TC: 14

In the Metropolitan Court of Noida

Case No. XXXX of 2020

In the Matter of:

Ms. Neetu (Prosecution)

V.

Ms. Rudrax and Ors. (Defendant)

Bench: X, Y

Counsel for the Prosecution: Ms. Nidhi

Counsel for the Defendant: Ms. Mandira

10. 05. 2020

1. Violence against Women is not a new or recent phenomenon. Women have been the
victims of this menace across the ages in all societies and cultures, religions,
communities etc., in the world. The list of crimes that is committed against women seems
to be endless, varying from simple harassment, physical and mental torture to the extent
of denying them the very right to exit. The places where these crimes are committed and
the person by whom they are committed are also endless. Such crimes are committed
within the four walls of the house, outside the house in lonely places and those that are
 committed in public places right in full public view. The main reasons of violence against
women is basically the mentality which dermas the women inferior of men and merely
limits their importance to the household chores only. Domestic violence is the most
serious violation of all basic rights that a woman suffers in her own home at the hands of
member within her own family.
2. The complainant filed a case against her husband (1st accused), mother in law (2nd
accused), father in law (3rd accused) brother in law (4th accused) with regard to domestic
violence and dowry demand. The complaint was registered as under Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and  Section 3 of the
DV Act and was investigated into. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against
the petitioners for the offence under Section 12 of The Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, hereinafter to be referred as "DV Act". Hence, the
charge.

 In the instant case, 

3. The voluminous record pertains that the marriage was solemnized between complainant
(Neeta) and accused 1 (Rudra) on February 1, 2018. After marriage, the complainant was
residing with accused no 1, in her matrimonial house at Noida along with accused No.1, 2
and 3.
4. The allegations raised in the complaint are that after six months of her marriage there was
constant demand for dowry from the complainant by accused no 1 for the expansion of
his business which was unknown to the accused no 2, 3 and 4. On July 20 ,2018 accused
no. 1 came in the house in intoxicated state and demanded 50,000 for the expansion of his
business. All the other accused were also not satisfied with the dowry articles given to
complainant at the time of the marriage. They started taunting, humiliating the
complainant. She was tortured by accused no 1 and 2 and was beaten up in front of all the
other family members for not brining the remaining amount which the complainant father
had promised to do so. She was even scolded by accused no 3 in filthy language and was
demanded remaining amount by him and accused no 4 also.
5. Similar incidence took place on November 30 2018. October 18 2018, October 20 2018,
November 25 2018 and November 28 2018. The complainant was always harassed by
 demanding more dowry and she was treated as slave by the accused and was also not
helped by anyone in the domestic work and time and again she was tortured. All the
accused also threatened towards her life and for other dire consequences and was
consequently abused by them. She has further stated that her husband (accused 1) has
illicit relation with a girl. She filed a complaint on February 10, 2019 in the woman
police station for domestic violence and dowry matter. Hence the matter is brought before
this Metropolitan Court of Noida.
6. Ms. Nidhi, learned counsel appearing for the prosecution has contended that by virtue of
Section 27 of the Domestic Violence Act, the place where the complainant permanently
or temporarily resides or carries on business, Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint and grant protection order and other orders under the Domestic Violence Act.
It was submitted that the complainant is currently residing within the territorial limit of
the Metropolitan Magistrate of Noida and that the Court rightly held that the
Metropolitan Magistrate at Noida has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Taking
us through the averments in the complaint, learned counsel for the defendant has
submitted that there are several instances of domestic violence against the husband
accused No.2,3,4 and other relatives particularly, accused no 1.
7. Ms. Nidhi learned counsel appearing for the prosecution took us elaborately through the
provisions of the DV Act .The counsel referred section 2(a)1 of the Act which allows the
institution of proceedings by an ‘aggrieved person’ who has been defined as any woman
who is or has been in a domestic relationship with any adult male person and who alleges
to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him, or his relatives, in the case
of a married woman or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.
8. The learned counsel of the prosecution further defined Section 2(f) and also referred a
case named Azimuddin v . State of Uttar Pradesh2 in which it was A ‘ domestic
relationship ’ has been defined in wide terms as a relationship between two persons who
live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are
related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family.

1
ection 2(a) defines ‘ aggrieved person
2
Section 2(f); Azimuddin v . State ofUttar Pradesh (High Court ofAllahabad).
 9. Learned counsel for the Prosecution further elaborated that It has been specifically
mentioned that such conduct might be in the nature of physical abuse, sexual abuse,
verbal and emotional abuse, or economic abuse.3 The definition also specifically includes
within its ambit any conduct that harasses, harms, injures, or endangers the aggrieved
person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any dowry, property, or valuable security.4
10. Ms. Nidhi, learned council further submits that, any such conduct that has the effect of
threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her 5or otherwise injures or
causes physical or mental harm to her6 has been brought within the ambit of domestic
violence. Physical abuse includes any act or conduct that causes bodily pain, harm, or
danger to life, limb, or health or impairs the health or development of the aggrieved
person and includes assault, criminal intimidation, and criminal force.7
11. Ms. Nidhi contended that it is undisputed fact and documents clearly mentions that she is
legally wedded wife of accused No. 1. Counsel further referred that the accused always
taunted, harassed and tortured her physically as well as mentally. Accused No. 1 and
family members raised demand of Rs.50,000 and when she showed her inability, she was
beaten up also and life threats were also given to her.
12. Ms. Mandira learned council pertinent contention was that an application can be filed
only against male members of the shared household and not against female members
such as the mother-in-law (accused no 2) don’t come within the definition of section 2(q).
To justify the contention the definition of respondent under the Act was forwarded.
13. Ms. Nidhi learned council relied on the decisions in Nand Kishore v. State of
Rajasthan8and Rema Devi v. State of Kerala9 and argued that these cases upheld the same
view that a female can be a respondent. In the first case, the Court categorically held that,
“the term ‘relative’ is quite broad and it includes all relations of the husband irrespective
of gender or sex”. The second case, further clarified that, “section 2(q) of the Act and its
proviso if read together nowhere suggest that relative of the husband or the male partner
3
Section 3(a).
4
Section 3(a).
5
Section 3(c)
6
Section 3(d).
7
Section 3, Explanation I, clause (i)
8
R.L.W.2008(4)Raj3432.
9
I (2009) D.M.C. 297.
 has to be a male. In proviso to section 2(q) of the Act the word is ‘relative’ and not ‘male
relative a female relative is not excluded from the definition of respondent” This stance
was reinforced in a number of rulings in the High Courts of Madras 10, Hyderabad11 and
Bombay.
14.  The Bench opined that giving effect to all the provisions in the Statute, the Act does not
exclude women from section 2(g).
15. Then comes the question whether there was any dowry demand. The council on the
behalf of defendant argued with the principle laid down in the case of Vinod Kumar v.
State12 and argued that their lordship has given description and held that a voluntary and
affectionate giving of dowry and traditional presents would thus be plainly out of the
ambit of the particular definition under the Act and once that is so the rest of the
provisions thereof would be equally inapplicable. A voluntary and affectionate giving of
dowry and traditional presents would thus be plainly out of the ambit of the particular
definition under the Act and once that is so the rest of the provisions thereof would be
equally inapplicable.13
16. With great respect, she further referred the principle laid down in In Shankar Prasad
Shaw v. State14,wherein it was held by the Calcutta High Court that mere demand is not
an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It should either be given or
agreed to be given15
17. Ms. Mandira has opined that mere vague allegation is not sufficient to bring the case
within domestic violence and dowry act.
18. Furthermore, the learned counsel on the behalf of defendant also submitted that the
prosecution case is a totally false and fabricated case. Counsel referred the case to
support the argument in which she referred that in Neera Singh v. State16 also, it was
noted that are being made about the amounts spent on marriage, other ceremonies, dowry
and gifts due to which the Court should insist on disclosing the source of such funds. It
was also stated that vague allegations against every member of the family of the husband
10
S. Meenavathu v. Senthamarai Selvi, MANU/TN/2547/2009.
11
Afalunnisa Begum v. State of A.P, MANU/AP/0206/2009.
12
Vinod Kumar v. State, AIR 1982 P & H 372
13
Vinod Kumar v. State, AIR 1982 P & H 372
14
Ramesh Kumar v. State, 1986 Cr.LJ.2087 (P&H); ee also Jaspal Singh v. State, 1984 Cr.LJ. 691 (P & H)
15
Shankar Rao v. L.VJadha, 1983 Cr.LJ. 269
16
 I (2007) DMC 545
 cannot be accepted at face value and the allegations have to be scrutinized carefully by
the Court before framing the charge. Court on guard to appreciate the allegations made
against the petitioners with reference to such factors, but no deep probe into the
acceptability and reliability of the allegations can be indulged herein, more so, in the
absence of any clinching proof either way on the material placed before the Court herein.
19. Coming to this contention Ms. Nidhi argued that exorbitant claims were made by the
accused. Some of the claim was fulfilled by the complainant family but the accused were
not satisfied with the dowry articles given to complainant at the time of the marriage they
repeatedly taunted, humiliated the complainant after the few months of marriage. 
20. The court examined the various witness. The neighbor of the accused confirmed that
complainant was often tortured and parents of Neeta also confirmed that their daughter
was often abused and there was constant demand of dowry.
21. After listening the arguments, the court is in favor of prosecution and hence this
contention of defendant is dismissed.
22. The next contention was put forward by the prosecution to invoke section 506 as
complainant was given life threats if the order of the mother in law (accused 2) was not
obeyed. Ms. Nidhi learned counsel appearing for the prosecution took us elaborately
through the ingredients of the Section 506 of I.P.C. She contended that every accused
should be charged under this section.
23. Section 506: Ingredients -The Section has the following essentials: - a) Threatening a
person with an injury. i.) To his person, reputation or property; or ii) to the person, or
reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. b) The threat must be with intent
i) to cause alarm to that person, or ii.) to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or iii) to cause
that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do so as the
means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
24. Ms. Nidhi therefore, in view of the aforesaid discussion, argued that all accused stand
convicted of offence under Section 506 read with section 34 of IPC.
25. The aforesaid conclusion takes court to the issue whether the accused persons can be
convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the act must have
been done in furtherance of the common intention in order to incur joint liability. In the
 present case the testimony of the complainant proves that all the accused persons acted in
concert with each other and committed crime in one and several transactions.
26. The conceal on the behalf of the defendant argued that the accused never acted in
pursuance thereof and it was pleaded that offence of criminal intimidation was not made
out and the accused would be entitled to the acquittal.
27. The prosecution further referred the judgement laid down in A. Sreenivasa Rao v. State of
Andhra Pradesh17 in which it was deal with a domestic violence case and a
criminal case simultaneously being pursued and held that the domestic violence
case cannot be considered to be a criminal proceeding and the mischief of Article
20 Clause (2) of the Constitution of India or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable in such an event. She further referred  S.A.L. Narayan Row
and another vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and another 18, case law to support the argument
where it was laid down the criteria by which to determine the nature of a proceeding.
According to it, she further submits, the expression "civil proceeding" includes all
proceedings in which a party asserts the existence of a civil right conferred by the civil
law or statute and claims relief for breach thereof, whereas the expression "criminal
proceeding" connotes a proceeding which is ordinarily the one which if carried to
conclusion, may result in penal consequences such as imposition of sentences of death or
imprisonment or fine and/or forfeiture of property. The prosecution further submits that
by these parameters, one can say that the proceeding initiated under Section 12(1) of the
D.V. Act, in order to seek various reliefs under the Act as are available under Sections
18 to 22 of the D.V. Act, is civil in nature, though, the procedure, that has to be generally
followed for taking the proceeding to its logical end, is criminal.
28. The learned counsel for prosecution vehemently contended that the accused persons
continuously make demand for 50,000 as dowry and on various occasions they harassed
her by making statement like your father has not fulfilled the promise as he told to us,
bring the remain amount and then only you will be given the food to eat, they also give
life threats to her, Thus the accused person should be convicted under section 498A of the
19
IPC, For this the learned counsel relied on the case of Moti lal v. State of M.P where

17
2011 (2) ALD (Crl.) 191 (AP)
18
AIR 1965 SC 1818
19
Moti lal v. State of M.P, A.I.R. 2004 S.C
 the apex court held guilty the accused husband for harassing his wife for not bringing
sufficient dowry and also threatened and beat her.
29. The learned counsel for prosecution further relied upon the case of Pawan Kumar v.
State of Hrayna 20where the apex court interpreted the cruelty and observed that taunting,
maltreatment, mental torture and mental agony to the victim includes under the definition
of cruelty, the learned counsel further contended that many a times the mother in law of
victim wouldn’t give food to her and she was forced to do household work even when she
was ill. Thus, causing great mental torture and agony to the victim. The learned counsel
further submitted that many a time the accused come drunk and used to beat her for not
giving the money, and drinking and late coming habits of husband coupled with beating
and demanding dowry have been taken to amount of cruelty within the meaning of
section 498A.21
30. The learned counsel make submission that the accused husband has an illegal affair with
other women, and when the victim asked about this illicit relation, the accused slapped
her and further harass her for not giving the money which he demands. The learned
counsel further submitted the record of log section of accused in which the accused called
that woman many times and the duration of call was beyond 30 minutes.
31. The counsel appearing on the behalf of respondent relied on the case of Rosamma Kurian
v. State of Kerela 22where the court held that usual and common domestic discord in any
matrimonial home cannot amount to cruelty within the meaning of section 498A of IPC,
and further make submission that what happened to the accused is usual domestic discord
and hence do not fall within the ambit of present section.
32. The learned counsel further submitted that the demand of money was for meeting
financial stringency hence it not a dowry demand, the counsel relied upon the case of
Appasaheb & Anr v. State of Maharastra 23where the apex court held that the a demand
of money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic
expense or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as demand of dowry as the said word
is normally understood.

20
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 S.C 958
21
Jagdish Chandra v. State of Haryana, 1998 CrLJ 1048 (P&H)
22
Rosamma Kurain v. State of Kerela, 2014 CrLJ 2666 (Ker) :2014 (2) KHC 64.
23
Appasaheb & Anr. V. State of Maharasthra, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 763
 33. The learned counsel contended that it is not every harassment or every type of cruelty
that would attract section 498A. The complainant has conclusively established that the
beating and harassment in question was with a view to force her to commit suicide or to
fulfill the illegal demand of dowry. 24In the present case no such severe cruelty has been
caused to the victim.
34. The learned counsel further contended that this section was introduced with the avowed
object of combating the menace of dowry deaths and harassment of a woman at the hands
of her in-laws. But the provision should not be allowed to be used as a device for
achieving oblique motives.25 Since the relief sought under the Act is civil in nature, proof
will be tested on the balance of probabilities and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. It must be remembered that domestic violence is a unique offence as it takes
place within the privacy of the home where no outside witnesses are likely to be present.
If it happens within the joint family then, although the relatives of the husband witness
the violence it is unlikely that any relatives of the husband will support the woman. The
woman, therefore, will be the primary witness under the Act. When no eyewitness is
available and there is only the statement of a woman, circumstantial evidence is
considered to arrive at a conclusion of the facts of the case.
35. As in the present case no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused.
36. Ms. Mandira counsel for the defendant further submitted that there was no illicit relation
of the accused, and the woman is only his good friend and regular customer of his shop.
There is no illegal affair between them and the accused convey the same to the victim.
37. The conceal on the behalf of prosecution contended that Protection Order should be
passed under Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act. In terms of Section 18 of the Act,
intention of the legislature is to provide more protection to woman. Prosecution further
argued that an order for protection is justified under the Domestic Abuse Act when a
spouse and his relatives manifest a present intention to inflict fear of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury or assault. Past abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor

24
Sarla Prabhakar Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 CrLJ 407 (Bom).
25
Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561: 2008 CrLJ 1391
 in determining cause for protection. Defendant argues that there was no evidence
showing any present intent on his behalf to inflict fear of imminent physical abuse. The
court disagrees.
38. The prosecution further demanded monetary relief under Section 20 under which the Act
empowers the court to order for monetary relief to the “aggrieved party”. When acts of
domestic violence is alleged, before issuing notice, the court has to be prima facie
satisfied that there have been instances of domestic violence.
39. The court is of the view that although there have been a number of cases in India, where
the petitioner was later abused and even killed by the respondent after a Protection Order
was passed, the courts have failed to set any landmark precedents in terms of holding the
various functionaries under the Act accountable for inaction or a failure to provide
protection to women. For example, a number of International Courts have held the state
directly responsible for a failure to provide protection to women facing domestic
violence. This was reaffirmed by the landmark case of Opuz v. Turkey26, where the
European Court of Human Rights held that the Turkish authorities’ failure to react to the
problem of domestic violence was tantamount to a form of discrimination against women
and ordered the state to pay the victim non-pecuniary damages and called for the Turkish
government to modify its tolerant attitude towards domestic violence. In the light of an
increasing number of women facing continued violence despite the issuance of Protection
Orders, the Indian Courts need to keep in mind the state’s national and international legal
obligations to protect women from violence and hold the state accountable in cases where
it fails to protect women from violence.
40. The next contention from the defendant side is related to the procedural aspects. The
counsel from the defendant argued that as no report from the Protection Officer was
sought and the Magistrate recorded the statement of the aggrieved person without first
issuing notice to the respondents, procedural requirements under the Act were not met.
41. The counsel Ms. Nidhi argued with the help of case Milan Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State
of U.P. & Anr27,in which the husband challenged the application filed by his wife under
the Act on the ground that such an application ought not be filed directly before a
Magistrate without first approaching the Protection Officer and recording a Domestic
26
2Opuz v. Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 33401/02)
27
2007 Cri. L.J. 4742, per R.N.Mishra,J.
 Incident Report as per the stipulations of the Act. The Court dismissed the contention on
the grounds that the provisions of the Act were not accurately interpreted by the husband.
The Court held that as the Act was a social legislation, its purpose was to help the
aggrieved person and not impose strict procedural requirements. The Court held: “A plain
reading of section 12(1) shows that the aggrieved person can file complaint directly to the
Magistrate concerned. This is the choice of the aggrieved person that instead of directly
approaching the Magistrate, he or she can approach the Protection Officer and, in case of
emergency, the service provider and with their help to the Magistrate concerned. There is
no illegality in directly approaching the Magistrate for taking cognizance in the matter.
This is for the Magistrate concerned to take help of Protection Officer and service
provider after receiving the complaint provided, if he feels it necessary for final disposal
of the dispute between the parties”28.
42. The Court rejected the contention of the defendant on the ground that procedural
irregularities were not sufficient to quash proceedings and that, as per Section 28(2) of
the Act, a Magistrate has the power to set his own procedure. In so doing, the Court
acknowledged the importance of ensuring speedy and efficacious access to justice,
unimpeded by procedural requirements, for a woman in need. This is in accordance with
the intention of the Act.
43. The next contention from the defendant side was that counseling should be initiated and
matter should be settled as they are also newly wedded couple so firstly attempt should
be made to save the marriage. The defendant referred the case law that is In T. Vineed v.
Manju S. Nair 29 in which the appeal that came up before the High Court of Kerala deals
with the issue of counseling as stipulated under the Act. the Court held that the attempt in
matrimonial cases must be first to exhaust the option of court mediated settlement before
beginning legal proceeding.
44. The court held on this contention that, on the facts of this case, a mutually agreeable
settlement through conciliation was an inappropriate strategy because here the issue at
hand is domestic violence, an approach prioritizing conciliation could adversely affect the
safety and security of the woman facing violence.

28
Dennison Paulraj v.Union of India, A.I.R.2009 (Noc) 2540 (Mad), per Venkataraman,J.
29
2008 (1)K.L.J. 525.
 45. Lastly the prosecution pleaded that on the matter of The DV Act is in addition to existing
laws and the aggrieved has the right to file a complaint simultaneously under Section
498A of the IPC. The Act also provides for compensation orders that may be additionally
granted by the magistrate to the victim as compensation for any injury, including mental
torture and emotional distress, which may have been caused by the aggressor. 30 It is ,
therefore, prayed that a case under  498-A, 120-B IPC and Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 may kindly be registered followed by Sections
3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against all the accused. and adequate compensation
orders should be given to the complainant.

After listening to the contention and arguments of both the side the bench raised the following
issues:

Issues raised

1) Whether the petitioner was treated with cruelty by the respondent after solemnization of
marriage?

2) Whether complainant was subjected to any act of domestic violence by her husband, and
his relatives and was harassed by dowry?

3) Whether female relative is comes within the ambit of the definition of defendant?

Judgment:

The court referred the case Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar in that case it was held that
Marriages are made in heaven, is an adage. A bridge leaves the parental home for the
matrimonial home, leaving behind sweet memories therewith a hope that she will see a new
world full of love in her groom’s house. She leaves behind not only her memories, but also her
surname, gotra and maidenhood. She expects not only to be a daughter-in-law, but a daughter in
fact. Alas! the alarming rise in the number of cases involving harassment to the newly wed girls
for dowry shatters the dreams. In-laws are characterized to be outlaws for perpetrating terrorism
which destroys the matrimonial home. The terrorist is dowry, and it is spreading tentacles in
every possible direction.31
30
Section 22.
31
(2005)2 SCC 388
In proviso to section 2(q) of the Act the word is relative and not male relative a female relative is
not excluded from the definition of defendant.

Times have changed considerably; much water has flow down the bridges. The actual position,
however, is that the custom of giving Tilak and Dahez has been in vogue uptill in now, although
most of the people in India where 40 percent of them are below the poverty line, cannot afford to
meet the high demands of their slender means, with the result that they have to incur the loans
and pledge their valuables to meet such demands. It leads to ruin and a disaster of the family.

Sometimes girls commit suicide to mitigate the sufferings of their poor parents. In spite of all
this, dowry is considered as a basic component of our marriage system. The women are told to
not complain about any difficulty they face by their own families and any woman who gathers
the courage to complain is looked down upon by the members of her community. In most of the
cases the victim is asked to tolerate all the abuse as a part of her karma. Women are subject to
frequent and multiple forms of violence in their lifetime. The main cause of this is the patriarchal
mindset of the people. Men have always considered themselves to be the superior sex and have
always tried to overpower women. Generally, women do not raise their voices against men
because they have been taught to believe that they are the inferior sex.

In criminal matter the burden of proof lies on the prosecution side but in this Act, the burden of
proof lies upon the accused person that, he had not committed offence. If he has proved that or
they have not committed offence certainly the accused person shall be acquitted. But on the other
hand, if the accused person failed to prove the offence certainly, he or they shall convict.

In the case of B.S Joshi v State of Haryana 32the apex court observed that section 498A of the
IPC was enacted to prevent torture to a woman by her husband and relatives in connections with
demand of dowry. This section was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives
who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of
dowry. Cruelty means harassment of the women where such harassment is with the view to
coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or on account of a failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

32
B.S Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 Cri. L.J. 2028 (S.C).
33
Here in the present case also there was unlawful demand of dowry and in pursuant of it the
victim was tortured by the husband.

The demand which was made by accused could not be said to be for meeting financial stringency
but rather it is a dowry demand as on several occasion victim was taunted for not bringing
sufficient dowry. The demand was for expansion of business we could not called such demand
as financial stringency or it is for meeting some urgent domestic expanse. Mere demand of
dowry before marriage, at time of marriage or any time after marriage is an offense 34 and dowry
covers all demand made at the time, before or any time of manage, provided the same were in
connection with the marriage. 35

However, the guilt of the other accused under section 498A is not established beyond reasonable
doubt. The apex court in the case of Kanaraj v. State of Punjab 36observed that the “for fault of
the husband, the in-laws or the other relatives cannot be held to be involved, the acts attributed to
such persons have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the cannot be held responsible by
mere conjectures and implications. The tendency to rope in relations of the husband, as accused
to be curbed. The bench agreed with the view.

The apex court in the case of Laxman Ram Mane v. State of Maharashtra 37observed that the
illicit relationship of a married man with another woman would clearly amount to cruelty within
the meaning of section 498A. In the instant also the accused has extra martial affair with another
woman hence clearly amounts to cruelty.

A newly married woman would disclose her sufferings to her father, mother, brother and her
friend and not to outsiders, the evidence of such persons with regard to cruelty cannot be said to
be interested. 38In the instant case also, we cannot say that the evidence of parents and friends are
interested, also the neighbors were also aware of ongoing fight in the house.

The court referred the case of Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel 39 in which
the apex court recognizing this ‘right of residence’ has placed it on a higher pedestal to the
33
Rajammal v. State, 1993 Cr. L.J. 3029 (Mad) (DB)
34
Bachhi Devi v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 1048 : (2011)4 S.C.C. 427.
35
Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, A.I.R.2010 S.C. 2839 : 2010 Cri. L.J. 4402
36
Kanaraj v. State of Punjab, 2000 Cri L.J. 2993: AIR 2000 S.C. 2324
37
Laxman Ram Mane v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (13) SCC 125: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 782
38
Vasanta v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr. L.J. 901 (Bom.).
39
2008(2) RCR(Crl.)699
existing right of maintenance as conferred under previous legislations. To exercise this right, the
Act provides for a residence order that may be obtained by the victim either restraining the
respondent from dispossessing her of the shared household or disturbing her possession
irrespective of whether or not he/she has a legal or equitable interest in it, directing him to
remove himself from the shared household, restraining him or his relatives from entering any
portion in which the victim resides, restraining him from alienating, disposing off, encumbering,
or renouncing his rights in it, directing him to secure an alternate accommodation for the victim
of the same level of comfort. The bench decides that residence order should be given to the
complaint in which any relatives from her matrimonial home should be restrained from entering
any portion in which the victim reside.

Dowry is becoming a nightmare for Women. The cases of infanticide are increasing. Poor
parents do not have any other option. They cannot afford to have a girl child, and hence they are
intentionally killing infant girl. Dowry is complete injustice with women and does not give
women equal status in society. This is creating a mess and negative environment in society. The
cruelty of the dowry system is one of many institutions preventing women from being equal to
men in India. Women are human beings and they deserve social equality as well as legal rights in
society and to be treated like any other human.

The DV Act is in addition to existing laws and the aggrieved has the right to file a complaint
simultaneously under Section 498A of the IPC.

Order:

1) Convict accused No. 1 under section 498-A I.P.C for 2 year.

2) Protection order is passed and residence order is given to the complaint in which any
relatives from her matrimonial home should be restrained from entering any portion in
which the victim reside.

3) 75000 Rs. compensation orders should be given to the complainant along with the dowry
amount which was claimed by the accused at the time of marriage.