Serg's Products vs.

PCI Leasing, 338 SCRA 499

FACTS:

PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin.

Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to
PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.

The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would return for
other machineries.

Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of the writ
of replevin.

PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and therefore can
still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin.

Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the
Civil Code.

Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries

In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court, Citing the
Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had
only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization

Ruling:

Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ
issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property.

Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery
of personal property only.

Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building
or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works

In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land.They were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own,
all of them have become “immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements
in the industry.”

However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.Under the
principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein.

Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be
and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or
hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon,
real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.

The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin
Benguet Corp. vs. CBAA, 218 SCRA 271

FACTS: On 1985, Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the said properties in issue as
taxableimprovements. The assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of
theProvince of Zambales. However, the appeal was dismissed mainly on the ground of the petitioner's
failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due during the pendency of the appeal.The petitioner elevated
the matter to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, one of theherein respondents. In its decision
dated March 22, 1990, the Board reversed the dismissal of theappeal but, agreed that the tailings dam
and the lands submerged thereunder shall be subject torealty tax.For purposes of taxation the dam is
considered as real property as it comes within theobject mentioned in Article 415 of the New Civil Code,
It is a construction adhered to the soilwhich cannot be separated or detached without breaking the
material or causing destruction onthe land upon which it is attached. The immovable nature of the dam
as an improvement whichdetermines its character as real property, hence taxable under Section 38 of
the Real Property TaxCode

Issue: Whether or not the tailings dam is subject to realty tax?

Whether or not it be considered as immovable property?

Held: Yes, it is subject to realty tax and it is considered an immovable property.The petitioner does not
dispute that the tailings dam may be considered realty within themeaning of Article 415. It insists,
however, that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as aseparate and independent property
because it does not constitute an "assessable improvement" onthe mine although a considerable sum
may have been spent in constructing and maintaining it.The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a
definition of "real property" and simplysays that the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as
lands, buildings, machinery an. Even without the tailings dam, the petitioner's mining operation can still
be carried out because the primary function of the dam is merely to receive and retain the wastes and
water coming from the mine. There is no allegation that the water coming from the dam is the sole
source of water for the mining operation so as to make the dam an integral part of the mine. In fact, as a
result of the construction of the dam, the petitioner can now impound and recycle water without having
to spend for the building of a water reservoir. And as the petitioner itself points out, even if the
petitioner's mine is shut down or ceases operation, the dam may still be used for irrigation of the
surrounding areas, again unlike in the Ontario case.

By contrast, the tailings dam in question is being used exclusively for the benefit of the petitioner.

The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an "improvement" because it is
permanent in character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's mine. Moreover, the
immovable nature of the dam defines its character as real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code
and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for failure to show that the questioned decision of respondent
Central Board of Assessment Appeals is tainted with grave abuse of discretion except as to the
imposition of penalties upon the petitioner which is hereby SET ASIDE
Prudential Bank vs. Panis, 153 SCRA 390

Facts:

Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. As security, respondent’s spouses executed a
real estate mortgage, their residential building as security. Since the respondents was not able to fulfil
their obligation, the security was extrajudiciaily foreclosed and was eventually sold in a public auction.
Hence this case, to assail the validity of the mortgage and to recover the foreclosed land.

Issue:

Whether or not a real estate mortgage can be instituted on the building of a land belonging to another

Held:

While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the
land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still
be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original
mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the
sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing,
it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building was a valid
mortgage.
Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jarque, 61 Phil 229

Facts:

Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels
Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and incumbrances of
vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".

Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage
contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until the period
of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque;

A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and
was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on within the thirty-day period
before the institution of insolvency proceedings.

Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the
insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.

Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary
sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law

Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING:

Yes. “Personal property” includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of good faith. The
absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and subsequent
encumbrances. The judge was correct.

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in
the registry of the register of deeds.
Barlin vs. Ramirez, 7 Phil 41

FACTS:Priests were already been in existence in the Municipality of Lagonoy since 1839.January 13,1869
the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873.Rebuildingprocess
were ordered by the Governor and was the laborers were the people from the barangay as perthe order
of the Cabeza De Barangay. The materials and funds that were used on the renovation werefrom the
parish priests funds.1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it
be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This
petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged
that the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the
authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner
thereof. Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and final
judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not that the subject property wherein the said church situated were own by the
government or by the Catholic Church having the capacity as Juridical Personality.

HELD: The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the Catholic Church because of its Juridical
Personality here in the Philippines, The Church belongs to God and therefore the use of the Church
should be to glorify God which is the Catholic Church used to do. The public properties are the Roads
and other properties wherein the public should have. The Ownership of the Churches in the Philippines
is not covered by the treaty of Paris which were contracted between U.S. and Spain. Notes: Catholic
Church has the capacity to own properties.
Bachrach vs. Seifert, October 12, 1950

Facts:

The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his
last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate
of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received
from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On
June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the
lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M.
Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her
the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of
stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and
Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in
question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary
but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a
stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital.

Issue:

Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.

Held:

The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in
usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may
be sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold
independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be
held to be income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently,
should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend
can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would
be a serious violation of the law.

Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the
remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The
Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.
Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Ledesma, August 31, 1937

FACTS:

June 30, 1927: CFI favored Bachrach Motor Co., Inc (Bachrach) against Mariano Lacson Ledesma

Ledesma mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc shares

September 29, 1928: PNB brought an action against Ledesma and his wife Concepcion Diaz for the
recovery of a mortgage credit

January 2, 1929: PNB amended its complaint by including the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., as party
defendant because they claim to have rights to some of the subject matters of this complaint

January 30, 1929: Bachrach field a gen. denial

CFI: favored PNB

December 20, 1929: Bachrach brought an action in the CFI against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., to
recover P13,850 against the bonus or dividend w/c, by virtue of the resolution of December 22, 1923,
Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., had declared in favor of Ledesma as one of the owners of the
hacienda which had been mortgaged to the PNB to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. in favor of said bank

CFI: favored Bachrach

ISSUE: W/N shares of stock are personal property and therefore can be subject to pledge or chattel
mortgage

HELD: YES. AFIRMED section 4 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, in so far as it provides that a chattel
mortgage shall not be valid against any person except the mortgagor, his executors or administrators,
unless the possession of the property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee or unless the
mortgage is recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the mortgagor
resides.

pledge of the 6,300 stock dividends is valid against the Bachrach because the certificate was delivered to
the creditor bank, notwithstanding the fact that the contract does not appear in a public instrument

Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi negotiable instruments
in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage to secure an obligation

certificates of stock, while not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, like bills and notes, are so
framed and dealt with as to be transferable, when property endorsed, by mere delivery, and as they
frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation or against prior holders, as good a title to the
transferee as if they were negotiable, and inasmuch as a large commercial use is made of such
certificates as collateral security, and it is to the public interest that such use should be simplify and
facilitated by placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper, they are often
spoken of and treated as quasi negotiable, that is as having some of the attributes and partaking of the
character of negotiable instruments, in passing from hand to hand, especially where they are
accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney, executed in blank, to transfer them to anyone
who may obtain possession as holders, even though such assignment and power are under seal.
US vs. Tambunting, 41 Phil 364

Facts: Manuel Tambunting and his wife were occupants of the upper floor of a house that had
previously been installed by the Manila Gas Corporation with apparatus for the delivery of gas. It was
found out that gas was being used, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company, for cooking
in the quarters occupied by the defendants.

Issue: whether gas can be the subject to larceny.(Larceny: The unauthorized taking and removal of the
Personal Property of another byan individual who intends to permanently deprive the owner of it.)

Held: Yes. There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable
of being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like
other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place. Likewise water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is
conveyed by wires are subjects of larceny. (Quoted from "Larceny," at page 34, Vol. 17, of Ruling Case
Law
US vs Carlos, September 1, 191

FACTS:

Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court issued
warrant for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he did failed
to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to tangibles,
chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away.

Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr.
Carlos contested saying that electrical energy can’t be stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?).
He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case
reached the supreme court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity.

HELD:

Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current was secured
by

Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.

Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‘gas’ which can be stolen. However, the true test of what
constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but
whether is is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of
merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent
to deprive the company of its rightful property, used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own
use. This constitutes larceny.
Rep. v Rizalvo, GR 172011, March 7, 2011

FACTS:

OnDecember 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union,
acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration of a parcel of land referred to in
Survey Plan Psu-200706, located inBauang, La Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee
simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer
datedDecember 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land.In support of his claim, he
presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of
Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.

OnApril 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property sinceJune 12, 1945or earlier and that the tax
declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership.The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to
the Republic of thePhilippinesand hence not subject to private acquisition.

The Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) ofSan Fernando, La Union thereafter certified that the subject parcel of land was within
the alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was in actual occupation and possession of the
land.

The MTC, acting as a land registration court, approved the application for registration, which the OSG
appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the
land in question in the manner and length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title

HELD:

The petition is granted.

CIVIL LAW: Requisites for registrability of title.

Under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, applicants forregistrationof title must
sufficiently establishfirst,that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;second,that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; andthird,that it is under
abona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was satisfied in this case.The certification and reportdatedJuly 17, 2001submitted
by Special Investigator IDionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the
entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone.

Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession.The MTC and the
CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to
show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent any
showing that the lower courts committed error.

However, the third requirement has not been satisfied.Respondent only managed to presentoral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through
a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale datedJuly 8, 1958between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P.
Rizalvo.He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078 for the year 1948 in the name ofEufrecina Navarro and
real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. What is required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under abona fideclaim of ownership sinceJune 12, 1945or earlier.

Under Section 14(2) applicant is likewise not entitled to registration of title through prescription, since
the 30-year period will only commence from the moment the State expressly declaresthat the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. There was no such declaration in this case.

Petition is GRANTED.

The decision of the MTC and CA are REVERSED.

Republic v Vega, GR 177790, January 17, 2011

FACTS: Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they inherited the same from
their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the claim. The Republic maintains that the
parcel of land is public domain, and that respondents failed to substantiate that such was alienable.
Respondents presented as witness an officer from CENRO who testified that the land in question is
indeed alienable. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered titles to be issued in favor of
Vega and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of
the lower court. The Republic files a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Republic claims that
respondents were unable to prove that the parcel of land in question is not part of the public domain.
Respondent-intervenor Buhay challenged the petition as it raises a question of fact, which is outside the
scope of Rule 45, a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES: Is the parcel of land in dispute part of public domain? Is the issue at hand a question of fact?

HELD: REMEDIAL LAW: A question of fact requires the reexamination of the evidence on record. What
the current question involves is a determination of the correctness of the appreciation of the facts. Is
the court correct, in light of law and recent jurisprudence, in assessing the land to be alienable? It does
not seek for the presence of facts. The issue is the application of law, to the facts.

CIVIL LAW: The rule for registration of government land is that there must be open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable government land. The fact of occupation
and that the land is alienable government land must be proven. Here, the Republic does not question
the fact of occupation, but that of the alienability of the land. They also contended that the testimony of
the CENRO officer is insufficient. It has been held in Jurisprudence that a CENRO certificate is inadequate
proof that the land is alienable. There must also be certification from the Secretary of Natural
Resources. However, in light of a recent ruling, the CENRO certification is held to be substantial
compliance to the needed proof. Since respondents sought certification from the CENRO before, they
are in good faith in claiming the land. The proof that they presented may be considered as competent
and sufficient proof. It is to be noted, however, that this ruling applies pro hac vice.
Republic v Santos III, November 12, 2012

Facts: Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by
Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by
Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of accretion.

Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of
soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level
from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the
water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language
of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the
language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of
public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because
it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the
deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply
because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the
river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that
would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than
thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by
other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its
public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is
a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners
of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to
acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by
the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property
of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Tan Toco vs. Mun. Council of Iloilo, March 15, 1926

Facts:

the widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the
purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square meters, and... the
otner on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had
appropriated for widening said street.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay the plaintiff the... amount so
claimed

On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore
plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of the said municipality... provincial fiscal of
Iloilo filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the said property be
dissolved,... Plaintiff's counsel objected to the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August 12, 1925,
declared the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null
and void, thereby dissolving the said attachment.

Issues:

The fundamental question raised by appellant in her four assignments of error is whether or not the
property levied upon is exempt from execution,

Ruling:

The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code, provides that:

"Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations, to be exercised by and through their respective municipal government in conformity with
law.

"It shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and be sued, to contract and be
contracted with, to acquire and hold real and personal property for municipal purposes, and generally to
exercise the powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred... upon them by law."

For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative Code does not specify the kind of
property that a municipality may acquire. However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of
provinces and towns (municipalities) into... property for public use and patrimonial property.

According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains,
and public waters, drives and public improvements of general benefit built at the... expense of the said
towns or provinces, are property for public use.

All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the
provisions of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws.

The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the
municipality is not within the ... commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and,
consequently, said property is also inalienable.
Municipal corporations are created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their
aggregate or public capacity. That they may properly discharge such public functions corporate property
and revenues are... essential, and to deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would
be materially impeded, and in some instances practically destroy it.

"It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a public purpose but for
quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a judgment against the municipality, and may be
sold.

The rule is that property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks,
promenades, wharves, landing places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses, public
markets,... hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not
subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the
hands of a public officer.

But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is temporarily used
for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution.
Buyser vs. Director, 121 SCRA 13

This is an appeal, perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Surigao, declaring a parcel of land formed along the shore by the action of the sea as
part of the public domain.

Plaintiff-appellant is the registered owner of Lot No. 4217 of the Surigao Cadastre, which borders the
Surigao Strait. Contiguous to said lot is a parcel of land which was formed by accretion from the sea, the
subject- matter of this controversy. Defendants Ignacio Tandayag and his wife Candida Tandayag have
been occupying this foreshore land under a Revocable Permit issued by the Director of Lands. For the
use and occupation thereof, said spouses paid the Bureau of Lands the amount of P6.50 annually. They
have a house on said lot, which plaintiff alleged had been purchased by the Tandayags from one
Francisco Macalinao, a former lessee of the plaintiff.

Claiming ownership of the said land, plaintiff filed an action against the spouses Tandayag in the Court of
First Instance of Surigao to recover possession of this land as well as rents in arrears for a period of six
years. The complaint was subsequently amended to implead the Director of Land as defendant,
allegedly for having illegally issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags.

After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff,
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff for lack of cause of action; declaring the defendants Ignacio
Tandayag and his wife, Candida de Tandayag as the lawful occupants of the land in question, which is
part of the public domain; condemning the plaintiff to pay to the defendant in concept of damages in
the amount of P250.00; plus the costs. (p. 67, Decision, Original Records.)

From this judgment, plaintiff appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law.

The plaintiff's claim of ownership over the land in question is bereft of legal basis. Such alluvial
formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by
adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by
either the executive or legislative branch of the government.1

In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866 which provides:

Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form
part of the public domain, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate
adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.

Plaintiff's reliance on the above article is quite misplaced. The true construction of the cited provision is
that the State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for
the purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar, the trial court found that plaintiff's evidence failed
to prove that the land in question is no longer needed by the government, or that the essential
conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters, exists.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the approval by the Director of Lands of the defendants' Revocable
Permit Application is tantamount to an implied declaration on the part of the Director of Lands of the
fact that the disputed lot is no longer needed for public use. We fail to see such implication.

In his letter, dated June 16, 1955, approving the defendants' Revocable Permit Application, the Director
of Lands did not declare the land as no longer needed for public use. Pertinent portions of said letter
reads: 2

With reference to your revocable permit application no. v-8040, I wish to inform you that as the District
Engineer of that province has in his 1st indorsement dated July 7, 1954 certified that the land applied for
by you is/may be needed by the Government for future public improvements (Boulevard and seawall
protection purposes) you may be allowed to continue with your temporary occupation and provisional
use of the premises under a revocable permit renewable every year in the meantime that the land is not
actually needed by the Government for the purposes aforestated, subject however to the following
conditions:

That no further structures shall be constructed on the land and that any structure constructed thereon
shall be removed and/or by you at your expense upon thirty (30) days notice if and when the
Government is ready to actually use the land for Boulevard and seawall protection purposes. (p. 113,
Exhibit 4.)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the State never relinquished ownership over the land.

Since the land is admittedly property of public dominion, its disposition falls under the exclusive
supervision and control of the Bureau of Lands.3 Under the Public Land Act, an application for the sale
or lease of lands enumerated under Section 59 thereof, should be filed with the Bureau of Lands. 4 In
compliance therewith, the spouses Tandayag filed the appropriate application, while plaintiff did not. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, "like any other private party, she (plaintiff) must apply for a permit
to use the land, like what appellee spouses did. Not having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands which has administration and control over the area in question, by filing the corresponding
application for permit, appellant has no right whatsoever in the foreshore land as to be entitled to
protection in the courts of justice." 5

In Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 6 a case involving two parcels of land formed along the shore by the
action of the sea, this Court has this to say.

The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of the
Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which they now
claim to be the owners; wherefore, the occupation or possession which they allege they hold is a mere
detainer that can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in
possession.

The rationale behind the grant of revocable permit was propounded by the Attorney General in his
opinion of July 24, 1920, in this wise:

The lease of reclaimed lands and of the foreshore was formerly provided by Act No. 1654. Under said
Act, said lands could only be leased in the manner and under the conditions provided by the said law. No
revocable permits were allowed. Then Act No. 2570 was passed amending Sec. 5 of Act No. 1654 so as
to authorize the temporary use of the foreshore under a revocable permit. This measure was apparently
deemed necessary as well as expedient in order to legalize the habitual use of the coast and shores of
these islands by the people, who had erected thereon light material houses and dwellings, temporary
structures used in connection with fishing and other maritime industries, as well as to authorize the
provisional occupation and use contemplated by the law providing for its format lease. The countless
houses and provisional constructions that fringed the shores of the archipelago especially in Mindanao,
and the constant and every day use and occupation of the foreshore by the people in fishing, salt and
other industries common to the sea, as above stated, evidently prompted the legislature to all the
temporary use of the foreshore in this manner by means of revocable permit.

In fine, the grant of a Revocable Permit to the defendants Tandayag for the temporary use and
occupation of the disputed land is valid, having been legally issued by the Bureau of Lands, acting for
and in behalf of the Secretary (now Minister) of Agriculture and Natural Resources who is empowered to
grant revocable permits under Section 68 of the Public land Act which we quote:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may grant to qualified persons temporary
permission upon the payment of a reasonable charge, for the use of any portion of the lands covered by
this chapter for any lawful private purpose, subject Lo revocation, at any time when, in his judgment the
public interest shall require.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, May 30, 1960

Facts:

Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the
application that he owned the parcel by right of accretion. The director of land opposed the registration
for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the applicant nor his
predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land applied was acquired
from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land in question was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila bay. The petition was denied by the
lower court and decided that the land to be registered are part of the public domain. Faustino, however,
contended that the court could have declared the land not to be part of the public domain.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land

Ruling:

No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called upon to
determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited there. A formal
declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government, specifically from the executive
department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a land in question is no longer needed
for public use, some public use or for the improvement of national wealth.
Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil 112

FACTS

Lots 36, 39 and 40, which are subject to cadastral proceeding of the City of Manila were formerly a part
of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants and appellees.

From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until
the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and
remained in such a state. On 1912, the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to
facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands
which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.

Nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro
Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such purpose.

The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots once formed a part of a large parcel of
land belonging to their predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in
interest having taken possession thereof, said lots belong to them.

ISSUE

To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

RULING

The Government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion,
because in letting it remained submerged, the claimants-appellees may be said to have abandoned the
same. Having become part of the sea or seashore, it became property for public use. When the
government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged. As
provided by Article 5 of the Law of Waters,

ART. 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.

Therefore, the claimants- appellees are not entitled to the land.