ROMULO ABROGAR, et al vs COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and RULING: (1) No.
RULING: (1) No. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of
INTERGAMES, INC.
FACTS: To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly
with Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon" wherein it plotted a 10-kilometer course starting
from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa through public roads
and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle.
Plaintiffs' son, Rommel, joined the contest. During the marathon, Rommel
was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the
marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A venue, he died later that same day
due to severe head injuries. Petitioners sued the respondents in the then
CFI of Rizal to recover various damages.
Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the organizer of the
marathon, but only its sponsor; that its participation had been limited to
providing financial assistance to Intergames (the sole organizer of the
marathon), and that there was no privity of contract between the
participants in the marathon and Cosmos.
On its part, Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an
accident exclusively caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver; that it
was not responsible for the accident; and that there could be no cause of
action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's
application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all
rights and causes of action arising from his participation in the marathon.
Petitioners, on the other hand, averred that Intergames did not provide
adequate measures for the safety and protection of the race participants,
considering that motor vehicles were traversing the race route.
ISSUES: (1) W/N Cosmos and Intergames are jointly and severally liable
to pay the plaintiffs. No, only Intergames is negligent thus, liable.
(2) W/N the negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the proximate
cause of the death of Rommel. Yes.
(3) W/N the doctrine of assumption of risk applies to Rommel. No.
(4) W/N Intergames is liable for damages. Yes.
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the
"omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of
the place." The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article
2176 and Article 20.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the
race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in
the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. The role of Cosmos
was to pursue its corporate commitment to sports development of the youth
as well as to serve the need for advertising its business. In the absence of
evidence showing that Cosmos had a hand in the organization of the race,
and took part in the determination of the route for the race and the adoption
of the action plan, including the safety and security measures for the
benefit of the runners, we cannot but conclude that the requirement for the
direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship
of Cosmos and the death of Rommel simply did not exist. Indeed, Cosmos'
mere sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the
efficient and proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
Intergames, on the other hand, had full awareness of the higher risks
involved in staging the race alongside running vehicles, and had the option
to hold the race in a route where such risks could be minimized, if not
eliminated. But it did not heed the danger already foreseen, if not expected,
and went ahead with staging the race along the plotted route on Don
Mariano Marcos Highway on the basis of its supposedly familiarity with the
route. Such familiarity of the organizer with the route and the fact that
previous races had been conducted therein without any untoward incident
were not in themselves sufficient safeguards. The standards for avoidance
of injury through negligence further required Intergames to establish that it
did take adequate measures to avert the foreseen danger, but it failed to
do so.
(2) Yes. Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without
which the event would not have occurred." To be considered the proximate
cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event closest in time to
the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to
the injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion
resulting ultimately in the damage.
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts
supports the conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and that the negligence of the
jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause. In fine, it was the
duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed
to do so.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road
blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the
volunteer personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the stage
for the injury complained of. Secondly, injury to the participants arising
from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route was an event known
to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if
only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on
a blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more
efficient supervision of the race through its volunteers. And, thirdly, the
negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not
efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence
of Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An
intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one not produced
by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring
the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful
cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or
anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening
cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate
cause of the final injury."
(3). No. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily
exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes
the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the
person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and
whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In
other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept
danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include
acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does
not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and
appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine
requires the concurrence of three elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must
know that the risk is present; (2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.79 According to
Prosser: "Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk."
The concurrence of the three elements was not shown to exist. Rommel
could not have assumed the risk of death when he participated in the race
because death was neither a known nor normal risk incident to running a
race. Although he had surveyed the route prior to the race and should be
presumed to know that he would be running the race alongside moving
vehicular traffic, such knowledge of the general danger was not enough,
for some authorities have required that the knowledge must be of the
specific risk that caused the harm to him. In theory, the standard to be
applied is a subjective one, and should be geared to the particular plaintiff
and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable person of ordinary
prudence who appears in contributory negligence. He could not have
appreciated the risk of being fatally struck by any moving vehicle while
running the race. Instead, he had every reason to believe that the organizer
had taken adequate measures to guard all participants against any danger
from the fact that he was participating in an organized marathon. Stated
differently, nobody in his right mind, including minors like him, would have
joined the marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk of harm or
even death from vehicular accident while running in the organized running
event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free from foreseeable
risks was the reasonable expectation of every runner participating in an
organized running event.
(4) Yes. Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Accordingly, Intergames was
liable for all damages that were the natural and probable consequences of
its negligence.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that exemplary damages are to be
awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The foregoing characterization by the RTC indicated that
Intergames’ negligence was gross. Gross negligence is the absence of
care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of
persons or property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed, the failure of Intergames
to adopt the basic precautionary measures for the safety of the minor
participants like Rommel was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct
is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a
situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent; it must be more
than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or
confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple
inattention.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased vs. REGINALD HILL, minor,
and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor
FACTS: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Quezon City in a Civil Case
“Pedro Elcano et al vs. Reginald Hill et al” dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages
from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in CFI of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act
was not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake,”
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the
decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that
such indeed was the basis stated in the court’s decision. And so, when
appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty, Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed
the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N the principle of vicarious liability is applicable.
by the minor children who live in their company.” In the instant case, it is
not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children
in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, in as
much as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor (child)”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus ‘‘Emancipation by marriage
or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the
child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian.”

Now under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant company, was at work transporting iron rails
from the harbor to the company's yard. Some laborers would push the hand
car while some would assist by pulling the hand car by rope. The plaintiff
was walking alongside the hand car. At a certain spot at or near the water's
edge, the track which guided the hand car had sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
The plaintiff sought for damages against the defendant alleging that the
accident happened through the negligence of the defendant.
The courts found the defendant liable; that implied by the relation between
the parties, the employer is bound to provide safe appliances for the use
of the employee; that it was the duty of the defendant to build and maintain
its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect the workingmen
from unnecessary danger; that defendant failed in its duty, otherwise, the
accident would not have occurred and, consequently, the negligence of the
defendant is established.
The most controverted question in the case was whether the plaintiff
committed contributed negligence on the grounds that (1) he noticed the
depression in the track he continued his work, and (2) he walked on the
ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either
before or behind it.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. Yes
(2) Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. Yes.
RULING: (1) Yes. There was contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff but the plaintiff is still entitled to damages.
Both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there
was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against
walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated
the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made
known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
In order to impose such liability upon the defendant, it must appear that its
negligence caused the accident. The reason why contradictory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff is a defense in this class of cases is that the
negligence of the defendant did not alone cause the accident. If nothing
but that negligence had existed, the accident would not have happened
and, as I understand it, in every case in which contradictory negligence is
a defense it is made so because the negligence of the plaintiff is the cause
of the accident, to this extent, that if the plaintiff had not been negligent the
accident would not have happened, although the defendant was also
negligent. In other words, the negligence of the defendant is not alone
sufficient to cause the accident. It requires also the negligence of the
plaintiff.
Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of
the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained
if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the
want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this
qualification, which has grown up in recent years that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence.
(2) Yes. The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but
not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each
part is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.
 Jose Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
FACTS: Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company
in the capacity of clerk. He lived in San Mateo, in the province of Rizal,
which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in
coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
On January 20, 1915, at around 7 or 8 in the evening, when the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, stepped off, but one or
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result
that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform.
His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving
car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. He was
therefore brought at once to a hospital where an examination was made
and his arm was amputated.
Plaintiff instituted proceedings in the CFI to recover damages, founding his
action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant
in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains.
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material,
also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as
a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under
such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train
at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore
he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. No.

RULING: No. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly
moving train. In this case, the train was barely moving when plaintiff
alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person
alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain
no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have
suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting
place.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the

plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the
car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping