CHAPTER I

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED

Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided in the law.

Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the intention of the
legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts.

A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different interpretations are in
contention.

CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERPRETATION

Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislative intent. A distinction, however, has been drawn between construction and
interpretation.

One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself, while one
who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written language of
the law
(Caltex [Philippines], Inc. v. Palomar, L-19650, September 29, 1966).

Hence, when the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the
meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and
when there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.
Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227).

 When the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible
to resort to extrinsic aids
(People v. Amigo, 67 SCAD 28).

When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the
same according to its clear language
(Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Manila, 75 SCAD 519).

Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct
expression of the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the
language used.

Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text. Construction on the other hand is the drawing of
conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text.

Ambiguity - is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinctness or uncertainty of

meaning of an expression used in a written instrument.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 105)
However, it has been held, that ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning of the particular
words but also from the general scope and meaning of the statute when all its provisions are
examined. There is also an ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead to
unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or where a statute is in conflict with the Constitution,
or where the statute would defeat the policy of the legislation.
(Tarlac Development Corporation v. CA, L-41012, September 30, 1976)

III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ARE AS

FOLLOWS:

Apply the Law Interpret the Law Construct the Law

When the law speaks in When there is ambiguity in the When the intent of the
clear and categorical language of the statute, legislature cannot be
language ascertain legislative intent by ascertained by merely making
making use of intrinsic aids, or use of intrinsic aids, the court
those found in the law itself. should resort to extrinsic aids,
or those found outside the
language of the law.

DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT CLARIFY THE RULE ON THE

ISSUE OF WHEN TO APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAW:

1. In Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court said: "When the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or
construction. There is only room for application. A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for
itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity." (G.R. Nos.
50999-5100, March 23, 1990)

2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J., the Supreme
Court made the same ruling, but explained further when an interpretation can be resorted to,
thus: "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to it express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." (248
SCRA 590)

3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on Audit,
297 SCRA 168).

4. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 199).

5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No. 9227. - It is axiomatic that when
the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention. With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in
light of the Special Allowance granted under RA No. 9227, Section thereof, could not be
any clearer. (Re: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special
allowance for judges be included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-
04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J.)

Axiomatic – unquestionable / self-evident

 THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE WORDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTION ARE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION

1. VERBA LEGIS, which means that whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

2. RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, which means that in case of ambiguity, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.

3. UTMAGIS VALEATOUAMPEREAT, which means that the Constitution should be

interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. (Francisco v. HRET, G.R. No. 160261, November 10,
2003).

WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?

Anyone can interpret the law. Lawyers, policemen, arbiters, administrative boards and
agencies, government as well as private executives are involved from time to time in the
interpretation of laws.

Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily conclusive nor can they bind the courts.
Hence, in many occasions, the decisions of STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION regulatory
boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and appealed to the Supreme Court in
cases where there is abuse of discretion and authority or when there is a violation of due
process or denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law
(MantradeFMMC Division Employee and Workers Union v. Bacungan,
G.R. No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J.).

The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the significance of a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural or a municipal ordinance.
It discharges a role no crucial than the roles played by the two other departments in
maintaining the rules of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has
to speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with finality through the
highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What it says is definite and authoritative, binding on
those who occupy the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy
(Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70443, September 15,
1986, Second Division, Gutierez, Jr., J.).

PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to ascertain and give effect
to the legislative intent.

It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the following reasons exists:

1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or obscure, when taken in
relation to a set of facts;
2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the language used in the statute.
 WHEN IS IT NECESSARY TO WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY
INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT? TO INTERPRET AND
CONSTRUCT?

It is necessary to interpret or construct It is not necessary to interpret or construct

when any of the following reasons
exists:
1. When the language of the statute
is ambiguous, doubtful, or
obscure, when taken in relation to
a set of facts;
2. When reasonable minds disagree
as to the meaning of the language
used in the statute.
when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language.
The duty of the court, in such a case, is to
APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET
IT.
(Go Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice & Corn Board,
G.R. No. L-23607, May 23, 1967; People v.
Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967;
Luzon Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-
25659, October 31, 1969).

THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOW THIS AFFECTS

INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

The present structure upholds the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances.

The present government is a presidential form with the executive power being vested
in the President of the Philippines, the legislative power in the Congress of the
Philippines consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, and the
judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

However, there is a more precise and specific meaning attached to each of the
said powers.

1. LEGISLATIVE POWER
It is the authority of Congress to make laws and to alter or repeal them. There are two kinds
of legislative powers namely:
 Original Legislative Power - This is a power belonging to the sovereign people and
this is supreme.
 Derivative Legislative Power - This is delegated by the sovereign people to the
legislative bodies and it is subordinate to the original power of the people.

Example of a case when the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164
was an invalid exercise of legislative power and ruled that proclamation no. 164 issued by
president Corazon c. Aquino was null and void.

Case: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v. COURT OF

APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997
FACTS:
On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes
certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was
occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay,
Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the
municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on
the subject land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San
Juan started to develop its government center by constructing the INP Building,
which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house
the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also
constructed thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School
Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987,
former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716.
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of
herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order
against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan
Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the
association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them
by Proclamation No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that
the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes
and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991. This
decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.Disregarding the
ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make
consolidation subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the same to
respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their
application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner
municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent
Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from
disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the
said decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More
specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
HELD: Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation —
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power
vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act
of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of
legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-
called bloodless revolution on February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly
referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power
until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came
the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When
Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power
under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation
No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely
vested in Congress.
The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid
exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby
declared NULL and VOID - There is a long standing principle that every
statute is presumed to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]).
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by
legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power
by the executive branch. For the Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all
constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would
be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the
discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court's usual practice of
not entertaining constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and
adequately argued.

2. JUDICIAL POWER TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER

What is the traditional concept of judicial power?
The traditional concept of judicial power refers only to the authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the court of justice or the redress of wrongs for the violation of such rights (Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia, by Jose Agaton R. Sibal, citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17SCRA 756).
What is the new definition of judicial power?
The traditional concept of judicial power, as above-mentioned, including
now the duty of the courts of justice "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," constitutes the totality of the judicial power which is now
vested by our Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law." This is what is known and referred to as the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
The significance of the additional sentence "and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government"? (Last paragraph Section 1,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
This sentence has, in effect, expanded the power, authority, and
jurisdiction of our courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to determine
whether any branch or instrumentality of our government has committed "grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." In fact, this power, authority
and jurisdiction goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether
it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or of any
official or branch of our government.
 The question of whether the said abuse of discretion is grave or not is
ultimately determined, not by the officials whose acts are in question, but by our
courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, and it is in this sense that the new provision
grants unto the Supreme Court "an expanded jurisdiction and authority" to look into what
it considers as a proper subject of its final disposition. In so doing, the Supreme
Court, as the final arbiter, enjoys a wide latitude of power and discretion using, as it
may, its honest evaluation of facts, laws, jurisprudence and any and all
materials, books and points of reference which may be valuable to support its
analysis and conclusion.
The wisdom and propriety, for instance, which may be invoked by the
executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the
justices. In the end, the Supreme Court may find itself intervening in matters which
should better be left to the wisdom of the leaders of the nation who are directly
responsible to the sovereign electorate.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, et al.
(G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the sale
of 51% of the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel Corporation, pursuant to the privatization
program of the government, cannot contravene the Filipino First Policy. In this case, the
petitioner invoked Article XII, Section 10(2) of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument that reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture.
Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national
economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer of Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm.

EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE

EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED BYTHE PRESIDENT WAS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
LOUIS "BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 and
REP. EDCEL C. bAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR. v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY ELORENCIO B. ABAD G.R. No.
193036, December 7, 2010

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of
which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. bagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House
of Representatives.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. They contend that it does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) an
"adventure in partisan hostility."
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the
historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared
his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahi rap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
HELD:
Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1
reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members
of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole
object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption
in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that
of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
 According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be
struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out
the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely
to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. - There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
"COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate
action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
Section 2. Powers and Functions. - The Commission, which shall
have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. (Emphases
supplied)
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Executive Order No. 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT MADE REFERENCE

TO THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY (THE POLICY OBSERVED AND MADE POPULAR
BY PAST PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA), TO THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF MANILA HOTEL, AND TO THE LATIN MAXIM OF UBI
JUS IBI REMEDIUM

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the shares of GSIS,

owner of 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), was sold by GSIS
through public bidding. Manila Prince Hotel and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, participated
in the bidding, and both of them offered to buy 51% of MHC shares. Renong Berhad
offered a higher bid. MHC sent a check to match the bid of the foreign firm. To prevent the
consummation of the bid of Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner's arguments are as follows:

1. Petitioner invokes Article XII, Section 10(2) of the Constitution and submits
that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of
Philippine heritage and culture.
2. Manila Hotel has become a national patrimony.
3. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the national
economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the offer of the
Malaysian firm.

Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of

principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation. Respondents added that even if the provision is
self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the term "national patrimony."

ISSUE: Does MHC fall under the term "national patrimony"? Is Section 10(2) of
Article XII self-executing?

HELD:

Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, is a

mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words, the provision does not require any legislation to put in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concession covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists
in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events, which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivities
during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official
Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays host to dignitaries and official
visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.

The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations
at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid, it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the required approvals. Since the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Reluctantly, respondents are not
bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated
to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in

the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so it must be enforced. This Court as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede
and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it,
the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by
the Constitution.

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability

and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not
take precedence over non-material values- A commercial, nay enen a budgetary,
 objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For
the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.

Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly is the effect of the Supreme
Court's "expanded jurisdiction and authority?"

The power, authority and discretion to determine whether grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed goes
beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether it is
committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or any official or
branch of our government.

The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the executive department,
may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the justices.

Example: The privatization of business asset for purposes of

enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in
pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not
meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position
that this argument should not take precedence over non-material
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary objective, should not
be pursued at the expense of national will and dignity.

 Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and that it requires an implementing
legislation. Respondents also argued that even if the said provision is self-executing, the
hotel does not fall under the term "national patrimony."

 In sum, the privatization of business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability
and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy,
did not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument
should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary,
objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity.

 Giving emphasis to what it considers to be more deserving of preference, the Supreme Court
added that there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.

IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWER AND AUTHORITY HOWEVER, THE COURT OR THE
JUDICIAL ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE FOLLOWING RULES:
1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it;
(Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326, 33 SCRA 105; Quijano p. DBP, 35 SCRA 220, L-26419,
October 16, 1970)

2. It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail; (Article 10, New Civil Code)
3. When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court should interpret the law
according to the meaning the legislature intended to give it;

4. If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which will achieve the ends
desired by Congress should be adopted;

5. Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding;

6. A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or

insufficiency of the laws. (Article 9, New Civil Code). In other words, he must decide the
case assigned to him whether or not he knows what law shall be applied. In case of
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, a judge may still be guided by the
following:

a. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or public policy;
b. Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases,
c. Legal opinions of qualified writers and professors;
d. General principles of justice and equity; and
e. Rules of statutory construction.

In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no crime when there is no
law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE. If there is no law therefore which punishes an act
complained of, the judge must dismiss the case (Suarez, Introduction to Law, p. 4).

3. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

"The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines."

Who shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices?

The President of the Republic of the Philippines shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices (Section 17, Article VII) and shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines. Under and by virtue
of all the powers vested in him by the Constitution, the President is regarded as the
most powerful and the most influential person in the country subject to no other
restraint than to comply with the law and the Constitution.

What does this mean?

This means that he is the "Chief Executive." More specifically, he is the Executive of
the Government of the Philippines and the heads of the different executive
departments who are popularly known and called as Cabinet Members, are, in
effect, merely his advisers, hence, they are subject to his control and supervision.

Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are expressly
enumerated in the Constitution?

No. The President has residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It
is founded on the duty of the President as steward of the people (Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66811989]).

What is the so-called residual power of the President?

In the said case (Marcos v. Manglapus ibid.), the Supreme Court, through Justice
Irene R. Cortes, said that "it is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It may be viewed also as a power implicit in the President's
duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed (see Hyman, the American
President, where the author advanced the view that an allowance of discretionary
power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President).

Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, on the other hand, made this explanation: "Failing in
legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to
sympathy, compassion and even Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains
we have achieved during the past three years are, however, too valuable and
precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could
public peace, order, and safety be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own
country. Verily, in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential
prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily
exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines."
What is the executive power of the President?
It is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (Section 1 and 17, Article VII) The
President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Section 17, Article VII).
Is he still required to determine the validity of a law?
No, this being a question that should be properly resolved by the judicial department
of government. Hence, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts
on its validity. Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, it is not unlawful
for the President to perform his duty of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed.
THE THREE PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT HELP ONE
ANOTHER IN THE ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
Each Department is Given Certain Powers by which each may Restrain the others from
Exceeding their Constitutional Authority. Hence, A System of Checks and Balances Provides
an Equilibrium of Governmental Powers.

The following are actual examples:

FIRST: THE LAWS EMANATE FROM THE LEGISLATURE

The legislature enacts laws but these laws have to be presented to the executive
department for its approval. The latter may veto or disapprove the acts of the
legislative if in its judgment they are not in conformity with the Constitution or if
they will cause hardship to the people.

Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play yet. It is only called
upon to interfere and to exercise its authority when an action is brought to it for
decision, and only upon reaching this stage when the courts should apply, among
others, these basic rules, to wit:

1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to interpret it.
2. In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and the purpose of
the legislature. If that intent and purpose can be discovered within the law, it is
the duty of the court to carry out that intention. If that intent and purpose cannot
be found within the law, the court should resort to extrinsic aids.
3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended, right and justice to prevail.

When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determination, it is authorized
to determine the validity of the said legislative measures or executive acts.

SECOND: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY MODIFY OR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT

The executive department, through the pardoning power, may also modify or set
aside the judgment of the courts.

The executive department is not in any way interpreting or constructing the law in
its favor. It is a plain exercise of pardoning power, which is expressly granted by the
Constitution to the President.

THIRD: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY AMEND OR REVOKE THE DECISIONS

OF THE COURT

The legislature may amend or revoke decisions of the courts when in its judgment
the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general
policy of the State. It may do this by enacting a new law or by amending the old law,
THEREBY ATTAINING AN INTERPRETATION THAT WILL WIPE OUT THE DECISIONS OF
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

In this example, the legislature is not interpreting or constructing the law but attains
the interpretation it desires by enacting a new law or by amending the old law.
 U.S. v. HART, et al., 26 PHIL. 149
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that construction should be based upon
something more substantial than mere punctuation found in the printed act. Argument
based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the
punctuation when necessary, to give the act the effect intended by the legislature.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA No. 519. This
section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be considered as vagrants such as
those "found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of support."
 Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for "loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses" the first part of Section 1. The second part, it will be
noticed is worded as follows: "or tramping or straying through the country without visible
means of support."
It turned out, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had visible means
of support.
The Attorney General argued that "without visible means of support" as used in the
second part, does not apply to "every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops
or gambling houses," but only to tramping or straying through the country." It was
contended that if "without visible means of support" is intended for the first part, either the
comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the comma after country
would have been inserted.
HELD:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts
to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the
statute which will give it effect.
The construction should be based upon something more substantial that the mere
punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning
which is reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus
punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will
not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect
intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and
inserting others where necessary.
The accused-appellants were acquitted.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute.

An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being

construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, informative or nugatory.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in

harmony with the Constitution.

The spirit rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in
this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Extrinsic aids are any of the following:

Contemporaneous circumstances, policy, legislative history of the statute, contemporaneous

or practical construction, executive construction, legislative construction, judicial construction, and
construction by the bar and legal commentators.
U.S. Supreme Court
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)

Kilbourn v. Thompson

103 U.S. 168

Syllabus

1. for refusing to answer certain questions put to him as a witness by the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the United States concerning the business of a
real estate partnership of which he was a member, and to produce certain books and
papers in relation thereto, was, by an order of the House, imprisoned for forty-five
days in the common jail of the District of Columbia. He brought suit to recover
damages therefor against the sergeant-at-arms, who executed the order, and the
members of the committee, who caused him to be brought before the House, where
he was adjudged to be in contempt of its authority. Held, that, although the House
can punish its own members for disorderly conduct, or for failure to attend its
sessions, and can decide cases of contested elections and determine the
qualifications of its members, and exercise the sole power of impeachment of
officers of the government, and may, where the examination of witnesses is
necessary to the performance of these duties, fine or imprison a contumacious
witness -- there is not found in the Constitution of the United States any general
power vested in either House to punish for contempt.

2. An examination of the history of the English Parliament and the decisions of the
English courts shows that the power of the House of Commons, under the laws and
customs of Parliament to punish for contempt, rests upon principles peculiar to it,
and not upon any general rule applicable to all legislative bodies.

3. The Parliament of England, before its separation into two bodies, since known as
the House of Lords and the House of Commons, was a high court of judicature -- the
highest in the realm -- possessed of the general power incident to such a court of
punishing for contempt. On its separation, the power remained with each body,
because each was considered to be a court of judicature and exercised the functions
of such court.

A petition has been filed in the Supreme Court to question the legality of the
Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT). The main issue is whether
the admission test violates separation of powers.

Separation of powers dictates that government branches not interfere with the
other or others in their discharge of their functions. Whether or not the
regulation of law schools is within the sole power and prerogative of the
Supreme Court is an issue yet to be passed upon.

Another issue is academic freedom. The 1987 Philippine Constitution

states that, "Academic Freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions
of higher learning."

The institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college
to decide and adopt its aims and objectives, and to determine how these
objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or interference,
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The
essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompass the
freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2)
who may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be
admitted to study. (G.R. No. 183572)

Associate Justice Marvic Leonen asked Solicitor General Calida: “What is the
state’s interest in interfering with law schools’ decision on who they want to
take?”

Calida explained that the basis for PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of the bar
and bench as stated in Section 2 of RA 7662.

“The State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education,” Calida said
quoting Section 2 of the law.

Leonen noted that based on Calida's response the state-administered law

admission exam “may become unconstitutional“ as it interferes with
a function tasked to the SC — to improve the quality of the bar and the
bench.

The justice furthered: “Congress cannot tell the SC how it is going to admit
people to the Bar.”

He ordered Calida to expound on his justification in their memoranda.

Leonen, during his interpellation of the petitioners earlier on Tuesday, also

zeroed in how the centralized law admissions exam may infringe on
academic freedom

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional two Legal Education Board memorandums requiring
incoming law students to pass the Philippine Law School Admission Test (Philsat) or the uniform
entrance exam for law schools.

In a decision, the high court ruled as unconstitutional for being ultra vires
 1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying
admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to
admit, particularly:

A. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or
graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required
to pass PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines
and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as first year law student in the
basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor
unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start for the
basic law course;
B. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of PhiLSAT as prerequisite for
admission to law schools;

Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made permanent. The regular admission of students
who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of law schools in the exercise of
their academic freedom; and

C. Sections 15,16,and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and
classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation
of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:

A. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

B.Resolution No. 2014-02;

C. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
D. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
A. Resolution No. 2015-18
B. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
C. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.