Site Condition so as to
avoid additional cost. Each request for a Change Order under this Section 13.9.1 shall
be accompanied by a statement signed by a qualified professional setting forth all relevant
assumptions made by Contractor with respect to the condition of the Site, justifying the
basis for such assumptions and explaining exactly how the existing conditions differ from
those assumptions, and stating the efforts undertaken by Contractor to find alternative
design or construction solutions to eliminate or minimize the problem and the associated
costs. For Differing Site Conditions involving Utilities, Contractor shall describe the
nature of the investigations undertaken under Section 6.6.1.1 hereof and explain why it
could not have been expected to discover such Utility in the course of its investigations.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Being their first large DB project,
UDOT approached the geotechnical risk by providing a GDR including nearly 100% AASHTO
standard borings which they consider uncommon for a project delivered under the DB scheme.
During the construction, it was found that approximately 95% of the data was within 5%-7%
variation from the actual conditions on the site. Additionally, having identified the risk of
settlement in the preliminary studies, UDOT decided to increase the settlement warranty
requirement for this project to three years instead of their standard two years.
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Case Study 5: I-15 SR-73 Pioneer Crossing – Lehi, Utah
This project is the second case study obtained from Utah DOT and is particularly
interesting to this research to illustrate how geotechnical risks are currently being handled as
compared to their first large DB project in 1996, the I-15 Corridor Reconstruction Project in Salt
Lake City. This project was not initially identified as one with a high geotechnical risk, but the
presence of a wetland in the area combined with the implementation of an ATC increased the risk
and ended up requiring a geotechnical-related change order.
Location: Lehi, Utah Award Year: 2009
Scope of work (contract extract): “Pioneer Crossing includes six miles of a new east-west
connector from American Fork Main Street through Lehi to Redwood Road in Saratoga Springs.
Project features include a new Diverging Diamond Interchange, a new 60-in. waterline for the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, a 5- to 7-lane urban arterial with PCCP pavement, new
bridges over the Jordan River and Union Pacific Railroad, new concrete box culverts at the Dry
Creek and Lehi Trail crossing, noise walls, retaining walls, aesthetics/landscaping, drainage,
utility relocations, ATMS, and traffic signal work. The innovative Diverging Diamond Interchange
(DDI) Bridge at I-15 replaces the existing diamond interchange and includes new ramps and I-15
widening. The DDI, which includes twin, two-span pre-stressed concrete girder structures
replacing an existing four-span structure over I-15, is a unique innovation in transportation
design. The four individual spans have a maximum length of 190 feet and weigh approximately
2,300 tons each.”
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Geotechnical Risks: This project was not considered to have particularly high geotechnical
risks when estimated by UDOT. The presence of a wetland was identified but the original
alignment was not intended to use that area. During the procurement process, an ATC was received
to shift the alignment. The ATC was approved but the new alignment did cross through the wetland
area resulting in encountering soft soil conditions which led to a claim that was settled in favor of
the contractor by means of a contractual change order.
Project Delivery Method: The delivery method selected for this project is Design-Build
with lump sum compensation method. Design-Build is selected by UDOT when the design will
take too much time or due to loss of expertise in the DOT.
Alternative Technical Concepts: An ATC was received in this project that resulted in an
alignment shift in one of the bridges. The new alignment crossed over a wetland area and
presented technical challenges due to soft soil conditions, which were addressed in a
contractual change order based on the Differing Site Conditions clause after the contractor
presented a claim.
“ITP.3.1 ATC GOALS AND ELIGIBILITY
Sections ITP.3.1 through 3.2 set forth a process for pre-Proposal review of
Alternative Technical Concepts (ATCs) that conflict with the requirements for
design and construction of the Project, or otherwise require a modification of the
technical requirements of the Project. This process is intended to:
(A) Allow Proposers to incorporate innovation and creativity into the
Proposals;
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(B) Allow the Department to consider Proposer ATCs in making the selection
decision;
(C) Avoid delays and potential conflicts in the design associated with the
deferring of reviews of ATCs to the post-award period; and
(D) Obtain the best value for the public.
ATCs eligible for consideration hereunder shall be limited to those deviations from
the requirements of the as-issued Contract Documents that result in performance
and quality of the end product that is equal to or better than the performance and
quality of the end product absent the deviation, as determined by the Department
in its sole discretion.
A concept is not eligible for consideration as an ATC if, in the Department’s sole
judgment, it is premised upon or would require:
(A) A reduction in Project scope, performance, or reliability;
(B) The addition of a separate Department project to the Contract (such as
expansion of the scope of the Project to include additional roadways); or
(C) An increase in the amount of time required for Substantial Completion.
Any ATC that, if implemented, would require further environmental evaluation of
the Project, may be allowed, provided that the Proposer will bear the schedule and
cost risk associated with such additional environmental evaluation. If the Proposer
is not able to obtain the approvals necessary to implement the ATC, the Proposer
will be obligated to develop the Project in accordance with existing approvals and
without additional cost or extension of time.
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Any ATC that has been pre-approved may be included in the Project, subject to the
conditions set forth herein.
If a Proposer is unsure whether a concept is consistent with the requirements of the
RFP or if that concept would be considered an ATC by the Department, the
Department recommends that Proposer submit such a concept for review as an
ATC.”
Differing Site Conditions (DSC) clause: The DSC clause was used in this project to
compensate the contractor for improving poor soil conditions that weren’t properly
identified in the new alignment on one of the bridges.
- Contractual clause extracts:

“Definition:
Differing Site Conditions: Subsurface or latent physical conditions at the Project
site that (a) differ materially from those indicated in the Contract, or (b) unforeseen
physical conditions that differ materially from those ordinarily encountered at the
geographical location where they were discovered; provided that such conditions
could not have been discovered by reasonable site investigation or review of other
available information prior to the Proposal Due Date. The term “Differing Site
Conditions” specifically excludes variations in soil moisture content from that
represented in reports, borings, or tests conducted by the Department and included
in the Contract Documents.”
“1.8 DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS, CHANGES, AND REQUESTS OR
CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION
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A. Immediately notify the Department verbally of alleged changes to the
Contract due to Differing Site Conditions. Verbal notice of Differing Site
Conditions shall be promptly followed by written notice.
1. Leave the site undisturbed and suspend Work unless directed otherwise
when Differing Site Conditions on the Project are encountered;
2. Obtain written authorization from the Department to perform affected
Work and incur expense for Contract items after discovering the change,
condition, or event;
3. Site conditions to report include:
a. Conditions differing materially from those indicated in the Contract;
b. Unforeseen physical conditions that differ materially from those
ordinarily encountered at the geographical location where they were
discovered; provided that such conditions could not have been
discovered by reasonable site investigation or review of other
available information prior to the Proposal Due Date; and
c. Circumstances or occurrences that may result in a request for
additional Contract Time or monetary compensation.
4. Failure to provide required notice under this Article 1.8 constitutes a
waiver for any claim resulting from the alleged change, condition, or
event; and
5. If the site conditions indicated from the Design-Builder’s site exploration
in any area differ materially from the conditions indicated in the
Contract for such area, the notification required by Article 1.8.A.4.a
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shall be made promptly after completion of the site exploration in the
area, and the Plans shall be based on the conditions as identified in such
exploration.
B. To request additional time or compensation, follow the requirements set forth
in Section 1282S, Article 9. Contract adjustment is made as written
modification to the Contract through Change Order when warranted, in
accordance with and subject to the limitations and restrictions set forth in
Article 9 of Section 01282S.
C. No claim may be made for Differing Site Conditions under Article 1.8.A.4.b. if
a reasonable site investigation and exploration during the pre-construction
phase would have indicated the condition.
D. The Design-Builder shall bear the burden of proving that a Differing Site
Condition exists and that it could not reasonably have designed the Project or
worked around the Differing Site Condition so as to avoid additional cost.
E. For equitable adjustments relating to existing utilities at the Site, the
provisions of this Article 1.8 is subject to Article 1.9.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: UDOT provided a Geotechnical Data
Report (GDR) in the contract with an estimated cost of 0.5% of the total project amount and
dedicate around six (6) months to perform the preliminary studies. Additional studies are allowed
to be performed by the proposers if requested, which did not occur in this project. Along with the
GDR and the contractual provisions for ATCs and the DSC clause, UDOT provided specifications
that had to be followed to mitigate differential settlement and also required at least 2 years of
warranty against settlement.
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Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: UDOT’s opinion stands that liquefaction
and seismic-related risks could preclude a project from being DB delivery method given that the
effect of these risks will not be apparent during construction or the warranty period. Therefore, the
design-builder might attempt to ignore those risks.
Case Study 6: Horseshoe Project – Dallas, Texas
This project was selected for inclusion due to the complex foundation work and high
geotechnical risk involved, and the selected project delivery method where the majority of work
is to be performed as a Design-Build Project but one of its components, the Margaret McDermontt
Bridges designed by Santiago Calatrava, was a Design-Bid-Build portion within the project. The
geotechnical conditions of the site along with the design of the Margaret McDermontt Bridges
presented challenges and required a contractual change order. The contractor proposed an ATC
before winning the contract to use a different correlation chart to design the drilled shaft based on
site-collected data. Figure B.1 shows a plan view of the project with all its components.
Location: Dallas, Texas Award Year: 2012
Scope of work: The U-shaped $818 million bridge and roadway project near Dallas’
Central Business District is referred to as The Horseshoe Project. TxDOT will replace bridges that
cross the Trinity River on Interstate 30 and I-35E, as well as upgrade the connecting roads just
south of downtown Dallas. The Horseshoe improves safety and increases capacity on these bridges
and roadways, which are central to the vitality of the Dallas economy.
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Figure B.1 - Plan View of Dallas Horseshoe Project
Project components:
- Replace bridges that cross Trinity River on I-30 and I-35E
- Connect roadways where they converge near the downtown Dallas Central Business
District
- Upgrade outdated roadway design improving safety, and increasing capacity and mobility
- Meets the North Central Texas Council of Governments 2035 Metropolitan Transportation
Plan (MTP)
Geotechnical Risks: This project is considered to have high geotechnical risks due to the
high uncertainty related to presence of around 30 to 40 feet of loose clay and soft soil (poor soil
conditions) in the site. These conditions present a challenge, especially for the foundations of the
Margaret McDermott Bridges due to their inclined design.
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Project Delivery Method: The Project Delivery Method used is Design-Build with the
exception of the Margaret McDermott Bridges, for which the design was developed by the owner
and provided in the specifications (Design-Bid-Build).
Although it was not used on this project, TxDOT has implemented a Project Delivery
Method Selection Tool based on TCRP Report 131. TxDOT, FHWA and the consulting industry
participated in the development of the model. The tool suggests a delivery method and the PM has
to get approval from the Transportation Commission.
Alternative Technical Concepts: There was a geotechnical-related ATC in this project, the
contractor proposed to create a new correlation chart for Allowable Skin Friction vs Texas
Cone Penetrometer by performing pilot drilled shafts in three locations, test them and use
that data to create a new chart instead of the chart provided in TxDOT’s geotechnical
manual. TxDOT agreed to the proposal with the condition that the contractor must use the
new chart even if it is more conservative than the one in the manual. After the tests were
performed (with the contract awarded), the chart ended up being more conservative than
TxDOT’s, therefore, the contractor had to use the new chart and absorb the costs of
designing more conservatively.

3.1 Alternative Technical Concepts
“Alternative Technical Concepts,” or “ATCs,” are concepts that conflict with the
requirements for design, construction, and capital maintenance of the Project or
otherwise require a modification of the Technical Provisions but that may
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nevertheless be proposed in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in
this ITP. Sections 3.1 through 3.5 set forth the process for pre-Proposal review of
ATCs. This process is intended to allow Proposers to incorporate innovation and
creativity into the
Proposals, in turn allowing TxDOT to consider Proposer ATCs in making the
selection decision, to avoid delays and potential conflicts in the design associated
with deferring of reviews of ATCs to the post-award period, and, ultimately, to obtain
the best value for the public.
ATCs eligible for consideration hereunder shall be limited to those deviations from
the requirements of the as-issued DBA Documents and CMA Documents that result
in performance and quality of the end product that is equal to or better than the
performance and quality of the end product absent the deviation, as determined by
TxDOT in its sole discretion. A concept is not eligible for consideration as an ATC
if, in TxDOT’s sole judgment, it is premised upon or would require (a) a reduction in
Project scope, performance or reliability; (b) the addition of a separate TxDOT
project to the DBA or CMA (such as expansion of the scope of the Project to include
additional roadways); or (c) an increase in the amount of time required for
Substantial Completion of the Work under the DBA. ATCs that, if implemented, would
require further environmental evaluation of the Project, may be allowed; provided,
however, that DB Contractor will bear the schedule and cost risk associated with
such additional environmental evaluation. If DB Contractor is not able to obtain the
approvals necessary to implement the ATC, DB Contractor will be obligated to
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develop the Project in accordance with existing approvals without additional cost or
extension of time.
Any ATC that has been pre-approved may be included in the Proposal, subject to the
conditions set forth herein. If a Proposer is unsure whether a concept is consistent
with the requirements of the RFP or if that concept would be considered an ATC by
TxDOT, TxDOT recommends that Proposer submit such concept for review as an
ATC.
“13.8.1 Differing Site Conditions
Subject to the restrictions and limitations set forth in this Section 13, DB Contractor shall
be entitled to a Change Order for certain additional costs which are directly attributable
to any Differing Site Conditions to the extent permitted in this Section 13.8.1. No time
extension shall be available with respect to Differing Site Conditions, and no delay or
disruption damages shall be recovered. To the extent that additional costs are incurred in
connection with the Project due to changes in DB Contractor’s obligations relating to the
Work resulting from the existence of Differing Site Conditions and which are not
reimbursed by insurance proceeds, TxDOT and DB Contractor shall share the risk as
follows:
DB Contractor shall be fully responsible 13.8.1.1. for, and thus shall not receive a Change
Order with respect to, the first $150,000 in additional costs incurred directly attributable
to changes in DB Contractor’s obligations hereunder resulting from each separate
occurrence of Differing Site Conditions, subject to an aggregate cap of $2,100,000 for such
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additional costs resulting from the $150,000 “deductible” amounts borne by DB
Contractor.
13.8.1.2. TxDOT shall be fully responsible for any additional costs incurred in excess of
(1) $150,000 directly attributable to changes in DB Contractor’s obligations hereunder
resulting from each separate occurrence of Differing Site Conditions, and (2) the
$2,100,000 cap described in Section 13.8.1.1, and a Change Order shall be issued to
compensate DB Contractor for such additional costs.
13.8.1.3. During progress of the Work, if Differing Site Conditions are encountered, DB
Contractor shall immediately notify TxDOT thereof telephonically or in person, to be
followed immediately by written notification. DB Contractor shall be responsible for
determining the appropriate action to be undertaken, subject to concurrence by TxDOT.
In the event that any Governmental Approvals specify a procedure to be followed, DB
Contractor shall follow the procedure set forth in the
Governmental Approvals.
13.8.1.4. DB Contractor hereby acknowledges and agrees that it has assumed all risks with
respect to the need to work around locations impacted by Differing Site Conditions. DB
Contractor shall bear the burden of proving that a Differing Site
Condition exists and that it could not reasonably have worked around the Differing Site
Condition so as to avoid additional cost. DB Contractor shall track the first $150,000 in
costs associated with a Differing Site Condition in accordance with the requirements and
limitations in Section 13.7 and shall track the costs incurred in excess of $150,000 in
accordance with the requirements and limitations in Section 13.6.
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13.8.1.5. Each request for a Change Order relating to a Differing Site Condition shall be
accompanied by a statement signed by a qualified professional setting forth all relevant
assumptions made by DB Contractor with respect to the condition of the Site, justifying the
basis for such assumptions, explaining exactly how the existing conditions differ from those
assumptions, and stating the efforts undertaken by DB Contractor to find alternative design
or construction solutions to eliminate or minimize the problem and the associated costs.
No time extension or costs will be allowed in connection with any work stoppage in affected
areas during the investigation period described above.”
Changes to the Margaret McDermont Bridges:
“13.8.5 Bridges Design Change
If a Change Order is necessary due to a Margaret McDermott Bridges Design Change as
described in Section 4.4.3 other than a DB Contractor-Initiated Margaret McDermott
Bridges Design Change, and upon DB Contractor’s fulfillment of all applicable
requirements of this Section 13 and subject to the limitations in this Section 13 and the
other provisions of this Agreement, TxDOT shall issue Change Orders: (a) to extend the
Completion Deadlines for Segment B, as applicable, as the result of any delay in a Critical
Path for the Margaret McDermott Bike/Pedestrian Bridges caused by such Margaret
McDermott Bridges Design Change, to the extent that it is not possible to work around
such change; and (b) to compensate DB Contractor for additional costs incurred directly
attributable to such Margaret McDermott Bridges Design Change in accordance with
Section 13.8.5.1 below.
13.8.5.1. Determination of Reimbursable Amount
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Except as otherwise provided and subject to the limitations in this Section 13.8 and other
provisions of this Agreement, TxDOT shall be responsible for the aggregate additional
construction costs incurred by DB Contractor directly attributable to such Margaret
McDermott Bridges Design Change, such that a Change Order will be issued in the amount
of 100% of such additional costs. In determining whether a Change Order is allowed under
this Section 13.8.5, DB Contractor shall bear the burden of proving that all costs incurred
are reasonable and necessary and could not have been avoided by reasonable construction
techniques.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: Given the inherent geotechnical risk,
TxDOT procured the project as a DB delivery in order to encourage innovation. In addition,
TxDOT managed the geotechnical risk by not limiting geotechnical investigations to be performed
by the contractor, promoting the proposal of ATCs, and letting the contractor decide on
geotechnical solutions like using a bridge instead of a retaining wall. However, some mandatory
design parameters are included as a mitigation action, such as standard pavement designs and a
full geotechnical manual that has to be followed except for approved ATCs as occurred in this
project (Allowable Skin Friction vs Texas Cone Penetrometer Chart).
TxDOT also included liability caps to the DSC clause to clearly establish the shared
responsibility of the geotechnical risks and incorporated two notices to proceed (NTP) in the
contract; the first NTP included preliminary work and studies, and the second NTP corresponds to
all other work pertaining the Project. The contract language is detailed as follows:
“4.1.3 TxDOT anticipates issuing NTP1 concurrently with execution and delivery of this
Agreement. Issuance of NTP1 authorizes DB Contractor to perform (or, continue performance of)
the portion of the Work necessary to obtain TxDOT’s approval of the component parts, plans and
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documentation of the Project Management Plan that are labeled “A” in the column titled
“Required By” in Attachment 2-1 to the Technical Provisions. It also authorizes DB Contractor
to enter Project Right of Way owned by TxDOT for the purpose of conducting surveys and site
investigations, including geotechnical, Hazardous Materials and Utilities investigations. Refer to
Sections 12.1.4 and 15.9 regarding a Price adjustment to be made in certain circumstances if the
effective date of the NTP1 is later than 180 days after the Proposal Due Date, and regarding DB
Contractor’s remedies for certain delays in issuance of NTP1 beyond 365 days after the Effective
Date.
4.1.4 TxDOT anticipates issuing NTP2 concurrently with TxDOT’s approval of all the
foregoing component parts, plans and documentation of the Project Management Plan and the
Project Schedule. Issuance of NTP2 authorizes DB Contractor to perform all other Work and
activities pertaining to the Project.”
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: TxDOT expressed that major unforeseen
geotechnical conditions and hazardous material are the main risk factors associated with DB
delivery, and the existence of hazardous materials could cause to advise against delivering projects
using DB. In this project, the costs related to treating Hazardous Materials were shared.
Case Study 7: Innovative Congestion Management Project – Montgomery and Frederick
Counties, Maryland
This project was selected for inclusion to analyze the benefits of delivering a project using
Progressive Design-Build, a new concept in transportation projects. This new project being
procured by Maryland DOT has the potential to eliminate the inherent risk associated with
decision-making based on one-sided preliminary geotechnical studies by segmenting the project
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and progressively issue notices to proceed as preliminary studies and design advance under a
guaranteed maximum price.
Location: Montgomery and Frederick Counties, Maryland Award Year: 2017 (Est.)
Contract Amount: $100,000,000 Status: Not awarded
Scope of work: The project consists of a 32-mile corridor, there is no specified scope of
work in the RFQ, but mobility, operation and safety are the overall goals. What follows is an
extract from the RFP:
“The project area is the IS 270 corridor from IS 495 (including the IS 270 spur) to IS 70. The
study corridor is one of the most congested in Maryland with average daily traffic of approximately
240,000 in many segments. Over saturated conditions and extended peak periods greatly impact
reliability.
The inside travel lane of IS 270 functions as a High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane from 6:00
am to 9:00 am in the southbound directions from IS 370 to IS 495 and from 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm
in the northbound direction from IS 495 to MD 121. It is expected that the HOV usage will be
required to be maintained for any future project.
The SHA is developing a contract to solicit a Design-Builder to reduce congestion and improve
reliability along the IS 270 corridor. The SHA has not developed any preferred solutions, but is
looking for the engineering and construction industries to provide implementable and innovative
solutions to increase vehicle throughput, reduce delay and increase reliability along IS 270 within
the project’s budget. The current budget for the project is $100,000,000. This includes all work
for the project including design, right-of-way acquisition, utility relocations, construction services,
and construction management services. The budget for the Design-Build contract has not been
established, but is anticipated to be in the high-$70 to low $80 million range.
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The SHA has developed goals for the project. The goals are as follows:
1. Mobility – Provide improvements that maximize vehicle throughput, minimize vehicle
travel times, and create a more predictable commuter trip along I-270.
2. Safety – Provide for a safer I-270 corridor.
3. Operability/Maintainability/Adaptability – Provide improvements that minimize SHA
operations and maintenance activities while being adaptable to future transportation
technological advancements.
4. Well-Managed Project – Provide a Project Management and Work Plan that
addresses communications, coordination and risk management, achieves a
collaborative partnership with all members of the project team and stakeholders, and
successfully advances the project goals.”
Geotechnical Risks: Given that this project is procured using Progressive DB, the design-
builder and the owner have flexibility to vary the geotechnical scope of the project. This project is
considered as a common project with regards of the geotechnical risk. Considering that the contract
has not been awarded at the moment of this study and the scope is very broad at this point; there
are no specific geotechnical risks identified.
Project Delivery Method: This project is the first time that the agency implements
Progressive DB, the objective is to encourage innovation from the industry in collaboration with
the DOT.
“This Progressive Design-Build (PDB) contract is a two-phase, fixed value contract.
Phase one of the contract will be for the selected Design-Builder to provide Design and
Preconstruction Services to SHA to develop the project to the level necessary to submit a price for
construction for work packages proposed by the Design-Builder.
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Once the design has been completed to the necessary level for any work package to submit
a price, the SHA will attempt to reconcile a Construction Agreed Price (CAP) for the construction
of that work package. As multiple packages are allowed and anticipated, multiple CAPs may be
agreed upon as long as the overall sum of all CAPs does not exceed the contract’s fixed value. If
the SHA agrees to a CAP, then notice to proceed for phase two construction services would be
issued for that package. The SHA reserves the right to not proceed with phase two of the contract
and bid a package competitively if a CAP cannot be reached. If SHA chooses to deliver the project
by other means, the selected Design-Builder will not be permitted to submit a proposal or bid.
The intent is to form a partnership with the owner (SHA) and the Design-Builder. The goals
of this partnership are to mitigate risk, streamline the design process, improve the decision-making
process with better information, and develop a project that meets the project goals while adhering
to the budget. We anticipate the involvement of the Design- Builder will help reduce errors in
design, maximize the achievement of project goals, improve the overall constructability of the
project and support the Practical Design process.
The fixed value of the contract is an aggregate of the Design-Builder’s Design and
Preconstruction Services Fee, the Design-Builder’s Construction Management Fee, and the
Construction Services Costs. Construction services will include all CAPs, costs for any necessary
right-of-way acquisition, and costs for any utility relocations required due to the construction of
the contract. The fixed value of the contract will be $100,000,000.
When right-of-way acquisition is required, the Administration will establish the right-of-
way costs based on the needs established by the Design-Builder. All costs for right-of-way
acquisition will be subtracted from the established cost for Construction services. Right-of-way
acquisition services are expected to be completed by the Administration; however, the
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Administration will consider placing acquisition services on the Design-Builder if agreed upon in
the development of a CAP.
When utility relocations are required, the Administration will establish relocation costs for
utilities to be relocated by parties other than the Design-Builder. Any costs for utility relocations
to be performed by the Design-Builder will be included in any CAP. All costs for utility relocations
will be subtracted from the established cost for Construction services.
Early procurement or construction work may be considered for acquisition of long lead
items or to complete early construction tasks that can be completed and turned over to another
Design-Builder or Contractor, should a CAP for final construction not be agreed upon. Early
right-of-way acquisition, utility work or construction work may be considered with the
understanding that early phases are not a guarantee of agreement of a CAP for final construction.
Early phases must be independent and severable from the final construction package, with well-
defined end point. Construction will not begin until a CAP has been accepted for a Plans,
Specifications & Estimates (PS&E) package.”
Alternative Technical Concepts (contract extract):
Proposed Technical Concepts (PTC): “As part of the second step, the RCL may
submit Proposed Technical Concepts (PTCs) to the Administration for review. The PTC
process allows each Proposer to submit solutions it may propose in the Technical Proposal
for Administration feedback. This process is intended to assist the Proposers in best
determining which concepts it will propose for implementation in its Technical Proposal.”
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RFQ page 21: “A stipend in the amount of $750,000.00 may be paid to a Proposer
not meeting either of the above conditions if the Proposer has a Proposed Technical
Concept (PTC) the Administration wishes to utilize in the final design.”
Standard differing site conditions clause. Since the DB company is taking on the
engineering responsibilities as well, the DOT thinks that their risk is minimal. The DB
company is responsible for “all” risks.
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: The agency considers that there should be a
balance in the amount of information that is given to contractors, as too much information or
interpretation can give foundations for change orders during the project execution. Giving the DB
additional information could reduce the initial cost but cause a change order down the line.
Additionally, a scope validation period is incorporated in the contract to allow the contractor to
incorporate any differing site conditions early in the project.
“Geotechnical
The Administration has performed ground penetrating radar (GPR) and obtained soil
borings on existing shoulders at selected locations along the project corridor (refer to appendices
for locations) and performed laboratory testing of the samples. The boring logs and laboratory
test data are included on ProjectWise. Pavement history has been collected and provided as
supplemental information.
Soils information from the Watkins Mill Interchange Project is also included on
ProjectWise.
These studies were performed with reasonable care and recorded in good faith. The
Administration considers the information Engineering Data and will stand behind its accuracy at
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the location studied. The Administration assumes no responsibility in respect to the sufficiency of
the studies for design. The Design-Builder will need to perform additional geotechnical testing
and analysis to complete the project. The Design-Builder is responsible for performing a complete
geotechnical program including additional borings, sampling, in-situ and laboratory testing,
analysis, and design, as necessary to complete design and construction.”
“Scope Validation and Identification of Scope Issues
A Scope Validation Period of 120 days from the date of the Notice to Proceed for Design
and Preconstruction Services will be provided on this contract. During the Scope Validation
Period, the Design-Builder shall thoroughly verify and validate that the Design-Builder’s
understanding of the scope of work and its ability to complete it within the Design and
Preconstruction Services Fee. Any Scope Issues determined during this period shall not be deemed
to include items that the Design-Builder should have reasonably discovered prior to submission
of its Technical Proposal.
If the Design-Builder intends to seek an adjustment to the Design and Preconstruction Fee
due to a Scope Issue, it shall promptly, but in no event later than the expiration of the Scope
Validation Period, provide the Administration in writing with a notice of the existence of such
Scope Issue and basis for such Scope Issue. Within 30 days of the notice, the Design-Builder shall
provide documentation that specifically explains its support for the Scope Issue, which shall
include among other things: (a) the assumptions the Design-Builder made during the preparation
of its Proposal that form the basis of its allegation, along with documentation verifying it made
such assumptions in developing its Proposal; (b) explanation of the Scope Issue that the Design-
Builder could not have reasonably identified prior to submission of the Technical Proposal; (c)
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specific impact on the Design and Preconstruction Services. For the avoidance of doubt: (1) The
Design-Builder shall not be entitled to raise any Scope Issues that were not previously addressed
with a notice; and (2) Design-Builder shall have no right to seek any relief for any Scope Issues
not identified in a notice provided to the Administration during the Scope Validation Period.
Within a reasonable time after the Administration’s receipt of the documentation, the
parties shall meet and confer to discuss the resolution of such Scope Issues. If the Administration
agrees that the Design-Builder has identified a valid Scope Issue, a change order will be executed
to increase the value of the Design and Preconstruction Fee; however, the Construction services
will be adjusted to retain the overall fixed value of the contract. Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in the Contract Documents or a matter of law, the Design-Builder shall have the burden
of proving that the alleged Scope Issue could not have reasonably been identified prior to the
submission of the Technical Proposal and such Scope Issue materially impacts its Design and
Preconstruction Services Fee.
The parties acknowledge that the purpose of the Scope Validation Period is to enable the
Design-Builder to identify those Scope Issues that could not have reasonably been identified prior
to the submission of the Technical Proposal. By submission of the Technical Proposal, the Design-
Builder acknowledges that the Scope Validation Period is a reasonable time to enable the Design-
Builder to identify Scope Issues that materially impacts its Design and Preconstruction Fee. The
Design-Builder will assume and accept all risks to complete the Design and Preconstruction
Services at the conclusion of the Scope Validation Period without any change in the fee absent any
change to the Contract requirements after the completion of the Scope Validation Period.”
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Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: According to the interviewee, the major
disadvantage of DB delivery is the loss of DOT control on the project. Public considerations can
be sensitive when working on projects near park or areas of public interest. Schedule and scope
can also be negative factors that could go against the use of DB. The agency perceives that giving
additional geotechnical information could reduce the initial cost but might cause a change order
down the line.
Case Study 8: Columbus Crossroad - Project 1 – Columbus, Ohio
This project was the first of two selected as case studies to illustrate the way the Ohio DOT
manages large DB projects with regards of geotechnical risks. The project is considered to have a
high geotechnical risk due to its magnitude, and there were some significant considerations such
as the need for dewatering due to a high water table, and the contractual requirement for a baseline
tunneling report for micro tunneling work.
Location: Columbus, Ohio Award Year: 2011
Scope of work: The work involved realignment of l-670 EB so through traffic stays to the
left and traffic to I-71 exits to the right and work on I-71 from over Jack Gibbs to Long Street.
Includes 21 mainline, ramp and overhead bridges. Includes one bridge cap on Spring St and two
bridge caps on Long St.
Geotechnical Risks: Given the overall size of the project, the geotechnical risk was
considered higher compared to other projects. In addition, other risks were the high water table on
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northern section of project, the required dewatering to occur prior to construction, the micro tunnel
required with location of pre-determined receiving pits.
The location of the project was categorized as: Below the pavement and topsoil layers, the
borings encountered primarily medium dense to very dense sand and gravel consisting of gravel
(a-1-a), Gravel with sand {a-1-b), fine sand (a-3) and coarse and fine sand {a-3a) With lesser
amounts of gravel with sand and silt (a-2-4) and gravel with sand, silt, and clay (a-2-6). Hea vino
sands were also encountered generally below depths of 15.0 feet. Conditions of specific layers
were of quality and gradation that it met the requirements of MSE wall backfill. Contractor did
utilize on-site materials for MSE walls with synthetic reinforcement (Tensar).
Project Delivery Method: The Project was to be the first of the Columbus Crossroads
project. Funding came available through ARRA funding. Accelerated delivery was required,
therefore a DB project delivery was utilized.
Alternative Technical Concepts: An ATC was received for the Microtunnel Manhole
Spacing: the preliminary plan and profile shows a spacing of greater than 500 ft between the
jacking and receiving pits, with each pit containing a manhole. One pipe run between
pits/manholes measures 1371 ft. When the tunnel is complete, additional manholes will have to be
"doghoused" on the microtunnel. The installation will be difficult and will require additional
maintenance of traffic and shoring to handle deep excavations.
“104. 02.B Differing Site Conditions. Notify the Engineer as specified in C&MS 104. 05
upon discovery of any of the following conditions:
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1) Subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those
indicated in the Contract Documents and are not discoverable from an investigation and
analysis of the site by the DBT meeting the standard of care for such an investigation and
analysis.
2) Unknown physical conditions of an unusual nature differing materially from those
ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inherent in the Work provided for in
the Contract Documents, are encountered at the site.
Provide required notification before disturbing any differing site condition. Irrespective of
the previous paragraph, the following will not be considered Differing Site Conditions for
purposes of this section:
Work involving utility relocations or utility coordination. This work will be addressed in
accordance with the Project Scope. Section 6.
Upon notification from the DBT, the Engineer will investigate potential differing site
conditions. The Engineer will determine if differing site conditions have been encountered
and notify the DBT of the Department's determination.
If the Department determines that conditions materially differ and cause an increase or
decrease in the cost or time required for the performance of any Work under the Contract,
the Department will make an adjustment and modify the Contract as specified in CMS
109.05 and as follows:
1) The first $250.000 of direct costs and associated impact will be the responsibility of the
DBT.
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2) All costs which exceed the amount identified in item #1 above will be computed and paid
to the DBT without any markup.
The Department acknowledged differing site condition Work is excusable, compensable,
as defined by CMS 108.06 D except as noted in this section.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: The first $250,000 of differing site
conditions was to be considered incidental. Micro Tunnel required with location of pre-determined
receiving pits defined. Requirement to provide a geotechnical baseline tunneling report from
Design-Builder to address risks with tunneling.
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: According to the agency, a geotechnical
risk factor associated with DB delivery is the liberal interpretation of geotechnical data where
design-builders may take risk with the strengths and reactions of the underground materials in
order to save expenses. Highly variable geotechnical conditions make a project not be a good DB
candidate.
Case Study 9: Cleveland Innerbelt CCG1 (I90WB Bridge) – Cleveland, Ohio
This project was the second of two selected as case studies to illustrate the way the Ohio
DOT manages large DB projects with regards of geotechnical risks. The project is considered to
have a high geotechnical risk due to its magnitude, and there were some significant considerations
such as the need to stabilize landslides, abandoned foundations, deep layer of poor quality soil,
and vibration impact on nearby structures.
Location: Cleveland, Ohio Award Year: 2010
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Scope of work: Replacement of the I90 Bridge over Cuyahoga River Valley in downtown
Cleveland. Includes associated roadway work to reconfigure the Interchanges adjacent to the
bridge work. First project includes new bridge which will initially carry bi-direction I90 traffic,
but in the future will carry only I90WB traffic.
The project included approximately 2 miles of mainline interstate reconstruction, including
a 4,000’-long viaduct over the Cuyahoga River Valley, system ramps, on/off ramps, local street
grid modifications. The work includes reconstruction of 15 bridges and 17 retaining walls.
Geotechnical Risks: ODOT only identified the stabilization of landslides (west slope
adjacent to Cuyahoga River) as complex geotechnical activity. However, given the size of the
contract, the project was considered as a complex. In addition, geotechnical risks identified were:
abandoned foundations; 150' average depth of poor quality soils above bedrock, for main viaduct
bridge; vibration impact on existing structures; control over foundation and wall types; and
mitigation of unsuitable soils.
Project Delivery Method: Due to structural issues with the 1950s lnnerbelt truss bridge,
project delivery was accelerated. Additionally, this project was also the last ARRA/stimulus
project sold by ODOT. Plan was to utilize this project to spend any remaining ARRA funding.
Due to the accelerated time frame, design-build delivery had to be utilized. Due to the
unique project scope and cost, it was felt value based design-build made sense. Due to the concerns
with slope stability on the west bank of the Cuyahoga River, a decision was made to design a slope
stabilization approach to this region and include full construction plans for this slope stabilization
as part of the design-build project.
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“104.02.B Differing Site Conditions. Notify the Engineer as specified in C&MS 104.05
upon discovery of any of the following conditions:
1) Subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those
indicated in the Contract Documents and are not discoverable from an investigation and
analysis of the site by the DBT meeting the standard of care for such an investigation and
analysis.
2) Unknown physical conditions of an unusual nature differing materially from those
ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inherent in the Work provided for in
the Contract Documents, are encountered at the site. Provide required notification before
disturbing any differing site condition.
Irrespective of the previous paragraph, the following will not be considered Differing Site
Conditions for purposes of this section:
1) Work involving regulated materials (e.g., asbestos) of the buildings to which the
DBT did not have access to during development of their Technical Proposal. This work
will be compensated as per the Project Scope, Section 5.
2) Work involving utility relocations or utility coordination. This work will be
addressed in accordance with the Project Scope, Section 6.
Upon notification from the DBT, the Engineer will investigate potential differing site
conditions. The Engineer will determine if differing site conditions have been encountered
and notify the DBT of the Department's determination. If the Department determines that
conditions materially differ and cause an increase or decrease in the cost or time required
for the performance of any Work under the Contract, the Department will make an
adjustment and modify the Contract as specified in CMS 109.05 and as follows:
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1) The first $500, 000 of direct costs and associated impact will be the responsibility
of the DBT.
2) All costs which exceed the amount identified in item #1 above will be computed and
paid to the DBT without any markup.
Department acknowledged differing site condition Work is excusable, compensable, as
defined by CMS 108. 06 D except as noted in this section.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: the agency conducted a robust
subsurface exploration program in advance of the procurement, prescribed the west bank slope
stabilization with sealed construction plans in the contract documents, and provided scope
language requiring deep foundations to bedrock for the main viaduct bridge, and drilled shaft
foundations for main viaduct substructures located within the Cuyahoga River west bank zone. A
$500,000 differing site conditions threshold was included in the contract.
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: Concerns of ODOT about geotechnical
risk are the less oversight over interpretation of data can be a risk when designers and/or
contractors are motivated by schedule and budgets, the risk that the DB team provides an
inadequate body of supporting geotechnical exploration and design information that weakens its
position in future dispute resolution or litigation, and lack of sufficient geotechnical data upon
which proposers base a responsive bid. ODOT considers that projects with geotechnical risks that
are not quantifiable in simple probabilistic terms and cannot economically be solved by DB
procurement should be candidate to DBB delivery because it would be more effective and efficient.
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Case Study 10: Port Access Road – Charleston County, South Carolina
This project was selected as a study due to the high geotechnical risk involved. The project
is located in a highly seismic location and the subsurface conditions consisted of liquefiable soils,
soft compressive clays, high variability due to dipping stratum, and the potential for environmental
contamination. The site is considered to have higher seismic acceleration than California.
Location: Charleston County, South Carolina Award Year: 2016
Contract Amount: $220,700,475 Status: Ongoing
Scope of work: “The Port Access Road is a new roadway and structure Project to provide
direct access between the proposed marine container terminal location on the former Navy Base
and I-26 while maintaining adequate service for local, commuter, and commercial traffic. Included
in the Project’s purpose is the intent to safely integrate container terminal traffic with existing
traffic; support local and regional planning policies and strategies; and minimizing adverse
impacts on communities and the environment. The Project consists of the construction of a new
fully directional interchange on I-26, a Bainbridge Connector Road, the extension of Stromboli
Avenue and associated roadway improvements to surface streets to serve the proposed Naval Base
Terminal (NBT) in Charleston County, South Carolina.”
Geotechnical Risks: The risk was perceived to be very significant, therefore, extensive
geotechnical and environmental testing was completed prior to advertising the project to assess the
potential risk. The project is located in a highly seismic area. Underground conditions consist of
soil potential for liquefaction, soft compressive clays, variable conditions and dipping stratum, and
the potential for environmental contamination.
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Project Delivery Method: The following criteria determines the project delivery method:
size/estimated dollar value of the project, challenging ground conditions, environmental
contamination, and potential for innovation. The agency is evaluating the use of a decision-making
matrix for future projects, a Design-Build Manual is under development.
Alternative Technical Concepts: ATCs were received for this project, but none based on
geotechnical considerations. No ATCs were allowed for changing the seismic criteria in
this project.
“An Alternative Technical Concept (ATC) is a confidential request by a Proposer to
modify a contract requirement, specifically for that Proposer, prior to the Proposal
due date. The ATC process provides an opportunity for design-build proposals to
promote innovation, find the best solutions, and to maintain flexibility in the
procurement process. ATC’s are evaluated for approval or denial by SCDOT within
the deadline set forth in the Milestone Schedule. In order to be approved, an ATC must
be deemed, in SCDOT’s sole discretion, to provide a Project that is “equal or better”
on an overall basis than the Project would be without the proposed ATC. Concepts
that simply delete scope, lower performance requirements, lower standards, conflict
with environmental commitments, or reduce contract requirements are not acceptable
as ATC’s. SCDOT reserves the right in its sole discretion to reject any ATC. No ATC
shall be included in the proposal unless approved by SCDOT in writing prior to the
proposal submission deadline.”
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“XIII. DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
A. “Differing Site Conditions” are defined as concealed or latent physical conditions at
the Site that (i) materially differ from the conditions reasonably assumed to exist based on
the information contained in the RFP, this Agreement and its Exhibits; or (ii) are of an
unusual nature, differing materially from the conditions ordinarily encountered and
generally recognized as inherent in the work. For this project, geotechnical/geological
conditions WILL NOT be considered as a Differing Site Condition.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: A total of about $1.2 million and more
than 7000 man-hours were used for performing the geotechnical and environmental investigations
in this project, around a third of the cost was due to deep boring for seismic consideration.
There is interpretation of the data, though it doesn’t specifically reference DSC clause and is
provided for information only. Interpretation of the data is used in part in developing the RFP to
determine liquefaction potential and preliminary stability analysis.
Some additional actions are detailed as follows:
- More information was made available to the proposers, including deep boring. As much
drilling as the agency could do was performed, up to approximately 70% of what would
have been done for a DBB. Regular projects are around 20-30% or enough to meet NEPA
test.
- The alignment was narrowed down for this project, so the contractor did not have too much
freedom to change it.
- Seismic parameters where provided. Liquefaction or loss of shear capacity and slope
stability.
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- An attempt to reduce overall risk was made by conducting relatively extensive geotechnical
and environmental testing prior to issuing an RFP. A specified dollar allowance was
included in the RFP Agreement for testing and handling of hazardous materials
(environmental contamination).
- Differing Site Conditions rights due to geotechnical/geological issues were eliminated
from the contract.
The contract also included compensation for the encountering of hazardous materials on the site:
“G. Compensation for SUBSURFACE Hazardous Material:
5. Contractor shall be responsible for the first $2,000,000 of Hazardous Materials Costs and
shall include $2,000,000 for Hazardous Materials Cost as a part of its “Total Cost to
Complete” in its Cost Proposal Bid Form. The $2,000,000 Hazardous Materials Costs shall
be included in the Schedule of Values as a separate item. SCDOT will track Hazardous
Materials Costs per the SCDOT Standard Specifications.
6. SCDOT shall compensate Contractor for 100% of the total chargeable Preexisting
Subsurface Hazardous Materials costs that exceed $2,000,000.
7. Contractor shall take all reasonable steps to minimize generation of any such Hazardous
Waste.
8. Time Extensions: Contractor shall not be entitled to an extension of Contract Time with
regard to any work or activities connected to or associated with subsurface Hazardous
Materials…”
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: Unexpected subsurface conditions seems
to be the biggest risk factor in DB projects; particularly when conditions differ from those provided
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in GBRs or Data Reports. The agency believes that projects where there is significant risk of long-
term settlement of embankments and/or structures, or any risks for which the agency needs to
retain control are geotechnical factors that SCDOT would advise against the use of DB delivery
method.
Case Study 11: I-40 Landslide Project – Haywood, North Carolina
This project was selected for inclusion to demonstrate how the North Carolina DOT
(NCDOT) managed the geotechnical risks in a time-sensitive and complex project. This project
consisted of an emergency repair on I-40 due to several landslides in the area, the Project Delivery
Method used was Design-Bid-Build with a ‘nested’ Design-Build component. NCDOT does not
allow change orders due to Differing Site Conditions. Due to the emergency nature of the project,
a geotechnical designer was selected by NCDOT for the ‘nested’ DB component and the General
Contractor had to work with them.
Location: Haywood, North Carolina Award Year: 2004
Contract Amount: $10,584,740.53 Status: Completed
Scope of work: The 2004 hurricane season wreaked havoc in western North Carolina from
four different storm events with immense rainfall. These rains caused a massive amount of damage
to the communities and transportation facilities in western North Carolina. The Pigeon River,
swollen with runoff from Hurricanes Jeanne and Ivan and a flood release from the Walters Dam
scoured away the toe of several embankment slopes supporting Interstate 40 near the North
Carolina-Tennessee border. On September 17, 2004, several landslides occurred between Mile
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Markers 1 and 4. Portions of eastbound I-40 fell into the river. I-40 was closed in both directions
and traffic was rerouted.
The NCDOT was faced with the challenge of re-opening all lanes of traffic on I-40 to the
traveling public as soon as possible. Numerous units from the Design Branch and the Division
Construction staff of the NCDOT had to work together within a tight schedule in order to
accomplish this task.
Geotechnical Risks: NCDOT realized that the required tie-backs for the retaining wall were
going to have to be long, a risk was identified for the case that the required length ends up being
longer than expected due to the site conditions. In addition, the potential was identified for finding
underground boulders on the site, which would impact the project execution.
Project Delivery Method: NCDOT calls the delivery method used for this project a ‘Nested
Design-Build’. The project has Design-Bid-Build components (scour protection system) as well
as Design-Build (Tie-back retention wall). The delivery method was selected to accelerate the
project due to the emergency situation. NCDOT selected the geotechnical design firm to work with
the General Contractor for the ‘nested’ DB component. “The successful prime contractor
subsequently shall enter into a subcontract with the successful geotechnical subcontractor chosen
by the Department.”
Alternative Technical Concepts: No ATCs were allowed for this project.
Differing Site Conditions (DSC) clause: NCDOT does not allow change orders due to
Differing Site Conditions, a state law was passed to eliminate the contractual clause.
- Contractual clause extracts: NCDOT’s Standard Specifications Manual states the

following:
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“102-7 SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATION REPORT
If a subsurface investigation report is available on a project, a copy may be obtained
by the plan holders upon request.
The subsurface report and the subsurface investigation on which it is based was made
for study, planning and design and not for construction or pay purposes. The various
field boring logs, rock cores and soil test data available may be reviewed or inspected
in Raleigh at the office of the Geotechnical Engineering Unit. Neither the subsurface
investigation report nor the field boring logs, rock cores, or soil test data is part of the
contract.
General soil and rock strata descriptions and indicated boundaries are based on a
geotechnical interpretation of all available subsurface data and may not necessarily
reflect the actual subsurface conditions between borings or between sampled strata
within the borehole. The laboratory sample data and the in-place test data can be relied
on only to the degree of reliability inherent in the standard test method. The observed
water levels or soil moisture conditions indicated in the subsurface investigations are
as recorded at the time of the investigation. These water levels or soil moisture
conditions may vary considerably with time according to climatic conditions including
temperature, precipitation and wind, as well as other non-climatic factors.
The bidder or contractor is cautioned that details shown in the subsurface investigation
report are preliminary only; the final design details may be different. For bidding and
construction purposes, refer to the contract for final design information on this project.
The Department does not warrant or guarantee the sufficiency or accuracy of the
investigation made, nor the interpretations made or opinions of the Department as to
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the type of materials and conditions that may be encountered. The bidder or contractor
is cautioned to make independent subsurface investigations, as he deems necessary, to
satisfy himself as to conditions to be encountered on this project. The Contractor shall
have no claim for additional compensation or for an extension of time for any reason
resulting from the actual conditions encountered at the site differing from those
indicated in the subsurface investigation.”
Agency approach to manage the geotechnical risk: NCDOT provides as much raw
geotechnical data (no interpretation) as possible in their contracts. In this project, due to the
emergency nature, four different geotechnical firms were contracted to perform borings and collect
data at each landslide location. A total of 35 borings were performed in a 3-week timeframe, which
was the time spent for letting and awarding the contract. The geotechnical studies in this project
represented around 5% of the project total amount, when the typical value for NCDOT’s DB
projects is around 1%.
The proposers are typically able to request additional borings to be performed by NCDOT
during the letting process. The results of these additional borings are made available to all
competitors, but sometimes the agency performs more borings to avoid giving away the location
requested by a proposer so the competitive advantage is retained.
Geotechnical risk considerations for DB projects: The agency considers that giving as
much geotechnical information as they can might reduce the probability of contractors increasing
their prices. Moreover, geotechnical risks such as highly compressive or too soft soils and the
presence of special structures such as historic buildings could cause the agency to advice against
delivering a DB project.
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Appendix C: Details of Geotechnical Risk Management Tools

This appendix provides a detailed description of each tool. Table C. 1 is a list of the geotechnical
risk management tools found to be effective by having been successfully employed in the field.
Table C. 1 – Tools for Managing/Mitigating Geotechnical Risks

# Tool
1 Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance
2 Develop and furnish GBR in RFP
3 Geotechnical conditions database
4 Site conditions history from property owners during ROW acquisition
5 Prescriptive geotechnical design
6 Performance specifications for post-construction performance (subsidence, etc.)
7 Include differing site conditions clause
8 Progressive DB
9 Request of geotechnical and/or utilities ATCs
10 Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs
11 Competitor designated boring locations
12 Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense
13 Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc.
14 Weight geotechnical evaluation criteria
15 Include life cycle criteria in best value award scheme
16 Scope validation period
Multiple NTPs with one designated for geotechnical investigation, design, and a second
17 specifically to commence excavations, utility work, etc.
18 Contractor produced GBR-C
19 Negotiated GBR interpretation
20 Differing site conditions allowance
21 Contaminated material allowance
22 Unforeseen utilities allowance
23 Assign design-builder responsibility for utility coordination
24 Validate proposed life cycle elements during design
25 Encourage life cycle related value engineering proposals from subcontractors
1. Flexible footprint for NEPA clearance: This tool depends on the agency selecting DB project
delivery much early enough to influence the final form of the NEPA clearance. In essence, this
tool seeks to provide as much flexibility in the final permit as practical to avoid the potential
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that attractive geotechnical design solutions are not unintentionally disallowed by

commitments made to obtain the permit in a timely manner.
2. Furnish geotechnical baseline report (GBR): developed by the owner, who collects all the
relevant data from similar previous projects and the test results for the current project and
assembles the information into what will serve as the geotechnical baseline for bidders for the
purpose of decreasing geotechnical uncertainty during procurement, which can make proposals
received more competitive.
3. Geotechnical conditions database: The advancement of computing power and the reduction in
data storage costs has made it feasible for agencies to create corridor-level geotechnical
databases consisting of all the data gathered in past projects. The database can then be mined
to furnish information on site conditions for upcoming projects.
4. Site conditions history from property owners during ROW acquisition: Property owners will
often have knowledge of a given parcel’s history and may be able to provide information with
regard to previous utilities and structures. Additionally, they may also have knowledge of the
presence of buried material such as demolition materials from previous structures, as well as
provide potential warning that contaminated material may be present. The tool merely adds
these questions to the ROW acquisition process and may trigger the need to conduct sampling
during preliminary engineering.
5. Prescriptive geotechnical design: DB project delivery is by definition performance-based in
that the contract is awarded before the design is complete. However, since geotechnical issues
are often on the critical path, this tool involves the agency prescribing a geotechnical design
approach with which it is comfortable and stating in the DB RFP that no deviations will be
permitted. The result saves time during initial design reviews of subsurface features of work,
which potentially allows those design packages to be released for construction as early as
practical if desired.
6. Performance specifications for post-construction performance (subsidence, etc.): to mitigate
potential geotechnical-related failures in the operation phase of the project, an owner might
include a requirement for specific geotechnical-related performance warranties by the
contractor.
7. Include differing site conditions (DSC) clause: Much of the geotechnical claim generally falls
under changes due to Differing Site Conditions (DSC). The typical DSC clause provides broad
relief to a contractor for site conditions that differ materially from what is expected according
to the contract documents. The FHWA does not have a DSC mandate for DB projects.
Nevertheless, many state DOTs use a DSC clause in their DB contracts.
8. Progressive Design-Build (PDB): PDB’s attraction in the geotechnical risk management realm
is the ability to negotiate the geotechnical risk after award and after the geotechnical
investigation has been completed rather than depending on the DSC clause to allocate the
subsurface risk. With PDB, the first design and construction package released for construction
could commence the subsurface investigation and conduct selected excavation on the project
site to identify where the geotechnical issues will be encountered and their magnitude. Thus, a
fair and equitable amount for the realized subsurface risk can be established. This eliminates
the need for adding unnecessary contingencies in the price, as the uncertainty of the subsurface
conditions is eliminated early in the project.
9. Request of geotechnical alternative technical concepts (ATCs): ATCs allow proposers to
submit alternative solutions to potential subsurface problems before the contract is awarded;
request ATCs (which the agency will hold confidential and preapprove if applicable) to
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identify geotechnical issues and enhance innovation in geotechnical design and subsurface
construction means and methods.
10. Define no-go zones for geotechnical ATCs: ATC No-go zones are those areas of the
geotechnical baseline design that MAY NOT be proposed for change during the DB
procurement.
11. Competitor designated boring locations: to reduce geotechnical risk by conducting subsurface
explorations (borings) at strategic locations to help provide reasonable geotechnical parameters
to the bidders; additional borings are made available to all competitors, but sometimes the
agency performs more borings to avoid giving away the location requested by a proposer so
the competitive advantage is retained; an important element for the success of the project
during the procurement phase is to have sufficient geotechnical information that allows
competitors to price the project without excessive contingencies.
12. Competitors permitted to conduct supplementary borings at own expense: allow competing
design-builders to conduct their own pre-bid geotechnical investigations before developing
their proposals to reduce geotechnical uncertainty; an important element for the success of the
project during the procurement phase is to have sufficient geotechnical information that allows
competitors to price the project without excessive contingencies.
13. Unit prices for contaminated material, over-excavation, etc.: a formalized geotechnical risk
allocation technique to draft the contract provision that uses selective unit pricing, which
provides an effective means for managing geotechnical quantity uncertainty.
14. Weight geotechnical evaluation criteria: tailor relative geotechnical weight for the contractor
selection process in each DB project.
15. Include life cycle criteria in best value award scheme: since design is where the quality
standards for construction are established, it is important that agency expectations for post-
construction life cycle performance be articulated in the solicitation; used to identify successful
approaches for managing geotechnical risks across the DB project’s life cycle as well as
discuss those practices that did not adequately address the geotechnical requirements and cause
the agency to hold geotechnical liability that it had hopes to shed.
16. Scope Validation Period: a period of time incorporated in the contract to allow the contractor
to discover any site conditions that differ with owner-furnished information early in the project.
After the end of the scope validation period, the design-builder’s claim rights are waived for
items not previously raised. This approach allows for an early resolution of geotechnical-
related issues and establishes a limit for the owner’s liability by assigning a specific timeframe
for differing site conditions claims.
17. Multiple Notices to Proceed (NTPs): Using multiple NTPs allows the owner to reduce the risk
of differing site conditions by issuing an NTP only for the contractor’s subsurface exploration
and underground work before releasing the entire scope of work. This way, there is a
prioritization in removing the uncertainty of the subsurface conditions early in the project so
any differing site condition is addressed before advancing to the next stages of the project.
18. Design-builder produced geotechnical baseline report for construction (GBR-C): developed
for the purpose of baselining geotechnical conditions for a project to allocate geotechnical risk
encountered during construction; the owner collects all the relevant data from similar previous
projects and the test results for the current project (geotechnical data report - GDR). Based on
the data collected and test results the owner prepares a GBR for Bidding (GBR-B). The bidder
uses the GBR-B and augments it with its approach and design to develop a new version: the
GBR for Construction (GBR-C). It will incorporate the contractors’ interpretation and
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approach and its proposed means and methods. The owner should review the GBR-Cs prepared
by bidders and seek clarification on any issues as needed. Based on this review, the owner will
have the opportunity to seek adjustment of contract price if appropriate. After the bidder is
selected, its GBR-C will be incorporated into the DB contract documents and forms the basis
for risk allocation during the design-construction phase.
19. Negotiated GBR interpretation: This tool generally involves the use of a GBR-C as described
above and a GBR-B (the owner’s GBR used during bidding). After award of the DB contract
and the subsequent completion of the GBR-C, the owner and the design-builder compare the
two GBRs and agree on how to interpret a final GBR (GBR-F) during construction with respect
to the contract’s DSC clause. The aim is to mutually agree on what constitutes a “material
difference” and in doing so share the DSC risk on a project-specific basis.
20. Differing site conditions allowance: including a specified dollar amount (allowance) in the
RFP Agreement for differing site conditions to mitigate this commonly misallocated
geotechnical risk.
21. Contaminated material allowance: including a specified dollar amount (allowance) in the RFP
Agreement for testing and handling of hazardous materials to mitigate this commonly
misallocated geotechnical risk.
22. Validate proposed life cycle elements during design: DB procurements often include both
design and evaluation criteria that seek to encourage life cycle design decision-making by the
competing proposers. This tool consists of conducting the subsequent life cycle cost analysis
to validate that the winning proposal’s betterments indeed reduce the project’s projected life
cycle cost from that of the baseline design.
23. Encourage life cycle related value engineering proposals from subcontractors: Subcontractors
are technical specialists in their particular areas of expertise. This is particularly true in areas
like jet grouting, seismic retrofits, soil nails, and other geotechnical specialties. As such they
are normally up to date with the state of technology and should be asked to review their scopes
of work for potential improvements that would reduce life cycle cost.
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Appendix D: Final Guidelines

The final Guidelines for Geotechnical Risk Management in DB projects is published as NCHRP
Research Report 884. It can be found at the TRB website. The table of contents for the
document are included below for reference.
Executive Summary
Chapter 1 Introduction to Design-Build Geotechnical Risk Management
1.1 Introduction to DB Project Risk Management
1.2 Project Geotechnical Risk Management Process
1.2.1 Risk Term Definitions
1.2.2 Geotechnical Term Definitions
1.2.3 Design-Build Term Definitions
1.2.4 The Differing Site Conditions Clause
1.3 Design-Build Project Risk Management Planning
1.4 How to Use the Guidelines.
Chapter 2 Geotechnical Risk Identification
2.1 Geotechnical Risk Identification throughout Project Development
2.2 Geotechnical Risk Identification: Strategies, Methods and Tools
Chapter 3 Qualitative Geotechnical Risk Analysis
3.1 Risk Assessment
3.2 Qualitative Approach
3.3 The Risk Matrix
3.4 Two-Step Approach for Evaluating the Project for DB Delivery
Chapter 4 Quantitative Geotechnical Risk Analysis

4.1 Risk Quantification
4.2 Risk Register
4.3 Non-Simulation Approach
4.4 Simulation Approach
Chapter 5 Geotechnical Risk Management Strategies, Methods, and Tools
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5.1 Geotechnical Issues & Available Risk Mitigation Strategies

5.2 Methods for Implementing Tools
5.3 Tools
5.4 Strategies, Methods, and Tools for Risk Mitigation
Chapter 6 Geotechnical Risk Monitoring, Control, and Retirement
6.1 Post-Award geotechnical risk register
6.1.1 Geotechnical risk register update with design-builder.
6.1.2 Geotechnical design decision register
6.1.3 Translating risks to early mitigation actions
6.2 Retiring geotechnical risks
6.2.1 Putting geotechnical risks on the project schedule
6.2.2 Geotechnical risk retirement conferences
6.2.3 Releasing geotechnical risk contingencies
Chapter 7 Design-Build Geotechnical Risk Management Planning Workshop Template
7.1 DB Project Geotechnical Risk Management Plan
7.2 Example DB Project Geotechnical Risk Management Plan
References
Appendix A – Glossary of Geotechnical and Risk Terms
Appendix B – Geotechnical Risk Management Workshop Templates
Appendix C – Detailed Explanation of Geotechnical Risk Management Strategies, Methods, and
Tools.
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Appendix E: Detailed Results of the Geotechnical Legal Review
The consequences of finding unexpected geotechnical conditions can be devastating to any
construction project. As a result, it is common for the affected parties to argue that someone else
should bear the financial impact of these conditions. Contractors often argue that the owner
provided it with information that was wrong or misleading, or that it would be unfair for the
contractor to bear these risks. Owners may argue that the contract shifts the risk of unexpected
site conditions to the contractor, or that the contractor did not properly investigate the site to assess
conditions in formulating its bid.
Differing Site Conditions
The construction law landscape is littered with hundreds of published opinions from federal
and state courts around the country that address geotechnical disputes on specific projects. Most
of these disputes arise out of interpreting what is commonly known as the “Differing Site
Conditions” (DSC) clause of the contract. The DSC clause was first introduced by the federal
government in 1927, when it was known as the “Changed Conditions” clause. This clause was
intended to eliminate the contingency factors in bidding, and intended to place the risk of
unexpected site conditions on the federal government (Pronchick 1990).
The federal government’s DSC clause is found in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) §52.236-
2:
(a) The contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are disturbed, give a written
notice to the Contracting Officer of: (1) subsurface or latent physical conditions at the
site which differ materially from those indicated in this contract, or (2) unknown physical
conditions at the site of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily
encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for
in this contract (emphasis added).
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(b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the site conditions after receiving the written
notice. If the conditions do materially so differ and cause an increase or decrease in the
Contractor’s cost of, or of the time required for, performing any part of the work under
this contract, whether or not changed as a result of the conditions, an equitable adjustment
shall be made under this clause and the contract modified in writing accordingly.
This clause has been the model for DSC clauses used by state and local governments. It
has likewise been used in industry standard form contracts published by, among others, the
American Institute of Architects (AIA), the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA), and the
Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee (EJCDC).
Substantial literature discusses the policy and benefits of the DSC clause. One leading case
is Foster Construction v. United States,1 where the court provided a clear explanation of the DSC
clause’s purpose:
The purpose of the changed conditions clause is thus to take at least some of the gamble
on subsurface conditions out of bidding. Bidders need not weigh the cost and ease of
making their own borings against the risk of encountering an adverse subsurface, and they
need not consider how large a contingency should be added to the bid to cover the risk.
They will have no windfalls and no disasters. The Government benefits from more
accurate bidding, without inflation for risks which may not eventuate. It pays for difficult
subsurface work only when it is encountered and was not indicated in the logs.2
At this writing, the Foster case is over 45 years old, but (as will be seen below) continues
to be cited by courts as the explanation for why DSC clauses are in contracts for construction
projects. The clause gives the owner the benefit of paying only for the actual costs incurred when
1
435 F.2d 873 (1970).
2
Id. at 887.
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the differing site condition actually arises – as opposed to the unliquidated contingency for a
problem that may never surface. It also helps to avoid the acrimony that can occur in the absence
of such a clause, as the parties fight over who bears the risk of unexpected site conditions.
Following the lead of the federal government, most other public and private owners use a DSC
clause for the same reasons as expressed in Foster.
Notwithstanding that some type of DSC clause is included in most contracts for
construction projects, and the recognition of the benefits and purpose of such clauses, there has
been a significant amount of litigation over what constitutes a DSC and whether the contractor
actually has the right to recover for its cost and time overruns. This has provided industry with
clear guidance of the principles associated with contractor rights and obstacles to recovering on
DSC claims. Importantly, most of these principles are not dependent on the type of project delivery
system used on the project.
Differing Site Conditions Principles Arising from Design-Bid-Build Projects
This section will discuss the legal aspects of DSC claims. It will first review the body of
DSC case law arising from design-bid-build projects, based on over 50 years of case precedent. It
will then review some of the legal issues and case law that has arisen on design-build project
relative to geotechnical issues, including some of the reported decisions addressing DSC claims.
As evident from a reading of the federal DSC clause, there are two types of differing site
conditions – commonly known as “Type 1” and “Type 2” conditions. A Type 1 DSC is triggered
by a physical condition differing materially from conditions indicated in the contract documents.
By contrast, a Type 2 DSC is independent from what is contained in the contract documents, and
is defined as a physical condition of an unknown and unusual nature which one would not
reasonably expect to encounter. The sections below will address some of the issues that commonly
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arise in the case law with respect to these two types of DSCs. The cases that are cited below were
all delivered through a design-bid-build delivery system, although, their principles are equally
applicable to design-build projects.
Common Elements of DSCs
While Type 1 and Type 2 conditions have different standards and are intended to cover
different situations, they do share common elements. They are both required to be “physical
conditions” that are “at the site” of the work. Moreover, these conditions must “differ materially”
from those baseline conditions either indicated in the contract documents (for Type 1) or which
one would normally expect to encounter (for Type 2).
The “physical condition” requirement is generally easy to satisfy. The most common
conditions have related to soil characteristics, presence of rocks in different qualities or quantities,
subsurface water and a variety of artificial and manmade conditions, such as pipelines, artifacts,
debris, etc. In essence, the type of condition which qualifies for recovery under the clause is
virtually wide-open. However, some contractors have tried to expand the scope of the DSC clause
to include physical forces that increase the contractor’s efforts, such as the general unavailability
of a work site, material and labor cost increases, and political, legal or governmental conditions.
Courts have refused to consider these to be DSCs (Loulakis et al. 1996).
The “at the site” requirement suggests that the project location is the only place where a
DSC can occur. This raises the question, however, of how areas that are technically “off-site,”
such as borrow pits, quarries and access roads, are to be treated. There have been only a few cases
addressing this issue, which cases suggest that such off-site areas can be subject to a DSC remedy
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if their use was so integral to a contractor’s performance that the owner should be responsible for
the conditions.3
A case which allowed recovery under a DSC theory was Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. U.S.4,
where the government owned the only two quarries in the area and made them available without
charge to the contractor as approved sources for the type of rock suitable for the project. The
contract cautioned that other quarry sources could not be used without the Contracting Officer's
permission. The contractor selected one of the two quarries but was forced to abandon operations
because it encountered over 60% waste and found it increasingly difficult to locate suitable rock.
Once the contractor moved to the other “approved” quarry it easily obtained the requisite quantity
and quality of rock, experiencing only a waste factor of 10%.
A different result was reached in L.G. Everist Inc. v. U.S.,5 where the court concluded that
a quarry was not considered “at the site” and denied a DSC recovery. The quarry was not identified
or mentioned in the contract, and under the contract the contractor was made solely responsible
for the acquisition of rip rap required for the project. Since the quarry supplied a sufficient quantity
and quality of rock, the contractor bore the risk of the higher cost than it anticipated.
The “differ materially” requirement has had little case law discussion, although it is
recognized as a major factual hurdle for a claimant to overcome. The mere fact that a condition
differs from the baseline is not enough to satisfy the test – there must be objective evidence to
demonstrate that there is a greater amount of work than one would normally have expected, or that
a different method of performance was required. When the contractor must make increased effort,
3
Id.
4
340 F.2d 322 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
5
231 Ct. Cl. 1013 (1982).
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and incur additional costs in dealing with the unforeseen site condition, it can generally show a
material difference and obtain an equitable adjustment (Loulakis et al. 1996).
Unique Type 1 Requirements
To establish entitlement for a Type 1 claim, the contractor must show that the physical
conditions actually encountered differed materially from the conditions indicated in the contract
documents. Because the type of conditions represented in contract documents can be limitless,
Type 1 DSCs have been found in myriad circumstances where the conditions were materially
different than indicated in the contract documents, including natural conditions (e.g., rock, water
and soil) and manmade conditions (e.g., unforeseen pipes or in different depths or locations).
There are also numerous cases finding Type 1 DSCs when soil conditions behaved differently than
indicated by the contract documents – such as soil that was more difficult to compact than indicated
by the contract’s bearing ratios.6
The predicate for a Type 1 DSC is that the claim be based on “indications in the contract
documents.” The primary documents that form the “contract documents” are geotechnical reports,
bidding documents, and contract drawings and specifications. One case even found a report
referenced in a note on a contract drawing to be sufficient as a baseline for a DSC claim (Loulakis
et al. 1996). In an attempt to override the DSC clause, some owners provide contractors with
information, but state that such information is excluded from the contract documents. This
occurred in P.J. Maffei Bldg. & Wrecking Corp. v. U.S.,7 where the solicitation documents stated
that certain drawings were furnished “for information only and will not be a part of the contract
documents.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the contractor assumed
the risk that such information was inaccurate when it based its bid on data contained in the
6
Id.
7
732 F. 2d 913 (Fed Cir. 1984).
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drawings. Notwithstanding this result, courts have generally taken a very liberal view of what
constitutes a “contract document,” as they will look at the purpose of the DSC clause (as articulated
in the Foster decision) and assess whether the owner should have expected that the contractor
would use the data in developing its bid (Loulakis et al. 1996).
“Indications” in the contract documents are often explicit – such as geotechnical reports
that state affirmatively “no rock is expected.” However, many of the cases discuss non-explicit
“indications,” and confirm that all that is required to prove a Type 1 DSC is enough of an indication
in the contract documents for a bidder to form a reasonable understanding of what site conditions
should be expected. For example, DSCs were allowed when:
 The contractor encountered french drains instead of solid pipes. It submitted evidence that
industry practice was to describe and label perforated french drains, and that the owner’s
failure to do so in the plans constituted an implied representation that the pipe was solid.
 The contractor encountered wet, instead of dry, conditions. It assumed it would encounter
dry conditions during excavation, because the contract required that the concrete be poured
in the dry and made no mention of the necessity of a special seal prior to pouring concrete.
Contractors also have to prove that that the site conditions they encountered were
unforeseeable. In determining this, courts generally look to all the information available to the
contractor, as well as to any information that would have been discovered on a reasonable visual
inspection of the site. As a result, if the actual site conditions are anticipated based on the contract
or information obtained or that could have been obtained during a reasonable site inspection, the
contractor will not be able to recover. Actual knowledge that the conditions are other than those
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indicated in the contract documents will also preclude recovery. The standard for determining
foreseeability adopts the perspective of the reasonable and prudent contractor.8
Unique Type 2 Requirements
Unlike a Type 1 DSC, a Type 2 DSC does not require contractual indications regarding the
conditions expected at the site. Rather, a Type 2 DSC deals with situations where the contractor
has encountered a physical condition that was unknown or unusual and could not be reasonably
anticipated by the contractor from its study of the contract documents, its inspection of the site,
and its general experience, if any, in the area of the project.
The burden of establishing a Type 2 DSC is more difficult than establishing a Type 1 DSC,
since a Type 1 DSC is based upon relatively objective criteria (i.e., contract indications), whereas
a Type 2 DSC is based upon subjective criteria (i.e., unknown or unusual conditions). Charles T.
Parker Construction Co. v. United States is the case often cited regarding the proof of a Type 2
DSC:
A Government construction contractor seeking to establish a “category two” changed
condition is confronted with a heavy burden of proof . . . the Government has elected not
to presurvey and represent the subsurface conditions with the result that the claimant must
demonstrate that he has encountered something materially different from the “known” and
the “usual.” This is necessarily a stiffer test because of the wide variety of materials
ordinarily encountered when excavating in the earth's crust.9
Courts considering Type 2 DSCs have found entitlement based on the same types of
physical conditions found to constitute Type 1 DSCs. Consequently, contractors have recovered
for unanticipated rock and stone, unstable soil conditions, artificial debris, and old railroad timbers,
8
Id.
9
193 Ct. Cl. 320, 433 F.2d 771 (1970).
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logs and other foreign matter. They have also recovered when geotechnical properties behave
differently than expected – such as rock not fracturing as expected, or soil not compacting as
expected. The key is for the contractor to show what the norm for the area is and that other
contractors have not encountered such material in similar work (Loulakis et al. 1996).
Notice of Claim
All DSC clauses require that the contractor provide some form of notice to the owner of
the DSC upon discovery of the condition. The notice provision is intended to provide the owner
an opportunity to view and/or correct the situation before conditions are disturbed or to find a
viable alternative. Although failure to comply with the notice provisions does not always bar a
contractor’s claim as a matter of law, it can create an impediment in some states that have adopted
a strict philosophy of notice (Loulakis et al. 1996).
Site Inspection
Most construction contracts require the contractor to investigate the site before bidding in
order to ascertain the project’s conditions. For example, FAR §52-236-3 (the Site Investigation
clause) provides:
The Contractor acknowledges that it has taken steps reasonably necessary to ascertain the
nature and location of the work, and that it has investigated and satisfied itself as to the
general and local conditions which can affect the work or its costs, including but not limited
to (1) conditions bearing upon transportation, disposal, handling, and storage of materials;
(2) the availability of labor, water, electric power, and roads; (3) uncertainties of weather,
river stages, tides, or similar physical conditions at the site; (4) the conformation and
conditions of the ground; and (5) the character of equipment and facilities needed
preliminary to and during work performance. The Contractor also acknowledges that it
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has satisfied itself as to the character, quality, and quantity of surface and subsurface
materials or obstacles to be encountered insofar as this information is reasonably
ascertainable from an inspection of the site, including all exploratory work done by the
Government, as well as from drawings and specifications made a part of this contract. Any
failure of the Contractor to take the actions described and acknowledged in this paragraph
will not relieve the Contractor from responsibility for estimating properly the difficulty and
cost of successfully performing the work, or for proceeding to successfully perform the
work without additional expense to the Government.
The site investigation clause is relevant to DSC claims because if the contractor should
have discovered the condition through a reasonable inspection, then the contractor will be unable
to recover. As the court in McCormick Construction Co. v. United States stated: “a contractor
who knows or should have known the facts of the conditions at the site is estopped to claim a
changed condition. Where he knows or has opportunity to learn the facts, he is unable to prove . .
. that he was misled by the contract.”10
The level of investigation required of the contractor in a pre-bid inspection is not
excessively burdensome. For a Type 1 claim, the contractor is not required to discover latent
conditions that require more time or expertise than that possessed by a reasonable contractor. The
contractor’s duty is to make a reasonable visual inspection – there is no duty to obtain information
available only to a geological expert. A contractor is not required to resort to expensive or
elaborate tests or procedures (Loulakis et al. 1996).
10
18 Cl. Ct. 259, 265 (1989).
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The limited nature of the contractor’s duty to investigate site conditions is consistent with
the holding in Foster, where the court found that the duty to investigate the site must be balanced
against the right to rely on government provided site information:
Faithful execution of the policy requires that the promise in the changed conditions clause
not be frustrated by an expansive concept of the duty of bidders to investigate the site. That
duty, if not carefully limited, could force bidders to rely on their own investigations, lessen
their reliance on logs in the contract and reintroduce the practice sought to be eradicated –
the computation of bids on the basis of the bidders’ own investigations, with contingency
elements often substituting for investigation.11
Without such a balance, the DSC clause would have no effect, and contractors would be forced
once again to include contingencies for site conditions in their bids. The contractor in Foster
recovered because the site conditions were not shown in the government logs and could not have
been discovered on a visual inspection without the help of technicians or trained geologists
(Loulakis et al. 1996).
Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses
It is well recognized that some owners have attempted to escape liability for DSC claims
through disclaimers or exculpatory clauses. Generally, these attempts have been unsuccessful –
particularly when the exculpatory language is in direct conflict with the purpose and broad
language of the DSC clause, which expressly puts the risk of unforeseen conditions on the owner.
Given this, most courts have been reluctant to enforce disclaimers (Loulakis et al. 1996).
For example, a disclaimer stating simply that the site information is not reliable or
guaranteed for accuracy will rarely be successful. As long as the information is part of the contract
11
435 F.2 at 887.
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documents, the contractor generally has a right to reasonably rely on the information. This is
particularly the case when an owner provides express indications of the conditions, and the
contractor cannot, due to time constraints or denial of access, perform its own investigation to
verify the indications and generally ascertain the site conditions. Similarly, a disclaimer will
generally not bar recovery when a pre-bid site inspection would have revealed no more accurate
information than is contained in the government’s documents (Loulakis et al. 1996).
Consider Syblon-Reid Co.,12 where the disclaimer stated that the quantities in the contract
documents were estimates only, and that each bidder was responsible to make its own
determinations as to the volume of material to be removed. The Interior Board of Contract Appeals
held that the disclaimer was invalid because it was impossible to estimate the quantity of sediment
to be removed accurately. In that situation, it was reasonable for the contractor to base its bid on
the express estimate provided by the government.
Despite the traditional reluctance of courts to enforce disclaimer language, and the strong
policy inherent in the DSC clause, there are several decisions that enforce disclaimers. The owner
in Frontier Foundations, Inc. v. Layton Construction. Co,13 provided boring logs from a
representative area near the site, but expressly limited their use by stating that the logs were not
part of the contract documents and were not a warranty of subsurface conditions. The contract
also included a site inspection clause which specifically stated that the contractor’s failure to
become familiar with the prevailing work conditions would not relieve the contractor from
responsibility for performing work at no additional cost to the owner. The court held that reliance
on the logs was not reasonable because it did not take into consideration the clear disclaimer
language in the contract.
12
IBCA No. 1313-11-79, 82-2 BCA (CCH) ¶16,105 (1982).
13
818 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1991).
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Recovery in Absence of a DSC Clause
Some owners have taken the position that despite the benefits of a DSC clause, they would
rather shift all of the risk of such conditions to the contractor. In the absence of such a clause,
recovery for unforeseen conditions is difficult at best. For example, in Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City
of Charlotte,14 the contractor on a city water main construction project planned to use excavated
soil for backfill, based upon the soil data shown in the engineering report included as part of the
bidding documents. Because of high moisture content, over 20% of the soil excavated from the
trenches was unsuitable for backfill, requiring off-site soil to be used. The court rejected the
contractor’s DSC claim on the basis that there was no DSC clause in the contract and that the risk
of this problem was shifted to the contractor.
Notwithstanding that result, it should be noted that contractors have been successful in
recovering costs for the problems of unforeseen conditions even if they do not have a DSC clause
in the contract. Common theories of recovery include fraud, misrepresentation and breach of
implied warranty. These legal theories, if available based upon the facts of a particular case, are
clearly more difficult to prove than recourse to a simple DSC clause. However, the owner remains
exposed to liability.
An example of a case where the legal theory of misrepresentation was accepted as a
potential basis for recovery is City of Columbia v. Paul N. Howard Co.15 In this case, the
contractor alleged that it had relied to its detriment on a misrepresentation in the boring logs, which
were far different than the actual soil conditions encountered. The contract stated that the boring
logs were only for reference and not a part of the contract documents. The Eighth Circuit reversed
14
740 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. N.C 1990).
15
707 F. 2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983).
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a lower court ruling for the city, concluding that it was a question of fact as to whether the
contractor was justified in relying upon the boring logs even with the disclaimer.
In Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,16 the documents for construction
of a bridge indicated sandy soil conditions throughout the site. The contract did not warrant the
soil data’s accuracy, but it did not disclaim accuracy either. Given this, the court concluded that
the data became a representation for which it could be held liable. Consider also PT&L
Construction Co. v. New Jersey Department of Transportation,17 where a highway contractor sued
the DOT for extra excavation and delay costs incurred after encountering unanticipated subsurface
conditions that required almost 1000% the amount of stripping originally called for in the contract.
The contractor had shown that the state had superior knowledge obtained prior to bid that soggy
soil conditions would make the work more difficult and that this constituted an actionable
misrepresentation of site conditions.
Geotechnical Liability Issues on Design-Build Projects
The reported case law that has arisen to date on design-build projects involving
geotechnical issues largely falls into two categories. One category is the treatment of DSC claims.
The other category involves disputes in the development of the geotechnical design, and the
flexibility that a design-builder has to make design decisions. Each is discussed below.
Proving a DSC Claim on Design-Build Projects
The DSC case law that has developed on design-build projects to date has largely
considered the same issues that exist on design-bid-build projects. The major issues relate to: (a)
pre-award information provided by the owner that formed the basis for the design-builder’s
16
519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
17
108 N.J. 539, 531 A. 2d 1330 (1987).
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technical and commercial proposal; (b) the materiality of the differences between this information
and the actual site conditions; (c) the notice provided by the design-builder; and (d) the impact of
disclaimers in the contract on the contractor’s DSC remedies. All of this presupposes, of course,
that there is a DSC clause in the design-build contract.
Consider Appeal of CCI, Inc.,18 where the design-builder was not able to prove that its $35
million Type 1 DSC claim was valid. The project involved the design and construction of a pier
and seawall in Iraq, and the government’s RFP contained some limited information about site
conditions. The design-builder argued that it had to develop a different design concept once it
determined that the site conditions were materially different from what it expected. In rejecting
the claim, the Board of Contract Appeals found, among other things, that the design-builder had:
(a) not conducted a reasonable site investigation which would have revealed the type of conditions
actually found; (b) failed to reasonably consider the soils reports that were included in the RFP,
even though they were “for information only,” and (c) not demonstrated that the conditions it
experienced were “materially different” from those indicated in the contract documents.
The design-builder in Appeal of Nova Group, Inc.19 fared no better on its DSC claims. The
$11.5 million contract was for the design and construction of a new open-ocean permanent supply
pier with mooring dolphins on San Nicolas Island, California. Nova experienced a variety of
alleged DSCs based upon differences in the boring logs and geotechnical reports and actual
conditions. According to Nova, this information indicated that: (a) sedimentary bedrock would be
encountered; (b) pure clay soil would not be present; (c) shears, faults and fault zones would not
be encountered; (d) there would not be severely disturbed bedrock at specific depths; and (e)
18
14-1 BCA P 35546 (A.S.B.C.A.), ASBCA No. 57316, 2014 WL 1168783 (2014).
19
10-2 BCA P 34533 (A.S.B.C.A.), ASBCA No. 55408, 2010 WL 3327870 (2010).
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slaking would not be encountered at any degree that would affect constructability. When actual
conditions varied, it affected Nova’s design and constructability, delaying the project and resulting
in a claim for over $6 million.
The Board examined all of the contract documents to determine what they indicated. While
it agreed with some of Nova’s contentions, it specifically noted that there was nothing in the
documents that addressed slaking one way or the other. Consequently, it concluded that there
could be no Type 1 claim for that issue. While it found that for some of the areas there were
material differences between what was indicated and what was actually found (e.g., shears and
fault zones), it did not find that these issues caused the damages alleged by Nova. Hence, the
entire claim was rejected.
The above two cases are representative of how a trier of fact considers DSC claims, whether
on a design-build or design-bid-build project. Each decision is almost 30 pages long and
demonstrates the fact-intensive nature of the dispute. The decisions recite the Type 1 and Type 2
DSC standards, and then address each element of the claim that something was different from what
a reasonable bidder should have expected.
The Impact of Design-Builder’s Obligation to Conduct Post-Award Geotechnical Investigations
One of the major differences between design-build and design-bid-build is that the owner’s
geotechnical investigation may be limited, with the design-build contract requiring that the design-
builder conduct, as part of its design process, a comprehensive geotechnical assessment of the site.
Owners will also frequently include broad disclaimers of liability for the geotechnical information
furnished by the owner during the procurement process. As a consequence, when a design-builder
claims that it encountered a DSC based on the owner’s geotechnical information, the owner argues
that the claim should be denied because: (a) the geotechnical information it provided was
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preliminary, incomplete, and, based on contractual disclaimers, could not be relied upon by the
design-builder; and (b) the design-builder had the contractual duty to perform the full geotechnical
assessment (Loulakis et al. 2015).
This argument was essentially what the Navy used in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United
States,20 one of the most well-publicized U.S. construction law cases in decades.21 While the trial
court agreed with the Navy, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s
decision, and provided an informative opinion as to how DSC claims are to be treated on design-
build projects.
Metcalf involved a Navy procurement for a $48 million housing facility at a Marine Corps
base. The RFP included a soils report that identified the soils as having “slight expansion
potential,” and noted that this was relevant to certain features of the project, such as concrete
foundations. It also stated that the soils report was for “preliminary information only,” with the
contract obligating the design-builder to conduct its own soils investigation after contract award.
After award, Metcalf’s geotechnical engineer discovered that the soil’s swelling potential
was “moderate to high” (i.e., not “slight”) and recommended some design changes to deal with
those conditions. Metcalf promptly notified the Navy, and the parties then had protracted
discussions over what to do. Almost a year after the issue arose, the Navy rejected the DSC claim,
and Metcalf used post-tension concrete slabs to mitigate the time and cost of over-excavating and
importing select fill.
Another soils issue involved the presence of chlordane, a chemical contaminant. The RFP
stated that chlordane was present at the site but that remediation actions would not be required,
20
742 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
21
In addition to the issue of disclaimers, the Metcalf decision also addressed the government’s implied duties of
good faith and fair dealing.
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since the levels were deemed “acceptable.” Metcalf later discovered soils with higher levels of
chlordane than expected and incurred costs to remediate. The Navy refused to reimburse Metcalf
for substantial remediation costs. Metcalf’s total claim, inclusive of other alleged breaches by the
Navy of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, was approximately $25 million.
In ruling in favor of the Navy, the trial court concluded that because Metcalf had to
investigate the soil conditions during performance, Metcalf could not rely upon the RFP’s
representations about the soil characteristics. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit flatly
rejected this, finding that the lower court misinterpreted the contract:
Nothing in the contract’s general requirements that Metcalf check the site as part of
designing and building the housing units, after the contract was entered into, expressly or
implicitly warned Metcalf that it could not rely on, and that instead it bore the risk of error
in, the government’s affirmative representations about the soil conditions.22
The appellate court differentiated between Metcalf’s post-award obligation to conduct
additional investigations and Metcalf’s pre-award right to reasonably rely upon the Navy’s
geotechnical information as it bid the project. Citing the Foster case, the appellate court stated
that the DSC clause was incorporated into the contract to “take at least some of the gamble on
subsurface conditions out of bidding.”23 It also highlighted that the phrase “for preliminary
information only” was not an effective disclaimer.24 The phrase, the court held, “merely signals
that the information might change (it is ‘preliminary’). It does not say that Metcalf bears the risk
if the ‘preliminary’ information turns out to be inaccurate.”25
22
Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 995-96.
23
Id. at 996.
24
Id.
25
Id.
E-18

The appellate court’s opinion in Metcalf is consistent with substantial precedent that
supports the DSC remedy for contractors in spite of disclaimers and discussed in Section A.6
above. Consequently, even though Metcalf is not binding on state courts, it is highly likely that a
state court would find it valuable precedent for dealing with a design-build contract’s broad
contractual disclaimer for the owner’s geotechnical information.
As noted in the preceding section, the ability to succeed on a DSC claim is premised upon
the reasonableness of the contractor’s interpretation of the owner-furnished information and
obligation to conduct a reasonable site investigation. In Appeal of Lovering-Johnson, Inc.,26 the
design-builder on a Navy housing project in Illinois was not able to prove that its interpretation
was reasonable. As a result, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals largely denied the
design-builder’s claim for over $6.8 million and 267 days of alleged delays.
The claim was based on issues that arose during the design phase, which resulted in the
design-builder (“LJI”) submitting its final design drawings to the Navy 15 months later than
planned. One of LJI’s primary arguments was that the Navy required it to perform “unfunded
preliminary design studies,” that included the project’s storm drainage system. The contract’s
performance specifications required that the system be capable of handling a 10-year storm and
runoff from adjacent properties. In preparing its design, LJI relied on certain solicitation drawings
by the Navy, which depicted various-sized drainage pipes. LJI contended that due to an alleged
DSC of high flow rates and large culverts, it ultimately had to use wider pipes in its design than
those shown on the initial drawings. The Board rejected LJI’s claim on several grounds, stating:
26
ASBCA No. 53902, 05-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 33126, 2005 WL 3100998 (Nov. 17, 2005).
E-19

Fundamentally, [LJI] misconstrues the extent of its design responsibility. . . [its] differing
site conditions (DSC) allegations are premised on the view that the Navy had already done
the storm drainage design work for it.27
According to the board’s decision, an adequate site investigation would have revealed the
presence of the twin 60-inch culverts and potentially “huge flows” from off-site water sources. In
addition, the board believed LJI’s reliance on the drawings was misplaced given that the
solicitation drawings were not detailed and the pipe systems identified were ambiguous.
Importantly, the board concluded that the Navy’s RFP design was not “final” and that its RFP
package expressly identified that any concepts and information contained therein would have to
be verified prior to LJI’s development of the “final” design. Stated differently, it was LJI, not the
Navy, which was responsible for designing the drainage system.28
Geotechnical Design Decisions
Several cases have addressed conflicts between owners and design-builders over
foundation designs. Some of these cases were raised in the context of a DSC, and others focused
solely on the ability of the design-builder to make its own design decisions.
In Appeal of PBS&J Constructors, Inc.,29 the design-builder filed an appeal to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals when the Corps of Engineers refused to allow it to use spread
footings to support balconies on a barracks project. The RFP documents identified drilled piers as
a “recommended foundation system.” They stated that spread footings were not considered a
viable alternative and, therefore, not allowed. The contract required the design-builder’s
27
2005 WL 3100998 at 20.
28
This case addressed two other topics that are addressed in this section – design review processes and the ability of
LJI to make changes to the design included in its proposal.
29
ASBCA No. 57814, 2014 WL 3821353 (July 25, 2014).
E-20

geotechnical engineer to provide design calculations to support its ultimate recommendation. The
design-builder’s proposal specified that it would use a drilled pier system, but did not specifically
state what would be used for the balconies.
During design development, the design-builder’s initial geotechnical report showed the
balconies supported by concrete piers. The final foundation design, however, contained a revised
geotechnical report, and showed for the first time the possibility of using spread footing
foundations. Based on the record before the board, it appeared the design-builder wanted to use
spread footings. It was behind schedule due to installation problems with drilled piers on other
areas of the project and was looking to save time and money. The Corps refused to allow this,
believing that it was entitled to strict compliance with the contract, which had disallowed spread
footings and required deep foundations.
PBS&J argued that the contract was ambiguous, because, among other things: (a) it allowed
the use of spread footings for small structures, which, it contended, included a balcony; and (b)
the RFP’s foundation specifications were not prescriptive, as they used the terms “recommended”
and “recommendations,” which the design-builder argued were not “requirements.” The board
rejected PBS&J’s ambiguity argument. It was influenced by the fact that, for much of the contract
performance period, PBS&J had interpreted the contract as not allowing spread footings for the
balconies, as its early designs had shown the use of concrete piers.
The board additionally noted that if the contract contained ambiguities, they were so
obvious that PBS&J should have asked about them prior to bidding. The board found that the
Corps had acted reasonably in rejecting the change to spread footings, as the building was on
expansive soils, and there was a possibility that balconies supported by spread footings would
move more than the rest of the structure, which was supported by the drilled piers.
E-21

Contrast the result in the PBS&J case to that in Record Steel and Construction v. United
States,30 where the dispute also involved whether geotechnical design specifications were a
requirement or simply a recommendation. The design-build project involved a dormitory at Offutt
Air Force Base in Bellevue, Nebraska. Part of the RFP contained a foundation analysis report,
with a section entitled “Subsurface Recommendations.” Included in the recommendations was the
following language, “Due to the anticipated column loads for a multi-story building, it is believed
that improving the site is more viable than reducing the bearing pressure to a very low value ….
The recommended improvement program is outlined below.”31 The recommended program
contained statements that materials be undercut and “should be excavated” from below the bottom
elevation of all building footings.
In response to the RFP, the design-builder submitted a price proposal informing the Corps
of Engineers that it did not believe over-excavation for the foundations would be required but, if
site conditions ultimately required over-excavation, it committed to perform this work at no
additional cost. The need for over-excavation was discussed during several design meetings both
prior to and after contract award. The parties agreed that the design-builder’s geotechnical firm
was to conduct field investigations and tests and provide such information to both the design-
builder and the Corps. If the resulting data was satisfactory, then the design-builder could proceed
with its design without conducting over-excavation.
The geotechnical firm concluded that the native soils were adequate to support the
building’s footings without over-excavation. However, the Corps apparently re-evaluated its
position and refused to issue a notice to proceed for the footings unless the design-builder agreed
to conform to “requirements” of the subsurface recommendations of the Foundation Analysis
30
62 Fed. Cl. 508 (2004).
31
Id. at 511.
E-22

Report and over-excavate the site. The design-builder complied with this order and submitted a
claim for the costs associated with the over-excavation effort.
The design-builder argued that the contract unambiguously made over-excavation a design
recommendation – not a design requirement. In the alternative, it argued that if the contract was
ambiguous, then the ambiguity was latent and should be construed against the government. The
government argued that the contract expressly and unambiguously required the design-builder to
over-excavate the foundation. After carefully examining the relevant contract provisions, the
United States Court of Federal Claims found the contract to be latently ambiguous, and saddled
the government with the financial responsibility of the over-excavation.
The court first looked at the reasonableness of each party’s contract interpretations. In
finding that the design-builder’s interpretation was reasonable, it first noted that the design-builder,
as the designer-of-record, was expected to exercise its professional judgment in designing the
dormitory and had to defer only to specific requirements contained in the RFP, not to
recommendations. The court then examined how the “requirements” in the RFP were expressed
in terms of words like “shall,” “may,” and “should.”
It found that the most critical aspects of the foundation report used the word “should”
instead of “shall” – and that this expressed a desire for action, but not a binding requirement. It
looked to the fact that the foundation report stated that the Corps “believed” that over-excavation
was “more viable” to improve the site, and couched its report in terms of a “recommendation”
rather than as a requirement. The court also found the design-builder’s interpretation to be
reasonable based on the fact that the Corps’ initial borings were not conducted within the actual
footprint of the dormitory’s location.
E-23

The court ruled, however, that the Corps’ contract interpretation fell “within the zone of
reasonableness.”32 It looked to the fact that the RFP used the verb “shall” in connection with
incorporating the foundation report’s recommendations into the contract, and that, by referring to
the terms “over-excavation and compaction requirements,” there was an argument that the RFP
expressly converted the foundation report’s recommendations into requirements.33
Faced with two reasonable contract interpretations, the court then looked to the rule of
contra proferentem for guidance on who should bear the risk of these ambiguities. The four-part
test associated with this rule places the risk of the ambiguities on the government when: (a) the
contract specifications were drawn by the government; (b) the language used therein was
susceptible to more than one interpretation; (c) the intention of the parties does not otherwise
appear; and (d) the contractor actually and reasonably construed the specifications in accordance
with one of the meanings of which the language was susceptible. The court found that all of these
conditions were satisfied.
The court also refused to apply the exception to the general rule of contra proferentem (i.e.,
the patent ambiguity doctrine), which resolves ambiguities against the contractor where the
ambiguities are “‘so ‘patent and glaring’ that it is unreasonable for a contractor not to discover and
inquire about them.’”34 The court did not find this ambiguity obvious, particularly since the Corps
had not indicated its view of the mandatory nature of these so-called “requirements” until many
predesign meetings between the parties had taken place.
Another case addressing foundation disputes during design development is Fluor
Intercontinental, Inc. v. Department of State,35 which involved a Department of State (“DOS”)
32
Id. at 515.
33
Id. at 516.
34
Id. at 517.
35
CBCA 1559, 13 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 35334, 2013 WL 3271335 (May 24, 2013).
E-24

design-build contract with Fluor for an embassy in Haiti. Fluor’s $38 million claim included,
among other things, a request for relief from differing site conditions. The RFP documents
incorporated a preliminary geotechnical report that indicated that spread footers could be used to
support the structure without having to fully undercut the site. This was confirmed by Fluor’s
geotechnical engineer and was the basis for Fluor’s proposal. After award, and as required by the
contract, Fluor’s geotechnical engineer investigated the site, conducted field testing, and
concluded that there were indications that the soil was collapsible, not suitable for supporting
foundations, and should be removed. Fluor notified the DOS that the findings constituted a
differing site condition, as the RFP documents gave no indication of the need to remove all of the
soil.
When the DOS indicated that it would likely reject the claim, Fluor asked for direction as
to how to proceed. The DOS refused to do so, stating that, “… this is a design problem …. You
need to provide an engineering solution that meets the requirements of the contract taking into
consideration the questionable bearing capacity of the soil that was clearly noted in the RFP.”
Fluor ultimately followed the recommendations set forth in its geotechnical engineer’s report,
removed the upper silt layer of the site, and formally claimed a differing site condition.
As the dispute proceeded, the DOS’s soil experts opined that the Fluor engineer’s test
results were unreliable, were not performed in accordance with accepted standards, and did not
necessarily indicate collapsible soil. The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals agreed with these
experts and held that the soil was not collapsible, “or collapsible to a degree significant to the
design of the foundations.” Because Fluor did not establish the collapsibility of the soil, the board
concluded that Fluor failed to meet its burden of proving that there was a differing site condition.
E-25

Fluor argued that the DOS should not have been allowed, “several years after the fact,” to
complain about the adequacy of its testing plan and methodology. The board disagreed, finding
that because the DOS had notified Fluor that it did not believe there was a valid differing site
condition, Fluor knew that its claim would be contested. In response to Fluor’s argument that the
DOS was obligated to investigate the site and provide direction once Fluor raised notice of the
differing site condition, the board stated:
The agency did provide direction, rejecting the conclusion that a differing site condition
existed and permitting the contractor to proceed as it deemed appropriate under the design-
build contract. The agency is not contending that the ultimate foundation design was
improper; rather, the agency contends that it is not obligated to provide additional time
and/or money under the contract because the contractor has not established the existence
of collapsible soils (that is, no differing site condition has been demonstrated to have
existed).36
One of the interesting features of the Fluor decision is that it shows how experts can see engineered
solutions differently. Fluor’s geotechnical engineer appeared to take a more conservative position
on potential soil collapses than the government’s testifying experts. This was certainly the
prerogative of Fluor’s engineer, given that he was ultimately responsible for the design. The
board’s decision, however, appeared to conclude that Fluor’s engineer based his finding on faulty
test results, and that had he conducted proper testing, he might have drawn a different conclusion.
Another recent case embassy case found that the design-builder failed to demonstrate that
it had a differing geotechnical site condition. In Liquidating Trustee Ester du Val of Ki
Liquidation, Inc. v. United States,37 Kullman Industries, Inc. (“KI”) contracted with the DOS for
36
Id. at 13.
37
116 Fed. Cl. 338 (2014).
E-26

the design and construction of the Tajikistan embassy. KI was ultimately terminated for default
and went bankrupt as a result of the project, in large measure because of the geotechnical costs it
incurred.
The parties had a fundamental disagreement over how geotechnical costs were to be treated
within the fixed price contract. KI put very little money in its contract price for foundation and
geotechnical work, on the assumption that this work would be treated as an allowance, and that
the contract price would be increased to reflect the actual costs of this work. The DOS did not
construe the contracting approach as being open-ended, and assumed that KI’s fixed price included
all geotechnical conditions, subject to any proven differing site conditions.38
Although the DOS furnished a geotechnical report that warned of poor and collapsible soil
conditions, KI did not conduct any meaningful site investigation prior to award. After visiting the
site and conducting some tests post-award, KI’s geotechnical expert agreed with the conclusions
in the DOS’s report. It used the same soil preparation approach contained in the report – which
involved compressing the foundation soils by an extensive flooding and dewatering system. This
approach was costly and time-consuming.
In considering KI’s claim, the court disagreed with KI’s contract interpretation and held
that its fixed price included all of the geotechnical work. The fact that it had little time to conduct
a pre-award site investigation was its own problem. If KI had been concerned that it was “being
pressed into making a premature decision, it had the option of simply not agreeing to the
government’s terms, unpalatable as that might have appeared at the time.”39 It also concluded that
there no differing site condition existed, as there was no indication of anything being materially
38
Part of the reason for this confusion was that DOS was, as the court noted, “eager, indeed desperate, to close the
deal on a fixed price contract [as of the close of the fiscal year.] And they may have welcomed KI’s naiveté in
agreeing to take on the risk that it could perform at a profit.” 116 Fed. Cl. at 376.
39
116 Fed. Cl. at 377.
E-27

different from what was shown in the contract documents. In drawing this conclusion, the board
was critical of KI’s foundation design:
It is ironic, and indeed tragic, that the [RFP geotechnical] report prompted [KI] to invest
millions in what probably was over-engineering with respect to the foundation work. But
KI’s own experts came to the same conclusion and the result was investment in an elaborate
watering/compaction/dewatering scheme, which appears to have been unnecessary.40
Note that the opinion contains no succinct explanation for why the court drew this conclusion
about over-engineering. There is only the inference that the court believed KI did not conduct a
more refined engineering effort because it thought the DOS would be paying for the ultimate cost.
Another reported decision discussed the consequences of a transportation agency spending
little time to conduct a pre-procurement site investigation and requiring the design-builder to
accept the site “as is.” Drennon Construction & Consulting, Inc. v. Department of the Interior41
involved a federal road project in central Alaska. The Department of the Interior (“DOI”) wanted
to widen a campground road from one lane to two, and to eliminate a blind curve. It obtained
funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 as a “shovel ready” project
and engaged an engineering firm, USKH, to prepare 100% design drawings and a geotechnical
report. The DOI provided USKH a digital terrain model based on earlier photogrammetric
mapping. When USKH realized the model contained inaccurate control points, it requested
$25,000 to perform a more reliable and accurate survey. Concerned about the limited project
funding, the DOI denied the request. Instead, the DOI decided to deal with this issue by warning
potential bidders of possible inaccuracies in the model, requiring the contractor to perform a survey
before commencing work, and using disclaimer language to shift the risk to the contractor.
40
Id. at 376.
41
CBCA 2391, 13-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 35213, 2013 WL 996042 (Jan. 24, 2013).
E-28

DOI ultimately entered into a design-build contract with Drennon Construction &
Consulting, Inc. (“Drennon”) to excavate the hillside and design-build a gabion wall along the
two-lane road. Drennon conducted a survey demonstrating that the road could not be built as
shown on USKH’s drawings. As a result, the road needed to be shifted in the opposite direction,
into the hillside, requiring additional excavation and construction of a much higher wall to restrain
the contents of the hill from falling onto the road.
Drennon also encountered soil problems during excavation, as the hillside slopes collapsed
due to the soils being “at or near [its] angle of repose.” In essence, every “scoopful” excavated
from the slopes caused a mini-landslide from above. Drennon concluded that the hill could not be
stabilized and stopped work. Ultimately, the project was scaled back to eliminate the widening of
the road, and included only the construction of the gabion wall.
Drennon filed a claim with the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, seeking its costs during
the suspension and for the additional gabions not used due to the project redesign. Drennon
claimed that the project’s design was defective and that the geotechnical information provided by
the government in the solicitation, on which Drennon relied in pricing the job, significantly
differed from the site conditions actually encountered. The board agreed, finding that the bidding
documents contained both design defects and representations about the site that materially differed
from actual site conditions.
The Board found that the DOI bore responsibility for the defective design. The decision
noted that both the DOI and USKH knew the design was flawed prior to bid. It called for the road
to be widened over the guard rail separating the road from a river, but that was impermissible given
the wild and scenic designation of the river. The correction involved moving the road into the hill
on the opposite side from the river, an act the board concluded a reasonable bidder could not have
E-29

anticipated, particularly given that the area was covered with snow during the bidding period. It
also rejected the notion that “weasel words” (USKH’s phrase used to describe the disclaimer) in
the solicitation would shift this responsibility.
The board further noted that the solicitation called for the gabion wall to be “approximately
nine feet high at most,” and that about 420 cubic yards of gabions would be needed to build it.
Because the road was moved into the hill, Drennon had to excavate much more of the hillside than
anticipated. In fact, the wall needed to be 15 feet high and consumed 778 cubic yards of gabions.
While the DOI acknowledged that these differences required Drennon to change its construction
means and methods, it argued that the use of the word “approximate” and the design-build nature
of the relationship shifted these risks to Drennon. The board disagreed, stating:
The disclaimer that the design might have to be adjusted per a contractor-financed survey
alerted bidders to the possibility that the design might have required a bit of tweaking, but
cannot reasonably be read to impose on the contractor an obligation to construct the project
in a manner significantly different from that envisioned in the contract. With regard to the
anticipated height of the wall, “[t]he use of the word ‘approximately’ . . . obviously does
not mean that the relevant quantity is absolute . . . [but it] implies a reasonable accurate
representation. . . . Nine feet is not a reasonably accurate representation of what turned out
to be fifteen feet.42
The board also concluded that Drennon encountered a DSC. The soil borings allegedly contained
between 5.1 and 10.7% fines, described as “slightly silty,” and advised that the hillside would be
“composed of similar soils.” The actual soils on the hillside, however, contained virtually no fines
and the slopes were in a state of incipient failure. As a result, the Board found that it was
42
Id. at 5.
E-30

impossible to keep the wall of the excavation open for any period of time, contrary to the
conclusions in the geotechnical report.
Contractual Disclaimers of Responsibility for Geotechnical Information on Design-Build Projects
As noted earlier, many public sector owners attempt to absolve themselves from liability
for geotechnical information they furnish to design-build proposers. This is evident from the
Metcalf decision, as well as in practice. They do this by using contractual disclaimers that, among
other things, warn bidders that their use of such information is “at their own risk,” “without any
liability to the owner,” and that the bidder “should independently determine the accuracy of the
information.”
An example of how disclaimers are used is found in the following excerpts from the design-
build contract released by Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) on its SR
99 Alaskan Way Viaduct Replacement Project (WSDOT 2010). This contract makes it clear that,
except for some limited exceptions, reference documents are informational and will not form a
basis for a claim by the design-builder. Section 3.3 (Reference Documents)43 states, in relevant
part:
. . . Design-Builder understands and agrees that WSDOT shall not be responsible or liable
in any respect for any loss, damage, injury, liability, cost or cause of action whatsoever
suffered by any DB-Related Entity by reason of any use of any information contained in
the Reference Documents or any action or forbearance in reliance thereon, except to the
extent that WSDOT has specifically agreed herein that Design-Builder shall be entitled to
an increase in its compensation and/or extension of a Completion Deadline with respect to
43
This contract defined the term “Reference Documents” to include Geotechnical Memoranda for Design, which
were defined as those Reference Document(s) “providing an interpretation of available geologic data that shall not
be used to determine differing site conditions, resolve contractual disputes, or in any way interpret the contract,
intents, or obligations of the parties.”
E-31

such matter. Design-Builder further acknowledges and agrees that (a) if and to the extent
Design-Builder or anyone on Design-Builder’s behalf uses any of said information in any
way, such use is made on the basis that Design-Builder, not WSDOT, has approved and is
responsible for said information, and (b) Design-Builder is capable of conducting and
obligated hereunder to conduct any and all studies, analyses and investigations as it deems
advisable to verify or supplement said information, and that any use of said information is
entirely at Design-Builder’s own risk and at its own discretion (WSDOT 2010).
Texas DOT (“TxDOT”) offers a similar provision on its Loop 1604 Western Extension
Project. This design-build contract has several clauses that shift risk away from TxDOT relative
to liability for reference documents (TxDOT 2013). Section 1.7 (Reference Information
Documents) states as follows:
1.7.1 TxDOT has provided and disclosed the Reference Information Documents
to DB Contractor. Except as provided in Section 1.2.3: (a) the Reference Information
Documents are not mandatory or binding on DB Contractor, and (b) DB Contractor is not
entitled to rely on the Reference Information Documents as presenting design, engineering,
operating or maintenance solutions or other direction, means or methods for complying
with the requirements of the DBA Documents, Governmental Approvals or Law.
1.7.2 TxDOT shall not be responsible or liable in any respect for any causes of
action, claims or Losses whatsoever suffered by any DB Contractor-Related Entity by
reason of any use of information contained in, or any action or forbearance in reliance on,
the Reference Information Documents, except any schedule or monetary relief available
hereunder as set forth in Section 13 of this DBA (TxDOT 2013).
E-32

The definition for “Reference Information Documents” states that such documents were provided
to the design-builder “for informational purposes only and without representation or warranty by
TxDOT.”
The preceding clauses are examples of the competing goals that occur when an agency
attempts to broadly disclaim responsibility for information it provides during the bidding process.
While the agency’s primary goal is to avoid claims arising from this information, its secondary
goals are to encourage marketplace competition and avoid excessive bid contingencies.
Consequently, even the most one-sided contractual disclaimers generally provide design-builders
with some limited relief for differing site conditions and major changes in alignment from that
shown in the RFP design. This can lead to confusion, as the contract may not clearly establish
what remedies are available to the design-builder for errors in owner-furnished information.
As discussed in Section A.6 above, there is some question as to whether the type of
disclaimers discussed above are enforceable. Substantial design-bid-build case law supports the
view that broad disclaimers of geotechnical information are generally not effective, particularly
when the disclaimer is in direct conflict with the purpose and language of a differing site conditions
clause (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011).
Confronted with any major flaw in the owner’s RFP documents that increases its time/cost
of performance, design-builders will almost certainly argue that the disclaimers should not be
construed to shift the consequences of these flaws away from the owner. If the owner disagrees,
an impasse will develop and relations will likely be negatively impacted. Moreover, Metcalf and
other design-build cases have found that design-builders are entitled to reasonably rely upon such
information.
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Contractual Geotechnical Risk Tools
Given the above case law, a number of approaches have been developed to better allocate and in
some cases, share the risk of geotechnical conditions between the owner and the design-builder.
Scope Validation
The Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) has developed a thoughtful way to
address the issues associated with information provided by the agency to design-build proposers.
VDOT recognized that if the risk of defective owner-furnished information was shifted to the
design-builder, design-build proposal prices would be higher because bidders would put in
contingencies to cover this risk. However, because of the uncertainty over whether a court would
enforce the disclaimer, VDOT believed it could still be obligated to pay the design-builder if the
risk materialized, and that relations on the project could be jeopardized.
VDOT decided to confront this issue directly by balancing its need for effective risk
transfer and price certainty with the reality that pre-award disclaimers may not be fair to design-
build proposers or enforceable. VDOT’s process is called “scope validation.” It establishes a
period of time (“scope validation period”) where the design-builder can, during the design
development process, present claims that relate to deficiencies in owner-furnished information.
The scope validation period is generally 120 days after contract award, although this can be
adjusted for more complicated projects. After the end of the scope validation period, the design-
builder’s claim rights are waived for items not previously raised. VDOT’s standard design-build
contract template now includes the following clause (VDOT 2010):
2.2 Scope Validation and Identification of Scope Issues
2.2.1 Scope Validation Period. The term “Scope Validation Period” is the period of time
that begins on Design-Builder’s receipt of Department’s Notice to Proceed and extends for
E-34

one hundred twenty (120) days from such date of receipt, unless otherwise stated in Exhibit
1. During the Scope Validation Period, Design-Builder shall thoroughly review and
compare all of the then-existing Contract Documents, including without limitation the RFP
Documents and the Proposal, to verify and validate Design-Builder’s proposed design
concept and identify any defects, errors, or inconsistencies in the RFP Documents that
affect Design-Builder’s ability to complete its proposed design concept within the Contract
Price and/or Contract Time(s) (collectively referred to as “Scope Issues”). The term
“Scope Issue” shall not be deemed to include items that Design-Builder should have
reasonably discovered prior to the Agreement Date.
2.2.2 Scope Validation Period for Non-Accessible Areas of the Site. The Parties
recognize that Design-Builder may be unable to conduct the additional geotechnical
evaluations contemplated by Section 4.2.2 below because it will not have access to certain
areas of the Site within the Scope Validation Period set forth in Section 2.2.1 above.
Design-Builder shall notify Department at the meeting set forth in Section 2.1.2 of all such
non-accessible areas and the dates upon which such areas are expected to become
accessible. If Department agrees that such areas are non-accessible, then, for the limited
purpose of determining Scope Issues that directly arise from geotechnical evaluations for
such areas, the term “Scope Validation Period” shall be deemed to be the thirty (30) day
period after the date the specified area becomes accessible for purposes of conducting the
geotechnical evaluation.
2.2.3 Submission Requirements for Scope Issues. If Design-Builder intends to seek relief
for a Scope Issue, it shall promptly, but in no event later than the expiration of the Scope
Validation Period, provide Department in writing with a notice (“General Notice”) of the
E-35

existence of such Scope Issue, which General Notice shall generally explain the basis for
such Scope Issue. Within twenty-one (21) days of the General Notice of a Scope Issue,
Design-Builder shall provide Department with documentation that specifically explains its
support for the Scope Issue (“Supporting Documentation”), which Supporting
Documentation shall include, among other things: (a) the assumptions that Design-Builder
made during the preparation of its proposal that form the basis for its allegation, along with
documentation verifying that it made such assumptions in developing its proposal; (b) an
explanation of the defect, error or inconsistency in the RFP Documents that Design-Builder
could not have reasonably identified prior to the Agreement Date: and (c) the specific
impact that the alleged Scope Issue has had on Design-Builder’s price and time to perform
the Work. For the avoidance of doubt: (1) Design-Builder shall not be entitled to raise in
its Supporting Documentation any Scope Issues that were not previously addressed in a
General Notice; and (2) Design-Builder shall have no right to seek any relief for any Scope
Issues that have not been specifically identified in a General Notice provided to Department
during the Scope Validation Period.
2.2.4 Resolution of Scope Issues. Within a reasonable time after Department’s receipt
of the Supporting Documentation described in the Section 2.2.3 above, the Parties shall
meet and confer to discuss the resolution of such Scope Issues. If Department agrees that
Design-Builder has identified a valid Scope Issue that materially impacts Design-Builder’s
price or time to perform the Work, a Work Order shall be issued in accordance with Article
9 hereof. If Department disagrees that Design-Builder has identified a valid Scope Issue
that materially impacts Design-Builder’s price or time to perform the Work, then Design-
Builder’s recourse shall be as set forth in Article 10. Notwithstanding anything to the
E-36

contrary in the Contract Documents or as a matter of law, Design-Builder shall have the
burden of proving that the alleged Scope Issue could not have been reasonably identified
prior to the Agreement Date and that such Scope Issue materially impacts its price or time
to perform the Work.
2.2.5 Design-Builder’s Assumption of Risk of Scope Issues. The Parties acknowledge
that the purpose of the Scope Validation Period is to enable Design-Builder to identify
those Scope Issues that could not reasonably be identified prior to the Agreement Date. By
executing this Agreement, Design-Builder acknowledges that the Scope Validation Period
is a reasonable time to enable Design-Builder to identify Scope Issues that will materially
impact Design-Builder’s price or time to perform the Work. After the expiration of the
Scope Validation Period, with the sole exception of those Scope Issues made the subject
of a General Notice during the Scope Validation Period and subject to valid requests for
Work Orders in accordance with Section 2.2.3 above, the Parties agree as follows:
1. Design-Builder shall assume and accept all risks, costs, and responsibilities of
any Scope Issue arising from or relating to the Contract Documents, including but not
limited to conflicts within or between the RFP Documents and Proposal;
2. Design-Builder shall be deemed to have expressly warranted that the Contract
Documents existing as of the end of the Scope Validation Period are sufficient to enable
Design-Builder to complete the design and construction of the Project without any increase
in the Contract Price or extension to the Contract Time(s); and
3. Department expressly disclaims any responsibility for, and Design-Builder
expressly waives its right to seek any increase in the Contract Price or extension to the
E-37

Contract Time(s) for, any Scope Issue associated with any of the Contract Documents,
including but not limited to the RFP Documents.
2.2.6 Waiver of Rights. The failure of Design-Builder to meet the submission
requirements required under Section 2.2.3 above for a Scope Issue, including but not
limited to the times for providing notice and documentation of the Scope Issue, shall
conclusively constitute a waiver of Design-Builder’s rights to seek relief for such Scope
Issue.
To date, VDOT has experienced a number of scope validation claims on its design-build projects,
including inaccurate survey information on a railroad line and subsurface conditions that differ
from those in the RFP documents. There has yet to be any litigation arising out of this clause that
is the subject of a reported decision as of yet, although there is at least one dispute that is at the
formal dispute resolution stage.
The AASHTO Guide for Design-Build Procurement (2008) notes that the approach used
by VDOT has also been used by other agencies:
Some agencies, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, use a contractual scope
validation period. With such provisions, the agency retains the risks of differing site
conditions/changed conditions until the design-builder has had the appropriate opportunity
to validate the information provided in the request for proposals and to further define the
scope of the project. The risks of differing site conditions/changed conditions are then
shifted to the design-builder following such scope validation period. It is suggested that
agencies conduct initial investigations necessary to prepare an appropriate scope, schedule
and price estimate for the work (AASHTO 2008).
E-38

VDOT’s original (2006) scope validation clause is included as an example in the Guide.44
Sharing DSC Risk
While the policy behind the DSC clause is to eliminate some of the risk from bidding,
transportation agencies have used contract provisions that shift significant risk to the design-
builder, particularly on larger design-build projects. According to NCHRP Synthesis 429, WSDOT
uses this approach. It quotes a WSDOT survey respondent who stated: “We [assign] all changed
conditions under a certain dollar amount (different amounts for different contracts) to the
contractor’s risk. If that threshold is exceeded, then the department pays for the costs above the
threshold.” For example, on the SR 520 Pontoon Construction design-build project, WSDOT used
the following language in its DSC clause:
Notwithstanding the above, the Design-Builder shall be entitled to equitable adjustment
adjusting the Contract Price only for the actual, reasonable cost increase resulting from
Differing Site Conditions which in the aggregate exceeds $10,000,000.00. The
responsibility for the first $10,000,000.00 worth of Differing Site Conditions shall rest
solely with the Design-Builder (WSDOT 2009).
During procurement, WSDOT received a request for information from a proposer, which stated
that the $10 million cap was extraordinary and could result in large proposal contingencies. It
asked WSDOT to reconsider this provision. WSDOT declined, stating:
Establishing a threshold dollar amount for Differing Site Conditions accomplishes the
following: 1) It provides a level of cost certainty for the owner, 2) It provides a level playing
field by limiting the liability of the Design-Builder, and 3) Encourages the Design-Builder
to develop strategies to limit risks associated with Differing Site Conditions. Providing a
44
Id., Appendix C, Example 18.
E-39

threshold dollar amount for Differing Site Conditions has been used successfully on all
WSDOT design-build projects to date. The $10,000,000 threshold for this project is
consistent with another WSDOT design-build project of this size and complexity (Tacoma
Narrows Bridge) (WSDOT 2009).
In essence, WSDOT put proposers on notice that it was willing to pay the $10 million contingency
that a prudent design-builder would include in its lump sum price proposal. Effectively, the clause
insulates WSDOT from being “nickel and dimed to death” with minor differing site conditions
claims during the project’s execution.
The Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project used a similar approach to create a “deductible” for
DSC risk on its design-build project. This project involves a 23-mile extension of the WMATA
subway system (i.e., the Silver Line) and has several major design-build projects as part of its
program, including two billion dollar-plus contracts for rail line, stations and systems. While DSC
clauses were used, they required that the design-builder bear the first dollar of risk for these
conditions (ranging from $2 million to $3 million for the respective contracts). The philosophy
was similar to that expressed by WSDOT above.
Use of a DSC Clause
While FHWA mandates the use of a DSC clause for federal aid highway projects (unless
the use of such a clause is contrary to state law), it does not have the same mandate for design-
build projects. “Instead, it encourages state DOTs to use this clause when appropriate for the risk
and responsibilities that are shared with the design-builder.” (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012).
While many DOTs use DSC clauses on their design-build projects, there are some that do not.
There are many compelling reasons to use such a clause, particularly given the policies expressed
in the Foster case.
E-40

Progressive Design-Build
One of the challenges with public sector design-build is that the agency is not able to take
advantage of the design-builder’s ideas until after the owner has already developed the preliminary
design concepts, since most public owners use some form of bridging documents in order to obtain
a fixed price contract from the design-build procurement. For those owners who have complex
projects, including major geotechnical risks, there can be a strong benefit in getting early
involvement of the design-build team.
Owners inclined to do this will use a progressive design-build (PDB) approach. Its core
features include the following:
 The design-builder is retained by the agency before the design has been significantly
advanced.
 The design-builder is selected primarily, if not exclusively, on qualifications, and provides
cost estimates on an open book basis.
 The parties work collaboratively in making design decisions based on cost, operability and
other considerations.
Under PDB, the design-builder performs its work in two phases. Phase 1 is often called the
“Preliminary Services Phase.” The design-builder works with the agency and its consultants to
create or confirm the project’s basis of design, and then advance that design. The design-builder
provides ongoing cost estimates as that design develops, to ensure that the agency’s budgetary
requirements are being achieved. At the point in time where the design has achieved an appropriate
level of definition, the design-builder will provide a formal commercial proposal (including the
overall contract price) for Phase 2 services. The proposal is often established when the design is
approximately 50-75% complete, but it can occur anytime up to when the design is 100%
E-41

complete, depending on the amount of control the owner desires to maintain over the design
definition.
Phase 2 is often called the “Final Design and Construction Phase.” Once the agency and
design-builder agree upon commercial terms, the design-builder will complete the design and
construct the facility in accordance with those commercial terms (i.e., the agreed-upon price and
schedule). The design-builder will also be responsible for any testing, commissioning, and other
services that have been agreed upon.
If, for any reason, the parties cannot reach agreement on the Phase 2 commercial terms,
then the agency has the right to exercise an “off-ramp” – where it can use the design and move
forward with the project through a design-bid-build procurement, with another design-builder, or
any other way it deems appropriate.
Phase 1 of the Dulles Corridor Metrorail Project successfully used PDB, and it has also
been used extensively in the water and wastewater sector. While several DOTs are considering
using it on some of their more complicated projects, only Maryland State Highway has an active
PDB procurement. However, given the attributes that PDB offers, specifically in terms of having
the design-builder and DOT collaboratively develop designs that reduce risk, there is a logic in
considering this as part of a risk management program for projects that have complex geotechnical
issues.
Dispute Review Boards (DRBs)
DRBs are used as a matter of course on tunneling projects, but have not yet had widespread
adoption on design-build road and bridge projects. Simply stated, the DRB is a group of three
experts that are appointed at the outset of the project to consider disputes that the parties present
to them and provide recommendations for resolution. They are highly regarded for many reasons,
E-42

but particularly because of their ability to provide the parties with real-time assessments of their
positions and allow the projects to move forward based on those assessments. DRBs can provide
an effective way to resolve DSC issues in a cost-effective and timely manner.
E-43

Appendix F: Interview and Survey Forms
Survey #1 Questionnaire
This appendix contains the online-survey used to collect the information from the analysis of
current geotechnical management practices conducted in this research.
General Information:
1. US state in which the respondent is employed:
2. What type of organization are you employed by?
State Department of Transportation
Other public transportation agency; Name of Agency:
Federal Agency; Name of Agency:
Consultant; Name of Organization:
Contractor; Name of Company:
Other; Please describe:
3. What group/section do you work in?
Design group/section Alternative project delivery group/section
Construction group/section Materials group/section
Operations group/section Contracts/procurement group/section
Geotechnical/foundations group/section Other, please specify:
4. What project delivery methods is your organization allowed to use? Check all that apply
DBB
Construction Manager-at-Risk or Construction Manager/General Contractor
DB Best Value
DB Low Bid
Other; Please specify:
If your agency does not use Design-Build project delivery

please skip to the 41question.
5. How many DB projects has your agency delivered?

1-2 3-5 6-10 >10
6. How long has your agency been using DB project delivery?

1-2 years 3-5 years 6-10 years >10 years
7. How many DB projects have you been personally involved in?

1-2 3-5 6-10 >10
Geotechnical Risk Management Information Section
8. Does your agency have a manual or document that specifically describes the procedures to be used with the
geotechnical requirements of DB and/or DBB projects?
No Yes. If yes, please add the web site URL address where it can be accessed or attach a corresponding
document:
9. How much preliminary geotechnical investigation is completed before making the decision to use DB
project delivery for a given project? Check all that apply
None
Reconnaissance Report (Review of records and observations from site)
Geotechnical Data Report (Review of records and limited investigation data)
Geotechnical Summary Report (Review of records and geotechnical investigation of critical areas)
Preliminary Geotechnical Design Report (Partial geotechnical investigation)
F-1

Geotechnical Design Report (Full subsurface investigation for all structures and geotechnical features)
Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) (A report that establishes the contractual understanding of
subsurface site conditions and upon which risks associated with subsurface conditions can be allocated
between the owner and the design-builder)
Geotechnical Interpretation Report (GIR) (A report that interprets the findings of the GBR)
Other, please specify:
10. Do you use DB project delivery on projects where the geotechnical risks are considered to be significant,
i.e. higher than the usual project?
Yes No
11. If the answer to the question 10 is “Yes”, please check all applicable steps that were taken to address
geotechnical issues in the DB RFQ/RFP?
Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) (A report that establishes the contractual understanding of
subsurface site conditions and upon which risks associated with subsurface conditions can be allocated
between the owner and the design-builder)
Allowance, restriction or elimination of Differing Site Conditions (DSC) rights
Mandatory design Other, please specify:
12. (Only for those who responded to the question 10 “YES”) What are the Geotechnical characteristics or
factors that preclude the project from being a DB contract delivery?
13. If the answer to the question 10 is “No”, Please check all the reasons why you do not use DB project
delivery where the geotechnical risks are considered to be significant.
Liability considerations (if so, specify: )
Not willing to give up full control of the geotechnical design
Inability to adequately describe geotechnical conditions and/or performance specifications
Could use DB on these projects but political/policy issues prevent its use and/ or agency upper
management is unwilling to use it
Not enough time to conduct preliminary geotechnical engineering investigations
14. Is a formal geotechnical risk analysis conducted on a typical project in any of the following areas? Check
all that apply
Type of Analysis Qualitative Quantitative Non-Formal

Geotechnical
Risk Analysis
Risk
Project Scope
Project Schedule
Project Cost
Contracting Risk
F-2

15. Within the geotechnical risk management process that is conducted by the agency or required of the design-
builder, please select all that apply whether on a DB typical or a DB project with significant geotechnical
issues:
DB DB project with
(Check all that apply) typical significant
project geotechnical risk
Geotechnical risk management process conducted by the agency prior to bid
Formal risk identification meetings are conducted by the agency’s project
team prior to bid
Risk register, encompassing geotechnical risks, is developed by the agency
Risk mitigation report which includes procedures for mitigating risks
identified during the risk analysis process is developed
Geotechnical risk management process required of the design-builder
Design-builder has to develop a risk management plan to be submitted in the
proposal to the agency
Design-builder has to maintain a risk register during the course of the project
that includes the geotechnical risks anticipated and mitigation measures
16. (Only for those who marked to the question 15 “Risk Register and Risk management plan”) Which of the
following best describe the content of the risk register of geotechnical issues:
Risk register developed by the agency determines the risk management mitigation strategies
applicable to the geotechnical risks identified (such as share, transfer, and avoid)
Risk register developed by the agency - encompassing geotechnical risks- is maintained during the course
of the project (e.g. geotechnical risks that are not materialized are retired during the course of the project
and contingencies are revised).
Risk register developed contains geotechnical risks with a deterministic estimate of the cost and schedule
impact of risk
Risk register containing geotechnical risks and probabilistic estimate (range) of cost and schedule impact
of risk ; Other, please specify:
17. Does your agency have a document that details your formal risk analysis/management process?
No Yes. If yes, please add the web site URL address where it can be accessed or attach a corresponding
document:
18. Does the geotechnical risk management process employed on DB projects differ based on the contract type
(lump sum, unit price, etc.)? No Yes
19. What types of geotechnical risks do you typically encounter on DB projects and how are they allocated?
Check all that apply
DB
Uncertainty in ground conditions Owner Shared
Contractor
Unknown geological condition
Groundwater
Rock faults/ fragmentation
Chemically reactive ground
Soil contamination
Slope instability
Settlement
Subsidence (subsurface voids)
Landslides
Karst formations
Others, please specify____________
F-3

Uncertainty in the Design Process

Inadequate geotechnical investigation
Incorrect geotechnical design information, in general
Bias and/or variation in design parameters being different than
estimated, in general
Inaccurate earthwork assumptions– soil or rock cuts or fills
Risk in retaining structures assumptions and recommendations -
geotechnical aspects
Risk in structure foundations assumptions and recommendations
(footings, driven piles, drilled shafts, etc...)
Risk in ground improvement technique recommendations (wick
drains, lightweight fill, vibro-compaction, dynamic compaction,
stone columns, grouting, etc...)
Risk in seismic design assumptions and recommendations
Procurement/Contracts Risk
Risk allocation in the differing site conditions (DSC) contract clause
20. Do your project cost estimates involve a quantitative analysis of geotechnical uncertainty (i.e. was a range
cost estimate developed)?
Yes No Do not Know
21. If your answer to the question 20 is “Yes”, does it include a line item risk-based cost estimate of
geotechnical risks
Yes No Do not Know
22. Do you employ any formalized geotechnical risk allocation techniques to draft the contract provisions?
(An example would be the decision to pay for piling or unsuitable material replacement by unit price rather
than including it in the lump sum amount.)
Yes, if yes, please describe: No
Geotechnical Aspects of Design-build Procurement Process
23. If geotechnical factors are included in the evaluation plan, how much weight do they carry with regard to
all other evaluated factors?
No weight minor weight some weight heavy weight
24. How much geotechnical information is provided in the DB Request for Proposals (RFP) in a DB project
with significant geotechnical issues?
None
Reconnaissance Report (Review of records observations from site)
Geotechnical Data Report (Review of records and limited investigation data)
Geotechnical Summary Report (Review of records and geotechnical
investigation of critical areas)
Preliminary Geotechnical Design Report (Partial geotechnical investigation)
Geotechnical Design Report (Full subsurface investigation for all structures
and geotechnical features)
25. How much additional geotechnical information is required from the design-builders as part of their DB
proposals in a DB project with significant geotechnical issues?
None
F-4

List of assumptions made regarding geotechnical conditions

Limited additional testing as requested by the design-builders
Pre-award geotechnical investigation of critical areas by design-builders
Geotechnical design values to be used
Preliminary designs for foundation features of work
Proposed mitigation approaches for known or potential geotechnical risk areas
Alternative technical concepts for geotechnical features of work
26. During the bidding stage of a DB project with significant geotechnical issues, the agency: (check all that
apply)
Allows the proposers to do their own boring at the site
Gives the bidders general site access and the results of the borings it had conducted.
Allows alternative technical concepts (ATC) during the DB procurement process
27. Rate the following areas (if applicable) in terms of importance to the success of the project during the
procurement process 1 = very important; 2 = important; 3 = not important; NA = Does not apply
Area Rating
Sufficient geotechnical information to allow the competitors to price the project without
excessive contingencies
Highly qualified geotechnical design engineers
Formalized geotechnical risk allocation techniques to draft the contract provisions
Verification of knowledge and experience working in the project area
Mandated use of agency design criteria
Detailed GBR in RFP
Geotechnical design QA plan in proposal
Peer-review of GDR and supplemental GDRs
Geotechnical construction QA plan in proposal
Geotechnical risk mitigation plan in proposal
Geotechnical ATCs with confidential one-on-one meetings
Opportunity for competitors to conduct some form of subsurface investigation during
proposal preparation
Correct weight of geotechnical issues in relation to other project requirements
Geotechnical Aspects of Design-Build Contracts
28. What type of payment provisions are contained whether on a DB typical or a DB projects with significant
geotechnical issues?
29.
DB typical DB project with
(Check all that apply) project significant
geotechnical issue
Lump sum
Unit price GMP
Cost reimbursable
Lump sum guaranteed maximum price (GMP)
Unit price
Combination lump sum and unit prices
Other; Please specify
F-5

30. Please answer the following questions regarding geotechnical aspects of DB contracts:
Do NOT
YES NO
Know
Does your agency use the GBR as a contract document?
Do you provide and require geotechnical design criteria in DB contracts? If
“Yes”: What type?
Do you provide and require geotechnical performance criteria, such as
maximum allowable settlement, in DB contracts? If “Yes”: What type?
Do you use performance verification or measurement methods
(instrumentation, etc.) for geotechnical features of work? If “Yes”: What type?
Do you use warranties in conjunction with the geotechnical features? If “Yes”:
What type?
Do you have incentives that are used to align owner and contractor geotechnical
risks and rewards? If “Yes”: What type?
31. Does your DB contract contain a clause regarding geotechnical differing site conditions?
Yes No
If your contract does not contain a clause regarding Geotechnical Differing Site
Conditions, please skip to the 35 question.
32. If the answer to the question 30 is “Yes”, how often does a design-builder’s claim of a differing
geotechnical site condition result in a compensable change order?
Never Occasionally Usually Always
33. Does your differing site conditions clause explicitly delineate the contractors’ right to submit a claim for
specific types of unforeseen conditions?
Yes If yes: what types? No No Opinion
34. Please estimate the % of your DB projects that end up with a compensable differing site conditions
change/claim:
None 1-10% 11-25% 26-50% >50%
35. What document, if any, is used to define a differing geotechnical site condition?
Geotechnical information contained in RFP
GBR contained in RFP
GDR produced by design-builder
Contract differing site conditions clause definition only
No document
36. Has your agency had a major claim regarding a geotechnical issue on any of your DB projects?
Yes. If yes, please describe the issue and the final decision:
No
37. If the answer to the question 35 is “Yes”, would you be willing to allow the research team to contact you to
do a structured interview and collect case study information?
Yes No
Please furnish contact information if different than respondent:

Contact name:
Phone number:
Email address
F-6

38. How do you rate the final quality of geotechnical work on DB projects compared to DBB projects?
Better Same Worse No opinion
Please explain primary reason for difference:
39. Do you formally evaluate the design-builder’s performance quality and use that for future DB selections?
Yes No Do not know
40. Please rate the following geotechnical factors for their impact on the final quality/performance of the DB
project.
Factor Very High High Some Slight No

Impact Impact Impact Impact Impact
Qualifications of the Design-Builder’s geotechnical staff
Design-Builder’s past project experience with
geotechnical issues
Use of agency geotechnical specifications and/or design
details
Amount of geotechnical information expressed in the
procurement documents
Use of geotechnical performance criteria/specifications
Early contractor involvement in geotechnical design
Agency interactivity with geotechnical design team
during proposal phase
Agency interactivity with geotechnical design team
during design phase
Warranty provisions
Confidential one-on-one meetings
Geotechnical ATCs
41. Do you have anything else you would like to share regarding the geotechnical aspects on your DB projects?
42. Only for participant who skipped ahead from Question 4. Please answer the following question based on
the DB definition included in this survey, and your knowledge and/or experience related to DB contracting.
If your agency would decide to implement DB contracting techniques; what would be your major concern in
regard to the development of geotechnical requirements for the advertisement and letting of DB contracts?
F-7

Survey #2 Questionnaire
The purpose of this second questionnaire is to gauge the impact of geotechnical risk factors on
Design-Build (DB) projects. The results of the survey is to identify those geotechnical factors
that could preclude a given project from being DB project.
Do you have anything else you would like to share regarding the geotechnical risk factors on
your DB projects?
F-8

Structured Interview Questionnaire: Geotechnical Risks in Design-Build Projects
Research Objectives:
1. Identify, analyze, and understand the current models for successful geotechnical risk management on
projects delivered by the Design-Build (DB) delivery method.
2. Quantify the costs and benefits of success approaches to managing geotechnical risk in each delivery
method.
3. Prepare a set of Guidelines for Managing Geotechnical Risk on Design-Build Projects for agency
implementation on highway construction projects.
Below are the various areas in which the interviewer will be asking questions. Please have any historic details on hand
at the time of the interview. We greatly appreciate your support for this important project and will give you the
opportunity to review and suggest corrections to the draft case study write-up prior to its inclusion in the final report.
I. General Agency Information:

1. Name of Agency:
2. What type of organization do you work for?
Highway/Road Agency Rail/Commuter Transit Agency Airport Agency
Seaport/Marine Transportation Agency Other Please describe:
3. What level of authority is your agency? National State/Province County/City/Local Other;
Please describe:
II. Case Study Project Information:
4. Project Name and location:
5. Project ID:
6. Project scope of work: If you have a standard version of this, please give it to the interviewer.
7. Original Total Awarded Value of project: $ Final Total Value of project: $ NOTE: can be
approximate values
8. Date project advertised: NOTE:
can be approximate dates
Date contract awarded:
Original Project Delivery Period (including design)
Final Project Delivery Period (including design)
9. Project delivery method used on this project:
10. Agency Project Delivery Decision-making Process: Describe process for selecting a PDM for the case
study project.
11. Which of the following were reasons why your agency selected the delivery method used for this project?
Check all that apply.
Reduce/compress/accelerate project delivery Compete different design solutions through the
period proposal process
Establish project budget at an early stage of Redistribute risk
design development Flexibility needs during construction phase
Get early construction contractor involvement Provide mechanism for follow-on operations
Encourage innovation and/or maintenance
Facilitate Value Engineering Complex project technical requirements
Encourage price competition (bidding Complex project environmental permitting
process) requirements
Compete different design solutions through Complex project traffic control requirements
the proposal process Complex project financing requirements
Innovative financing Complex project political/public relations
Reduce life cycle costs requirement
F-9

12. Agency Project Delivery Experience:

PDM #Projects Remarks
DBB 1-5; 6-10; 10-20; >20
CMR 1-5; 6-10; 10-20; >20
DB 1-5; 6-10; 10-20; >20
Etc. 1-5; 6-10; 10-20; >20
III. Contractual Provisions and Status: Please answer the following questions based on the Case Study RFP and/or
contractual documents.
13. What is the compensation method used in the contract? (e.g. Lump Sum, Unit Prices)
14. Does the contract allow for Alternative Technical Concepts (ATCs)?
b. If yes, was any ATC received from the Design-Builders proposing on this project?
c. If an ATC was received, was it intended to mitigate geotechnical risks? If so, explain further.
15. Does the contract include a Differing Site Conditions Clause (DSC)?
a. If yes, does it include reference to geotechnical studies provided in the pre-award phase?
16. Did the geotechnical information provided in the contract include any interpretation of the geotechnical
data as a baseline for the differing site conditions clause?
i. If yes, please explain the degree in which the contractually given baseline was optimistic, pessimistic
or neutral within the range of potential interpretations of the available data.
ii.Optimistic: the baseline reflects the best case scenario of geotechnical conditions within the
available data.
iii.Pessimistic: the baseline reflects the worst case scenario of geotechnical conditions within the
available data.
iv.Neutral: the baseline reflects a mid-point in the potential interpretations or there is only one possible
interpretation of the available geotechnical data.
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very

Pessimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Optimistic
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
17. Was there any dispute with the contractor (or other party) in this project?
If yes,
a. What was the basis of the dispute?
b. Did the claim include a geotechnical component?
c. How was the dispute settled? (in favor of the claimant or the agency)
18. Was there any contractual changes during the project execution?
If yes,
a. What was the basis and impacts of the change?
b. Did the change include a geotechnical component?
IV. Geotechnical Risk Management: Please answer the following questions from a general perspective based on
your experience.
19. Was this project considered to have a higher geotechnical risk in comparison with other Design-Build
projects executed by your agency? (please describe how your agency perceived the geotechnical risk before
advertising the project)
20. If the project considered to have a higher geotechnical risk, please explain as follows:
a. Why was the geotechnical risk higher for this project?
b. How was this higher risk handled by your agency?
F-10

21. Within the geotechnical risk management process that is conducted by the agency or required of the design-
builder, please select all that apply whether on a typical DB project or one with significant geotechnical
issues:
DB DB project with
(Check all that apply) typical significant
project geotechnical risk
Geotechnical risk management process conducted by the agency prior to bid
Formal risk identification meetings are conducted by the agency’s
project team prior to bid
Risk register, encompassing geotechnical risks, is developed by the
agency
Risk mitigation report which includes procedures for mitigating
risks identified during the risk analysis process is developed
Geotechnical risk management process required of the design-builder
Design-builder has to develop a risk management plan to be
submitted in the proposal to the agency
Design-builder has to maintain a risk register during the course of
the project that includes the geotechnical risks anticipated and
mitigation measures
22. How much geotechnical investigation was performed internally by the agency before advertising the
project? Select one below:
Before advertising Provided in the
the project request of
proposal
No geotechnical investigation
Reconnaissance report (Review of records observations from
site)
Geotechnical data report (Review of records and investigation
data)
Geotechnical summary report (Review of records and
summarized data)
Preliminary geotechnical design report (Partial geotechnical
investigation)
Final geotechnical design report (Full subsurface investigation
for all structures and geotechnical features)
Geotechnical interpretive report (GIR)
23. What was the cost of the geotechnical investigation performed by your agency?
24. In your experience, please provide the typical cost associated with different levels of geotechnical
investigation efforts across all projects in your agency:
Reconnais Geotech Geotech. Prelim. Final

Typical Cost -sance . Data Summary Geotech Geotech GBR GIR
Report Report Report Design . Design
$0 - $1,000
$1,000 - $10,000
$10,000 - $100,000
$100,000 - $1,000,000
$1,000,000+
F-11

25. How much time (days or man-hours) did the geotechnical investigation effort require?
26. In your experience, please provide the typical duration of the geotechnical investigation efforts across all
projects in your agency depending on the level of detail of the study:
Typical Duration Geotech. Prelim. Final

Reconnais- Geotech. GIR
(Days or man- Summary Geotech Geotech GBR
sance Report Data Report
hours) Report Design . Design
0-15
15-30
30-60
60-120
120-240
240+
27. Please describe the process for underground utility coordination in the project:
a. Did your agency perform utility identification before advertising the project? Please explain.
b. Describe the procedure for obtaining utility clearance in coordination with the design-builder
28. Where the competing teams allowed to request or obtain additional geotechnical information during the
pre-award proposal preparation period?
a. If yes, what were they allowed to request/perform?
Additional borings provided by the DOT – results made available to all competitors
Additional borings provided by the DOT – results provided to only the requesting competitor
Additional borings self-performed– results made available to all competitors
Additional borings self-performed – results retained by performing competitor
Interpretation of RFP geotechnical data– results made available to all competitors
Interpretation of RFP geotechnical data – provided to only the requesting competitor
Other
29. If geotechnical risks were identified and quantified during the pre-award phase, please provide a list of the
identified risks.
30. Did the project cost estimate for this contract involve a quantitative analysis of the geotechnical
uncertainty? Please provide a description of the process and the estimated probability and impact of the
identified risks.
31. Does your agency have a standard risk analysis manual that describes the process?
32. What contractual clause or provision did your agency include to mitigate the geotechnical risks?
a. Provide a complete geotechnical study such as a Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR).
b. Allowance, restriction or elimination of Differing Site Condition (DSC) rights.
c. Mandatory design parameters.
d. Other, please specify:
33. Was a contingency assigned to the project cost estimate for potential additional costs associated with
geotechnical issues? If yes,
- Please provide an approximate value for this contingency in dollars or as a percentage of the
construction costs.
- Was this contingency lower, similar or higher in comparison with typical Design-Build
projects managed by your agency? Please explain.
F-12

V. General Geotechnical Risk Impact

34. Please rate the following geotechnical risk factors as to their impact on a typical DB project and a DB
project with significant geotechnical issues. Also rate how often they typically occur in each type of DB
project.
1 = no impact; 2= minor impact; 3 = distinct impact; 4= major impact; 5= catastrophic impact
1= never occurs; 2= occurs in 1% to 25% of DB projects; 3 = 26% to 75%; 4 = 76% to 90%; 5 = 91% to 100%
Frequency of
Impact
Occurrence
Typical DB with Typical DB with
Factor Remarks
DB significant DB significant
Project geotech Project geotech
issues issues
Differing condition claim – water table
Differing condition claim – unsuitable
material
Differing condition claim – rock/boulders
Differing condition claim – contaminated
material
Differing condition claim – utility conflict
Change order – replace in situ material with
borrowed material
Change order – relocate utility conflict
Change order – ground water infiltration
Change order – settlement of adjacent
structure
Landslide remediation
More
VI. Complementary Information: Please answer the following questions from a general perspective based on your
experience.
35. In your opinion, what could have been done differently to prevent the geotechnical issues that occurred in
this project?
36. In your opinion, what are the main geotechnical risk factors associated with Design-Build contracts?
37. In your opinion, what types of geotechnical risks are of a nature that you would advise against delivering a
project using DB? (for example – dilatant soils, ancient landslide areas, etc.)
38. Is there anything else about geotechnical risk in Design-Build contracts that you consider relevant for this
research?
39. Is there any other Design-Build contract awarded by your agency that in your opinion could provide value
knowledge for this research?
F-13

Managing Geotechnical Risks in DBMOT

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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS

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Managing Geotechnical Risks in Design Build Projects

279 pages | 8.5 x 11 | PAPERBACK

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Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Michael Loulakis Shannon Sweitzer

Ali Touran Dominique Pittenger

Ghada Gad Ivan Castro Nova

Contractor’s Final Report for NCHRP Project 24-44

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Learn more about the Transportation Research Board at www.TRB.org.

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Chapter 1: Background ............................................................................................................... 3

1.1. The Research Problem ..................................................................................................... 3

1.2. Background ...................................................................................................................... 7

1.3. Choosing Alternative Project Delivery ............................................................................ 8

1.4. Research Problem Statement .......................................................................................... 11

1.5. Research Objectives ....................................................................................................... 12

Chapter 2: Research Approach ................................................................................................. 16

2.1. Research Framework ...................................................................................................... 16

2.1.1. Phase 1: Benchmark the State-of-the-Practice in Geotechnical Risk ..................... 18

2.1.2. Phase 2: Geotechnical Risk Assessment ................................................................. 28

2.2. Phase II Work Plan Task Completion ............................................................................ 35

2.2.2. Risk Quantification Approach ................................................................................ 36

Chapter 3: Findings and Applications ...................................................................................... 49

3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 49

3.2.1. Geotechnical Risk Literature .................................................................................. 49

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

3.2.2. Design-Build Literature .......................................................................................... 54

3.2.3. Findings from the Literature ................................................................................... 55

3.2.4. Findings from the Content Analysis ....................................................................... 56

3.3. Summary and Analysis Surveys ..................................................................................... 65

3.3.1. Findings from Survey of State DOTs (Survey 1) ................................................... 65

3.3.2. Survey of DB Geotechnical Risk Experts (Survey 2) ............................................. 96

3.4. Summary and Analysis of Case Study Interviews ....................................................... 109

3.5. Summary and Analysis of Legal Review ..................................................................... 111

3.6. Application of the Findings .......................................................................................... 112

Chapter 4: Conclusions and Suggested Research ................................................................... 117

4.1. Benchmarks: ................................................................................................................. 117

4.2. Perception of the Geotechnical Risk ............................................................................ 118

4.4. Tools for Managing Geotechnical Risks ...................................................................... 120

4.6. Suggested Future Research and Implementation ......................................................... 123

References ................................................................................................................................... 125

Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................... 130

Appendix A: State of the Practice ............................................................................................. A-1

Appendix B: Case Study Reports .............................................................................................. B-1

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Appendix C: Details of Geotechnical Risk Management Tools ................................................ C-1

Appendix D: Final Guidelines ................................................................................................... D-1

Appendix E: Detailed Results of the Geotechnical Legal Review .............................................E-1

Appendix F: Interview and Survey Forms.................................................................................. F-1

Figure 2.2 – Phase 2 Research Work Plan.................................................................................... 18

Figure 2.4 – Risk Quantification Approaches .............................................................................. 37

Management Matrix) .................................................................................................................... 44

Figure 2.8 – Cost Estimate for Risk Factors .................................................................................45

distribution) .................................................................................................................................. 45

Figure 2.10 – The Effect of Mitigation Effort .............................................................................. 46

(Tapia et al. 2017). ........................................................................................................................ 52

Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

al. 2017). ....................................................................................................................................... 53

Figure 3.4 – Respondent Group/Section Assignment. .................................................................. 66

Figure 3.5 – Use of Alternative Contracting Methods .................................................................. 67