A. NASI-VILLAR v.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176169, 14 November 2008

FACTS:

Nasi-Villar was held liable the offense of Illegal Recruitment under the Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) when she feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment
abroad, received and demanded PhP6,500.00 as placement fee, when she does not have a license or
authority to recruit workers abroad.

The petitioner appealed to CA in the alleged error by the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal
recruitment. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, declaring that
petitioner should have been charged under the Labor Code and not under RA. 8042.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration under an Information that erroneously designated the
offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the Labor
Code, but was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in failing to consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect
and the decision of the RTC constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
law.

RULING:

No. the CA’s conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code is correct. There is no violation of the
prohibition against ex post facto law nor a retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by
petitioner.

In this case, what was applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in relation to Art. 39,
the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than
eight (8) years or a ne of not less than P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other
hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a ne not less than
P200,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00.

The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time of its commission.
Since R.A. No. 8042, a special penal law, did not yet exist in January 1993 when the crime was allegedly
committed, the law cannot be used as the basis of fling a criminal action for illegal recruitment, unless it
is in favor of the accused. However, the penalty of imprisonment provided in the Labor Code was raised
or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that as it was proven that petitioner
had committed the acts she was charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and
not under R.A. No. 8042.
B. VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016

FACTS:

Lin testified that in the year 2000, he was a Grade 1 pupil of Cawitan Elementary School. At around 9:00
a.m. of December 13, 2000, he was playing “langit lupa” during recess with Ray Ann, Marco, Nova and
another classmate. During the course of their game, he touched the shoulder of Nova, Jabalde’s
daughter, causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then helped Nova to stand while
one of his classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he ran towards a dilapidated building,
which was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter, Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck
and choked him. Lin was able to get out of her hold when he removed her hands from his neck.

He immediately ran towards their house some 500 meters away from the school. He told his mother
Aileen about the incident. Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Catalina Hospital for treatment and a
medical certificate was then issued to him.

Jabalde posits that in her case, the act of inflicting injuries, however minute they were, is punishable
under the RPC particularly Article 266(1)22 which defines slight physical injuries; hence, she should be
punished under the RPC and not under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code or R.A. 7610.

RULING:

The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Slight Physical Injuries under Paragraph 2,
Article 266 of the RPC and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of 1 day to 10 days of arresto menor.

The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or the alleged falsehood of the alleged facts.

In the case at bar, Jabalde neither questions the veracity or the falsehood of the alleged facts nor the
sufficiency of the evidence, but the appreciation of R.A. No. 7610 on the factual circumstances of the
case.

Jabalde lacked the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a
human being as required under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, her acts of laying hands against
Lin showed the essential element of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the
RPC.

The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of
freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying
an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a
person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of
intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act.47

Jabalde is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries under paragraph 2, Art.
266 of RPC and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of one day to ten days of arresto menor because of
the mitigating circumstance of passional obfuscation.

The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being informed that
her daughter’s head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got
blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on her chair in front of the
board for about five to ten minutes.

It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution’s witness herself testified
that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just “mildly inflicted.” If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse,
maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows.

As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is the
most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde against Lin
is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as
manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on
inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed
degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

C. PEOPLE VS. ACURAM

GR No. 177954, April 27, 2000

FACTS:

On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of
murder.

On June 29, 1991, at around seven o’clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome
Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day’s work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to head for home instead.
They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan
de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which,
however, swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep
"Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger
inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately
thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of
the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded
towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his
companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed
blood transfusion and so they transferred him at around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Hospital in the same city. A few hours after the operation, Rolando died due to massive loss of blood
due to the one gunshot wound he sustained on his leg.

The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant Orlando
Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental, was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at the front, right side of the
jeepney and was the only one among its passengers who was carrying a firearm.

On motion by the prosecution and without objection from the defense, the trial court suspended
appellant from the service and ordered his detention at the provincial jail.

During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that
time but denied firing it.

The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in declaring that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, granting arguendo that the accused appellant is guilty.

RULING:

For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused
consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
14 In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. Treachery cannot be appreciated
where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a
deliberate act of the will.

Since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime committed is only homicide, not
murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only
reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court
or shown after a review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of
reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17
years and 4 months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be
within the range of prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision temporal is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The span of reclusion
temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
D. People vs. Gumimba
GR No. 174056, February 27, 2007

FACTS:
On or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit:
by then and there pinning down one [AAA],5 a minor, 8 years of age, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 o'clock lacerated wounds of [sic] the
vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the different parts of her body and which were the direct cause of
her death thereafter.
On 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing and co-accused Ronie
Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of rape with homicide of an eight (8)-year
old child.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the following hearing on 22 May
1997 that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The RTC ordered
appellant's re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty.The court conducted an
inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his full comprehension of the
consequences thereof. Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of culpability
of appellant.
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's plea of guilty,
the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the appellant's conviction,
but with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim.
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to simultaneously submit
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.22 On 21 November and 24
November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they are adopting the briefs
they filed before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of rape with homicide despite the failure of
the prosecution to establish the latter’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the accused owning up only
to the crime of simple rape?

The trial court erred in declaring that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, granting arguendo that the accused appellant is guilty.

The trial court erred in ruling that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of the crime charged, despite the
fact that accused was not properly and conclusively identified, and the alleged weapon not positively
tested.

That the trial court gravely erred in disregarding evidence pointing to the innocence of the accused-
appellant, that is, the existence of efficient intervening cause, which is the proximate cause of the death
of the victim.

RULING:
 In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the
court. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the
investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law.
The trial court is correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
appellant's favor.

On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be
proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself. In this case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment.

The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the jeepney where the... sparks of the gun
bursts were seen and heard by the witnesses. There were no other persons with a rifle inside the
jeepney except the appellant. The empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where
the fatal shooting occurred. The appellant did not... go forward to the authorities to present himself
until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest.

The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim's death. They
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the... offense. It is the
height of desperation on appellant's part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise
moment the shot was fired considering the sudden and completely unexpected shooting of the victim.
Here, circumstantial evidence... suffices.

WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in
Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of
HOMICIDE and... sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prison mayor, as
minimum, to 15 years and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando

Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

E. People vs. Brioso

GR No. 182517, March 13, 2009, Attempted Stage

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the November 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 02556 which affirmed with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur.

The victim narrated that, sometime in February 2003, at about 2:30 a.m., appellant arrived home from
fishing. At that time, the victim and her younger siblings were at the upper level of their house, while
their mother was working in Lucena. Appellant suddenly dragged the victim to the lower portion of their
house where he forced her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty. She cried because she
could do nothing. Afterwards, appellant also undressed himself and tried to insert his penis into her
vagina but he did not succeed. She felt his penis touch her vagina and she felt pain because he was
forcing his penis into her vagina. After around five minutes, appellant ceased trying and threatened to
kill her siblings if she told anyone about the incident. After that, appellant and the victim dressed up and
went upstairs.

On December 5, 2003, around 5:30 in the morning, appellant dragged the victim to the lower level of
their house and onto the bed. He then caused her to remove her short pants and panty; afterwards, the
former also undressed himself by removing his short pants and brief. Appellant placed himself on top of
her while she was lying down on the bed. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain. The
sexual abuse lasted for a while only, after which, appellant prepared his things to fish. Before leaving,
appellant again threatened to kill her and her siblings.

Feeling severely tormented, the victim told her mother about the incident when she arrived home that
morning from the fishing port. Her mother was very angry when she learned about the rape incidents.
The victim further testified that appellant raped her so many times but she could only remember these
three incidents. She cried several times in the course of her testimony

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. As to the first two charges of rape, appellant raised
the defense of alibi. He claimed that he would usually go out to fish at 10:00 p.m. and return at about
4:00 a.m. and that there was never an instance that he did not go out to fish, as it was their source of
livelihood. He added that the victim told him that it was a certain Richard, adopted child of the victim’s
mother, who raped her. He allegedly mauled Richard in her defense, and then he told the victim’s
mother about the rape, but the latter did not file any complaint against Richard.

As to the third charge of rape, appellant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim but
claimed that it was consensual. Appellant disclosed that he and the victim were sweethearts and were
sexually active since August 20, 2003.

On August 2, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. L-3844 and simple rape in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3845 and L-3846.

The CA essentially concurred with the findings of the trial court that the victim had been sexually
abused. However, relying on the victim’s testimony that appellant’s penis touched her vagina and that
she felt pain, the CA held that the first incident of sexual abuse, subject of Criminal Case No. L-3844,
warranted a conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the CA held that appellant should be held
guilty of three counts of qualified rape considering that the three information uniformly alleged that the
accused, who is the "live-in partner/common law spouse of complainant’s mother," had carnal
knowledge of a 13-year old and these circumstances were adequately established by the prosecution
during the trial.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Consummated Rape in Criminal Case No. L-3844?
RULING:

The COURT find that the appellate court erred in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim during the first alleged incident of
sexual abuse so as to justify a conviction for consummated rape.

In a number of cases, we have held that the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis,
capable of consummating the sexual act, is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. However, in
People v. Campuhan, the Court clarified that the act of touching should be understood as inherently part
of the entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum. In other words, to constitute consummated rape, the touching must be made in
the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of penetration. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Clearly, it is carnal knowledge, not pain that is the element to consummate rape. While pain may be
deduced from the sexual act whatever worth this inference may have, we certainly cannot convict for
rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is truly a dangerous proposition to equate the
victim's testimony of pain with proof of carnal knowledge. The peril lies in the absolute facility of
manufacturing testimonies asserting pain. Pain is subjective and so easy to feign. Our jurisprudence
dictates positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, the touching of the labias by
the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated.

It is held that Criminal Case No. L-3844 is an ATTEMPTED QUALIFIED RAPE while two counts of
QUALIFED RAPE in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3845 and L-3846.

F. People vs Bonifacio Badriago

G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, Frustrated Stage

FACTS:

On automatic review is the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00129, which found accused-appellant Bonifacio Badriago guilty of Frustrated Homicide in Criminal
Case No. 4255 and Murder in Criminal Case No. 4276.

On the morning of September 13, 2002, he was asked by his mother to bring a letter to one Berting Bello
at Barangay Guindapunan, Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the letter along with his younger brother,
Oliver. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where their mother was waiting for
them. Before they could reach their destination, however, they were approached by accused-appellant
at Sitio Mombon in Carigara. Accused-appellant then suddenly hacked him with a sundang or long bolo
on his lumbar area. Accused-appellant aimed a second time but Adrian was able to somehow shield
himself. His lower left arm suffered a hack wound as a result. Struck with panic, he jumped off the
tricycle but could not run away. He was able to push Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call
for help. He could no longer testify on what happened thereafter as he lost consciousness and only
woke up while confined at Carigara District Hospital. His mother later informed him that Oliver was also
attacked and did not survive.

The doctor’s testimony showed that Adrian suffered from two wounds that could have been fatal; the
hack would on the lumbar area and on his left arm. He could have died had he not been brought to the
hospital. On the other hand, Oliver suffered eight of the 11 wounds inflicted that were fatal. He died of
hypovolemic shock.

In his defense, accused-appellant stated under oath that on the morning of September 13, 2002, he was
on his pedicab looking for passengers. While he was on his way to the bus terminal in Carigara, Leyte, he
was accosted by Adrian and Oliver, who carried stones with them. Adrian called out to him, "Now
Boning, let us fight." He tried to speed away but the two chased him, with Adrian driving his pedicab and
Oliver standing on the cargo compartment. They bumped accused-appellant’s pedicab, causing him to
swerve to the middle of the road. When accused-appellant looked back, Adrian got out of his pedicab
and approached him with a knife about 10 inches long. Seeing Adrian was about to stab him, he grabbed
a bolo from his pedicab’s passenger seat and used it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand. Adrian’s
knife fell and when he bent to pick it up, accused-appellant again hacked at him with his bolo. Adrian
then managed to run away from accused-appellant and head towards Barangay Guindapunan. Accused-
appellant, meanwhile, ran towards the municipal building to inform the police that he had injured
someone. He denied killing Oliver as while he was fighting with Adrian he did not even see Oliver.

When cross-examined accused-appellant admitted that he did not suffer any injury following the
confrontation with Adrian. He claimed not to know what happened to Oliver.

On July 29, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment and found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of
FRUSTRADED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 4255 and MURDER in Criminal Case No. 4276.

On September 14, 2004, the C.A. ruled that accused-appellant is guilty only of FRUSTRADED HOMICIDE
in Criminal Case No. 4255 and guilty of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 4276.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and
MURDER despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

The SC ruled that To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person
without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of
parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance.
On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) The offender
performs all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.

From the evidence presented to the trial court, it is very much clear that accused-appellant was able to
perform all the acts that would necessarily result in Adrian’s death. His intention to kill can be presumed
from the lethal hacking blows Adrian received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo was not justified. His
claim of self-defense was not given credence by both the trial and appellate courts. Neither there are
any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide, and infanticide. The circumstances, thus, make
out a case for frustrated homicide as accused-appellant performed all the acts necessary to kill Adrian;
Adrian only survived due to timely medical intervention as testified to by his examining physician.

Further, the SC ruled that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-
appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be competent to establish guilt as long as it is sufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else, was responsible for the
killing. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as there is (1) more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

We go back to accused-appellant’s own admission that he indeed injured Adrian, causing him near-fatal
injuries. From this admission the rest of the evidence, albeit circumstantial, made out a clear case for
Oliver’s murder. First, the victims were together in Adrian’s pedicab when the attack took place; second,
accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrian’s injuries were caused by a bolo; fourth,
Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost unconsciousness; fifth, Oliver’s wounds were found
to have been caused by a weapon that made similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-
appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and sixth, Oliver died on the same day Adrian sustained stab
wounds. Although there is no direct evidence of Oliver’s actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence
presented sufficiently established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks on the
brothers.

As regards to the Incomplete Self-Defense as a Justifying Circumstance of the herein case, incomplete
self-defense, the indispensable requisite is unlawful aggression. What is missing is either reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the persons defending themselves. In the instant case, accused-appellant’s self-serving claim of self-
defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injuries from his supposed attacker, Adrian,
fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression, the crucial requisite to his defense. As the appellate
court noted, there was no clear, credible, and convincing evidence that Adrian was the one who
instigated the fight and that accused-appellant was merely fending off an attack. Unlawful aggression by
the victim must be clearly shown.

WHEREFORE, appeal is DENIED and found accused-appellant guilty of FRUSTRADED HOMICIDE in

Criminal Case No. 4255 and Murder in Criminal Case No. 4276 with the MODIFICATION that he is
likewise ordered to pay Adrian the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
G. People vs. Mario Castro
G.R. No. 172874, December 17, 2008, Consummated Stage

On appeal is the decision dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00126 which affirmed in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 in
Criminal Case No. 117506-H, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

Private complainant [AAA], is a fourteen (14) year old lass having been born on July 8, 1985. Appellant
Mario Castro is the husband of [BBB], elder sister of [AAA].

On November 11, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, appellant fetched [AAA] from her Aunt’s house at
PNR Compound, Taguig Metro Manila. He said that her elder sister, [BBB], collapsed and was in the
clinic. Believing the story, [AAA] went with appellant.

As events turned out, appellant brought [AAA] not in the clinic - but near TEMIC Factory, which is an old
abandoned building located at Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As they reached a dark narrow
alley, appellant suddenly stopped and held [AAA]’s left arm. Startled and frightened, [AAA] screamed for
help but nobody seemed to have heard the outcry. Wasting no time, appellant strangled her, with a
threat to keep quiet lest he would kill her. [AAA] was cowed into silence. She felt helpless as she knew
that appellant had killed someone before.

Appellant hurriedly pulled [AAA] to the side of a building and told her to undress. When she refused,
appellant undressed her, after which, he undressed himself. [AAA] could not run away as appellant
pressed her against the wall of the building and blocked her way. When both of them were already
naked, appellant kissed her on the different parts of her body and, in an instant, forced his penis into her
vagina until he satisfied his lust.

Once satiated, appellant told [AAA] to dress up and warned her not to tell anybody. Appellant initially
brought her to the bus and jeepney terminal but he later changed his mind. He told [AAA] that they have
to go to Kuya Manny’s work place. Still overwhelmed with shock and fear, [AAA] could not resist. When
appellant learned that Kuya Manny was not at work, he brought [AAA] again to the dark narrow alley
beside Temic Factory. This time, however, they passed by a different route that is near "Pepsi."

Again, in the same place and of the same manner, he satisfied his lust for the second time. Appellant
eventually told [AAA] to dress up. He brought her to the terminal of the jeep and allowed her to go
home.

When [AAA] reached her residence, she immediately took a bath. She told her aunt [CCC] and her
grandmother [DDD] that she was raped. After her relatives learned of the incident, they brought her to
the Barangay Tanod and, later to Camp Crame for medical examination. They also proceeded to the
Police Station located at the Municipal Hall of Taguig to give her statement.

On the other hand, the defense relied on the testimony of Margarita Salangsang, a lessee of accused-
appellant’s mother at Signal Village in Taguig. She testified that at around 9:30 in the evening on
November 11, 1999, accused-appellant was in her house for her birthday celebration. Accused-appellant
did not leave the house at any time from the moment he arrived at 9:30 in the evening until he finally
left around midnight.

ISSUE:

Whether the Trial Court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of RAPE instead of the crime
of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.

RULING:

Clearly, complainant's statement that not all of accused-appellant's organ was inserted simply means
that there was no full penetration. There can be no doubt, however, that there was at least a partial
entry, so as to make the crime consummated rape. As we have said in a number of cases, full or deep
penetration is not necessary to consummate sexual intercourse; it is enough that there is the slightest
penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ.

The commission of rape against complainant cannot be negated simply because of the absence of the
testimony of the doctor who examined the victim. It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctor’s
certificate is merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the
commission of rape.

WHEREFORE, Decision dated Feb. 15, 2006 of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED.

H. Janet Lim Napoles Vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017, Conspiracy

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which sought to nullify
and set aside the Resolutions dated October 16, 2015 and March 2, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-
CRM-0238. These Resolutions denied Janet Lim Napoles' (Napoles) application for bail because the
evidence of her guilt for the crime of Plunder is strong.

FACTS:

In 2004 to 2010, or thereabout (sic), in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then
Chief of Staff of Senator Emile's Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php 172,834,500.00) through a combination
or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

a) By repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILE's Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE's endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE's PDAF projects, which
duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the
PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

b) By taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former Senator Enrile and
Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On this point, this Court
has consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually
an agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act. Even Congress, in its
Explanatory Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized that this crime, by its very
nature, is committed through a series or combination of acts done "in stealth and secrecy over a period
of time.”

Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the accused,
the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole." It was therefore unnecessary
for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator Enrile and
Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction that furthers
the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two or more
persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be
inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.

Here, .the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

ISSUE:

Did the SANDIGANBAYAN gravely abuse its discretion in denying Napoles’ Petition to Bail?
RULING:

Applying these jurisprudential standards to the present case, it is readily apparent that the
Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Upon
receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, it scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their respective
pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary evidence,
endeavoring to establish evident proof of Napoles' guilt. Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to
submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the supposed weakness of the prosecution's
evidence.

The individuals involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the
doctrine on implied conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to
prove the existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an actual agreement
took place.

Napoles nonetheless challenged the credibility of the whistleblowers, arguing that their testimonies
should have been received with "grave suspicion," coming as they were from "polluted source[s]."
However, as this Court earlier discussed, the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were
consistent, clear, and corroborative of each other. Other testimonial and documentary evidence also
substantiated the veracity of the whistleblowers' statements during the bail hearing.

It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed on those who are
found guilty of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional liberty is not easily granted to those
accused of this offense, especially when the prosecution more than amply established that the evidence
of guilt is strong. This is a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, which this Court may
nullify only when the exercise of this discretion is tainted with arbitrariness and capriciousness that the
trial court failed to act within the contemplation of law.

Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It has discharged its judicial duty in
Napoles' bail application in a manner consistent with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and the
evidence on record. Thus, all things considered, the Court finds no reason to nullify the assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolutions. The Petition for Bail of Napoles was correctly denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.

I. People vs Jaime Lopez, Rogelio Regalado and Romeo Aragon

G.R. No. 177302, April 16, 2009, Indication of Conspiracy

FACTS:
At around 3:30 P.M. of April 25, 1996, appellant Rogelio Regalado (Regalado), who was outside
Bantogan3Tailoring, a tailoring shop at Bandola street corner Villaluz, Hinaruan, Surigao del Sur, called
out: "You let Bonjong come out so we could measure his courage!," referring to Edencito Chu (Chu)
whose nickname is "Bonjong." Chu thereupon emerged from his mother’s bakery, Purity Bakery,
fronting the tailor shop, put his arms around Regalado’s shoulders and asked for forgiveness. Regalado,
however, pushed Chu’s arms aside, drew a curved four to five inches long knife as he uttered "Putang
Ina, ka Jong!" and stabbed Chu below the left nipple.

As Chu ran towards Villaluz street, Regalado chased him and picked up two pieces of firewood along the
way with which he hit Chu.

Appellant Jaime Lopez (Lopez) in the meantime surfaced from a house beside the tailoring shop and,
armed with a hunting knife, joined the chase.

Soon appellant Romeo Aragon (Aragon) also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and also joined
the chase.

The three appellants caught up with Chu at the corner of Lindo and Bandola streets at which Aragon
boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall. Aragon kicked Chu. Lopez then stabbed Chu several times as
Regalado looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left. Chu expired before
reaching the hospital.

The RTC convicted all the accused as co-principals by direct participation, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER.

The C.A. affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether conspiracy attended the killing of the victim.

RULING:

Appellants’ disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails. The evidence shows that they cooperated in a
common design to kill Chu. Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the two
other appellants joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood along the way.
Then, when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and kicked Chu, enabling Lopez to stab
him several times. These indicate a conspiracy.

Wherefore, the appeal is DENIED!

J. People v Marlon Albert De Leon Y Homo

G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon
y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

FACTS:
In the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III,
both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of
Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint
green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.

Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side in order to
take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the
lowered window shield that there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to
fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing this, he returned the key to the driver. While
returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not start. Eduardo Zulueta
offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato Lacambra III
were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the same
vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38
caliber pistol.

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down, while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car
Wash Section. At that instance, guns were poked at them.

Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet
containing a pawnshop ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape
with a gun.

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth
₱3,000.00. Those four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.
Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service firearm.

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately
leave the place. The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal. When
the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers
took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He
immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin Macahis to the hospital. Later on,
Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.

In his defense, according to the appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita
Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at
approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine
Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal.
While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant
and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would allow appellant to
hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other
passengers in the said vehicle.

When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do
so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road,
appellant fell asleep. When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia
and the other passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do
anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and
the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they were
followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then
that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him
behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.

As a result of the above incident, four Information for Robbery with Homicide were filed against
appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes,
an alias "Rey," an alias "Jonard," an alias "Precie," and an alias "Renato.”

The C.A., on June 29, 2007, affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC, with the accused Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of
only one count.

ISSUES:

The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator in the commission of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same and guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

On the assumption that accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide, the trial court gravely
erred in imposing four (4) death penalties despite that the crime charged was produced by one single
act which should be meted with a single penalty.

RULING:

All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although
not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized

For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the
commission of the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting
that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself
from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. Appellant offered no
evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers nor to
prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the
defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct
them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive
evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.

If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. The prosecution was able to prove the presence
of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.
Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would
still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

The decision of CA is hereby Affirmed with Modification!