Prosecution RJ 21

TEAM CODE- “RJ-21”
REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
BEFORE THE HON’BLE DISTRICT & SESSION COURT
IN THE MATTER OF –
STATE ...............
(PROSECUTION)
V/S
MR. VISHNU PANDEY & OTHERS ...............

(DEFENDANT)
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................III
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................................VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................VIII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES....................................................................................................X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..........................................................................................XI
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................1
I. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 498A, 304B OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860 R/W SECTION 113B OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?......................1
1. Accused has committed the offense of cruelty.........................................................1
2. Accused has caused dowry death of victim.............................................................3
3. It will raise a presumption under section 113B.......................................................5
II. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 376 AND 354 OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860?..............................................................................................................6
1. Motive......................................................................................................................6
2. Presumption as Mandated and envisaged by the Evidence Act..............................7
3. Appreciation of Evidences.......................................................................................7
4. Duty of The Prosecution..........................................................................................9
5. Meaning of Modesty................................................................................................9
III. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 322, 323, 326 AND 506 OF
INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?................................................................................................10

1. Grievous hurt was caused voluntarily...................................................................11
2. There was use of dangerous weapons and means.................................................11
3. Threat to assault....................................................................................................12
4. Voluntarily caused hurt to the victim....................................................................13
IV. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 299 AND 302 OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE 1860?.............................................................................................................14
1. Motive....................................................................................................................14
2. Complete chain of Circumstantial evidence..........................................................15
3. Understanding the dying declaration....................................................................17
4. Medical evidence...................................................................................................18
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
PRAYER..............................................................................................................................XIII
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS]
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREV. FULL FORM

& And
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad High Court
Cal Calcutta High Court
Cri LJ / Cr LJ Criminal Law Journal
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Del Delhi High Court
DW Defence Witness
Ed Edition
Guj Gujarat High Court
IPC Indian Penal Code
IC Indian Cases
Mad Madras High Court
n. Foot Note no.
Ori Orissa High Court
p. Page Number
P&H Punjab and Haryana High Court
Pat Patna High Court
PW Prosecution Witness
Raj Rajasthan High Court
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
SCJ Supreme Court Journal
Sec. Section
v. Versus
Index of AuthoritiesCASES PAGE NO.
Administrator, Josgiri hospital v. Government of Kerala (2008) ILR 3 Ker 9

381
Akula Ravinder v. State of A.P, AIR 1991 SC 1142 3
Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2004 SC 1497 9, 10
Amar Singh Guman v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 Crimes 302 (Guj 14
Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera 1995 CrLJ 355 (Ori 13
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Anil Kumar v. State of U.P; AIR 2004 SC 4662 18
Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkahnd, 2002 CrLJ 3973 (Jhar 4
Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 4,5
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 1986 Cri L.J 1510 (Del.) 1
Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 691 5
Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2003) 3 SCC 21 8
Bishnu Prasad and another v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 46 8
Camilo Fernandez v. State of Maharashtra (1988) 3 Crimes 179 10
Chandi Charan Dutta v. Bhabataran Dey, (1964) 2 CrLJ 85 (Cal. 13
Chandra v. State of A.P, 1996 Cr LJ 2670 (AP 2
D. Yohannan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1958 Ker 207 15
Dilip and anr. v. State of M.P AIR 2001 SC 304 17
Empror v. Saberali, AIR 1920 Cal 401 14
Gade Laxmi Mangraju v. State of A.P, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2677 15
Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619 2
Girdhari Gopal v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 MB 147 9
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P, A.I.R 1952 S.C 343 15
In re, Thangaavelu,1972 CrLJ 390 (Mad) 15
K.R Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, A.I.R S.C 1994 18
Kamla v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374 18
Kashmir Kaur and another v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039 4
Keshab Chandra Panda v. State of Orissa, (1995) 1 CrLJ 178, 179 (Ori 4
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1958 S.C 22 17
Kishore Kumar v. State, 1993 CrLJ 253 (Del 4
Kumar v. State of U.P (1998) 9 SCC 343 7
Kusa v. State of Orrisa, (1980) 2 SCC 207 17
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Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, A.I.R 2003 S.C 854 9
Laxmi v. Om Prakash, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2383 17
Lolo v. Durghatiya A.I.R 2001 M.P 188 7
Matukdhari Singh v. Emproer, AIR 1942 Pat 376 12
Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company v. Bondili. A.I.R 1995 A.P 7
268
Oza V. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374 17
P.V Radhakrishnan v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R 2003 S.C 2859 18
Padam Ben Shamal Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 1991 SCC (Cri) 275. 17
Pakala Narayan Swamy v. Emperor, A.I.R 1939 P.C 47 17
Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra, (1981) 4 SCC 569 7
Pandurang Sitaram Bhagwat v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 9 SCC 44 10
Param Dev v. State of H.P., 1975 CrLJ 1346 (HP) 11
Parimal Banerjee v. State of W.B., 1986 CrLJ 220 (Cal) 14
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 95 2
Prabbhu v. State of M.P. AIR 2009 SC 745 12
Prabhu v. Statte of M.P; AIR 2009 SC 745 11
Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1983 S.C 446 15
Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885) ILR All. 385 17
Rajayyan v. State of Kerela, AIR 1998 SC 1211 3
Rajinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 215 5
Sadananda Bargohain v. State of Assam (1972) Cr LJ 658(Gau) 10
Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 5 14
Sankar Prasad v. State, 1991 Cri. L.J. 639 (Cal. 2
Sarojkshan v. State of Maharastra, 1995 CrLJ 340 (Bom) 3
Sarwan Singh Ratam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 63 8
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Satyendra Dayal Khare v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 12 SCC 485 10
Shahnaz v. Dr. Vijay A.I.R 1995 Bom. 30 7
Sharda Birdichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R 1984 S.C 162 17
Shekara v. State of Karnataka (2009) 14 SCC 76 9
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105. 1
Sidharth v. State of Bihar (2005) 12 SCC 54 8
State of Bihar v. Pasupati Singh,1973 CrLJ 1832 (SC) 15
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheo Dayal AIR 1956 Nag 8 10
State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, 2012 (2) SCC 182 3
State of U.P v. Babu Ram, AIR 2000 SC 1735 6
State of U.P v. Ram Sewak, A.I.R 1977 S.C 472 18
State of U.P v. State of Gujrat, A.I.R 1992 S.C 424 15
Suresh and Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R 2001 S.C 1344; 7
Suvetha v. State. (2009) 6 SCC 757 1
T.N. v. Kutty (2001) 6 SCC 55 8
Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) (2006) 8 SCC 560 9
Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R 1994 S.C 258 7
Tukaram Govind Yadav v. State of Maharashtra (2011) Cr LJ 1501(Bom) 9
Umedbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R 1978 S.C 424. 15
Vasudevan v. State of Kerala (2006) Cr LJ 3173(Ker) 9
Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala AIR 2004 SC 536 9
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 10
Vishwanath and others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2008) 5 SCC 35 17
W.B v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418 2
STATUTES
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Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1973.

Constitution of India, 1950
The Indian Penal, 1860
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
BOOKS REFERRED
P S A Pillai, Criminal Law, 11th Edn
K D Gaur, A Textbook on the Indian Penal Code, 4th Edn.
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33rd edn
Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, vol 4, 11th edn
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Crimes, 23rd edn.
S.N. Mishra, India Penal Code, 16th edn
Dr. N.V Paranjape, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 2nd ed.,
M.D Chaturvedy, Code of Criminal Procedure, 4th ed.,
R.V Kelkar, Criminal Procedure, 5th ed.,
Ratanlal And Dhirajlal, Code of Criminal Procedure, 17th ed.,
Butterworths Wadhwa & Co., Nagpur, 2008
Batuk Lal, The Law of Evidence., 1, 2015
Ratan Lal and Dhiraj Lal, Law of Evidence Edition: 27TH, 2019
Avtar Singh, Priciple of The Law of Evidence Edition: 22, 2016
Vepa Sarathi, Law of Evidence Edition: Seventh, 2017
M Monir, The Law of Evidence Edition: 11th edn, 2018
ARTICLE REFERRED
Ahmad N. Dowry deaths (bride burning) in India and abetment of suicide: a socio-legal
appraisal. J. East Asia Int. Law. 2008;1(2):275–289. [Google Scholar]
Van Willigan J, Channa V. Law, custom, and crimes against women: the problem of dowry
death in India. Hum. Organ. 1991;50(4):369–377. [Google Scholar]
Ravikanth N. Dowry deaths: proposing a standard for implementation of domestic
legislation in accordance with human rights obligations. Mich. J. Gend. Law. 2000;6:449–
497. [Google Scholar]
The impact on friends. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 15, 959-986. Google Scholar |
SAGE Journals | ISI
Ahrens, C. E., & Campbell, R. (2000). Assisting rape victims as they recover from rape:
Campbell, R. (2002). Emotionally involved: The impact of researching rape. New York:
Routledge. Google Scholar
Russell, D. E. H. (1983). The prevalence and incidence of forcible rape and attempted rape
of females. Victimology: An International Journal, 7, 1-4. Google Scholar
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Section 177 read with
Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
SECTION 177 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
‘177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction it was committed.’
Read with SECTION 209 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
‘209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it.
When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively
by the Court of Session, he shall-
(a) commit the case to the Court of Session;
(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody
during, and until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are
to be produced in evidence;
(d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.’
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [STATEMENT OF FACTS]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Satya Prakash was looking for a groom for his daughter, Dhanlaxmi and found Mr.
Vishnu Pandey, who also worked in his office, as a suitable match and the marriage was
solemnized on 29th of December, 2007. Mr. Prakash was against the concept of Dowry
and only provided some jewelery and a Rado watch to his son-in-law.
2. On 9th January, 2010, Mr. Prakash scolded Mr. Pandey for being late, who routinely
came to the office late, which turned Mr. Pandey livid and he warned Mr. Prakash that
his daughter would have to bear the consequences. When he came back home, he started
shouting at his wife for not bringing a car as dowry. This became a routinely affair which
was joined by the other family members as well.
3. The whole society knew about this but Dhanlaxmi did not say anything to her family, she
only discussed this with her friend Vijaylaxmi that her husband was physically abusing
her for not bringing enough dowry.
4. On 5th of July, 2014, all the family members had left for a wedding except the couple.
When Vishnu came to the house at night in a drunken state with his friends Jayesh and
Rahul, Dhanlaxmi started scolding him for misbehaving with the guard. This humiliation
made Vishnu hatch a plan with his friends to rape her. When Vishnu went to her room
the other day, he found her lying unconscious and took her to the hospital where she told
the doctors that she was raped thrice while her face was covered with a cloth throughout
the heinous act.
5. A criminal complaint was lodged by the police officials against Vishnu and his two
friends who were by then absconded. The doctors informed her in-laws that she would
not be able to live more than an hour. When her in-laws came to visit her in the hospital,
they started abusing her for making allegations of rape and her mother-in-law even
kicked her in the stomach.
6. Dhanlaxmi gave a statement to the Police in front of a Magistrate that she was raped
thrice and she was not able to recognize the rapists and that even her mother-in-law
attacked her a few minutes ago and kicked her stomach.
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [STATEMENT OF FACTS]
7. Dhanlaxmi succumbed to her injuries soon. The police started conducting the
investigation and got hold of Rahul who accepted his role in the rape and subsequently
Vishnu and Jayesh were also arrested.
8. Charges have been framed against Mr. Vishnu, Mr. Jayesh, Mr. Rahul, Mrs. Laxmi, Mr.
Rohan under section –37, 323, 322, 326, 376, 302, 498(À), 304 (B), 506 rw. s. 34,
s.120B, s. 354, s. 299 of Indian Penal Code, S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Now the
case is listed before the Sessions Court for Final argument.
Vishnu A1
Jayesh A2
Rahul A3
Laxmi Devi A4
Rohan A5
Security Guard PW1
Mr. Satya Prakash PW2
Mr. Rafiq PW3
Ms. Vijayalaxmi PW4
Mrs. Sharma PW5
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [STATEMENT OF ISSUES]
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
_____________ ISSUE: [1] _____________
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 498A, 304B OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860 R/W SECTION 113B OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
_____________ ISSUE: [2] _____________
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 376 AND 354 OF INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860?
_____________ ISSUE: [3] _____________
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 322, 323, 326 AND 506 OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE 1860?
_____________ ISSUE: [4] _____________
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 299 AND 302 OF INDIAN PENAL
CODE 1860?
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE:1 THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 376 AND 354 OF
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
The prosecution humbly submits that the accused are guilty under section 376 and 354 of
Indian Penal Code. All the accused had motive. Sexual intercourse was against the consent of
the victim. the accused in furtherance of common intention gang raped the victim and hence
guilty u/s 376 of IPC. The circumstantial, medical, testimony and confession proves the case
of prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It is evident beyond the shadow of doubt that the
accused gagged the victim and outraged her modesty by violating her under section 354.
Thenceforth it is perforce, that the accused A1, A2, A3 shall be held guilty and be brought to
justice.
ISSUE:2 THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 322, 323, 326 AND
506 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860
It is most respectfully submitted before this honourable court that A1, A2, A3 is guilty of
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt under section 322 of IPC. They had every intention to rape
her and cause grievous hurt as it was pre-arranged plan in order to take revenge from the
victim. looking upon the medical examination report it is quite evident that some dangerous
weapons and means have been used as upon finding of the external examination of the victim
all the clothes were blood stained .Hence they should be charged under section 326 0f I.P.C.
threat was given to the victim’s father with the view to be communicated to the victim. the
present case the testimony of deceased clearly proves that all the accused persons acted in
concert with each other and committed crime in one and several transactions. Hence, they
should be punished under section 506 of I.P.C read with section 34 & 120 of I.P.C. In the
moment of anger with the intention of revenge Laxmi Devi (A4) started abusing her and
kicked victim’s stomach several times. Therefore, A4 is liable under section 323 of IPC for
voluntarily causing hurt.
ISSUE:3 THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 299 AND 302 OF
INDIAN PENAL
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
Accused intention was only to rape and teach the victim a lesson and there was no motive to
kill her but even in absence of motive still, they can be convicted under section 302 of I.P.C.
Even if victim has not named the accused that who has raped her but it is quite evident that
A1, A2, A3 had brutally assaulted and raped her. There was full planning of rape, at the place
of incident only they were present, watchmen also saw two man coming out of the apartment.
Moreover, Rahul has already confessed his and A1, A2 guilt under the statement recorded
U/S 315 CrPC 1973.There are other corroboration like medical examination, dying
declaration also which corroborates with the fact. So, there is no reasonable ground that on
the slightest doubt prosecution evidence should be rejected as complete chain is formed. The
dying declaration mentions the fact that she was raped thrice, thereby it urged by the
honourable court that it should be taken into consideration. Oral evidence given by A3 has
more value than the medical evidence and can be concluded that she was brutally assaulted
and was succumbed to death.
ISSUE:4 THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 498A, 304B OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 r/w SECTION 113B OF INDIAN
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
The accused persons are liable to be punished on reasonable grounds A1 often scolded and
tortured the deceased for not bringing dowry. He along with his family i.e A4, &A5 went to
the extent of physically abusing her. So A1 along with A4 &A5 committed the offence of
cruelty. It is humbly submitted that the accused has caused dowry death of the victim. So
looking at the history of harassment and cruelty by the husband and in-laws and also the
victim died under suspicious circumstance it can be concluded that the accused are guilty of
the above sections. Presumption under 113-B of I.P.C is presumption of law. On proof of
essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court that the accused caused the
dowry death. In the instant case also all the essentials required under this section is satisfied
so it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble session court to raise presumption under this
section.
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MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE [I] WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 498A, 304B OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 R/W SECTION 113B OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
¶ [1]. It is humbly submitted that the accused Mr. Vishnu, Mrs. Laximidevi and Mr. Rohan
(hereinafter will be referred as A1, A4 AND A5 respectively) are guilty under section 498A 1,
304B 2of IPC r/w section 113B3 of IEA.
¶ [2]. The prosecution would divide the contentions into 3 sub issues to deal with this issue
[1] Accused has committed the offense of cruelty on victim; [2] Accused has caused dowry
death of victim; [3] It will raise a presumption under section 113B.
¶ [3]. This is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Session Court that the accused had
committed the offense of Cruelty on victim.
1. ACCUSED HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF CRUELTY
¶ [4]. The ingredients of Section 498A are as follows4:
a) The women must be married
b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and
c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the
women or by his relative of her husband5
¶ [5]. The object of section 498A of IPC was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband
or his relatives in connection with the demand of dowry6. This section has given a new
dimension to the concept of cruelty for the purpose of matrimonial remedies and that the type
of conduct described here would be relevant for proving cruelty7.
1
§498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860
2
§ 304B of Indian Penal Code, 1860
3
§ 113B of Indian Penal, 1860
4
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code,1860 (LexisNexis, 35 th Edition)
5
Suvetha v. State. (2009) 6 SCC 757.
6
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 1986 Cri L.J 1510 (Del.)
7
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105.
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¶ [6]. In furtherance of afore-stated section and objective of it, it is humbly submitted before
the hon’ble court the acts of the accused persons is liable to be punished on reasonable
grounds which are mentioned below.
¶ [7]. After being scolded by PW2, he warned him that his daughter is married to him and
he must be ready for his daughter to bear effects of it. This warning was given in the presence
of PW2 personal secretary PW3.When A1 returned home on that day and when he saw his
wife, he started shouting on her for not getting a car from her paternal home, after which a
quarrelled followed. For months it become that they quarrel on the issue dowry. 8Cruelty for
the purpose of offense and the said section need not be physical, even mental torture or
abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty. This principle was reaffirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Gananath Pathak v. State of Orissa 9. In the instant case also,
mental torture has been caused to the victim10.
¶ [8]. The other two accused A4 &A5 also joined A1 and used to torture the victim for not
bringing adequate dowry from home.11 Same was confirmed by PW4 who is her close friend
since college days that her in laws tortured her for dowry 12 and they wanted a car in dowry,
she also told that she will never tell about all this to her father 13. Even if it is mere demand for
dowry it will attract the provision of aforesaid section as it was observed by the Calcutta High
Court in the case of Sankar Prasad v. State14 that mere demand of dowry may not be an
offense under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 but it is an offense under section
498A of the Indian Penal Code.
¶ [9]. In the case of Chandra v. State of A.P 15the accused stayed happily with wife for one
and half year then he demanded additional money and gold from her. He was held guilty
under section 498-A. In the instant case also after 3 years of marriage the accused persons
start demand of dowry from the victim.
¶ [10]. In the case of State of W.B v. Orilal Jaiswal 16the victim was subjected to abuses,
humiliation and mental torture by her mother in law. Her husband used to come drunk and
8
Page 1, Moot Proposition, Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition
9
Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619
10
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958
11
12
13
Annexure 4, Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition
14
Sankar Prasad v. State, 1991 Cri. L.J. 639 (Cal.)
15
Chandra v. State of A.P, 1996 Cr LJ 2670 (AP)
16
W.B v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418.

abused and assaulted her on occasions. Both her husband and mother-in-law were convicted
under section 498A. In the instant case also victim is subject to abuses and humiliation by her
husband and her in laws which is evident from the fact that once victim broke a glass, which
was predictably followed by A4 anger and she ended up slapping her. 17These all abuses and
humiliation become a routine business which even the neighbours were evident of.
18
¶ [11]. In the case of Sarojkshan v. State of Maharastra the husband was highly
suspicious nature, always insult wife and not permitting anybody to her, all this was held to
be suffiecent to justify the husband’s conviction under cruelty. Similarly, in the instant case
also husband alleged to have locked the vagina of wife and lock was taken by her all this
done to prevent her from making sexual relationship with other men and he also physically
19
abused her. The expression cruelty postulates such a treatment as to cause reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the wife that her living with husband will be harmful and
injurious to her life. Such kind of behaviour have created a apprehension in the mind of
victim that it is harmful and injurious to her life, if she continues to live with her husband.
2. ACCUSED HAS CAUSED DOWRY DEATH OF VICTIM
¶ [12]. This is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Session Court that 1.2The accused had
committed the offense of dowry death. 1.3 It will also attract the provision of section 113B
of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 304B, IPC and section 113B, Evidence Act, were
inserted with the object of combating the menace of dowry killings and the attempt was to
encounter difficulties of proof by creating a presumption.20
¶ [13]. The Supreme Court took occasion in Shannti v. State of Haryana to explain the
ingredients of s. 304B. K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY J. Said, “A careful analysis of s. 304B
shows that this section has the following essentials.
¶ [14]. The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than
under normal circumstances.21 The expression “otherwise than under normal circumstances”
means a death not taking place in the course of nature and apparently under suspicious
circumstances if not caused by burns or bodily injury 22. In the instant case death of victim has
17
18
Sarojkshan v. State of Maharastra, 1995 CrLJ 340 (Bom)
19
20
State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, 2012 (2) SCC 182
21
Akula Ravinder v. State of A.P, AIR 1991 SC 1142
22
Rajayyan v. State of Kerela, AIR 1998 SC 1211

caused due to internal bleeding which most probably cause due to some injury, this internal
bleeding resulted into hypovolemia and dyspnea23. Moreover, blood stained clothes were
found and nail wound has been found on back and neck24. This all indicate that death is not
natural and occurred under suspicious circumstance.
25
¶ [15]. Such Death should have been occurred within seven years of her marriage. In the
instant case marriage has been solemnized on 29th of December, 2007 and death occurs on 6th
of July, 2014. 26 Thus, this ingredient is also satisfied.
¶ [16]. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband soon before her death.
¶ [17]. Such cruelty or harassment should be for in connection with demand of dowry27.
Earlier it has been established by the prosecution that victim is subject to cruelty by his
husband and relative in connection with demand of dowry. In S. 304B there is no such
explanation about the meaning of cruelty but having regard to common background to these
offenses it has to be taken that the meaning of cruelty or harassment is the same as prescribed
in Explanation to s. 498A28.
¶ [18]. In the case of Kishore Kumar v. State29, the wife died in mysterious circumstances.
There was history of harassment and cruelty caused to her by in-laws and the husband. The
accused were held guilty under s.498A and 304B of the IPC. In the instant similar history
exist of harassment and cruelty by the husband and in-laws and also the victim died under
suspicious circumstance.
¶ [19]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana
30
observes that where other ingredients of s. 304B are satisfied, in that event, the husband or
all relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. In the instant case also all the
necessary ingredient required under s. 304B is satisfied now it is humbly submitted before the
Hon ‘ble court that held accused guilty of dowry death.
23
Annexure 2, Rem Juris 1st National Moot Court Competition
24
Ibid at 22
25
Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkahnd, 2002 CrLJ 3973 (Jhar)
26
27
Kashmir Kaur and another v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039
28
Keshab Chandra Panda v. State of Orissa, (1995) 1 CrLJ 178, 179 (Ori)
29
Kishore Kumar v. State, 1993 CrLJ 253 (Del)
30
Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350

3. IT WILL RAISE A PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 113B
¶ [20]. As per section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, if the accused is being tried for the
offense of dowry death and there are allegations of cruelty or harassment upon such married
women for or in connection with demand of dowry by the husband or his relatives there shall
be presumption against the husband and the relatives. 31 It has been earlier established by the
prosecution that there has been dowry death of the victim and all also all other essentials
required under this section has been established so now it raises a presumption against the
accused.
¶ [21]. The rule of law requires a person to be innocent till proved guilty. In contradiction to
this aspect, the legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provision of s.
304B. The legislature has made this presumption a mandatory presumption of law, of course,
rebuttable, though this may sound to be a violent departure from the accepted norms of
criminal law.32 The legislature thought that the presumption under Section 113B should be a
mandatory presumption if the evil of dowry deaths is to be eradicated from the roots of our
society. The legislature in its wisdom has used the word “shall” thus, making a mandatory
application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person
who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with or demand of dowry33.
34
¶ [22]. The apex court in the case of Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana observes that the
once prosecution proved it case regarding basic ingredients of s. 304B, the court will presume
by deemed fiction of law that the husband or the relatives complained of, has caused her
death. In the instant case also, the prosecution has already proved its case regarding basic
ingredients of s. 304B so by deemed fiction of law the accused persons are guilty of dowry
death of the victim.
¶ [23]. The apex court in the case of Rajinder Kumar v. State of Haryna 35observes that
Presumption under this section is presumption of law. On proof of essentials mentioned
therein, it becomes obligatory on the court that the accused caused the dowry death. In the
instant case also all the essentials required under this section is satisfied so it is humbly
submitted before the Hon’ble session court to raise presumption under this section.
31
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 27 th Edition)
32
Ibid at 21
33
Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 691
34
Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350
35
Rajinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 215

ISSUE [II] WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 376 AND 354 OF
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?
¶ [24]. It is humbly submitted that the accused Mr. Vishnu, Mr. Jayesh and Mr. Rahul
(Hereinafter will be referred as A1, A2, and A3 respectively, wherein Rahul (A3) has
confessed his guilt and chose to depose under section 315 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973) are guilty of rape under section 37636 and s. 354 of IPC. The accused on the intervening
night of 6th and 7th of July brutally committed rape on the victim, while she was sleeping in
her room.
¶ [25]. The prosecution would divide the contentions into 5 main parts to deal with the issue:
[1] Motive; [2] Presumption as Mandated and Envisaged by The Evidence Act; [3]
Appreciation of Evidences.
1. MOTIVE
¶ [26]. It is most respectfully submitted before this honourable court that the accused are
guilty of Rape under section 376 of IPC. It must be brought to the notice of this court that the
accused A1, the husband of the victim time and again made demands of dowry and
threatened the father of victim that if he continues to humiliate him, her daughter might face
some unwanted repercussions. This is indubitably proved by the statement made by father of
victim (PW-2) and Rafiq (PW-3).
¶ [27]. However, the incident which requires a greater consideration is that on the night of 6 th
July, when the accused A1, A2 and A3 came to the house of victim in the state of
intoxication, A1 was reprimanded by the victim and was humiliated in front of his friends.
Also when one of the other two accused tried to pacify the victim, he was also rebuked by the
victim. Thus, with a view to settle scores and to teach the victim a lesson, they violated her
by committing rape. This shows that the accused had motive 37 to commit the aforesaid
offence. Motive assumes special importance when the whole case is built on circumstantial
evidence38. This is relevant under section 739 and 840 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
36
Section 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
37
State of U.P v. Babu Ram, AIR 2000 SC 1735.
38
Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R 1994 S.C 2585
39
Section 7 of Indian Evidence Act. 1872
40
Section 8 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872

4. PRESUMPTION AS MANDATED AND ENVISAGED BY THE EVIDENCE ACT
¶ [28]. Section 11441 of India Evidence Act, 1872 (Hereinafter will be referred as Evidence
Act) mandates presumption of certain facts. Section 114 is based on the maxim that all acts
are presumed to have been done correctly and regularly in the common course of natural
events. It authorises this honourable court make presumption of facts, without the help of any
artificial rules of law. As it has been previously established and proved that the all the
accused had motive and A1 has also threatened PW2 and when A1, A2, A3 were scolded by
the victim, they planned to settle the score and teach her a lesson by raping her.
¶ [29]. Now the subsequent rape of victim on the night of 7 th July at 3:00 AM, form part of
the same chain and unerringly points toward the guilt of the accused. The prosecution with
the help various evidence would be buttressing its stand. Thus, this presumption 42 under
section 114 of Evidence act, become an irrefutable presumption and Juris et de jure, which
means conclusive presumptions of law which cannot be rebutted by evidence. Additionally,
section 114A of Evidence Act, envisages presumption in cases of rape. Where a woman
alleges that the sexual intercourse was against her consent, the court shall presume that the
rape is committed by the accused43. Now it is on the accused to dislodge such presumption.
5. APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCES
¶ [30]. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act is also attracted. Section 30 of the Indian
Evidence Act has heading consideration of proved confessions affecting person making it and
others jointly trial for the same offence.
¶ [31]. Section30. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence,
and a confession made by one such persons affecting himself and some other of such person
is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person
as well as against the person who makes such confession.
¶ [32]. In the case of Bishnu Prasad and another v. State of Assam 44 it was held that a
confessional statement, as is well known, is admissible in the evidence. It is a relevant fact. It
41
Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872
42
Suresh and Anr v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R 2001 S.C 1344; Shahnaz v. Dr. Vijay A.I.R 1995
Bom. 30; Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra, (1981) 4 SCC 569; Rajendra Kumar v. State of U.P
(1998) 9 SCC 343; Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company v. Bondili. A.I.R 1995 A.P 268;
Lolo v. Durghatiya A.I.R 2001 M.P 188
43
Fagnu Bhai v. State of Orrisa, 1992 CrLJ, 1808
44
Bishnu Prasad and another v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467

may also form the basis of the conviction, wherefore the court may have only to satisfy itself
in regard to voluntriness and truthfulness thereof and in the given cases some corroboration
thereof. In the case of Sidharth v. State of Bihar45 the court accepted the confessions as the
evidence. In the case of State of T.N. v. Kutty46, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P47, Sarwan
Singh Ratam Singh v. State of Punjab 48, it was held in a cases where sufficient materials
are brought on record to lend assurance to the court in regard to truthfulness of the confession
made, which is corroborated by several independent circumstances lending assurance to the
court in regard to truthfulness of the confession made, which is corroborated by several
independent circumstances lending assurance thereto, even a retracted confession may be
acted upon. In the present case the one of the accused Rahul accepted his role in the rape and
subsequently A1 and A2 were also arrested.
¶ [33]. The accused came to the house of victim in an inebriated mood and they abused the
watchman (PW1) of the building. After a few moments they went upstairs and the accused
were reprimanded by the victim for their insolent behaviour with the security guard (PW1).
Disgruntled with it they decided to teach her a lesson by raping her. This is confirmed by the
statement recorded under section 315 of Cr.PC, wherein under oath A3-Rahul deposed that
he along with A1 and A2 brutally raped the victim in order to take revenge.
¶ [34]. Victim in her dying declaration stated that at 3:00 AM some people entered in her
room, gagged her and raped her. A3 deposed that after raping the fled from the place of
occurrence and subsequently they were seen by the security guard (PW1) at 4:00 AM fleeing
from that place. A2-Jayesh has given his alibi, which is defective and faulty, as he was seen
by PW1 at site of commission of offence at two occasions, once at arrival another at
departure. Now keeping in mind the presumptions, the burden of proof is on the accused to
dislodge such presumption. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced hereinbefore, abundantly
establishes the chain of events, which coupled with motive unerringly point towards the
guilt49of the accused.
¶ [35]. Thus, it is clear that the accused in furtherance of common intention gang raped the
victim and hence guilty u/s 376 of IPC. The circumstantial, medical, testimony and
confession proves the case of prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
45
Sidharth v. State of Bihar (2005) 12 SCC 545
46
T.N. v. Kutty (2001) 6 SCC 550
47
Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2003) 3 SCC 21
48
Sarwan Singh Ratam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637
49
Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, A.I.R 2003 S.C 854

¶ [36]. It is humbly submitted that for the charges under s. 354, the prosecution has divided
and dealt with the case as follows [4] Duty of Prosecution [5] Meaning of Modesty
6. DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION
¶ [37]. It is duly submitted that the accused had the requisite motive to sexually abuse her
and it has been proved dutifully in the previous segment. In order to seek conviction under
50
section 354, the prosecution has to prove not only that the accused assaulted or used
criminal force to the woman but also that he did it with either the intent to outrage her
modesty or the knowledge that it would outrage her modesty.51Intention to outrage modesty
of a woman, however, is not the sole criterion of the offence. It can be committed by a
person, assaulting or using criminal force, if he knows that the modesty of the woman is
likely to be affected by his act. The existence of intention or knowledge, are essentially things
of the mind, has to be culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the
alleged offence is alleged to have been committed 52. However, what constitutes an outrage to
modesty of a woman is nowhere defined. It can be described as the quality of being modest
and in relation to woman 'womanly propriety of behaviour, scrupulous chastity of thought,
speech and conduct; reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to
impure or coarse suggestions'. It is a virtue attached to a woman owing to her sex53.
7. MEANING OF MODESTY
¶ [38]. Honourable Supreme Court in its landmark judgement of State of Punjab v. Major
Singh54, Bachawat J speaking for the majority opined that- “The essence of a woman's
modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large on her body. Young or old,
intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses modesty capable of being
outraged. Whoever uses criminal force to her with intent to outrage her modesty commits an
offence punishable under Section 354. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the
50
Girdhari Gopal v State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 MB 147
51
Vidyadharan v State of Kerala AIR 2004 SC 536; Aman Kumar v State of Haryana AIR 2004 SC
1497; Vasudevan v State of Kerala (2006) Cr LJ 3173(Ker)
52
Shekara v State of Karnataka (2009) 14 SCC 76
53
Tarkeshwar Sahu v State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) (2006) 8 SCC 560.
54
AIR 2004 SC 1677; Administrator, Josgiri hospital v Government of Kerala (2008) ILR 3 Ker 381;
Tukaram Govind Yadav v State of Maharashtra (2011) Cr LJ 1501(Bom); Aman Kumar v State of
Haryana AIR 2004 SC 1497; State of Madhya Pradesh v Sheo Dayal AIR 1956 Nag 8; Sadananda
Bargohain v State of Assam (1972) Cr LJ 658(Gau); Camilo Fernandez v State of Maharashtra (1988)
3 Crimes 179; Satyendra Dayal Khare v State of Maharashtra (2005) 12 SCC 485; Pandurang Sitaram
Bhagwat v State of Maharashtra (2005) 9 SCC 44; Vishaka v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011

matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always decisive, as
for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a sleeping
woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of anaesthesia, she may be sleeping,
she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the act, nevertheless, the offender is
punishable under the section. A female of tender age stands on a somewhat different footing.
Her body is immature, and her sexual powers are dormant. In this case, the victim is a baby
of seven and half months old. She has not yet developed a sense of shame and has no
awareness of sex. Nevertheless, from her very birth she possesses the modesty which is the
attribute of her sex”. (Emphasis Supplied)
¶ [39]. Keeping in mind the above-mentioned principle of law, it is clear that modesty of
women is an essential attribute of her sex which can be outraged even while victim is
sleeping. Hence as it has been previously proved that the accused barged into the room of the
victim, it is evident beyond the shadow of doubt that they gagged her and outraged her
modesty by violating her under section 354. Thenceforth it is perforce, that the accused A1,
A2, A3 shall be held guilty and be brought to justice.
ISSUE [III] WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 322, 323, 326 AND
506 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?
(hereinafter will be referred as A1, A2 AND A3 respectively) are guilty under section
32355,32656 and 50657 of IPC and Laxmi Devi (hereinafter will be referred as A4)
[1] Grievous hurt was caused voluntarily; [2] There was use of dangerous weapons and
means; [3] Threat to assault [4] Voluntarily caused hurt to the victim.
1. GRIEVOUS HURT WAS CAUSED VOLUNTARILY
¶ [42]. Ingredients -In order to attract Section 322, the Court has to see that the accused
intended to cause hurt, or that he knew that grievous hurt was likely to be caused and such
55
Section 322 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
56
57

grievous hurt is actually caused. In the Param Dev v. State of H.P.58the grievous hurt was
actually caused and the accused should have known that his action was likely to cause
grievous hurt. Nothing more was needed to bring the offence under Section 322 I.P.C.
¶ [43]. It is most respectfully submitted before this honourable court that A1, A2, A3 is guilty
of Voluntarily causing grievous hurt under section 322 of IPC. It must be brought to the
notice that in the mid night of 6th July, A1, A2, and A3 brutally raped the victim and
specifically they had hit the victim’s private body part and also other parts of body. 59They
had every intention to rape her and cause grievous hurt as it was pre-arranged plan in order to
take revenge from the victim and looking upon the medical examination report 60 it is clear
that she was brutally assaulted which made her unconscious and she finally died and they
knowingly assaulted her as it is clear from their intention that they wanted to teach her a
lesson.61
8. THERE WAS USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS AND MEANS
¶ [44]. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are:
a) Voluntarily causing hurt;
b) hurt caused must be grievous hurt; and
c) the grievous hurt must have caused by dangerous weapons or means.62
¶ [45]. If a hurt is caused and the others of the crime are actuated by a common intention to
cause the said hurt, then no matter who actually did cause hurt, all the members of the group
would be vicariously liable for causing the grievous hurt. 63Whether a particular article can per
se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined particular. What
would constitute a ‘dangerous weapon’ would depend upon the facts of each case and no
generalization64
¶ [46]. It is humbly submitted before this honourable bench that apart from ingredients of
section 323 the ingredients of section 326 also fulfils. In the instant case looking upon the
58
Param Dev v. State of H.P., 1975 CrLJ 1346 (HP)
59
Annexure-4; Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2020
60
61
Moot Proposition; Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2020
62
Prabhu v. Statte of M.P; AIR 2009 SC 745
63
Matukdhari Singh v. Emproer, AIR 1942 Pat 376
64
Prabbhu v. State of M.P. AIR 2009 SC 745

medical examination report65 it is quite evident that some dangerous weapons and means have
been used as upon finding of the external examination of the victim all the clothes were blood
stained. As far as who actually used the weapon or means in causing hurt or did that jointly or
that particular weapons were dangerous or not is immaterial as generalization can’t be done
about the weapon nor about gravity of wounds as the injury was dangerous which ultimately
proved to be fatal. Therefore, the prosecution request to make them vicariously liable and
convict them A1, A2 and A3 under section 326 read with section 34 and 120 of I.P.C.
9. THREAT TO ASSAULT
¶ [47]. Section 506: Ingredients -The Section has the following essentials: -
a) Threatening a person with an injury.
i. To his person, reputation or property; or
ii. to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
b) The threat must be with intent
i. to cause alarm to that person, or
ii. to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the
means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
iii. to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to
do so as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
¶ [48]. Therefore, intention must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or
not is really of no consequence. But material has to be brought on record to show that
intention was to cause alarm to that person66In instant case on 9th January 2010 when PW2
had scolded A1 then A1 had warned Infront of PW3 that if he (PW2) continued to scold him
again then he should be ready for the consequences.67 As stated in the above mentioned that it
doesn’t matter whether victim was threatened or not and through material on record that is
statement recorded U/S 161 Crpc,1973 of PW2 and PW3 it can be clearly deduced through
the warning given by A1 that there was every intention to threaten the victim.
65
Annexure 2, Rem Juris National Moot Court Competiton,2020
66
Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera 1995 CrLJ 355 (Ori)
67
Moot Proposition & Annexure-4; Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2020

¶ [49]. It is not correct to say that under Section 503 the threat must be direct threat, that is, it
must be in the presence of the complainant. If the threat was uttered in the presence of some
person with a view to be communicated to the person threatened it must be said that the
person who uttered the threat, threatened the person for whom the threat was meant. 68In the
instant case also although the threat was given to the victim’s father but it was with the view
to be communicated to the victim and from that day there was a daily routine that A1
regularly insulted the victim for not bringing dowry and also she was mentally tortured and
also physically abused69
¶ [50]. However, the co-accused A2 &A3 in the present case have also been charged under
Section 506 IPC. The aforesaid conclusion takes me to the issue whether the accused persons
can be convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must
have been done in furtherance of the common intention in order to incur joint liability. In the
present case the testimony of deceased clearly proves that all the accused persons acted in
concert with each other and committed crime in one and several transactions.
¶ [51]. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, all accused stand convicted of offence
under Section 506 read with section 34 of IPC.
10. VOLUNTARILY CAUSED HURT TO THE VICTIM
¶ [52]. Where the accused has been proved by evidence to have been blows and kicks to the
deceased simply with the intent to give him a thrashing, he should be convicted under Section
323in the absence of proof that he intended to cause death, or grievous hurt.70
¶ [53]. In the instant case even after knowing that the victim will not be able to live for more
than an hour on account of the internal bleeding in the stomach then also A4 in the moment
of anger with the intention of revenge started abusing her and kicked victim’s stomach
several times.71
¶ [54]. Therefore, A4 is liable under section 323 of IPC for voluntarily causing hurt.
68
Chandi Charan Dutta v. Bhabataran Dey, (1964) 2 CrLJ 85 (Cal.)
69
70
Empror v. Saberali, AIR 1920 Cal 401
71
Moot Proposition &Annexure-3; Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2020

ISSUE [IV] WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION 299 AND 302 OF
INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?
(hereinafter will be referred as A1, A2 AND A3 respectively) are guilty under section
29972,and 30273 of IPC.
[1] Motive [2] Complete chain of Circumstantial evidence [3] Understanding the dying
declaration [4] The Statement recorded u/s 161 CrPC is acceptable [5] confession u/s 164 of
CrPC [6] Medical evidence.
1. MOTIVE
¶ [57]. In Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar74 Where other circumstances lead to the only
hypothesis that the accused has committed the offence, the Court cannot acquit the accused of
the offence merely because the motive for committing the offence has not been established in
the case. Murder charge when has been squarely proved by circumstantial evidence coupled
with dying declaration, motive is not important.75Murder charge when is proved by
circumstantial evidence to the hilt, absence of motive is not relevant.76
¶ [58]. Where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused it is immaterial to go
into question as to whether the accused had intention to cause death or knowledge that the act
will cause death.77
¶ [59]. In the instant case also all though A1, A2, A3 intention was only to rape and to teach
victim a lesson and there was no motive to kill her but even in the absence of motive still,
they can be convicted under section 302 of I.P.C.
11. COMPLETE CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
¶ [60]. This case is bereft of any direct evidence. The facts happened so suddenly that it did
not leave behind much direct evidence. In this case the prosecution will be reconstructing the
72
299 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
73
302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
74
Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 52
75
Amar Singh Guman v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 Crimes 302 (Guj)
76
Parimal Banerjee v. State of W.B., 1986 CrLJ 220 (Cal)
77
In re, Thangaavelu,1972 CrLJ 390 (Mad); State of Bihar v. Pasupati Singh,1973 CrLJ 1832 (SC)

circumstances before this honourable court. With the help of such surrounding circumstances
the fact in issue may be inferred to be proved or disproved.
¶ [61]. To establish the case of circumstantial evidence three requirements must be meted:
a) Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be

cogently established78;
b) Those circumstances should be of definitive tendency and unerringly point towards

the guilt of the accused79 and
c) Circumstances taken cumulatively80 should form a chain so complete that there is no

escape from conclusion that within all human probability crime was committed by the
accused and none else.81
¶ [62]. In D.Yohannan v. State of Kerala82 it was held that an act is said to cause death
when death results either from the act directly or results from some consequences necessarily
or naturally flowing from such act and reasonably contemplated as its result. The prosecution
humbly submits before the honourable court that death of the victim was the consequences of
rape and causing grievous hurt.
¶ [63]. The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the
cumulative effect of all these facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis
of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put
forward by the accused however far- fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that
prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits
rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. 83It is humbly submitted before this
honourable bench that complete chain is formed and it is requested to convict them under
section 302 of I.P.C. Even if victim has not named the accused that who has raped her but it
is quite evident from the above submissions that A1, A2, A3 had brutally assaulted and raped
her. There was full planning of rape, all the accused were present at the place of incidence,
78
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P, A.I.R 1952 S.C 343
79
Umedbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R 1978 S.C 424.
80
State of U.P v. State of Gujrat, A.I.R 1992 S.C 424.
81
Gade Laxmi Mangraju v. State of A.P, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2677; Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R
1983 S.C 446
82
D. Yohannan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1958 Ker 207
83
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, 1992 CrLJ 1104 (SC) : (1962) 2 SCC 86 : AIR 1992 SC
840.

watchmen also saw two man coming out of the apartment. Moreover, Rahul has already
confessed his and A1, A2 guilt under the statement recorded U/S 315 CrPC 1973. So there is
no reasonable ground that on the slightest doubt prosecution evidence should be rejected as
complete chain is formed.
¶ [64]. Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal84 it was held that once the accused
was last seen with the deceased, the onus is upon him to show that either he was not involved
in the occurrence at all or that he had left the deceased at her home or at any other reasonable
place. To rebut the evidence of last seen and its consequences in law, the onus was upon the
accused to lead evidence in order to prove his innocence. It is humbly submitted before this
honourable bench that on 6th of July, 2014 when all the person were out of station then A1
along with A2 and A3 had come to the house in the midst of the night 85 and subsequently
planned to teach her a lesson and A3 have already made his statement about A1 ,A2 & and
his occurrence and they have failed to lead evidence in order to prove their innocence.
¶ [65]. The plea of alibi is required to be proved with certainty so as to completely exclude
the possibility of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence. 86A2 has not proved
with certainty that he was not present at the occurrence even if he left home he hasn’t proved
that its difficult for him to reach at the occurrence place at the time of incident. Moreover, A3
has specifically mentioned in statement recorded/S 313 CrPC 1973 that A2 had raped the
victim. 87Therefore, it is requested that A2 plea of alibi should be rejected.
¶ [66]. In the case of Vishwanath and others v. State of Tamil Nadu (represented by
inspector of police)88 the prosecutrix was found in the naked condition in the road. The court
accepted the evidence of villager who saw the prosecutrix in that situation and with the help
of medical evidence the accused were convicted. In the present case statements of Security
Guard (PW1), Mr. Satya Prakash (PW2), Mr. Rafi (PW3), Ms. Vijyalaxmi(PW4) and Mrs.
Sharma(PW5), recorded u/s 161 of CrPC corroborates the case.
¶ [67]. In the case of Dilip and anr. v. State of M. P 89 “it was held that “Conviction for an
offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical
evidence and other circumstances such as the report of chemical examination.” In the present
84
Arabindra Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, 2012 AIR(SCW) 1032 : 2012 CrLJ 1207
85
86
Shaikh Sattar v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 8 SCC 430}].
87
88
Vishwanath and others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2008) 5 SCC 354
89
Dilip and anr. v. State of M.P AIR 2001 SC 3049

case the prosecutrix gave the testimony in the presence of judicial magistrate 1 st class that she
was raped thrice and even Laxmi attacked her and kicked her in the stomach for several times
when she entered the ICU. Also, the medical evidence shows the internal bleeding in her
stomach, thus it corroborates the case as well.
12. UNDERSTANDING THE DYING DECLARATION
¶ [68]. One important aspect of this case is the dying declaration of the victim. Dying
declaration is a statement of the deceased explaining either his cause of death or the
circumstances in which his death has happened and it is relevant under section 32(1)90 of
Evidence Act. Circumstances must bear a proximate relation with the cause of death 91. It is
presumed by law that a dying man would not lie92. It is on this premises, which is considered
strong enough to set off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and
be cross examined by person who is sought to be implicated93
¶ [69]. Moreover, a dying declaration recorded by a judicial officer is on a higher footing

compared to other94. It is evident from the dying declaration95,that it is made under a fit state
of mind96and the statement was complete and consistent97.Also the chances of the dying
declaration being a result tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination is ruled out as it is
properly registered by a judicial officer 98. Noteworthy the dying declaration mentions the fact
that she was raped thrice, thereby it is urged by the honourable court that it should be taken
into consideration. Reading the dying declaration conjointly with circumstantial evidence it is
clear that brutal rape was committed by the accused 99which ultimately proved to be fatal and
the victim died.
13. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
90
Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872
91
Pakala Narayan Swamy v. Emperor, A.I.R 1939 P.C 47, Sharda Birdichand Sharda v. State of
Maharashtra, A.I.R 1984 S.C 1622
92
Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885) ILR All. 385.
93
Padam Ben Shamal Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 1991 SCC (Cri) 275.
94
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1958 S.C 22.
95
Annexaure 3; Rem Juris 1st National Virtual Moot Court Competition,2020
96
Laxmi v. Om Prakash, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2383
97
Kusa v. State of Orrisa, (1980) 2 SCC 207; Oza V. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374.
98
K.R Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, A.I.R S.C 1994; State of U.P v. Ram Sewak, A.I.R 1977 S.C
472; P.V Radhakrishnan v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R 2003 S.C 2859.
99
Kamla v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374.

¶ [70]. When oral evidence is credible and cogent, the medical evidence to the contrary
would be inconsequential.100Although it not mentioned coherently that there was injury on the
private part but oral evidence given by A3 has more value and can be concluded that she was
brutally assaulted and was succumbed to death.
100
Anil Kumar v. State of U.P; AIR 2004 SC 4662: (2004) 13 SCC 257

MEMORANDUM for PROSECUTION [PRAYER]
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. Convict Mr. Vishnu guilty for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, voluntarily causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means, criminal intimidation , assaulting or
using criminal force to women with intent to outrage her modesty, dowry death, rape,
gang rape murder, cruelty, criminal conspiracy defined under the section 322, 326,503
read with 37/34 ,354, 376D 3o4-B, 375,300, 498A,120-A read with 37,37 of I.P.C.
2. Convict Mr. Jayesh and Rahul for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, voluntarily causing
grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means, criminal intimidation, assaulting or
using criminal force to women with intent to outrage her modesty rape, gang rape,
murder defined under section 322, 326, 503 read with 37/34, 354, 375, 376D, 300, 120-
A of I.P.C.
3. Convict Laxmi Devi for cruelty, dowry death, voluntarily causing hurt defined under
the section 498A, 304-B,321of I.P.C.
4. Convict Mr. Rohan for cruelty, dowry death defined under the section of 498A, 304-B
of I.P.C.
5. Declare a sentence of life imprisonment for all the accused
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the prosecution to meet the ends of
equity, justice and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the prosecution shall duty bound forever.
PLACE: sd/-
DATE: COUNSEL for the PROSECUTION
REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MCC, 2020 PAGE | XIII

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REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020

BEFORE THE HON’BLE DISTRICT & SESSION COURT

MR. VISHNU PANDEY & OTHERS ...............

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?................................................................................................10

REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MCC, 2020 PAGE | I

REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MCC, 2020 PAGE | II

ABBREV. FULL FORM

Administrator, Josgiri hospital v. Government of Kerala (2008) ILR 3 Ker 9

Akula Ravinder v. State of A.P, AIR 1991 SC 1142 3

Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2004 SC 1497 9, 10

Amar Singh Guman v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 Crimes 302 (Guj 14

Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabaghana Behera 1995 CrLJ 355 (Ori 13

REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MCC, 2020 PAGE | III

Anil Kumar v. State of U.P; AIR 2004 SC 4662 18

Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkahnd, 2002 CrLJ 3973 (Jhar 4

Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 4,5

B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 1986 Cri L.J 1510 (Del.) 1

Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 691 5

Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2003) 3 SCC 21 8

Bishnu Prasad and another v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 46 8

Camilo Fernandez v. State of Maharashtra (1988) 3 Crimes 179 10

Chandi Charan Dutta v. Bhabataran Dey, (1964) 2 CrLJ 85 (Cal. 13

Chandra v. State of A.P, 1996 Cr LJ 2670 (AP 2

D. Yohannan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1958 Ker 207 15

Dilip and anr. v. State of M.P AIR 2001 SC 304 17

Empror v. Saberali, AIR 1920 Cal 401 14

Gade Laxmi Mangraju v. State of A.P, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2677 15

Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619 2

Girdhari Gopal v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 MB 147 9

Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P, A.I.R 1952 S.C 343 15

In re, Thangaavelu,1972 CrLJ 390 (Mad) 15

K.R Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor, A.I.R S.C 1994 18

Kamla v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374 18

Kashmir Kaur and another v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039 4

Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay A.I.R 1958 S.C 22 17

Kishore Kumar v. State, 1993 CrLJ 253 (Del 4

Kumar v. State of U.P (1998) 9 SCC 343 7

Kusa v. State of Orrisa, (1980) 2 SCC 207 17

REM JURIS 1ST NATIONAL VIRTUAL MCC, 2020 PAGE | IV

Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, A.I.R 2003 S.C 854 9

Laxmi v. Om Prakash, A.I.R 2001 S.C 2383 17

Lolo v. Durghatiya A.I.R 2001 M.P 188 7

Matukdhari Singh v. Emproer, AIR 1942 Pat 376 12

Oza V. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1993 S.C 374 17

P.V Radhakrishnan v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R 2003 S.C 2859 18

Pakala Narayan Swamy v. Emperor, A.I.R 1939 P.C 47 17

Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra, (1981) 4 SCC 569 7

Pandurang Sitaram Bhagwat v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 9 SCC 44 10

Param Dev v. State of H.P., 1975 CrLJ 1346 (HP) 11

Parimal Banerjee v. State of W.B., 1986 CrLJ 220 (Cal) 14

Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 95 2

Prabbhu v. State of M.P. AIR 2009 SC 745 12

Prabhu v. Statte of M.P; AIR 2009 SC 745 11

Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1983 S.C 446 15

Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885) ILR All. 385 17

Rajayyan v. State of Kerela, AIR 1998 SC 1211 3

Rajinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 215 5

Sadananda Bargohain v. State of Assam (1972) Cr LJ 658(Gau) 10

Sanaulla Khan v. State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 5 14

Sankar Prasad v. State, 1991 Cri. L.J. 639 (Cal. 2

Sarojkshan v. State of Maharastra, 1995 CrLJ 340 (Bom) 3

_ ISSUE: [1] _

_ ISSUE: [2] _

_ ISSUE: [3] _

_ ISSUE: [4] _