Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946 (Supra.

FACTS: Alvero’s appeal of the decision of the lower court against him in a civil case of double
sale was dismissed because he failed to file the appeal bond.

Respondent Jose Victoriano purchased 2 parcels of land from Margarita Villarica in 120 equal
monthly installments for the aggregate sum of P6,000; the down payment was P1,700, and the
monthly payment was P76.86 on October 1, 1940. Victoriano took possession and paid the
installments until December 1941, when war broke out and he verbally agreed with Villarica on
February 1942 that the payments would be suspended until the war ended. Victoriano stayed in
the property until December 1944 when he had to evacuate.

However, Villarica sold the land to petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero on December 31, 1944 for
P100,000 in Japanese military notes. Alvero presented the deed to the Register of Deeds of
Manila on January 3, 1945 but was not able to secure a TCT. Alvero took possession in
December, 1944, but afterwards found
Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in February, 1945. Villarica offered to repurchase from Alvero
the property but he refused.

Hence, Victoriano filed a complaint against Alvero and Villarica in the CFI of Manila on June 26,
1945 alleging two causes of action, to wit, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale between
him and Villarica which land was subsequently sold Alvero and (2) to declare said subsequent
sale null and void.

On November 16, 1945, the CFI rendered his decision in favor of Victoriano, adjudging to him
the title over the property in question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and
dismissed the counterclaim of Alvero who demanded rental from him.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he
filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and of
said order the was notified on January 7, 1946. On January 8, 1946, Alvero filed his notice of
appeal and record on' appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60 appeal
bond.

On January 14, 1946, Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same time,
asked for the execution of the judgment. On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said
motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for
P60 had been actually filed, and alleged as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due
time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following
day.

On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal
of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed
in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said
order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration was
denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

On February 11, 1946, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for certiorari, alleging
(1) that said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2) that there has been no
excusable negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent
judge, in the instant case.

ISSUE: WON the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal

RULING: Alvero’s motion for reconsideration and new trial was pro forma and does not suspend
the period for
the perfection of the appeal
As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa,
was dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified on
November 28, 1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27,
1945, and denied on
January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was notified of said order on January 7, 1946;
and that he filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal the following day, to wit, January 8,
1946, and that the P60-appeal bond w as filed only on January 15, 1946.

According to the computation erroneously made by the trial court, the last day for filing and
perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, on which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero
should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the
P60-appeal bond was filed only
on January 15, 1946.

Alvero’s motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point out

specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment, which are not supported by the evidence
or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal
provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court.
Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to delay the
proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the
perfection of the appeal. (Valdez vs.

Jugo, 74 Phil., 49, and Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Bautista, 74 Phil., 235.) Hence, the
period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he
was notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and,
therefore, his notice of appeal
and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his
appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the
judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore
the jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs. Director of
Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of
Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34 Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 36 Phil.,
774.) The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and
filed may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the
expiration of the original period. (Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.) Rules of courts, promulgated
by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure
to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause
the dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39 Phil., 922.)

In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time
prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own
motion, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

FACTS: This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this
court on the ground that the main basis of the petition was the constitutionality of Section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409 which respondents assail as unconstitutional because it contravenes the
constitutional provision that the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade . . . " (Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution.)

Primicias was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses
namely,
(1) violation of Commonwealth Act No. 60 in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine
registry
to an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and
(2) violation of section 129 in
relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, in that he failed to submit to the
Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated documents for the vessel
"Antarctic" and failed to
obtain the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said
vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial, petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed
to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in the cases as authorized by
section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion. holding in effect that with the
promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines
previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court,
having been vested with the rule- making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of
Civil Procedure regarding assessors in
said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409
on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.
Hence the instant case.

Petitioner argues that the right to trial with the assistance of assessors is a substantive right
which cannot impaired by this court in the exercise of its rule-making power and that the
Revised Charter of Manila, RA 409, approved on June 18, 1949, wherein section 49 of said Act
states that the aid of assessors may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure, has reenacted said
provision on right to the assistance of assessors.

ISSUE:
"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being substantive right, cannot be impaired by this
court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila,
creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by
Rules of Court.

"IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the same provisions were
later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila, which is now the
source of the right to trial
with the aid of assessors and which refers to the Code of Civil Procedure merely to indicate the
procedure for appointing assessors.

HELD: We hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are
still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of section 49 of
Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal
cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The right to a trial by assessors is a substantive right which is not embraced by the rule-making
power of the Court. The right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must be
created and defined by express
enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or obtain redress
therefor.

"Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A substantive law creates,
defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or
instrumentalities for
the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of procedure are provisions prescribing the
method by which substantive rights may be enforced in courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 ed., p. 4.) In Bustos vs. Lucero, * (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp.,
pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with approval the following definitions of substantive law:
"Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J. 980.)
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S.
1026)."

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not
embraced by the rule making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section
154 this matter is referred to as a
right given by law to a party litigant. Section 2477 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is couched
in such a manner that a similar right is implied when invoked by a party litigant. It says that the
aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has
been declared absolute and substantial by this Court in several cases where the aid of
assessors had been invoked (Berbari vs. Concepcion, et al., 40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose
vs. Sison, 54 Phil., 344).

Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial by
assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by the Supreme
Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been a travesty of its rule-
making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is limited to matters referring to
pleading, practice and procedure.

There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are remedial. This is
true; but it is likewise true that because said remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with
the substantive
part, it must have been deemed wise and proper to leave them as they were for reasons of
coordination and expediency, it being a truism that the one cannot be detached from the other
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Remedial measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended to the
portion of the law to which they belong.

Reference Statutes
Granting arguendo that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure and even in
the old Charter of Manila are purely remedial in nature and because of the failure to incorporate
them in the Rules of Court they are deemed to have been impliedly repealed as claimed by
respondents, we are of the opinion that they can still he invoked by a litigant upon the theory
that they had been reaffirmed
and reenacted by Republic Act No. 409, which was approved in 1949, or nine years after the
Rules of Court became effective. The mention made of the Code of Civil Procedure in said
section indicates in itself a re-enactment or incorporation by reference of the provisions
concerning assessors contained in said law. Congress, whose members were mostly lawyers,
must be presumed to know that at the time said Act was approved the Rules of Court had
already been promulgated without incorporating therein the provisions concerning the aid to
assessors, and fully cognizant of this situation, and not desiring to omit this right granted to a
litigant, they must have deemed it wise and proper to re-enact them by reference in said section
49. This Congress can do, for, while our Constitution has given the power to
adopt rules of procedure to the Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from
enacting any procedural law or altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may
be promulgated by the Supreme Court (Section 13, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).
The practice of making such reference has long been sanctioned.

Our Congress did this not only in

connection with courts in the City of Manila. It also did it in connection with courts in Quezon
City (Republic Act No. 537). Statutes which refer to other statutes and make them applicable to
the subject for legislation are called "reference statutes". These statutes are frequently used "to
avoid encumbering the statute books by unnecessary repetition, and they have frequently been
recognized as an approved method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions."
[50 Am. Jur. 57; Gruen vs. Tax
Commission, 211 P. (2d) (1949) 651, 666.]
Again, it has been held that "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much
as a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is true of a
legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." (50 Am. Jur. 58.) The
reference in Republic Act No. 409 to the provisions on assessors must be deemed, therefore, to
have incorporated therein the
pertinent provisions on the matter contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in much the same
manner as if the whole provisions had been reproduced. Consistent with this theory, we cannot
but hold that the observations made by respondents to the effect that the reference made to
said provisions in section 49 is a mere surplusage, or was due to a mere oversight, has no legal
basis, as such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing lack of foresight, if not brazen
negligence, to our legislative body.
Constitutionality It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention cannot be
entertained: firstly, because it is raised for the first time in this instance, a procedural defect
which would bar any further discussion on the matter following well-known precedents and,
secondly, because it is not correct that at present only in Manila
trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked.
The contention of respondents - we reckon - is predicated on the assumption that the provisions
on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed.

Such is not the case. We have

already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of the nature of substantive
law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court. The corollary to this conclusion is
that this remedy may be invoked out only in Manila but in all other places where it existed prior
to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With regard to criminal
cases, we have seen that they are allowed by Act No. 2369; and we have already said that the
same remedy may be invoked in the cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that
their charters make express reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the code
of Civil Procedure. With this historical background, the claim that under the theory we have
entertained the trial with the aid of assessors can only be invoked in the City of Manila is
certainly without merit.

Sec. 2. In what courts applicable

These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.
Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable
These Rules shall not apply to:
x Election cases
x Land registration
x Cadastral
x Naturalization and insolvency proceedings
x Other cases not herein provided for
EXCEPT by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.

GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents, 20 employees of the GSIS main
office, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees
and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The respondents wore red shirts when they attended a public
hearing on 27 May 2005 in support for Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, union officers who
were facing separate administrative charges.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven
(7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus
the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser
offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to
reprimand. The CSC ruled that there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead, the CSC found that the respondent’s
assembly was an exercise of their
freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.[7] The CA
upheld the CSC ruling that Garcia “failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Petitioners
are aware at the outset that the only
apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario
Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS
administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.

Hence the instant case. Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to
respondents’ letters of explanation in
response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never filed their
answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the
allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.— Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are
deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.

According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1,
Section 4 of
the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. – These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(underscoring supplied)
ISSUE:
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE
PROVISIONS OF THE RULES
OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO
FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DID NOT FILE ANY
RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.

RULING:
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners’ own rules, Rule XI,
Section 4 of the GSIS’ Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically
provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal
Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his
right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render
judgment, as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution. A perusal of said section
readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver
of “his right to file an answer.” There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are
deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges
with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a
“suppletory character.” Suppletory is defined as “supplying deficiencies.” It means that the
provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the
applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in
case of failure to file the required
answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may “render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.”

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case,
petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the
failure to deny the same.

Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in
the complaint.[11] Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all
averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and
that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that
even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who
have the burden of proving,
with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was resolved
against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents’ evidence, but on the weakness of
that of the
petitioners.

Reyes v. Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010

FACTS: On 26 September 1995, petitioner Renato Reyes (petitioner) filed before the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, PARAD of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint
for ejectment against respondent Leopoldo Barrios (respondent).

The property was co-owned by petitioner and his four sisters.7 Petitioner claimed that the
property
became subject of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27),
except the 3.6‒hectare landholding which was allegedly retained. In his Memorandum8 dated
18 September 2007, petitioner averred that he and his sister Leticia V. Reyes are the co-owners
of the landholding. Petitioner hired respondent as the overseer of the farm and piggery on the
landholding. However, petitioner contended that respondent never remitted the proceeds from
the piggery business and the fruits from the landholdingOn the other hand, respondent alleged
that he was a tenant of the landholding since 1972 and he even built his house on the subject
landholding. Respondent also acted as the caretaker of the piggery business on the
landholding. Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, respondent stated that petitioner’s wife took all
the proceeds from the piggery business, which later ceased operation due to an epidemic.

When respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearings, petitioner moved to submit
the case for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Respondent alleged that his
failure to attend the scheduled hearings was because he received the Notice for the 29
February 1996 hearing only on 6 March 1996. Respondent moved for the postponement of the
hearing because he was bedridden due to
hypertension and heart ailment.10 However, the PARAD again heard the case ex-parte on 28
March 1996, of which respondent alleged that he was still not notified.

On 31 October 1996, the PARAD rendered a decision declaring that herein plaintiff [Renato
Reyes] is entitled to recover the possession of the property. Respondent appealed to the
DARAB. Meanwhile, respondent passed away on 13 February 1997 and was substituted by his
spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.

On 29 June 1998, the DARAB reversed the PARAD decision and held that respondent is a bona
fide tenant of the landholding and that he cannot be ejected from the landholding absent any
justifiable cause.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking for the reversal of the DARAB decision and
the reinstatement of the PARAD decision. Respondent, substituted by his spouse Lucia
Manalus-Barrios, also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, asking for the modification of
the decision by declaring respondent as a beneficiary under PD 27 and to issue an
Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s
surviving spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.

In its 7 December 2004 Resolution, the DARAB denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit and granted respondent’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and granted
Barrios motion for the issuance of an Emancipation Patent.

Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration, which the DARAB denied in its Resolution
dated 5 May 2005.16 Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the
petition for review in its 8 February 2006 Decision. The Court of Appeals likewise denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its 29 May 2006 Resolution. The CA held “But the
petitioner insists that public respondent decided the case at bench against him in defiance of the
evidence on record. We do not agree. The DARAB based its findings on the certification dated
December 7, 1982 of then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (now Department of Agrarian Reform) of Sta. Ana, Pampanga finding
Leopoldo Barrios as legitimate farmer-beneficiary and on the joint statement dated March 5,
1989 of residents of neighboring lots who attested to respondent-appellant’s cultivation and
occupation of the subject lot. It
bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, as in the case at bench, the quantum of
evidence required to sustain a judgment is only substantial evidence. It is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine differently. Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally
accorded respect, and even finality, by the appellate tribunal, if supported by substantial
evidence.”

ISSUES:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS BY RULING IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX “A”)
THAT THE DARAB WAS CORRECT IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST HIM AS THIS IS
SUPPORTED BY THE CERTIFICATIONS
ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF
THE AGRARIAN REFORM TEAM OF ARAYAT-STA. ANA-CANDABA, PAMPANGA DENIED
PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT NOT ONLY
ARE THE EVIDENCE OF BARRIOS
IRRELEVANT BUT THEY [ARE] ALSO MERE MACHINE COPIES WHICH WERE NEVER
PRESENTED IN A PROPER HEARING WHERE THE PETITIONER CAN SCRUTINIZE THEM
AND CROSS-EXAMINE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ON THEM.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS LEGAL ERROR AND/OR GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY
FAILING TO CORRECT THE DARAB IN
NOT RECOGNIZING PETITIONER’S RIGHT OVER HIS RETAINED AREA WHICH HAD
ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AWARD IN CLAIM 83-144 OF LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

HELD: Partially granted

Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 3, Rule I of
the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure26), the Board and its Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence:
SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in
the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice
and equity.
x x x
c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless
adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed
and followed in all instances.
Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the
2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure27) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding
the admission and sufficiency of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall
be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the
technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of
evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Thus, in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court held:

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of
Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and
subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that ‘Rules of Court shall
not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states
that ‘In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be
allowed and are admissible in evidence.’
Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian
reform and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of
agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.
Although we affirm the ruling of the DARAB that respondent is a bona fide tenant, we disagree
with its order for the issuance of an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s heir. Thus,
there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. As
regards respondent, the
records are bereft of evidence indicating that this procedure has been followed. It was improper
for the DARAB to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent without
the required supporting documents and without following the requisite procedure before an
Emancipation Patent may be validly issued. Moreover, there was no sufficient evidence to prove
that respondent has fully paid the value of the subject landholding.
Sec. 3. Cases governed
These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings.
Kinds of Actions in the Rules of Court
x Civil Action – is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules of ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action.
x Criminal Action – is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission
punishable by
law.
x Special Proceedings – is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact.