Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By
ABSTRACT
A cross border merger as the name suggests, refers to the combination of two or more
companies belonging to or registered in two different countries. For a cross border merger
two basic motives stand out; efficiency motive and strategic motive. Efficiency motive
basically means want of the two companies want to increase the synergy between them by use
of their economies of scale, scope, tax advantages etc. Strategic motive refers to the intention
of the two companies to change the market structure which results into the profit of the
merging companies. The mergers are governed by tight regulatory framework in India. A
merger has to comply with multiple regulations non compliance to which may lead to
penalties or may lead to civil prosecution under regulations. When it comes to regulations
governing cross border mergers the number of regulations also increase by two fold as such
transactions includes the laws and regulations of two different countries. The research
revolves around inbound and outbound forms of Cross border mergers.
In recent years India is regarded as very important market on globe for cross border
transactions. In view of their increasing importance, it is essential to analyze the legal
compliances required for carrying out a cross border merger. This paper attempts to look
into the provision of Companies Act, 1956 (interpretation of Section 394 (4) (b) which defines
the ambit of its applicability in case of cross border mergers) involving a cross border
merger/Acquisitions and also attempts to include the provisions provided in New Companies
Bill, 2011. The present paper also attempt to look into the other regulations which are to be
complied with in cross border Mergers in India and also analyze the role of RBI and CCI as
regulators to cross border mergers.. The last part of the paper includes two case studies of
Cross border merger in India.
*Hemant Singh & Dhruva Rathore, are candidates of LL.M. in Corporate Law
(Sem-IV) of National Law University, Jodhpur;
1|P a g e
So in simple terms it can be defined as a combination where two companies which decide to
combine their operations. Both the companies involved in the merger cease to exist resulting
into a combined new company. There are generally three types stated of merger transactions
when viewed from the perspective of value chain:
TYPES OF MERGER:
Mergers may be of several types, depending on the requirements of the merging entities:
Horizontal Mergers:
Also referred to as a ‘horizontal integration’, this kind of merger takes place between entities
engaged in competing businesses which are at the same stage of the industrial process. A
horizontal merger takes a company a step closer towards monopoly by eliminating a
competitor and establishing a stronger presence in the market. The other benefits of this form
of merger are the advantages of economies of scale and economies of scope.
Vertical Mergers:
Vertical mergers refer to the combination of two entities at different stages of the industrial or
production process. For example, the merger of a company engaged in the construction
business with a company engaged in production of brick or steel would lead to vertical
integration. Companies stand to gain on account of lower transaction costs and
synchronization of demand and supply. Moreover, vertical integration helps a company move
towards greater independence and self-sufficiency. The downside of a vertical merger
involves large investments in technology in order to compete effectively.
Conglomerate Mergers:
A conglomerate merger is a merger between two entities in unrelated industries. The
principal reason for a conglomerate merger is utilization of financial resources, enlargement
of debt capacity, and increase in the value of outstanding shares by increased leverage and
earnings per share, and by lowering the average cost of capital. A merger with a diverse
business also helps the company to foray into varied businesses without having to incur large
start-up costs normally associated with a new business.
Out of the two renowned business strategies that include organic and inorganic strategy,
Mergers would provide immediate extension of company’s human resource, clientele, and
infrastructure thus catalyzing the growth. Though, various reasons for the rapid growth of
2|P a g e
If one sees the market records of past 25 years, it is apparent that there have been two major
waves of cross border Merger transactions. The first wave was witnessed in the late 1980s,
while the second, a big cross border buying spree being in the latter half of the 1990s. 1 It is
pertinent to note that the global economy experienced relatively high economic growth and
widespread industrial restructuring, during both these waves of cross border M&As.
Experience shows that cross border Mergers can yield dividends, in terms of a company’s
performance and profits as well as benefits for home and host countries, when successful
industrial restructuring leads to greater efficiency without undue market concentration.
Coming to India, post independence, for about 10 years India was receptive towards foreign
investment due to various reasons. Thereafter due to change in policies, India became a
closed economy. Hence it became nearly impossible for an Indian business firm to think of
inviting foreign investment, leave alone investing abroad. The concept of Mergers gained
popularity in India, after the government introduced the new economic policy in 1991,
thereby paving the way for economic reforms and opening up a whole lot of challenges both
in the domestic and international spheres. 2
A cross border merger as the name suggests, refers to the combination of two or more
companies belonging to or registered in two different countries. For a cross border merger
two basic motives stand out; efficiency motive and strategic motive. Efficiency motive
basically means want of the two companies want to increase the synergy between them by
use of their economies of scale, scope, tax advantages etc. Strategic motive refers to the
intention of the two companies to change the market structure which results into the profit of
the merging companies.
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and regulations made there under
1
Refer Platt Gordon, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS SHOW RISING TREND AS GLOBAL ECONOMY
EXPANDS available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3715/is_200412/ai_n9466795/ (last
visiteded on 10 September 2012)
2
Refer Chaitanya K., INDIAN ECONOMY IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS: KEY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES,
2005-2009, available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eaa/aeinde/v4y2004i1_30.html (last accessed on
10 September 2012)
3|P a g e
Securities and Exchange Board of Indian Act, and regulations made there under
The application or compliance of these regulations are subject to the category under which the
cross merger will fall. Generally they are categorized into two categories-
In 2007, the Indian market figured in the top ten markets on the international plane in terms of
merger and acquisition deals3 . By the end of Oct. 2011 M&A cross-border deals stood at USD 29
billion which is a great share in overall global market4 . In view of their increasing importance, it is
essential to analyze the legal compliances required for carrying out a cross border merger
They have become topics of interest mainly because they help a firm enter new international
markets and thereby enhance their ability to compete in global markets.5 Also, as seen with
transactions completed in single countries, synergies are sought through such cross-border
mergers and acquisitions for enhancing cost efficiencies of the new company which results
from the process. Although similar in nature, a cross-border merger differs from a cross-
border acquisition- a merger is a transaction in which two firms with their home operations
in different countries agree to an integration of the companies on a relatively equal basis.
Blending of such operations would make the two companies have capabilities that are
expected to create competitive advantage that will contribute to success in the global
marketplace.6
The present research aims in understanding the cross border transactions and regulations
provided under various Indian laws. This will included all provisions covering both inbound
and outbound mergers.
The present paper is divided into five chapters which includes all necessary aspects to
understand the technicality involved in a cross border merger. First chapter of the research
aims in understanding the meaning and types and mergers. Later part of the chapter will help
in understand the relevance of cross border mergers and its role in overall market.
Second chapter aims in understanding the regulations that governs the cross border mergers.
3
India breaks into top 10 M&A league, Economic Times, April 12, 2007
4
Cross-border M&A deals reaches $29 bn Economic Times, Dec 6, 2011
5
MIchaeL a. Hitt et al., Mergers and acquIsItIons- a guIde to
creatIng vaLue for stakehoLders 14 (2001).
6. See also Chandrima Das, Black and White Aspects of Cross Border Mergers, available at
http://www.caclubindia.com/articles/black-white-aspect-of-cross-border-merg- ers--3866.asp
(Last visited on Sept. 20, 2012).
4|P a g e
This includes SEBI, FEMA, Competition law, and Taxation law. This chapter includes all
important provisions of the above said regulations and their applicability with the help of
some of the land mark cases decided in various courts.
Third chapter includes only the provision of companies Act 1956 and specifically to section
394 of the Act. This will help in understanding how amalgamation or cross border mergers
are governed by the Act of 1956, with the help of some of the decided cases. The later part
of the chapter provides an understanding of the provisions which are included in New
Companies Bill 2011.
Fourth chapter aims in understanding the role of regulatory bodies, which is essential for
carrying out any business transaction in India and even in abroad. This chapter is divided in
to two part , where the first part explains the role of RBI in providing approval for cross
border mergers as provided under latest master circular of 2012 which is also known as
Master Circular on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly Owned
Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad dated July 2, 2012. The later part of the chapter explains the role
of CCI in cross border mergers. At the end this chapter also discusses the role of both RBI
and CCI in matter of any merger of Bank.
Fifth chapter includes two case studies one of which is on cross border merger of Bharti and
MTN which could not materialize because of Dual listing of the company. This chapter will
provide an insight as to what went wrong in that deal in simple and lucid manner. The later
part of the chapter includes the latest merger of all Indian subsidiaries of Vedanta group of
London, this is also known as Sesa- Sterlite deal. This chapter provides all the facts and
figures of the deal and also explains that how the company will transform after the merger.
FDI means investment by non-resident entity/person resident outside India in the capital of an
Indian company under Schedule 1 of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of
Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations 2000, popularly known as FEMA
20.8
7
Paragraph 1.1.1, Intent and Objective of Consolidated FDI Policy 2012
8
Paragraph 2.1.11 of Consolidated FDI Policy 2012
5|P a g e
Non-resident entity/person resident outside India means a person who is not a person resident
in India.9 Person resident in India10 .
According to the Indian Companies Act, 1956, only inbound cross border mergers and
acquisitions are allowed in India whereby a foreign company can only merge with an Indian
company but not the vice versa; although an Indian company can merge with an Indian
establishment of a foreign company.
When we talk about inbound cross border M&As in India, we essentially mean foreign
investment in India. As stated earlier, foreign investment in India, i.e. investment in India by
a “person resident outside India”, (hereinafter to be interchangeably used with “non resident
entity”) is governed by FEMA 20, RBI Master Circular on Foreign Investment in India
(hereinafter referred as RBI master circular), and after 2010 also by ‘Consolidated FDI
Policy’. RBI master circular and Consolidated FDI Policy are updated every year. Previously
FDI policy was being updated in every six months but in 2012 it was mentioned in the policy
itself that it will be updated every year.
Under FEMA 20, general permission has been granted to any non-resident entity to purchase
shares or convertible debentures of an Indian company under Foreign Direct Investment
Scheme, subject to the terms and conditions specified in Schedule 1 thereto.
A non-resident entity can invest in India, subject to the FDI Policy. A citizen of Bangladesh
or an entity incorporated in Bangladesh can invest only under the Government route. A
citizen of Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Pakistan can invest, only under the
Government route, in sectors/activities other than defence, space and atomic energy. 11 Further,
persons resident outside India are permitted to purchase equity or preference shares or
convertible debentures offered on right basis by an Indian company which satisfies the
conditions restated herein below:12
(i) The offer on right basis does not result in increase in the percentage of foreign equity
already approved, or permissible under the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme in terms
of FEMA 20;
9
Paragraph 2.1.24 of Consolidated FDI Policy 2012
10
Paragraph 2.1.29 of Consolidated FDI Policy 2012
11
Paragraph 3.1.1 of Consolidated FDI Policy 2012, as amended by Press note no. 3 of 2012 series,
dated 1st August 2012
12
Regulation 6 of FEMA 20
6|P a g e
(ii) The existing non-resident shareholders may apply for issue of additional shares, and the
investee company may allot the same subject to the condition that the overall issue of
shares to non-residents in the total paid up capital does not exceed the sectoral cap;
(iii) The existing shares or debentures against which shares or debentures are issued by the
company on right basis were acquired and are held by the person resident outside India
in accordance with FEMA 20;
(iv) The offer on right basis to the persons resident outside India shall be
(a) In the case of shares of a company listed on a recognized stock exchange in India,
at a price as determined by the company;
(b) In the case of shares of a company not listed on a recognized stock exchange in
India, at a price which is not lower than that at which the offer on right basis is
made to resident shareholders;
The right shares or debentures so acquired shall be subject to the same conditions regarding
repatriation as applicable to original shares or debentures against which right shares or
debentures are issued. Further, under FEMA 20, an Indian company has been permitted to
issue shares to its employees or employees of its joint venture / subsidiary abroad, who are
non-resident, either directly or through a trust. 13
Under Regulation 7 of FEMA 20, once a scheme of merger, demerger or amalgamation has
been approved by the court, the transferee company (whether the survivor or a new company)
is permitted to issue shares to the shareholders of the transferor company resident outside
India, subject to the following conditions, namely:
(a) the percentage of shareholding of persons resident outside India in the transferee or new
company does not exceed the percentage specified in the approval granted by the Central
Government or the Reserve Bank, or specified in these Regulations.
Provided that where the percentage is likely to exceed the percentage specified in the
approval or the Regulations, the transferor company or the transferee or new company
may, after obtaining an approval from the Central Government, apply to the Reserve Bank
for its approval under these Regulations.
(b) the transferor company or the transferee or new company shall not engage in agriculture,
plantation or real estate business or trading in TDRs; and
(c) the transferee or the new company files a report within 30 days with the Reserve Bank
giving full details of the shares held by persons resident outside India in the transferor and
the transferee or the new company, before and after the
merger/amalgamation/reconstruction, and also furnishes a confirmation that all the terms
and conditions stipulated in the scheme approved by the Court have been complied with.
13
Regulation 7 of FEMA 20
7|P a g e
General permission has also been granted for transfer of shares / convertible debentures by a
non-resident14 as follows:
(i) Non-residents other than non-resident Indians (“NRIs”) or Overseas Corporate Bodies
(“OCBs”) may transfer shares / convertible debentures, by way of sale or gift, to any
non-resident, provided that the transferee should have obtained permission of the
Central Government, if he had any previous venture or tie-up in India through
investment in shares or debentures or a technical collaboration or trademark agreement
in the same or allied field in which the Indian company whose shares are being
transferred is engaged;
(ii) NRIs are permitted to transfer by way of sale or gift, any shares or convertible
debentures of Indian companies to other NRIs only;
(iii) Non-residents are permitted to transfer shares / debentures of any Indian company to a
resident by way of gift and can sell the same on a recognized stock exchange in India
through a registered broker.
FEMA 20 further stipulates that any transfer of security by a resident to a non-resident, not
being erstwhile OCBs, would require the prior approval of the RBI. 15 For the transfer of
existing shares/convertible debentures of an Indian company by a resident to a non resident
by way of sale, the transferor will have to obtain the approval of the Central Government
before applying to the RBI. In such cases, the RBI may permit the transfer subject to such
terms and conditions, including the price at which the sale may be made.
For the purpose of FEMA 20, investment in India by a non-resident has been divided into the
following 5 categories and the regulations applicable have been specified in respective
schedules as under:
i) Investment under the Foreign Direct Investment Scheme 16 (“the FDI Scheme”).
ii) Investment by Foreign Institutional Investors17 (“FIIs”) under the Portfolio Investment
Scheme (“the Portfolio Investment Scheme”).
iii) Investment by NRIs under the Portfolio Investment Scheme18 .
iv) Purchase and sale of shares by NRIs on non-repatriation basis19 .
v) Purchase and sale of securities other than shares or convertible debentures of an Indian
company by a Person resident outside India20 .
14
Regulation 9 of FEMA 20
15
Regulation 10 of FEMA 20
16
Schedule 1 of FEMA 20
17
Schedule 2 of FEMA 20
18
Schedule 3 of FEMA 20
19
Schedule 4 of FEMA 20
20
Schedule 5 of FEMA 20
8|P a g e
The following schemes are related to cross border merger and acquisition and the prominent
features of the schemes are as below:
I. FDI Scheme
Under the FDI Scheme, a non resident or a foreign entity, whether incorporated or not, may
purchase shares or convertible debentures, issued by an Indian company. If the non resident
to whom the shares are being issued proposes to be a collaborator or proposes to acquire the
entire shareholding of a new Indian company, he should have obtained the prior permission
of Central Government, subject to certain exceptions, if he had, as on January 12, 2005, an
existing joint venture or technology transfer/trademark agreement in India in the same field in
which the Indian company issuing the shares is engaged.
Further, a small scale industrial unit can issue shares or debentures to non-resident entities up
to 24% of its paid up capital. An Indian company can also issue ADR/GDR to non-resident
subject to fulfilment of conditions specified in the schedule itself.
Provided that the shares or convertible debentures are not being issued by the Indian
Company with a view to acquire existing shares of another Indian company.
It also prescribes a ceiling of 10% of the total paid-up equity capital or 10% of the paid-up
value of each series of convertible debentures, and provides that the total holdings of all
FIIs/sub-accounts of FIIs put together shall not exceed 24% of paid-up equity capital or paid
up value of each series of convertible debentures.
Provided that the limit of 24% may be increased up to sectoral cap/statutory ceiling, as
applicable, by the Indian company concerned by passing a resolution by its board of directors
followed by passing a special resolution to that effect by its general body with the prior
approval of RBI.
RBI may also permit a domestic asset management company or a portfolio manager
registered with SEBI as FIIs for managing the sub-account to make investment under the
Portfolio Investment Scheme on behalf of non-residents who are foreign citizens and bodies
9|P a g e
corporate registered outside India, provided such investment is made out of funds raised or
collected or brought from outside India through normal banking channel.
Such investment is restricted to 5% of the equity capital or 5% of the paid-up value of each
series of convertible debentures within the overall ceiling of 24% as applicable for FIIs for
the purpose of the Portfolio Investment Scheme.
The designated branch of an authorised dealer is authorised to allow remittance of net sale
proceeds (after payment of taxes) or to credit the net amount of sale proceeds of shares /
convertible debentures to the foreign currency account or a non-resident rupee account of the
registered FII concerned.
(i) The NRI may purchase and sell shares/convertible debentures under this scheme
through a branch designated by an authorised dealer for the purpose and duly approved
by RBI;
(ii) The paid-up value of shares of an Indian company, purchased by each NRI both on
repatriation and on non-repatriation basis, does not exceed 5% of the paid-up value of
shares issued by the company concerned;
(iii) The paid-up value of each series of convertible debentures purchased by each NRI both
on repatriation and non-repatriation basis does not exceed 5% of the paid-up value of
each series of convertible debentures issued by the company concerned;
(iv) The aggregate paid-up value of shares of any company purchased by all NRIs does not
exceed 10% of the paid up capital of the company and in the case of purchase of
convertible debentures the aggregate paid-up value of each series of debentures
purchased by all NRIs does not exceed 10% of the paid-up value of each series of
convertible debentures;
Provided that the aggregate ceiling of 10% may be raised to 24% if a special resolution
to that effect is passed by general body of the Indian company concerned.
(v) The NRI investor takes delivery of the shares purchased and gives delivery of shares
sold;
(vi) Payment for purchase of shares and/or debentures is made by inward remittance in
foreign exchange through normal banking channels or out of funds held in NRE/FCNR
account maintained in India if the shares are purchased on repatriation basis and by
inward remittance or out of funds held in NRE/FCNR/NRO/NRNR/NRSR account of
10 | P a g e
the NRI concerned maintained in India where the shares/debentures are purchased on
non-repatriation basis;
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 further provides that the link office of the designated branch of an
authorised dealer is obliged to furnish daily report to the Chief General Manager, Reserve
Bank of India, ECD, Central Office, Mumbai in a format supplied by RBI
After a global merger between Eaton Industries Inc.(EII) and Aeroquip Vickers(AVI) , EII
came to hold 51% shares in Vickers system international limited (VSIL), a publicly listed
companies incorporated in India. It was held in Eaton Industries case, that the SEBI Takeover
Code would not get triggered since there was ample proof to suggest that there had been a
merger of EII with AVI under the laws of the state of Ohio in the US and indirect acquisition
of controlling interest of VSIL was purely a fallout and incidental to the global restructuring
arrangement. SEBI has directed, vide Circular dated 15th April, 2010, the modification of the
listing agreement focusing on certain deviations from accounting standards commonly carried
out as part of scheme of mergers.
Japanese drug maker, Daiichi Sankyo Companies Limited, which owns India’s biggest drug
firm, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, has won the open offer price war with Hyderabad based
Zenotech Laboratories Limited in a Supreme Court. India’s Apex Court has struck down
ruling by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), thus allowing DAIICHI to launch an open
offer for a 20% stake in Zenotech at Rs. 113.62 per share. The Takeover Regulations
Advisory committee under the chairmanship of C. Achuthan, in its report to the SEBI, has
proposed sweeping changes on critical issues, including the open offer trigger, offer size,
11 | P a g e
indirect acquisition, exemption from open offer obligations, calculating the offer prize and
competing offers. The renewed Takeover Code would have certain changes such as
increasing the period for making a competing bid, prohibiting acquirers from being
represented in the board of Target Company, and permitting any competing acquirer to
negotiate and acquire the shares tendered to the other competing acquirer, at the same price
that was offered by him to the public. Vedanta’s Takeover offer for Cairn energy has raised
some questions because it comes in wake of impending changes to a SEBI Takeover
Regulations that may make it potentially difficult for the acquirers to structure transactions.
2.3 TAXATION:
The tax law consists of the body of rules of public law that affect the activities and reciprocal
interest of a political community and the members opposing it as distinguished from
relationships between individuals in the sphere of private law. The first step in any
reorganization activity is to explore leveraging local country operations for cash management
and repatriation advantages, the companies should also be looking at the availability of asset
basis set up structure for tax purposes and keeping a keen eye on valuable tax attributes in
M&A targets, including the net operating losses, foreign tax credits and tax holidays. As per
the provisions of the IT Act, capital gains tax would be levied on such transactions when
capital asset are transferred. From the definition of “transfer” it is clear that if merger,
amalgamation, demerger or any sort of restructuring results in transfer of capital asset, it
would lead to a taxable event.
12 | P a g e
The concept of levy of tax on a transfer of beneficial ownership in a cross border transfer is
not provided for in the current tax legislation, but the revenue authorities are of the view that
in a cross border transaction the value of the transaction includes valuation for the Indian
entity as well and, accordingly, the overseas entity which has a business connection in India.
Amalgamation is merger of one or more companies with another or merger of two or more
companies to form a new company, in such a way that all assets and liabilities of the
amalgamating company becomes assets and liabilities of the amalgamated company and
shareholders not less than 75% in value of the shares in the amalgamating company or
companies become the shareholders of the amalgamated company.
In the case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Mrs. Grace Collis & Another 21 , the supreme
court has held that, “extinguishment of any right in any capital asset” under the definition of
“transfer” would include the extinguishment of the right of the holders of shares in an
amalgamating company, which would be distinct from and independent of the transfer of
capital assets itself. Hence, the right of the shareholders of the amalgamating company in the
capital asset i.e. the shares, stands extinguished upon the amalgamation of the amalgamating
company with the amalgamated company and this constitutes a transfer under section 2(47)
of the IT Act. Benefits of taxation in respect to cross border mergers and amalgamations
under Income Tax Act, 1961:
Section 47(via): Any transfer in a scheme of amalgamation, of a capital asset being a share or
shares held in an Indian company, by the amalgamating foreign company to the amalgamated
foreign company if :
(i) At least 25% of shareholders of the amalgamating foreign company continue to remain
shareholders of the amalgamated foreign company.
(ii) Such transfer does not attract tax on capital gains in the country in which the
amalgamating company is incorporated.
(i) The transfer is made in contravention of the allotment to him of any share or shares in the
amalgamated company.
(ii) The amalgamated company is an Indian company. Section 79: carry forward and set off
of losses in case of a company not being the company in which the public are substantially
21
[2001] 248 ITR 323 (SC)
13 | P a g e
interested, no loss incurred in a any year prior to the previous year shall be carried forward
and off against the income of previous year unless –
(a) on the last day of the previous year the shares of the company carrying not less than
51% shares of the voting power were beneficially held by persons who beneficially
held shares of the company carrying not less than 51% of the voting power on the last
day of the year or years in which the loss was incurred.
Section 72A (2): provisions relating to carry forward and set off accumulated loss and
unabsorbed depreciation allowances in amalgamation or demergers. No tax exemption is
provided under the IT Act, 1961, in case of amalgamation of an Indian co. into a foreign
company wherein the resultant amalgamated company is a foreign company. The test of
residence is based on either place of effective management or place of central control and
management. It is therefore argued that a company incorporated outside India will be treated
as resident in India if its “place of effective management” is situated in India. With the
Ruling in the case of CIT v. Visakhapatnam Port trust 22 , the Judiciary reemphasized the
importance of international tax jurisprudence aligned with OECD standard modules, while
interpreting tax matters in Indian courts. In Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. ITC 23 , it
was held that interpretation of a DTAA must be in consonance with the principle of
international law.
The revenue authorities are exploring the possibility of generating tax from cross border
reorganization resulting in the transfer of beneficial interest of the Indian company. This is on
the basis of substance theory that the country has a right to claim tax on the profit generated
from the business carried out in India. By introducing DTC, Government widens scope of
anti abuse provisions in IT Act. Under 1961 Act, foreign Companies were regarded as
“Resident of India” only if their control and management was wholly situated India. The
DTC has modified this and now a foreign company will be treated as “Resident of India” if
22
1983 144 ITR 146 AP
23
(2002) 76 TTJ Cal 323
24
AIR 1986 SC 649, (1985)
14 | P a g e
its control and management is wholly or partly situated in India. Treating a foreign company
as “Resident of India” would have serious tax implications as its world income would be
taxable in India. Moreover it would be subject to Dividend Distribution Tax etc.
It is provided that even income arising from Indirect Transfer of capital asset in India, would
be deemed to accrue or arise in India. The DTC continues present position regarding
Business Reorganization that they should be tax neutral. One important beneficial provision
is that the successor will be allowed the benefit of accumulated losses of the predecessor of
business provided stipulated conditions are satisfied. The DTC also would abolish distinction
between long and short term capital gains, as well as security transaction tax (a tax levied on
stock exchange transactions).
The CBDT – Circular No. 333 dated 2nd April, 1982 that in case of conflict in the provisions
of the agreement for tax avoidance of double taxation and the Income Tax Act, the provisions
contained in the Agreement for DTAA will prevail. Neither the treaty nor the Code shall have
a preferential status by reason of it being treaty or law; and (b) the provision which later in
time shall prevail. In effect, the accepted principle under International Taxation and current
law that treaty provisions will override the Income Tax act has been altered. As the DTC
would be later in time than most of treaties, it will override such treaties. This will cause
great hardship to many Indian and foreign companies having cross border transactions and
result in considerable tax litigations. Controlled Foreign corporations (CFCs)
recommendation of the Kelkar working Committee report on Tax reforms in India brought an
international tax concept in India. A provision including taxation of CFC income is proposed
for the first time in DTC. Under these provisions, passive income earned by a foreign
company controlled directly or indirectly by a resident in India, if such income is not
distributed to shareholders, will be deemed to have been distributed and be taxable in India in
the hands of resident shareholders as dividend received from the foreign company.
The DTC would introduce a GAAR to deal with specific instances where a taxpayer enters
into an arrangement, the main purpose of which is to obtain a tax benefit and the arrangement
is entered into or carried on in a manner not normally employed for bona fide business
purposes, is not at arm’s length, abuses the provisions of the DTC or lacks economic
substance. The proposed GAAR does not distinguish between tax mitigation and tax
avoidance, with the result that any arrangement to obtain a tax benefit could be deemed to be
an impermissible avoidance agreement. Central Board of Direct Taxes issue guidelines are to
provide for the circumstances and thresholds under which GAAR could be invoked. Further
the Dispute Resolution Panel would be made available when the GAAR is invoked against a
taxpayer. A general treaty override would render India’s tax treaties redundant and would
violate the spirit and intent of Vienna conventions; the revised discussion paper indicates that
DTC would be amended to provide for a limited tax treaty override; i.e. it would apply only
when the GAAR or CFC provisions are invoked or when branch profits tax is levied.
15 | P a g e
must be to honour the common good, and prevent concentration of wealth. Anti-competitive
agreements can either be in vertical or in horizontal combinations. Vertical restraints include
cartels, bid-rigging etc. Horizontal restraints can be in the form of tie-in arrangements, refusal
to deal and maintenance of resale price. The Competition Act, 2002 has overridden the
Monopolies and restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 in India, which provides for regulations
to curb restraints and promote fair competition in the market. Section 3 of the Competition
Act, 2002 governs anti-competitive agreements and prohibits: “agreements involving
production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of
services, which cause or are likely to cause an ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ in
India.“
The Act prohibits the abuse of dominant position by an enterprise. It defines ‘combination’
by providing threshold limits in terms assets and turnover, rendering it a little restrictive in
scope. The Competition Act prohibits enterprises from entering into agreements that cause or
are likely to cause an “appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market
in India”. Section 32 of the Competition Act explicitly allows the Competition Commission
to examine a combination already in effect outside India and pass orders against it, provided
that it has an ‘appreciable adverse effect’ on competition in India. This power is extremely
wide and allows the Competition Commission to extend its jurisdiction beyond the Indian
shores and declare any qualifying foreign merger or acquisition as void. Globalization and the
growth in such cross border mergers have thrown up major challenges to competition
authorities around the world. Commission of India is still finding its feet in so far as trade
regulation in the country is concerned. The control of mergers is one such aspect which the
Commission shall encounter in the near future. The powers of merger review of CCI thus
impacts the feasibility of certain deals. The Competition Act, 2002 has been inspired by the
UNCITRAL Model Law and the US Anti-Trust Laws. But since the market conditions are
very different in India, the US anti-trust law and European community merger control
regulation concepts may not be interpreted or applied in the same way.
Basically Section 394 (4)(b) of the company act 1956 applies to cross border merger and
acquisition. Section 394(4)(b) states that a „transferee company‟ under the section can only
be a „company within the meaning of this Act‟ while a „transferor company‟ can be
16 | P a g e
„anybody corporate, whether within the meaning of the Act or not‟. The expression „body
corporate‟ includes a foreign company under Section 2(7). Thus, under the purview of
Section 394, a foreign company can amalgamate/merge into an Indian company with the
sanction of the court25 .
The permissibility of such cross border mergers is also evident from the provisions of the
Income Tax Act, 1961. Under the Income Tax Act, an amalgamation means the merger of
one or more companies with another company or the merger of two or more companies to
form one company26 subject to fulfilment of the conditions specified there under. Section
2(17) defines a company to include a foreign company as well. Section 47(vi) specifies that a
transfer in the scheme of amalgamation is not to be regarded as transfer for the purposes of
charge of capital gains tax where the amalgamated company (i.e. the resulting company) is an
Indian company. Furthermore, section 47(vii) exempts a transfer of shares by shareholders of
shares in the amalgamating company (foreign company in our case) if the transfer is made in
consideration of the allotment to him of any share or shares in the amalgamated company
which is required to be an Indian company. Thus, merger of a foreign company into an Indian
company is expressly allowed and receives tax benefits.
The problem arises in the reverse case whereby an Indian company seeks to
merge/amalgamate into a foreign company. To find an answer to the aforesaid problem, let us
explore the underpinnings of the expression „within the meaning of this Act‟. Section 2(10)
defines a company to mean a company as defined in Section 3. The latter section defines the
expression „company‟ as a company formed and registered under this Act or an existing
company. Clearly, the expression as defined under the Act excludes a foreign company.
However, the determinative question is whether the expression „company as defined under
this Act‟ distinct and different from „company within the meaning of this Act‟. Prima facie,
there does not appear to be a distinction between the two expressions. Thus, on an apparent
consideration of Section 394(4)(b), it seems that a transferee company has to be a company
registered under the Act.
However, judicial dicta in Andhra Bank Housing Finance Ltd. v. Andhra Bank27 and In Re
Vibank Housing Finance Ltd.28 have taken an expansive interpretation of the expression in
view of Section 4. Both cases involved consideration of schemes of amalgamation between a
company formed under the Companies Act, 1956 and a body corporate formed under
different legislations (viz. Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1980). Clearly, a body corporate can only be a transferor under Section 394 and not a
transferee. However, the transferor companies were subsidiaries of the transferee body
corporate. For the purposes of Section 4, “company” includes, anybody corporate‟ and thus,
a body corporate is regarded as “holding company” under the Act. The Court, in both cases,
came to the conclusion that there is an apparent conflict between Section 394(4) (b) and
Section 4(5). Thus, applying the principle of harmonious construction, it has been held that a
25
Bombay Gas Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [1997] 89 Comp Cas 195 (Bom); Andhra Bank Housing
Finance Ltd. v. Andhra Bank [2003] 47 SCL 513 (AP).
26
Section 2(1B).
27
[2003] 47 SCL 513 (AP).
28
[2006] 130 Comp Cas705 (Kar).
17 | P a g e
transferee company which includes a body corporate is a company for the purpose of the Act.
Hence, it was held that a transferor company can amalgamate with a transferee parent
company which might be a body corporate. The essence of the reasoning seems to be that the
expression „within the meaning of the Act‟ looks beyond the definitional section of the Act
and applies even in case where a specific definition is provided under another section viz.
section 4 in this case.
A caveat needs to be inserted to the reasoning presented above. In view of their peculiar facts
and reference to Section 4, the cases seem to be authorities only for schemes of amalgamation
between a subsidiary company and a holding company where the latter is a body corporate.
However, the definition of „body corporate‟ under Section 2(7) expressly includes a foreign
company within its ambit. Thus, in cases where the Indian subsidiary seeks to merge with
foreign holding company, the cases would be good precedents. To negate the aforesaid
reasoning, the following arguments can be advanced: (a) The Report of the Expert Committee
on Company Law, 2005 (Irani Committee Report), argues that under the current framework
of law as provided under Section 394, an Indian company cannot merge into a foreign
company. The Report states the position in the following words: A forward looking law on
mergers and amalgamations needs to also recognize that an Indian company ought to be
permitted with a foreign company to merger. Both contract based mergers between an Indian
company and a foreign company and court based mergers between such entities where the
foreign company is the transferee, needs to be recognized in Indian Law. The Committee
recognizes that this would require some pioneering work between various jurisdictions in
which such mergers and acquisitions are being executed /created.
(b) Secondly, in the case of Bombay Gas Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India29 , the court has
categorically laid down that: It is quite clear from the special provisions of law contained in
section 394(4)(b) of the Act that the transferor company could be a body corporate
incorporated outside India but the transferee company could not be a foreign company.
Thus, an interpretation of section 394(4)(b) does not yield any satisfactory result in respect of
such cross border mergers whereby an Indian company merges with a foreign company.
Some cases have held that the transfer of shares in accordance with a scheme under section
391-6 of the act does not constitute a transfer for the purpose of the act. In the case of
Moschip Semiconductor technology Limited, the High Court of the state of Andhra Pradesh,
dealing with the amalgamation of an Indian company (as the transferee) and a foreign
company governed by the laws of California (as the transferor), held that, under Section 1108
29
[1997] 89 Comp Cas 195 (Bom).
30
Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, AIR 2002 SC 1432, Paragraph 15 ; Thirath Singh v. Bachittar
Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830, at p.833.
18 | P a g e
of the California Corporation Code and in contrast to the provisions of Indian law, the
surviving company could be either a domestic company or a foreign company. In the above
matter, the court observed that “in these days of liberal globalization, a liberal view is
expected to be taken enabling such a scheme of arrangement for amalgamation between a
domestic company and a foreign company and there is every need for suitable modification of
the law in that direction.”
1) Scheme of amalgamation:
The scheme of amalgamation should be prepared by the companies, which have arrived at a
consensus to merge. There is no specific form prescribed for scheme of amalgamation but
scheme should generally contain the following information:
19 | P a g e
18. Transferor and transferee companies give assent to change in the scheme by the court or
other authorities under the law and exercising the powers on behalf of the companies by their
respective Boards.
19. Description of powers of delegatee of transferee to give effect to the scheme.
20. Qualification attached to the scheme, which requires approval of different agencies, etc.
21. Description of revocation/cancellation of the scheme in the absence of approvals qualified
in clause 20 above not granted by concerned authorities.
22. Statement to bear costs etc. in connection with the scheme by the transferee company.
20 | P a g e
6) High Court directions for members’ meeting:
Upon the hearing of the summons, the High Court shall give directions for fixing the date,
time and venue and quorum for the members’ meeting and appoint an Advocate Chairman to
preside over the meeting and submit a report to the Court. Similar directions are issued by the
court for calling the meeting of creditors in case such a request has been made in the
application.
11) Holding the shareholders’ general meeting and passing the resolutions:
The general meeting should be held on the appointed date. Rule 77 of the Companies (Court)
Rules prescribes that the decisions of the meeting held pursuant to the court order should be
ascertained only by taking a poll. The amalgamation scheme should be approved by the
members, by a majority in number of members present in person or on proxy and voting on
21 | P a g e
the resolution and this majority must represent at least three fourth in value of the shares held
by the members who vote in the poll.
15) Issue of notice to Regional Director, Company Law Board under section 394 – A:
On receipt of the petition for amalgamation under section 391 of Companies Act, 1956 the
Court will give notice of the petition to the Regional Director, Company Law Board and will
take into consideration the representations, if any, made by him.
22 | P a g e
required vide section 394(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 within 30 days after the date of the
Court’s order in Form No. 21 prescribed under the (Central Government’s) General Rules
and Forms, 1956. The amalgamation will be given effect to from the date on which the High
Court’s order is filed with the Registrar.
1. Where transferor company is not a listed company, the formalities prescribed under listing
agreement do not exist and the allotment could take place without setting the record date or
giving any advance notice to shareholders except asking them to surrender their old share
certificates for exchange by the new ones.
2. The second situation will emerge different where transferor company is a listed company. In
this case, the stock exchange is to be intimated of the record date by giving at least 42 days
notice or such notice as provided in the listing agreement.
3. The third situation is where allotment to Non-Resident Indians is involved and permission of
Reserve Bank of India is necessary.
The allotment will take place only on receipt of RBI permission. In this connection refer to
regulations 7, 9 and 10B of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by
a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000 as and where applicable. Having made
the allotment, the tranferee company is required to file with ROC with return of allotment in
Form No. 2 appended to the Companies (Central Government’s) General Rules and Forms
within 30 days from the date of allotment in terms of section 75 of the Act. Transferee
company shall having issued the new share certificates in lieu of and in exchange of old ones,
surrendered by transferor’s shareholders should make necessary entries in the register of
members and index of members for the shares so allotted in terms of sections 150 and 151
respectively of the Companies Act, 1956.
23 | P a g e
21) Court order to be annexed to memorandum of transferee company:
It is the mandatory requirement vide section 391(4) of the Companies Act, 1956 that after the
certified copy of the Court’s order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation is filed with
Registrar, it should be annexed to every copy of the Memorandum issued by the transferee
company. Failure to comply with requirement renders the company and its officers liable to
punishment.
Companies Act, 1956: Cross-border mergers are permitted only if the transferee is an Indian
company, and not vice-versa
Companies Bill, 2011: The Bill has opened doors for cross- border mergers by allowing
them both ways subject to certain conditions. Permission of Reserve Bank of India shall also
be a pre-requisite in cross-border M&As. The consideration to shareholders of the
amalgamating company may be discharged by payment of cash, or issuance of Indian
Depository Receipts, or a combination of both. In case the Indian Company is the
amalgamating company, The Central Government will notify the jurisdictions of the foreign
Company which are allowed for such cross-border mergers.
Prior Approval
Another potentially unwished-for-change is the requirement of seeking prior RBI approval
for any and all cross-border M&A activity. The inherent paperwork and lengthy timelines
surrounding regulatory approval could prove practically onerous for Indian corporate, should
such a process be required for each and every cross-border transaction.
24 | P a g e
uncertain as to whether Indian Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) will be given the ability
to engage in cross-border mergers and amalgamations as part of their future commercial
strategy.
The merging entities must then consider the concerns of the registrar and liquidator and
approve the scheme in their respective general meetings. Next, both transferor and transferee
companies must file a declaration of solvency with the registrar that has jurisdiction. The
merging entities must also seek approval from their respective creditors.
The bill stipulates that any objection to the proposed scheme must be made only by persons
that hold at least a 10% shareholding or with outstanding debt amounting to at least 5% of the
total outstanding debt, as detailed in the last audited financial statement. On receipt of
approval from the shareholders and creditors, the scheme must be filed with the NCLT and
the registrar and liquidator that have jurisdiction.
The bill also describes the process addressing situations where objections may again be raised
by the relevant authorities. If no objections are raised, the NCLT will confirm, approve and
register the scheme and thereafter notify the registrar. Registration of the scheme will have
the effect of liquidating the Transferor Company or companies. The process appears to be
detailed, but several questions have arisen and more are expected during testing. For
example, it is unclear whether the shareholders and creditors must approve the scheme in the
same or in two separate general meetings. As the proposed provision requires no approval
31
A 'small company' is defined under Section 2(85) of the bill as a company, other than
a public company: l whose paid-up share capital does not exceed approximately $101,000 (or
such higher amount as may be prescribed, which shall not exceed approximately $1,014,000); or l
whose turnover in the last profit and loss account does not exceed approximately $405,000 (or
such higher amount as may be prescribed, which shall not exceed approximately $4 million).
This is subject to the provision that nothing in this clause shall apply to: l a holding company or a
subsidiary company; l a company registered for charitable purposes; or l company or body
corporate governed by any special act.
32
The NCLT is a proposed body that is expected to become a comprehensive forum
for various matters under the bill.
25 | P a g e
from the high court or NCLT, it is therefore aimed at providing substantial relief to small
companies, as well as to their holdings and subsidiaries, when deciding on consolidation and
mergers – particularly those that have so far desisted due to the cumbersome process
involved.
New regulators
The bill provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction over any suit or proceeding in
respect of any matter that the NCLT is empowered to determine under the bill. The only
exception is in out-of-court approvals, where the objections or suggestions of the registrar of
companies and official liquidator prevail – if they object, the matter will proceed to the
NCLT. The bill proposes the establishment of both the NCLT and the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which will replace several existing forums, including the
Company Law Board, the Board for Industrial and Financial Restructuring and the Appellate
Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction.
The NCLT will consist of a president and other judicial and technical members, as
prescribed. The president will be appointed by the central government but, following
consultation with the chief justice of India and the members, will be appointed by the central
government on the recommendation of a selection committee. The NCLT is expected to take
over the role of the high court in approving schemes for amalgamations and liquidation and
dealing with petitions for oppression and mismanagement and other roles performed by the
Company Law Board and the Board for Industrial and Financial Restructuring. However, the
creation of the NCLT has been controversial right from the start. 33 Although the act was
amended as early as 2002 to pave the way for the establishment of the NCLT, the body is yet
to be established and the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act 2002 are yet to be
notified, as several aspects of its constitution and functioning have been the subject of
litigation. In a recent development, a constitution bench of the Supreme Court has upheld the
creation of the NCLT as constitutional. 34
Once the proposed provision has been notified, it will also quash the Company Law Board.
The purpose of the provision is to reduce the burden of the high courts by creating a high-
power tribunal that will hear all company law matters. Keeping this in view, the expectation
is that the formation of the NCLT should help to expedite the M&A process. Under the
existing regime, a decision of the high court can be challenged before the Supreme Court.
The bill provides that appeals from the NCLT will now go to the NCLAT, and thereafter
directly to the Supreme Court. This should ensure that uniform decisions are received on a
particular subject by the NCLAT instead of different decisions on the same or similar matters
by different high courts, leading to confusion in relation to jurisprudence.
33
In R Gandhi v Union of India, ([2004] 120 Com Cases (Mad)), the constitutional validity of the NCLT
and NCLAT was challenged.
34
Union of India v R Gandhi/Madras Bar Association, [2010] 100 SLC 142.
26 | P a g e
ROLE OF REGULATORY BODIES IN CROSS BORDER
MERGERS
The Authorities in India which are responsible for grant of approval include, Reserve Bank of
India and Competition commission of India. This chapter will determine how role of
competition commission is very vital for any cross border merger transaction. And the later
part will include the role of RBI in granting the approval for Cross border mergers that
includes provisions of Companies Act 1956 and provision under new Companies Bill 2011
The latest Master Circular on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly
Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad dated July 2, 2012, is the latest circular which talks about
the mandatory approval of RBI in case of any investment by any Indian company in foreign
entity who is engaged in the business of Real Estate and Banking
The request for merger can emanate from banks registered under the same State Act or from
banks registered under the Multi State Cooperative Societies Act (Central Act) for takeover
of a bank/s registered under State Act. While the State Acts specifically provide for merger
of co- operative societies registered under them, the position with regard to take over of a co-
operative bank registered under the State Act by a co-operative bank registered under the
Central Act .
There are no specific provisions in the State Acts or the Central Act for the merger of a co-
operative society under the State Acts. With that under the Central Act, it is felt that, if all
concerned including administrators of the concerned Acts are agreeable to order merger/
amalgamation, RBI may consider proposals on merits leaving the question of compliance
with relevant statutes to the administrators of the Acts. In other words, Reserve Bank will
confine its examination only to financial aspects and to the interests of depositors as well as
the stability of the financial system while considering such proposals. In the post reform
period almost all the public sector banks have improved their performance in terms
profitability, low NPAs and raised fresh equity from the capital markets at a good premium.
27 | P a g e
Forced mergers may be detrimental to the further growth of these banks. Dilution of
Government ownership may be a prerequisite to improve operational freedom and to devise
performance-linked incentives for public sector employees, which are essential to tackle the
post- merger problems arising out of forced mergers. Another issue, which is completely
ignored, is impact of consolidation on customers, especially small borrowers who are
dependent on the banking channel. The other consolidation model, which is simultaneously in
progress, is operational consolidation among banks. The largest public sector bank State
Bank of India is being operationally integrated with its subsidiaries in providing various
banking services. Above all we firmly believe that certain corporate governance issues are to
be solved on a priority basis before implementation of merger agenda.
The various aspects & provisions of the power of Competition Commission of India in
relation to cross border mergers are provided in Section 5 of the Competition Act 2002 and
the change proposed in it by the notification taken out by the MCA on 4 th march 2011 and
how it affected cross border transactions. Section 32 of the competition act 2002 throws light
on extraterritorial jurisdictions.
The powers of merger review of CCI thus impacts the feasibility of certain deals. 35 The
Competition Act, 2002(hereinafter CA) introduces three enforcement areas usually found in
modern competition law regimes: prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 36 , prohibition of
abuse of dominance37 and merger regulation.38 Many concepts of the new law are similar to
those found in other jurisdictions, such as European Union or US competition law. But since
the market conditions are very different in India, these concepts may not be interpreted or
applied in the same way.39 The first confession that needs to be made and accepted without
any reservations is that in an interdependent world economy everything affects everything
else. Economic and industrial globalization has increased international competition and given
35
The Competition Act, 2002 represents a clean break with the former competition law regime: a
modern competition law inspired by the laws on restrictive agreements and dominant firm
conduct, as well as merger regulation, in jurisdictions with long-standing enforcement records,
most notably the European Union.
36
Section 3, Competition Act, 2002
37
Section 4, Competition Act, 2002
38
Section 5 and Section 6, Competition Act, 2002
39
See ‘Indian Starts Antitrust Enforcement: The Legal Framework Explained’. A concept note by
Linklaters available online at www.linklaters.uk. Retrieved on 1 March 2010.
28 | P a g e
rise to the need for an increasingly integrated and evolving legal system. A number of trends
have contributed to the accelerated globalization of industry and the integration of
international economies. For instance, the growing similarity in available infrastructure,
distribution channels, and marketing approaches has enabled companies to introduce products
and brands to a universal marketplace.40
However this is not to suggest that the Competition Act, 2002(hereinafter CA) should govern
all the international economic conduct. There is a need to identify ways of distinguishing
those international matters affecting Indian commerce sufficiently to warrant sufficient
attention from our law.41 It needs to be kept in mind that many ordinary difficulties of
applying antitrust principles are compounded by the different mores and economic
circumstances of international markets.42 These issues would have been at the background
with a much lesser significance if the basis of jurisdiction was territorial and focused on the
question as to where the relevant conduct occurred. However, with the judicially created
“effects” test having come to the fore and the rise of its dominance these issues have acquired
tremendous prominence.
Section 32 of the Competition Act explicitly allows the Competition Commission to examine
a combination already in effect outside India and pass orders against it provided that it has an
'appreciable adverse effect' on competition in India. This power is extremely wide and allows
the Competition Commission to extend its jurisdiction beyond the Indian shores and declare
any qualifying foreign merger or acquisition as void. An 'appreciable adverse effect on
competition means anything that reduces or diminishes competition in the market. Section 32
states that:
The Commission shall, notwithstanding that,- (a) an agreement referred to in section 3 has
been entered into outside India; or (b) any party to such agreement is outside India; or (c) any
enterprise abusing the dominant position is outside India; or (d) a combination has taken
place outside India; or (e) any party to combination is outside India; or (f) any other matter or
practice or action arising out of such agreement or dominant position or combination is
outside India, have power to inquire into such agreement or abuse of dominant position or
40
Kenneth J. Hammer, ‘The Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and Competition Law
in
the United States, The European Union, Latin America and China’, 11 Journal of Transnational Law
and
Policy, pp. 385-406 at p. 385.
41
With the enforcement of antitrust law beginning on 20 May 2009, India joins the circle of global
economic powers with effective tools to combat anti-competitive agreements and abuses of
dominant
positions and powers to review mergers and acquisitions.
42
See generally Kahn-Freund, ‘Some Reflections on Company Law Reform’, The Modern Law Review,
Vol. 7, No. ½, Apr. 1944, pp54-66 on the changing function of the company law as far its economic
and
social functions are concerned.
29 | P a g e
combination if such agreement or dominant position or combination has, or is likely to have,
an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in India.
The wording of Section 32 succinctly lays down the scope of the applicability of the
provision as far as the subject matter is concerned. It shall apply to:
• Anti-competitive agreements
• Abuse of dominant position
• Combinations43
Combinations in the terminology of CA or cross border mergers have thus been included
within the domain of the regulatory and investigative powers of the Commission. This
provision needs to be read along with Section 18 of CA. Section 18 specifies in rather generic
terms the duties of the Commission and the steps it can take to perform its functions under
CA. It states that:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Commission to eliminate
practices having adverse effect on competition, promote and sustain competition, protect the
interests of consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants, in
markets in India: Provided that the Commission may, for the purpose of discharging its duties
or performing its functions under this Act, enter into any memorandum or arrangement with
the prior approval of the Central Government, with any agency of any foreign country.44
This provision is a vindication of the purpose of the Act stated in rather broad terms in the
preamble of the Act.45 This enabling provision actually provides teeth to the power conferred
to the Commission under Section 32.
It was in the case of US v. Aluminium Company46 of America et al; famously known as the
Alcoa case‘ that Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that any State may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders‘. This doctrine was given statutory recognition in US in 1994
by the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act. Similarly, European Union also
recognizes this concept, though with minor theoretical differences.
43
Anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance are to be prohibited by the orders of the
Commission whereas the mergers are to be regulated by the orders of the Commission. This
difference in law is of immense significance. Whereas the former two prevent enhancement of
consumer welfare the latter drives economic growth.
44
This provision is in fact an implicit recognition and incorporation of the limits to the ‘effects’ test
as incorporated under Section 32.
45
Preamble of the Act in verbatim states that: An Act to provide, keeping in vie w of the economic
development of the country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices having
adverse affect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the
interests of consumers and to ensure to freedom of trade carried on by other participants in
markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
46
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945)
30 | P a g e
Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India recognised this doctrine in the famous ANSAC case 47 but
held that under the MRTP Act, 1969, MRTP Commission could take action only against the
Indian legislation of the restrictive trade practice 48 . This restriction has been done away with
under the new Competition Act, 2002. Therefore, CCI would have complete power to take
action against a foreign entity in a similar situation
Section 18 of the Competition Act entrusts the Commission with an overarching duty of
sustaining competition in the market. The magnitude of this duty, as a corollary, entails that
the Commission is vested with a comprehensive, overall perspective on the economy. Unlike
sector specific regulatory authorities, the Commission combines the twin powers of private
enforcement and the ability to pursue claims for damages.
Hence, the Commission is uniquely situated to ensure a robust level of consumer welfare. 49
The Commission for the purpose of exercising its extra territorial powers would most
certainly need the cooperation and help of the regulatory authorities of other countries.
Section 18 enables the Commission to smoothen and accelerate the exercise of its power
under Section 32 by way of entering into arrangements and memorandum of understandings
with the regulatory bodies of other countries in order to facilitate the entire process.
The exercise of the powers of the Commission over cross border mergers is crucially hinged
on the meaning that the phrase ‘appreciable adverse effect on competition’ is given and how
the jurisprudence surrounding the phrase develops. In fact, the inclusion of the word ‘effect’
in the phrase is indicative of the intention of legislators to lean towards the US jurisprudence
on the point. In fact it would not be inappropriate to state that the legislators intended to
incorporate the judicially created ‘effects test’ in the legislation itself from the very outset.
Such a broad, sweeping vantage point is unavailable to any sector-specific regulator. The test
thus laid down under the Act is that the Commission can investigate into a cross border
merger taking place outside India if the (i) agreement or (ii ) abuse of dominant position or
47
“Sec 32 – An albatross around CCI’s neck?”, http://www.competitionlawindia.com/
October 10,2012
48
ibid
49
See generally Rahul Singh, ‘The Teeter-Totter of Regulation and Competition: Balancing the Indian
Competition Commission with the Sectoral Regulators’. A Paper presented to the Advisory
Committee on Market Studies, Competition Commission of India. Available online at law.wustl.edu
and at www.cci.gov.in
31 | P a g e
(iii) combination has or is likely to have an appreciable adverse affect on competition in the
relevant market in India. Cross border merger regulation in India has only been partly taken
care under the regulatory landscape of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). With
the emergence of the new Competition Law regime in India a host of issues need to be looked
into as far as cross border merger regulation is concerned and recognize the need to find a
purposive solution to the possible conflicts and grey areas.
In March 2011 the role of CCI in relation to banking mergers got limited by finance ministry
and RBI was appointed as the chief regulatory body for the Banking mergers. The reason
provided for this was that the RBI has CCI does not have the expertise to regulate Mergers in
the banking sector, and that RBI has such expertise
.
Recent experience shows that CCI has been efficient, and has also cleared a takeover by
HSBC of RBS’s retail business in India, a deal worth $1.8 billion. It did not refer the matter
to RBI since there was no need and later even RBI may clear the merger with come
conditionality’s in line with our international rights and obligations. In some other cases, CCI
has consulted sector regulators like in telecom and electricity because it felt that their opinion
was germane to merger cases.
RBI is a prudential regulator of banks, while CCI is a competition regulator for the whole
economy, including the financial sector. Prudential regulation requires laying out and
enforcing rules that limit risk-taking of banks, ensuring safety of depositors’ funds, stability
of the financial sector and other public policy requirements. Thus, regulation of Mergers by
RBI would be determined by such benchmarks. Competition regulation of Mergers in the
banking sector, on the other hand, is a different matter. The review will take into account
whether such a merger can lead to an “appreciable adverse effect” on competition. For
illustration, it will seek to ensure that banks compete among themselves for customers by
offering the best terms and interest rates for both deposits and borrowings. While CCI is not a
prudential regulator, RBI is not a competition regulator, though both are required to promote
competition and consumer interest.
In the case of failing banks, unquestionably, the mergers are allowed swiftly as in the case of
Global Trust Bank in India that was taken over by the Oriental Bank of Commerce in 2004.
There can also be a one-time exception from competition rules allowed in specific cases like
in the UK in 2009 when Halifax Bank of Scotland was merged with Lloyds TSB after the
earlier turned turtle following the financial crisis
There is room, therefore, for both CCI and RBI in the banking sector, and the economy
stands to benefit if both are allowed to exercise their powers. Genuine concerns such as the
effects of delays from CCI in making decisions, especially in case of forced mergers, should
not be used as justification for total but rather conditional exemptions. Just like in other
countries, CCI can handle Mergers in the sector with no delays only if there is cooperation
between RBI and CCI. The sooner the two regulators sit down and work out a cooperation
agreement the better for the whole economy, and one hopes that this call for exemptions will
not be a basis for an adverse relationship between the two.
32 | P a g e
CASES RELATING TO CROSS BORDER MERGERS
Having explained one side of the coin, one also needs to look into the other, i.e. resource
mobilization for carrying out these cross-border transactions. Indian companies are involved
in more and more merger/ acquisition activities, hence raising the importance of the issue.
Earlier Indian capital markets were quite thin and merger and access to capital was quite
restricted. The growing needs of the economy, have however, changed the face of the Indian
financial system drastically and the capital markets have become important in the resource
allocation process of the economy50
Keeping that in mind, the article looks into the dynamics of such cross-border transactions
involving Indian companies and focuses on one particular example of an Indian telecom
company, Bharti Enterprises’51 recent attempts to enter into a complex merger deal with a
South African company, MTN Ltd52 . In recent years, mobile services have achieved a
significant mile- stone in India, with the country having nearly 50 per cent telecom density. 53
33 | P a g e
Increasing competition, decreasing call rates and fluctuating net profit growth, however,
made Bharti Airtel, the telecom arm of the company to enter into negotiations with MTN, so
as to make new customers in African continent which is also regarded as immensely growing
market, with tremendous potential for growth, unlike India where telcos’ growth is projected
to reach a flat terrain in five years. After a failed attempt, the two companies again tried to tie
up a complex cross-border merger in 2009 which required Bharti to acquire about 36 per cent
of MTN’s equity and MTN to buy 25 per cent of Bharti; however the deal fell through
mainly because of South African company’s demand for dual listing of the shares of the
company, which in turn required radical changes in foreign exchange, company, and takeover
norms in India.
This particular case has been taken specifically because of the novelty and complexity in the
process of carrying of the cross-border merger as well as unheard of hurdles arising out of it,
which raises important question about the arrangement of capital controls and other policies
of the country. The article gives a detailed outline of the reasons which resulted in the failure
of the deal and the paper have tried to link up the reasons to the likely amendments and
changes which Indian laws require for facilitating such cross-border mergers of Indian
companies with their foreign counterparts.
Talks of a mutual acquisition between the telecom giants of India and South Africa, Bharti
Airtel and MTN, respectively was called off for a second time in two years. The history of
the deal is provided below:
(i) In 2008, talks ended because of a last-minute demand by MTN that Bharti Airtel
become its subsidiary.54
(ii) In 2009, Bharti Airtel and MTN were again close to a merger agreement as part of a
$24-billion deal which would have created the world’s third largest telecom
company. The deal, however, could not go through due to some regulatory hurdles
from the South African Government.
1. Details of Deal II
Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Iran, Afghanistan, Benin, Cyprus, Ghana,
Guinea Bissau, etc. See id., 6 for more details
53. Telecom density in India is already at 47.89 per cent and is projected to touch 80 per cent by
2015; See M. Rajendran, The Big Buy, available at, www.businessworld.in/bw/2010_02_20_
The Big Buy.html (Last visited on September 16, 2012).
54 This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt by Reliance Communication headed by Anil Ambani
to pull off a similar acquisition. See No deal: Bharti, MTN hang up available at http://
www.indianexpress.com/news/no-deal-Bharti-mtn-hang-up/523666/0 (Last visited on September
17, 2012).
34 | P a g e
The mutual acquisition was to be achieved through a scheme of arrangement 55 with the
following principal elements: MTN was to approximately acquire a 25 per cent economic
interest in Bharti for an effective consid- eration of approximately $2.9 billion in cash and
newly issued shares of MTN to the tune of approximately 25 per cent of the currently issued
share capital of MTN. Bharti would have acquired approximately 36 per cent of the currently
issued share capital of MTN from MTN shareholders for a consideration of ZAR 86.00 in
cash and 0.5 newly issued Bharti shares in the form of Global Depository Receipts (‘GDRs’)
for every MTN share acquired which finally would take Bharti’s stake to 49 per cent of the
enlarged capital of MTN. Each GDR would be equivalent to one share in Bharti and would
be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
The basic hurdle in the deal came in the form of requirement of dual listing by the South
African government, which triggered off the requirement for other changes, like the open
offer obligations under the Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations,
1997 (‘SEBI takeover regulations’), and proposed issuance of American Depository Receipts,
(‘ADRs’) and GDRs with voting rights to MTN, to name the important ones.
To define a dual listed structure, it involves “a company linking with a foreign company in a
way that allows each to retain its individual identity, but with the shareholders of the two
separate companies receiving a claim on the combined earnings as though they had
undertaken a conventional merger.”
A dual listed company (‘DLC’) structure (also referred to as a ‘Siamese twin’) engages two
companies incorporated in different countries contractually agreeing to operate their
businesses as if they were a single enterprise, while retaining their separate legal identity and
existing stock exchange listings.56 DLCs are the result of a merger between two firms
incorporated in different countries in which the firms agree to combine their activities and
cash flows. At the same time, the corporations keep separate shareholder registries and
identities and distribute the cash flows to their shareholders using a ratio laid out in the
‘equalization agreement’57 . The equalization agreements are set up in such a way that equal
treatment of both companies’ shareholders in voting and cash flow rights is ensured under all
circumstances. The contracts cover issues that determine the distribution of these legal and
economic rights between the twin parents, including issues related to dividends, liquidation,
and corporate governance.
55 for details -Media Statement from Bharti Airtel, May 25, 2009, available at
http://www.bharti.com/media- centre/media-releases/release-detail/article/media-statement-
from-bharti-airtel-limited-2. html (Last visited on September 17, 2012).
56. Abe De Jong, The Risk and Return of Arbitrage in Dual Listed Companies, available at http://
gates.comm.virginia.edu/uvafinanceseminar/2005-van%20DijkPaper.pdf (Last visited on
September 18, 2012).
57 Economic Times, Dual Listing: its Implications, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/markets/analysis/Dual-listing-Its-implications/articleshow/5015937.cms (Last visited on
September 18, 2012)
35 | P a g e
Usually the two companies will share a single board of directors and have an integrated
management structure. “A DLC is somewhat like a Joint Venture. But the parties share
everything they own, not just a single project.” DLCs have special corporate governance
requirements. The interest that the shareholders in each of the listed companies have in the
business is the same. This is usually addressed by guaranteeing equal rights in all respects
(most importantly voting rights and dividends) and by an appropriate management structure
(such a unified board).
Often, management of the two companies believes that the merged company will have better
access to capital if it maintains listings in each market, as local investors are already familiar
with their respective companies58 . When two companies in two countries enter into an equity
alliance without an outright merger, dual listing means continued listing of the firms in both
the countries. The key point to note here is that shareholders can buy and sell shares of both
the companies on bourses in the two countries. In other words, if the Bharti-MTN deal would
have happened with a dual listing rider, a Bharti share could be sold on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (‘JSE’) and vice-versa. Global experience suggests that companies at times
choose the dual listing structure to avoid capital gains tax that results from a conventional
merger. Many a time, complicated cross-border mergers require various forms of official
approvals, and dual listing can preserve the existence of each company.
The South African government wanted MTN to continue to be listed at the JSE, but Indian
corporate laws do not allow dual listing, and it will need major amendments to key corporate
laws of the country59 . Currently, the scene in India is such that it allows only foreign firms to
issue Indian Depository Receipts (‘IDRs’), while Indian companies can issue ADRs and
GDRs, which are consequential changes, which occur after deciding on the optimality of
dual listing.
36 | P a g e
The main question involved was whether the acquisition of 36% GDRs in Bharti Airtel
by MTN and its shareholders as part of the combination transaction would trigger various
obligations under the SEBI Takeovers Regulations.62 With reference to this negotiation,
Chapter III of the SEBI Takeover Regulations requires the acquirer to make an open public
offer to buy an additional 20 per cent equity in case of acquiring more than 15 per cent of
the economic interest in an entity as a measure to regulate substantial acquisition of
shares. Further, Regulation 3(2) of the Takeover Regulations prior to amendment provided,
“nothing contained in Chapter III of the regulations shall apply to the acquisition of Global
Depository Receipts or American Depository Receipts so long as they are not converted
into shares carrying voting rights”. Also as mentioned earlier, MTN was to acquire an
‘economic interest’ in bharti Airtel Bharti Airtel; the concept of economic interest was
instrumental in the entire deal since it helped in triggering the exception under Regulation 3(1) (
j) of the Takeover Code, which stated that “any acquisition of shares or voting rights made
pursuant to a scheme of arrangement (Scheme) is exempt from the application of Regulations 10,
11 and 12 which deal with open offer requirements.”
MTN was supposed to be a board controlled subsidiary of Bharti. The term economic interest
helped the company in complying with section 42 of the Indian Companies Act wherein a
subsidiary cannot hold voting equity in its parent; hence while MTN was holding 25 per cent
equity in Bharti from an economic rights point of view, that equity was non-voting because the
scheme under which it was issued was to comply with section 42. Hence the combination of
shares plus the issuance of GDRs gave the shareholders an economic interest, as well as a sort of
control, but not the control which would have triggered an open offer under the Takeover Code.
Hence, the acquisition of economic interest of Bharti by MTN made it possible for it to take the
benefit of exemption. To help the matter further, SEBI issued an informal guidance63 on July
7, 2009 pertaining to Bharti-MTN exempting MTN from making an open offer unless the
GDRs were converted into shares with voting rights in consonance with the Takeover
Regulations.64
The problem arose with the proposed changes in the Takeover Regulations, called the
Proposed Changes to the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
Regulations, 199765 . As it has been mentioned above, Bharti had planned to issue GDRs to
the extent of 25 per cent stake to MTN and 11 per cent to the shareholders of MTN. SEBI
had announced that mandatory public offer to acquire the shares would not be required to
63.SEBI (Informal Guidance) Scheme, 2003 regarding the proposed transaction between Bharti Airtel
Ltd. and MTN Group Ltd, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/informal-
guide/bharatiinformal.pdf (last visited on September 19, 2012).
64. See Regulation 3(2) and 14(2); Depository Receipts and the Takeover Regulations
65. Amendment to the Takeover Regulation by SEBI, available at http:// www.sebi.gov.in /
press/2009/2009300.html (Last visited on September 19, 2012).
37 | P a g e
be made by MTN on crossing the 15 per cent threshold, until the GDRs were converted
into shares of the company. However, SEBI revised its Takeover norms on September
22, 2009 by bringing ADRs/GDRs with voting rights at par with domestic shares, thereby
triggering the open offer requirement even in case of issuance of GDRs if the 15 per cent
limit under Chapter III of the Takeover Regulations is crossed.66
This led to the detriment of the interests of the players in the deal as MTN now was getting
no voting rights upon acquiring GDRs and with the additional open offer requirement MTN
was seeking to totally acquire a majority 56 per cent share in Bharti which was not
envisaged by the deal. The options which MTN had was to issued GDRs worth less than 15
per cent stake in Bharti to avoid an open offer, or MTN and its shareholders to be issued the
originally agreed 36 per cent stake, but in the form of GDRs without voting rights. The
entire valuation of the deal was, however, affected since even if MTN would have agreed to
buy GDRs without voting rights, demand of higher cash payment from Bharti had to be
made.
Hence, among others, the refusal to grant dual listing and the variety of complications
arising out of the SEBI deal being scrapped.
This part try to look into the various changes which are required in various company and
foreign exchange laws to accommodate such cross-border deals as well as the feasibility of
such an overhaul.
The major changes would start with the amendments which would usher in the system of
dual listing. Dual Listing, which is currently not allowed in India, would need major
amendments to key corporate laws of the country. For example, the existing Companies Act
and its proposed successor would both need to be amended; apart from that, Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, takeover regulations and the listing agreement need to be
amended to enable dual listings. The listing agreement and the takeover code of the capital
38 | P a g e
market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India, would need to be redefined to
protect the rights of shareholders.67 In the case of a dual listed company, an investor can buy
shares in one country and sell it in an overseas market.
Also, permission shall be needed for trading of shares denominated or expressed in a foreign
currency (if shares are expressed in Rupee and shares of foreign company are expressed in
local currency, the equalization will be disturbed). That would need the Indian rupee to be
fully convertible, something that the central bank is yet to allow. It would require India to
change its system to full capital account convertibility (at the moment, it is regulated).68 A
Capital Account Transaction has been defined as meaning a transaction “which alters the
assets or liabilities including contingent liabilities, outside India of persons resident in India
or assets or liabilities in India or persons outside India, and includes transactions referred to
in sub-section (3) of section 6 [of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999] 69 .” The
dual listing arrangements would simultaneously require capital account convertibility since a
shareholder should be able to acquire the shares on one stock exchange and sell them on
another70 . The current convertibility rules do not allow an Indian citizen to hold shares in
foreign currency, which is different from the cash that such an individual would hold in
foreign currency. As seen, “shares are a common currency for acquisition and Indian
companies would be shut out of overseas buyout opportunities if they are not allowed to
issue them.”71
It is not that Indian laws have not started to change according to the changing situation. The
change in FDI guidelines, substantially through Press Notes 2, 3 and 4 in 2009, was brought
in response to the needs of the industry. 72 It also helped to bring the deal back on the tables
67 Mint, Lack of dual listing law may bog down deal, available at http://www.livemint.
com/2009/09/16232432/Lack-of-dual-listing-law-may-b.html, (Last visited on September 19,
2012).
68. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, section 6 [regarding restrictions on capital account
trans- actions by the Reserve Bank of India (the “RBI”)] read with Rule 4 of the Foreign Exchange
Management (Permissible Capital Account Transactions) Regulations, 2000, [regarding the
prohibitions on the capital account transactions]. Rule 3 [regarding restriction on issue or
transfer of Security by a person resident outside India] and Rule 4 [Restriction on an Indian
entity to issue security to a person resident outside India or to record a transfer of security from
or to such a person in its books] of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of
Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000, prevent the dual - listed company
arrangement. Furthermore, the restrictions specified in Foreign Exchange Management
(Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 would also apply.
69. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, section 2 (e). section 6(3)(a) includes within its scope:
(i) transfer or issue of any foreign security by a person resident in India; and ( ii) transfer or issue
of any security by a person resident outside India
70. Since, an arrangement as mentioned above, would result in the government losing control over
the transfer of money across the border, therefore, it was not permitted.
71. Bharti Airtel MTN Deal Called off, available at http://www.cainindia.org/news/10_2009/
bharti_airtelmtn_deal_called_off.html (Last visited on September 19, 2012).
72. Press Note 5 of 2005 (“Press Note 5”), Press Note 3 of 2007 (“Press Note 3”) and Press Note
2 of 2009 (“Press Note 2 of 2009”) have provided for the regulatory framework for FDI in
telecom sector and ascertain the trend and degree of regulation on FDI attendant downstream
investments in the telecom sector. As regards computation of FDI, Press Note 5 provided that 74%
FDI limit shall apply to FDI infused into the telecom services company both directly (that is, by
39 | P a g e
after the failure in 2008. The changes brought earlier, however, have only impacted the flow
of foreign investment into the country. But as this deal shows, the demand now, is to change
rules for outward investments, and it hence refers to change in rules to relax the way the
Indian currency flows out of India, bringing back the same concern change in capital account
convertibility rules. It would help to “conduct transactions of local financial assets (like
shares) into foreign financial assets, freely and at prices determined by the markets.” Even
though the schedule for the change according to the Tarapore Committee report has been set
out to be in 2012, however, the frequency of such deals begs the decision to be taken before
that.
Another change is required in the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA). Also,
domestic trading in shares denominated in foreign currency cannot happen without the
permission of the Reserve Bank of India. The above mentioned changes would primarily
mean that a foreign company would be listed on the Indian bourses, which is currently
disallowed. Foreign companies can be listed in India, but only in the form of Indian
Depository Receipts (IDRs) and not their underlying shares. Although the legal regime
relating to IDRs has been in place for the last few years, no company is yet to avail of it.
The regime for IDRs can work as an alternative for the major changes. The listing obstacle,
where lack of capital account convertibility in the erstwhile deal meant that neither MTN nor
Bharti shareholders could access each other bourses while dealing with shares, can maybe
solved for the time being, through depository receipts. 73 If seen in terms of the Bharti MTN
deal, trading in South Africa could be done in the home currency for both the sets of shares
with Bharti Airtel being traded in the form of a depository receipt.
In the same manner, in the Indian bourses, MTN could be listed through India Depository
Receipts (IDRs) which then would have facilitated quotation for MTN’s shares in rupees.
“In short, absence of capital account convertibility need not be a stumbling block to the
informal Siamese twin’s agreement between the two companies. Perhaps, this would
incidentally kick-start the comatose market for IDRs in India
investing directly into the company engaged in the business of telecom) or indirectly (that is, by
investing into the holding company, of which the company engaged in the business of telecom is a
subsidiary). Press Note 5 clarified that in the instances of indirect holding in the operating
company, the extent of FDI would be calculated on a proportionate basis. Press Note 2 of 2009
clarifies the manner and mechanism for calculating indirect foreign investments in Indian
companies. See Bharti MTN Deal Dissected, available at www.nishithdesai.com/ma- lab.html (Last
visited on September 21, 2012).
73. Hindu Business Line, Dual Listing truths, available at
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/09/19/stories/2009091950080900.htm (Last visited
on September 20, 2012).
40 | P a g e
This deal can be regarded as the best example of corporate restructuring, in which the UK-
based Vedanta Resources Plc will merge its Indian firms — Sesa Goa and Sterlite Industries
into a single entity Sesa Sterlite and also offload debt of $9 billion (Rs 45,000 crore 74 ) on it.
Investment banking firm, JP Morgan has initiated coverage of Sesa Goa with an "overweight
“rating and a September 2013 target price of Rs 240.The investment bank has cited the
earnings prospect of Sesa Goa following its merger with Sterlite Industries , with "high
quality" assets in zinc and earnings growth driven by oil.
"In our view post merger, the combined SESA STERLITE entity would offer investors best
in class resource diversification with top quality assets in zinc and oil," JP Morgan said 75
JP Morgan adds heavy capital spending is coming to an end, although a re-rating of the stock
depends on the performance of its aluminium and power businesses, while coal "remains the
missing part in the diversified portfolio."
In fiscal 2011, it produced 18.8 million tonnes and 18.1 million tonnes (DMT) respectively of
iron ore. In the same year, its turnover was above US$ 2 billion77 . Sesa is among the low-cost
producers of iron ore in the World and is well placed to serve the growing demand of Asian
countries. Sesa's iron ore markets/customers are primarily in China, India, Japan, Korea,
Europe and other Asian countries. Sesa has mining operations in Goa and Karnataka in India.
While iron ore from its Goa mines is shipped through the Mormugoa port, the ore from
Karnataka mines is exported through the ports of Goa, Mangalore and Krishnapatnam.
As of 31 March 2011, Sesa owns or has rights to reserves and resources of 306 million tonnes
of iron ore; which has been independently reviewed and certified as per Joint Ore Reserves
Committee (JORC) standards. In August 2011, Sesa acquired 51% stake in Western Cluster
Limited, Liberia ('WCL"). WCL, which has mining interests / rights in the Western Cluster
iron ore project in Liberia with a potential reserves and resources of over 1 billion tonnes.
74
Refer http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/article2931666.ece last visited on 10th
October 2012
75
Refer The Economic Times dated 30 AUG. 2012, cited as Sesa Goa-Sterlite merger 'best in class',
says JP Morgan. available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-
industry/indl-goods/svs/metals-mining/sesa-goa-sterlite-merger-best-in-class-says-jp-
morgan/articleshow/15995291.cms last visited on 10 oct 2012
76
Refer http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/article2931666.ece last visited on 2 oct
2012
77
Refer http://www.sesagoa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=53
lastvisited on 10 oct. 2012
41 | P a g e
Over the last two decades, Sesa has diversified into manufacturing of pig iron and
metllurgical coke. In Goa, Sesa operates a metallurgical coke plant with an installed capacity
of 280,000 tpa78 ; and a pig iron plant with an installe capacity of 250,000 tpa and an
environmental clearance of 292,000 mtpa of pig iron and 60,000 tpa of slag. Sesa has also
developed and provides proprietary technology in metallurgical coke production and has
entered into technology licensing agreements with different licenses for marketing
technology for setting up non-recovery coke oven plants across the globe.
About Sterlite :
Sterlite Industries India Limited (SIIL) is the principal subsidiary of Vedanta Resources plc, a
diversified and integrated FTSE 100 metals and mining company, with principal operations
located in Australia and India.
Sterlite’s principal operating companies comprise Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) for its fully
integrated zinc and lead operations; Sterlite Industries India Limited (Sterlite) and Copper
Mines of Tasmania Pty Limited (CMT) for its copper operations in India/Australia; and
Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO), for its aluminium and alumina operations and
Sterlite Energy for its commercial power generation business.
Sterlite is India's largest non-ferrous metals and mining company and is one of the fastest
growing private sector companies. Sterlite is listed on BSE, NSE and NYSE. It was the first
Indian Metals & Mining Company to list on the New York Stock Exchange.
Sterlite has continually demonstrated its ability to deliver major value creating projects,
offering unparalleled growth at lowest costs and generating superior financial returns for its
shareholders. At the same time, it ensures that its expansion projects meet high conservative
financial norms and do not place an unwarranted burden on its balance sheet and financial
resources.
In addition, Sterlite Industries produces various chemical products, such as sulfuric acids,
phosphoric acids, phospho gypsum, hydro fluo silicic acids, and granulated slag. Further, the
company involves in trading gold, as well as in paper business
The Deal:
The reconstruction which is done in this particular deal was although initiated previously in
2008 also where in the parent company intended to do the same but had failed due to
objections raised by some minority shareholders over valuation of a group firm, Konkola
Copper Mines.
78
Ibid
42 | P a g e
In Feb.2012 it again initiated the proceeding for restructuring of all its Indian subsidiaries
into a single unit to cut costs, and planned to issue American Depositary Shares in the
combined firm to be named Sesa Sterlite. It was also said that it will result in a cost cut of Rs
1000 cr.
The present situation of the Vedanta, the parent group, has three major holdings companies
Sterlite (54.6 per cent), Sesa Goa (55.1 per cent) and Cairn India (38.5 per cent). Sesa Goa
also holds 20 per cent stake in Cairn India. Both the stakes, after the restructuring plan goes
through, will transfer to Sterlite that will hold 58.8 per cent in Cairn India.
Sterlite has a strong balance-sheet and therefore one can expect a major portion of the
earnings to be used to service the debt. By merging Sesa Goa and Cairn India the group
company will get cash and bank balance of these companies which will give them more
leverage to raise further funds. Further, the company can collect dividend payouts from these
subsidiaries which can be used to service their interest obligations. Vedanta’s debt covenants
are all-restrictive which means the debt has been given on some conditions and if those
conditions or covenants get triggered, there could be an impact on the ratings.
43 | P a g e
Moreover, this restructuring is to de-leverage its balance-sheet for a further fund-raising
programme. The Vedanta Group was recently in the news to acquire the remaining stake of
its subsidiaries Bharat Aluminum and Hindustan Zinc. For that it will need a huge sum of
money. Also, it has its own huge capex programmes. This will in turn result into additional
debt burden and the gross debt could rise by 70-80 per cent of the current debts in the books.
That will definitely not be sustainable
After Deal:
The deal will reach to its finality after all necessary approval from share holder and NOD
from regulatory body which are required for the finalization of the deal. it is most likely end
by the last week of December 2012. It collapses all the assets of Vedanta's listed and unlisted
companies in India-Sesa Goa, Sterlite, Vedanta Aluminium (VAL), Malco, Balco and
Hindustan Zinc-into Sesa Sterlite. The new company will also own the group's majority stake
in Cairn India, the oil & gas company whose acquisition was finally completed in December
2011.
44 | P a g e
Post merger will include the following things:-
1. Vedanta Resources, which is listed in London, will merge all of its Indian holdings,
particularly Sterlite Industries and Sesa Goa, into a single entity.
3. The merge will entail a share swap in the 3:5 ratio, wherein five shares of Sterlite will
fetch three shares of Sesa Goa.
4. The new entity, to be named Sesa-Sterlite, will have a market capitalization of about
$22 billion, four billion more than the sum of the individual firms’ market cap.
5. The merged company will have consolidated net profit of $2.5 billion.
6. Unlisted Vedanta Aluminium, Madras Aluminium and Vedanta's 38.8 per cent
holding in oil and gas producer Cairn India will also be transferred to Sesa Sterlite,
whose stake in the company will go up to 58.9 per cent. Cairn India’s debt of $5.9
billion will also be transferred to Sesa-Sterlite.
7. Vedanta Resources will also issue American Depository Shares (ADS) in the new
company that will be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
8. The restructuring does not include Vedanta’s African business – it holds a 79.4 per
cent stake in Konkola Copper Mines Plc in Zambia.
9. Sesa Goa is India’s largest privately-held producer and exporter of iron ore, Sterlite
Industries is India’s largest non-ferrous metals and mining company.
10. The restructuring will come into effect only after some minority shareholders and
regulators in India and the UK give it their stamp of approval
So by looking at all these points we can say that This merger makes Sesa Sterlite a natural
resources conglomerate with global size and scale, not too different from some of the world's
top listed resources monoliths like the Melbourne headquartered BHP Billiton, Vale in Rio de
Janeiro and London's Rio Tinto. Only Konkola Copper Mines in Zambia, in which Vedanta
Resources holds a 79 per cent stake, will be controlled by the holding company.
CONCLUSION:
The mergers in India have to comply with very tight and stringent regulatory framework. The
non compliance to such may lead to penalties or may lead to civil prosecution under
regulations. If we consider the regulations governing cross border mergers the number of
regulations also increase by two fold as such transactions includes the laws and regulations of
two different countries.
45 | P a g e
The basic problem in this regard is that only inbound cross border mergers are allowed under
companies Act 1956. And the Act is silent over outbound mergers. So this has raised a big
issue with regard to overall development of Indian market economy. Where, Company Act
allows only inbound cross border mergers and not outbound cross border mergers. It means
our company law somewhere is giving opportunity to foreign company to come and utilize
my market. But it is unfavourable for the Indian company which are not allowed to merge
with foreign company. It means Indian company cannot expand its horizon to earn greater
profit by utilizing the market of foreign market. It means the company law by not allowing
outbound cross borer merger is creating obstacles in the development of India.
Another problem which is being faced by the companies which wants to merge in each-other
is of tax treatment. Firstly cross border mergers in most of the case results in the capital gains
because in it, assets are transferred to one company to other company. Indian tax laws
provide that capital gain tax shall be imposed if due to transfer of assets capital gains accrue.
So companies are not willing to pay so much high capital gain tax. Another problem is that
such cross border merger transaction is in most of the case, is taxable in both the countries
which are involved in this transaction. Such tax treatment is also a reason for discouraging
such cross border mergers. The provisions provided under FEMA are also not encouraging
the foreign investors to invest in Indian market directly, because they have to undergo a very
rigorous and time consuming process which ultimately results in lost of interest to invest in
India.
If outbound Cross border merger will be allowed (As allowed in New Companies Bill 2011)
then those will certainly help the Indian market as this will allow a foreign company to merge
an Indian company. For instance where there is a merger between two foreign companies
with one company having a subsidiary in India then this provision will allow the transferee
company to take control over all its Indian operations and also realize maximum tax benefits
by offsetting losses of the subsidiary against its profits.
If we consider Bharti MTN deal it should act as an eye opener for the Indian policy makers
because the current state of globalization makes it imperative that this deal would not remain
a one-off incident. Companies prefer such complex merger schemes to better cater to their
business interests. Hence, the need of the hour is to make necessary changes in the law and
regulatory procedures, which are inter connected, and does not result in a situation where one
change in a law is going against the other. A holistic approach is needed to prevent such a
situation to rise again, and prevent companies, from trying back door entries, when a legally
regulated front door entry is possible.
Cross border mergers can be effective tool available to Indian Companies to globalize their
business is still a tedious task due to existing regulatory framework. Keeping in pace with the
globalization there is a strong need of deregulating the cross border mergers or providing a
single window clearance to make Cross Border Mergers more effective and attractive. There
is a immediate need of implementation of New Companies Bill, 2011 which will certainly
provide a boost to the Cross Border Mergers.
46 | P a g e
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES
PRIMARY SOURCES:
SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS:
47 | P a g e
ARTICLES:
48 | P a g e
WEBSITES:
o www.manupatra.com
o http://www.sebi.gov.in
o www.rbi.org.in
o www.cci.gov.in
o www.taxmann.com
o www.kpmg.com
CASES:
49 | P a g e