1.

Jos
e et al. vs. Novida et al. G.R. No.177374, July 2, 2014 (Alcala, Pangasinan)

FACTS:

Based on the facts of the case and evidences adduced, Felicisimo Jose was the former
legitimate agricultural lessee of the Galvan-Cabrera estate. However, on August 13, 1981, he and
his spouse mortgaged one-half of the said property with an area of 82,579 square meters to
secure a loan of ₱10,000 from a certain Benigno Siobal and Rogelio Orezo20 by delivering the
physical possession thereof to the mortgagees. Subsequently, Felicisimo left for abroad to
acquire his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America.

Sometime in 1985, the subject landholding was subdivided into sixteen (16) farm lots and
the complainants-appellees were installed by the mortgagee Benigno Siobal. Their possession
and cultivation were duly sanctioned by the landowner and DAR Team Leader of Alcala,
Pangasinan. They paid the rentals and later on the amortization payments to the subject
landholding.

In 1990, respondents were each granted – as farmer-beneficiaries – Emancipation Patents

(EPs) and Certificates of Title6 (covering one hectare each) over a parcel of land which formed
part of a 16.4142-hectare agricultural land (subject property) in San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan
which was placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

On January 4, 1991, petitioners filed with the Region I Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) at San Fernando, La Union (DAR Region I) a Petition for
Reinvestigation and Cancellation of Anomalously Prepared and Generated Emancipation
Patents against the respondents.

On January 6, 1991, their peaceful enjoyment and cultivation of their respective

landholdings was interrupted upon the unlawful dispossession, through force and intimidation by
the defendants-appellants, who forcibly took over by destroying the corn plants by hiring two (2)
tractor operators despite the issuance of the tenant-farmers’ Emancipation Patents.

Claim of Petitioners:

 They claim that they are the bona fide and actual tenant-tillers of the subject property;
 That they were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to the same; that they are
actually in possession of the same; and
 On December 17, 1991, respondents filed a Complaint11 for recovery of possession,
accounting, liquidation and damages with injunctive relief against petitionersOn
December 17, 1991, respondents filed a Complaint11 for recovery of possession,
accounting, liquidation and damages with injunctive relief against petitionersthat the
EPs issued to respondents were anomalous.

On January 31, 1991, DAR Region 1 issued an order for reinvestigation and cancellation
of EPs.
 On December 17, 1991, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession,
accounting, liquidation and damages with injunctive relief against petitioners.

Respondent Petitioner (Counter claim)

Felicisimo was the original tenant of in addition to Felicisimo, Mariano, and Virgilio, the
the subject property; subject property was being cultivated by their
siblings Tiburcia, Fermina, Victoria, and Josefina,
and their mother Aniceta Jose;
Felicisimo obtained loans from one Felicisimo indeed mortgaged the subject property in
Benigno Siobal (Siobal) and one 1981 to secure a loan of ₱10,000.00, which was
Rogelio Cerezo (Cerezo), which were settled by letting the lender Siobal take exclusive
secured by a mortgage over the subject possession of the land, cultivating the same and
property; keeping the harvests;
Felicisimo did not redeem the subject Siobal cultivated the subject property up to 1987,
property from Siobal and Cerezo, but after which petitioners Camilo, Virgilio, Mariano,
instead abandoned the same when he and the other siblings took over; that when
migrated to the United States of Felicisimo returned from the U.S.A. in 1990, Siobal
America (U.S.A.) and became a attempted to negotiate another agreement with him,
naturalized citizen thereof; but this time he refused;

On July 13, 1992, the DARAB Urdaneta issued a Decision in favor of petitioners.

On August 22,1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order16 affirming the January 30,
1991 Order of the DAR Region I Director in the petition for reinvestigation and cancellation of
EPs filed by petitioners against the respondents.

Respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration and the DAR Secretary issued
another Order on June 5, 1996 remanding the case to the DAR Adjudication Board for its proper
disposition. For failing to obtain a reconsideration of the DARAB Urdaneta’s July 13, 1992
decision, petitioners interposed an appeal with the DARAB Quezon City.

Petitioners argument: DARAB Urdaneta erred in taking cognizance of the case,

which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as the
subject property was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP);
and that there is another case between the parties – for cancellation of anomalously
prepared/generated Emancipation Patents – pending in the Office of the DAR Secretary.

On June 20, 1997, the DARAB Quezon City issued its Decision affirming in toto the July
13, 1992 decision of the DARAB Urdaneta. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the DARAB Quezon City denied the same via its June 24, 1998 Resolution.
 Petitioners then went up to the CA via Petition for Review.
Argument: The DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the
Revised (1989) DARAB Rules of Procedure which state that matters involving the
administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations shall be
the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary.

On September 25, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the challenged
DARAB decision and resolution dated June 20, 1997 and June 24, 1998.

The CA held that under Section 1,Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
the DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance and cancellation of EPs; the DAR Secretary had no power to cancel EPs, and
petitioners’ argument that such power is part of his administrative functions is misplaced.
It noted further that the DAR Secretary himself recognized the DARAB’s jurisdiction over
cases involving the cancellation of EPs when he issued his June 5, 1996 Order in the
undocketed case for reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs filed by petitioners against the
respondents.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but in its assailed March 16, 2007
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Thus, the instant petition.

Summary of (Administrative & Lower Court) Decisions:

 DAR Region I (January 30, 1991)- issued an order relative to the petitioners’ petition for
reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs
 DARAB Urdaneta (July 13, 1992)- ruled in favor of respondents
 DAR Secretary (August 22, 1995)- affirmed the January 30, 1991 Order of the DAR
Region I Director
 DARAB Quezon City (June 20, 1997)- affirmed in toto the July 13, 1992 decision of the
DARAB Urdaneta.
 CA- affirmed the challenged DARAB decision and resolution dated June 20, 1997 and
June 24, 1998.

Summary of Arguments before the SC

Respondent
Based on the merits and consonant with the
substance and intent of the agrarian laws,
respondents – and not petitioners – are
entitled to the subject property.
Petitioner
They are the actual tillers of the subject
property, and not respondents. That they are
tenants of the land; that respondents have
never cultivated the subject property, and have
never been in possession of the same; that
respondents are mere landgrabbers; that
Felicisimo has settled his financial obligations
to Siobal; that respondents’ EPs have been
 cancelled by the DAR Region I Director and
the DAR Secretary;
Respondents point out that a review under That it was erroneous and unjust for the CA to
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure have expunged their Memorandum.
is discretionary and will be granted only
whenthere are special and important reasons
therefor; that such special and important
circumstances that should warrant review do
not obtain in petitioners’ case; that the CA
is correct in stating that the DARAB has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving the issuance and
cancellation of EPs

ISSUE: WON it is the DAR Secretary OR the DARAB who has jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, [correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are] registered
with the Land Registration Authority the Registry of Deeds

RULING:

DARAB. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA that the DARAB has primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance and cancellation of EPs.

The DARAB derives its jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

R.A. 6657, Rule II, sec. 1 (f)

The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases;
(f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority

Subparagraph (f) provides that the DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, [correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are] registered with the Land
Registration Authority (the Registry of Deeds). Therefore, this Court finds that no special and
important reasons exist to warrant a thorough review of the assailed CA Decision. Quite the
contrary, the Court is satisfied with and can simply rely on the findings of the DARAB Urdaneta,
DARAB Quezon City, and the CA - as well as the very admissions of the petitioners themselves
- to the effect that:

 respondents fulfilled all the requirements under the agrarian laws in order to become
entitled to their EPs;
 that Felicisimo voluntarily surrendered and abandoned the subject property in favor of his
creditors, who took over the land and tilled the same until 1987;
 that Felicisimo migrated to the U.S.A. and became a naturalized American citizen;
 that in 1991, respondents were illegally dispossessed of their landholdings through force
and intimidation by the petitioners after Felicisimo returned from abroad;
 and that as between petitioners and respondents, the latter are legally entitled to the
subject property.

These identical findings are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality. For petitioners to
question these identical findings is to raise a question of fact.

2. Ber
boso vs. Cabral GR 204617, July 10, 2017 (Meycauyan, Bulacan)

FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land (23,426 sqm) in Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauyan,
Bulacan which was awarded to Alejandro Berboso by DAR by virtue of a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) No. 0-05645. In 1987, CLT No. 0-056450 was replaced by EP No. 445829
covering 22,426 sq m and EP No. 445830 covering the remaining 1,000 sq m. Register of Deeds
of Meycauyan, Bulacan issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP-046 and TCT No. EP-
047 in the name of Alejandro in 1992 after complying with the requirements for the final grant of
title. The TCT’s canceled EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.

Alejandro died in 1994, so his heirs settled his estate and executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate. After which TCT Nos. EP-046 and EP-047 were canceled and TCT Nos.
263885(M) and 263886(M) were issued in the name of the heirs of Alejandro in 1996.

FIRST PETITION:
September 8, 1993 – Respondent Cabral filed with the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB) her first petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.

PARAB - rendered decision in favor of Alejandro affirming the validity of the EP Nos. 445829
and 445830 in the respondents first petition (September 8, 1993)

DARAB - respondent appealed, DARAB denied the appeal

CA - affirmed the decision of PARAB and DARAB on April 21, 1998

SC - on December 9, 1998, Cabral assailed the CA decision before the SC but was denied.
March 17, 1999 - The Motion for Reconsideration before the SC on December 9, 1998 was
denied with finality.
SECOND PETITION:
February 26, 1999 - Cabral filed her second petition for the cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and
445830 before the PARAB. Claims that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to a certain
Rosa Fernando within the prohibitory period under the existing rules and regulation of the DAR
and for the second time prayed for the cancellation of EP. Nos. 445829 and 445830.

December 20, 2000 - the second petition dated February 26, 1999 was granted by PARAB
(favors respondent).

August 30, 2006 - petitioner appealed PARAB’s decision (2000) to the DARAB which set aside
the decision of the PARAB.

May 7, 2012 - respondent appealed to the CA which reversed DARAB’s decision in favor of the
respondent.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1) whether the principle of res judicata and forum shopping apply in this case
2) whether the petitioner sold the subject land to a certain Fernando in violation of the
prohibition to transfer under the provisions of P.D. No. 27; and
3) whether the petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 constitute a collateral
attack to the certificate of title issued in favor of Alejandro.

RULING:

1) Whether the principle of  res judicata and forum shopping apply in this case, such that the
second petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was barred by the decision in
G.R. No. 135317 dismissing respondent's first petition.

The principle of forum shopping and res judicata does not apply. The first petition for
cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was based on the validity of its issuance in favor of
Alejandro, while the second petition was based on the alleged violation of the prohibition on the
sale of the subject land. As such, there is no, as between the first petition and the second petition,
identity of causes of action which would satisfy the elements of res judicata. Therefore, the final
decision in G.R. No. 135317 does not constitute as res judicata on the second petition.

2. Whether the petitioner sold the subject land to a certain Fernando in violation of the
prohibition to transfer under the provisions of P.D. No. 27 (Emancipation Patent Law)

Respondent was not able to prove that petitioner violated the prohibition on the sale of the
subject land.
A. The party who asserts must prove. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available
degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are
best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence. (Rule 130, Sections 3 and 5 of the Rules of Court)

B. The Kasunduan is merely a private document since the same was not notarized before a
notary public.

Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court requires the authentication of private documents
either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker, before it can be admitted as evidence. With
exception to those excused from authentication under Section 21, Rule 132 of Rules of Court, to
which the said document does not fall.

The Kasunduan was not authenticated by the respondent and no one attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the document. Fernando was not even presented nor did he
submit an affidavit to confirm and authenticate the document or its contents. Neither was the
requirement of authentication excused under the instances cited in Section 21, Rule 132 of Rules
of Court.

Therefore, since the Kasunduan  dated December 17, 1994 was not authenticated and
was a mere photocopy, the same is considered hearsay evidence and cannot be admitted as
evidence against the petitioner. The CA, therefore erred when it considered
the Kasunduan as evidence against the petitioner.

3. Whether the petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 constitute as a
collateral attack to the certificate of title issued in favor of Alejandro.

Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral
attack to a certificate of title and allows only a direct attack thereof. A Torrens title cannot be
altered, modified or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
 direct attack - the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement.
 indirect or collateral - when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Bumagat, et al. v. Arribay states that:

Certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents acquire the same protection
accorded to other titles, and become indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands so
titled may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding; nor can they be decreed
to other individuals.

As such, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become
irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. Therefore, TCT
Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M) issued in favor of petitioner and her children as heirs of
Alejandro are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. Thus, the the petition to
cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the validity of TCT Nos.
263885(M) and 263886(M); as such should not be allowed.

3. Ca
nas – Manuel vs. Egano, G.R. No. 198751, August 19, 2015 (Leyte)

FACTS:
In May 1985, FLOR CAÑAS MANUEL, was identified as a qualified farmer-beneficiary of a
3,895 sq. m.-farm lot in Brgy. Palarao, Leyte, Leyte, originally owned by her parents Celedonio and
Floriana Cañas, and designated as Lot No. 3592, Cad. 726-D. On November 17, 1986, the lot’s Survey
Plan was approved after a survey conducted on the property in December 1985 and on May 31, 1993, she
was issued a Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00091138 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. OC- 3324, embodied in one (1) document that was registered with the Register of Deeds, Province of
Leyte, on June 30, 1993; and that she had been cultivating the land and paying the taxes due on the
property ever since.
In 2004, Respondent Andres Egano and his spouse Tarcelita Egano filed with DAR Regional Office
(DARRO) Region VIII, Tacloban City, a “Petition for Nullification of Coverage and Disqualification of
Farmer-Beneficiary.”
- They contested the issuance of Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to and
identification as farmer-beneficiaries of petitioner, Flor Cañas Manuel and her sister Salome D.
Cañas, because a portion (3,655.50 sq. m.) of the land covered by the said CLOA was previously
sold to him by the petitioners’ father, Celedono Cañas.
- And that the petitioner and Salome were not qualified as farmer-beneficiaries because they were
not actual tillers of the subject portion of the land.
DAR Order: October 28, 2004 (DAR Regional Director Tiburcio A. Morales, Jr.)
1. Declared the CLOA awarded to the Cañas siblings as null and void ab initio
2. Directing the Operations Division of DARPO Leyte, to conduct a delineation survey to determine
the specific area actually owned and cultivated by Egano and coordinate with the Bureau of
Lands for the correction of the name of the farmer-beneficiary in its approved subdivision plan.
3. Ordering MARO, DAR Municipal Office of Leyte, Leyte to identify and document Egano’s as
rightful farmer beneficiaries of such portion subject to the petition.
4. Ordering the Egano’s to coordinate with the Legal Division of the DARPO, Leyte to file the
proper petition with the Adjudication Board for the Cancellation of the CLOA.

Cañas moved for reconsideration but was denied. The Order became final and executory as NO
APPEAL was filed within the remainder of the 15-day filing period.
Pursuant to Dir. Morales’ Order to coordinate with DARPO, on January 24, 2005 the Egano’s filed a
“Petition for Cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138" with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)-Region
VIII.
DARAB Case No. R-0800-0042-05 - PARAD Wilfredo M. Navarra’s Order: February 16, 2006,
- Cancelled the CLOA and its corresponding OCT No. 3324 based on Dir. Morales' order.
 - Cañas moved to reconsider but her motion was denied on May 8, 2006. Cañas then filed an
appeal with the DARAB Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City.
DARAB Central Office Decision- DARAB Case No. 14579: May 29, 2007
- Dismissed the appeal as without merit.
- The cancellation of CLOA and OCT of the Cañas was an offshoot of the Decision of Dir.
Morales. As correctly stated by the Adjudicator a quo: "Thus, the declaration of Dir. Tiburcio A.
Morales, Jr., regarding the disqualification of Flor Manuel Cañas and Salome D. Cañas as farmer-
beneficiaries, is an exercise of an authority of the DAR Secretary that has been delegated to him.
The cancellation of the subject CLOA is a necessary consequence of that declaration which
binds this office, being an adjunct of the DAR. xxx And in the meantime that the off-
mentioned Order of Dir. Tiburcio Morales, has not been vacated or ordered vacated by an
appropriate authority, it is incumbent upon this Office to honor the same."

The DARAB, also denied Cañas’ Motion for Reconsideration on October 9, 2007. Cañas appealed to
the CA through a Petition for Review filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Decision of the Court of Appeals: (Assailed Decision) February 18, 2011
The CA affirmed in toto the DARAB's decision.
- "As correctly enunciated by PARAD Navarra, the objections of herein petitioner to the
cancellation of the subject CLOA as the same is a violation of their right to due process, the
illegality of the sale of the land, the irregularity of the certificate of finality, etc., cannot be
entertained by the DARAB because these are questions related to the administrative
implementation of agrarian laws which are beyond the DARAB's jurisdiction. DARAB has no
appellate jurisdiction over acts of DAR Regional Directors, thus, petitioners should have
addressed their concerns to the DAR Secretary. xxx
- xxx it is clear that the DARAB did not err in ruling against herein petitioner as it has no authority
to grant the reliefs she has prayed for. Moreover, it cannot be argued that Section 1(f) of the
Rules vests the DARAB with jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLT) and the administrative correction thereof, as it has been ruled that for the
DARAB to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, there must be an agrarian dispute between
the landowner and the tenant which is not so in the instant case." (Emphases supplied and
citations omitted)

CA Resolution- August 31, 2011 - denied Cañas Motion for Reconsideration. Hence the Petitioner
Cañas’ filing of the present petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

PETITION/ISSUES:
Petitioner’s Contention:
1. CA denied the petition for review based on purely technical reasons and ignoring the crucial,
substantive issues Petitioner presented in her appeal. CA committed reversible error when it
ruled that the order of Dir. Morales could no longer be disturbed and argues that the said order
cannot attain finality because it is illegal, null and void.
 2. The October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales, was erroneous and patently illegal for the reasons
outlined below:
a. Procedural Issues:
i. The filing of the respondent’s petition with the DARRO and DARAB were
already barred by prescription as it was filed after the lapse of eleven (11) years
since the registration of the CLOA with the Register of Deeds.
ii. It was a prohibited collateral attack on her Title.
b. Substantive Issues:
i. The land purportedly sold by the petitioner’s father to the respondent is not the
actual lot referred to in the petitioner’s CLOA. The CLOA issued to the
petitioner covered Lot No. 3592, and not Lot No. 3595 as claimed by the
respondent.
ii. Dir. Morales exceeded his authority when he ruled that the respondent had
validly acquired ownership over the subject portion of Lot No. 3595 from the
petitioner’s parents, as the authority to rule on the issue of the lot’s ownership
rests with the courts of law.
iii. Lastly, assuming that the alleged sale between the respondent and the
petitioner’s father had actually transpired, the sale of the subject portion of Lot
No. 3595 to the respondent was a prohibited act under Section 73(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and, thus, cannot serve as the basis for the petitioner’s
disqualification as FB and for the cancellation of the CLOA.
In a resolution dated November 14, 2011, this Court required the respondent to file his comment.
Respondent’s Comment:
1. The petition for review on certiorari suffers a procedural infirmity that warrants its outright
dismissal.
a. Petitioner failed to furnish him copies of the annexes mentioned in his petition,
particularly pertaining to copies of the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales, and the
decisions of PARAD Navarra and the DARAB Central Office.
b. That the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales is a legal and binding order, which had
already become final and executory and thus could no longer be reviewed.
Petitioner’s Reply:
1. The petitioner denies that the respondent was not furnished copies of the annexes of her petition.
She alleges that, in any case, the annexes to the present petition were the same attachments to her
petition for review with the CA, of which the respondent was previously furnished copies.

RULING:
We find MERIT in the petition.
While a Rule 45 petition must generally be confined to questions of law, we shall resolve the present
petition, which substantially raises questions of fact as we find glaring procedural and substantive
errors committed and overlooked by the DARAB and the CA in this case. Thus, we find it imperative
to review the facts of the case and the proceedings before the DARAB, including those before the
DARRO.
DARRO:
 - In his October 28, 2004 order, Dir. Morales granted the respondent's petition and declared CLOA
null and void. But, instead of ordering the cancellation of the CLOA, Dir. Morales ordered
the respondent to coordinate with the DARPO-Leyte Legal Division for the filing of the
"proper petition" for cancellation with the Adjudication Board.
PARAD:
- Here, the petitioner objections and contentions were not addressed because, according to PARAD
Navarra, "these are questions related to the administrative implementation of agrarian laws
which are beyond the DARAB's jurisdiction." Then following the orders of Dir. Morales,
PARAD Navarra cancelled the CLOA and OCT. The petitioner appealed to the DARAB Central
Office, which sustained the PARAD's order of cancellation.
o Under Section 5026 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 1727 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 229, the DAR is vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Section 2, Rule I of DAR Administrative Order 03 series of 2003
defines, by enumeration, the nature of Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases
over which the Regional Director exercises primary jurisdiction, and includes cases
arising from or involving the classification and identification of landholdings for CARP
coverage (including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting such
coverage), and the classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries.
Without ruling on the merits of the PARAD's decision at this point, the PARAD already erred in taking
cognizance of and ruling on the respondent's when, in his opinion, the case before him was an agrarian
law implementation case that rightfully falls under the DAR's jurisdiction. What PARAD Navarra
should have done was to refer back the case to the DARRO in accordance with Section 6, Rule I of
DAR Administrative Order 03 series of 2003, which provides:
o Section 6. Referral of cases. When a party erroneously files a case under Section 2
hereof before the DARAB, the receiving official shall refer the case to the proper
DAR office for appropriate action within five (5) working days after determination that
said case is within the jurisdiction of the Secretary. Likewise, when a party erroneously
files a case under Section 3 hereof before any office other than the DARAB or its
adjudicators, the receiving official shall, within five (5) working days, refer the case to
the DARAB or its adjudicators, (Emphasis supplied)
The next question for resolution is whether the PARAD correctly considered the respondent's case as an
agrarian law implementation case cognizable by the DAR.
o Under Section 1 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the Rules applicable to the
petition for cancellation of CLOA filed by the respondent, the DARAB and its
Adjudicators have jurisdiction over cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.
o While it appears that the CLOA subject of this case has been registered with the Register
of Deeds on June 30, 1993, the respondent's petition for cancellation of the petitioner's
CLOA does not fall within the DARAB's jurisdiction due to the absence of an
agrarian dispute or tenancy relationship between the respondent and the petitioner.
Here, both parties claim to be the owners and actual tillers of the subject lot.
An agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 as:
 o (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
o It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee, (Emphasis supplied)
- For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be an agrarian dispute or tenancy
relationship existing between the parties.
- We find that the decisions of PARAD Navarra in DARAB Case No. R-0800-0042-05 and the
DARAB in DARAB Case No. 14579 were rendered without authority and jurisdiction, hence,
null and void.

Lastly, on the procedural issue raised by the respondent in his comment, we resolve it unfavorably to the
respondent by reason of his failure to prove his allegation that he received an incomplete copy of the
petitioner's petition. The respondent cannot also argue that he was denied due process considering that the
Annexes allegedly missing from his copy of the present petition for review on certiorari for the annexes
are readily available and known to him, as he was the petitioner on the cases in said annexes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the present petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the February 18, 2011 Decision and August 31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03230.
Accordingly, we NULLIFY the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator's February 16, 2006
decision in DARAB Case No. R-0800-0042-05 and the DARAB's May 29, 2007 decision in DARAB
Case No. 14579 for want of jurisdiction. The petition for cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138 filed by
the respondent is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition with the
proper forum. Costs against the respondent Andres D. Egano.

4. Hil
ado et al., vs. Hon. Chavez, G.R. NO. 134742 : September 22, 2004 (Kabankalan City,
Negros Occidental)

FACTS:
Celso Zayco is the owner of Lot No. 343 which is a large parcel of agricultural land with
an area of 540,248 square meters located in Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The lot was
covered by TCT. No. 133298 and portions of it were occupied and cultivated by twenty tenants.
Celso mortgaged the property to Pacific Banking Corporation as security for a loan; however, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage upon Celso’s failure to pay his account. 
When the property was sold at public auction by the sheriff, the bank was adjudged as the
highest bidder. Celso failed to redeem the property, and the bank became the owner. In 1984, the
bank then sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado, the Chairman of the Board of the respondent
corporation, Perpetual Help Development and Realty Corporation (PHDRC).  No liens or
encumbrances whatsoever or any notice that the property had been placed under the agrarian
reform laws were annotated at the dorsal portion thereof.
Subsequently, the DAR granted Emancipation Patents to the 20 tenants on the property
from April 28, 1988 to July 1, 1988 on the basis of which titles were issued in their favor during
the period of September 16, 1988 to August 24, 1990.
On February 14, 1996, notwithstanding the issued EPs, the Sangguniang Bayan
ng Kabankalan approved Resolution No. 96-39, reclassifying the property partly as property for
light industry, and the rest as residential.
On August 26, 1997, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the 20 petitioners, who were all occupants-farmers on the property, with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Kabankalan City.
Respondents’ Allegations before the MTCC:
 That on May 27, 1997, it obtained a certified xerox copy of TCT No. 133298 from the
Register of Deeds and discovered that of the 20 petitioners, 7 had been issued Emancipation
Patents on July 1, 1988 which were inscribed at the dorsal portion of said title.
 Nevertheless, the petitioners were not agricultural tenants under the agrarian reform laws
because (a) they entered the property without its consent and did not pay any consideration
for the use of the land they occupied; and (b) the property was, as resolved by
the Sangguniang Bayan under Resolution No. 96-39 in 1996, partly for light industry and
partly residential.
 They therefore pray that the court order defendants (petitioners in this case) to vacate the
areas they respectively occupy in Lot No. 343 and to return the same to plaintiff (respondents
in this case.
In the Petitioners’ Answer (with motion to dismiss the complaint), they alleged that the
landholding had long been placed under Operation Land Transfer, and that they became the
owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. The petitioners prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
MTCC’s Decision
The MTCC applied the Rules of Summary Procedure. Instead of ruling on the motion to
dismiss, it ordered the parties to file their position papers. They ruled that:
 the petitioners failed to prove that they were farmers-beneficiaries on the landholding and
that based on Resolution No. 96-39 of the Municipal Council, the said property had
already been reclassified as part residential and part industrial/commercial areas. 
 that thirteen (13) of the petitioners occupied portions of the landholding only by tolerance
of the respondent and its predecessors, and failed to pay any amount as consideration for
their occupancy of the petitioners’ property. 
The MTCC rejected the petitioners’ contention that the DARAB had exclusive original
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, ruling that the action was one for unlawful
detainer over which it (the MTCC) had exclusive original jurisdiction.
 The petitioners did not assail the order of the MTCC and instead, filed a petition
with the RTC against the respondent for the annulment of the decision of the MTCC.
Petitioners’ Arguments before the RTC
1. that they were agricultural tenants of the late Celso Zayco as evidenced by the receipts signed
by him, where he acknowledged receipt of their rentals over the portions of the landholding
tenanted by them, and the affidavit of Lorenzo Zayco, the son of Celso Zayco;
2. that Julieta Salgado, after she purchased the property in 1981, received rentals over the
landholding from them, as evidenced by the receipts signed by her;
3. that Emancipation Patents over their respective landholdings were issued in their favor;
4. that they had made partial payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for the price
of the lots covered by their respective patents. They also appended a Certification by the
Register of Deeds that thirteen (13) of them were issued TCTs based on the EPs executed in
their favor;
5. that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action of the respondent in
Civil Case No. 034-97, it being an agrarian dispute between the petitioners, as patentees, and
the respondent; hence, the MTCC’s decision was null and void; and
6. that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (PARAD) had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action in the civil case.
Respondents’ averments in its Verified Answer
1. the receipts purportedly signed by Julieta C. Salgado were spurious;
2. the petitioners failed to submit the said receipts to the MTCC and, as such, they were barred
from submitting the same before the RTC;
3. the petitioners participated in the proceedings in the MTCC and were, thus, estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC; and
4. the petitioners were not entitled to injunctive relief because the decision of the MTCC had
become final and executory.
RTC’s Decision
On April 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order declaring that the case involved only
questions of law and not of facts, and ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. On
May 26, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that:
 the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 034-97
and over the persons of the defendants therein; and
 the petitioners failed to file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and even
participated in the proceedings therein; hence, they were estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the MTCC. 
The petitioners filed their petition with the Supreme Court, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the decision of the RTC on questions of law. They
attached to their petition certified true copies of the TCTs issued to each of the them during the
period of September 16, 1988 to August 24, 1990 by the Register of Deeds based on
Emancipation Patents executed by the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, to prove that long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC,
the Register of Deeds had issued such titles to each of them.
 Petitioners’ Arguments before the SC
 This appeal via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is proper, considering that they raised purely
legal issues in their petition.
 The action filed before the MTCC is an agrarian case involving agricultural land placed
under Operation Land Transfer, for which they were issued EPs by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform even before such complaint for ejectment was filed against them. The issue involved
the validity of the EPs issued to them, and was decisive of the issue of jurisdiction in the
MTCC; hence, the MTCC had no original jurisdiction over the action of the respondent,
conformably to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, and the DARAB Rules of Procedure. 
 By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and the Emancipation Patents issued to them,
they became owners of the property and were entitled to the possession thereof.
Respondents’ Answer to the Petition
1. The RTC decision is appealable, the proper remedy of the petitioners from the said decision
was to appeal, by writ of error, to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, and not via a petition for review on certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the
said Rules. As gleaned from the petition, the petitioners raised factual issues because
petitioners assailed the factual findings made by the MTCC that they (the petitioners) are not
agricultural tenants of the late Celso Zayco and Julieta C. Salgado, and that the subject
landholding is residential and not agricultural.
2. The decision of the MTCC had become final and executory because of the petitioners’ failure
to perfect the appeal therefrom; hence, immutable. That by participating in the proceedings
before the MTCC, the petitioners were estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether it is proper for the petitioners to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with this Court from the decision of the RTC.
2. Whether the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
3. Whether the decision of the MTCC is null and void.

RULING:
1. Yes, it is proper for the petitioners to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court with this Court from the decision of the RTC.
General rule is that the remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, is to appeal by writ of error to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 4120 of the Rules of Court, in which questions of facts and/or of law may be raised by the
parties. However, under Section 2(c),21 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, where only questions
of law are raised or are involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. However, even if only questions or issues
are raised by the party in his appeal, it should be made to the Court of Appeals and not to
the Supreme Court, unless there are compelling reasons to allow such appeal.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, we held that "for a question to be one of law, it must
involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
one of them." In an avuncular case, we held that there is a question of law in a given case when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain set of facts, and there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.

2. No, the MTCC had no exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.
Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Rep.
Act No. 7691 provides that Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court and
Metropolitan Trial Court, have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for unlawful detainer.
The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the Rules
on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure
issued by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and
appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB, thus:
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction
shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other
agrarian law.
f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority;
g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct
Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except sub-
paragraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. l 815.
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the
DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian
laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the
Secretary of the DAR.
h) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of
the DAR.
The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform programs. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any
agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. In Tirona v. Alejo, we held that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over
an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably interwoven with an agrarian
dispute.
The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter
of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.
The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient
of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.
If after hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if the
answer with motion to dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are considered, the
DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and original jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent.

3. Yes, the decision of the MTCC is null and void.

Conformably to our ruling in Bayog v. Natino, the MTCC should not have applied
the Rules on Summary Procedure; it should have dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction; or, at the very least, should have proceeded to hear the parties on the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and receive their respective evidence on the issue of whether
or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Thus, the judgment here on
its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are then
inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even
when no appeal has been taken."
It is settled that jurisdiction over the judgment cannot be changed by agreement of the
parties or by the act or omission of each of them that will contravene the legislative will. A party
should not be allowed to divest a competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even
deliberately in derogation of the law.

5. Val
es et al, vs. Galinato et al., G.R. No. 180134, March 05, 2014 (Cabatuan, Ilo ilo)

Petitioners- children of the owners of the land; Respondents- tenants

FACTS:
On March 3, 1972, Spouses Perfecto and Marietta Vales (Sps. Vales) executed a Deed of
Sale conveying five (5) parcels of registered agricultural land, with an aggregate area of
20.3168 hectares all situated in Barrio Manguna, Cabatuan, Iloilo (subject lands), to their three
(3) children, herein petitioners (subject sale). However, the subject sale was not registered,
hence, title to the subject lands remained in the names of Sps. Vales. At the time of the sale,
the subject lands were tenanted.
On October 21, 1972, PD 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants. As required
under Letter of Instruction No. (LOI) 41 issued on November 21, 1972, petitioner Rafael Vales
executed a sworn declaration, asserting that he and his sisters are co-owners of the subject lands.
This notwithstanding, the subject lands were placed under the coverage of the government’s
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program as properties belonging to Sps. Vales, not to
petitioners.

Invoking the landowner’s retention rights provided under PD 27, petitioners filed, on

December 23, 1975, a letter-request for the retention of the subject lands with the Office of the
Agrarian Reform Team No. 06-24-185, which, however, was not acted upon. 
On March 31, 1980, they filed a petition before the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Region
VI, praying that they be certified as owners of the subject lands which they have declared in their
names for tax purposes as early as November 29, 1972. They further prayed that they be allowed
to partition the subject lands with the end in view of obtaining titles for their respective shares.
The petition, however, remained unresolved for nearly two decades.
Meanwhile, during the period July to August 1987, petitioners entered into several Agricultural
Leasehold Contracts with the following tenants: Milagros Allaga, Wenceslao Perez, Dalmacio
Parian, Francisco Choresca, Teofilo Amado, Vivencio Ordoyo, Melchor Choresca, Ricardo
Paniza, and Rodolfo Porcal. These contracts were duly registered with the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan.
The following year, 1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to certain tenants of the
subject lands. Petitioners claimed, however, that such issuances were made “without [their]
knowledge and despite their vehement protest and opposition.”
On January 12, 1998, petitioners filed a petition before the Regional Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), docketed as Administrative Case No. A-0604-0014-98, asking for:
(a) the resolution of the earlier petition dated March 31, 1980;
(b) the exemption of the subject lands from the coverage of the OLT Program; and
(c) the affirmation of petitioners’ right to retain seven (7) has. as provided under PD 27, which
they requested way back in December 1975, but to no avail.
Significantly, petitioners admitted in their petition that the subject sale was not registered and
thus, the titles to the subject lands were not transferred to their names. This was supposedly due
to the fact that the lands were tenanted, and that the Minister of Agrarian Reform refused to issue
the required certification for purposes of registration.
The DAR Regional Director
Ruling:
DAR Regional Director denied the petitions for exemption and retention, and affirmed the
placing of the subject lands under the OLT Program of the government pursuant to PD 27, as
well as the issuance of EPs in favor of the tenants.
Rationale:
Ownership over the subject lands remained with Sps. Vales due to petitioners’ failure to effect
the registration or even the annotation of the subject sale before October 21, 1972 as required
under DAR Memorandum dated May 7, 1982 (May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum). Hence, the
sale did not bind the tenants concerned, and no retention rights were transferred to petitioners.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in an Order dated December
6, 1999, prompting their appeal before the DAR Secretary.
The DAR Secretary Ruling
In an Order dated December 11, 2002 the DAR Secretary reversed and set aside the orders of
the DAR Regional Director, and thereby granted the petitions for exemption and retention,
subject, however, to the provisions of LOI 474 dated October 21, 1976.
The DAR Secretary ruled that petitioners were able to prove by substantial evidence that the
tenants had knowledge of the subject sale in their favor and had even recognized petitioners as
the new owners of the subject lands as they paid rentals to them. Hence, the sale was valid and
binding on the tenants pursuant to the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum, thus removing the
subject lands from the OLT Program coverage.
However, in line with LOI 474, the DAR Secretary directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer to determine if petitioners own other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) has. or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families.
Some of the tenants and/or their relatives (respondents) - filed a motion for
reconsideration which was initially denied but subsequently granted by the DAR Secretary in
an Order dated September 25, 2003.
In granting the motion and reversing his earlier decision, the DAR Secretary held that the
tenants must be shown to have acquired actual knowledge of the subject sale prior to
October 21, 1972 in order to grant validity thereto. However, it appears from the date of
the earliest receipts evidencing the rental payments to petitioners that the tenants knew of
the said sale only in 1977. As such, petitioners never became valid owners of the subject
lands, thus warranting the denial of their petitions for exemption and retention.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the OP.
 The Proceedings Before the OP

In a Decision dated December 30, 2003 ,the OP affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
DAR Secretary which thereby prompted petitioners to file a Motion for
reconsideration, wherein they proffered a new argument, particularly, that when their father,
Perfecto Vales, died on September 8, 1985, they acquired ownership of the subject lands by
intestate succession, including the right of retention as owners.
Finding merit in the argument, the OP, in a Resolution dated April 6, 2004, reversed its earlier
ruling, holding that upon the demise of Perfecto, his heirs, including herein petitioners, became
co-owners of the subject lands by intestate succession with the inherent right to apply for
exemption/retention. Considering, however, that the subject lands were conjugal in nature,
Perfecto’s half of the entire 20.3168 hectare area was transferred by intestacy to petitioners and
their mother, giving each heir about 2.5 has., which was within the seven-hectare (7-hectare)
retention limit under PD 27. Consequently, the OP exempted the pro-indiviso shares of
petitioners in the subject lands and ordered the cancellation of the EPs covering the same.
On respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the OP modified its April 6, 2004 Resolution in
an Order3dated August 19, 2004, declaring that petitioners should be considered as only one
landowner with respect to their undivided portions and not as separate landowners
pursuant to Article 3 of DAR Memorandum dated January 9, 1973.
Consequently, it excluded from the coverage of the OLT Program only a 7-hectare portion of
the subject lands as petitioners’ collective retention area and maintained the OLT Program
coverage of the remaining portion.
Both petitioners and respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were
denied in an Order dated September 5, 2005.
The OP reinstated its initial December 30, 2003 Decision, holding that the non-registration of
the subject sale and the tenants’ lack of actual knowledge thereof prior to October 21, 1972
rendered the transfer as invalid and non-binding on third persons. The subject lands, thus,
remained under the ownership of Sps. Vales for purposes of determining OLT Program
coverage.
Considering, however, that Sps. Vales’ aggregate landholding consists of 58.606 has., which
exceeded the 24-hectare landholding limit under PD 27, they were therefore disqualified to
avail of any retention rights under the said law, without prejudice to the availment of the
retention rights granted under the new law, Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
“Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.”
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA.
Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated July 25, 2007, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal, holding that since their
predecessors-in-interest (i.e., Sps. Vales) were not entitled to exemption and retention under PD
27 given that their aggregate landholdings consist of 58.606 has., neither could petitioners avail
of said rights under RA 6657.
In this relation, the CA noted that while PD 27 allows a covered landowner to retain not more
than seven (7) has. of his land, if his aggregate landholdings do not exceed 24 has., on the other
hand, under LOI 474, where his aggregate landholdings exceed 24 has., the entire landholding
inclusive of the seven (7) has. or less of tenanted rice or corn lands will be covered without any
right of retention.
Accordingly, the CA pronounced that the new retention rights under RA 6657 are likewise
unavailing to petitioners as the same is premised on the existence of such right under PD 27.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated
September 27, 2007, hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the subject lands are exempt from OLT Program coverage.
2. Whether petitioners are entitled to avail of any retention right under existing
agrarian laws.

RULING:
1. No. PD 27, which implemented the OLT Program of the government, covers tenanted rice or
corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT Program are the following: (a) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (b) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-
tenancy obtaining therein.
If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption since the land would not be
considered as covered under the OLT Program.
Petitioners sought exemption of the subject lands from the OLT Program of the government by
claiming ownership thereof on the basis of a sale thereof by the registered owners, i.e., Sps.
Vales, executed on March 3, 1972. However, said transaction, in order to be valid and equally
deemed as binding against the tenants concerned, should be examined in line with the
provisions of the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum, to wit:

Transfers of ownership of lands covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title duly executed prior to
October 21, 1972 but not registered with the Register of Deeds concerned before said date in
accordance with the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) shall not be considered a valid
transfer of ownership insofar as the tenant-farmers   are concerned and therefore the land
shall be placed under [the OLT Program].

Transfer of ownership of unregistered lands (ownership may be evidenced by tax declaration,

deeds of conveyance) executed prior to October 21, 1972, whether registered or not with the
Register of Deeds concerned pursuant to Act No. 3344 may be considered a valid
transfer/conveyance as between the parties subject to verification of the due execution of the
conveyance/transfer in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

In order that the foregoing transfers of ownership mentioned in the preceding two
paragraphs  may be binding upon the tenants, such tenants should have knowledge of such
transfers/conveyance prior to October 21, 1972, have recognized the persons of the new
owners, and have been paying rentals/amortization to such new owners.

Tersely put, the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum provides that tenants should (a) have actual
knowledge of unregistered transfers of ownership of lands covered by Torrens Certificate of
Titles prior to October 21, 1972, (b) have recognized the persons of the new owners, and (c) have
been paying rentals/amortization to such new owners in order to validate the transfer and
bind the tenants to the same.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the subject sale was not registered or even annotated on
the certificates of title covering the subject lands. More importantly, the CA, which upheld the
final rulings of the DAR Secretary and the OP, found that the tenants categorically belied having
actual knowledge of the said sale, and that the tenants still recognized Sps. Vales as the
landowners. In this regard, petitioners failed to show any justifiable reason to warrant a contrary
finding.
Thus, keeping in mind that the factual findings of the CA are generally accorded with finality
absent any sufficient countervailing reason therefor, it may be concluded that petitioners
failed to comply with the requirements stated under the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum.
As a result, the subject sale could not be considered as valid, especially as against the tenants
and/or their relatives - particularly, herein respondents. The subject lands were therefore
correctly placed under the OLT Program of the government, which thereby warranted the denial
of the petition for exemption.
2. No. Anent the issue on retention, Sps. Vales had no right to retain the subject lands
considering that their aggregate landholdings, consisting of 58.6060 has., exceeded the 24-
hectare landholding limit as above-explained.
Consequently, the subject lands would fall under the complete coverage of the OLT Program,
without any right of retention on petitioners’ part, either under PD 27 or RA 6657, being mere
successors-in-interest of Sps. Vales by virtue of intestate succession. In this respect, the denial of
the petition for retention was likewise proper.
If the land is covered by the OLT Program, which, hence, renders the right of retention operable,
the landowner who cultivates or intends to cultivate an area of his tenanted rice or corn land has
the right to retain an area of not more than seven (7) has. thereof, on the condition that his
aggregate landholdings do not exceed 24 has. as of October 21, 1972. Otherwise, his entire
landholdings are covered by the OLT Program without him being entitled to any retention right.
Similarly, by virtue of LOI 474, if the landowner, as of October 21 1976, owned less than 24 has.
of tenanted rice or corn lands, but additionally owned (a) other agricultural lands of more than 7
has., whether tenanted or not, whether cultivated or not, and regardless of the income derived
therefrom, or (b) lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes, from
which he derives adequate income to support himself and his family, his entire landholdings
shall be similarly placed under OLT Program coverage, without any right of retention.
-may be skipped-
Finally, the Court finds no merit in petitioners’ claim that the December 11, 2002 Order of the
DAR Secretary granting the petitions for exemption and retention had already attained finality
and can no longer be reconsidered, reversed or modified, especially on a second motion for
reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.
In his September 25, 2003 Order, the DAR Secretary explained that a “palpable mistake” and
“patent error” had been committed in determining the date of the filing of respondents’ motion
for reconsideration, which upon review, was shown to have been timely filed, warranting
reconsideration of his earlier order.
Settled is the rule that issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian
reform are within the domain of the DAR Secretary. By virtue of such special competence,
he should be given an opportunity, even on a second motion for reconsideration, to rectify the
errors he may have committed.
The time-honored rule is that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly
exhausted. Besides, rules of procedure are construed liberally in administrative proceedings as
administrative bodies are not bound by the technicalities applicable to courts of law, hence,
should not be used to override substantial justice, as in this case.
All told, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the denial of the tribunals a quo of the
petitions for exemption and retention herein considered.

6. Ca
bral vs. Heirs of Adolfo and Policarpio, GR 191615, August 2, 2017.
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that she is the registered owner of several parcels of land situated, at
Barangay Purok, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-1670, subsequently renumbered as OCT No. 0-220 (M).
On October 21, 1972, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform subjected the said land under the
coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government under P.D. No. 27.
In July 1973, petitioner sought to convert her landholdings to non-agricultural purposes.
In his 2nd Endorsement Letter to the DAR Secretary dated October 1, 1973, DAR District
Officer Fernando Ortega, stated that the subject property was not included in the OLT program
under, nor has any portion thereof been transferred to a tenant. Thus, District Officer Ortega
recommended the conversion of the same into residential, commercial, industrial, or other
purposes.

On April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to Gregoria Adolfo, Gregorio
Lazaro, Florencio Adolfo, and Elias Policarpio pursuant to the OLT program covering the
subject property. Corresponding Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) were then issued to
respondents Florencio Adolfo and Elias Policarpio upon registration of their respective EPs with
the Register of Deeds.
 On January 16, 1990, petitioner filed a petition before the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council (BARC) for the cancellation of the EPs issued. On January 19, 1990, petitioner filed
another petition for cancellation of the said EPs and TCTs before the DAR. The said petition
was, however, forwarded to the DAR Regional Director, who dismissed the case. In a case
decided by this Court in 2001 entitled Victoria P. Cabral v. CA, however, this Court held that the
Regional Director had no jurisdiction over the case as it is the PARAD who has jurisdiction over
cases involving cancellation of EPs.
In 1994, petitioner filed an OLT Letter Protest before the DAR Regional Director,
questioning the coverage of her landholdings. The DAR Regional Director denied the said OLT
protest, finding that despite the reclassification of the subject parcels of land, the same will not
be a bar in placing the said lands under the OLT program, considering that petitioner's
landholdings exceeded 24 hectares.
On appeal, the then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in his Order dated July 12, 1996,
affirmed the DAR Regional Director's Order, declaring that the subject landholdings are covered
by the OLT program as it was only after the landholdings were placed under the OLT program
on October 21, 1972 when it was classified as within the residential zone.
On August 16, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents
and Torrens Title before the Office of the PARAD. Petitioner contended that the issuance of the
said EPs and TCTs were violative of applicable agrarian laws considering that the subject
property was already classified as residential. Petitioner also averred that the said EPs were
issued without due process and without payment of just compensation.
On June 18, 2004, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner.
Respondents appealed the said decision to the DARAB. In its July 29, 2008 Decision, the
DARAB affirmed PARAD's Decision. Undaunted, respondents elevated the case to the CA for
review.

In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the DARAB Decision. The CA
found that the subject land was never converted into a residential land and, therefore, not exempt
from the coverage of the government's OLT program.
G.R. No. 198160
The issue on the coverage of Lot 4 under the OLT program pursuant already been settled
by this Court in its Decision dated August 31, 2016 in the case of Victoria P. Cabral v. Gregoria
Adolfo, Gregorio Lazaro, and Heirs of Elias Policarpio.
The said case involves the same issues, same assailed decisions of the PARAD and
DARAB, same subject property, and same parties.
Essentially, this Court upheld the findings of the PARAD and DARAB, recognizing the
zoning reclassification made on the subject property as evidenced by the Certifications dated
February 24, 1983 and August 28, 1989 issued by the zoning administrator. We also considered
therein the 2nd Endorsement Letter of then DAR District Officer Ortega, declaring that
petitioner's landholdings were not covered by the OLT program. The Court also found that no
CLTs were issued in favor of the respondents therein, which bolstered the fact that the subject
property was not covered by P.D. No. 27.
Hence, as it was established that Lot 4 was not covered by the OLT program, this Court
declared that the EPs covering the subject lands therein were erroneously issued to the
respondents.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in reversing the PARAD and DARAB's order of cancelling the subject
EPs/TCTs? (iisa lang issue na sinabi sa case pero ang daming diniscuss ng SC)

RULING:

The subect property (Lot 4) is not covered by the OLT program under P.D. No. 27.

The resolution of the instant controversy is primarily anchored upon the determination of
whether the subject lands are covered by the OLT program under P.D. No. 27.

(1) As the Court has determined in G.R. No. 198160, Lot 4 had already been reclassified to
non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already outside the coverage of the OLT
program.
As this Court has often stressed, factual findings of administrative bodies charged with
their specific field of expertise, such as the PARAD and the DARAB, are afforded great
weight, nay, finality by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings
were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in
the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. Contrary to the
CA's conclusion, the Court finds find no cogent reason to disturb the said quasi-judicial agency's
findings.
(2) The records are bereft of proof that the subject lands are tenanted and devoted
primarily to rice or corn production.
It bears stressing that P.D. No. 27 covers only tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites
for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or
com crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein.
Neither of these requisites is present in this case.
(a) The subject property is not covered by the OLT because of its residential nature.

Again, as found by both the PARAD and the DARAB as early as October 1, 1973, the
DAR, through District Officer Ortega, already declared that the subject landholding is suited for
residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes considering its potential for national
development.
(b) As to whether a tenancy relationship exists, petitioner insists that respondents are not her
tenants. On the other hand, the respondents necessarily claim that there is a system of share-
crop between them and the petitioner.
 This Court has, time and again, held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural
land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is
necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner. Tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be
done away by conjectures. Thus, as petitioner denies such tenancy relationship and it is
respondents who assert the same, the latter has the burden to prove their affirmative allegation of
tenancy. Again, the respondents failed to discharge such burden as there is nothing on record that
will provide this Court factual basis to determine that indeed a crop-sharing agreement exists
between the parties.
(c) Farmer-beneficiaries cannot be deemed full owners when there is no compliance with the
procedure for the issuance of an EP under P.D. No. 27 and related rules.

Thus, neither do the Court subscribe to Sec. Garilao's reasoning and respondents'
argument that since the reclassication of the property was made after the effectivity of P.D. No.
27, tenant-farmers enjoy a vested right and should be deemed as "full owners" of the property.

Indeed, under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of
the land they till as of October 21, 1972 or the effectivity of the said law. This policy was
intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil. However, the provision
declaring tenant farmers as owners as of October 21, 1972 should not be construed as
automatically vesting upon them absolute ownership over the land they are tilling. Certain
requirements must also be complied with before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-
farmers.
(d) Foremost, there was no CLT issued prior to the issuance of the subject EPs.

In recognition of the said inchoate (partial, imperfect) right, a CLT is issued to a tenant
farmer to serve as a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is
awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing
owner. The CLT proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice or
corn production.
(e) Likewise, there is no showing that petitioner was notified of the placement of her
landholdings under the OLT program and, more importantly, there was no proof that
petitioner was paid just compensation therefor.
Land acquisition partakes of the nature of expropriation. In fact, jurisprudence states that
it is an extraordinary method of expropriating private property. As such, the law on the matter
must be strictly construed. In expropriation proceedings, as in judicial proceedings, notice is part
of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State's intention
to acquire private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to
present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian
law.

In this case, the respondents and the DAR failed to adduce evidence to prove actual
notice to the petitioner and payment of just compensation for the taking of the latter's property.
In G.R. No. 198160, there is nothing on record that will show that the landholding was brought
under the OLT program, CLTs were issued prior to the issuance of the subject EPs, respondents
are full-fledged members of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative, they finished payment of
amortizations, and that petitioner, as the landowner, was notified and paid just compensation for
the taking of her lands before the issuance of the subject EPs.
The issue on the validity of EPs is not barred by prescription.

Respondents argue that the EPs and subsequent TCTs issued to them, registered with the
Register of Deeds, have already become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of the issuance thereof and can no longer be cancelled. Respondents point out that their EPs
were issued in 1988 and the instant case was filed only in 2003 or 15 years after such issuance.

This Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of EPs and TCTs does not put the
ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. EPs issued to agrarian
reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules, and
regulations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2009 and Resolution dated March
15, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108518 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

7. Bor
romeo vs. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 05, 2013 (Naguilian, Isabela)

TOPIC/ DOCTRINE: A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and
it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.

FACTS:

• Petitioner, Borromeo, claiming that he is the owner of the subject land, filed a petition before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Isabela, to seek the cancellation of Mina’s
title based on emancipation patent and to seek exemption from the coverage of the
government’s OLT program under PD 27.
• He purchased the said property from its previous owner, Garcia, as evidenced by a notarized
deed of sale. He claimed that since his total agricultural landholdings was only 3.3635
hectares which is below the retention limits under both PD 27 and Republic Act No. 6647
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) it should have been excluded from the
coverage of the OLT program.
• The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a report indicating that the property
was erroneously identified by the office as the property of petitioner’s father, the late
Cipriano Borromeo. The property was never actually owned by Cipriano, as its true owner
was Garcia who later sold the same to petitioner. The MARO recommended that the subject
landholding be exempted from the coverage of the OLT. The PARO adopted the
recommendation and accordingly cancelled respondent’s emancipation patent.
• Respondent filed an administrative appeal to the DAR regional director, who held that the
petitioner, being the true owner of the property, had the right to impugn its coverage from the
government’s OLT program. He declared that the subject landholding to be exempt from
 OLT coverage because it is below the retention limits. This was upheld by the DAR
Secretary.
• CA reversed the DAR Secretary’s ruling. It said that the said sale to be null and void for
being a prohibited transaction under PD 27 which prohibits the transfers or alienation of
covered agricultural lands after October 21, 1972, except to the tenant- beneficiaries thereof,
of which petitioner was not.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can seek exemption from OLT coverage and whether he can seek the
cancellation of Mina’s émancipation patent. (NO)

HELD:

NO, PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October
21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant¬ tillers thereon. The sale by Garcia to
petitioner is null and void. Petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as
his present claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void
source. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous
identification of the subject landholding by the MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact
remains that petitioner had no right to file a petition for landholding exemption since the sale of
the said property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void. Proceeding from this, the finding that
petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings is way below the retention limits set forth by law thus,
becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption precisely because he has no right over
the aforementioned landholding.

8. Ay
o-alburo vs. Matobato G.R. NO. 155181. April 15, 2005 (Alangalang, Leyte)

The controversy in the case at bar involves a parcel of private agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice with an area of 1.787 hectares situated at Barangay San Pedro, Alangalang, Leyte
(the property) which was owned by Dr. Victoria Marave-Tiu.
On October 21, 1972, then President Marcos issued P.D. 27, otherwise known as the
Tenant Emancipation Decree, which transfers to qualified tenant-farmers the ownership of the
lands they till. The Decree is applicable to agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn.
As the property was covered by Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27, Dr.
Marave-Tiu submitted to the Department of Agrarian Reform a list of the names of her farmer-
tenants including petitioner’s adoptive father Estanislao Ayo who was also administrator of the
property.
The property was eventually awarded to Estanislao who, being at that time already old
and sickly, requested that it be instead registered in the name of petitioner (Liberty- Ayo) which
was granted.
On April 2, 1996 The Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer of Leyte and its Regional Director for Region VIII, and Uldarico
Motabato later filed a Petition before the PARAD of Tanghas, Tolosa, Leyte, for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer and Emancipation Patent issued in petitioner’s
(Liberty Ayo) favor and for the issuance of a new certificate and patent in respondent’s name.
Contention of the Respondent:
 He was the one of cultivated the said land since 1966 and gives share of the harvest to the
petitioner as rentals. He further claimed that issuance of certificates is bec. of possible
oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect. This is because she never engaged in the
actual cultivation and tillage of the land.
 She admitted that the respondent has planted rice on the disputed property but because
the respondent pleaded to plant the excess rice seedlings. It only happened on 1986.
Decision of PARAD:
In favor of respondent (Motabato).
 From 1985 up to the present, it is the private petitioner who tilled the land and gave
shares to the private respondent. He also paid the land amortization with the Land Bank
in 1985 and 1986. In effect private respondent has taken the shoes of a landlord, an
inimical practice the Agrarian Reform Program among others is designed to abolish if not
eradicate. Having tolerated private petitioner in the cultivation of the land in question and
received shares for the past eleven (11) years is no different at all from having installed a
tenant. Farmer beneficiaries are prohibited from installing tenants on the land they
acquired under P.D. 27. xxx even a transfer of the right to use or cultivate the land
constitutes a grave violation of P.D. 27 and its implementing rules and regulation.
Appeal to DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board)
Affirmed the decision of PARAD.
(in favor of respondent,Matobato)
 CA: In favor of respondent, Matobato. There was absence of the element of "personal"
cultivation on the part of petitiioner (Ayo-Alburo). permitted and actually engaged the
service of the private respondent to do the farm work in exchange for the payment of the
land amortization and shares in the produce of the land. These facts violated the terms of
the Land Title.
ISSUE/ISSUES
1. Whether Emancipation Patent of petitioner may be set aside after it had long been
issued.
2. Whether the CA, DARAB, PARAB erred in finding her guilty of violating the terms
and conditions of the certificate of land transfer and emancipation patent, she asserting
that private respondent was not a bona fide tenant of the property and thus praying for an
assessment of the evidence.
3. Whether tenancy relationship be implied.
 4. Whether the amortization payment made by the petitioner should be forfeited in favor
of the respondent.
5. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the decisions of the PARAD and DARAB
which resolved to cancel petitioner's emancipation patent for violation of the terms and
conditions on the patent whereas respondent's bases of filing of the complaint before the
PARAD were inadvertence, oversight or excusable neglect.

1. Whether Emancipation Patent of petitioner may be set aside after it had long been issued.
Contention of PETITIONER:
Since Emancipation Patent and a TCT had been issued, the ownership of the property had
become conclusive and no longer open to doubt or controversy.
SUPREME COURT:
The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian
reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.
Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. 
Section 12(g) of P.D. 946
2. Whether the CA, DARAB, PARAB erred in finding her guilty of violating the terms and
conditions of the certificate of land transfer and emancipation patent, she asserting that
private respondent was not a bona fide tenant of the property and thus praying for an
assessment of the evidence.
Contention of Petitioner:
Private respondent (Matobato) was not bona fide tenant of the property.
SUPREME COURT:
Only question of law can be raised.
Findings of fact by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the
Supreme Court, more so if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of
the DARAB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and
specialized jurisdiction.
3. Whether tenancy relationship be implied.
Yes, tenancy relationship can be implied, as held in Felizardo v Fernandez:
A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly xxx
 Although petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing
respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from him the
landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
4. Whether the amortization payment made by the petitioner should be forfeited in favor of
the respondent.
While the DARAB has jurisdiction to order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian
reform beneficiary, forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the
reallocate of the landholding.
5. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the decisions of the PARAD and DARAB which
resolved to cancel petitioner's emancipation patent for violation of the terms and conditions
on the patent whereas respondent's bases of filing of the complaint before the PARAD were
inadvertence, oversight or excusable neglect.
It is the material allegations of fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusion or the prayer
made therein, that determines the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled.
The power of adjudication, vested then in the now defunct Court of Agrarian Relations and
now in the DARAB, is not restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
preventing further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing.
And the DARAB is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that
agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive proceeding.
What are the effects of petitioner's violation of the condition of the title?
 1. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Leyte to cancell (sic) TCT NO. TE-775 with
Emancipation Patent No. A-025173 containg (sic) an area of 17,870 square meters
located at Barangay San Pedro, Alangalang, Leyte in the name of Liberty Ayo;
 2. Declaring the said title null and void;
 3. Ordering the DAR Provincial Office, Tanghas, Tolosa, Leyte, Attention: Operations
Division to process the reallocation of the land covered by TCT No. TE 775, EP No. A-
025173 registered in the name of Liberty Ayo in favor of Uldarico Matobato;
 4. Ordering the Register of Deeds Province of Leyte in coordination with the DAR
Provincial Office, Tanghas, Tolosa, Leyte to issue a new title and register covering
subject landholding in favor of Uldarico Matobato as reallocatee and;
 5. Ordering the forfieture (sic) of the land amortization payment paid in the name of
Liberty Ayo in favor of the government.
9. Cor
ua vs. Cinamin, GR 154286, February 28, 2006 (Binalbagan, Negros Occidental)

FACTS:

Julieta Vasquez Coruńa was the owner of Lot No. 1176-A located in Himaya, Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, with an area of 119.3830 hectares and Lot No. 350-B situated in Payao, Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental, composed of 25.2513 hectares. When Julieta died intestate on September 30, 1972, these
properties passed on to her children, herein petitioners. Lot No. 1176-A was tenanted by respondents
Cinamin, Acana, Laureano, Egang, and Gabiota. Lot 350-B was tenated by respondents Vanguardia,
Locsin, Gualdrapa, Goroy, Sonquiawon, and Belo. On June 28, 1994, petitioners filed before the PARAD
two separate complaints for cancellation and/or nullification of emancipation patents and/or certificates of
land transfer issued in favor of respondents. PARAD dismissed complaint for utter lack of merit and the
counterclaim was denied as well for lack of evidence. On February 14, 1995, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the PARAD. Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal on June 29,
1995 before the DARAB which affirmed in toto the decision of the PARAD. Still undaunted, the
petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which was denied on December 14,
2001. On May 23, 2002, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was again denied by the Court of
Appeals.

Hence, this petition.

Contention of the Petitioners:

Both lands were primarily devoted to sugar production and only a small portion of Lot 1176-A (9.92
hectares) and of Lot 350-B (8.10 hectares) was devoted to rice and corn production. Both land is owned
in common and is less than the retention limit stated in said statute. Also, respondents failed to pay the
rentals and amortizations for the lands awarded to them. Despite such, emancipation patents were issued.
Under both law and jurisprudence, emancipation patents may only be issued to farmer-beneficiaries after
they had fully complied with the requirements of PD No. 27 including the full payment of amortization
citing Section No. 2 of PD No. 266.

Contention of the Respondents:

Respondents contended that they were duly paying the landowners’ shares on the lands they were farming
since by virtue of PD No. 27, they were recognized as farmer-beneficiaries. They alleged that they were
paying their amortizations for the lands granted to them through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
and that they had been paying the real property taxes due on the subject lands.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA committed reversible error in not invalidating the emancipation patents and
certificates of land transfer awarded to respondents for having been issued prior to the full payment of the
amortization required under PD No. 27

2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the payments made by the respondents to the LBP are credited as
valid amortization payments as required under PD No. 27

RULING:
Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue

PD No. 27 was issued in order to address the then prevailing violent conflict and social tension brought
about by the iniquitous landownership by a few. This statute declares emancipation of all tenant-farmers
effective October 21, 1972. Nevertheless, such emancipation does not come free for the farmers who
were supposed to benefit from said decree. A careful study of PD No. 27 reveals that transfer of
ownership over lands is subject to particular terms and conditions wherein the compliance with
which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.
Section No. 2 of PD No. 266 specifies procedure for the registration of title to lands acquired under PD
No. 27 – full compliance by the grantee is required for grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation
Decree.

In the case at bar, the emancipation patents were issued to respondents on various dates between 1989 and
1990 notwithstanding the fact that they were still paying their amortizations to LBP which is a clear
violation of PD No. 27 and Sec. 2 of PD No. 266. Although under the law, tenant farmers are already
deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including
interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.

While the court commiserates with respondents in their plight, we are constrained by the explicit
requirements of the laws and jurisprudence on the matter to annul the emancipation patents issued
to respondents in the absence of any proof that they or the LBP has already fully paid the value of
the lands put under the coverage of PD No. 27.

Second Issue

We cannot, however, agree in the petitioners’ contention that the amortization payments made by the
respondents to the LBP were invalid. Petitioners’ reliance in the holding of the Court of Appeals in
Gonzales v. LBP is unavailing. There is neither inconsistency nor incompatibility between PD No. 816
and DAR’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978. Under both PD 816 and the MAR Circular,
payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the
tenant farmers shall pay amortization to the LBP. The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial
payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.

In the present case, the value of the Lot No. 1176-A was determined on June 17, 1988 and on December
20, 1977 for Lot No. 350-B. Notably, these values were subsequently adopted by the LBP. As the
valuation of the subject lands was already accomplished, respondents were then authorized to course their
payment through the LBP pursuant to PD No. 816 and DAR MAR Circular No. 6.

Premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY granted.

Legal Bases: Presidential Decree Number 27; Section 2 of Presidential Decree Number 266;
Presidential Decree 816; Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular Number 6, series of
1978; Executive Order 228; Dura lex, sed lex

10. Pa
ngilinan vs. Balatbat, GR 170787, September 12, 2012 (Sta. Ana, Pampanga)
FACTS:
 Respondent spouses Jocelyn N. Balatbat and Vicente A. Balatbat were found by the
PARAD to have landholdings totaling 25.2548 hectares, which consisted of 9.8683 hectares of
riceland and 15.3864 hectares of sugarland. The 9.8683 hectares of riceland was covered by
land reform.
Out of the 25.2548 hectares of land owned by respondents, 18.2479 hectares was under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6009. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
Victorino D. Guevarra found that the OCT consists of:
- 8.6402 hectares of riceland covered by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228,
- 9.6077 hectares was sugar land it was subdivided by respondents as follows:
- Title No. 181462 -- 64,540 square meters (6.4540 h)
- Title No. 181464 -- 8,904 square meters (0.8904 h)
- Title No. 181469 -- 22,633 square meters (2.2633 h)
= Total 96,077 square meters (9.6077 h)
The first two title was used by the respondent in a condominium project called Carolina
Village, while the last title was subdivided among the children of the respondents. The
respondents applied for the retention of 8.3749 hectares of riceland.
This case was first filed on December 24, 1975, where the respondent filed an application
for Retention of their landholdings under P.D. No. 27, however, it was not acted upon.
In May 1996, respondents received a letter from MARO informing respondents of a
conference for the determination of the value of their landholdings and the final survey of the
land preparatory to the issuance of emancipation patents. On Sept that same year the respondent
received a notice of coverage on OCT No. 6009 under R.A. No. 6657. As a response,
respondents reiterated their application for retention to the DAR through MARO. However,
still on October that year, they received a final notification to landowner, issued by MARO.
Hence, the Registrar of Deeds issued TCT No. 25866 to petitioner, pursuant to Emancipation
Patent No. 00728063.
This prompted respondents to file with the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a Complaint:
1. For annulment of emancipation patent, and
2. Ejectment and damages against petitioner Crispino Pangilinan, Municipal Land
Officer Victorino D. Guevarra, and the DAR Secretary, represented by the Regional
Director, Region III.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
Guevarra knew that the land cultivated by petitioner is one of those included in their
application for retention, Guevarra, acting in bad faith and without notice to them and in
disregard of their rights and in collusion with petitioner, recommended for the coverage of their
land under Operation Land Transfer and that the emancipation patents were unlawfully issued
and registered in the Registrar of Deeds
 The respondent then prayed for the annulment of the emancipation patent issued, the
ejectment of petitioner from the landholding in question, and for payment of moral damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
PARAD RULING
PARAD ruled in favor of the Petitioners. According to them:
1. Respondents were already barred in their bid for the retention area when they filed their
application for retention on November 6, 1996, since the last day for the landowner to
apply for his right of retention under Administrative Order No. 1 of 1985 was on August
29, 1985.
2. The area of retention policy under P.D. No. 27 is that a landowner can retain in naked
ownership an area of not more than seven (7) hectares of rice/corn lands if the said
landowner does not own an aggregate area of more than seven (7) hectares of land used for
residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes from which the landowner
derives adequate income to support himself and his family. Otherwise, such landowner is
compelled to give up his rice/corn land to his tenant-tiller, and payment to him shall
be undertaken by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) if not directly paid by such
tenant-tiller.
PARAD declared that respondents "retained" the sugarland with an area of 15.2864
hectares, and 4.8836 hectares thereof was divided into a subdivision lot, while the remaining
balance was subdivided among respondents and their children. Hence, the PARAD held that the
area of seven hectares that can be retained under P.D. No. 27 can no longer be awarded to
respondents, since they already owned an aggregate area of more than seven hectares used for
residential and other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their family.
Also, the petitioner has absolute ownership of the landholding as he has fully paid the
amortizations to the LBP.
**Respondent then appealed to the DARAB
DARAB RULING: Affirmed the decision of PARAD
CA RULING: The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
The Court of Appeals stated that P.D. No. 27 allows a landowner to retain not more than
seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed 24 hectares. In this
case, respondents' total landholding is 25.2548 hectares, 9.8683 hectares of which was covered
by land reform being riceland, while the balance of 15.3864 hectares was sugarland. Since
respondents timely filed their application for retention of seven hectares way back in 1975 and
the deadline was in 1985, the Court of Appeals held that respondents were qualified to retain at
least seven hectares.
Moreover, CA stated that AO No. 2, Series of 1994, an Emancipation Patent or Certificate of
Land Ownership Award may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area. CA held that the transfer certificate of title issued on the basis of the
certificate of land transfer could not operate to defeat the right of respondents to retain the five
hectares they have chosen, which includes the said less than three (3) hectares (29,942 square
meters) of riceland involved in this case.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the right to be heard and denied due
process of law because he was not personally furnished a copy of the petition. According to
petitioner, the legal services rendered to him by Mr. Fernando Dizon was merely an
accommodation to him in Mr. Dizon’s capacity as Legal Officer for the Legal Services Division
of the DAR. Petitioner asserts that after the case was decided and resolved by the DARAB, the
legal assistance extended to him by Mr. Fernando Dizon ended, simply because Mr. Fernando
Dizon is not a full-fledged lawyer, which the respondents knew very well. Thus, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, cannot be enforced against him.
ISSUES/ SUPREME COURT RULING:
1. The CA committed a grave error when it decided CA G.R. [SP] No. 85017 without
requiring that petitioner be furnished with a copy of the petition, thus depriving the
latter his right to be heard and to present evidence in opposition thereto.
a. Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
i. He was not denied due process, as he was furnished a copy of the petition
through his counsel of record, Mr. Fernando Dizon, from both PARAD
and DARAB.
1. DARAB New Rules of Procedure allows a non-lawyer to appear
before the Board or any of its adjudicators if he is a DAR Legal
Officer.
ii. As Mr. Dizon was petitioner’s counsel of record, service was properly
made upon the said counsel, absent any notification by petitioner to the
court of circumstances requiring service upon petitioner himself.
iii. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Such
process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered. In this case, petitioner was not denied due process as he was
able to file a comment before the Court of Appeals through Mr. Dizon.
Moreover, records show that petitioner, had the assistance of two other
lawyers, Atty. Paul S. Maglalang and Atty. Jord Achaes R. David.
2. The CA seriously erred when it failed to recognize that the private respondents filed
the petition in the CA in utmost bad faith and are guilty of willful and deliberate
forum shopping and perjury.
a. Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
i. Chavez v. CA held: The elements of forum shopping are the same as in
litis pendentia where the final judgment in one case will amount to res
 judicata in the other. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
b. There is no forum shopping in this case as the parties involved and the reliefs
prayed for are different.
i. DAR: Respondent’s letter reiterated their application for retention of their
Riceland under RA No. 6657. The relief sought was for their exercise of
their right of retention as landowners.
ii. PARAD: Respondent filed for the annulment of emancipation patent,
ejectment and damages.
3. If the petition in the CA during the pendency of the application for retention of
private respondents is not considered forum shopping, the CA should have, at the
very least, considered the former as litis pendentia which necessitates the dismissal
of the later suit.
a. Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
b. Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit". As the
elements of forum shopping, are the same as the elements of litis pendentia, and
the said elements are not present in this case, litis pendentia cannot be a ground
for the dismissal of the complaint for annulment of emancipation patent.
4. The PARAD of Pampanga erred in adjudicating the right of retention of the private
respondents.
a. The Complaint is within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, as it
seeks the annulment of petitioner's emancipation patent which has been registered
with the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga.
i. The jurisdiction of the DARAB under Section 1, Rule II, of the applicable
DAR New Rules of Procedure (1994) includes "those involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered
with the Land Registration Authority." Section 2 of the said DARAB New
Rules of Procedure grant the PARAD "concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and
disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their
assigned territorial jurisdiction."
5. The decision of the CA cannot be enforced against the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga considering that it was not impleaded in the case filed before the PARAD
of Pampanga nor in the CA:
 a. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pampanga was correctly not impleaded in the complaint for annulment of
emancipation patent before the DARAB as it is neither a party in interest who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit nor a necessary party
whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose
interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence
without affecting them.
6. Whether respondents are qualified to retain their Riceland.
a. No, respondents are not qualified to retain their Riceland. The laws pertinent to
this case are P.D. No. 27, LOI No. 474 and Administrative Order No. 4, series of
1991.
b. Landowners covered by P.D. 27 are entitled to retain seven hectares, except those
whose entire tenanted rice and corn lands are subject of acquisition and
distribution under Operation Land Transfer (OLT). An owner of tenanted rice and
corn lands may not retain these lands under the following cases:
i. If he, as of 21 October 1972, owned more than 24 hectares of tenanted rice
or corn lands; or
ii. By virtue of LOI 474, if he, as of 21 October 1976, owned less than 24
hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands but additionally owned the
following:
1. Other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares, whether
tenanted or not, whether cultivated or not, and regardless of the
income derived therefrom; or
2. Lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban
purposes, from which he derives adequate income to support
himself and his family.
c. In this case, the DARAB and the CA agreed that respondents’ total landholding is
25.2548 hectares, and that 9.8683 hectares thereof was riceland, which was
subjected to Operation Land Transfer, while 15.3864 hectares was sugarland. In
addition, the PARAD and the DARAB found that the 15.3864 hectares of
sugarland was subdivided by respondents into a 4.8836 subdivision lot to support
themselves and their family; hence, under LOI No. 474 and Administrative Order
No. 4, series of 1991, the PARAD and the DARAB held that respondents are no
longer entitled to retain seven hectares of the land subject to Operation Land
Transfer.
7. Whether there was a ground for canceling petitioner’s emancipation patent.
a. The resolution of the issue on whether petitioner's emancipation patent should be
cancelled hinged on the right of retention of respondents. Hence, the PARAD and
the DARAB determined respondents’ right of retention. The applicable DARAB
New Rules of Procedure (1994) did not contain a contrary proviso in Section 1 or
Section 1 (f) thereof.
 b. The Court notes that even before the PARAD rendered his decision on the
complaint for annulment of petitioner's emancipation patent, the DAR Regional
Director of Pampanga had already issued an Order dated March 12, 1998, denying
the application for retention of respondents for utter lack of merit.
i. DAR Secretary’s Decision “it is in this provision of law (LOI 474) that
this Office strongly denies the application for retention of the herein
applicant in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries concerned who had already
been issued their Emancipation Patents (EP).
ii. The legal basis of the decision of the DARAB in determining whether
respondents were qualified to retain their riceland, in order to resolve the
main issue on whether there was a ground for the cancellation of
petitioner's emancipation patent, is the same as the legal basis of the DAR
Regional Director in denying respondents' application for retention.
SC ruled in favor of Petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated May 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85017,
and its Resolution dated December 2, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision
of the DARAB dated February 2, 2004 in DARAB Case No. 8024 and its Resolution dated June
11,2004 are hereby REINSTATED.

11. Nat
alia Realty, Inc. VS DAR GR 103302

FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3)
contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, and Rizal with areas of: 120.9793
hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares, a total of 125.0078 hectares.
April 18, 1979- Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land
located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb
the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing
subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation
(EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted
preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission.
Permits issued:
Phase I 13.2371 hectares-sometime in 1982
Phase II 80,000 hectares-13 October 1983
Phase III 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986
 Thus, became “Antipolo Hills Subdivision”
June 15, 1988- R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988” went into effect.
November 22, 1990 – DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped parts of
Antipolo hills subdivision.
NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
On January 17, 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc.
(SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA
members, and subsequently the Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from
developing the subdivision.
Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complained which was denied and instead the
Regional Adjudicator issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on March 5 199. Petitioners the
elevated their cause to the DARAB.
December 16, 1991- DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator.
In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its
request to set aside the Notice of Coverage.
Contentions of NATALI and EDIC:
- grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including undedeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL;
- NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in
the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.

Contentions of the OSG:

- the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply
with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957;
- that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural residential
was ever filed with the DAR in other words there was no valid conversion;
- allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the case instituted by
SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet
terminated;
- Petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them before
coming to court.

ISSUE:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies prior to June15,
1988, covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988?

RULING:
DID NATALIA and EDIC Comply with the requirements of the implementing Standards,
Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957? YES
A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well as the
Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and
EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan
Development Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development
of the townsite reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission. Hence, the argument of public respondents that not all of
the requirements were complied with cannot be sustained.
There was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR.
The NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of
providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect
converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were
met.
Whether such lands are covered by the CARL? NO
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.
As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural
lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."
It is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is
bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
12. Luz
Farms vs. Secretary of DAR GR 86889

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with
others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR.

These said laws includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

The petioners argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the
Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage. (bakit daw kasama ang mga to sa agriculture). Livestock or poultry raising is not
similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking.

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in
the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is
proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary:

"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting
crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage,
husbandry, farming."

ISSUE: The question raised is one of constitutional construction. Whether or not the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine are covered as to agriculture.

HELD: It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land.

SO, Petitioner's, in using the language of the law, clearly showed that livestock, poultry and
swine are not covered in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
The Respondent, in using the WEBSTER's dictionary, stating that private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial
farms" IS INVALID, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
So, it must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

HENCE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.

13. DA
R vs. Woodland GR 108174

FACTS:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 seeks the nullification of the Decision dated
February 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch 14 (RTC) and its Order
dated 8 May 2009 which nullified the Notice of Coverage (NOC) dated December 11,2003 and
Notice of Acquisition (NOA) dated 5 October 2004 issued by petitioner Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) over a portion of a parcel of land owned by respondent Woodland Agro-
Development. Inc. (Woodland).
Woodland is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 10.0680
hectares located at Subasta, Calinan, Davao City. On December 11, 2003, the DAR issued an
NOC placing 5.0680 hectares under the coverage of the CARL for having exceeded the retention
limit provided by law. The title for the land was canceled, and a new title covering 5.0680
hectares was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, on February 14,
2005, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued in favor of five farmer
beneficiaries.
On March 3, 2005, Woodland filed with the RTC a Complaint for "Declaratory Relief,
Annulment of the Notice of Coverage under R.A. 6657, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction."
Contention of Woodland:
The issuance of the NOC was illegal, because R.A. 6657 had already expired on June 15, 1998.
It argued that pursuant to Section 5 of the law, the agency had a period of ten (10) years to
implement the CARP from the time of its effectivity on 15 June 1988. It further argued that the
CARL's amendatory law, R.A. 8532, did not extend the DAR's authority to acquire agrarian
lands for distribution. It theorized that the budget augmentations legislated in R.A. 8532
pertained only to the funding requirements of the other facets of the CARP implementation and
excluded the acquisition of private agricultural lands.
Section 5, R.A. 6657
SECTION 5. Schedule of Implementation. - The distribution of all lands, covered by this Act
shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten (10) years from the effectivity
thereof.
Answer of DAR:
Hinged on Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 009, Series of 1997 issued by then
DOJ Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. who opined that Section 5 (R.A. 6657) was merely
directory in character; that the 10-year period of implementation was only a time frame given to
the DAR for the acquisition and distribution of public and private agricultural lands covered by
R.A. 6657. The schedule was meant to guide the DAR in setting its priorities, but it was not by
any means a limitation of authority in the absence of more categorical language to that effect.
*the RTC ruled in favor of the R-Woodland*
The RTC ruled that the DAR's act of sending Woodland a NOC was already a breach of
R.A. 6657, since the NOC was issued beyond the 10-year period prescribed by law. The trial
court further ruled that R.A. 8532 only amended the CARL' s provision on the sourcing of funds
for the implementation of the CARP, and not the provision on the period within which the DAR
may acquire lands for distribution. The court held that R.A. 8532 did not extend the 10-year
period of land acquisition. Neither did it overstep the DAR's jurisdiction to try agrarian matters,
but only determined Woodland's rights under the CARL.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act No. 8532 (R.A. 8532) authorized the DAR to issue Notices of Coverage
and Acquisition after 15 June 1998, or beyond the 10-year implementation period provided or in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL)
RULING:
YES. The Court rules that R.A. 8532 extended the term of the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the CARL. Consequently, the NOC
dated 11 December 2003 and NOA dated 5 October 2004 issued over the portion of respondent's
land are valid.
In Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, lnc., the Court recognized the CARL
as a "bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to
the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive
tenancy." To those who seek the law's benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and
ultimately, a decent life.
The agrarian reform program, being one of the immutable hallmarks of the 1987
Constitution, must be faithfully implemented to meet the ends of social justice. The Court cannot
subscribe to Woodland's stance that the DAR's authority to issue notices of coverage and
acquisition ceased after the 10-year implementation period mentioned in Section 5 of the CARL.
Such a view runs afoul of the constitutional mandate firmly lodged in Article XIII, Section 4,
which seeks the just distribution of all agricultural lands to qualified farmers and farm workers to
free them from oppressive tenancy agreements.
Article XIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution encapsulates the people's yearning for
genuine agrarian reform. The provision states:
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
The success of the CARP depends heavily on the adept implementation by the DAR. The
agency's primordial procedural tool for realizing the law's objectives is the issuance of Notices of
Coverage and Acquisition. For us to sustain Woodland's theory that the DAR can no longer issue
those notices after 15 June 1998 despite the enactment of R.A. 8532 would thwart the CARP's
purpose. As the Court ruled in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals:
[O]ur laws on agrarian reform were enacted primarily because of the realization that
there is an urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our
country. Yet, despite such laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a hand-to-mouth
existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these agrarian laws have never really been
effectively implemented.

Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL in its entirety, not just the
funding source. Indeed, R.A. 8532 specifically amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657, but it does not
follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the amendment. The fact that Section 63 falls
under the chapter on "Financing" only emphasizes its general applicability. Hence, the phrase
"until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532 unmistakably extends the DAR's authority to issue
NOCs for purposes of acquiring and distributing private agricultural lands.
 Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands until
30 June 2014. The title alone of R.A. 9700 - An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands,
Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act
No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As
Amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor - reveals that the CARP was indeed extended from
1998 to 2008 via R.A. 8532. Had there been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else
could the CARP have been extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June 2014?
There could have been an extension only if the program sought to be extended had not
expired.

14. LB
P vs. Franco 03/12/19

FACTS:
Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco (the Francos) were the registered owners of
parcels of agricultural land in Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-62209, T-62210, T-62212, and T-51316.
The Francos offered the parcels of land for sale to the Department of Agrarian Reform
under the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in 1995. Of
the 14.444 hectares of the property, 12.5977 hectares were acquired and distributed to qualified
agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Department of Agrarian Reform
The parcels of land were valued at P714,713.78. The Francos did not agree with the
initial valuation. Petition for Review to the DARAB.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
It raised the amount to P739,461.43,11 which the Francos then withdrew from the Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). They were, however, not satisfied so they went to the RTC
acting as a Special Agrarian Court.
RTC
It fixed the just compensation for the 12.5977 hectares of land area actually taken by the
government in the amount of P1,024,115.49. It ordered Land Bank to pay the remaining balance
of P288,115.49 with legal interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1996 until full payment.
Moreover, it held that under Section 1917 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, the Francos were also entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash
payment by way of incentive for voluntarily offering their lots for sale.
Thus, in determining just compensation, the Court will take into consideration the
factors, like the price set by the plaintiffs when they first offered the subject land for voluntary
acquisition (P300,000.00 per hectare; Date of Offer - January 30, 1995) and those provided
under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, to wit: a) the cost of acquisition of the land; b) the current value
of like properties; c) the sworn valuation by the owner; d) the tax declarations and assessments;
e) the assessments made by government assessors; f) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the government to the property; and g)
the non-payment of taxes or loans secure from any government financing institution on the said
land.
The Francos presented the four (4) Tax Declarations for 1996 of the subject lots wherein the
assessor fixed the market value per hectare as follows:

Per Hectare Area Actually Taken Value

Bambooland P38,494.50 0.4855 Has. P18,689.08
     
Rice unirrigated P90,935.96 8.9920 Has. 817,696.15
Rice unirrigated P60,166.10 3.1202 Has. 187,730.26
 TOTAL   [12.5977] has. P1,024,118.49
Court of Appeals (affirmed the amount of just compensation but removed the 12%
interest)
LBP filed an MR to the RTC but was denied. Hence, petition for review to this court.
The argument of LBP was that the RTC did not follow the DAR Administrative Order in the
computation of fees for just compensation. CA affirmed the decision and authority of the RTC in
evaluating just compensation and said that it is judicial in nature and the valuation of property or
determination of just compensation is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies. Thus, even though there might have been an acceptance by the landowner of the
valuation of the DAR, this acceptance does not bar resort to the courts for the final determination
of just compensation.
LBP: The court erred in its determination of just compensation for not following the guidelines
of the DAR and it posits that the 5% cash incentive under Section 19 in relation to Section 18 of
Republic Act No. 6657 refers to the mode of payment on the cash portion, but not to an
additional award of five percent (5%) on top of the full amount of just compensation.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Special Agrarian Court's
valuation of just compensation using a variation of the basic general formula provided for
in Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998.
2. whether or not the five percent (5%) cash incentive under Section 19 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law refers only to the mode of payment of the cash
portion, not to an increase in the total amount of just compensation.

RULING:
1. There is no question to the authority of the court to determine just compensation.
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vested in
regional trial courts exclusive and original jurisdiction of civil actions and special
proceedings under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian
relations. Section 56, in relation to Section 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, confers "special jurisdiction" on special agrarian courts.

Regional trial courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
as well as the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. In contrast to the special agrarian courts, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board only has preliminary administrative determination of just
compensation.

Several cases yield answers to this that determination of just compensation is a judicial
function and the determination of administrative bodies is not conclusive, as it is the
RTC, sitting as a SAC, that could make the final determination of just compensation,
taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the
applicable DAR regulations. LBP's valuation has to be substantiated during an
appropriate hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance with Section 17
of RA 6657 and the DAR regulations.

Sec 16(f)of RA 6657 also expressly provides that:

(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. SAC is given the
final say concerning just compensation.
On the issue of just compensation:
The SC reversed the decision of the RTC and CA giving the amount of P1,024,118.49 as just
compensation because the basis was income productivity approach that would suppress the
purpose of land acquisition.
Case law states that agricultural lands are not acquired for investment purposes but for
redistribution to landless farmers in order to lift their economic status by enabling them to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. In this regard, farmer-beneficiaries are not given those lands so they can live
there but so that they can till them. Since they generally live on a hand-to-mouth
existence, their source of repaying the just compensation is but derived out of their
income from their cultivation of the land. Hence, in order to be just, the compensation for
the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based on
what the land can produce. It would therefore be highly inequitable that in the 30-year
allowable period to pay the annual amortizations for the lands, farmer-beneficiaries
would be required to pay for the same income they expect to earn therefrom on top of the
computed market value of the landholdings. Such could not have been the intent of the
State's agrarian reform program. In fine, the Court cannot sustain the RTC's application
of the Income Productivity Approach used as one of its bases in arriving at its decreed
valuation. Not only is the same aversive to the jurisprudential concept of "market value,"
 but it also deviates from the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657 and thus,
remains legally baseless and unfounded.
As this Court held in Alfonso v. Land Bank, any deviation to the basic formula made in the
exercise of judicial discretion must be "supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the
evidence on record." A computation by a court made in "utter and blatant disregard of the factors
spelled out by law and by the implementing rules" amounts to grave abuse of discretion. It must
be struck down.
Here, the Special Agrarian Court's computation of just compensation resulted in a "double take
up" of the market value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already
been considered in Palmares as a departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative
guidelines.
2. The five percent (5%) cash incentive under Section 19, in relation to Section 18 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is not in addition to the amount of just
compensation awarded by the courts. The incentive only applies to the cash payment to
be awarded.

Section 19 provides:

SECTION 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. — Landowners, other than banks
and other financial institutions, who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be entitled
to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment.

Section 19 must be interpreted to mean that while the additional five percent (5%) cash
payment is an incentive to owners-sellers to expedite the agrarian reform program, the
incentive given to these land owners should not be to the detriment of the government.

The landowner shall receive 35% of the just compensation in cash, while the remaining
65% shall be paid in bonds if the aggregate area acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform is below 24 hectares. However, if the landowner voluntarily offers their land to
the Department of Agrarian Reform, as in this case, the landowner shall be entitled to an
additional five percent (5%) only on the cash portion. Therefore, instead of receiving
only 35% in cash, the landowner shall now receive 40% in cash and 60% in bonds.

15. JM
A Agro vs. LBP GR 206026 >> PLEASE SEE ATTACHED PDF FILE 

16. Ha
cienda Luisita, Inc. VS. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council GR 171101

FACTS:

SPANISH OWNERS SELL HACIENDA LUISITA TO TADECO

• 1958- Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), assisted by the Central Bank of the
Philippines, purchased Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar
 mill of the hacienda, from the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas (Tabacalera).
• Tadeco-owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group.
• Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price
component of the sale, with the condition that:
“the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-
corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions
should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” 
• Tadeco did not comply with this condition.

MARCOS ADMINISTRATION FILES SUIT AGAINST TADECO

• May 7, 1980- the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against
Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost.
• Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita is not covered by existing agrarian reform
legislations for it does not have tenants.
• The argument did not convince the Manila RTC, thus rendered judgment ordering
Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

CA DISMISSES THE CASE

• Tadeco appealed the case to the CA.
• On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
government’s case against Tadeco, et al. 
• The Court of Appeals granted the motion, on condition that TADECO must submit a
Stock Distribution Plan duly approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) which must be implemented after such approval. Failure to comply with these
conditions will result in the revival of the case.
• On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as
vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers.
• For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75
hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI
shares of stock.

PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL (PARC) APPROVES HLI’S SDP

• On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of
Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock
Distribution Option Plan (SODP).  
 • On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA)was formally
entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then
DAR Secretary Philip Juico.
• Subsequently, HLI submitted to DAR its SDP, designated as "Proposal for Stock
Distribution under C.A.R.P.,"which was substantially based on the SDOA.
• The PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, by Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated
November 21, 1989, approved the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.

As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are:
(a) production-sharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the
production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or
incentive bonus; and
(b) distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to
family-beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is
payable "irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or not," implying that
the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily
understood under corporation law.

4,335.75 Hectares Remained of The Original 4,915 Hectares Tadeco Ceded To HLI
• On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the
hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR
approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%) of
the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
• On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks
of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to
the latter. Consequently, HLI’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 287910 was
canceled and TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary.
• HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita Realty
Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly
involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each.
• Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex.
• Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) in payment of LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to
RCBC.  LIPCO’s titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.
• Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda
Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX) complex.
• Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
DAR Finds HLI Noncompliant with Obligations under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law Of 1988 (RA 6657).
• Two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003:
1ST PETITION: filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for
a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. alleging that:
HLI had failed to give them their dividends and the one percent (1%) share in gross
sales, as well as the thirty-three percent (33%) share in the proceeds of the sale of the
converted 500 hectares of land.
2ND PETITION: Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda
Luisita (AMBALA) prayed for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the
distribution of the lands in the hacienda.
• The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the
SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied
with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP.

DAR Places Hacienda Luisita Under CARP

• On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01,
recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands
be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme
of the CARP.
• From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding,
HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the
DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or
even read the motion for reconsideration.
• PARC would eventually deny HLI’s motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-
34-01 dated May 3, 2006.
• Later, RCBC and LIPCO intervened in the proceedings, questioning the inclusion of
lands that they acquired from HLI in the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

ISSUES and RULING:

1. Does the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council have jurisdiction, power and
authority to nullify or revoke the Stock Distribution Option Agreement?
-YES.
Necessary Implication
The conferment of an express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall
the approval of the plan.

2. Was the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council correct in nullifying or revoking the
Stock Distribution Option Agreement?
 -YES
1. HLI has not complied with its undertaking to distribute homelots to the beneficiaries
under the SDP despite the lapse of 16 years.
2. The original beneficiaries got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per
beneficiary because the acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on
"man days," or “number of days worked” by the beneficiaries in a year’s time.
The number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs
were allowed to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the
original 6,296 FWBs. The total number of farmworkers of HLI as of August 2, 2010
stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were
given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total
outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each
original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of "man days" and the
hiring of additional farmworkers.

3. Was the PARC correct in including the lands that the RCBC and LIPCO had
gained from the HLI, in the coverage of the agrarian reform program?
The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council was not correct in including the lands that the
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial, Inc., in the
coverage of the agrarian reform program.
They are bona fide purchasers for value.
Considering that the sale and transfer of the 500 hectares of land in the Conversion Order
came after compulsory agrarian reform coverage has taken place, the beneficiaries should
have their corresponding share of the land’s value.
Subject to payment of 3% of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued
compliance with its undertakings under the SDP.

4. Should the 80.51- hectare land transferred to the government for use as part of the
Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway, be excluded from the compulsory reform
coverage?
The 80.51 hectare should also be excluded from the compulsory agrarian reform
coverage considering that the transfer was consistent with the government’s exercise of
the power of eminent domain and none of the parties questioned the transfer.
Since the sale and transfer of the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot came after compulsory
coverage has taken place, the beneficiaries should have their corresponding share of the
land’s value.
To determine once and for all whether or not all the proceeds of sale were properly
utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, DAR engaged the services of a reputable accounting
firm approved by parties to audit the books of HLI.
If after audit, it is determined that there remains a balance from the proceeds of the sale,
then the balance shall be distributed to the qualified FWBs.
The original 6,296 qualified FWBs have the right to choose whether they want to remain
as HLI stockholder or not.
 With respect to the 4,206 non-qualified FWBs who were not listed as qualified
beneficiaries, they are not entitled to land distribution but shall, however, continue as HLI
stockholders.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution placing the lands
subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition
scheme of CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as stockholders of
HLI.

17. DA
R vs Cuenca GR 154112, September 23, 2004

FACTS:
Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117
hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of
sugar cane.
Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a notice of coverage to
Cuenca which placed his land under compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
RTC
Private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint against Noe
Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for:
 Annulment of Notice of Coverage
 Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.
Contention of Cuenca (RTC)
1. implementation of CARP has lapsed (June 1988 to June 1992)
2. placing the land under CARP is without the approval of PARC and PARCOM
3. EO 405 is unconstitutional bec. then Pres. Corazon Aquino has no longer had law
making power
4. Notice of Coverage is a gross violation of PD 399 thus it must be declared null and
void
MARO Noe seek the dismissal of the complaint bec. RTC does not have jurisdiction over
the nature and the subj. matter. The motion was not granted.
RTC judge issued TRO to MARO and LBP. Later Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
granted in favor of Cuenca.
CA
 MARO Noe assails that the issuance Writ of Preliminary Injunction was a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC judge.
Contention of Noe (CA)
1. All lower courts are barred if not prohibited by the law to issue orders of injunctions
against the Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of the Notice of
Coverage.
2. RTC has jurisdiction bec. nature and subj. matter of the case is purely agrarian in
character.

CA Ruling: The issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was
mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. 

ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case when it involves agrarian reform matter.
2. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued
by the trial court, which is a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.

SC Ruling:
1. No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
The principal averments and reliefs prayed for refer - - not to the "pure question of law"
spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 - - but to the annulment of the DAR's
Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of
Coverage as seen in the averments in the complaint.
Further, the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was
not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405). Note that no amount had yet been
determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the court's
function of determining just compensation.
Note:
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All
doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and
original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.
2. Yes.
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that
the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is
particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's
Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657.
Sec. 68:
No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the
lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."

18. Da
gondon vs. Ladaga GR 190682 February 13, 2019

FACTS:

Jose L. Dagondon [father of Paul C. Dagondon (petitioner)] owned a parcel of riceland

(4,147 square meters) which was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
pursuant to PD No. 27. Ismael Ladaga (respondent), as a tenant of Jose, was then declared the
beneficiary of the coverage.

The petitioner, then filed a protest with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR)
arguing that the subject land was exempt from coverage of PD 27 because the income from
the land is inadequate to support the land owner and his family. However, the protest was
denied. He then appealed but was also denied through the order dated February 28, 1986 of then
Minister Conrado Estrella (Estrella Order). The petitioner moved to reconsider but was not
immediately acted upon. Thus, on March 5, 1987, Minister Alvarez issued an Original Certificate
of Title in favor of the respondent pertaining to the Riceland and was registered with the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Camiguin.

The petitioner, again, filed another protest with the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), arguing the same that the income from the father’s landholding was insufficient for the
family’s support. Finally, DAR Secretary Garilao issued an order, based on an investigation
report of the said land, setting aside the Estrella Order, and exempting the subject land to the
coverage of OLD under PD 27. Further explaining “that agricultural land could be exempt
from the coverage of the OLT upon proof of the landowner's inability to derive adequate
income therefrom to support himself and his family”.

Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied. Similarly, the Provincial Office of
Camiguin appealed to the Office of the President but also dismissed through the OP decision
dated September 2002. The petitioner then brought his petition for the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patent which was granted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO) in Mambajaoo Camiguin – reinstating the title of ownership of the late Jose
Dagondon. The respondent again appealed to the DARAB but was dismissed affirming IN
TOTO the decision of the PARO.
 However, the respondent appealed by petition for review to the CA questioning the
“authority of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform to reverse and set aside
the Order of his predecessor which already attained finality”. The CA then GRANTED the
petition REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the previous decision. The petitioner moved to
reconsider but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

Contentions of the Petioner:

- The Estrella Order did not attain finality considering that it was based on MAR
Ministry Circular No. 11 that was unenforceable because of lack of
publication, as ruled by Secretary Garilao.
- That the subject property does not qualify for coverage under the OLT because the
aggregate lands of the late Jose L. Dagondon did not produce adequate income;
- That the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLTs fell within Secretary Garilao's
jurisdiction as the implementor of P.D. No. 27
- That Secretary Garilao's order dated February 21, 1995 already attained finality when
the respondent did not pursue further remedies
- That the DAR Secretary has the authority to order the cancellation of the
emancipation patent upon a finding that its issuance violated agrarian laws.

Contentions of the Respondent:

- The Estrella Order had already attained finality because the petitioner permitted the lapse
of 174 days before filing his motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the Estrella Order
- That the issue on the non-publication of the MAR Ministry Circular No. 11 rendering it
null and void was evidently self-serving;
- That MAR Ministry Circular No. 11 had not been invalidated or declared void by
proper authority; and that the DARAB could no longer cancel the respondent's
certificate of title.
ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision
of the PARO.

RULING:

YES. The CA grossly erred in still reopening the matter of the exemption of the subject
land from the coverage of P.D. No. 27 especially so because the petitioner’s action for the
cancellation of the E.P. had been commenced to implement the finals decision in favor of
the petitioner and in consonance with the express advice for that purpose given by
Secretary Garilao.

The CA overlooked that the matter concerning the exemption of the subject property
from the coverage of P.D. No. 27 had been settled in the earlier case of the protest, and the
ruling had attained finality even prior to the institution of the petitioner's action for the
cancellation of the emancipation patent

Settled is the rule that a judgment that is final and executory becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical
errors, or to make nunc pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Outside of these
exceptions, the court that rendered the judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
execution. The judgment also becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is
erroneous. Any amendment or alteration that substantially affects the final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and the nullity extends to the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.

19. Sec
of DAR vs. Heirs of Redemtor GR 186432 March 12, 2019
FACTS:

October 14, 1983 - Spouses Redemptor and Elisa Abucay purchased a 182- hectare parcel of
land from Guadalupe Cabahug.

The property is located in Leyte and is covered by TCT No. T-9814. 22.8409 hectares of the lot
were later on declared covered under the OLTP pursuant to PD 27. Consequently, EPs were
issued to the farmer-beneficiaries.

June 28, 2002 - the Heirs of Spouses Abucay filed before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator a complaint for the proper determination of just compensation.

The Heirs of Spouses Abucay alleged that they inherited the 182-hectare property upon the death
of their parents and enjoyed its ownership and possession. They also claimed that they did not
received any just compensation for the 22 hectares of the property that was placed under the
OLTP, and the Certificate of Deposit worth P103,046.47 issued in 2001 by the LBP as
compensation was issued to Cabahug. Thus, they prayed that they be paid P2,000,000.00 as just
compensation.

Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy

Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy held that there was no proper
valuation of the property to determine just compensation. He found that the Final Notification
Letter was not sent to Cabahug, but to her deceased father. Thus, administrative due process was
not followed, which nullified the coverage of the 22-hectare property under the OLTP. He
declared the EPs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries void.

DARAB
Reversed the decision of Regional Adjudicator Diloy and declared itself wanting of jurisdiction
over the appeal. It found that the nature of the action was an OLT protest, an agrarian law
implementation case under the primary jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the DAR and the
consequent appeal, to the DAR Secretary. The DARAB also held that the Heirs of Spouses
Abucay were not the proper parties to file the complaint because the land was already owned by
the farmer-beneficiaries who tilled the land pursuant to PD 27 when Cabahug sold the property
to Spouses Abucay.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DARAB but was denied. Hence, they
filed a Petition for Review before the CA.

Court of Appeals
Reversed the ruling of the DARAB and held that the respondents were the proper parties to file
the action.

The DAR Regional Director for Region VII and the PARO of Leyte separately filed their
Motions for Reconsideration, both of which were denied in the CA. April 7, 2009 - two Petitions
for Review on Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court.

Petitioners’ Contentions:
 Respondents' complaint for cancellation of original certificates of title and emancipation
patents is essentially an OLT protest that assails the coverage of the 22-hectare property
under the OLTP - under the EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, APPELATE JURISDICTION OF DAR SECRETARY.
 Respondents had no legal personality to file the complaint for cancellation of original
certificates of title and emancipation patents
 Petitioners further assail the CA's finding that Cabahug was not accorded due process
during the acquisition proceedings, arguing that she was not notified of the coverage of
the 22-hectare property.
 CA erred in finding that no just compensation had been paid

Arguments of the Respondents

 Petitions must be dismissed for being filed without authority
 It is the Office of the Solicitor General which has the authority to represent before this
Court the DAR Regional Director for Region VII and the PARO of Leyte
 DARAB had jurisdiction over the Complaint for cancellation of original certificates of
title and emancipation patents.
 The Regional Director and the PARO are already estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of Regional Adjudicator Diloy and the DARAB as they failed to do so at the
level of Adjudicator or evan on appeal before the Board.
  Assuming that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case, respondents argued that it
should have instead referred the case to the DAR Secretary.
 They have Legal personality because they acquired a valid title to the 22-hectare property
from their parents.

ISSUES AND RULINGS:

WON Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy and the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board have jurisdiction over the Complaint for
cancellation of original certificates of title and emanciaption patents filed by respondents,
the Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucay.

Sec. 24 of RA 9700 states that all cases involving the cancellation of registered EPs, certificate
of land ownership awards, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He or she takes jurisdiction over
cases involving the cancellation of titles issued under any agrarian reform program, whether
registered with the LRA or not.

WON respondents had legal personality to file the Complaint before the Regional
Adjudicator.

With the enactment of RA 9700, the exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases for
cancellation of registered EPsnow belongs to the DAR Secretary.
AO No. 07-14 states that petition for cancellation of registered EPs must be filed with the PARA,
which would then take the case build-up before forwarding it to the DAR Secretary for decision.

WON the acquisition proceedings involving the 22-hectare property were void for lack of
administrative due process.

The SC leave the issue to the executive branch for its own determination.