Professional Documents
Culture Documents
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/246481910
CITATIONS READS
5,213 1,963
2 authors, including:
Walter W. Powell
Stanford University
126 PUBLICATIONS 56,021 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
All content following this page was uploaded by Walter W. Powell on 23 July 2016.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Sage Publications, Inc., American Sociological Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE IRON CAGE REVISITED: INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM
AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS*
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of capitalist firms in the marketplace; competition
Capitalism, Max Weber warned that the ra- among states, increasing rulers' need to control
tionalist spirit ushered in by asceticism had their staff and citizenry; and bourgeois de-
achieved a momentum of its own and that, mands for equal protection under the law. Of
under capitalism, the rationalist order had be- these three, the most important was the com-
come an iron cage in which humanity was, save petitive marketplace. "Today," Weber
for the possibility of prophetic revival, impris- (1968:974) wrote:
oned "perhaps until the last ton of fossilized
it is primarily the capitalist market economy
coal is burnt" (Weber, 1952:181-82). In his
which demands that the official business of
essay on bureaucracy, Weber returned to this
administration be discharged precisely, un-
theme, contending that bureaucracy, the ra-
ambiguously, continuously, and with as
tional spirit's organizational manifestation, was
much speed as possible. Normally, the very
so efficient and powerful a means of controlling
large, modern capitalist enterprises are
men and women that, once established, the
themselves unequalled models of strict bu-
momentum of bureaucratization was irreversi-
reaucratic organization.
ble (Weber, 1968).
The imagery of the iron cage has haunted We argue that the causes of bureaucratiza-
students of society as the tempo of bureau- tion and rationalization have changed. The bu-
cratization has quickened. But while bureau- reaucratization of the corporation and the state
cracy has spread continuously in the eighty have been achieved. Organizations are still be-
years since Weber wrote, we suggest that the coming more homogeneous, and bureaucracy
engine of organizational rationalization has remains the common organizational form.
shifted. For Weber, bureaucratization resulted Today, however, structural change in organi-
from three related causes: competition among zations seems less and less driven by competi-
tion or by the need for efficiency. Instead, we
will contend, bureaucratization and other
forms of organizational change occur as the
*Direct all correspondence to: Paul J. DiMaggio
result of processes that make organizations
and Walter W. Powell, School of Organization and
more similar without necessarily making them
Management, Yale University, Box IA, New
Haven, CT 06520.
more efficient. Bureaucratization and other
A preliminary version of this paper was presented forms of homogenization emerge, we argue,
by Powell at the American Sociological Association out of the structuration (Giddens, 1979) of or-
meetings in Toronto, August 1981. We have bene- ganizational fields. This process, in turn, is
fited considerably from careful readings of earlier effected largely by the state and the profes-
drafts by Dan Chambliss, Randall Collins, Lewis sions, which have become the great ration-
Coser, Rebecca Friedkin, Connie Gersick, Albert alizers of the second half of the twentieth cen-
Hunter, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Charles E.
tury. For reasons that we will explain, highly
Lindblom, John Meyer, David Morgan, Susan
structured organizational fields provide a con-
Olzak, Charles Perrow, Richard A. Peterson, Arthur
Stinchcombe, Blair Wheaton, and two anonymous
text in which individual efforts to deal ration-
ASR reviewers. The authors' names are listed in ally with uncertainty and constraint often lead,
alphabetical order for convenience. This was a fully in-the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure,
collaborative effort. culture, and output.
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
148 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 149
a certain point in the structuration of an orga- gests that older, larger organizations reach a
nizational field, the aggregate effect of individ- point where they can dominate their envi-
ual change is to lessen the extent of diversity ronments rather than adjust to them.
within the field.2 Organizations in a structured The concept that best captures the process
field, to paraphrase Schelling (1978:14), re- of homogenization is isomorphism. In Haw-
spond to an environment that consists of other ley's (1968) description, isomorphism is a con-
organizations responding to their environment, straining process that forces one unit in a
which consists of organizations responding to population to resemble other units that face the
an environment of organizations' responses. same set of environmental conditions. At the
Zucker and Tolbert's (1981) work on the population level, such an approach suggests
adoption of civil-service reform in the United that organizational characteristics are modified
States illustrates this process. Early adoption in the direction of increasing comparability
of civil-service reforms was related to internal with environmental characteristics; the
governmental needs, and strongly predicted by number of organizations in a population is a
such city characteristics as the size of immi- function of environmental carrying capacity;
grant population, political reform movements, and the diversity of organizational forms is
socioeconomic composition, and city size. isomorphic to environmental diversity. Han-
Later adoption, however, is not predicted by nan and Freeman (1977) have significantly ex-
city characteristics, but is related to institu- tended Hawley's ideas. They argue that
tional definitions of the legitimate structural isomorphism can result because nonoptimal
form for municipal administration. Marshall forms are selected out of a population of orga-
Meyer's (1981) study of the bureaucratization nizations or because organizational decision
of urban fiscal agencies has yielded similar makers learn appropriate responses and adjust
findings: strong relationships between city their behavior accordingly. Hannan and
characteristics and organizational attributes at Freeman's focus is almost solely on the first
the turn of the century, null relationships in process: selection.5
recent years. Carroll and Delacroix's (1982) Following Meyer (1979) and Fennell (1980),
findings on the birth and death rates of news- we maintain that there are two types of
papers support the view that selection acts isomorphism: competitive and institutional.
with great force only in the early years of an Hannan and Freeman's classic paper (1977),
industry's existence.4 Freeman (1982:14) sug- and much of their recent work, deals with
competitive isomorphism, assuming a system
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
150 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 151
by output controls. Under such circumstances, advantages of mimetic behavior in the econ-
organizations employ ritualized controls of omy of human action are considerable; when
credentials and group solidarity. an organization faces a problem with ambigu-
Direct imposition of standard operating pro- ous causes or unclear solutions, problemistic
cedures and legitimated rules and structures search may yield a viable solution with little
also occurs outside the governmental arena. expense (Cyert and March, 1963).
Michael Sedlak (1981) has documented the Modeling, as we use the term, is a response
ways that United Charities in the 1930s altered to uncertainty. The modeled organization may
and homogenized the structures, methods, and be unaware of the modeling or may have no
philosophies of the social service agencies that desire to be copied; it merely serves as a con-
depended upon them for support. As conglom- venient source of practices that the borrowing
erate corporations increase in size and scope, organization may use. Models may be diffused
standard performance criteria are not neces- unintentionally, indirectly through employee
sarily imposed on subsidiaries, but it is com- transfer or turnover, or explicitly by organi-
mon for subsidiaries to be subject to stan- zations such as consulting firms or industry
dardized reporting mechanisms (Coser et al., trade associations. Even innovation can be ac-
1982). Subsidiaries must adopt accounting counted for by organizational modeling. As
practices, performance evaluations, and bud- Alchian (1950) has observed:
getary plans that are compatible with the
While there certainly are those who con-
policies of the parent corporation. A variety of
sciously innovate, there are those who, in
service infrastructures, often provided by
their imperfect attempts to imitate others,
monopolistic firms-for example, telecom-
unconsciously innovate by unwittingly ac-
munications and transportation-exert com-
quiring some unexpected or unsought unique
mon pressures over the organizations that use
attributes which under the prevailing cir-
them. Thus, the expansion of the central state,
cumstances prove partly responsible for the
the centralization of capital, and the coordina-
success. Others, in turn, will attempt to copy
tion of philanthropy all support the homogeni-
the uniqueness, and the innovation-imitation
zation of organizational models through direct
process continues.
authority relationships.
We have so far referred only to the direct One of the most dramatic instances of mod-
and explicit imposition of organizational mod- eling was the effort of Japan's modernizers in
els on dependent organizations. Coercive the late nineteenth century to model new gov-
isomorphism, however, may be more subtle ernmental initiatives on apparently successful
and less explicit than these examples suggest. western -prototypes. Thus, the imperial gov-
Milofsky (1981) has described the ways in ernment sent its officers to study the courts,
which neighborhood organizatioins in urban Army, and police in France, the Navy and
communities, many of which are committed to postal system in Great Britain, and banking
participatory democracy, are driven to devel- and art education in the United States (see
oping organizational hierarchies in order to Westney, forthcoming). American corpo-
gain support from more hierarchically orga- rations are now returning the compliment by
nized donor organizations. Similarly, Swidler implementing (their perceptions of) Japanese
(1979) describes the tensions created in the free models to cope with thorny productivity and
schools she studied by the need to have a personnel problems in their own firms. The
"principal" to negotiate with the district sup- rapid proliferation of quality circles and
erintendent and to represent the school to out- quality-of-work-life issues in American firms
side agencies. In general, the need to lodge is, at least in part, an attempt to model
responsibility and managerial authority at least Japanese and European successes. These de-
ceremonially in a formally defined role in order velopments also have a ritual aspect; com-
to interact with hierarchical organizations is a panies adopt these "innovations" to enhance
constant obstacle to the maintenance of their legitimacy, to demonstrate they are at
egalitarian or collectivist organizational forms least trying to improve working conditions.
(Kanter, 1972; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). More generally, the wider the population of
Mimetic processes. Not all institutional personnel employed by, or customers served
isomorphism, however, derives from coercive by, an organization, the stronger the pressure
authority. Uncertainty is also a powerful force felt by the organization to provide the pro-
that encourages imitation. When organi- grams and services offered by other organi-
zational technologies are poorly understood zations. Thus, either a skilled labor force or a
(March and Olsen, 1976), when goals are am- broad customer base may encourage mimetic
biguous, or when the environment creates isomorphism.
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may Much homogeneity in organizational
model themselves on other organizations. The structures stems from the fact that despite con-
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
152 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
siderable search for diversity there is relatively base and legitimation for their occupational
little variation to be selected from. New orga- autonomy. As Larson points out, the profes-
nizations are modeled upon old ones through- sional project is rarely achieved with complete
out the economy, and managers actively seek success. Professionals must compromise with
models upon which to build (Kimberly, 1980). nonprofessional clients, bosses, or regulators.
Thus, in the arts one can find textbooks on how The major recent growth in the professions has
to organize a community arts council or how to been among organizational professionals, par-
start a symphony women's guild. Large orga- ticularly managers and specialized staff of large
nizations choose from a relatively small set of organizations. The increased professionaliza-
major consulting firms, which, like Johnny tion of workers whose futures are inextricably
Appleseeds, spread a few organizational mod- bound up with the fortunes of the organizations
els throughout the land. Such models are pow- that employ them has rendered obsolescent (if
erful because structural changes are observa- not obsolete) the dichotomy between organi-
ble, whereas changes in policy and strategy are zational commitment and professional alle-
less easily noticed. With the advice of a major giance that characterized traditional profes-
consulting firm, a large metropolitan public sionals in earlier organizations (Hall, 1968).
television station switched from a functional Professions are subject to the same coercive
design to a multidivisional structure. The sta- and mimetic pressures as are organizations.
tions' executives were skeptical that the new Moreover, while various kinds of professionals
structure was more efficient; in fact, some ser- within an organization may differ from one an-
vices were now duplicated across divisions. other, they exhibit much similarity to their
But they were convinced that the new design professional counterparts in other organi-
would carry a powerful message to the for- zations. In addition, in many cases, profes-
profit firms with whom the station regularly sional power is as much assigned by the state
dealt. These firms, whether in the role of cor- as it is created by the activities of the profes-
porate underwriters or as potential partners in sions.
joint ventures, would view the reorganization Two aspects of professionalization are im-
as a sign that "the sleepy nonprofit station was portant sources of isomorphism. One is the
becoming more business-minded" (Powell, resting of formal education and of legitimation
forthcoming). The history of management re- in a cognitive base produced by university spe-
form in American government agencies, cialists; the second is the growth and elabora-
which are noted for their goal ambiguity, is tion of professional networks that span organi-
almost a textbook case of isomorphic model- zations and across which new models diffuse
ing, from the PPPB of the McNamara era to the rapidly. Universities and professional training
zero-based budgeting of the Carter administra- institutions are important centers for the de-
tion. velopment of organizational norms among
Organizations tend to model themselves professional managers and their staff. Profes-
after similar organizations in their field that sional and trace associations are another vehi-
they perceive to be more legitimate or suc- cle for the definition and promulgation of nor-
cessful. The ubiquity of certain kinds of mative rules about organizational and profes-
structural arrangements can more likely be sional behavior. Such mechanisms create a
credited to the universality of mimetic pro- pool of almost interchangeable individuals who
cesses than to any concrete evidence that the occupy similar positions across a range of or-
adopted models enhance efficiency. John ganizations and possess a similarity of orienta-
Meyer (1981) contends that it is easy to predict tion and disposition that may override varia-
the organization of a newly emerging nation's tions in tradition and control that might other-
administration without knowing anything wise shape organizational behavior (Perrow,
about the nation itself, since "peripheral na- 1974).
tions are far more isomorphic-in administra- One important mechanism for encouraging
tive form and economic pattern-than any normative isomorphism is the filtering of per-
theory of the world system of economic di- sonnel. Within many organizational fields fil-
vision of labor would lead one to expect." tering occurs through the hiring of individuals
Normative pressures. A third source of from firms within the same industry; through
isomorphic organizational change is normative the recruitment of fast-track staff from a nar-
and stems primarily from professionalization. row range of training institutions; through
Following Larson (1977) and Collins (1979), we common promotion practices, such as always
interpret professionalization as the collective hiring top executives from financial or legal
struggle of members of an occupation to define departments; and from skill-level requirements
the conditions and methods of their work, to for particular jobs. Many professional career
control "the production of producers" (Lar- tracks are so closely guarded, both at the entry
son, 1977:49-52), and to establish a cognitive level and throughout the career progression,
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 153
that individuals who make it to the top are macy and visibility and lead competing firms to
virtually indistinguishable. March and March copy aspects of their structure or operating
(1977) found that individuals who attained the procedures in hope of obtaining similar re-
position of school superintendent in Wisconsin wards. Professional and trade associations
were so alike in background and orientation as provide other arenas in which center organiza-
to make further career advancement random tions are recognized and their personnel given
and unpredictable. Hirsch and Whisler (1982) positions of substantive or ceremonial influ-
find a similar absence of variation among For- ence. Managers in highly visible organizations
tune 500 board members. In addition, individu- may in turn have their stature reinforced by
als in an organizational field undergo antici- representation on the boards of other organi-
patory socialization to common expectations zations, participation in industry-wide or
about their personal behavior, appropriate inter-industry councils, and consultation by
style of dress, organizational vocabularies agencies of government (Useem, 1979). In the
(Cicourel, 1970; Williamson, 1975) and stan- nonprofit sector, where legal barriers to collu-
dard methods of speaking, joking, or address- sion do not exist, structuration may proceed
ing others (Ouchi, 1980). Particularly in indus- even more rapidly. Thus executive producers
tries with a service or financial orientation or artistic directors of leading theatres head
(Collins, 1979, argues that the importance of trade or professional association committees,
credentials is strongest in these areas), the fil- sit on government and foundation grant-award
tering of personnel approaches what Kanter panels, or consult as government- or
(1977) refers to as the "homosexual reproduc- foundation-financed management advisors to
tion of management." To the extent managers smaller theatres, or sit on smaller organi-
and key staff are drawn from the same univer- zations' boards, even as their stature is rein-
sities and filtered on a common set of attri- forced and enlarged by the grants their theatres
butes, they will tend to view problems in a simi- receive from government, corporate, and
lar fashion, see the same policies, procedures foundation funding sources (DiMaggio, 1982).
and structures as normatively sanctioned and Such central organizations serve as both
legitimated, and approach decisions in much active and passive models; their policies and
the same way. structures will be copied throughout their
Entrants to professional career tracks who fields. Their centrality is reinforced as up-
somehow escape the filtering process-for wardly mobile managers and staff seek to se-
example, Jewish naval officers, woman cure positions in these central organizations in
stockbrokers, or Black insurance order to further their own careers. Aspiring
executives-are likely to be subjected to per- managers may undergo anticipatory socializa-
vasive on-the-job socialization. To the extent tion into the norms and mores of the organi-
that organizations in a field differ and primary zations they hope to join. Career paths may
socialization occurs on the job, socialization also involve movement from entry positions in
could reinforce, not erode, differences among the center organizations to middle-
organizations. But when organizations in a management positions in peripheral organi-
field are similar and occupational socialization zations. Personnel flows within an orgarni-
is carried out in trade association workshops, zational field are further encouraged by
in-service educational programs, consultant ar- structural homogenization, for example the
rangements, employer--professional school existence of common career titles and paths
networks, and in the pages of trade magazines, (such as assistant, associate, and full profes-
socialization acts as an isomorphic force. sor) with meanings that are commonly under-
The professionalization of management stood.
tends to proceed in tandem with the structura- It is important to note that each of the in-
tion of organizational fields. The exchange of stitutional isomorphic processes can be ex-
information among professionals helps con- pected to proceed in the absence of evidence
tribute to a commonly recognized hierarchy of that they increase internal organizational effi-
status, of center and periphery, that becomes a ciency. To the extent that organizational effec-
matrix for information flows and personnel tiveness is enhanced, the reason will often be
movement across organizations. This status that organizations are rewarded for being
ordering occurs through both formal and in- similar to other organizations in their fields.
formal means. The designation of a few large This similarity can make it easier for organi-
firms in an industry as key bargaining agents in zations to transact with other organizations, to
union-management negotiations may make attract career-minded staff, to be acknowl-
these central firms pivotal in other respects as edged as legitimate and reputable, and to fit
well. Government recognition of key firms or into administrative categories that define eligi-
organizations through the grant or contract bility for public and private grants and con-
process may give these organizations legiti- tracts. None of this, however, insures that
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
154 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
conformist organizations do what they do more variability in the extent to and rate at which
efficiently than do their more deviant peers. organizations in a field change to become more
Pressures for competitive efficiency are also like their peers. Some organizations respond to
mitigated in many fields because the number of external pressures quickly; others change only
organizations is limited and there are strong after a long period of resistance. The first two
fiscal and legal barriers to entry and exit. Lee hypotheses derive from our discussion of coer-
(1971:51) maintains this is why hospital ad- cive isomorphism and constraint.
ministrators are less concerned with the effi- Hypothesis A-1: The greater the dependence
cient use of resources and more concerned of an organization on another organization,
with status competition and parity in prestige. the more similar it will become to that organi-
Fennell (1980) notes that hospitals are a poor zation in structure, climate, and behavioral
market system because patients lack the focus. Following Thompson (1957) and Pfeffer
needed knowledge of potential exchange and Salancik (1978), this proposition recog-
partners and prices. She argues that physicians nizes the greater ability of organizations to re-
and hospital administrators are the actual con- sist the demands of organizations on whom
sumers. Competition among hospitals is based they are not dependent. A position of depen-
on "attracting physicians, who, in turn, bring dence leads to isomorphic change. Coercive
their patients to the hospital." Fennell (p. 505) pressures are built into exchange relationships.
concludes that: As Williamson (1979) has shown, exchanges
are characterized by transaction-specific in-
Hospitals operate according to a norm of vestments in both knowledge and equipment.
social legitimation that frequently conflicts
Once an organization chooses a specific
with market considerations of efficiency and
supplier or distributor for particular parts or
system rationality. Apparently, hospitals can
services, the supplier or distributor develops
increase their range of services not because expertise in the performance of the task as well
there is an actual need for a particular service as idiosyncratic knowledge about the exchange
or facility within the patient population, but relationship. The organization comes to rely on
because they will be defined as fit only if the supplier or distributor and such
they can offer everything other hospitals in transaction-specific investments give the
the area offer. supplier or distributor considerable advantages
in any subsequent competition with other
These results suggest a more general pattern.
suppliers or distributors.
Organizational fields that include a large pro-
Hypothesis A-2: The greater the centraliza-
fessionally trained labor force will be driven
tion of organization A's resource supply, the
primarily by status competition. Organi-
greater the extent to which organization A will
zational prestige and resources are key ele-
change isomorphically to resemble the organi-
ments in attracting professionals. This process
zations on which it depends for resources. As
encourages homogenization as organizations
Thompson (1967) notes, organizations that de-
seek to ensure that they can provide the same
pend on the same sources for funding, person-
benefits and services as their competitors.
nel, and legitimacy will be more subject to the
whims of resource suppliers than will organi-
zations that can play one source of support off
PREDICTORS OF ISOMORPHIC CHANGE
against another. In cases where alternative
It follows from our discussion of the mech- sources are either not readily available or re-
anism by which isomorphic change occurs that quire effort to locate, the stronger party to the
we should be able to predict empirically which transaction can coerce the weaker party to
organizational fields will be most homogeneous adopt its practices in order to accommodate
in structure, process, and behavior. While an the stronger party's needs (see Powell, 1983).
empirical test of such predictions is beyond the The third and fourth hypotheses derive from
scope of this paper, the ultimate value of our our discussion of mimetic isomorphism, mod-
perspective will lie in its predictive utility. The eling, and uncertainty.
hypotheses discussed below are not meant to Hypothesis A-3: The more uncertain the re-
exhaust the universe of predictors, but merely lationship between means and ends the greater
to suggest several hypotheses that may be pur- the extent to which an organization will model
sued using data on the characteristics of orga- itself after organizations it perceives to be suc-
nizations in a field, either cross-sectionally or, cessful. The mimetic thought process involved
preferably, over time. The hypotheses are im- in the search for models is characteristic of
plicitly governed by ceteris paribus assump- change in organizations in which key
tions, particularly with regard to size, technol- technologies are only poorly understood
ogy, and centralization of external resources. (March and Cohen, 1974). Here our prediction
A. Organizational-level predictors. There is diverges somewhat from Meyer and Rowan
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 155
(1977) who argue, as we do, that organizations the collective organization of the environment
which lack well-defined technologies will im- (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
port institutionalized rules and practices. B. Field-level predictors. The following six
Meyer and Rowan posit a loose coupling be- hypotheses describe the expected effects of
tween legitimated external practices and inter- several characteristics of organizational fields
nal organizational behavior. From an on the extent of isomorphism in a particular
ecologist's point of view, loosely coupled or- field. Since the effect of institutional
ganizations are more likely to vary internally. isomorphism is homogenization, the best indi-
In contrast, we expect substantive internal cator of isomorphic change is a decrease in
changes in tandem with more ceremonial prac- variation and diversity, which could be mea-
tices, thug greater homogeneity and less varia- sured by lower standard deviations of the
tion and change. Internal consistency of this values of selected indicators in a set of organi-
sort is an important means of interorgani- zations. The key indicators would vary with
zational coordination. It also increases organi- the nature of the field and the interests of the
zational stability. investigator. In all cases, however, field-level
Hypothesis A-4: The more ambiguous the measures are expected to affect organizations
goals of an organization, the greater the extent in a field regardless of each organization's
to which the organization will model itself after scores on related organizational-level mea-
organizations that it perceives to be suc- sures.
cessful. There are two reasons for this. First, Hypothesis B-1: The greater the extent to
organizations with ambiguous or disputed which an organizational field is dependent
goals are likely to be highly dependent upon upon a single (or several similar) source of
appearances for legitimacy. Such organizations support for vital resources, the higher the level
may find it to their advantage to meet the ex- of isomorphism. The centralization of re-
pectations of important constituencies about sources within a field both directly causes
how they should be designed and run. In con- homogenization by placing organizations under
trast to our view, ecologists would argue that similar pressures from resource suppliers, and
organizations that copy other organizations interacts with uncertainty and goal ambiguity
usually have no competitive advantage. We to increase their impact. This hypothesis is
contend that, in most situations, reliance on congruent with the ecologists' argument that
established, legitimated procedures enhances the number of organizational forms is deter-
organizational legitimacy and survival charac- mined by the distribution of resources in the
teristics. A second reason for modeling be- environment and the terms on which resources
havior is found in situations where conflict are available.
over organizational goals is repressed in the Hypothesis B-2: The greater the extent to
interest of harmony; thus participants find it which the organizations in afield transact with
easier to mimic other organizations than to agencies of the state, the greater the extent of
make decisions on the basis of systematic isomorphism in the field as a whole. This fol-
analyses of goals since such analyses would lows not just from the previous hypothesis, but
prove painful or disruptive. from two elements of state/private-sector
The fifth and sixth hypotheses are based on transactions: their rule-boundedness and for-
our discussion of normative processes found in mal rationality, and the emphasis of govern-
professional organizations. ment actors on institutional rules. Moreover,
Hypothesis A-5: The greater the reliance on the federal government routinely designates
academic credentials in choosing managerial industry standards for an entire field which
and staff personnel, the greater the extent to require adoption by all competing firms. John
which an organization will become like other Meyer (1979) argues convincingly that the as-
organizations in its field. Applicants with aca- pects of an organization which are affected by
demic credentials have already undergone a state transactions differ to the extent that state
socialization process in university programs, participation is unitary or fragmented among
and are thus more likely than others to have several public agencies.
internalized reigning norms and dominant or- The third and fourth hypotheses follow from
ganizational models. our discussion of isomorphic change resulting
Hypothesis A-5: The greater the participa- from uncertainty and modeling.
tion of organizational managers in trade and Hypothesis B-3: The fewer the number of
professional associations, the more likely the visible alternative organizational models in a
organization will be, or will become, like field, the faster the rate of isomorphism in that
other organizations in its field. This hypothesis field. The predictions of this hypothesis are
is parallel to the institutional view that the less specific than those of others and require
more elaborate the relational networks among further refinement; but our argument is that for
organizations and their members, the greater any relevant dimension of organizational strat-
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
156 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 157
proportioned social edifice that macrotheorists nization seek to use it for ends that restrict the
describe? return to masters."
The conventional answer to this paradox has We reject neither the natural-selection nor
been that some version of natural selection oc- the elite-control arguments out of hand. Elites
curs in which selection mechanisms operate to do exercise considerable influence over mod-
weed out those organizational forms that are ern life and aberrant or inefficient organi-
less fit. Such arguments, as we have con- zations sometimes do expire. But we contend
tended, are difficult to mesh with organi- that neither of these processes is sufficient to
zational realities. Less efficient organizational explain the extent to which organizations have
forms do persist. In some contexts efficiency become structurally more similar. We argue
or productivity cannot even be measured. In that a theory of institutional isomorphism may
government agencies or in faltering corpo- help explain the observations that organi-
rations selection may occur on political rather zations are becoming more homogeneous, and
than economic grounds. In other contexts, for that elites often get their way, while at the
example the Metropolitan Opera or the Bohe- same time enabling us to understand the irra-
mian Grove, supporters are far more con- tionality, the frustration of power, and the lack
cerned with noneconomic values like aesthetic of innovation that are so commonplace in or-
quality or social status than with efficiency per ganizational life. What is more, our approach is
se. Even in the for-profit sector, where com- more consonant with the ethnographic and
petitive arguments would promise to bear the theoretical literature on how organizations
greatest fruit, Nelson and Winter's work work than are either functionalist or elite
(Winter, 1964, 1975; Nelson and Winter, 1982) theories of organizational change.
demonstrates that the invisible hand operates A focus on institutional isomorphism can
with, at best, a light touch. also add a much needed perspective on the
A second approach to the paradox that we political struggle for organizational power and
have identified comes from Marxists and survival that is missing from much of popula-
theorists who assert that key elites guide and tion ecology. The institutionalization approach
control the social system through their com- associated with John Meyer and his students
mand of crucial positions in major organi- posits the importance of myths and ceremony
zations (e.g., the financial institutions that but does not ask how these models arise and
dominate monopoly capitalism). In this view, whose interests they initially serve. Explicit
while organizational actors ordinarily proceed attention to the genesis of legitimated models
undisturbed through mazes of standard and to the definition and elaboration of organi-
operating procedures, at key turning points zational fields should answer this question.
capitalist elites get their way by intervening in Examination of the diffusion of similar organi-
decisions that set the course of an institution zational strategies and structures should be a
for years to come (Katz, 1975). productive means for assessing the influence of
While evidence suggests that this is, in fact, elite interests. A consideration of isomorphic
sometimes the case-Barnouw's account of the processes also leads us to a bifocal view of
early days of broadcasting or Weinstein's power and its application in modern politics.
(1968) work on the Progressives are good To the extent that organizational change is
examples-other historians have been less unplanned and goes on largely behind the
successful in their search for class-conscious backs of groups that wish to influence it, our
elites. In such cases as the development of the attention should be directed to two forms of
New Deal programs (Hawley, 1966) or the ex- power. The first, as March and Simon (1958)
pansion of the Vietnamese conflcit (Halperin, and Simon (1957) pointed out years ago, is the
1974), the capitalist class appears to have been power to set premises, to define the norms and
muddled and disunited. standards which shape and channel behavior.
Moreover, without constant monitoring, in- The second is the point of critical intervention
dividuals pursuing parochial organizational or (Domhoff, 1979) at which elites can define ap-
subunit interests can quickly undo the work propriate models of organizational structure
that even the most prescient elites have ac- and policy which then go unquestioned for
complished. Perrow (1976:21) has noted that years to come (see Katz, 1975). Such a view is
despite superior resources and sanctioning consonant with some of the best recent work
power, organizational elites are often unable to on power (see Lukes, 1974); research on the
maximize their preferences because "the com- structuration of organizational fields and on
plexity of modern organizations makes control isomorphic processes may help give it more
difficult." Moreover, organizations have in- empirical flesh.
creasingly become the vehicle for numerous Finally, a more developed theory of organi-
"gratifications, necessities, and preferences so zational isomorphism may have important im-
that many groups within and without the orga- plications for social policy in those fields in
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
158 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
we argued, changed since Weber's time. But glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
DiMaggio, Paul
the importance of understanding the trends to
1981 "Cultural entrepreneurship in nineteenth-
which he called attention has never been more
century Boston. Part 1: The creation of an
immediate.
organizational base for high culture in
America." Media, Culture and Society
4:33-50.
REFERENCES 1982 "The structure of organizational fields: an
analytical approach and policy implica-
Alchian, Armen
tions." Paper prepared for SUNY-Albany
1950 "Uncertainty, evolution, and economic
Conference on Organizational Theory and
theory." Journal of Political Economy
Public Policy. April 1 and 2.
58:211-21.
Domhoff, J. William
Aldrich, Howard
1967 Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs,
1979 Organizations and Environments. En-
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
1979 The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling
Althusser, Louis
Class Domination in America. New York:
1969 For Marx. London: Allan Lane.
Random House.
Barnouw, Erik
1966- A History of Broadcasting in the United Fennell, Mary L.
68 States, 3 volumes. New York: Oxford Uni- 1980 "The effects of environmental charac-
versity Press. teristics on the structure of hospital clus-
Boorman, Scott A. and Paul R. Levitt ters." Administrative Science Quarterly
25:484-510.
1979 "The cascade principle for general disequi-
librium dynamics." Cambridge/New Freeman, John H.
Haven: Harvard-Yale Preprints in Mathe- 1982 "Organizational life cycles and natural
matical Sociology. Number 15. selection processes." Pp. 1-32 in Barry
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis Staw and Larry Cummings (eds.), Research
1976 Schooling in Capitalist America. New in Organizational Behavior. Vol. 4.
York: Basic Books. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Carroll, Glenn R. and Jacques Delacroix Giddens, Anthony
1982 "Organizational mortality in the newspaper 1979 Central Problems in Social Theory: Action,
industries of Argentina and Ireland: an Structure, and Contradiction in Social
ecological approach." Administrative Sci- Analysis. Berkeley: University of Califor-
ence Quarterly 27:169-98. nia Press.
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 159
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
160 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
This content downloaded from 171.64.184.225 on Tue, 19 Jul 2016 20:41:42 UTC
View publication stats
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms