In Basdev v.

State of Pepsu high court convicted the accused under Section 302 but on appeal to
Supreme Court it was to be determined whether offence committed by petitioner fell under
Section 302 or 304. It was held that he intended to inflict bodily injury to the deceased and that
injury was sufficiently fatal. He was not so much under influence of intoxication that his mind
was so obscured by drink that there was incapacity in him to form the required intention. As such
virtue of provisions of Section 36 it was a clear case of murder and conviction was upheld.1

In Kanchayalal v. State The provocation, if any, must be not merely sudden nor only grave but
must be both grave as well as sudden which alone gives the benefit to the culprit. The effect of
such grave and sudden provocation, if any, must be loss of self- control. If there was time enough
to cool down and the accused afterwards avenges himself for the insult or offence given, he can
hardly plead the extenuating circumstances as enacted.2

In R v. Cullen the accused to self-induced intoxication started fire in room where he was alone at
the relevant time and pleaded accident in his defence. It was held that term accident did not apply
in the context of an act done by a person in such induced intoxication that filed to appreciate the
risk of what he was doing.3

Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal it was held that once the accused was last seen
with the deceased, the onus is upon him to show that either he was not involved in the
occurrence at all or that he had left the deceased at her home or at any other reasonable place. To
rebut the evidence of last seen and its consequences in law, the onus was upon the accused to
lead evidence in order to prove his innocence.4…….

In Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar Where other circumstances lead to the only hypothesis that
the accused has committed the offence, the Court cannot acquit the accused of the offence
merely because the motive for commitiing the offence has not been established in the case. 5
………..

1
Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488:1956 CrLJ919 (2) : 1956 All LJ 666
2
Kanchayalal v. State, 1952 CrLJ 945.
3
R v. Cullen, (1993) Cr LR 936 (CA)
4
Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, 2012 AIR(SCW) 1032 : 2012 CrLJ 1207
5
Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 52; 2013 CrLJ 1572
In Kusa v. State of Orrisa There is no absolute rule of law, or even a rule of prudence which has
ripened into a rule of law, that a dying declaration unless corroborated by other independent
evidence, is not fit to be acted upon, and made the basis of a conviction6

If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal
impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.7

Before dealing with the merits of the contentions urged by the counsel for the parties, it would be
appropriate to refer to the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court cited by the counsel for both
the parties in the matter of appreciation of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case, which
are these: 8

In State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewal Chand Jain this Court had emphasised that a
woman who is a victim of rape is in the same position as an injured witness and her evidence
should receive the same weight. This is what this Court observed in that case:

A prosecutrix in a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of
the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118
and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical
violence.

In a case it was held that “though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the
reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination, there is neither
a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying
declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. Thus, Court must not look for
corroboration unless it comes to the conclusion that a dying declaration suffered from any
infirmity by the reason of which, it was necessary to look out for corroboration.9

6
Kusa v. State of Orrisa, AIR 1980 SC 559 : 1980 CrLJ 408
7
Atbir v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 9 SCC 1.
8

9
Munna Raja v. State of M.P., AIR 1976SC 2199:(1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 CrLJ 1718; Surendra Singh v. State of
Rajasthan,(1989) 3 Crimes514 (Raj)
Where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused it is immaterial to go into
question as to whether the accused had intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will
cause death.10……

An act is said to cause death when death results either from the act directly or results from some
consequences necessarily or naturally flowing from such act and reasonably contemplated as its
result.11…….

Multiple injuries were caused to the victim who died after a fortnight. Medical evidence gave
cause of death as short supply of blood to the body as a result of multiple injuries on the victim.
It was held that death was caused on account of injuries.12

If dying declaration is acceptable as truthful even in the absence of corroborative evidence, the
Court may act upon it and convict.13Truthful coherent and consistent dying declaration needs no
corroboration and conviction may be based on it.14

Murder charge when has been squarely proved by circumstantial evidence coupled with dying
declaration, motive is not important. 15Murder charge when is proved by circumstantial evidence
to the hilt, absence of motive is not relevant.16………….

The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative
effect of all these facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But
this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the
accused however far- fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution
evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is
reasonable and not otherwise.17…….

10
In re, Thangaavelu,1972 CrLJ 390 (Mad);State of Bihar v. Pasupati Singh,1973 CrLJ 1832 (SC) : (1974) 3 SCC
376: AIR 1973 SC 2699.
11
D.Yohannan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1958 Ker 207 : 1958 CrLJ 1021.
12
Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 SCC (Cri) 705 : AIR 1993 SC 2604 :1994 Suppl (1) SCC 532.
13
State of U.P. V. Ram Sagar, AIR 1985 SC 416: (1985) 1 SCC 552: 1985 SCC (Cri)127
14
Harbans Singh V. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 : (1962) 1 CrLJ 439
15
Amar Singh Guman v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 Crimes 302 (Guj).
16
Parimal Banerjee v. State of W.B., 1986 CrLJ 220 (Cal)
17
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, 1992 CrLJ 1104 (SC) : (1962) 2 SCC 86 : AIR 1992 SC 840.
The plea of alibi is required to be proved with certainty so as to completely exclude the
possibility of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence.18……

When oral evidence is credible and cogent, the medical evidence to the contrary would be
inconsequential.19

Where the accused has been proved by evidence to have been blows and kicks to the deceased
simply with the intent to give him a thrashing, he should be convicted under Section 323in the
absence of proof that he intended to cause death, or grievous hurt.20

Ingredients -In order to attract Section 322, the Court has to see that the accused intended to
cause hurt, or that he knew that grievous hurt was likely to be caused and such grievous hurt is
actually caused. In the Param Dev v. State of H.P.21the grievous hurt was actually caused and the
accused should have known that his action was likely to cause grievous hurt. Nothing more was
needed to bring the offence under Section 322 I.P.C.

The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are:

(1) Voluntarily causing hurt;) (2.) hurt caused must be grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous
hurt must have caused by dangerous weapons or means.22

If a hurt is caused and the others of the crime are actuated by a common intention to cause the
said hurt, then no matter who actually did cause hurt, all the members of the group would be
vicariously liable for causing the grievous hurt.23Whether a particular article can per se cause any
serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined particular. What would constitute
a ‘dangerous weapon’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no generalization24

Ingredients -The Section has the following essentials: -

1. Threatening a person with an injury.

18
Shaikh Sattar v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 8 SCC 430}].
19
Anil Kumar v. State of U.P; AIR 2004 SC 4662: (2004) 13 SCC 257 :2004 CrLJ 4881.
20
Empror v. Saberali, AIR 1920 Cal 401: 21 CrLR (Raj) 465.
21
Param Dev v. State of H.P., 1975 CrLJ 1346 (HP) :ILR (1975)HP 54.
22
Prabhu v. Statte of M.P; AIR 2009 SC 745 (2008)17 SCC 381.
23
Matukdhari Singh v. Emproer, AIR 1942 Pat 376 :43
24
Prabbhu v. State of M.P. AIR 2009 SC 745 : (2008) 17 SCC 381
 (i)To his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested.
2. The threat must be with intent
(i)to cause alarm to that person, or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause
that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do so as the
means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

Therefore, intention must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or not is
really of no consequence. But material has to be brought on record to show that intention was to
cause alarm to that person25

It is not correct to say that under Section 503 the threat must be direct threat, that is, it must be in
the presence of the complainant. If the threat was uttered in the presence of some person with a
view to be communicated to the person threatened it must be said that the person who uttered the
threat, threatened the person for whom the threat was meant.26

However, the accused in the present case have also been charged under Section 506IPC. The
aforesaid conclusion takes me to the issue whether the accused persons can be convicted with the
aid of Section 34 IPC. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance
of the common intention in order to incur joint liability. In the present case the testimony of
deceased clearly proves that all the accused persons acted in concert with each other and
committed crime in one transaction.

Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, all accused stand convicted of offence under
Section 506 read with section 34 of IPC.

25
Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera 1995 CrLJ 355 (Ori)
26
Chandi Charan Dutta v. Bhabataran Dey, (1964) 2 CrLJ 85 (Cal.)