EN BANC

[G.R. No. 12579. July 27, 1918.]

GREGORIO JIMENEZ , plaintiff-appellee, vs . PEDRO RABOT, NICOLASA

JIMENEZ and her husband, EMILIO RODRIGUEZ , defendants. PEDRO
RABOT , appellant.

Antonio Bengson, for appellant.

Jose Rivera, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. SALE OF LAND; POWER OF ATTORNEY; SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF

PROPERTY UNNECESSARY. — Where the owner of real property desires to confer upon
an attorney in fact authority to sell the same, it is necessary that the authority should be
expressed in writing; but it is not necessary that the property to be sold should be
precisely described. It is su cient if the authority is so expressed as to determine
without doubt the limits of the agent's authority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The plaintiff, being the owner of three parcels
of land, left the same in the care of his sister as his agent and went to live in another
province. While so absent, he wrote her to sell one of his parcels and to send him the
money. The sister found a purchaser and sold one of the parcels but failed to forward
the proceeds to her brother. Afterwards the plaintiff returned and instituted an action to
recover the parcel which had been sold. Held: That the authority to sell was su cient
and that the plaintiff could not recover.

DECISION

STREET , J : p

This action was instituted by the plaintiff, Gregorio Jimenez, to recover from the
defendant, Pedro Rabot, a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Alaminos, in the
Province of Pangasinan, and described in the complaint as follows:
"Approximate area of three hectares; bounded on the north and west with
land of Pedro Reynoso; on the south with land of Nicolasa Jimenez; and on the
east with land of Calixta Apostol before, at present with that of Juan Montemayor
and Simon del Barrio. It is situated in Dinmayat Tancaran, barrio of Alos of this
same municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan."
From a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Pedro Rabot has appealed; but
his codefendants, Nicolasa Jimenez and her husband, who were cited by the defendant
for the purpose of holding her liable upon her warranty in case of his eviction, have not
appealed.
It is admitted that the parcel of land in question, together with two other parcels
in the same locality originally belonged to the plaintiff, having been assigned to him as
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 one of the heirs in the division of the estate of his father. It further appears that while
Gregorio was staying at Vigan, in the Province of Ilocos Sur, during the year 1911, his
property in Alaminos was con ded by him to the care of his elder sister Nicolasa
Jimenez. On February 7 of that year he wrote this sister a letter from Vigan in which he
informed her that he was pressed for money and requested her to sell one of his
parcels of land and send him the money in order that he might pay his debts. This letter
contains no description of the land to be sold other than is indicated in the words "one
of my parcels of land" ("uno de mis terrenos").
Acting upon this letter Nicolasa approached the defendant Pedro Rabot, and the
latter agreed to buy the parcel in question for the sum of P500. Two hundred and fty
pesos were paid at once, with the understanding that a deed of conveyance would be
executed when the balance should be paid. Nicolasa admits having received this
payment of P250 at the time stated; but there is no evidence that she sent any of it to
her brother.
About one year later Gregorio came down to Alaminos and demanded that his
sister should surrender this piece of land to him, it being then in her possession. She
refused upon some pretext or other to do so; and as a result Gregorio, in conjunction
with others of his brothers and sisters, whose properties were also in the hands of
Nicolasa, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of
recovering their land from her control. This action was decided favorably to the
plaintiffs upon August 12, 1913; and no appeal was taken from the judgment.
Meanwhile, upon May 31, 1912, Nicolasa Jimenez executed and delivered to
Pedro Rabot a deed purporting to convey to him the parcel of land which is the subject
of this controversy. The deed recites that the sale was made in consideration of the
sum of P500, the payment of which is acknowledged. Pedro Rabot went into
possession, and the property was found in his hands at the time when nal judgment
was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the action above mentioned. It will thus be seen
that Pedro Rabot acquired possession under the deed from Nicolasa during the
pendency of the litigation in which she was defendant; but it does not positively appear
that he was at the time cognizant of that circumstance.
In considering the questions presented by this appeal one or two preliminary
observations may be made. The rst is that, as a matter of formality, a power of
attorney to convey real property ought to appear in a public document, just as any other
instrument intended to transmit or convey an interest in such property ought to appear
in a public document. (Art. 1280, Civil Code.) But inasmuch as it is an established
doctrine that a private document is competent to create, transmit, modify, or extinguish
a right in real property (Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. Rep., 561; Couto Soriano vs.
Cortes, 8 Phil. Rep., 459), it follows that a power of attorney to convey such property,
even though in the form of a private document, will operate with effect. Again,
supposing that the letter contained adequate authority for Nicolasa to sell the property
in question, her action in conveying the property in her own name, without showing the
capacity in which she acted, was doubtless irregular. Nevertheless, such deed would in
any event operate to bind her brother, the plaintiff, in its character as a contract (Lyon
vs. Pollock, 99 U. S., 668; 25 L. ed.,-265), and supposing that the authority was
su cient, he could be compelled by a proper judicial proceeding to execute a
document to carry such contract into effect. (Art. 1279, Civil Code.)
The principal question for consideration therefore in the end resolves itself into
this, whether the authority conferred on Nicolasa by the letter of February 7, 1911, was
su cient to enable her to bind her brother. The only provisions of law bearing on this
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 point are contained in article 1713 of the Civil Code and in section 335 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Article 1713 of the Civil Code requires that the authority to alienate land
shall be contained in an express mandate; while subsection 5 of section 335 of the
Code of Civil Procedure says that the authority of the agent must be in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged. We are of the opinion that the authority
expressed in the letter is a sufficient compliance with both requirements.
It has been urged here that in order for the authority to be su cient under
section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure the authorization must contain a particular
description of the property which the agent is to be permitted to sell. There is no such
requirement in subsection 5 of section 335; and we do not believe that it would be
legitimate to read such a requirement into it. The purpose in giving a power of attorney
is to substitute the mind and hand of the agent for the mind and hand of the principal;
and if the character and extent of the power is so far de ned as to leave no doubt as to
the limits within which the agent is authorized to act, and he acts within those limits, the
principal cannot question the validity of his act. It is not necessary that the particular
act to be accomplished should be predestinated by the language of the power. The
question to be answered always, after the power has been exercised, is rather this: Was
the act which the agent performed within the scope of his authority? In the case before
us, if the question is asked whether the act performed by Nicolasa Jimenez was within
the scope of the authority which had been conferred upon her, the answer must be
obviously in the affirmative.
It should not escape observation that the problem with which we are here
concerned relates to the su ciency of the power of attorney under subsection 5 of
section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not to the su ciency of the note or
memorandum of the contract, or agreement of sale, required by the same subsection,
in connection with the rst paragraph of the same section. It is well settled in the
jurisprudence of England and the United States that when the owner, or his agent,
comes to make a contract to sell, or a conveyance to effect a transfer, there must be a
description of the property which is the subject of the sale or conveyance. This is
necessary of course to de ne the object of the contract. (Brockway vs. Frost, 40 Minn.,
155; Carr vs. Passaic Land etc. Co., 19 N. J. Eq., 424; Lippincott vs. Bridgewater, 55 N.
J. Eq., 208; Craig vs. Zelian, 137 Cal., 105; 20 Cyc., 271.)
The general rule here applicable is that the description must be su ciently
de nite to identify the land either from the recitals of the contract or deed or from
external facts referred to in the document, thereby enabling one to determine the
identity of the land and if the description is uncertain on its face or is shown to be
applicable with equal plausibility to more than one tract, it is insu cient. The principle
embodied in these decisions is not, in our opinion, applicable to the present case, which
relates to the su ciency of the authorization, not to the su ciency of the contract or
conveyance. It is unquestionable that the deed which Nicolasa executed contains a
proper description of the property which she purported to convey.
There is ample authority to the effect that a person may by a general power of
attorney authorize an agent to sell "all" the land possessed by the principal, or all that he
possesses in a particular city, county, or state. (Roper vs. McFadden, 48 Cal., 346;
Rownd vs. Davidson, 113 La., 1047; Carson vs. Ray, 52 N. C., 609; 78 Am. Dec., 267; 31
Cyc., 1229.) It is also held that where a person authorizes an agent to sell a farm ("my
farm") in a certain county, this is su cient, if it be shown that such party has only one
farm in that county. (Marriner vs. Dennison, 78 Cal., 202.) In Linton vs. Moorhead (209
Pa. St., 646), the power authorized the agent to sell or convey "any or all tracts, lots, or
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 parcels" of land belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that this was adequate. In Lyon vs.
Pollock (99 U. S., 668), the owner in effect authorized an agent to sell everything he had
in San Antonio, Texas. The authority was held su cient. In Linan vs. Puno (31 Phil. Rep.,
259), the authority granted was to the effect that the agent might administer "the
interests" possessed by the principal in the municipality of Tarlac and to that end he
was authorized to purchase, sell, collect, and pay, etc. It was held that this was a
sufficient power.
In the present case the agent was given the power to sell either of the parcels of
land belonging to the plaintiff. We can see no reason why the performance of an act
within the scope of this authority should not bind the plaintiff to the same extent as if
he had given the agent authority to sell "any or all" and she had conveyed only one.
From what has been said it is evident that the lower court should have absolved
the defendant Pedro Rabot from the complaint. Judgment will accordingly be reversed,
without any express adjudication of costs of this instance. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.

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