Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Civil Atty.

Tranquil Salvador
Procedure) Roco, B2015 III

I. FILING FEES
Rule 141, Sections 1, 2 , 3, 4, 7, 8 and 19

1. Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation V. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10,
2009
DOCTRINE:
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down
guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of szamorazamoraaid fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court ,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.

No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in
Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its
title to and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.

Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession
of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in
their complaint the value of the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for
nonpayment of the correct docket fees.

In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or
the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated
value of the same.

The Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title
to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must
be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals,
therefore, did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.

2. Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 176339, January 10, 2011
DOCTRINE:
What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the
1
Remedial Law Review Doctrines (Civil Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Procedure) Roco, B2015 III
payment of the filing

2
fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did
not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the
Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the
additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet
pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the
rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make
special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

3. Philippine First Insurance v. First Logistics, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a pleading which
does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court
acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Pyramid, on the other hand, insists on the application of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion and
subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee.

In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, the Court clarified the effect of the Sun Insurance ruling
on the Manchester ruling as follows:

As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the
Manchester ruling] that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has
not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent “amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended pleading,” the trial court now being authorized to allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or
reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of claims not
specified in the pleading — i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading — as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the “sum claimed,” on
the one hand, or the “value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate,” on the other.

Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the
basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or
similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case.”

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for
money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is
that the pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts
are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit
amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime
become time- barred.
 The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are
insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and
the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in
and consequently barred the right of action.

Indeed, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for “specific performance and damages” even if it was, as the allegations
in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of
which it, by its own admission, “knew.” And, indeed, it failed to specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of
its claims/damages.

As the salient allegations of Pyramid’s complaint show and as priorly stated, they constitute, in the main, an action for
collection of its claims it admittedly “knew.” Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which
are yet to be determined by the trial court, the rule established in Manchester which was embodied in this Court’s
Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still applies.

While it is true that the determination of certain damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the
parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

4. Benjamin Bautista v. Shirley Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008

DOCTRINE:
Their failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees was due to a justifiable reason.

The right to appeal is a purely statutory right. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, the right to appeal may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the rules provided therefor. For this reason, payment of the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona, the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above
rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the
interest of justice. It is always within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case
from their operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.

As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios, the Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid less than the correct
amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he was required to pay by the clerk of court , and he
promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because “(e)very citizen has the right to assume and trust
that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law. To
penalize such citizen for relying upon said officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice.”

5. Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 706 SCRA 698 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay
for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges
such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety. Rather, what
petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of
financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the
forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner’ request.
The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire P540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation, when that figure
was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the
MeTC. Granting petitioner’s request would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly
intends to pay in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.

Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. In criminal actions, these
pleadings refer to the information filed in court.

In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the MeTC. And
each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one covers. Under
the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the forty (40) counts is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different
informations, as each count represents an independent violation of BP Blg. 22.

That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed in the OCP is
irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that were filed before the
MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.

Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases
involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not transform the filing fees due for each
case consolidated into one indivisible fee.

6. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/

DOCKET FEES, [ A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010 ]
DOCTRINE:
The subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees and court fees. Section 22 of
Rule 141 reads:

Sec. 22. Government exempt. — The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local government units and government-
owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying
such fees.

Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets,
expressly states that the NPC “shall remain as a national government-owned and -controlled corporation.”

Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.

The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re:
Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal
Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the
power to promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive.

With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke Republic Act No.
6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis for exemption from the payment of
legal fees.

7. Unicapital v. Consing, 705 SCRA 511 (2013)

DOCTRINE:
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his complaint. It has long
been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that
the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation
v. CA should be
applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the
government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.

As pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period , more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.

8. Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
FILING FEES ARE INCLUSIVE OF INTEREST, DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND COSTS
The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration “the total sum claimed,
inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of
the property in litigation.”

APPLICATION OF EXCHANGE RATE

Respecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he applied the exchange rate of US
$1 = P43.00 “[i]n the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to
follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct,” the same does not lie.

The presumption of regularity of the clerk of court’s application of the exchange rate is not conclusive. It is
disputable. As such, the presumption may be overturned by the requisite rebutting evidence. In the case at bar,
petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed
on September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21. In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.

MERELY RELIED ON ASSESSMENT MADE BY CLERK OF COURT

The ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the
former there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in
the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be
incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must
pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

INTEREST ACCRUING UNTIL FILING OF COMPLAINT

Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for “accrued interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully
paid.” The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondent’s claim includes the interest from August
16, 1998 until such date of filing.

Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until
the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands,
respondent cannot claim the interest from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed
by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners
owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.

INTEREST ACCRUING AFTER FILING THE COMPLAINT

With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be determined after a final
judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding docket fee therefor .
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be
made to pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to
interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.

In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of claims
not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

9. Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying Filing and Docket
Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance. The legal
aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to
adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free
access to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and
access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.

10. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption form legal and filing fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
DOCTRINE:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are
working for indigent and underprivileged people . The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free
access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court on indigent litigants indicate that only a
natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical
person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring
civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.

Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.

Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people
may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and
entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation
requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

II. JURISDICTION

Batas Pambansa Bilang

129 Republic Act 7691
1991 Rules on Summary Procedure as
amended Rules on Small Claims
1. Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004
DOCTRINE:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children . Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place
to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This
lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.

In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy
“to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children” under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

2. Bernabe L. Navida, et al. v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon et al., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011
DOCTRINE:
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the
enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”

Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 0994, states: “2. The exclusion of the term “damages of
whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”

It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints
is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants . The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the
cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the
purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint•Complaints narrate that the defendants were at fault or were
negligent in that they manufactured, produced, sold, and/or used DBCP and/or otherwise, put the same into the stream
of commerce, without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or health and/or without
instructions on its proper use and application.

As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or
omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the
stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health
and/or without instructions on its proper use and application. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the
cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi•delict, which under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is defined as an act, or
omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.

JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi•delict which is the
basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately
P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of
the RTCs.

Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their
exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were
residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended
Joint•Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines .

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting
in their becoming part of the stream of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. The cases are not
criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and
venue for trial of cases.

In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced
and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non•resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

CONVENIENT FORUM
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are
available only in the Philippines:

1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for
damages
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co•workers, family
members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they
are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo . All the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and
his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.

Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court or body’s jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is authority to decide a case, not the orders or
the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an
exercise of such jurisdiction.

Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does
not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of
the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.

3. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Corazon M. Villegas, G.R. No. 180384, March 26, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a province has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation in that province .

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 (1996) the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases:

(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners; and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.

By “special” jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over and above the ordinary
jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their
regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts.
R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the single sala courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC,
Branch
63 of Bayawan City as Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just because
the lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.

Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it
has jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just compensation involving agricultural lands within that province,
regardless of whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.

4. Celia S. Vda. De Herrera v. Emelita Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 170251, June 01, 2011.
DOCTRINE:
The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a
means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and
members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.

Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory

functions: Section 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and

functions:
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which
are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute . Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options
in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit:

(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if
such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved,
the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action.

In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.

In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents’ complaint. The present
case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for , irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.
Respondents’ cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property ,
which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction of which is
vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.

Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered,
are null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of
any right or create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Havi ng no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in
the position they were before the
proceedings.

QUESTION OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY TIME

Respondents’ allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent
of the parties.

In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier , it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages
of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on
the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application of
estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the
case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment
is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

5. Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to
this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the right court.

What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its
Judgment for Dissolution.” Herald’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but
of the post-divorce agreement on child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s “retained
jurisdiction.”
While the trial court had jurisdiction, the agreement cannot be enforced because it is void for being contrary to law
(daughter was below 7 years old and, by law, she must stay with the mother). Also, the agreement was repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody.

6. Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12, 2006

DOCTRINE:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees
cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of
supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the
handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to the
government in general and to the judiciary in particular.

Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation?

Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts have
sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.”

In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus:

(a) Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.

(b) If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money , the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim.
(c) However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought , the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real
estate and chattel mortgages for want of consideration . In Bumayog v. Tumas, this Court ruled that where the issue
involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation . In the more recent case of
Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing Bumayog, held that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog and
Russell. Hence, petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the
clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN4045.

7. Arriola v. Nabor Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008

DOCTRINE:
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz.:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the mandatory requirements for initiating an indirect contempt
proceeding are:

(a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition; and

(b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions.

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent . The latter did
not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71.

He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did
not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification
against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed
outright by the RTC.

8. Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manza, G.R. No. 163602, September 07, 2011
DOCTRINE:
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed of
where “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.” It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is
never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies. The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

The petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief inconsistent with the
nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer. They contend that whatever
maybe questionable in the decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal — or in certain cases, as ground for
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 — and not as ground for its annulment.

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter is conferred by law.

A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who
has the right of possession , but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title
of ownership. We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue
of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the
ownership of the property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.

In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of simply
dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it ordered the
respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own
interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain
period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case
where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical possession of the property .
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction .

As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision
rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no jurisdiction; that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have
the authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in Ybañez v. Court of Appeals:

Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners’ appeal from the adverse decision of the
MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate jurisdiction as
mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it
has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.

The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners’ appeal .

9. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, VS. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. When the place of departure and
the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
said carriage is deemed an “international carriage.” The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the
signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.

In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was
Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of
the petitioner is deemed to be an “international carriage” within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER GOVERNED MY WARSAW CONVENTION

Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before —

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with
London as its principal place of business . Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may
bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented
by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome , Italy. Consequently, under the third
jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy , which is properly designated given the
routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the
courts of Rome, Italy.

We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the
petitioner.

TORTIOUS CONDUCT WITHIN PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international
carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION
The special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the
trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence
disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that
could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person.

10. Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 702 SCRA 721 (2013)

DOCTRINE:
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB. It is not
enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the
parties.

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an AGRARIAN DISPUTE as “any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements ,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements” and includes “ any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator
and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to
wit:

(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their complaint that a
tenancy relationship exists between them and respondent.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for , irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover,
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially
where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.

Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the
DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to
resolve the dispute raised by petitioners.
11. Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, 705 SCRA 613 (2013) (HIERARCHY OF COURTS)
DOCTRINE:
Under the PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing
the overcrowding of its docket.

Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in
certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as:

(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct
handling of the case.

This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this Court
take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been dragging on
for more than twenty (20) years . Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment promulgated
by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.

III. CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)

1. Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix Assurance, G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009

DOCTRINE:
The complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a
cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and
stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce .

Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a
party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a
cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the
present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of
service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del
Monte Produce.

Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the
allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from
quasi-delict.

2. Dolores Macaslang v. Renato Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
DOCTRINE:
The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed that there was no
demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed. We agree with the CA.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:

(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination
of the latter’s right of possession;
 (c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment;
and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not , only the facts alleged in the complaint are
considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged
and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of
applying the test.

Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred
that the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded
that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the
property despite the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999, which
was well within a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later.

FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION V. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure
to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the pleading.

Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:

Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in
the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading , while the remedy in the second is to demur to the
evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would
consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or,
at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action ,
namely:

(1) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(2) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a
cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of
action.

Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss , but
lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the
stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.

3. Philip Turner, et al. v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010
DOCTRINE:
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause
of action are:

(a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and
 (c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or
damage
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last element,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

In order to give rise to any obligation to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners should first make a valid
demand that the respondent refused to pay despite having unrestricted retained earnings. Otherwise, the
respondent could not be said to be guilty of any actionable omission that could sustain their action to collect .

Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the complaint cure the
lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners’ right of action could only spring from an existing cause
of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action.
For, only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative.
Verily, a premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without a cause of action and
dismissible on such ground. In short, Civil Case No. 01-086, being a groundless suit, should be dismissed.

Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than sufficient to cover the petitioners’
claims on June 26, 2002 did not rectify the absence of the cause of action at the time of the commencement of Civil Case
No. 01-086. The motion for partial summary judgment, being a mere application for relief other than by a pleading, was
not the same as the complaint in Civil Case No. 01-086.

4. Chua v. Metrobank, et al., G. R. No.182311, August 19, 2009

DOCTRINE:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, attached to
their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-
0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping,
since the two cases do not have the same ultimate objective —

(1) Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of the 8 November 2001 public auction and certificate of sale
issued therein; while
(2) Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the award of actual and compensatory damages for respondents’
tortuous act of making it appear that an auction sale actually took place on 8 November 2001.

Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with
different prayers. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting of a single cause of action:

Section 3. A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others.
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a
cause of action. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant
in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can violate various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However,
where there is only one delict or wrong , there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that
may have been violated belonging to one person.

Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 was solely concerned with the nullification
of the auction sale and certification of sale, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 was a totally separate claim for damages.
Yet, a review of the records reveals that petitioners also included an explicit claim for damages in their Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, to wit:

20-A. The abovementioned acts of [herein respondents] Metrobank and Atty. Celestra are in gross
violation of the injunction made under Article 19 of the Civil Code, thereby entitling the [herein
petitioners] to recover damages from the said [respondents] in such amount as may be awarded by the
Court.

The Court observes that the damages being claimed by petitioners in their Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402
were also occasioned by the supposedly fictitious 8 November 2001 foreclosure sale. There is no question that the
claims of petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the
same cause of action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful conduct of respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the
subject properties.

5. Catalina Chu, et al. v. Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of
action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire
claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.

The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was
sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose
primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res judicata.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the former judgment must be final;

(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions
a. identity of parties,
b. identity of the subject matter, and
c. identity of cause of action.
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity.

As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage.

Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one
and the same cause of action — the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936, the
only difference between them being that the petitioners alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was “not also a
purchaser for value and in good faith.”

In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis-à-vis the five lots were all defined and governed by the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was single and indivisible, as far as they
were concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251,
despite the silence of the compromise agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one
action where the contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and
damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single cause of action the
basis of several suits.

6. NM Rothschild & Sons (AUSTRALIA) Limited, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, G.R. No.
175799, November 28, 2011
DOCTRINE:
As previously stated, petitioner seeks the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-782 on the following grounds: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) failure of the
Complaint to state a cause of action and absence of a cause of action; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d)
respondent did not come to court with clean hands.

ABSENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION V. FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION

As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the alleged ABSENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION (as
opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the argument that
respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as
enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related
to the validity and/or existence of respondent’s alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out
during the trial.

As regards the allegation of FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, while the same is usually available as a ground
in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits
of the main case.

It is basic that “[a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.” Its elements are the
following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right,
and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.

We have held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.

The trial court held that the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three elements of a cause of action, i.e., it
alleges that:
(1) plaintiff has the right to ask for the declaration of nullity of the Hedging Contracts for being null and void and
contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
 (2) defendant has the corresponding obligation not to enforce the Hedging Contracts because they are in the
nature of wagering or gambling agreements and therefore the transactions implementing those contracts are null
and void under Philippine laws; and
(3) defendant ignored the advice and intends to enforce the Hedging Contracts by demanding financial
payments due therefrom.

The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the
ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of
exceptions. Thus, in Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held:

The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the
complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the
failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to
such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud ; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or
conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of
which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter;
nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor
to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document
referred to; and, nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.

A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted
to the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and
jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to
examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the
demurrer to the complaint.

In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article
2018 of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries
of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of
the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.

Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore cannot be
hypothetically admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to be nullified, as well as a copy of
the contract itself, are incorporated in the Complaint. The determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a
cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under
Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined in Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioner’s
defense against the charge of nullity of the Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties that actual deliveries
of gold be made pursuant thereto. Such a defense requires the presentation of evidence on the merits of the case. An
issue that “requires the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the
main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere Motion to Dismiss.” The trial court, therefore,
correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.

7. Pua v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 180064, Sep. 16 2013 (SEC JURISDICTION)
DOCTRINE:
Records show that Pua’s complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money
with damages, which stemmed from Citibank’s alleged sale of unregistered securities, in violation of the various
provisions of the SRC.

Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of the SRC pertain to civil suits involving violations of the same law. Among
these, the applicable provisions to this case are Sections 57.1 and 63.1 of the SRC which provide:
 SEC. 57. Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection With Prospectus, Communications and Reports. – 57.1.
Any person who: (a) Offers to sell or sells a security in violation of Chapter III;
Or
(b) Offers to sell or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of this Code, by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication, by means of a prospectus or other written
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall fail in the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may
sue to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.

SEC. 63. Amount of Damages to be Awarded. – 63.1. All suits to recover damages pursuant to Sections
56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 shall be brought before the Regional Trial Court which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide such suits. The Court is hereby authorized to award damages in an
amount not exceeding triple the amount of the transaction plus actual damages.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to civil liabilities arising
from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as other civil suits under Sections 56,
58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before the regional trial courts . It is a well-settled rule in
statutory construction that the term “shall” is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision
of similar import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal cases
arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.

Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first filed before the SEC, unlike
criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.

IV. PARTIES (RULE 3)

1. Philip Go, et al. v. Distinction Properties Development, G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012
DOCTRINE:
As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot prosper for failure to implead the
proper party, PHCC.

An INDISPENSABLE PARTY is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In the recent case of
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin (NLMKOLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, the Court had
the occasion to state that:

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, ‘parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.’ If there is afailure to implead an
indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is precisely ‘when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.’ The purpose of the rules on joinder
of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties
themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid
on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.
Similarly, in the case of Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a final decree would necessarily affect the
rights of indispensable parties so that the Court could not proceed without their presence . In support thereof, the
Court in Plasabas cited the following authorities, thus:

When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The burden of
procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff. The evident purpose of the rule
is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to
include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so
that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.

From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as a plaintiff or as a
defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and adversely affected by any
determination therein. To belabor the point, the causes of action, or the acts complained of, were the acts of PHCC as a
corporate body. Note that in the judgment rendered by the HLURB, the dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI was
ordered
(1) to pay P998,190.70, plus interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and turnover the administration
office to PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC P1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the deep well, with interests and
surcharges. Also, the HLURB declared as illegal the agreement regarding the conversion of the 22 storage units and Units
GF4-A and BAS, to which agreement PHCC was a party.

Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot exercise the same except through a
derivative suit. In the complaint, however, there was no allegation that the action was a derivative suit. In fact, in the
petition, petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative suit. In the cited case of Chua v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled:

For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of
the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf
of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit.
It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the
corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The
judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the
benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same
cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of
action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.

Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURB’s judgment. The CA was, thus, correct in
ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead an indispensable party.

2. Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate, G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody
of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and
which would be affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner .

The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are
indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable party is
defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.

In the fairly recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development the Court had the occasion to reiterate the

principle that: It is “precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be
dismissed.’ The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present .” The purpose of the
rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between
the
 parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A
decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case that:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the
exercise of judicial power. For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record
that there are other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation , who are not made
parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either
plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person interested in
sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be dismissed. When an indispensable party is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed.

The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.

In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely
affected by petitioner’s petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioner’s service
records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner’s service is
extended by ten years, the government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits
that would have to be given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which
may be affected by the change should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an
adversary system of justice.

As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the decision
of the trial court granting petitioner’s prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is void. As
mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

NO ESTOPPEL
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as
government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner’s
petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on
the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the
government, be considered in estoppel due to the petitioner’s seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC
when it initially made corrections to some of petitioner’s records with the PNP.

This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling
significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is
the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and
the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.

3. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 05, 2011
DOCTRINE:
HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA, i.e., Julio
Suniga, Windsor Andaya, and Rene Galang, who filed the revocatory petitions before the DAR. As HLI would have it,
Galang, the self-styled head of AMBALA, gained HLI employment in June 1990 and, thus, could not have been a party to
the SDOA executed a year earlier. As regards the Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that supervisors are not regular
farmworkers, but the company nonetheless considered them FWBs under the SDOA as a mere concession to enable them
to enjoy the same benefits given qualified regular farmworkers. However, if the SDOA would be canceled and land
distribution effected, so HLI claims, citing Fortich v. Corona, the supervisors would be excluded from receiving lands as
farmworkers other than the regular farmworkers who are merely entitled to the “fruits of the land.”
The SDOA no less identifies “the SDP qualified beneficiaries” as “the farmworkers who appear in the annual
payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees , who are regularly or periodically employed by [HLI].”
Galang, per HLI’s own admission, is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes
within the definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court , meaning, one who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly employed by HLI and
whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP,
Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment
recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply with RA 6657.

Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in the category of
“other farmworkers” mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only entitled to a share of the fruits of the
land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not detract from the fact that they are still identified as being among the
“SDP qualified beneficiaries.” As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP .

Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to represent themselves, their
fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR. Specifically:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—

Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their
organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, that when there are two or more
representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves
to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings.

Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real parties-in-interest
allowed by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC. This is not necessarily to say, however, that Galang represents
AMBALA, for as records show and as HLI aptly noted, his “petisyon” filed with DAR did not carry the usual
authorization of the individuals in whose behalf it was supposed to have been instituted. To date, such authorization
document, which would logically include a list of the names of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part of
the records.

4. Metrobank v. Rural Bank of Gerona, G.R. No. 159097, July 05, 2010
DOCTRINE:
A basic first step in resolving this case is to determine who the liable parties are on the IBRD loans that the Central
Bank extended. The Terms and Conditions of the IBRD 4th Rural Credit Project (Project Terms and Conditions) executed
by the Central Bank and the RBG shows that the farmers-borrowers to whom credits have been extended, are
primarily liable for the payment of the borrowed amounts. The loans were extended through the RBG which also took
care of the collection and of the remittance of the collection to the Central Bank. RBG, however, was not a mere conduit
and collector. While the farmers-borrowers were the principal debtors, RBG assumed liability under the Project
Terms and Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors to fulfill the obligation.

Based on these arrangements, the Central Bank’s immediate recourse, therefore should have been against the
farmers- borrowers and the RBG; thus, it erred when it deducted the amounts covered by the debit advices from
Metrobank’s demand deposit account. Under the Project Terms and Conditions, Metrobank had no responsibility over
the proceeds of the IBRD loans other than serving as a conduit for their transfer from the Central Bank to the
RBG once credit advice has been issued.

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that the agreement governed only the parties involved — the Central Bank
and the RBG. Metrobank was simply an outsider to the agreement.
Our disagreement with the CA is in its conclusion that no legal subrogation took place ; the present case, in fact,
exemplifies the circumstance contemplated under paragraph 2, of Article 1302 of the Civil Code which provides:
 Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:

(1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor’s knowledge;
(2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of
the debtor;
(3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter’s share.

As discussed, Metrobank was a third party to the Central Bank-RBG agreement, had no interest except as a
conduit, and was not legally answerable for the IBRD loans. Despite this, it was Metrobank’s demand deposit
account, instead of RBG’s, which the Central Bank proceeded against, on the assumption perhaps that this was the
most convenient means of recovering the cancelled loans. That Metrobank’s payment was involuntarily made does
not change the reality that it was Metrobank which effectively answered for RBG’s obligations.

Was there express or tacit approval by RBG of the payment enforced against Metrobank? After Metrobank received the
Central Bank’s debit advices in November 1978, it (Metrobank) accordingly debited the amounts it could from
RBG’s special savings account without any objection from RBG. RBG’s President and Manager, Dr. Aquiles Abellar,
even wrote Metrobank, on August 14, 1979, with proposals regarding possible means of settling the amounts debited by
Central Bank from Metrobank’s demand deposit account. These instances are all indicative of RBG’s approval of
Metrobank’s payment of the IBRD loans. That RBG’s tacit approval came after payment had been made does not
completely negate the legal subrogation that had taken place.

Article 1303 of the Civil Code states that subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the credit with all the rights
thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or against third persons. As the entity against which the collection was
enforced, Metrobank was subrogated to the rights of Central Bank and has a cause of action to recover from RBG
the amounts it paid to the Central Bank , plus 14% per annum interest.

Under this situation, impleading the Central Bank as a party is completely unnecessary. We note that the CA
erroneously believed that the Central Bank’s presence is necessary “in order x x x to shed light on the matter of reversals
made by it concerning the loan applications of the end users and to have a complete determination or settlement of the
claim.” In so far as Metrobank is concerned, however, the Central Bank’s presence and the reasons for its reversals of
the IBRD loans are immaterial after subrogation has taken place.

5. Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, 706 SCRA 580 (2013)

DOCTRINE:
We agree with the trial court that respondents are “privies” to Maria Laquindanum. By the term “ PRIVIES” is meant those
between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action. This Court, in
Correa v. Pascual, had occasion to explain that “privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee,
donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their respective
assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one , it has been said, who
derives his title to the property in question by purchase ; one who takes by conveyance.”

In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same position as their
predecessor in whose shoes they now stand . As such successors, respondents’ situation is analogous to that of a
transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, reiterating Fetalino
v. Sanz where this Court held:

As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is
bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a
proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment
against his predecessor.
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely
succeeded Maria.

6. Cagato v. Almonte, 707 SCRA 172 (2013)

DOCTRINE:
From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the title of Carlos over the land in
question. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that “a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” An attack on the
validity of the title is considered to be a collateral attack when, in an action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the said action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.

Cagatao’s original complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the
Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the Fernandez Siblings and Spouses
Fernandez, and the earlier one between the latter and Almonte and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao
mention that he sought to invalidate TCT No. 12159-A. It was only during the course of the proceedings , when
Spouses Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought of questioning
the validity of TCT No. 12159-A.

Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the existence of a valid
Torrens title in the name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged before the proper courts has made irrelevant
the issue of whether Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest should have retained ownership over the property .
This is pursuant to the principle that a Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct
proceeding. Hence, a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless it is
nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have been impleaded as
an INDISPENSABLE PARTY. It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in his action for the
annulment of TCT No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger and strangers to a case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the court.

It would be the height of injustice to entertain an action for the annulment of Carlos’ title without giving her the
opportunity to present evidence to support her claim of ownership through title . In addition, it is without question a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and Spouses Fernandez, he should
institute a direct action before the proper courts for the cancellation or modification of the titles in the name of the
latter two. He cannot do so now because it is tantamount to a collateral attack on Carlos’ title, which is expressly
prohibited by law and jurisprudence.

7. Legaspi Towers 300 v. Amelia Muer, et al., G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The Court notes that in the Amended Complaint, PETITIONERS as plaintiffs stated that they are the incumbent
reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., and that defendants, herein RESPONDENTS, are the newly-
elected members of the Board of Directors; while in the Second Amended Complaint, the PLAINTIFF is Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc., represented by petitioners as the allegedly incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi
Towers 300, Inc.

The Second Amended Complaint states who the plaintiffs are, thus:

That the plaintiffs are: LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., non-stock corporation xxx duly represented by the
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., namely: ELIADORA FE BOTE
VERA xxx, as President; BRUNO C. HAMAN xxx, as Director; LILY MARQUINEZ PALANCA xxx,
as
 Secretary; ROSANNA DAVID IMAI xxx, as Treasurer; and members of the Board of Directors, namely:
ELIZABETH GUERRERO xxx, GLORIA DOMINGO xxx, and RAY VINCENT.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Second Amended Complaint is meant to be a derivative suit filed by
petitioners in behalf of the corporation .

INDIVIDUAL SUIT V. CLASS SUIT V. DERIVATIVE SUIT

Cua, Jr. v. Tan differentiates a derivative suit and an individual/class suit as follows:

A derivative suit must be differentiated from individual and representative or class suits, thus:

Suits by stockholders or members of a corporation based on wrongful or fraudulent acts of

directors or other persons may be classified into individual suits, class suits, and derivative suits.
Where a stockholder or member is denied the right of inspection, his suit would be individual because
the wrong is done to him personally and not to the other stockholders or the corporation. Where the
wrong is done to a group of stockholders, as where preferred stockholders’ rights are violated, a class
or representative suit will be proper for the protection of all stockholders belonging to the same group.
But where the acts complained of constitute a wrong to the corporation itself, the cause of action
belongs to the corporation and not to the individual stockholder or member. Although in most every
case of wrong to the corporation, each stockholder is necessarily affected because the value of his interest
therein would be impaired, this fact of itself is not sufficient to give him an individual cause of action
since the corporation is a person distinct and separate from him, and can and should itself sue the
wrongdoer. Otherwise, not only would the theory of separate entity be violated, but there would be
multiplicity of suits as well as a violation of the priority rights of creditors. Furthermore, there is the
difficulty of determining the amount of damages that should be paid to each individual stockholder.

However, in cases of mismanagement where the wrongful acts are committed by the directors or
trustees themselves, a stockholder or member may find that he has no redress because the former
are vested by law with the right to decide whether or not the corporation should sue, and they will
never be willing to sue themselves. The corporation would thus be helpless to seek remedy. Because of
the frequent occurrence of such a situation, the common law gradually recognized the right of a
stockholder to sue on behalf of a corporation in what eventually became known as a “derivative
suit.” It has been proven to be an effective remedy of the minority against the abuses of management.
Thus, an individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever
officials of the corporation refuse to sue or are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the
corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as the nominal party, with the
corporation as the party-in- interest.

RELIEFS IN A DERIVATIVE SUIT MUST PERTAIN TO THE CORPORATION

Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a derivative suit, then the reliefs prayed for must be for
the benefit or interest of the corporation . When the reliefs prayed for do not pertain to the corporation, then it is an
improper derivative suit.

REQUISITES OF DERIVATIVE SUIT

The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:

(1) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the
number of his shares not being material;
(2) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the
appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
(3) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused
to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.
In this case, petitioners, as members of the Board of Directors of the condominium corporation before the election in
question, filed a complaint against the newly-elected members of the Board of Directors for the years 2004-2005,
questioning the validity of the election held on April 2, 2004, as it was allegedly marred by lack of quorum, and
praying for the nullification of the said election.

As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ complaint seek to nullify the said election, and to protect and enforce
their individual right to vote . Petitioners seek the nullification of the election of the Board of Directors for the years
2004- 2005, composed of herein respondents, who pushed through with the election even if petitioners had adjourned the
meeting allegedly due to lack of quorum. Petitioners are the injured party, whose rights to vote and to be voted upon
were directly affected by the election of the new set of board of directors.

The party-in-interest are the petitioners as stockholders, who wield such right to vote. The cause of action devolves
on petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint for
nullification of the election is a DIRECT ACTION by petitioners, who were the members of the Board of Directors of the
corporation before the election, against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of Directors. Under the
circumstances, the derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the Second
Amended Complaint is improper.

The stockholder’s right to file a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code, but is
impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the
corporation and its stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties, which is not the issue in this case.

8. Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy, G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005.
DOCTRINE:
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, meaning “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit,” a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in
Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, citing earlier cases, we wrote:

Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor
may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the
government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” To qualify a person to
be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by REAL
INTEREST is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

The very complaint in this case, filed by petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the time
Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., “the property in question was already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and
Valeriano Espiritu,” and that at that time, “the property in question was no longer a disposable public land .”

With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are already private
properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, “no longer disposable public land”
over which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, “no longer had any jurisdiction and control,” we
are simply at a loss to understand how petitioner Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this
case, and insists that the disputed properties are still part of the public domain . If ever, the real party-in-interest could
be none other than the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
9. Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc. G.R. No. 152272, March 05, 2012
DOCTRINE:
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without
merit. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly
stated by the CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially
shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court , conveying their intention to join private
respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were
also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the
individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint .
These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in
San Pedro, Laguna.

10. Sylvia Banda v. Eduardo R. Ermita G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as
one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet, we held that “[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit,
which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties . For while no difficulty may arise if
the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who
were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.”

Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.

From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are:

(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the Court held that:

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts , and the complaint, or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the
existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of
persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the
members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine
whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common
interest.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive
Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who
pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction
of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an
Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of
petitioners to 34.

Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that
a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the
petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping,
only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary
public. Inother words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.

ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., we observed that an element of a
class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate
representation of members of a class, the court must consider

(1) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;
(2) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and
(3) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

OPPOSING INTERESTS BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND MEMBERS OF THE CLASS

Previously, we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic Church that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other
members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.

It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance
was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said
manifestation expressed NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take
into account the contention of petitioners’ counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such
manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the
members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an
apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent.

11. Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.

DOCTRINE:
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death , the Rules require the
substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the
court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the
defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the
names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless,
despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.

The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death
of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon
if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of
the party.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party
alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The
rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate .

Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though
not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that
the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased . In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process. The
essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one’s
defense. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.

In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment rendered
therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a codefendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The
records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juan’s death .
Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below.
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.

12. Sumaljap v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Josefa Maglasang filed a complaint for the Nullity of a Deed of Sale of Real Property executed between her as vendor and
the Sps. Literato as vendee in the RTC. Literato filed a Counterclaim alleging that Sumaljag occupied said land at the
instance of Maglasang without authority. However, RTC dismissed the Counterclaim. After dismissing the Counterclaim,
Literato declared a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Lease Contract, Recovery of Possession of Land and
Damages against Sumaljag and Maglasang.

Pending trial, Maglasang died. Atty. Suray, common counsel of Sumaljag and Maglasang, filed a notice of death and
substitution praying that Maglasang be substituted by Sumaljag. RTC denied the Motion for Substitution. MR denied. CA
affirmed.

DOCTRINE:
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
 The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs[.]

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation who may be
affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as he/she continues to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.

DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT PENDING ACTION SURVIVES

A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are
actions that survive the death of Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:

The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was
elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena as follows:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which SURVIVE, the wrong complained [of] affects
PRIMARILY and PRINCIPALLY property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are dealing with actions that
survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply.

DUTY OF COUNSEL; TIMELINESS NOT AN ISSUE

The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the death of his
client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceased’s legal representative or
representatives. Incidentally, this is the only representation that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the
fact of death terminated any further lawyer-client relationship .

In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court, although belatedly, of
the fact of her death. However, he did as well inform the lower court that —

2. That before she died she executed a QUITCLAIM DEED in favor of REMISMUNDO D.
MAGLASANG over the land in question (Lot No. 1220-D of Benolho, Albuera, Leyte), evidenced by a
QUITCLAIM DEED, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’ who in turn sold it in favor of
JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG, evidenced by a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex ‘C.’

Further, counsel asked that “the deceased Josefa Maglasang in her capacity as plaintiff and as Third Party Counterclaim
Defendant be substituted in the case at bar by JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG whose address is 38 Osmeña Street,
Ormoc City” pursuant to “Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant Josefa Maglasang
so as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the
latter in fact granted counsel an extended period. The timeliness of the report is therefore a non-issue.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IMPROPER

The “legal representatives” that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law — the administrator, executor
or
guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the
deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that “the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator.”

Significantly, the person — now the present petitioner — that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those
mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a COUNTERCLAIM CO-DEFENDANT of the deceased whose proferred
justification for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her
death.Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to counsel’s
suggested substitute.

HEIRS AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES

The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the appropriate legal
representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear — the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear
and unequivocal. In San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held:

The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals that priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the
deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.

We likewise said in Gochan v. Young:

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the
heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator
appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more
reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.

13. Memoracion Cruz v. Oswaldo Z. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 01, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Memoracion filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages in the RTC of Manila against her son
Oswaldo. Allegedly, the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud. After presenting evidence, Memoracion died. Her
lawyer notified the court and informed the same that her son Edgardo would substitute her. Oswaldo moved to dismiss on
the ground that the Action for Reconveyance is a personal action which does not survive the death of Memoracion. RTC
dismissed the case. CA upheld.

DOCTRINE:
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES SURVIVED THE DEATH OF PETITIONER
The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, to
wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of ACTION WHICH SURVIVE, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and
principally property and property rights , the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or
petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato, we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is
one relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant
case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
DUTY OF COUNSEL IN CASE OF SURVIVAL OF PENDING CASE
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the court of such death,
and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his
heirs in the pending action.

If NO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative FAILS TO APPEAR
within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the OPPOSING PARTY to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to
protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.

IMPROPER TO DISMISS THE INSTANT CASE; IMPROPER TO SUBSTITUTE HEIR WHO IS AN ADVERSE PARTY
It was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves
property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit
belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative,
Edgardo Cruz.

What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as
party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established
jurisprudence. Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals, we consider such Manifestation, signed
by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neri’s services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased
Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz.

It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz (respondent), although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as
a legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.

14. Heritage Park Management v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
In developing into a memorial park a piece of land in Fort Bonifacio, PEA engaged the services of EDC (Elpidio Uy)
under a Lanscaping and Construction Agreement wherein EDC would undertake to develop and do landscaping works on
105 hectare Heritage Park. However, due to PEA’s inability to evict the squatters, it was delayed. Aggrieved, EDC filed a
complaint befCore the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission seeking to collect damages from PEA. Thereafter,
PEA executed a Dead of Assignment in favor of Heritage Park Management Corporation which assigns all of PEAs rights
and contracts to the Hertige. As a result, Heritage, as assignee, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction in the CA to
enjoin the CIAC from ruling on the complaint. Heritage claims that CIAC has no jurisdiction because it was not
impleaded as an indispensible party.

DOCTRINE:
Petitioner (Heritage) claims that it is an indispensable party to the proceedings before the CIAC as the assignee of the
PEA of the latter’s rights, interests, and obligations in the Heritage Park Project. Thus, its non-inclusion in the proceedings
before the CIAC deprived the latter of jurisdiction over the case. Heritage argues that it is in possession and control over
the funds of the Heritage Park Project which EDC is targeting with its complaint before the CIAC.

Such contention is bereft of merit. It must be remembered that when the case was originally filed by EDC before the
CIAC on January 12, 2000, PEA had not yet transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage , as
evidenced by the Deed of Assignment dated March 2000. Thus, by impleading PEA as respondent, the CIAC had
jurisdiction over the case at that time.

Heritage, however, claims that when PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to Heritage, the CIAC lost
its jurisdiction. In other words, Heritage alleges that a court may lose jurisdiction over a case based on the subsequent
actions of the parties. This is unacceptable.
The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties that disagree with the decision of a
judicial tribunal to annul the same through the expedient of transferring their interests or rights involved in the case.

HERITAGE NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE

Moreover, Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an indispensible party to the case and that it was not included in
the case before the CIAC. Being a transferee of the interests of PEA over the Project during the pendency of the case
before the CIAC, it is bound by the proceedings in like manner as PEA . In Jocson v. Court of Appeals, this Court
held the Bank of the Philippine Islands is bound by the decision of the trial court being the transferee pendent lite of
the original defendant therein, despite the fact that it had not been substituted for the original defendant and had
not been notified of the proceedings against it.

CASE IS BINDING UPON THE TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE

Rule 3 of Section 20 (now Section 19, Rule 3) of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 20. Transfer of Interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.

This Court has declared in a number of decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as
its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the
property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an indispensible party as it would in any event be bound by the
judgment against his predecessor. This would follow even if it is not formally included as a defendant through an
amendment of the complaint.

Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the Rules of Court
specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the original parties while binding the transferee .

15. William Genato v. Benjamin Bayhon, G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bayhon contracted a loan with Genato. Thereafter, Bayhon et al filed an Action for the Declaration of Nullity of a Dacion
en Pago executed by Bayhon in favor of Genato. Likewise, Genato filed an Action for Specific Performance against
Bayhon compelling the latter to pay the loan and execute a dacion en pago in his favor. Upon consolidation of the 2 cases,
RTC ruled in favor of Genato and held Bayhon liable for the loan. During Bayhon’s appeal, he died. CA reversed the RTC
and ruled that Bayhon’s liability was extinguished by his death.

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,
the Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

The Court proceeded further to state the GENERAL RULE: “Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.

The loan in this case was contracted by Bayhon. He died while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan , the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion
of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs UNLESS the debt has first been satisfied.

The procedure in VINDICATING MONETARY CLAIMS involving a DEFENDANT WHO DIES BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT is
governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
 When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant
dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death,
it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person .

Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased respondent.

16. Algura v. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps Algura filed a Complaint for Damages against Naga City for the illegal demolition of their residence and boarding
house. Also, Algura filed an Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigents. They claim that they have a gross monthly income
of 10K and a net pay of 3K. They also showed that they had no property. In Naga’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs for
Nonpayment of Filing Fees, it was shown that the Sps Algura exceeded the gross income requirement. Thus they were
disqualified as indigent litigants.

DOCTRINE:
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda
Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, and a
Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for
taxation. Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so
the property requirement is met.

However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of
petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP
1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement
was not satisfied.

The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should
have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999.
Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the
application could not have been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP
3,000.00 monthly income threshold.

RULE 141 § 19 & RULE 3 § 21 ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS CAN BE APPLIED TOGETHER

Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order disqualifying
them as indigent litigants that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is “one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.” The trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3,
Section 21 on Indigent Party.

The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent litigants brings
to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such
applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded
by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1,
2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still
valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants. Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and
impliedly amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be
harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when
conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.

APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS

When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards
prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141 — that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s
immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does
not own real property with a fair market value of more than PhP 300,000.00. If the trial court finds that the applicant
meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and
the grant is a MATTER OF RIGHT.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to
enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter
and basic necessities for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence
to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on
the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the
grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the
party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees
shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution
shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may
impose.

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property
requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court
should apply the “indigency test” under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for an exemption.

V VENUE (RULE 4)

1. Spouses Ochoa v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011

QUICKIE FACTS:
Ochoa owns land in Paranaque. Such land was under a Real Estate Mortgage with Chinabank which was granted power to
foreclose extrajudicially. Chinabank sought to extrajudicially foreclose the REM.

Ochoa insists that the stipulated venue of Makati applies only to his complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages filed before the RTC of Paranaque but not to Chinabank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage
filed in the same court.

DOCTRINE:
The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the
provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of ACTIONS, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

Under the Rules, an “action” means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Verily then, with respect to the venue of
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with
extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue
of Actions. Act 3135, as amended provides that —
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage
hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the
provisions of
 the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected,
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.

Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated;
and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation,
such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the
property or part thereof is situated.

2. San Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
An Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) was executed between SMC and SMB Warehousing (Monasterio). The
Agreement contained a stipulation on venue stating that actions should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, to the
exclusión of other courts. Later, being a resident of Naga, Monasterio filed a complaint for collection of Money against
SMC for unpaid cashiering fees. Likewise, he demanded warehousing fees. SMC filed a MTD due to improper venue
claiming that the EWA should be followed. MTD dismissed. MR filed. Pending MR, Monasterio Amended his complaint
and deleted his claim for unpaid warehousing fees.

DOCTRINE
The venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good
custom or public policy, this provision is binding upon the parties. The EWA stipulation on venue is clear and
unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected.

However, we note that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the Monasterio before the RTC of Naga was not
based on the EWA, but concern services not enumerated in the EWA. Moreover, in the amended complaint,
Monasterio’s cause of action was specifically limited to the collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering
service in favor of SMC. He already omitted SMC’s non-payment of warehousing fees. As previously ruled, allegations in
the complaint determines the cause of action or the nature of the case. Thus, given the circumstances of this case now
before us, we are constrained to hold that it would be erroneous to rule, as the CA did, that the collection suit of
Monasterio did not pertain solely to the unpaid cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to
breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such
that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation
designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the
basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be
allowed free access to courts of justice.

RESTRICTIVE STIPULATIONS are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to
institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as
relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such
limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse,
arbitrary and oppressive.

Moreover, since convenience is the raison d’être of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be deemed merely
permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties’ convenience.

Accordingly, since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal action, we
find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff resides.

3. URC v. Albert Lim, G.R. NO. 154338, October 05, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Despite repeated demands, Albert Lim failed to settle its obligation with URC whom he bought grocery products from.
Thus, URC filed complaint for a sum of money in the RTC of QC. Later, the RTC dismissed the complaint motu proprio
for improper venue.
DOCTRINE:
In personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in the place of his or her residence or the place where
the defendant resides. However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place where neither of
them resides.

Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances when the trial court may motu proprio
dismiss a claim, thus:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is
deemed waived. Thus, a court may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not
one of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings.

In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a
complaint on the ground of improper venue. In Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, the
Court likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.

4. Irene Marcos Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Irene Marcos-Araneta with other co-plaintiffs filed an action for conveyance of shares of stock against Benedicto before
the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Benedicto sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue considering
that Irene is not a resident of Batac but of Makati City. On the other hand, Irene asserts that her co-plaintiffs are residents
of Batac. RTC dismissed case. CA reverses and holds that venue is proper.

DOCTRINE:
Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. As to her, Batac,
Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place “where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides” at the time she filed her amended complaint.

Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac,
Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties reside. Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the
status of Irene’s co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4.

IRENE IS THE PRINCIPAL PARTY; HER RESIDENCE IS CONTROLLING

There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the
disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. It is undisputed too that
petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in
the amended complaint as Irene’s new designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of
Irene.

Upon the foregoing consideration, the resolution of the crucial issue of whether or not venue had properly been laid
should not be difficult.

Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences
of the PRINCIPAL PARTIES should be the basis for determining proper venue. According to the late Justice Jose Y.
Feria, “the word ‘principal’ has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff from
choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue.” Eliminate the qualifying term “principal”
and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice Regalado, “be defeated where a nominal or formal party
is impleaded in the
action since the latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the
desirably active participation expected of litigants in a case.”

Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal
plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and
prosecuted at the place where Irene resides .

5. Heirs of the Late Flaviano Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation, 2013

DOCTRINE:
In this case, respondent sought to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise
the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate
court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring
the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extrajudicial foreclosure under Section
7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.

STIPULATION ON VENUE (LEYTE)

As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void
since the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage contract stating that the
auction sale should be held in the capital of the province where the properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.

The Court disagrees. As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the real estate mortgage executed by Sps.
Maglasang which fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban City LACKS WORDS OF EXCLUSIVITY which
would bar any other acceptable fora wherein the said sale may be conducted, to wit:

It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, the auction sale shall be
held at the capital of the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province
concerned, or shall be held in the city if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the city
concerned.

Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum, the
stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue. As a consequence, the stipulated venue and
that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied alternatively.

In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province where the property to
be sold is situated, viz.:

SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated; and
in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale
shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part
thereof is situated.

In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Province of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-cited requirement.

VI. SUMMARY PROCEDURE (RULE 5; 1991 RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE AS AMENDED)

1. Macadangdang v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
As administrator of the Estate of Filomena Macadangdang, Atty. Macdangdang filed an Action for Unlawful Detainer
against Gaviola et al who had occupied lands owned by the deceased by mere toleration. MTC of Davao ruled in favor of
the Estate and ordered for them to vacate, remove structures, and pay damages.
RTC dismissed the appeal. As such, Gaviola et al filed an MR which the RTC denied. Undaunted, they went up to the CA
on certiorari. CA set aside the RTC decision denying the MR. Hence, this petition.

Macadangdang argues that the CA should not have allowed the filing of the MR in the RTC because, since Unlawful
Detainer is governed by RSP, MR is a prohibited pleading.

DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the MTC. Since the case before the MTCC was an
unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is
prohibited, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

HOWEVER, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the
RTC acting as an appellate court . The appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for
reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.

2. Republic v. Sunvar Reality Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
As owners of a parcel of land in Pasong Tamo, Republic & NPC leased said property to Technology Resource Center for
25 years ending Dec 31, 2002. They also allowed TRC to sublease it. As such, they subleased it to Sunvar. TRC was
reorganized as Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) in 1987.

With 6 months left before the expiration of the lease, NPC informed PDAF that the lease was not going to be renewed. In
turn, PDAF informed its sub-lessee Sunvar of this. Contract expired in Dec 2002. Years later, in Feb 2008, Republic asked
Sunvar to vacate. Then, on Feb 2009, Sunvar received a final notice from the OSG to vacate but Sunvar refused. As such,
an Action for Unlawful Detainer was filed against Sunvar on July 2009 before the MTC of Makati.

Sunvar moved to dismiss and argued that since the action was an accion publiciana, it fell within the RTC and not the
MTC because the action was filed more than 1 year after. MTC denied the motion to dismiss. As such, Sunvar went to the
RTC on Rule 65 to assail the denial of the motion. In reply, Republic claimed that under the RSP, filing of a Petition for
Certiorari against Interlocutory Orders of the MTC are prohibited.

DOCTRINE:
It was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of Sunvar , since the Rules on
Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently,
the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by
the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition
is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed outright Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition , considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of
the certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear the
Rule 65 Petition on the merits.

RECKONING ONE-YEAR PERIOD FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES

The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses
the ruling of the RTC. Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold possession may — by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one
year after the unlawful deprivation — bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully
withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.
Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only AFTER A DEMAND to pay or to comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or AFTER A WRITTEN NOTICE OF THAT DEMAND is
served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of
land or 5 days in the case of buildings.

3. Banares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000

QUICKIE FACTS:
Balising filed estafa complaints against Banares et al in the MTC. The complaints were dismissed because of non-
compliance with the conciliation proceedings in the Lupong Tagapamayapa pursuant to the RSP and the LGC. After 2
months, Balising filed a Motion to Revive after having complied with the conciliation proceedings. MTC granted the
Motion.

Banares argues that the Order by the MTC dismissing the cases had long become final and executor. As such, Balising
should have REFILED the cases and not through a Motion to Revive. On the other hand, Balising claimed that the rule on
finality of judgments does not apply to RSP cases and that the case was initially dismissed without prejudice of being
revived.

DOCTRINE:
Banares’ contentions are meritorious.

A “FINAL ORDER” issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action , leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an “INTERLOCUTORY ORDER” is one which does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.

This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal order was any
less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless
finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the
complaint.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the
action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.

After the lapse of the 15-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of
the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect,
even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the
same.

There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents’ view. Section 18 merely states that when
a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the
issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay
conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be
revived by mere motion even after the 15-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has
lapsed.

The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said
doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

NON-REFERRAL TO LUPON IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss . The
Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them
due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints,
against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
4. Angelina Soriente v. Estate of Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Soriente had been occupying a lot owned by Concepcion by mere toleration. When Concepcion initiated steps to develop
the land, a demand letter to vacate was sent to Soriente. She refused. Thus, an Action for Unlawful Detainer was filed by
Concepcion against Soriente in the MTC of Mandaluyong. Instead of filing her own Answer, Soriente just affixed her
signature in the Answer filed by Caballero, another occupant of the property whom an Action for Unlawful Detainer was
filed against by Concepcion. As such, the two cases were consolidated.

Thereafter, pursuant to the RSP, a Preliminary Conference was scheduled. In said conference, Soriente (or her
representative) did not show up. In view of said absence, Concepcion moved to submit the case for decision. Afterwards,
the MTC ruled against Soriente.

Soriente claims that the MTC erred in ruling against her because, considering that her case was consolidated with that of
Caballero’s, her absence in the Preliminary Conference should not have been taken against her because her co-defendants
were present.

DOCTRINE:
Soriente contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, thus:

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be
applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his
complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference.

Petitioner asserts that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she
and defendant Caballero signed and filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the
trial court should not have rendered judgment on her case based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference. The contention lacks merit.

The ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case
against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as
Civil Case No. 17932. These cases were consolidated by the trial court.

Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the
preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is,
the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein. However, “[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the preliminary conference.”
Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by
the trial court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have
rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.

The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner, since she and Caballero were
not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero,
even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in
Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.

Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioner’s
failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on
the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

VII. PLEADINGS (RULES 6 TO 8)

1. Cosco Philippines Shipping v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
Insurer, Kemper, a corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, filed a claim in the RTC against Cosco to
recover what it paid in favor its Insured, Genosi. During Pre-Trial, Cosco filed a Motion to Dismiss because the
Complaint was signed by one Atty. Lat but failed to show his authority to sue. Moreover, Atty. Lat was the one who
signed the Certification Against Forum Shopping. RTC granted and dismissed the case without prejudice. MR denied. On
appeal, CA reversed RTC and held that the Rules must be applied liberally.

DOCTRINE:
We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for
any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly
authorized.

With respect to a CORPORATION, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly
authorized officers and agents.

Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of
directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by
a specific act of the board of directors.

In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), we ruled that only
individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on
behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented . The petition is subject to
dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority .

In the present case, since Kemper is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the
board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the
complaint will have to be dismissed.

The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but
shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.

There is no proof that Kemper, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum
shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of Kemper’s complaint for
Insurance Loss and Damages against Cosco.
INSTANCES WHEN RULE WAS RELAXED
In Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., the Court cited instances wherein the lack of authority of the
person making the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent compliance by the parties
therein. Thus,

[w]hile there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum
shopping by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time
of its filing, we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there
was a subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that
the person who signed the certification was duly authorized.

In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., the CA dismissed the
petition filed by China Bank, since the latter failed to show that its bank manager who signed the
certification against non- forum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the CA and said that the
case be decided on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, since the board
resolution which was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the bank manager
as an authorized signatory.

In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the complaint before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila was instituted by petitioner’s Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed
the verification and certification against non-forum shopping without proof of authority to sign for the
corporation, we also relaxed the rule. We did so taking into consideration the merits of the case and to
avoid a re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the case had
already been decided by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abaya’s authority to sign the
certification was ratified by the Board.

NO RELAXATION
Contrary to the CA’s finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation of
the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted , even belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the
requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or secretary’s certificate subsequently
submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to
comply with the rules. Thus, there exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to
the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of
the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no
evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy’s authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a
resolution from respondent’s board of directors or secretary’s certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act,
the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondent’s attorney-in-fact, with full powers to
represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary’s
certificate.

AMOUNTS TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary
consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.

Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the
trial court’s jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
2. Iglesia ni Kristo v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Heirs of Enrique Santos filed an Action to Quiet Title over a parcel of land in QC against INC who was depriving them of
the enjoyment thereof. The Heirs were represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter was also the only person who signed
the Certification Against Forum Shopping. Thus, INC moved to dismiss on the ground that since there were more than 1
plaintiff, all of them should have signed the Certification Against Forum Shopping. In this case, Enrique did not have the
required authorization by all the other plaintiffs. In their Comment on the Motion, the Heirs averred that as pro indiviso
co- owner of the land with other plaintiff-co owners, anyone of them could act for the other for the benefit of the property
without need of authorization.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss holding that signature of one of the heirs constitutes substantial compliance. On
appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition asking whether or not substantial compliance rule can apply.

DOCTRINE:
The PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition (or complaint)
have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.

Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. The issue in the present case is not the lack of
verification but the sufficiency of one executed by only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University
v. Manalo, that the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only
one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition
(complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the
Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification . This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded.

The SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile,
where the Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners because he is a relative of
the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of
the Philippines, where the Court allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a
family home in which all the petitioners shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered
as valid the certification signed by only 4 of the 9 petitioners because all petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a
complaint against respondents for quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided
whole; and Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, where the Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they
were sued jointly involving a property in which they had a common interest.

In all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance because of the COMMONALITY OF
INTEREST OF ALL THE PARTIES with respect to the subject of the controversy.

Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not err in affirming the
application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case, the property involved is a 936-square-meter real
property. Both parties have their respective TCTs over the property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case
below have a common interest over the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered
owner of the subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered co-owners pro indiviso
of
the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated to any of the heirs. Consequently, as one of the
heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for
the RTC to take cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority to
inform the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the
same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal
involving the same issues.

3. Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:
Cabanilla was driving a bus owned by Vallacar Transit. Cabanilla figured in an accident wherein Jocelyn Catubig’s
husband died as a result. Jocelyn initially charged Cabanilla with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide which was
dismissed on the ground that there was no negligence. Subsequently, Jocelyn filed an Action for Damages against the bus
company Vallacar. Aside from filing an Answer with Counterclaim which imputed negligence on Jocelyn’s husband,
Vallacar also moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not verified. Vallacar alleges that, under the Rules,
a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned pleading which has no legal effect.

DOCTRINE:
We find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of Catubig’s complaint. A pleading
required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge,
information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”

The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a pleading lacking
proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect. HOWEVER, it also just as
clearly states that “[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.” No such law or rule specifically requires that Catubig’s complaint for
damages should have been verified.

CERTIFICATION V. VERIFICATION
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, we already pointed out that:

A party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party’s failure to
sign personally the verification. The CERTIFICATE of non-forum shopping must be signed by the party,
and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.

On the other hand, the requirement on VERIFICATION of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional
requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.

GENERAL RULE: PLEADING NEED NOT BE VERIFIED

In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same . Examples of pleadings that require verification are:

(1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
(2) petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule
41, Section 2;
(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1;
(4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5;
(5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1;
(6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4;
(7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4;
(8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4;
 (9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1;
(10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1;
(11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions
under Rule 64, Section 2;
(12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
(13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1;
(14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1;
(15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
(16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Intra- Corporate Controversies;
(17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation; and
(18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well
as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.

In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true
and correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.

GENERAL RULE: CERTIFICATION REQUIRED IN INITIATORY PLEADINGS

In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a
certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1,
1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that Catubig’s complaint for
damages was accompanied by such a certificate.

4. Korean Technologies v. Alberto Lerma, G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Korean Technologies and Pacific General Steel executed a contract concerning the installation and operation of an LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Cavite. They had problems implementing said contract. As such, Korean filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance before the RTC of Muntinlupa to put back the machineries ad equipment it
dismantled. Pacific filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim claiming that it had a right to dismantle and transfer
such machinery and equipment and also sought a claim for damages. However, Pacific did not pay any docket fees nor
filed a Certification Against Forum Shopping.

DOCTRINE:
STARTING AUGUST 16, 2004, DOCKET FEES REQUIRED IN COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
The counterclaims of Pacific were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in
accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory counterclaim
or a crossclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.”

On July 17, 1998, at the time Pacific filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against Korean, it was not liable
to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, HOWEVER, that effective August 16,
2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM or CROSS-CLAIMS.

CERTIFICATION NOT REQUIRED; ANSWER NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING

As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, Pacific’s Answer is not an initiatory pleading which
requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a
responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying Korean motion to dismiss
Pacific’s compulsory counterclaims.
5. Filipinas Textile v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Filipinas Textile (Filtex) issued trust receipts to State Investment House (SIHI) whereby Filtex to hold merchandise in
trust for SIHI with liberty to sell the same for SIHI’s account. However, Filtex failed to pay SIHI. Thus, the SIHI filed a
Complaint for Collection. In its defense, Filtex alleged that the trust receipts in which the Complaint for Collection was
based was null and void because SIHI allegedly altered it and there was absence of documentary stamps as required by the
NIRC. However, Filtex failed to specifically deny under oath the genuiness and due execution of said trust receipts in their
Answer. Thus, SIHI argued that Filtex admitted the due execution of the trust receipts and, as such, they could no longer
question its admimissiblity. RTC ruled against Filtex. CA affirmed because Filtex admitted the genuiness and due
execution of said trust receipts.

DOCTRINE:
As correctly noted by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of Filtex and Villanueva, respectively,
did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive
surety agreement upon which SIHI’s Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the implied admission of the
genuineness and due execution of these documents.

Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in
or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under OATH, SPECIFICALLY DENIES them, and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts.

In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the ADMISSION OF THE GENUINENESS AND DUE
EXECUTION of a document means that the party whosesignature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words
and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that
any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by
him.

Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and
comprehensive surety agreement. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the petitioners from impugning these
documents by evidence of:

(1) fraud;
(2) mistake;
(3) compromise;
(4) payment;
(5) statute of limitations;
(6) estoppel; and
(7) want of consideration.

6. Sy Tiong v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sy Siy Ho & Sons charged Sps. Sy with Robbery after failing to report to work and for failing to respond to a demand
letter for accounting of misappropriated money in the amount of P67M which the Spouses failed to deposit to the
corporation’s banks. Meanwhile, the Corporate VP, Sy Tiong, and his wife, Juanita, were elected as new President and VP
of the corporation, respectively. Then, another Complaint for Accounting and Damages was filed by the corporation
against the Sps. Sy. In their Answer, Sps. Sy claimed that the newly elected officers had no authority and that they were
the ones authorized by the By-laws to administer the corporation.

Later, the Sps. Sy filed a Motion for Leave to filed a Third-Party Complaint against Sy Tiong and Juanita (in their
personal capacity) alleging that the latter are the one’s directly liable for the misappropriation. RTC granted the Motion
for Leave. On appeal, CA reversed and held that a Third-Party Complaint is prohibited under the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.
DOCTRINE:
The Third-Party Complaint should be allowed.

There are conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies. There is a conflict,
for while a Third-Party Complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings , neither is it among the prohibited
ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. This spirit
and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:

Sec. 3. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.

Now, a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person
not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the
plaintiff’s complaint. In fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would
have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party
defendant. Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the PURPOSE of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of
action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters
arising from one particular set of facts.

It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the allowance of the filing
of third-party complaints is premised on one objective — the expeditious disposition of cases. Moreover, following the
rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and taking into consideration the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should
not be prohibited in controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are
rendered beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to
the litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of the principal complaint for accounting and
damages against the Spouses Sy.

REQUISITES FOR IMPLEADING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist ,
whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the
plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another
transaction.

The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant:

(1) on an allegation of liability of the Third-Party Defendant to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief;
(2) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or
(3) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.

SUFFICIENCY OF THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party
complaint must be examined. A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT must allege facts which prima facie show that the
defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.

In the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and
complete control of the day-to day operations and complete control and custody of the funds of the corporation,
and hence they are the ones liable for any shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporation’s cash account.
Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan should render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received
and earned by the corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the complaint for
accounting and damages.

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to
the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that
the Spouses Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation’s claims, and thus the allowance of
the third-party complaint is warranted .

7. PTA of St. Matthew Academy v. Metrobank, G.R.No. 176518, March 2, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
For failure to pay their loan with Metrobank, Sps. Ilagan’s properties were extrajudicially foreclosed. In the public sale,
Metrobank as the highest bidder. During the period of redemption, Metrobank filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Possession. Thereafter, St. Matthew filed a Petition for Injunction against Metrobank. The judge issued a joint
resolution for the 2 cases and ruled that Metrobank is entitled to the Writ of Possession. MR was filed by St. Matthew.
Pending resolution of the MR, PTA of St. Matthew filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition in Intervention in the
Injunction case against Metrobank.. RTC granted said Motion for Leave. However, it later reversed its ruling and held that
PTA of St. Matthew would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession. CA dismissed
appeal. In this petition, PTA of St. Matthew claim that Metrobank Branch Head lacked authority to sign the Certification
Against Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession and, thus, it was rendered
worthless.

DOCTRINE:
PTA of St. Matthew’s contention lacks basis. In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, where the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned in an application for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:

It bears stressing that a CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING is required only in a complaint or a

petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The
PURPOSE OF A MOTION is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of
the case where the motion is filed.

It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession was denominated as a “petition”, it was
in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by
the MBTC did not render the writ irregular . After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need
be attached to the motion.

Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTC’s petition was signed by its branch
head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in form.

8. Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz, 701 SCRA 682 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Alcaraz was hired by Abbot as Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager in a Probationary capacity. Thereafter, she was
informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position and requester her to tender her resignation.
While on leave, HR Managers announced that Alcaraz had already resigned due to health reasons. Aggrieved, she filed a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Damages against Abbot and its officers. She claimed that she should have already
been considered as a regular employee because Abbot failed to inform her of reasonable standards for regularization upon
engagement.
LA dismissed Complaint. NLRC reversed holding that there was illegal dismissal and ordered Alcaraz’s reinstatement. As
such, Abbot filed its FIRST Certiorari questioning the NLRC. Pending resolution of the FIRST, Alcaraz moved for
Execution of the NLRC’s Decision. Motion for Execution was granted. As such, Abbot filed a SECOND Certiorari
assailing the Propriety of the Execution. Both the FIRST and SECOND Certiorari petitions filed by Abbot were denied by
the CA. Thus, Abbot filed an MR. Pending resolution of the MR, Alcaraz again moved for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution before the LA.

LA granted. Abbot then appealed to the NLRC via Memorandum of Appeal. Alcaraz alleged that Abbot was guilty of
Forum Shopping in filing the SECOND Certiorari petition while the MRs were pending resolution. Additionally, Alcaraz
contends that Abbot did not comply with the Certification requirement when it failed to disclose the filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC.

DOCTRINE:
PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING V. VIOLATION OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
In Sps. Ong v. CA, the Court explained that:

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should
by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself.
There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in
the manner of enforcing them.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and
after hearing, while VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING is a ground for
summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.

As to the first, FORUM SHOPPING takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties , either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment . It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely:

(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case.

NO FORUM SHOPPING
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements of forum shopping do not
exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally
dismissed. On the other hand, the Second CA Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award
pending the resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz and the
petitioners.

Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA
Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of
action, there exists no forum shopping.

NO VIOLATION OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT

Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete
statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the SAME ISSUES as the one that was filed.
If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare
under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal
filed with the NLRC likewise cover different subject matters and causes of action.

In this case, the validity of Alcaraz’s dismissal is at issue whereas in the said memorandum of Appeal, the propriety of
the issuance of a writ of execution was in question. Thus, given the dissimilar issues, petitioners did not have to
disclose in the present petition the filing of their June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC . In any
event, considering that the issue on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution had been resolved in the Second
CA Petition
— which in fact had already attained finality — the matter of disclosing the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is
now moot and academic.

9. Permanent Savings Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
For failing to settle his loan obligation evidenced by a Promissory Note, PSB filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money against Velarde in the RTC of Manila. In his Answer, Velarde denied having received the proceeds of the loan and
also claimed that the Promissory Note did not express the true intention of the parties. After PSB rested its case, Velarde
filed a Demurrer to Evidence instead of presenting evidence. He alleged that PSB failed to prove its case and that the
cause of action is barred by prescription. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed PSB’s complaint. It ruled that merely
presenting documents evidencing the loan without testimony of a competent witness did not meet the required quantum of
evidence. CA affirmed.

DOCTRINE:
A reading of Velarde’s Answer, however, shows that he DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DENY that he signed the loan
documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note
seems to be his. Velarde also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated
therein, and the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations
in his “denial under oath,” stating that “the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine
signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties
as stated in the defenses.”

Velarde’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs.
Sellner, the Court expounded on HOW TO DENY THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION of AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENt,
viz.:

This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he DID NOT SIGN the document or that it
is otherwise FALSE or FABRICATED. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due
execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof,
since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.

In fact, Velarde’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law , such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.

Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that
the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the
signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.

Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Velarde specifically denied PSB’s
allegations regarding the loan documents, as Velarde’s Answer shows that he failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore, Velarde is deemed to
have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his obligation with PSB; and with Velarde’s implied
admission, it was not
necessary for PSB to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan
documents sued upon.

10. S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
S.C. Megaworld bought electrical lighting materials from Gentile Industries, a sole proprietorship owned by Engr. Parada.
However, S.C. Megaworld was unable to pay for the purchase price on the due date. It blamed its failure to pay on its
failure to collect from EnviroKleen Technologies money under its sub-contract. S.C. Megaworld was able to convince
EnviroKleen to pay Parada P250K. However, there is still an outstanding balance of P800K in favor of Parada. After
unheeded demands, Parada filed an Action for Collection in the RTC. RTC ruled for Parada. On appeal, CA affirmed. In
its MR, S.C. Megaworld alleged for the first time that the Verification and the Certification Against Forum Shopping
attached was invalid. Nonetheless, CA still denied the MR.

Apparently, while the case was pending, Engr. Parada died and his heirs were substituted on his behalf. The heirs
executed an SPA authorizing Leonardo, one of Engr. Parada’s sons to represent them in this petition.

DOCTRINE:
In this petition, the S.C. Megaworld reiterates its argument before the CA that the above verification is invalid, since the
SPA executed by the Parada did not specifically include an authority for Leonardo to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, thus rendering the complaint defective for violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7.

The S.C. Megaworld’s argument is untenable. It failed to reckon that any objection as to compliance with the
requirement of verification in the complaint should have been raised in the proceedings below, and not in the CA
for the first time.

In KILUSAN-OLALIA v. CA, it was held that verification is a FORMAL, not a jurisdictional requisite:

VERIFICATION is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure an

assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and not
mere speculation. The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the
unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in
the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY in a motion to dismiss or a
similar pleading. The high court even warned that “[i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may
result in the dismissal of the action.”

VERIFICATION NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE MUST BE BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS

Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the complaint below, Section
4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifier’s personal knowledge but even only on
authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount
still due to the respondent from the petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the Parada’s
attorney-in-fact with the requirement of verification.

VIII. DEFAULT (RULE 9)

1. Anuncacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Anuncacion filed an Action for Queting of Title against Bocanegra. Summons were the served to Atty. Pizaro. Later,
Bocanegra filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state no cause of action. After Anuncacion filed his Comment,
Bocanegra again filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss alleging an additional ground of failure to file filing fees. After
Anuncacion filed
their respective responses, Bocanegra again filed a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss alleging that there’s no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and no cause of action. Anuncacion
filed their repsonses again. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. MR denied. On appeal, CA
dismissed the petition. MR denied.

DOCTRINE:
Bocanegra’s failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal
to their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial
court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if NOT PLEADED in the
motion to dismiss or answer, are:

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
(3) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED

We likewise cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which raise
grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file piecemeal objections
to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of action.

2. Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Martinez filed a Petition for Registration of 3 parcels of land wherein he alleged that he has claimed it through acquisitive
prescription. OSG opposed arguing that the possession was not in accordance with CA 141. Despite the Opposition filed
by the OSG, RTC issued an Order of General Default against the Republic (via OSG) because no party appeared during
the hearing to oppose Martinez’s Petition. Thus, RTC proceeded to receive evidence and ruled in favor of Martinez. OSG
filed a Notice of Appeal. CA reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Registration. On Petition for
Review to the SC, Martinez contends that OSG no longer had personality to appeal following the Order of General
Default.

DOCTRINE:
The RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor appeared before it on
the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s
petition long before the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:

[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds , having been formally filed, it was
improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the
oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing . The
pertinent provision of law which states: ‘If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the
court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded,’ cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before
it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted,
and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial
hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer , it would have been so
stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of default.
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is
alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant’s evidence and set
another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner
herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government’s claim.

The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing the need for adversarial proceedings, it
affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or
obedience to the judicial processes.
The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate.
Way back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas, we declared that the defaulting defendant “loses his standing in court, he not
being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce
evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing.”

These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay, decided in 1948, where a divided Court
pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court, except
where a motion to set aside the order of default had been filed . This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in
dissent that there was no provision in the then Rules of Court or any law “depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to
be heard on appeal.”

In Tanhu v. Ramolete, the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice Moran, expressing the
reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant “cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be
heard at the final hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on
the merits.”

Thus, for around 30-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal the adverse
decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41.

Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was REMOVED from Section 2, Rule
41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an
order of default.

It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant declared in default to appeal the
adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the
1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco
doctrine has been reinstated?

RIGHT TO APPEAL BY DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT STILL EXISTS UNDER THE LINA DOCTRINE
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT had evolved into a fairly
comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:

(1) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (SEC. 3, RULE 18)
(2) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under SECTION 1(A) OF RULE 37;
(3) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under SECTION 2 OF RULE 38; and
(4) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if
no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (SEC. 2, RULE 41)

The FOURTH REMEDY, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that
provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine,
including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him.

Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997
Rules, THE DOCTRINE STILL EXISTS, applying the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules
has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a
defendant, and no argument in this petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise .
3. Dico v. Vizcaya Management Corporation, 701 SCRA 367 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Celso Dico resides on and owns a lot in Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. It adjoined 2 more lots. In 1964, he and his
wife filed a Free Patent Application for the 2 adjoining lots with the Bureau of Lands but were not acted upon. As it turns
out, VMC had TCTs covering both adjoining lands. As a result, in 1981, VMC filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against Dico. MTC ordered the demolition of the Dicos sluice gate. Decision became final.

In 1986, the Dicos filed an Action for Annulment and Cancellation of Titles of VMC. In 1987, Dicos amended the
complaint alleging that they are possessors-by-succession of the 2 other lots. During the pendency of the case, Celso Dico
died and was substituted. Thereafter, RTC ruled in their favor and ordered VMC to vacate. On appeal, CA reversed and
ruled VMC as absolute owner. Moreover, CA declared that prescription/laches already barred Dico from asserting their
right. MR denied.

DOCTRINE:
The action of the Dicos for reconveyance was properly dismissed. The insistence of the Dicos that prescription could
not be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance by virtue of VMC’s failure to aver them in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer was unwarranted.

We agree with VMC’s contention to the contrary. Although defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived, it was really incorrect for the Dicos to insist that prescription could
not be appreciated against them for that reason . Their insistence was contrary to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.

Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription of action may be raised AT ANY STAGE of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, EXCEPT that
the objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be barred by laches .

4. Heirs of Medrano v. Estanislao De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 09, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Medrano obtained ownership over a parcel of land after the heirs (Hilaria and Elena) of the original owner (Flaviana)
waived all their hereditary rights in favor of Medrano in consideration for the expenses incurred by the latte for Flaviana’s
medication and burial. After Hilaria and Elena died, Medrano filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against the other
relatives. Some of these relatives named as defendants renounced their rights in favor De Vera (transferee pendente lite).
As such, De Vera filed an Answer to the Medrano’s complaint.

Some of the defandants were declared in default for failing to file an Answer on time. As for De Vera, the RTC admitted
his Answer but required him to file an Motion in Intervention to be able to participate in the case. Thereafter, Medrano
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. CA reversed and held that RTC should not have required De Vera to file a
Motion in Intervention.

DOCTRINE:
The trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not independent of or severable from the
interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants by virtue of the Deed of
Renunciation of Rights. His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would be
bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Vera’s interest cannot be
considered and tried separately from the interest of the named defendants.

EFFECT OF PARTIAL DEFAULT

While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the protection of the
parties’ interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the circumstances demanded that the trial court
had already admitted De Vera’s Answer when it declared the original defendants in default . As there was a
transferee pendente lite whose Answer had already been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the
basis of that Answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c):
 Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against
several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the
case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

Thus, the default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of evidence because De
Vera (a transferee pendente lite who may thus be joined as defendant under Rule 3, Section 19) filed the Answer. The
trial court should have tried the case based on De Vera’s Answer , which Answer is deemed to have been adopted by
non- answering defendants.

To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants after De Vera’s answer had been
admitted would not only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c), but would also be a gross disregard of De Vera’s right
to due process. This is because the ex parte presentation of evidence would not result in a default judgment which would
bind not just the defaulting defendants, but also De Vera, precisely because he is a transferee pendente lite. This would
result in an anomaly wherein De Vera would by a default judgment even if he filed an answer and expressed a desire to
participate in the case.

5. Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
By virtue of a Deed of Sale, Aure purchased a parcel of land from Aquino. Despite the sale, Aquino refused to vacate the
property. As such, Aure filed an Action for Ejectment against Aquino. In his defense, Aquino contends that the sale was
invalid because Aquino did not receive any consideration. Nevertheless, MTC dismissed the complaint for Aure’s failure
to undergo barangay conciliation proceedings. RTC affirmed. On appeal to the CA, RTC and MTC were reversed and the
case to the MTC for further proceedings. Additionally, CA stated that failure to comply with barangay conciliation is not a
jurisdictional flaw and will not affect the cause of action considering that Aquino failed to raise said issue in his Answer.

DOCTRINE:
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before
Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation proceedings
was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-
recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment
suit filed with the MeTC.

Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature and, hence,
dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and even subsequently in her
Position Paper submitted to the MeTC. We do not agree.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH BARANGAY CONCILIATION :VULNERABLE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS; EXCEPTIONS

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the LGC on
barangay conciliation is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies — the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity ; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination.
The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.

NEVERTHELESS, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant.

As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:

Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a
quo. [P]etitioners cannot now
 be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily.

In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil
Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer
before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the
complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction.

By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced
or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment
suit for Aure and Aure Lending’s failure to resort to the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded
from doing so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no
moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.

6. Republic v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 161657, October 04, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Mendoza filed an Action for the Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of Title, Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of
Ownership and Possession of a piece of property known as the Arlegui Residence against the Republic. Mendoza contends
that she owns said property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of. The case was re-raffled to RTC of Manila
under Judge Hidalgo.

Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Third Amended Complaint which the RTC granted. Republic was
ordered to file an Answer. Republic filed an Motion for Extension. However, no Answer was filed thereafter. Thus, Judge
Hidalgo declared the Republic in default. Thus, Mendoza was allowed to present evidence ex parte. RTC rendered
judgment in default in favor of Mendoza and awarded her almost P2B. Republic moved for New Trial but was denied.

DOCTRINE:
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioner’s threshold theme. Due process, in its procedural aspect,
guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid
at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner ,
then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew
with what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to
seasonably file a responsive pleading.

While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default, the policy of the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full
merits, the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly
issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.

IX. Amendment and Supplement (Rule 10)

1. PAGCOR v. Lopez, A.M. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
PAGCOR filed an administrative case against Judge Lopez for gross ignorance of the law. The complaint arose when
PAGCOR, who was given funds (P1.5B) by FILGAME and BELLE JAI-ALAI CORP for the Jai-Alai operations in the
Philippines, was ordered by the Office of the President and the DILG to close down Jai-Alai operations. Aggrieved, on
Nov. 6, 2000, FILGAME and BELLE filed an Action for Specific Performance against PAGCOR, etc which was raffled
to Judge Lopez. Weeks later, Del Mar v. PAGCOR was promulgated enjoining BELLE and FILGAME from operating
Jai-Alai games.

As a result, they filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint to change their cause of action from Specific Performance
to Recovery of Sum of Money amounting to 1.5B considering that they can no longer ask for Specific Performance
anymore. Judge Lopez admitted the Amended Complaint over PAGCOR’s opposition. Thus, PAGCOR filed a Motion to
Dismiss for failure of FILGAME and BELLE to pay the correct docket fees based on the Amended Complaint which now
amounted to 15.8M. Judge Lopez denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction was not lost by the
amendment.
As such, PAGCOR filed its Answer. BELLE and FILGAME filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Then, without
conducting hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Lopez ruled in favor of BELLE and FILGAME ordering
PAGCOR to return the 1.5B. PAGCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and an Administrative Case against
Lopez.

When the Administrative Case was allowed to continue, CA Justice Tijam recommended the dismissal of the Complaint.
Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The Court finds no gross ignorance of law committed by Lopez when he admitted the Amended Complaint
notwithstanding that it substantially altered the cause of action of FILGAME and BELLE. Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity
to be heard.

As held in Valenzuela vs. CA,

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase ‘or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered’ was stricken-off and
not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the
new rules, ‘the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.’ This should
only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense,
the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a ‘just,
speedy an inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.’

The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs was for Specific Performance and injunction with prayer for damages and for
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against complainant while the Amended Complaint was for Recovery of Sum of
Money. Such amendment to the original complaint was filed by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE after the
Supreme Court decision declared that complainant could not enter into a joint agreement with other corporations
to operate the Jai-Alai, and that the Agreement dated June 17, 1999 entered into between complainant and the
plaintiffs is null and void. However, since plaintiffs had provided funds for complainant’s preoperating expenses
and working capital, plaintiffs had to file an amended complaint which seeks the recovery of their expenses .

Although the amended complaint substantially changed the cause of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE, the
admission thereof by Judge Lopez is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and jurisprudence.

SUN INSURANCE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES

The Court also finds that respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he admitted the amended
complaint despite the non-payment by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE of additional docket fees on the amended
complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, the Court laid down the rules on the payment of docket fees as
follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
 applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow
 payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Lopez is correct in ruling in his Order dated June 19, 2002 that the court had jurisdiction over the amended complaint
as it had acquired jurisdiction over the case when the original complaint was filed and the corresponding docket
fee was paid thereon. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non- payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Also, the unpaid additional docket fees should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though plaintiffs had
specified the amount of P1,562,145,661.87 in the prayer of the amended complaint.

Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction for non-payment of additional docket fees is deemed abandoned as there was neither a
motion for reconsideration nor a petition questioning such Order filed by complainant. In fact, when the amended
complaint was admitted and respondent directed complainant to file its answer, the latter filed its Answer with
compulsory counterclaim and without questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of insufficient
payment of docket fees. Complainant even invoked the court’s authority when it asked for affirmative relief on its
counterclaim, thus it is estopped from challenging the court’s jurisdiction.

2. Asean Pacific v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
FACTS:
Waldo Del Castillo, as taxpayer, filed an Action for Annulment of Contracts against Urdaneta City, Capalad (JJEFWA
Builders) and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Goco. It was alleged that Urdaneta Mayor entered
into 5 contracts for the design, construction, and management of a commercial center and hotel amounting to 250M. The
contractor was paid 95M. Del Castillo claims that the contract is void because the object, being public domain, is outside
the commerce of man.

In their Answer, APP claimed that the contracts were valid. Urdaneta also joined and claimed that the contracts were
properly executed with prior authority from the Sanggunian. It also claimed that Del Castillo has no capacity to sue and
states no cause of action. Capalad also filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss against Del
Castillo.

After pre-trial, Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer
to withdraw its Answer, drop Urdaneta as defendant and be joined as plaintiff, admit its Complaint, and conduct new pre-
trial. Urdaneta allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal representation caused its inability
to file necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.

RTC admitted the entry of appearance of Lazaro Law Firm and withdrew appearance of the City Prosecutor. Urdaneta’s
Complaint was likewise admitted and was consolidated with Del Castillo’s. Thereafter, Defendants were directed to
Answer Urdaneta’s complaint. This was also done to Calapad’s.

Thus, APP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence, this Petition. It is claimed that
Urdaneta is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trail brief, that the
execution of the contracts was in good faith.

DOCTRINE:
The court may allow amendment of pleadings. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.

Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue
whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties’ evidence on the issue. Any evidence of
the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10,
necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City’s judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the
contracts assailed. A party’s testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.

As regards the RTC’s order admitting Capalad’s complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order.
Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however,
that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a
complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus,
we should expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.

3. Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009

FACTS:
Asian Water Resources Inc, represented by Tiu, was granted a loan by PBCOM which was guaranteed by a parcel of land.
Wanting to apply for a bigger loan, PBCOM required all members of the Board to become sureties through a Surety
Agreement which was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary public. One copy was kept by the notary
public while the other was sent to the Records Management and Archives Office through the RTC Clerk of Court.

PBCOM denied the request to pay the existing loan via dacion en pago. Thereafter, PBCOM demanded payment which
remain unheeded. Thus, PBCOM filed a Collection Case against Tiu. In their Answer, they claim that the Surety
Agreements were falsified because, based on the copy of the Surety Agreement from the Records Management and
Archive Office, there was nothing that said they were liable in their personal capacity.

Upon investigation, PBCOM discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor. It alleged that when the Surety
Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called the attention of the loans clerk as to why the words “In his
personal capacity” did not appear under the signature of each party. As such, the loans clerk was ordered to insert such
words.

PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute the current annex in
the Complaint. It likewise admitted its mistake in making the insertion without the knowledge of the notary public. It
maintained that it was not a falsification but was made only to speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. Moreover,
PBCOM asserted that Tiu et al were already primarily liable even without the insertion.

RTC allowed the substitution of the altered document with the original. MR denied. At the CA, Tiu et al’s petition was
likewise dismissed.

DOCTRINE:
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the original thereof, this
Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution.

The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when
the cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof “shall” be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof, to wit:

Section 7. Action or defense based on document.—Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading,
and
 the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be
a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.

With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto , after petitioners
have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The
said Section states:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding section,

substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party,
and an opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court
of Appeals, thus:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase ‘or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered’ was stricken-off and
not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the
new rules, ‘the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.’ This should
only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense,
the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay
and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a ‘just, speedy andinexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.’

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially
change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless,
as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such
amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice ; prevent delay;
and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that
the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the
amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to
answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice
in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case
or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.

In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety
agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place instead of
the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the
copy wherein the words “IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard practice.
This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea that what it
submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the
original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.
4. Biglang Awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. NO. 158998, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Ligaya, Charito, Paraluman, and Efren Biglang-awa, with their mother Encarnacion, filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Deeds, Cancellation of Titles, Reconveyance, and Recovery with Damages in the RTC of QC against Roberth
Tolentino and PhilTrust Company.

Biglag-awa and Encarnacion alleged that they owned 8 parcels of land in Novaliches. In 1997, without the knowledge and
consent of Encarnacion and through the use of falsified documents, Tolentino was able to have 4 parcels mortgaged with
PhilTrust. Later one he was able to secure Torrens title in his name over all 8 parcels.

Tolentino filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Ligaya had no capacity to sue on behalf of the others and that she
had no cause of action considering that the parcels were already sold to him. Then, Encarnacion filed a Notice of
Dismissal and claimed that the Complaint was filed without her permission and that the 4 parcels were hers and that she
sold them to Tolentino. PhilTrust also filed its Answer praying that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state cause
of action and that Encarnacion failed to verify and certify.

RTC confirmed the Notice of Dismissal and dismissed the case with prejudice as to Encarnacion and the other defendants.
Tolentino filed a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of Finality. Then, Biglang-awa filed an MR. Subsequently, Biglang-
awa filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Admit Attached Amended Complaint . Said amendment
sought to implead Encarnacion and Liwayway Biglang-awa as defendants. They claimed that as co-owners with
Encarnacion and Liwayway, they secured a partition of the titles over the properties in favor of Tolentino.

Tolentino’s Motion to Dismiss was granted. As such, the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was likewise denied
because the cause of action had changed. Biglang-Awa filed MR which was denied. At the CA, the denial of the MR as
well as the denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint were assailed. Both were denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
With respect to Biglang-awa’s right to amend their Complaint after PhilTrust had filed its Answer, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.—A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after
it is served.

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding Section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the Court upon the matters provided in
this Section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Africa, this Court held that where some but not all of the defendants have answered,
plaintiffs may amend their complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the
non- answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

In the present case, prior to petitioners’ filing of their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached
Amended Complaint, respondent already filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had already filed its answer, it follows that petitioners may no
longer amend their complaint against the former as a matter of right . They may do so only upon leave of court, as
provided under Section 3, Rule 10 of the same Rules, which they did by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint.

In Philippine Ports Authority v. William Gothong & Aboitiz (WG&A), Inc., this Court, in discussing the import of Section
3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, as amended, held that:
 Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off
and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under
the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This
should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT CORRECTLY DISMISSED

On the basis of the foregoing ruling, the denial of petitioners’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on the ground
that the amendment “drastically altered the causes of action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and
among themselves” is erroneous. The RTC did not make any finding that the motion was filed with intent to delay .
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the RTC correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, although
for a different reason.

In their original complaint, petitioners claim that the properties covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632 were owned
exclusively by Encarnacion. There was no mention whatsoever that Encarnacion’s titles over these parcels of land
were obtained through fraud or any other illegal means. However, in their Amended Complaint, in which
petitioners sought to make Encarnacion and Liwayway as defendants, they subsequently seek the nullification of
Encarnacion’s titles over the abovementioned parcels of land by alleging that petitioners, together with Encarnacion
and Liwayway, are co- owners of all the subject lots, and the titles thereto were obtained on the basis of falsified
subdivision agreements and subdivision plans.

It should be noted, however, that the basis of the February 2, 2001 Order and April 16, 2001 Resolution of the trial court,
both of which had already become final and executory, is its finding that the four parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. N-198629 to N-198632 were exclusively owned by Encarnacion. Since the February 2, 2001 Order and the April
16, 2001 Resolution of the RTC have already become final and executory, petitioners are already precluded from claiming
otherwise.

X. BILL OF PARTICULARS (RULE 12)

1. Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001

QUICKIE FACTS:
Dominador Mercader is a businessman who boarded the bus of JB Lines driven by one Jose Baritua. However, Mercader
was not able to reach his destination because the bus fell into a river somewhere in Northern Samar. As a result, he died.

Consequently, Mercader’s wife filed a Complaint for Damages against JB Lines alleging that its driver was negligent and
reckless in operating the bus which caused said bus to fall into the river. JB Lines filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Bill
of Particulars on the ground that Mercader failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party. Mercader filed an
Opposition.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and admitted the Amended Complaint which now impleaded Baritua. In its Answer,
Baritua and JB Lines contend that Mercader did not board said bus because no ticket was issued to him. Nonetheless, RTC
ruled in favor of Mercader. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition claiming that their procedural rights were violated because
CA did not pass upon the issue about the RTC’s failure to rule on their Motion for Bill of Particulars.

DOCTRINE:
It must be noted that Baritua’s counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. The
RTC gave him 10 days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on
April 2, 1985 or 11 days past the deadline set by the trial court . Moreover, such motion was already moot and
academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their Answer and several other pleadings to the
amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:
 Section 1. When applied for; purpose.—Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness
or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the
motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects
complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.

We therefore believe that there is no reason to overturn the assailed CA Decision, which affirmed that of the RTC. It is
a well-settled rule that the trial court’s factual findings, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding,
if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. As clearly
discussed above, petitioners have not presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.

2. Reyes v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Oscar and respondent Rodrigo Reyes are children of Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. They owned shares of Zenith Insurance,
a domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro died in 1964 while Anastacia died in 1993. While Pedro’s estate
had already been partitioned, Anastacia’s was not.

Thereafter, Rodrigo and Zenith filed a complaint with the SEC denominated as a “derivative suit” against Oscar to obtain
accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith. Allegedly, Oscar fraudulently appropriated for himself shares which should
have been distributed to the other heirs.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Oscar denied the allegations and asserted that the requisites for a derivative suit were
not complied with. Later on, RA 8799 took effect which transferred to the RTC exclusive and original jurisdiction over
commercial cases. As such, the SEC case was transferred to the RTC of Makati. Oscar also filed a Motion to Declare
Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra Corporate Controversies.
RTC ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the derivative suit, the other cause of action should be for the settlement of
the estate. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that,
without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective
cause of action. The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake are
required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts
allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.

Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the
required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these
allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are
not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be
characterized as “illegal and fraudulent” were not explained nor elaborated on.

BILL OF PARTICULARS IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING IN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES

In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since
such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars . In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the
complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the
court’s special commercial jurisdiction.

3. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Marcos had been declared in default for failure to respond to alias summons when he was in exile in Hawaii. After
Marcos died, Imelda moved to set aside the order of default which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, as
executor of
Marcos’ estate, Bong Bong filed a Motion for Leave to File Responsive Pleading which was also granted. He even asked
for 3 extensions totaling 35 days to file an Answer. However, instead of filing an Answer, Bong Bong filed a Motion for
Bill of Particulars and prayed for clearer statements of the allegations which he claimed were mere conclusions of law and
thus too vague and general to enable them to intelligently answer. This motion was likewise granted by the
Sandiganbayan.

In opposition, Republic argued that since Motions for Extension to File Answer were filed, the Sandiganbayan should not
have granted the Motion for Bill of Particulars.

DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the allegations against
former President Marcos appear obviously couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show how the
Marcoses acted “in unlawful concert” with Cruz in illegally amassing assets, property and funds in amounts
disproportionate to Cruz’s lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the president at the time.

In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature, manner and extent of
participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above under Cruz; particularly whether former
President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these properties ; and the specific manner in which he acquired such
beneficial control.

The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, as the remedy for
perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which was similarly worded as
the complaint in this case. That doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion for
a bill of particulars. While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and
unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly “in unlawful concert with” the former. There was no
factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by
former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the
allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts,
conditions and circumstances that could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and
sufficiently set forth by petitioner.

That the late president’s co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint does not necessarily
mean that his estate’s executor will be able to file an equally intelligent answer, since the answering defendants’
defense might be personal to them.

Phrases like “in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers with grave and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws,” “unjust enrichment,”
“embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth,” “arrogated unto himself all powers of government,”
are easy and easy to read; they have potential media quotability and they evoke passion with literary flair, not to mention
that it was populist to flaunt those statements in the late 1980s. But they are just that, accusations by generalization.
Motherhood statements they are, although now they might be a politically incorrect expression and an affront to
mothers everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses in the case at bar.

The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses against the
Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars , so that respondent can properly
prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible. To
avoid a situation where its pleadings may be found defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause of action,
petitioner for its part must be given the opportunity to file a bill of particulars . Thus, we are hereby allowing it to
supplement its pleadings now, considering that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed especially
before trial.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound discretion of the court . As
usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless there has been a
palpable
abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order . This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest
latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands
and the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.

4. Estardante v. People, G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Heide Estandarte was the principal of Ramon Torres National High School (RTNHS). Sometime in 1998, a group of
RTNHS teachers sent a letter to the School Division of Bago City with a list of 15 irregularities allegedly committed by
Estandarte. The letter requested that said irregularities be investigated. The same group eventually filed complaints against
Estandarte with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The latter forwarded to the City Prosecutor for Preliminary
Investigation. The Prosector served a subpoena on Estandarte which required him to submit a counter-affidavit.

Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, she filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars alleging that there were no specific criminal
charges that were stated in the subpoenas thereby not giving her the opportunity to intelligently prepare her counter-
affidavit. In response, the Prosecutor issued an Order attaching the complainants’ Bill of Particulars which state that
Estandarte was being charged with §§ 68 and 69 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code). Then, she filed her counter-
affidavit limiting herself to charges specified in the Bill of Particulars.

When the Prosecutor referred the case back to the Ombudsman-Visayas, the latter found her liable under § 3 (e) of RA
3019. As a result, 5 Informations were filed before the RTC. These were all consolidated.

As such, Estandarte filed for a Motion for Reinvestigation on the ground that she cannot be charged with violations of PD
1445 since she was not a collecting officer. Also, she contends that she cannot be liable RA 3019 since the acts did not
constitute “manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.” RTC denied said motion. In her MR, she
contends that her right to due process was violated because the Ombudsman-Visayas went beyond the Bill of Particulars
filed by the complainants. MR denied.

Hence, this petition. She claims that the Ombudsman should have limited the charges filed to those mentioned in the Bill
of Particulars.

DOCTRINE:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a bill of particulars is not allowed by Administrative Order
No. 7, entitled Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman (A.O. No. 7); and that therefore the
Ombudsman cannot be bound by the Bill of Particulars submitted by private complainants.

The Court agrees with the OSG. Clearly, the act of the prosecutor in granting the petitioner’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars is an act contrary to the express mandate of A.O. No. 7, to wit:

Section 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill
of particulars be entertained. If the respondent desires any matter in the complainant’s affidavit to be
clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the
manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

The Court finds the argument of Estandarte that when the City Prosecutor was deputized by the Ombudsman-Visayas to
conduct the preliminary investigation, any action taken therein is, in effect, an action of the Ombudsman, who is bound by
the act of the City Prosecutor in granting the Motion for Bill of Particulars, and is not tenable.

Section 31 of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 expressly provides that those designated or deputized to
assist the Ombudsman shall be under his supervision and control. Indubitably, when the City Prosecutor is deputized
by
the Office of the Ombudsman, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is
subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor’s decision.

Consequently, in the present case, Estandarte has no valid basis for insisting that the Ombudsman-Visayas must be
bound by the erroneous act of the City Prosecutor in granting petitioner’s Motion for Bill of Particulars . Laws and
jurisprudence grant the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to reverse or nullify the acts of the prosecutor pursuant to
its power of control and supervision over deputized prosecutors. Hence, it was within the prerogative of the Ombudsman-
Visayas not to consider the Bill of Particulars submitted by the private complainants.

CANNOT BE DETERMINED IF PETITIONER WAS FULLY APPRISED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HER
While the Bill of Particulars is not allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and therefore
should not be the basis for determining what specific criminal charges should be filed against herein petitioner, it
behooves the Ombudsman to accord the petitioner her basic rights to due process in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the petitioner’s basic due process
rights, such as the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint , the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and
the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents in her defense.

Likewise, Section 4 of A.O. No. 7 provides:

Section 4. Procedure.—The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service
thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of
the counter-affidavits.

In the pleadings submitted before this Court, petitioner complained that the subpoenas served on her did not state the law
allegedly violated by her.

In the Motion for Bill of Particulars she filed before the City Prosecutor, she declared that she was served with
“subpoena together with the documents attached therein .”

However, after a thorough examination of the records, the Court does not find the subpoenas and the alleged
documents served on her. Absent the subpoenas and the documents attached to the subpoenas, how could it be
intelligently determined whether she was fully apprised of the acts complained of and imputed to her; whether she was
given the opportunity to submit an appropriate counter-affidavit to the charges; and whether the charges in the 5
Informations filed against petitioner were based on the same acts complained of and stated in the subpoena and the
documents attached thereto?

It is a basic elementary rule that the complaint should specifically allege the criminal acts complained of, so as to enable
the accused to prepare his answer or counter-affidavit accurately and intelligently. The RTC should have required the
petitioner to submit the subpoenas and the attached documents served on her to enable it to examine the same and
resolve whether the petitioner’s right to be informed was violated. It was only upon ascertaining this fact that the RTC
could have validly determined whether petitioner was denied due process.
XI. SERVICE AND FILING (RULE 13)

1. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
The RTC of Sto Domingo declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land between Marcelino
Domingo & his wife (buyer) and Julio Domingo (seller) due to the forged signature of the seller. Marcelino was thus
ordered to deliver possession of said property to the Domingos. After the appeal was denied, the decision became final
and executory. As such, a Writ of Execution was issued in favor of the Domingos.

Then, Marcelino filed with the DAR a Petition that he be declared as a tenant-beneficiary of the property.

While the DAR case as pending, Marcelino reentered and retook possession of the property. As such, the Domingos filed
in the RTC a Motion to cite Marcelino in contempt for not complying with the judgment. RTC found him in contempt.
Later on, Marcelino employed 6 men to reenter the same property. Thus, they were arrested. They were eventually
released after they declared in writing that they would no longer interfere with the Domingos. RTC also warned Marcelino
that a warrant of arrest will be issued if he reenters the property again.

Afterwards, DAR granted Marcelino’s petition and declared him as tenant-beneficiary. Consequently, Marcelino reentered
and retook the possession of the same property. Then, the Domingos filed another motion in the RTC to cite him in
contempt and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. MR denied. CA also denied Marcelino’s Petition for Certiorari on the
Petition was deemed not filed because there was no written explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of personal
service. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.—Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the
court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was
not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held that:

Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever
practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide
a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays
likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postal service.
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who , wanting to appear
clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices : (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to
catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered
parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in
the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The
 exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11
itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.”

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and
filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had , which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance
of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow
circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the
administration of justice. For the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11
of Rule 13 is mandated.

2. Romulo v. Peralta, G.R. No. 165665, January 31, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 253 which provided for an “open skies” policy in the aviation industry. In said EO, several airports
were opened to international air cargo transportation providers and foreign airlines. As a result, PALEA and other labor
unions filed a Petition in the RTC of Manila assailing the constitutionality of said EO.

OSG, representing the Government, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for lack of cause of action. On Apr 6, 2004,
OSG served by registered mail a copy of its Motion to Dismiss upon Atty. Bacungan, counsel for the unions. On Apr 16,
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was absence of proof of transmittal by registered mail of a
copy of sai motion.

In OSG’s MR, it attached a photocopy of the Registry Receipt. Nonetheless, RTC denied it. OSG filed a Second MR
attaching the following ítems: (a) certified copy of the OSGs; (b) certified copy of the Official Records Book; and (c)
affidavit of one Masangkay-Bayongan, Records Officer, stating that the mail matter sent by the OSG to Atty. Bacungan
was actually a copy of the Motion to Dismiss. Second MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Atty. Bacungan, counsel for the labor unions, received a copy of the OSG’s
motion to dismiss dated April 5, 2004 on April 20, 2004, or 4 days after it was set for hearing. Petitioners insist
though that they sent a copy of their motion to him by registered mail on April 6, 2004.

Sections 7, 10 and 13 of Rule 13, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:

SEC. 7. Service by mail.—Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post
office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise
at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the
mail to sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either
the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.

SEC. 10. Completeness of service.—Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by
ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five
(5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

SEC. 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party
served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement
of the date, place, and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is
made by registered
 mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender or in lieu thereof, the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.

It is clear that where service of a pleading is by REGISTERED MAIL, proof of such service consists of the following:

(1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of
service; and
(2) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.

We recall that in their first motion for reconsideration, OSG attached thereto only a photocopy of registry return
receipt No. 4096. The trial court declared it could not determine on its face whether the registered matter was actually a
copy of the motion to dismiss.

In Cayetano v. Ceguerra, we held that actual knowledge of a decision cannot be attributed to the addressee of a
registered matter where there is no showing that the registry notice itself contains any indication that the registered
matter is a copy of the decision or that the registry notice refers to the case being ventilated . Then, in Sapida v.
Villanueva citing Cayetano, we ruled that we could not justly attribute to respondents “actual knowledge of the order
of denial of their motion for new trial through registered mail because there is no showing that the registry notice
itself or the envelope or the return card for that matter contained any indication or annotation that the registered
matter was indeed and in fact a copy of the said order.”

Anent the affidavit of Josephine S. Masangkay-Bayongan, she stated that “On April 6, 2004, I caused to be served by
registered mail a copy of a Motion to Dismiss dated April 5, 2004 in Civil Case No. 04-109021.” Clearly, she merely
directed that the motion be served by registered mail. She did not actually post the motion by registered mail. The
rule requires that the affidavit must be executed by “the person mailing” the motion.

In sum, registry return receipt No. 4096 does not indicate that what was mailed to Atty. Bacugan , counsel for the
labor unions, was a copy of petitioners’ motion to dismiss; and that Bayongan’s affidavit shows she was not the one
who mailed such copy. It follows that in dismissing the motion to dismiss on the ground that a copy thereof was not
validly served upon private respondents’ counsel, respondent judge acted pursuant to the Rules.

3. Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
After Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed on the REM of Sps. Topacio, it was able to purchase said property at an
auction sale. After getting the Certificate of Sale, RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of BF. However, said writ was
not implemented because Sps. Topacio filed a Petition to Set Aside the Auction Sale and Writ of Possession to which the
RTC issued a TRO. BF filed its Answer. Then, Sps. Topacio filed a Reply.

The proceedings were postponed due to the instance of both parties. N Dec 1986 or 2 years later, the RTC dismissed the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession for failure to prosecute. However, BF was not served a copy of the Order of
Dismissal as it closed operations in Jan 1985.

When BF was reorganized 6 years later, it filed a Motion to Clarify the Order and moved for the Issuance of an Alias Writ
of Possession. The Alias Writ of Possession was granted. As such, Sps Topacio filed an MR which was denied. On
appeal, CA affirmed and held that the previous dismissal was not a dismissal on the merits having been based on purely
technical grounds. Moreover, BF was not served a copy of the Order of Dismissal. Sps. Topacio now contend that RTC
was already barred by res judicata.

DOCTRINE:
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in
the previous suit. The term literally means a “matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.” The
principle bars a
subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that “public
policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.”

The doctrine of res judicata embraces 2 concepts: the first is “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT” under paragraph (b) of Rule
39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is “ CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” under paragraph (c) thereof.
Res judicata applies in the concept of “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT” if the following requisites concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.

The Sps. Topacio claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all of the elements
thereof are present. In response, the BF argues that res judicata did not set in as the first element is lacking. We agree
with the BF.

DEC. 1986 DISMISSAL NEVER ATTAINED FINALITY AS IT WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED
The Sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of judgments.

As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the
counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof . After
service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed 15-day period attains finality .

In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Resolution of the NLRC, denying the
respondent’s MR, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there is no conclusive proof of service of
the said resolution. In the words of the Court, “there was no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by
the respondent’s counsel.” Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired jurisdiction over
the respondent’s petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for
the filing of the petition, the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.

Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang, the Court held that the decision of the RTC did not become final and
executory where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration. The Court also noted that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy
of the said Order or that she indeed received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid
basis for the issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.

In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory in view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the BF’s counsel.

4. Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
QUICKIE FACTS:
Based on a Construction Contract, Atlantic Erectors undertook to construct townhouses on Herbal Cove’s parcel of land in
Tagaytay. However, AE claimed the 180-day period of completion was not complied with due to reasons attributable to
HC. Thus, AE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages in the RTC of Makati. Additionally, AE filed a Notice
of Lis Pendens for the annotation of the pendency of the case on the TCTs thereof.

HC then filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for non-compliance with the Contact’s arbitration clause. Thus,
RTC dismissed the case. AE’s MR was denied. HC also filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens because the
Complaint is a personal action to collect a sum of money and does not directly affect title to or possession real property.
RTC granted the motion. On MR, RTC reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens. On appeal, CA granted HC’s petition and
reinstated the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
DOCTRINE:
PROPER BASIS FOR NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as follows:

(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;

(b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the
occupation thereof.

Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to
or possession of real property . This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable
estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.

Apparently, AE proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the enforcement of a lien. Since the money claim
is for the nonpayment of materials and labor used in the construction of townhouses, the lien referred to would have to be
that provided under Article 2242 of the Civil Code (Contractor’s Lien).

However, a careful examination of AE’s Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such lien or interest
over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction services and
materials plus damages, without mentioning — much less asserting — a lien or an encumbrance over the property.
Verily, it was a purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any
enforceable right, interest or lien in connection with the subject property.

As it is, AE’s money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement of a lien or an
encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint.

COLLECTION CASE WITH DAMAGES NOT PROPER TO ENFORCE CONTRACTOR’S LIEN

Even assuming that AE had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the annotation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for collection and damages is not the proper
mode for the enforcement of a contractor’s lien.

In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the concept of a contractor’s lien under Article
2242 of the Civil Code and the proper mode for its enforcement as follows:

Specifically, the contractor’s lien claimed by the petitioners is granted under the third paragraph of
Article 2242 which provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings or other works shall be preferred with respect to the specific building or other
immovable property constructed.

However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits, i.e., when the same
specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of several creditors and the value of such
property of the debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of
preference will arise, that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of
the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien should then only be
enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding where the claims of all the preferred creditors
may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency proceedings.

Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien thereunder is applicable here ,
because AE’s Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Nowhere does it show that HC’s property was
subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient to pay for all concurring debts. Moreover, the Complaint
did not pertain to insolvency proceedings or to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of preferred creditors
could be ascertained.
5. St. Mary of the Woods School v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, G.R.No. 174290, January 20,
2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Tomas Soriano, father of petitioner Marcial Soriano and respondent Hilario Soriano, owned a few parcels of land in
Makati. Tomas and his wife executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Oro Development Corp (ODC) which covered
said parcels of land. By virtue of said Deed, ownership and title of the properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter,
ODC executed a Deed of Sale in favor of St Mary involving the property.Tomas died intestate.

Later on, Hilario discovered that Tomas’ signature in the Deed of Assignment had been forged. So he filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Assignment and Deed of Sale and Cancellation of the TCTs in ODC’s and St.
Mary’s name. By reason of this, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on the titles of ODC.

Marcial Soriano, however, recognized the validity of the transfer of property. Thus, he sought to dismiss the case. RTC
dismissed the case. RTC denied the MR. So, Marcial filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens which was granted.
Hilario appealed to the CA. Pending appeal, St. Mary mortgaged the property for 8M. Eventually, Hilario’s appeal was
granted and Reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens.

Aggrieved, Marcial filed this petition. They claim that the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens was valid and proper
because they were issued on the basis of Hilario’s lack of interest/right over the properties.

DOCTRINE:
Granting arguendo that the present special civil action for certiorari can be given due course, the Court still finds that the
CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting Hilario’s Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of
Lis Pendens.

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires
over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public
policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended:

(1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to
prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation; and
(2) to announce to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property.

A trial court has, however, the inherent POWER TO CANCEL a notice of lis pendens, under the express provisions of law.
As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on 2
grounds:

(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.

Considering that the dismissal of Hilario’s Complaint by the RTC was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Complaint
refers to the properties covered by TCTs No. 175209, No. 220977, and No. 220978 that bear the annotations of lis
pendens, and such properties therefore are irrefragably still the subject matter of litigation, the CA rightly saw the
need for giving notice to the public of such a fact . The necessity becomes even more compelling considering that
St. Mary had already entered into transactions with third parties involving the subject properties.

6. Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of a parcel of land. In Oct 1 1987, the latter executed a Deed of Sale in
favor of Sps. Vicente over said land. On the other hand, Delia Avera alleged that on Oct 9 1987, sold the same land to her
husband Roberto Domingo. In 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage wherein she asserted her
exclusive
ownership over said property. As such, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated. In 1997, Sps. Vicente possessed the
property and a new TCT was issued to them which carried over the Notice of Lis Pendens.

RTC finally declared the marriage of Avera and Domingo null and void and ordered their conjugal properties to be in
Avera’s custody. The same RTC also issued an Alias Writ of Execution ordering Sps. Vicente to vacate since the transfer
was made despite the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. Sps. Vicente sought to enjoin the implementation of the
Alias Writ of Execution and a TRO was issued. CA set this aside. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Petitioners’ title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered by the notice of lis
pendens. Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a purchaser of the property affected by
the notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of
filing such notice. Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule.

Thus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any judgment,
which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation.

A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real
rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution. While the notice of lis pendens
remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it
during the litigation. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting
the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation . For this reason, the Court has pronounced
that a “purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and
a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending
litigation.”

In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners’ title to the property in dispute. A notice of lis
pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee who acquires land with a
notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which
case the transferee’s title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern
litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The
notice of lis pendens pertains to the Nullity case between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao’s title to the
property in dispute is not subject to the results of the Nullity case, petitioners’ title to the same property is also not
subject to the results of the Nullity case.

7. Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012
QUICKIE FACTS:
The case started when Aberca et al, as suspected subversives, were arrested, detained, and allegely tortured by Fabian
Ver’s forces. A Complaint for Damages were filed by Aberca et al but was eventually dismissed on motion of Ver et al
through then SolGen Estelito Mendoza. However, pending appeal, EDSA Revolution broke out.

In 1988, the SC declared to annul the Dismissal of the case and remanded the case to trial. However, the trial could not
proceed immediately because the records of the case were burned when the QC City Hall burned down. Thus, in 1989,
Abera et al sought to reconstitute the record of the case. When the Petition for Reconstitution was set for hearing, Ver et al
were not notified. Thus, it was granted.

Aberca was directed to report to the RTC the addresses and whereabouts of Ver et al. However, Aberca could not comply.
Instead, it sought to declare them in default. RTC denied the Motion to Declare in Default becauase Ver et al were not
duly notified by the SC decisión. RTC granted the request to serve Notice to File Answer by Publication After the Notices
were published in BALITA, no answer was still filed. Thus, RTC declared them in default. CA reversed. Hence, this
petitition. Aberca et al claims that the RTC did not err in declaring Ver et al in default and in allowing them to present
evidence ex parte.
DOCTRINE:
Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one’s person or
property. Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court adopted
and promulgated Sections 5, 6, 7, & 8 of Rule 13 concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other
papers, namely:

(1) personal service;

(2) service by mail; and
(3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail.

The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the substantive rights of
all party litigants. It is for this reason that the basic rules on the modes of service provided under Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court have been made MANDATORY and, hence, should be STRICTLY FOLLOWED.

In the case at bench, the Ver et al were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based
on a defective mode of service — service of notice to file answer by publication . The rules on service of pleadings,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default.
The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default
and in allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.

As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC’s August 17, 1990 Order was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the
respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred modes of service, however, were never
resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the petitioners failed to comply with the August 17, 1990 RTC order
requiring them to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less
preferred but proper mode of service available — substituted service — which is service made by delivering the copy
to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute
mode of service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail . Instead,
the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules , which was service of notice to file answer by
publication.

In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC should have instead directed the petitioners to
exert diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by registered mail . In case the preferred modes
were impractical, the Court should have required the petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts exerted
towards personal service or service by mail failed . In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal
service or service by mail to the respondents should have been shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the
publication of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack
of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail .

At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the circumstances
considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government positions.

To stress, the ONLY MODES OF SERVICE of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed
by the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by mail
cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to
file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized.

SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of SUMMONS stated
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons in civil cases are :
 (1) personal service;
(2) substituted service;and
(3) service by publication.

Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.— Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall
be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed
to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him
also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.

8. FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
As a result of the failure in negotiations between FEU and its workers’ unión, the unión filed a notice to strike. Thereafter,
FEU filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction with the NLRC. The Secretary of Labor granted the Petition and
issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which would effectively prohibit any strike or lockout.

However, in his certification, the NLRC process server claimed that at 4PM of Sep 5 1996, he attempted to serve a copy
of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the unión officers but no one was around at the strike area. As such, he just
posted copies of the order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.

Claiming that they had no knowledge, the striking employees continued to hold the strike. Sec of Labor issued another
order directing all employees to return to work and for FEU to accept them under the same terms and conditions. Later
FEU filed a case before the NLRC contending that the unión staged a strike in defience of the Assumptio Order. LA
declared the strike ilegal and dismissed the unión officers. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed on the ground that no personal
service was validly effected by the process.

DOCTRINE:
The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was rendered impossible since the striking
employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of
Procedure read:

Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.

(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the case personally by
the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail; Provided, That in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in cases of
decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel or
representative by registered mail; Provided further, that in cases where a party to a case or his
counsel on record personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party
shall be deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that where parties are so
numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be
practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code,
as amended.

An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT
for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality . Consequently, the rule on service of summons and orders,
and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction
Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of ORDERS should be made by the process server either
personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and
the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same
should be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by
the intended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the
proper mode of serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order in conspicuous
places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules, nor is it even referred to when the said rules
enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted service, in case personal service is impossible by the absence
of the party concerned.

Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due
process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make prompt service
impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in
the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and
discretion then residing therein.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that statutory restrictions
for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule
renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of
this rigid requirement is that the person, to whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the
consequences of the suit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom
the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending proceedings. Applying this principle in the case at
bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred
from the circumstances considering the adverse effect in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by
such Order.

Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper
service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was
invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not
properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.

9. Republic v. BPI, 705 SCRA 650 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
DPWH filed an Expropriation case against portions of properties owned by BPI and Bayani Villanueva for the
construction of the Zapote-Alabang Flyover. On 25 Nov. 1998, the RTC set the FMV at 40K psm. On Dec. 15, 1998, the
branch clerk issued a Certification that the decision has become final, executory, and unappealable. Meanwhile, on Dec
16, 1998, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine just compensation of the building which was not included
in the determination of just compensation. BPI claimed that the motion was timely filed since it only received a copy of
the Decision on Dec 1, 1998. RTC granted said Motion for Partial New Trial.

For failure of DPWH to appear in the hearing, BPI was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On Sep 10, 1999, RTC set
just compensation for the building at 2.6M. DPWH filed MR which was granted. Thereafter, RTC set a new amount of
just compensation at 1.9M. DPWH appealed claiming that the Nov 1998 decision already attained finality. However, CA
dismissed the appeal stating when BPI filed the Motion, the Decision has not yet attained finality due to the absenceof any
Return or Affidavit of the party serving the Decision was attached.

DOCTRINE:
A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998 Decision had already become final,
executory and unappealable as to petitioner:
 The Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY and
UNAPPEALABLE as of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the Solicitor General
failed to file any Notice of Appeal or Motion for Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof
on November 26, 1998.

There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record. Section 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court states that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail.
Section 13 of the same Rule provides what consists PROOF OF SERVICE:

Proof of PERSONAL SERVICE shall consist of a written admission of the party served , or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place
and manner of service. x x x If service is made by REGISTERED MAIL, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office . The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender.

A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25 November 1998 was served
upon BPI. Hence, the CA correctly held that absent any proof of service to BPI of the Decision, the period of 15
days within which to file its motion for partial new trial did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPI’s
admission that it received a copy of the Decision on 01 December 1998 is binding on it, and was correctly
considered by the CA as the reckoning date to count the 15-day period.

XII. SUMMONS (RULE 14)

1. Cada v. Time Saver, G.R. No. 181480, January 30, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Josefina Cada worked as a Presser at Time Saver Laundry, a single proprietorship owned by Leslie Perez. For allegedly
failing top pay her overtime pay and other employment benefits, she filed a case for illegal dismissal and underpayment of
salary with against Time Saver in the NLRC.

The bailiff sought to serve summons on Leslie Perez personally. However, since she was out of town, it was served upon
one of Cada’s co-workers Alfredo Perez.

Time Saver/Perez failed to appear so the LA heard the case ex parte. Based on Cada’s position papers, the LA ruled in her
favor. Time Saver/Perez appealed to the NLRC on the ground of improper service of summons. Nonetheless, NLRC
affirmed the LA stating that they were given opportunity to be heard. In the CA, NLRC was reversed stating that
considering that the summons were not personally served upon Leslie Perez, no jurisdiction was properly acquired over
her person. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Based on the NLRC Rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case personally. The same
rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court.

Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should be made personally.
But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified? Obviously,
in this case, personal service of summons was not practicable. By Leslie Perez’s own admission, she was out of
town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter . Given this admission, she would be unable to
personally receive the summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter.

Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some other time to personally serve the summons on respondent Perez, it
would still yield the same result. To proceed with personal service of summons on respondent Perez who
unequivocally admits that she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not
only be impractical and futile - it would be absurd.

While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be made personally,
considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of summons at TSL, Leslie Perez’s place of
business, amounts to SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with the Rules.

In the fairly recent case of Scenarios v. Vinluan, service of summons by registered mail at therein petitioners’ place of
business was considered valid. This Court declared in the said case that technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied in quasi-judicial proceedings ; only substantial compliance is required . That the summons was served in the
premises of therein petitioners’ office was enough to convince the court that the service of said processes was completed
and resultantly, the requirement of notice has been served.

In QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRC and its ARBITRATION BRANCH, procedural rules governing
service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient . The constitutional
requirement of due process with respect to service of summons only exacts that the service of summons be such as may
reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes
that end, the requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process is served.

To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws
in favor of labor. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules maybe relaxed in the interest of the
working man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties.

Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed;
that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasijudicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts
and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct,
if any, is on the part of respondents who, in this case, clearly failed to discharge the same.

2. Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Constantino Pascual filed an Action for Specific Performance in RTC of Malolos against Lourdes Pascual. In the Process
Server’s Return, it indicated that:

May 20, 2002: He went to Lourdes’ house in QC but the latter was not home and her maid refused to receive summons.
He then requested the Barangay for a certifcation that he exerted efforts to effect service. The next day, Lourdes was still
not at her house. On May 29, 2002, an Alias Summons was issued. Still, the maid said she was not at her house even
though her car was there and neighbors verified that she was just inside. As such, the Alias Summons was returned
unserved. On August 14, 2002, the Process Server reported that he effected Substituted Service by leaving a copy to the
maid who is of age and of reason but refused to sign.

For failure of Lourdes to file an Answer, Constantino moved to declare her in default. RTC granted said motion and
allowed Constantino to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in Constantino’s favor ordering Lourdes not to interfere in
the corporate affairs of Rosemoor Mining. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decisión. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
In a case where the ACTION IS IN PERSONAM and the DEFENDANT IS IN THE PHILIPPINES, the service of summons may
be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. A
plain and simple reading of the provisions indicates that personal service of summons should and always be the first
option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server
resort to substituted service .

This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the NATURE and REQUISITES of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals, et al.:
 (1) IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE: The party relying on substituted service or the
sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service.

(2) SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE RETURN: The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service . The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.

(3) A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION: If the substituted service will be effected at
defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of “suitable age and discretion then
residing therein.”

(4) A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE: If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office
or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

Constantino contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not one, but three Officer’s
Return. He points out that the absence in the officer’s return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service
does not conclusively prove that the service was invalid. He adds that proof of prior attempts to serve personally can be
deduced from the other returns when there are several in a series of officer’s returns all tending to establish the
impossibility of personal service upon the respondent. However, the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain
deduction that veers away from the well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant cannot
be served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service.

The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any POSITIVE STEPS taken by the
officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon, this Court ruled
that:

The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the
process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best,
the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying
the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld . This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute.

Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions must be applied to the
present case. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that there was a strict compliance with the
procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for a
substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
public functions does not apply.
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never vested with the RTC ,
because the manner of substituted service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such,
there
was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons , “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is null and void.”

3. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Trajano sought to enforce a foreign judgment against Imee Marcos-Manotoc by the US District Court of Hawaii. As such,
Summons was served to Manotoc’s representative, Macky dela Cruz (caretaker) at Alexandria Condo in Pasig. For her
failure to file an Answer, the RTC ordered her to be in default. By special appearance of her counsel, she filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over her person due to invalid service of summons because she was a resident of
Singapore, Alexandria was not her dwelling, residence, or place of business, Dela Cruz was not her representative, and
that the Rule on Summons was not complied with.

During the hearing for the Motion to Dismiss, she presented a resident of Alexandria who testified that she he only saw
Imee twice. She also presented her Passport showing that she was in Singapore at that time. On the other hand, Trajano
presented a lawyer in the “Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation” who said that Bong Bong confirmed Imee’s
residence in Alexandria in his deposition.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. CA affirmed and stated that there was valid substituted service. Hence, this

petition. DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and
void.” In an ACTION STRICTLY IN PERSONAM, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service,
that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons , cannot be
served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to . While substituted
service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.”
Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by
the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.”

REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, see previous case

INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts
to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why
those efforts proved inadequate , to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of “on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons personally,” “at reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.” Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from the
ruling — in Domagas v. Jensen and other related cases — that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts
exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times ,
on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made . Given the fact that the substituted
service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent
facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return or
Certificate of Service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent
Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly,
the second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were “informed, and so [they] allege” about the
address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort
in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged
petitioner’s residence
or house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been
pursued persistently.

Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine
performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service — for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal
carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by
a defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff’s Return should clearly
and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.

PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defendant’s
house or residence. Thus, there are 2 requirements under the Rules:

(1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and

(2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.

Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to residence, age, and
discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff’s general assertion that de la Cruz is the “resident caretaker” of
petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It
is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married
woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s
allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional
information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons
is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary “relation of confidence” with petitioner. To protect
petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons
must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

Based on the above principles, Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements
of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Due to non-compliance
with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.

4. Sansio v. Mogol, G.R. No. 177007, July 14, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Mogol purchased aircon units and fans from Sansio Philippines and paid with postdated checks. However, some of
them bounced. So Sansio filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Sps Mogol in the MTC of Manila. In
the Complaint, it stated that service of process to the Sps will be made at their residence in Lucena City.

When the case was filed, the Process Server of MTC Manila served the Summons and the Copy of the Complaint to the
Sps. Mogol at the courtroom in Branch 24 since they were already in the premises while waiting for their hearing in a
violation of BP22 case filed by Sansio. Upon being informed of said summons, Sps. Mogol referred it to their lawyer.
Said lawyer then informed the process server that summons can only be served on the address indicated in the Complaint.
So, he gave the summons back to the Process Server.

A Return of Service was given to MTC which reported what had happened. For failure to file any responsive pleading,
Sansio moved to declare the Sps. Mogol in default despite valid personal service of summons. They also prayed that
judgment be rendered in their favor. Sps. Mogol opposed contending that there was no valid service of summons.

DOCTRINE:
A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a CIVIL ACTION,
jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and
void. Where the
action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made
through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS most
effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished.
The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself,
wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.

In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of spouses Mogol.
To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at
the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila , Branch 24. The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who
was present with them in the aforesaid courtroom. At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons
and the copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said documents.
Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy
of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest
and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in
person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the
summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material.

Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the summons and the
copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only in the address stated therein, was a
gross mistake.

Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person
must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear
that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch
50, the service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch
24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait for respondent
spouses Mogol to reach their given address, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, before he could
serve on the latter the summons and the copy of the complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein
would have been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server in effecting
the service of the summons.

PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS PREFERRED OVER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE

Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not
provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience
to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred
over substituted service.

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to
bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even though notice of such action is served not upon
him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For substituted
service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or
upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business.
Relevantly, in Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., very categorical was our statement that the
service of summons to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant’s actual
residence. It is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by
law.

5. Republic v. Glasgow, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Republic filed a Complaint for Civil Forefeiture of Assets (with Urgent Plea for Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injuction) against the bank deposits of Glasgow in Citystate Savings Bank Inc (CSBI) pursuant to the Anti-
Money Laundering Act. After being raffled, its hearing for its application of WPI was set. After the hearing, WPI was
granted.

Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned “unserved” since it could not be found in its last known address. As such,
Republic filed an ómnibus motion for issuance of Alias Summons and Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication.
However the RTC only directed the issuance of Alias Summons.

For not being able to serve the Alias Summons, the RTC archived the case. Upon motion of Republic, the case was
reinstated and directed again the Republic to serve the Alias Summons o Glasgow & CSBI. However, it still did not
resolve on the motion regarding Summons by Publication. The Alias Summons on Glasgow was again returned unserved
for the same reason.

Thereafter, Glasgow filed a Motion to Dimiss (By Way of Special Appearance) on the ground of Failure to Prosecute
which was received by the OSG. RTC dismissed the case over the Republic’s objections. Hence, this Petition.

DOCTRINE:
There was no failure to prosecute. Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to
prosecute the complaint for civil forfeiture? While there was admittedly a delay in the proceeding , it could not be
entirely or primarily ascribed to the Republic . That Glasgow’s whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only
beyond the Republic’s control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which left its principal office address without
informing the Securities and Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the
Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In Marahay v. Melicor, this Court ruled:

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of
the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority
to dismiss.

We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republic’s complaint.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS MAY BE BY PUBLICATION

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court declared that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem.
While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under
RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties either acquired illegally or related to
unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. In actions in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court ,
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the
defendant
in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such
mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.

In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 8. Notice and manner of service. — (a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the
same manner as service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:

(1) The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court;
(2) The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and
(iv) the relief prayed for; and
(3) The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within the
reglementary period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render such judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting evidence.

(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the
value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not be required.

6. Palma v. Galvez, G.R.No. 165273, March 10, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
Leah Palma filed an Action for Damages against Phil. Heart Center, Dr. Giron, and Dr. Cruz for medical malpractice in
negligently removing her right ovary. Answers were thereafter filed. Subsequently, however, Palma filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Complaint praying for the inclusión of the nurses at PHC including prívate repsondent Agudo.
After the RTC granted the Motion, summons were issued to them.

RTC’s process server submitted his return stating that the alias summons and copies of the complaint were served upon
Agudo thru her husband who received and signed the same since Agudo was temporarily out of the country (Ireland).
Thereafter, Agudo’s lawyer filed a Notice of Appearance and Motion for the Extension of Time to File Answer. Days
later, another Motion for Extension was filed stating that the draft Answer would still be coursed through the Phil.
Consulate in Ireland for the clarification of Agudo.

Thereafter, Agudo filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
served with summons properly. According to the RTC, considering she was a resident temporarily out of the country, she
can only be served summons by publication. Over Palma’s objections, RTC dismissed the Complaint for invalid service of
summons. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
In CIVIL CASES, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of
summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Agudo was a Filipino
resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of
summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court , which provides:

Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may,
by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:
 SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by PERSONAL SERVICE as under section 6;
or BY PUBLICATION in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.”

In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not
mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a RESIDENT DEFENDANT is
TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to:

(1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14;
(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Considering that Agudo was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her
through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. —If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made , even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is,
thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a
relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that
such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.

In this case, the Sheriff’s Return stated that Augdo was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her
residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age
and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent’s behalf.

Notably, Agudo makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was served was her residence ,
though she was temporarily out of the country at that time , and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of
appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer submitted by private respondent’s counsel, he
confirmed the Sheriff’s Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his service was ngaged
by respondent’s husband.
These statements establish the fact that Agudo had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that her husband had
told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.

In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Agudo when the
latter’s counsel entered his appearance on Agudo’s behalf , without qualification and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even filed 2 Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.

7. Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Angela Paglicawan was first married to one Vernier Quijano. They bore 3 children (Yolanda, Epifania, Napoleon,
respondents herein). The spouses thereafter bécame estranged causing their separation. Vernier lived in Mindoro while
Angela worked and lived in Muntinlupa. While working thereat, she met Jesus Asance and lived together as as common
law spouses and bore Jesulito, Manuel, and Nestor (petitioners herein).

In 1966, Angela worked as a nurse in the US. With her earnings, she bought a parcel of land in Muntinlupa. When Vernier
Quiano died, Angela married Jesus. Thereafter Jesus died. The Acance siblings with Angela sought an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate which includes the Muntinlupa property. As a result, TCTs were issued in the name of the Asance
siblings.

As such, the Quijanos filed in the RTC of Muntinlupa an Action to Annul the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
JEsus Asance and Waiver of Rights executed by Acance. They claim that they have a valid right to succeed over the
Muntinlupa property especially considering that it was acquired during the subsistence of Angela’s marriage with Vernier.

Upon motion of the Quijanos were able to ask the RTC to declare Asance in default for failure to file an Answer. A
Motion to Lift Order of Default was thereafter filed which was denied. The RTC said that being residents of the US and
the subject of the complaint being situated in Muntinlupa, they were deemed served with summons through publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation. Despite said publicaiton, no Answer was filed.

In certiorari, the Asance went to the CA but were denied. Hence, this

petition. DOCTRINE:
In this case, the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Acance spouses in default without
showing that there was full compliance with the requirements for extraterritorial service of summons under
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The said provision reads:

Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by PERSONAL SERVICE as under Section 6;
or BY PUBLICATION in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered
mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

The Acance spouses are citizens of the United States and residents thereof. Further, the suit against them involves
real property wherein they have an interest. These facts clearly warranted extraterritorial service of summons in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for service of summons on a nonresident
defendant is explained, thus:
We repeat, service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is
required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance
of
 the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him
and the possibility that the property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded
an opportunity to defend in the action , if he be so minded. The only relief that may be granted in such
an action against such a nonresident defendant, who does not choose to submit himself to the jurisdiction
of the Philippine court, is limited to the res.

In its Order dated April 26, 2002, the court a quo declared the petitioners in default. However, as will be shown shortly,
the service of summons in this case is defective. There was no showing that copies of the summons and the
amended complaint were duly served at the petitioners’ last known correct address by registered mail, as a
complement to the publication pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and in compliance with the court a
quo’s Order dated July 1, 2001 granting the respondents’ motion for leave to serve summons by publication.

The respondents alleged that they had “caused copies of the Amended Complaint and Summons and the 1 July 2001
Order to be sent on November 13, 2001 by registered mail to the Acances’ known addresses in the United States.”
However, except for this bare allegation, the corresponding registry receipts or copies thereof were not presented to
show compliance with the rules.

NO PROOF OF SERVICE BY PUBLICATION

Further, there was likewise non-compliance with Section 19, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court relating to the proof of
service by publication. The said provision reads:

Sec. 19. Proof of service by publication. — If the service has been made by publication , service may be proved
by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising
manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit showing the deposit
of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known address.

While the respondents claimed that they had complied with the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, it does not appear that they had presented the court a quo the “affidavit of the printer, his
foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager” of the “ Remate,” where the
publication was allegedly made, to prove such service by publication.

Neither did they present an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order of publication in the
post office, postage prepaid, directed to the petitioners by registered mail to their last known addresses.

The failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the
summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.

Under the circumstances, the setting aside of the order of default is in order. The petitioners should be afforded the
opportunity to present evidence on their behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved .

8. Cabigao v. Nery, 707 SCRA 424 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Cabigao represented Vision Automotive Technology in a case before the MTC of Manila. Sheriff Nery called his
client and asked for Money to cover the transportation expenses in serving summons to the defendant in New Manila.
Accordingly, his client deposited P1,000 in Nery’s account in Land Bank. However, despite receipt of said money, Nery
still failed to serve summons. As a result, Atty. Cabiga filed an administrative complaint against Nery.

Nery denied and said it was a representative of Vision Automotive who insiste don depositing the money after Nery told
them that it was burdensome to withdraw the amount from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund. Likewise, he avered that he never
meant to tarnish the image of the judiciary when he accepted the money. Also, he said he already served summons on
March 2012 and then returned the remaining balance of what was deposited.
OCA recommended that he was liable for simple neglect and less serious dishonesty

DOCTRINE:
Summons to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the
payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any
other person serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so
constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him,
and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.

It took Nery more than two months to serve the summons to the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC from the time
the same was raffled to their branch. Civil Case No. 01785-SC was raffled to the MeTC of Manila, Branch 30, on January
13, 2012; Nery was only able to serve the summons on the defendant therein only on March 16, 2012. Explaining the
delay in the service of the summons, Nery claims that Vision Automotive, from the time it deposited the P1,000.00 in his
bank account, no longer coordinated with him as regards the service of the summons. Nery’s reasoning is flawed. The
supposed lack of coordination on the part of Vision Automotive would not hinder the service of the summons to the
defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC. To stress, once issued by the clerk of court, it becomes the duty of the sheriff,
process server or any other person serving court processes to promptly serve the summons on the defendant in a
case.

There being no sufficient justification for his delay in serving the summons on the defendant in the said case, Nery
clearly disregarded his duty to promptly serve the Summons on the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC and
should thus be held liable for simple neglect of duty.

SHERIFFS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO RECEIVE PAYMENTS FROM PARTIES

It is likewise improper for Nery to ask and actually receive money from Vision Automotive, even if the money would be
used to defray the expenses in serving the summons to the defendant in Civil Case No. 01785-SC. “Sheriffs are not
allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the proper procedural steps .”

Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, outlines the procedure to be observed in
defraying the actual travel expenses in serving summons. Accordingly, the plaintiff in a case is required to deposit the
amount of P1,000.00 with the clerk of court, which would be used to defray the actual travel expenses in serving
the summons. The sheriff, process server or any other person authorized to serve court processes would then submit to
the court a statement of estimated travel expenses for the service of the summons. Once the court approves the
statement of estimated travel expenses, the clerk of court shall release the money to the sheriff, process server or any other
person authorized to serve court processes.

Nery failed to follow the foregoing procedure and, instead, opted to ask Vision Automotive to defray the actual
travel expenses that would be incurred in serving the summons to the defendant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Neptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, is
found GUlLTY of less serious dishonesty, and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of P20,000.00. Neptali
Angelo
V. Nery is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record.

XIII. Motions (Rule 15)

1. Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003

QUICKIE FACTS:
Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. The latter was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in
Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion
of said property. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. Benedicto’s lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate.
Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. RTC ruled in
favor of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all improvements thereon.

Days before the expiration of the period to appeal, on May 30, 1997, Republic filed through registered mail a Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC decison. However, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it failed to
incorporate any notice of hearing as required by the Rules. From this decisión, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. In
opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere scap of paper and thus did not
toll the running of the reglementary period.

Pending all this, the RTC judge retired. The new judge issued an order giving due course to Republic’s Appeal but was
again reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was
granted. Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of Execution. MR
denied.

On certiorari in the CA, Republic’s petition was again dismissed. Hence, this

petition. DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a
new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule , a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to
all the parties concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice
of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.
The requirements, far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of
procedural due process.

Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court
would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear
him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The
requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma;a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right
to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of
a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion.

In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until
June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal
from said adverse decision . Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997
within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that
there is no proof that Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule
13 of the Rules of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

2. Preysler v. Manila Southcoast, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
Preysler Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against MS. It alleged that Preysler’s property in Nasugbu covered by
TCT overlapped with MS’ TCT. MTC ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered MS to vacate. On appeal, RTC reversed and
dismissed Preysler’s Complaint.

Preysler received the RTC Decision on Feb 9, 2004 and then filed an MR which was set for hearing on Feb 26, 2004.
Preysler sent a copy of the MR to MS through registrered mail on Feb. 23, 2004. However, it was only on March 3, 2004,
or 6 days after the scheduled hearing that MS received a copy of the MR.
During the scheduled hearing, the judge reset the hearing to April 2. Thereafter, it was again rescheduled to April 7.
Finally, said hearing was reset to August 6. After the hearing, MS filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the 3-Day
Notice Rule was not complied with and thus did not stop the running of the period thereby causing the RTC Decision to
become final and executory. RTC declared that the decision had become final and executory because Preysler’s MR was
fatally flawed. CA likewise dismissed the petition for certiorari and stated the the 3-Day Notice Rule was mandatory.

DOCTRINE:
The 3-Day Notice Rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in
the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of
its authority.

Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure
are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of
motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion
was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of
hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where
the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The
Court held:

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party , who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The TEST is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

In this case, the CA ruled that Preysler failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the CA overlooked
the fact that although MS received Preysler’s MR six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004 , the
said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than
5 months after MS received a copy of Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC.
Clearly, MS had more than sufficient time to oppose Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did
oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we
find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the
merits.

OMNIBUS MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED

Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the
3-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioner’s Omnibus Motion which was set to be
heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the
notice of hearing was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice.

We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that “[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.” Thus, the date of the hearing
should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent
should have received the
notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent’s
receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard
on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days’ notice.

As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should
be given:

The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be SERVED BY TUESDAY at the latest, in
order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with. If notice be given by ordinary mail,
it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first
notice of the postmaster should be at least (5) days before Tuesday.

3. Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 143440

QUICKIE FACTS:
Jemelee Bolos, a student of St. Bridget, died in a vehicular accident involving her School Service Vehicle and an Isuzu
Truck. Initially, the owners of the School Service Vehicle (Bacelonia) sued the owner (Roxas-Cu) and driver (Carino) of
the Isuzu Truck for damages. However, the case was dismissed after the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.

Subsequently, the parents of Jemelee Bolos filed a Complaint for Damages against Bacelonias, Roxas-Cu, and Carino. As
a result, Bacelonia filed a Motion to be Dropped as Defendants on the ground of the Compromise Agreement entered into
by the co-defendants previously wherein it was alleged that Roxas-Cu admitted sole responsibility. Roxas-Cu opposed
and denied having admitted anything and that res judicate does not apply in the present case.

RTC denied the Bacelonia’s Motion to be Dropped and scheduled the reception of evidence of the defense on Feb. 3,
2000. As such, on Jan 31, 2000, Bacelonias filed an MR and set the hearing on Feb. 15, 2000. On the same day, they
also filed another motion to Cancel the Hearing for Presentation of Evidence on Feb 3. Sps Bolos opposed both motions.

During the hearing on Feb 3, RTC denied the MR. On certiorari, CA dismissed Bacelonia’s petition. Hence, this

petition. DOCTRINE:
The CA correctly dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Bacelonia’s MR on February 3, 2000.

It should be noted that the MR of the RTC’s resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by Bacelonia on January 31, 2000.
The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:

Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must NOT BE LATER than ten (10) days after the
filing of the motion.

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said MR was BEYOND THE PERIOD specified by the Revised Rules of
Court which was not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the
above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term “must” in fixing the period within which the motion
shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15,
Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.
XIV. MOTION TO DISMISS (RULE 16)

1. Heirs of Loreto Maramag v.Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
The Legitimate Heirs of Loreto seek the reduction and revocation of insurance proceeds of the lllegitimate Heirs. They
claim that Eva De Guzman was a concubine of Loreto and is suspected of having killed the latter and thus disqualified to
receive proceeds from Loreto’s insurance policies with Insural Life and Grepalife. Moreover, it is claimed the illegitimate
children of Loreto are entitled to only ½ of the legitime of the legitimate children.

In their Answer, Insular and Grepalife averred that since Eva was disqualified as beneficiary, the Insurance proceeds
should go to the illegitimate children. A Motion to Dismiss was likewise incorporated alleging that the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action considering that the Insurance Code provides that once a beneficiary has been revoked and
disqualified, the proceeds must go to the remaining beneficiaries (illegimate children).

DOCTRINE:
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action,
as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads —

SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action
when it contains the 3 elements of a cause of action:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff;

(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right.

If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action.

When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the FACTS ALLEGED
in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test
of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true,
the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general
rule.

However, this rule is SUBJECT TO WELL-RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of the allegations if:

(1) the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

(2) such allegations are legally impossible;
(3) the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
(4) by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
(5) there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the
hearings related to the case.

In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of
Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis
of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are
entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance
Code, Eva’s share in the
proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that
the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the
legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article
2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the
Insurance Code.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if
still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this
rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the
form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the
proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance
proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit
relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is
disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.

2. UCPB v. Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
UCPB granted Sps. Beluso a Credit Line so they could avail of loans. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over
some land in Roxas City. Years later, Beluso did not pay when the loans became due. As such, UCPB foreclosed on the
Roxas City properties subject to the mortgage. Consequently, Beluso filed a Petititon for Annulment, Accounting, and
Damages against UCPB in the RTC of Makati on the ground that the stipulation as to the interest rate was invalid.

UCPB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of forum shopping allegedly because the Sps. Beluso
instituted another case in the RTC of Roxas City involving the same parties and issues. However, Beluso contends that the
Petition for Injunction against Foreclosure (Roxas City) is about the propriety of the foreclosure while the case in Makati
deals with the validity of the interest rate provision.

RTC of Makati denied UCPB’s Motion to Dismiss. In the CA, UCPB’s petition was denied. Hence, this

petition. DOCTRINE:
Even if we assume for the sake of argument, however, that only one cause of action is involved in the 2 civil actions,
namely, the violation of the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property foreclosed for an amount they do not
owe, the Rules of Court nevertheless allows the filing of the second action. Civil Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by the
RTC of Roxas City before the filing of Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati City, since the venue of litigation
as provided for in the Credit Agreement is in Makati City.

Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously dismissed only in the following instances:

SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based
on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (n)

IMPROPER VENUE as a ground for the dismissal of an action is found in paragraph (c) of Section 1, not in paragraphs
(f), (h) and (i).
When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action
is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action CANNOT be refiled. As regards all the other grounds , the
complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after
the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be.

UCPB, however, brings to the attention of this Court a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Beluso on 15
January 1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso
filed Civil Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati . Hence, there were allegedly two pending actions between the
same parties on the same issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 99-314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of
Makati. This will still not change our findings.

It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the same
issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. According to this Court
in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals:

In these cases, it is evident that the first action was filed in anticipation of the filing of the later
action and the purpose is to preempt the later suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal of the
second action.

Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the
later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties.

In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before the RTC of Roxas City was an action for injunction against a
foreclosure sale that has already been held, while Civil Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of Makati City includes an
action for the annulment of said foreclosure, an action certainly more proper in view of the execution of the foreclosure
sale. The former case was improperly filed in Roxas City , while the latter was filed in Makati City, the proper
venue of the action as mandated by the Credit Agreement. It is evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-314 is the
more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties, as compared to Civil Case No. V-7227. Thus,
we rule that the RTC of Makati City was not in error in not dismissing Civil Case No. 99-314.

3. Manila Banking v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
MBC granted a 14M credit line to UB for the construction of buildings and the purchase of new equipment. Vice
Chairman Bautista signed in behalf of UB. However, the loan was not paid because Bautista diverted the net proceeds of
the loan to Group Developers Inc. (GDI).

Thus, MBC filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against UB, Bautista, and his wife before RTC of Makati. Later, MBC
amended the Complaint and impleaded GDI. In its Answer, UB claimed that the bank and GDI approved the diversion.
By way of cross-claim, UB prayed that GDI be ordered to pay UB the amount it owed to MBC.

So, MBC and GDI executed a Deed of Dacion en Pago where GDI ceded and transferred to MBC a parcel of land in full
settlement of the loan. Thereafter, UB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that there
was no more cause of action since the loan had already been settled by GDI and that MBC failed to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time.

RTC denied. Likewise, RTC expunged from its record the Deed of Dacion en Pago because no compromise agreement
was submitted for approval. UB again filed a Manifestation regarding its previous Motion to Dismiss and claimed that it
should not have been denied. MBC opposed. Then, RTC granted the Motion and dismissed the case since MBC no
longer had a cause of action.
DOCTRINE:
In Domondon v. Lopez, we distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action from
a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g), Rule 16, while the second by
Rule 33, of the Rules of Court, to wit:

The FIRST [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only
from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde.
The SECOND [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a
demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only
on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern
itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge
has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting.

Hence, a motion to dismiss based on LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has
presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a MOTION TO
DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the
trial, a MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case.

In this case, UB’s March 19, 1998 motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper under Rule 16 because it was
filed after UB filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motion’s merit could not be determined based
solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed
of dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint . And since the deed of dacion en pago had been
expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In
fact, on January 11, 2002 or just three months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the trial court had even noted
petitioner counsel’s manifestation regarding the parties’ initial efforts to enter into a “dacion en pago but not based on the
previous offer made but on a new proposal involving new properties”and urged them to pursue further settlement
discussions.

In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had “ no more cause of action” or lacked a cause of action against the
university. Following Domondon, that motion was a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to
evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at bar,
there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore, the August 17, 1999
Order properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule 16 or 33.

4. Corales v. Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013).

QUICKIE FACTS:
Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr.
Angeles as Municipal Administrator. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved. However, in the last
two terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles’ unsatisfactory
performance. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.

Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) to Corales and
asking the latter to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal
and the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. MR denied. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. CA granted the petition
in favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales’ action for Prohibition.

DOCTRINE:
PREMATURE
As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in
its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner
Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to
a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is
premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.

Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]nvaggrieved party may appeal
from an order or decision orvruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,vmemorandum, letter, notice of
disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director whovhas jurisdiction over the agency
under audit.” From thevfinal order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved partyvmay appeal to the Commission proper.
It is the decisionvor resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.

Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the same
and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but the
petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity
to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Also, in The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service Insurance System,
this Court has extensively pronounced that:

The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action . The
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so
as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
the case.

Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues
within their respective specializations prior to any court intervention.

DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted all the material averments and narration
of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. As such, there is no longer any question of fact to speak of
and what remains is a pure question of law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no
longer subject to any appeal or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in line
with the pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals (China Road Case).

Petitioners’ above argument is misplaced. China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as
distinguished from an interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.

In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, contrary to the claim of
petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65) showing that
such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion.

5. National Housing Authority v. Baello, 703 SCRA 333 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Pedro Baello and Nicanora Beallo-Rodriguez applied to register a parcel of land. CFI confirmed title in their favor. The
Republic, through the Director of Lands, did not appeal so it became final and executory. An OCT were then issued in
their names. Then, the property was later subdivided into 2 parcels of land with 2 TCTs.

During Martial Law, Marcos issued a PD expropriating land and authorizing the NHA to develop the land into a
residential area. It covered both the Baello and Rodriguez properties.Thereafter, a truckload of military personnel forcibly
ejected Baello and Rodriguez out of their properties. The NHA then took possession thereof.

After the EDSA Revolution, the Baellos executed a extrajudicial partition. On August 1987, NHA filed an Action for
Eminent Domain against Baello and Rodriguez at the RTC of Caloocan Branch 120 but was dismissed for res judicata
and lack of cause of action. CA affirmed. SC affirmed.

Then, in 1993, the NHA filed a Complaint for Nullity of the OCT issued in favor of Pedro & Nicanora in RTC of
Caloocan Branch 128. The same court, however, dismissed the complaint due to estoppel and res judicata. CA
affirmed. SC affirmed.

During the pendency of the case in Branch 128, Baello filed an Action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
NHA. RTC ruled in favor of Baello. On appeal, CA denied NHA’s appeal. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of res judicata has been explained as follows:

The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and were admitted
or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions
become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or
their privies regardless of the form of the latter.

Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as “BAR
BY PRIOR JUDGMENT,” or “estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution
of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as
“CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

The Court explained further:

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action , and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different
and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former
suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve
a different claim or cause of action.

In this case, the NHA’s petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment which states that —
 any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

We sustain the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA, which it alleged in its Answer before the trial court,
is the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 had long been settled by this Court in
G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in
LRC Case No. 520. The Court noted that the Republic did not oppose Pedro and Nicanora’s application for registration in
LRC Case No. 520, and neither did it appeal the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of Deeds in
1959 and the Republic did not file any action to nullify the CFI’s decision until the NHA filed a complaint for nullity of
OCT No. (804) 53839 on 5 November 1993, the case which was the origin of G.R. No. 143230. As pointed out by this
Court in G.R. No. 143230, the NHA was already barred from assailing OCT No. (804) 53839 and its derivative titles.

6. Unicapital v. Consing, 702 SCRA 511 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Consing and his mother (Dela Cruz) obtained a loan an 18M loan from Unicapital secured by PNs and a real estate
mortgage over a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. Intrested in developing said property into a residential subdivision, Plus
Builders (PBI), through its real estate development arm, URI, negotiated with Dela Cruz and Unicapital to purchase the
same. Thereafter, Dela Cruz decided to sell to Unicapital and PBI. For said purpose, she appointed Consing as her
attorney-in-fact.

After paying Consing but before the TCTs were transferred to PBI and URI, some Chinese dudes popped up and claimed
to be lawful owners. Upon investigation, it was found that Dela Cruz’s title was dubious. Thus, PBI and Unicapital
demanded from Consing to return the money. As a result, the following cases were filed:

In May 1999, Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI. in the RTC of Pasig. They
claimed that due to incessant harassment from Unicapital, his professional and personal life was affected. On the other
hand, Unicapital filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Failure to State a Cause of Action. PBI likewise filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of that the complaint Does Not Have a Cause of Action. RTC denied the motions. CA
affirmed.

In August 1999, Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Consing and Dela Cruz before
the RTC of Makati. Likewise, PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila.

The RTC Manila case was subsequently consolidated with the case in RTC Pasig. Then, Consing filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case in RTC Makati but was denied. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation of the cases in Makati
with the case in Pasig. However, RTC of Makati dismissed said motion on the ground that said cases had no identity of
rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. MR denied. On certiorari, CA also refused to consolidate . MR denied.
Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to
sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which
if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon
the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material
allegations. If
 the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not
be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able
to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action . Lest it be misunderstood, FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), while the latter (NO CAUSE OF ACTION) is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in RTC Pasig properly states a cause of action since the
allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 (harassment) and 26 (libelous
statements) of the Civil Code. Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to
demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him.

Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant
to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Likewise,
Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION

In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 991418, although
involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since they proceed
from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction
and damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 991418 is a
collection and damages suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No.
1759 deals with whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which they demanded payment from
Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 991418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may demand payment from Consing, Jr.
based on the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical effect as the core issues
and reliefs sought in each case are separate and distinct from the other.

7. Brown–Araneta v. Araneta, 707 SCRA 202 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Juan Ignacio Araneta and Michelle Brown-Araneta were married in Vegas. They bore 2 daughters namely Ara and Ava.
The spouses separated after 7 years. During the separation, the daughters remained in Michelle’s custody. In 2007, Juan
filed a Petition for Custody in the Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother claiming that they have completely barred
him from seeing his daughters.

Pending the Petition for Custody, Michelle filed a Petition for Protection Order in the RTC of Muntinlupa claiming that
Juan had committed sexual, psychological, and economic abuse on her and their daughters. In this petition, it was stated
that there was a pending case in the Makati RTC for the custody of the children. Muntinlupa thereafter granted the TPO.

Later, Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO in the Makati RTC on the ground of litis pendentia
and forum shopping since the Makati RTC is competent to grant the very same reliefs sought by Michelle in the Petition
for Protection Order. Also, he alleged that Michelle’s filing in Muntinlupa amounts to forum shopping. RTC ruled partly
in favor of Michelle and partly in favor of Juan. So both parties appealed.

In the CA, Michelle was found guilty of forum shopping. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Michelle contends that there
was no forum shopping when she filed her Petition for Protection Order in Muntinlupa while the Petition for Custody was
still pending in Makati.

DOCTRINE:
A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of
action, subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, FORUM SHOPPING is the institution of two or more actions
involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the test for
determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.

LITIS PENDENTIA, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must be present:

(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.

Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping:

(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum , a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another; or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such case
said party deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is
dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open”; or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it from the
original court.

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions . Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent
tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case.

FORUM SHOPPING WAS COMMITTED; IN ANTICIPATION OF AN ADVERSE RULING IN MAKATI RTC, MUNTINLUPA RTC WAS
SOUGHT FOR A FAVORABLE OPINION
As discussed above, the presiding judge of the Makati RTC, in the custody case, made of record that she was not inclined
to issue a protection order in favor of Michelle because she did not bother to appear in Court and that the allegations
against
Juan Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising visitation rights over his children. After this adverse ruling,
Michelle sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC by filing an independent Petition for Protection Order.

IDENTICAL PARTIES
The Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who represent the same
interests. The fact that Ava and Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition
for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective
rights are represented by their mother, Michelle.

In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, it was held that forum shopping exists even in cases like this
where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents or defendants in another. Moreover, this
Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case
are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining
whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.

IDENTITY IN RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR

Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Petition for Protection Order are practically based on the same facts
and are so intertwined with that in Petition for Custody, such that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless
of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata.
ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA ARE PRESENT
Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata.
Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacio’s Petition for Custody, this would necessarily mean that it
would be in the best interest of the children if he were allowed to visit and spend time with them and that granting
Juan Ignacio visitation rights would not pose any danger or threat to the children.

On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelle’s prayer for a permanent protection order would
presuppose at the minimum that it would be to the children’s best interest if Juan Ignacio is directed to keep away
from them, necessary implying that he is unfit even to visit Ara and Ava. Conversely, if Juan Ignacio’s Petition for
Custody were denied, then it would mean that the Makati RTC gave weight and credence to Michelle’s allegations
of abuse and found them to be in the best interest of the children to bar Juan Ignacio from visiting them . Thus, the
Muntinlupa RTC should have no ground to deny Michelle’s Petition for Protection Order pending before it.

XV. DISMISSALS BY THE PLAINTIFF (RULE 17)

1. Limaco v. Shohan Gakuen Children’s House, G.R.No. 158245, June 30, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Limaco owns 3 parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. They entered into a Contract of Sale with Shohan Gakuen over said
parcels of land in the amount of 12.5M. Parties agreed that a downpayment of 1.2M would be paid upon signing and the
rest would be paid in installments. Also, it was stipulated that should the vendors be unable to transfer the property,
similar properties would be substituted. Due to Limaco’s failure to get clearance and approval from the DAR, Shohan
demanded the Limaco solve the tenancy problem or substitute the lots with another acceptable, suitable, and untenanted
land.

Thereafter, Limaco informed Shohan that, to solve the problem, the tenant farmers would first be donated to the
municipality and then to Shohan. However, the scheme was not accepted by Shohan because they don’t want future
municipal officials to feel that Shohan is beholden to it. Thus, they insisted on the substitution. However, Limaco did not
respond.

Shohan filed a Complaint for Recision with Damages in RTC of Makati. To counter, Limaco and the tenant farmers filed
an Action for Specific Performance in the RTC of Laguna. Because the Action for Specific Performance was served
earlier than the Complaint for Rescision, the latter was dismissed in lieu of the Action for Specific Performance.

In its Answer with Counterclaim in the Action for Specific Performance, it claimed that the remedy is not possible
because Shohan already bought another property for the purpose. During trial, the parties were able to compromise and
agree that only half (600K) of the downpayment would be returned. However, Limaco only remitted 487K leaving a
balance of 113K. As such, the case continued.

Then, Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in light of Shohan’s contention that Specific Performance was no
longer possible and prayed that their Complaint as well as Shohan’s Counterclaim be ordered withdrawn. Shohan objected
saying that dismissal of the Counterclaim would be prejudicial to them. As such, RTC denied Limaco’s motion.
Moreover, the tenant farmers were also dropped from the case. Finally, RTC ordered Limaco to pay the 113K balance. On
appeal, CA ruled that the entire own payment (713K) should be paid because Limaco’s failure to non-compliance
cancelled their Compromise Agreement. In their MR, Limaco revived their argument that the Shohan’s Compulsory
Counterclaim should have been dismissed. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The applicable provisions are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 17 of the old Rules:

Sec. 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary
judgment[.]
 Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. — Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not
be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.

Thus, there are TWO WAYS by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff.

First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for
summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant.

Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at
any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment .

While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the
second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in
the dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into
consideration.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after Shohan already filed its
Answer with Counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense of Shohan in its
answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the subject lots under the
contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully withdrawn upon
the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in this petition that “[p]rivate
respondent objected to [the] withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the objection.”

More important, the OLD RULES OF COURT provided that “[i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s
objection unless the ounterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court ”.

What may invariably remain for independent adjudication are permissive counterclaims as compared to compulsory
counterclaims which generally necessitate a simultaneous adjudication with the complaint itself. In the case at bar,
Shohan’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature, hence, cannot remain for independent adjudication .

2. Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
In May 1998, the Heirs of Santiago filed a Complaint for Injunction against Pinga in the RTC of Zamboanga It alleged
that Pinga and Saavedra unlawfully entered the coco lands of Santiago and prayed that they be enjoined from doing such
act. In their Answer with Counterclaim, Pinga disputed Santiago’s ownership claiming that, as early as 1968, the
Santiagos had already been ejected from the property.

By 2005, the trial had not yet finished. In fact, the Heirs of Santiago had failed to present their evidence. In the July 2005
hearing, Santiago’s counsel failed to appear, sending instead a representative to postpone the hearing. Pinga’s counsel
opposed the motion for postponement and moved to dismiss the case. Thus, the Complaint for Injunction by the Heirs
of Santiago was dismissed but, at the same time, the RTC allowed Pinga to present their evidence ex parte.

In their MR, the Heirs prayed that the entire action be dismissed and that Pinga be not allowed to present evidence ex
parte. Essentially, they contend that the counterclaim could not stand. RTC granted the MR and dismissed the
counterclaim. MR denied. Hence, this Petition (R45) which raises the issue as to whether or not the dismissal of the
complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the counterclaim.
DOCTRINE:
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the
fault of plaintiff DOES NOT necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In
fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17
mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the
counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the merits
of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the merits of the
counterclaim.

Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a complaint; namely a cause
(or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another . The main
difference lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff, while the
converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot
survive.

A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties, and
stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount involved and the nature of the claim. The fact
that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are founded within the same transaction or occurrence as
the complaint, is insufficient causation to negate the counterclaim together with the complaint.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on
the survival of the main complaint.

Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the
complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or
order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the
amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal
of the complaint.

XVI. PRE-TRIAL (RULE 18)

1. Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Diaz was an operator of a taxi business. Arman Retes drove one of her Tamaraw FX taxis. While driving at an excessive
speed, it hit the back of a Hino cargo truck owned by Lantoria and driven by Francisco. As a result, 9 passegers of the taxi
died including Sherly Moneno. Thus, Moneno’s heirs filed an Action for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages
against Diaz and Retes. In turn, Diaz impleaded Lantoria and Francisco in a Third-Party Complaint.

The pre-trial conference was set on July 11 1998 but was reset for July 30 because Diaz and counsel failed to appear
despite due notice. Again, Diaz and her lawyer failed to appear. Consequently, the RTC allowed Moneno to present
evidence ex parte.

More than 7 months after the presentation of evidence, Diaz filed a Motion for Leave to Present Evidence on her defense
but was denied. Thereafter, RTC ruled that Diaz and her driver solidarily liable for the death of Moneno. CA affirmed.
MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
First, Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that:
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served
with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him.
Diaz was represented by Atty. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent. It was incumbent on the latter to advise
Diaz accordingly. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound Diaz .

Further, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 read:

Sec. 4. Appearance of Parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-
trial. The non-appearance of the party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if
a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution , and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to
the next preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action . The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.

Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to allow Moneno to present their evidence ex parte when Diaz and her
counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.

2. Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152202, G.R. No. 152202, July 28, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Equitable Card Network issued a credit card to Alcaraz. Through said credit card, the latter purchased goods and services
on credit. Alcaraz owed Equitable unpaid credit. Despite receipt of several demands, the latter failed to pay. As such,
Equitable sought payment of the balance including the interest, penalties, and surcharges as stipulated in the contract. It
filed an action for collection in the RTC of Makati.

In his defense, he argued that the case filed against him was premature because Alcaraz claimed that he was just an
honorary member and was not required to submit any application or sign any contract prior to the issuance of the card. He
also claimed that he was entitled to pay on installments without interest.

After several postponements of the pretrial conference, RTC declared Alcaraz in default upon Equitable’s motion and
allowed the latter to present evidence ex parte. Afterwards, RTC ruled in favor of Equitable. Alcaraz filed a Motion for
New Trial which was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition alleging violation of his right to due process.
He claims that he suffered a stroke while his lawyer suffered from a gall bladder ailment.

DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, both the parties and their counsels are mandated to appear in the pre-trial conference. If
the parties opt not to be present, their counsel must be armed with a SPA specifically for the purpose. This must be
so as the pretrial conference is primarily for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a compromise , or on the failure
thereof, for the parties to make certain admissions and stipulations in order to facilitate a more efficient
proceeding at the trial proper.

In the case at bar, both Alcaraz and his counsel did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial. Instead, it was the
Alcaraz’s wife alone who made the verbal manifestation on behalf of her husband and his counsel while
presenting an unverified medical certificate on the latter’s behalf . As correctly observed by the CA, the records are
bereft of any medical certificate, verified or unverified, in the name of Alcaraz to establish the cause of his absence at
the pre-trial conference. Even assuming arguendo that Alcaraz and Atty. Ibuyan’s absence on the February 23, 1999
pre-trial conference is due to justifiable causes, Alcaraz is represented by a law firm and not by Atty. Ibuyan alone.
As such, any of the latter’s partners or associates could have appeared before the court and participate in the pretrial
or at least make the proper motion for postponement if necessary.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court.
3. Macasaet v.Macasaet, G.R. No. 154391, September 30, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet had a son named Ismael. Ismael married Teresita. The parents filed an Ejectment
Suit in the MTC of Lipa against Ismael and Teresita alleging that, as owners of 2 parcels of land in question, they
executed a Verbal Lease Agreement in favor of Ismael and Teresita for them to occupy the lots and use them as their
residence. They also claim that despite repeated demands, Ismael and Teresita failed to pay P500 monthly rent.

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of such agreement and claime that his parents invited them on the said property
so they could leave near each other. Moreover, they claim that it was actually an advance grant of inheritance in favor of
their children.

MTC ordered Ismael and Teresita to vacate since they were merely being tolerated. RTC affirmed but allowed the parents
to appropriate the improvements built in accordance with the Civil Code. CA sustained. Hence, this petition.

Ismael and Teresita claims that the MTC should have dismissed the case upon failure of his Parents to attent the
preliminary conference pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 70. However, they do not dispute that an Attorney-in-Fact with a
written authorization from his Parents appeared during such conference.

Thus, they question whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a party’s personal appearance.

DOCTRINE:
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference. Under
Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the
appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit
to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal
appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference . If there are valid reasons or if a
representative has a “special authority,” a party’s appearance may be waived. As petitioners are challenging only the
applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can
indeed be readily considered as a “special authorization.”

4. Chingkoe v. Republic, 702 SCRA 677 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
The Republic, through the Bureau of Customs, filed 2 Complaints for Collection of Money against Chiat Sing Carboard
Inc, Filstar Textile, and Chingkoe on account of the use of fake and spurious tax credit certificates. The cases were then
consolidated and were jointly heard in RTC of Manila.

The cases were referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mandatory mediation. Likewise, pretrial for the
consolidated cases was set on January 9, 2006. On said date, the pretrial was again moved to Feb 15 because the
mediation proceedings were still on going. Again, it was moved to March 17 for the same reason. Afterwards, no
settlement or compromise was agreed upon. As such, on March 17, pretrial commenced.

Starting on the March 17 pretrial setting, the pretrial date was moved to 4 more dates (April 19, 2006, May 25, 2006, June
30, 2006, July 14, 2006). In all cases, the OSG failed to appear. In the June 30 pretrial setting, a certain Atty. Bautista
Corpin appearing on behalf of BOC appeared but was not prepared for pretrial. On the other hand, petitioners were all
present during said pretrial settings.

Because of this, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of the Republic’s failure to prosecute. In the
last pre-trial date (July 14), the petitioners moved anew and the RTC dismissed the case. MR denied. Republic went to the
CA on certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Petitoners’ MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The RTC amply gave the Republic sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pre-trial conference, but despite
this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the scheduled pre-trial hearings. Hence, the RTC cannot
be faulted for dismissing the case.

This Court finds that the dismissal of the case by the RTC was due to the fault and negligence of the Republic. There
is clear negligence and laxity on the part of both the BOC and OSG in handling this case on behalf of the Republic.
Despite several re-settings of the hearing, either or both counsels failed to attend the pre-trial conference, without
giving a justifiably acceptable explanation of their absence .

This utter neglect of its duty to attend the scheduled hearings is what led the trial court to ultimately dismiss the
cases. In finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed reversible
error.

The records bear out that the pre-trial conference has been reset for 6 times, for various reasons. It is fairly obvious
that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC, every opportunity to be present during the
pre-trial conference. The hearings had to be reset six times due to various reasons, but not once was the OSG and
BOC properly represented. Too, not once did the OSG and BOC offer a reasonable explanation for their absence
during the hearings. Despite the express warning by the trial court during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the
OSG and BOC still failed to attend the next scheduled setting. Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court,
it seemed that the OSG and BOC did not accord proper importance to the pre-trial conference.

PRE-TRIAL, to stress, is way more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or neglected, as
the counsels for respondent had. In Tolentino v. Laurel, this Court has this to say on the matter of importance of pre-
trial:

In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held that pre-trial
cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital
objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.
The Court said that:

The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court, citing
Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial, thus:

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary
under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent
amendments in 1997. Hailed as “the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century,” pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute

resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
5. LBL Industries v. City of Lapu-Lapu, 705 SCRA 688 (2013)
FACTS:
LBL Industries owns 40K sqm of land in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City. In 2006, the City filed a Complaint for Expropriation
before the RTC. It wanted to expropriate around 2.7K sqm for its road opening project. Upon deposit of 15% of the land’s
FMV, the City took possession of the property.

LBL filed its Answer to the Complied with an attached Board Resolution and Sec Cert authoring one Elsie Marino to
commence any action or file any pleadings necessary for the case. Additionally, LBL filed a Motion to Conduct a Joint
Survey and Set Case for Pre-trial. RTC then issued 2 Orders dated July 2006 and March 2007 directing the Clerk of Court
the issuance of a Writ of Possession. However, the Clerk failed to comply.

In 2008, LBL moved to dismiss the case alleging that the City failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time considering that the City did not move for the setting of the case for pre-trial. In its defense, the City
claimed that the reason for the delay was that it was waiting for the RTC’s resolution on the matter.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that the City cannot be faulted for the delay. MR was likewise denied
and it was included in the dispositive part a third order to the Clerk of Court to issue a Writ of Possession. On appeal,
LBL attached a Sec Cert authorizing one Roberto Sison along with Elsie Marino to file the pleadings. CA dismissed the
appeal because no Board Resolution authorizing Sison was attached. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.

HELD: NO. THE FAULT WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CLERK OF COURT.

While the Court considered that Sison was indeed authorized, it nonetheless ruled that the petition is bereft of merit
because the RTC correctly denied LBL’s Motion to Dismiss.

Sec. 1, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, reads:

Sec. 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the
plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.

Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of Rule 17, which states:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion x x x.

Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last
pleading is served and filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases, ruled that the plaintiffs omission to
promptly move that the case be set for pre-trial is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint due to his fault ,
particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.

The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider that the aforequoted Sec. 1 of Rule 18 had already
been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004, Item 1.2 of which states:

I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:

1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte
that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given
period, the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial within 5 days from the
filing of a reply, the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch clerk of court . However, this does not
relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.

For a plaintiff (City of Lapu-Lapu) to be excused from its burden to promptly prosecute its case, it must convince
the court that its failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons. If the neglect is justified, then a dismissal of the case
on said ground is not warranted.

A consideration of the events that transpired in the said expropriation case readily shows that the delay cannot solely be
attributed to the City of Lapu-Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of the branch clerk of court to set the case for
pre- trial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as the trial court’s delay in resolving LBL’s Motion to Conduct
Joint Survey and Set the Case for Pre-Trial.

We find good reason to believe the City’s assertion that it acted in good faith when it did not move to set the case
for pre-trial, since LBL already moved for the pre-trial setting . Another motion from respondent can be simply
repetitive of petitioner’s earlier motion.

The Court, however, is mindful of LBL’s predicament that the delay in the resolution of the expropriation case and the
City’s continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property for more than half a decade is extremely
disadvantageous and prejudicial to said corporation without any payment of just compensation. To prevent further damage
to LBL, the trial court is directed to immediately resolve its Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set the case for pre-trial, and
take all appropriate measures to expedite the resolution of said case.

XVII. INTERVENTION (RULE 19)

1. Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001

QUICKIE FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve a house and lot in Mandaloyung previously owned by Sps. Mendoza where various
creditors and assignees are contesting the property.

LOOYUKO AND UY V. SPS. MENDOZA

Looyuko and Uy won. As a result, RTC issued a writ of execution on the property and was later sold at public auction to
Looyuko and Uy as the highest bidders. The Register of Deeds issued a TCT in their name.

GUTANG V. MENDOZA
In this Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages, Gutang won and successfully caused to be annotated on the TCT a
notice of levy on execution. The property was sold at public auction in favor of Gutang. Later, TCT was issued in his
name.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. MENDOZA

FGU filed an action against Sps. Mendoza in the RTC of Manila by reason of the failure of Sps. Mendoza to satisfy their
obligation secured by a real estate mortgage over said property. Mendoza filed an Answer but failed to appear during
pretrial. So, they were declared in default and evidence was received ex parte.

RTC then ruled in favor of FGU. No appeal was taken and the decision became final and executory. Upon issuance of the
writ of execution, the property was sold at public auction with FGU as highest bidder. However, before a TCT was issued
in FGU’s favor, Gutang filed a Motion in Intervention arguing that they are new registered owners of said property.

RTC allowed the motion and set aside the decision. MR denied. FGU went up the CA on certiorari contending that the
motion for intervention should not be allowed considering that the decision is already final and executory. In the CA,
Looyuko et al filed an Urgent Motion Praying for Leave to File a Motion for Intervention alleging they were attachment
creditors which was allowed. Thereafter, CA denied the Motion for Internvention. Hence, this petition.
Looyuko et al contend that they were deprived of due process when they were not allowed to intervene. In other words,
were the Motions for Intervention filed by Gutang and Looyuko proper considering that the case was already final and
executory?

DOCTRINE:
Then Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, the law prevailing at the time, reads as follows:

Intervention. — A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

None of the grounds underscored above are present to warrant their intervention. Accordingly, we assume for purposes of
discussion that the action was indeed for the foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject property. The rule stated above
also requires that a motion for intervention should be made “before or during a trial.” Because of varying interpretations
of the phrase, the present Rules have clarified that the motion should be filed “any time before rendition of judgment.”

In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed AFTER JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN RENDERED , indeed
when the case was already final and executory. Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already
terminated by final judgment.

Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent
proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where
the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based. Here, there
is no more pending principal action wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko, et al. may intervene.

In EXCEPTIONAL CASES, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the
assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Recently in Mago vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court granted intervention despite the case having become final and executory.

It must be noted, however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. This is not so in the
case at bar. Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the premises
subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action for foreclosure.

2. Limpo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124582, July 16, 2000

QUICKIE FACTS:
Despite having been acquitted for charges of estafa and violations of BP 22, Limbo was adjudged to be civilly liable to
Veronica Gonzales in the amount of P275K by the RTC of Malolos. This decision became final and executory. To enforce
said judgment, Gonzales caused the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Pursuant to this, parcels of land registered in
Limpo’s name were levied upon. Said properties were likewise sold to Gonzales after an auction sale. Later on, Gonzales
was able to cause new TCTs to be issued in her favor. A dispute arose on account of Limpo’s refusal to vacate the
premises. This dispute reached the SC.

While the case was pending deliberation in the SC, spouses Bulaong filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging that
they have an interest in the parcels of land in question. They claim that as early as 1993, the Limpos mortgaged the lands
to them for 4.3M and that said mortgage was annotated on the TCT.

DOCTRINE:
Intervention cannot be allowed at this late stage of this case. Intervention may be granted only where its allowance will
not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case.
Generally, it will be allowed “before rendition of judgment by the trial court,” as Rule 19, §2 expressly provides.
After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal
without unduly delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.

Indeed, there is no justification for granting the motion for the intervention of the spouses Bulaong which they filed
only on April 25, 2000, after the appeal in this case had already been submitted for resolution, when they could
have done so earlier.

The result of all this is that the spouses Bulaong, knowing Gonzales’ interest in the properties in conflict with theirs ,
could have sought to intervene much earlier and not only now on appeal. It took them nearly 5 years from March 29,
1995, when Gonzales filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, before filing their motion for leave to
intervene in this case. Such delay amounts to laches and justifies the denial of their motion. Allowance of intervention at
this late stage would unduly delay the resolution of the appeal as trial would be conducted anew to allow the spouses
Bulaong to present evidence in support of their claim of ownership.

3. Asian Terminals v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
A shipment of secondhand buses from Japan arrived in the Port of Manila. However, Customs impounded the vehicles
and ordered them stored at Asian Terminals Inc’s (ATI) warehouse. As a result, the importers filed a Complaint for
Replevin in the RTC of Paranaque with prayer of the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction. RTC
granted the Writ of Replevin. BOC, through the OSG, filed an MR contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
vehicles subjected to seizure by the BOC.

ATI then filed a Motion for Intervention and for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention alleging that it had a lien on
the vehicles. RTC then dismissed the Complaint stating that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Likewise, the RTC
dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention. ATI filed an MR which was however denied. On certiorari, CA likewise denied
ATI’s petition. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over seized and forfeited cars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control customs law and all other laws,
rules and regulations relating to the tariff and customs administration; and to supervise and control all import and export
cargoes, loaded or stored in piers, terminal facilities, including container yards and freight stations, for the protection of
government revenues.

As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings,
who has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of
dutiable goods.

Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein , issue the
writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale
thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea
of respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted
without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.

The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing ATI’s complaint-inintervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction
over respondents’ action and over the shipment subject of the complaint , all proceedings before it would be void.
The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the
same.
Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an
independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-
intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-
intervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of
intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.

4. Salas Jr. v. Aguila, 706 SCRA 252 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Juan S. Salas and Eden Aguila were married. Months after Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Salas left the conjugal
dwelling and no longer communicated with Aguila. Years later, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on account of psychological incapacity. In her Petition, she stated that they “have no conjugal properties.” Then,
RTC declared the nullity of the marriage.

Then, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion that she discovered parcels of land in QC and Tondo registered under
“Juan S Salas, married to Rubina Salas.” Salas opposed arguing that Aguila’s statement was a judicial admission and was
not made through palpable mistake.

RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. Then, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention and claimed that said properties were
her paraphernal properties. Also she claimed that her brother was the one who registered the properties in the name of
“Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina Salas.” On appeal, CA affirmed.

DOCTRINE:
On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas” is the registered owner of the Discovered
Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a
strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina’s statement that
she owns the Discovered Properties.

Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only “a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.”

5. Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 705 SCRA 392 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Florentino Sebastian agreed to lease to Smart a piece of vacant lot. Smart immediately constructed and installed a cellular
base station on said property. Within said base station is a communications tower rising 150 ft high with antennas and
transmitters. There was also a power house open on 3 sides with a diesel power generator. Close to said base station are
houses, hospitals clinics, and establishments including properties of Aldecoa et al.

Aldecoa et al filed in the RTC a Complaint against Smart for Abatement of Nuisance and Injunction with TRO. It was
alleged that said base station is susceptible to collapse, emits noxious and deleterious fumes, radiates ultra high frequency
radio waves emissions, and violates the law by constructing a tower without the necessary public hearing, permit, and
other requirements of the NTC. Moreover, they stated that judicial intervention is needed to ensure that death,
injuries, and damage will not happen. On the other hand, Smart denied.

RTC ruled in Smart’s favor and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA declared the base station a nuisance. Hence, this
petition.

DOCTRINE:
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it
was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the validity or nullity of
petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base station.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were explained at length
by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
Court of Appeals, as follows:

The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature
resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel,
the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons.
Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition
of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to
give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded
a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.

The Court again discussed the said principle and doctrine in Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization,
Inc. v. Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al.citing Republic v. Lacap, to wit:

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of
all the means afforded him by administrative processe s. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

The HLURB is the planning, regulatory, and quasi-judicial instrumentality of government for land use development. In the
exercise of its mandate to ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued HLURB Resolution No. R-626,
series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base Stations of Cellular Mobile Telephone Service, Paging
Service, Trunking Service, Wireless Loop Service and Other Wireless Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines). Said
HLURB Guidelines aim to protect “providers and users, as well as the public in general while ensuring efficient and
responsive communication services.”
There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the aforementioned administrative remedies prior to
instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, respondents never asserted nor argued any
of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.

XVIII. SUBPOENA (RULE 21)

1. Collado v. Bravo, A.M.-P-99-1377, April 10, 2011

QUICKIE FACTS:
Lorena Collado charged Teresita Bravo, Clerk of Court of Naguilan, with Grave Misconduct. She alleged that she
received through priority mail a subpoena from the MTC of Naguilan directing her to appear before the MTC at a
specified date and time. Said subpoena was signed by Bravo as Clerk of Court. Upon arriving at the MTC, Bravo told her
that no complaint was filed against her. Bravo only issued a subpoena in order to allow a certain Baterina to talk to
Collado about the latter’s son.

In her Answer, Bravo claimed that she issued the subpoena with good intentions so that Collado and Baterina can already
settle their differences. As a result, OCA recommended that Bravo be fined for Grave Misconduct.

DOCTRINE:
Bravo’s act of issuing the subpoena to Collado was evidently not directly or remotely connected with her judicial or
administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to act as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute between
Collado and the Baterinas, upon the request of the latter.

Bravo, as Clerk of Court, is primarily tasked with making out and issuing all writs and processes issuing from the court.
She should have known or ought to know what a subpoena is. “A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him
to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or
for the taking of his deposition.”

She should have known that a process is “the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before
it, or a compliance with its demands.” Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before
a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, Bravo knew there was no case filed against Collado. Neither had Collado
commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Bravo, then, had absolutely
neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.

Perusal of the subpoena she issued to complainant shows that the form used was the one used in criminal cases, giving
complainant the impression that her failure to appear would subject her to “the penalty of law,” and that the subpoena was
issued with the trial court’s sanction. We find, therefore, that Bravo was using without authority some element of state
coercion against Collado who was understandably compelled to heed the contents of the subpoena resulting in her
humiliation. Such naked abuse of authority by complainant could not be allowed to pass without appropriate sanction.

2. Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Roco paid Cal’s Poultry Supply Corporation with 5 checks for the purchase of dressed chicked which the former used in
his business. However, the checks were dishonored. As a result, complaints for violation of BP 22 were filed in the MTC
of Roxas City. MTC convicted Roco. On appeal, RTC remanded the case to the MTC upon the finding that Roco was not
accorded due process.

During the pendency of the remanded cases, Roco filed a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Subpoena Duces Tecum to require Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap to appear and testify and to bring with them specified
documents, records, books of accounts for 1993-1999. In opposition, Cal’s Poultry argued that the production of said
documents were inmaterial and irrelevant. Thus, MTC denied the Request. MR denied. RTC and CA both affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum. The FIRST is used to compel a person to testify, while the SECOND is used to compel the production of books,
records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine
Vegetable Oil Company:

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the
exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things described in the subpoena.

Well-settled is the rule that before a SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present:

(1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
controversy (TEST OF RELEVANCY); and
(2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (TEST OF DEFINITENESS).

Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be
enforced by the court, it is proper to consider, FIRST, whether the subpoena calls for the production of
specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and SECONDLY, whether that proof is prima facie
sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all
the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something
of value may not show up, will not be enforced.

Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., we held:

Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces
tecum,’ it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be
produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the precise
book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may
be identified.

TEST OF DEFINITENESS COMPLIED WITH BUT NOT THE TEST OF RELEVANCY

Going by established precedents, it thus behooves Roco to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and
the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.

Admittedly, the books and documents that Roco requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his
request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.

It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that Roco
miserably failed to discharge his burden. We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment . The offense
is already consummated from the very moment a person issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the
check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to the
drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of
his funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by such
payment.
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA, Roco had been issued by Cal’s Corporation with
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been
validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents requested by Roco
are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment.

In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or
Danilo Yap of Cal’s Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by Roco, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal
cases.

XIX. DEPOSITION (RULES 23 TO 29)

a. Deposition taken in another proceeding

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Jose Africa, Imelda Marcos, et al. G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011
QUICKIE FACTS:

DOCTRINE:
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court does not only require due observance of its subparagraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for
admissibility, compliance with “the rules on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an
implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading
Rule 23 in isolation, the Republic failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule
23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.

In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence
in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under
another and farther jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is
their mutual reference to depositions.

A DEPOSITION is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose
of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the
preparation for trial.

Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant
facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement
of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers
of the witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent
in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule — i.e., that the adverse
party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity
for cross- examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity
for cross- examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually
presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case. However, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or deposition
appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or deposition as an
admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s
lack of opportunity to cross- examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires,
inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination afforded an adverse party in usual trials
regarding “matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith.” Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the
requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former testimony or
deposition is sought to be introduced.

Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise,
there is no basis in saying that the former statement was — or would have been — sufficiently tested by cross-
examination or by an opportunity to do so. (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the
two proceedings should be the same. Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a
former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.)

These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be
confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the
petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this
very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found , for purposes of using the
Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not
necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further
requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition
under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same
deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is
whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.

(1) The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

(2) The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
(3) Involving the same parties;
(4) Relating to the same matter;
(5) The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the
proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane
deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.

b. Deposition may be taken anytime after institution of any action; Uses of

Deposition Jonathan Land Oil v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
In a Complaint for Damages filed by Sps. Mangungudatu against JLO, the latter was declared in default for failure to
appear at Pretrial. Thereafter, a decisión was rendered against it. As a result, JLO filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial
and Change of Venue which was also denied. Without having received an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion, JLO
received already a copy of a Writ of Execution. So, JLO filed a Motion to Quash/Recall the Writ of Executio.

Meanwhile, JLO’s counsel, Attys. Mario and Peligro withdrew their appearance and were replaced by Ong Abad Santos
& Meneses who filed an Entry of Appearance with a Supplement wherein Attys Mario and Peligro’s affidavits were
attached stating that they had not received the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion.

Sps. Mangungudatu filed a Vigorus Opposition wherein there was attached a Certification of the Postmaster that the Order
denying the Omnibus Motion was received by Attys. Mario and Peligro. Thus, JLO served on Spouses Mangungudatu a
Notice to Take Deposititon Upon Oral Examination to prove that they never received a copy of the Order.

Then, JLO’s previous Motion to Quash was denied. Consequently, Spouses Mangungudatu moved to Set Auction Sale of
JLO’s levied properties. As a result, JLO filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and argued that since it had not received
the Order denying its Omnibus Motion, the judgment never bécame final and thus would not be subject to a Writ of
Execution. However, CA denied. It ruled that JLO could no longer avail of a deposition since trial had already been
terminated.

DOCTRINE:
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served. Deposition is
chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing
the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is “well-nigh unrestricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law.”

Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass,
or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege.

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:

(1) It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury.
(2) It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
(3) It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have
been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
(4) It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby
encouraging settlements out of court.
(5) It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by
settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
(6) It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried,
thereby expediting the trial.
(7) It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of
discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has
commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v.
Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.
Thus, “[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient .
There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking
of
depositions after pretrial.” There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding,
depositions are allowed as a “departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses
in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge .” Depositions are allowed, provided they are
taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been
served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified
circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have in tended. However, it is well-settled that this
discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised — not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively — but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY

The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to their
admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness were present
and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition . As a rule, depositions should be
allowed, absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.

USE OF DEPOSITIONS
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the
circumstances specified unde Section 4. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section
4(c) (2) of Rule 23 — the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan
Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of
Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final.

As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly
taken.

However, the SC did found not reason to disturb the findings of the CA as regards the circumstances surrounding the
Omnibus Motion for New Trial.

c. Deposition not a substitute for actual

testimony Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sabino filed a Complaint against Sales, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Sabino’s son,
Elbert. Before any responsive pleading was filed, Sabino notified the Sales that he will take the deposition of one Corral
before the RTC. Thus, the deposition on oral examination of Corral was taken in the presence and active participationof
Sales’ counsel who even cross-examined Corral. During trial, Sabino had the deposition marked as exhibits.

After the presentation of evidence, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits. Sales opposed the admission. Nonetheless,
the RTC admitted it. MR denied. On certiorari, CA denied. It stated that Sales’ active participation estopped him from
assaling the admissibility. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, upon which petitioner mounts his challenge to the admission in evidence of the
subject deposition, pertinently reads:

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
 (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice,
that such exception circumstances exist and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony
of witnesses orallyvin open court, to allow the deposition to be used.

While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the
deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the
actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay .
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent,
provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility
of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the
Philippines.

The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his deposition was
made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves respect , having been
adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary support.
Accordingly, the attribution of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court must be struck down . It has
been said to be customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to
the use of depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his
departure via Flight No. PR 658, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such was the case. As it is,
however, the petitioner does not even assert the return as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary
proof had been adduced.

In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be
considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating,
therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume
inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he
participated in the taking thereof.

Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends support to the conclusion just made. In gist,
it provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting
the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the
taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of
testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the
deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

d. Period to apply for

Deposition Rosete v. Lim, June 8, 2006, G.R.

No. 136051
QUICKIE FACTS:
Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Perfromance, and Damages against Rosete, AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits Systems, Espreme Realty, etc. It asked that the Deed of Sale covering certain parcels of land be
annulled and that ownership be resotred to Lim. Motions to Dismiss were filed but were all denied. Rosete et al
manifested that they filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to challenge the orders denying the Motions to Dismiss. They
likewise informed the RTC that they filed an Ex Parte Motion to Admit Answers Ex Abundante Cautela.

Thereafter, Lim filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination and gave notice that they will take the
deposition of Rosete and Mapalo. Rosete et al filed an Motion and Objection to Take Deposition on the ground that
deposition may not
be taken without leave of court considering no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since
their Answer was filed ex abundanti cautela.

RTC denied Rosete et al’s Motion and Objection and scheduled the taking of the deposition. They then went up on
certiorari to the CA challenging said order but was denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave
after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at
the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance
of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in
prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person, whether a party
or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories . In the case before us, Rosete et
al contend they have not yet served an answer to Lim because the answers that they have filed with the trial court were
made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not consider the answers they filed in court and served on Lim as
answers contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.

We find Rosete et al’s contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means “out of abundant caution” or “to be on the
safe side.” An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the
answers filed by Rosete et al shows that they contain their respective defenses . An answer is a pleading in which a
defending party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file one within the time allowed herefore may cause a defending
party to be declared in default.Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their
answers despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.

Rosete et al’s argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of our ruling that
petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are joined when all the
parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the court. In the present
case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when Rosete, as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The
respective claims and defenses of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have been
laid down.

Hyatt International v. Ley Construction, G.R. NO. 147143, March 10, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
LCDC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in the RTC of Makati against Hyatt International,
Princeton Development, and Yu He Ching (President of Hyatt). LCDC claims that Hyatt reneged on its obligation to
transfer 40% of the real property in favor of LCDC even after LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price. Likewise, it
was alleged that Hyatt sold said property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC.

LCDC filed Notices to Take Depositions of Yu, Go (Account Officer of RCBC), and Sy (Finance Officer of Hyatt).
Likewise, Hyatt also filed Notices to Take Depositions of Manuel Ley (President of LCDC). RTC ordered the depositions
to proceed. At the scheduled deposition, Hyatt prayed that depositions be disregarded and instead proceed to Pretrial
arguing that the depositions would just delay the proceedings. RTC agreed and cancelled all scheduled depositions and set
the pretrial.

Aggrieved, LCDC appealed to the CA which was however dismissed. During Pretrial, LCDC refused to enter into pretrial.
As such, it was declared non-suited and the complaint was dismissed. MR denied. Then, LCDC went up again to the CA
to appeal. This time, the appeal was granted and the CA remanded the case to allow depositions to be taken. Hyatt now
files this petition. Essentially, they question whether the CA was correct in remanding the case and ordered for deposition-
taking to proceed.
DOCTRINE:
The CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to proceed. A deposition
should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.

It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court
where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has
been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.The rules on discovery should not
be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and
expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A .M. No. 03-1-09-SC on
July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the
conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed
to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of
adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under
Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer . The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days
before the pre-trial, pre trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their
intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said issuance, however, the depositions
sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of
the 1997 Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction
has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action , or
without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person , whether a party or
not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in
Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the rules then
prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions .

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry
touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances, however
are absent in the case at bar.

Hyatt also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was only after the filing of its Complaint
that it started looking for evidence through the modes of discovery. On this point, it is well to reiterate the Court’s
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts;
those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, “the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a
 broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession . The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial
to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan
Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not
parties to the pre-trial conference.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to
fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-
trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark — the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to
prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable.

e. Non-resident foreign corporation to testify through

deposition San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. 159127, March 3, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Suing on an isolated transaction, Berdex International Inc., a corporation based in California, filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money against Ramon San Luis. It was alleged that San Luis loaned money from Berdex and that San Luis refused to sign
the contract of loan. In his defense, San Luis argued that there was no contract of loan.

Berdex then filed a Motion to Authorize Deposition Taking through Written Interrogatories stating that all of its witnesses
are Americans who reside or hold office therein. Likewise, one of the witnesses was old and could not travel to the
Philippines. San Luis opposed this saying that it would deprive the court of the right to examine the demeanor of the
witnesses. Moreover, he also claimed that this would violate his right to cross-examine the witness. Nonetheless, the RTC
and the CA allowed the taking of depositions.

San Luis now questions whether or not Sec 1 of Rule 23 allows a non-resident foreign corporation testify through
deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines.

DOCTRINE:
Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that
Berdex is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person
may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party.
Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case . The evident purpose is to
enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.

In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, where we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to
present its evidence by deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral examination in court, we
said:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts
resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are
 meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his
witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter’s own witnesses. In fine, the
object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant
facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not
suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid
before the Court, without omission or suppression.

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all
the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the
actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is
hearsay: the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time
that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for crossexamination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at
the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand
by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes . These exceptional
situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. It is apparent then that the
deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party
or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition “shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary
public” (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition “shall be
taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory.”

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting Berdex’s MOTION (To Allow
Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering Berdex’s allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are
all Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule
23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition.

The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during the trial
stage that the deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not matter whether one witness for
the plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmariñas ruling did not make such testimony in court a condition to grant
the deposition of the two other witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of
money which was the same as in the instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of
money.

While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and
without judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith;or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; or
when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. It has been
repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should not be unduly
restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and
expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their
use in case of oral contract as alleged by petitioner.
Philippine Computer Solutions v. Jose Hernandez, G.R. NO. 168776, July 17, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
PCS filed a complaint before the SEC against 2 of its incorporators, Condol & Lisama, and one Manzo. The complaint
alleged that its corporate name was being unlawfully used in unauthorized business transactions here and abroad.
Specifically, it was alleged that Condol acted as a purported President and Manzo as the purported secretary/treasurer.
They entered into a partnerhsip with PeopleSoft Australia.

Only Manzo filed an Answer to the Complaint because summons was not served on the others on account of their change
of address. Before issuance of summons by publication, RA 8799 took effect, thereby transferring jurisdiction of
intracorproate matters from the SEC to the regular courts. Upon service by publication, no answer was still filed. Thus,
PCS moved to declare them in default.

Also, PCS filed a Motion for Issuance of a Commission to take the deposition in Australia of a corporate officer of
PeopleSoft Australia regaing the details of PeopleSoft’s transactions with Condol et al. Unfortuantely, the RTC denied the
Motion for Issuance of a Commission. It ruled that, under the Interim Rules for Intra Corporate Disputes, a party can only
avail of modes of discovery within 15 days from the joinder of issues. On appeal, CA dismissed PCS’ petition. CA ruled
that even though no responsive pleading was filed, PCS failed to serve written interrogatories on its witness abroad within
15 days. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
This Court notes that during the pendency of the instant Petition, specifically on 27 December 2006, the trial court already
rendered a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524. Taking her bearings from this incident, Manzo prays in her
memorandum before this Court that the instant petition should now be dismissed.

It is not disputed that a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524, has already been rendered. While the Court of
Appeals has yet to act on petitioner’s Petition for Review, it is this Court’s view that the issue has become moot and
academic.

Considering the trial court’s Decision dated 27 December 2006 in SEC Case No. 68524 and the personal testimony of
Bergen before the trial court, this Court finds that the issue of whether a commission should be issued for the taking
of depositions of petitioner’s witnesses has indeed become moot.

f. Application of Rule 23 in criminal

cases Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, August

28, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Risos et al were charged with Estafa through Falsification of a Public Document in the RTC of Cebu. It was alleged that
Risos et al falsified a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage when they made it appear that Concepcion Manguerra affixed her
signature to the document.

While in Manila, Concepcion was unexpectedly confined at Makati Med and advised to stay there for futher treatment.
Concepcion’s lawyer filed a Motion to Take Deposition of Concepcion. He explained that there was a need to perpetúate
her testimony due to her weak physical condition and advanced age. As such, RTC granted the Motion and ordered the
deposition of Concepcion before the RTC of Makati. Risos et al’s MR was denied. Thereafter, Concepcion’s deposition
was finally taken.

Aggrieved, Risos et al assailed via certiorari the Order of the RTC allowing deposition-taking. CA granted the petition and
declared the deposition taken to be void. It was stated that the Rules governing the examination of the prosecution witness
is governed by Sec 15 Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23. Thus, the deposition could only be taken before
the judge where the case is pending (RTC of Cebu) and not in Makati. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
ESPECIALLY TRUE IN CRIMINAL CASES in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their
counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or
to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes
of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense
and prosecution witnesses.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the Manguerra, was too sick
to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before
the court where the case is pending . Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial . Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined:

(1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or

(2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken , had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would
have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear
before the court for examination during the trial proper.

Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made BEFORE THE COURT WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING . It is also necessary that the accused be
notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer.

Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court
where the case is pending. Contrary to Manguerra’s contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be
interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said
court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case,
we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.

g. Purpose of taking deposition

Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515, October 31, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Kalangeg filed in the RTC of Bontoc a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Pajarillaga. In one hearing
date, despite due notice, Pajarillaga failed to appear. Thus, Kalangeg was allowed to present his witnesses subject to cross
on the
next hearing date. However, Pajarillaga was again absent. Consequently, upon Kalangeg’s motion, the RTC declared that
Pajarillaga waived his right of cross-examination.

Thereafter, Pajarillaga moved to reset the hearing which the RTC granted. Then, Pajarillaga filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Take the Deposition of Kalangeg upon written interrogatories on the grounds that Pajarilla lives in Manila which
is more tan 400KM away from Bontoc and that he was suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenous
activities.

Kalangeg opposed. Afterwards, RTC denied Pajarillaga’s motion. MR denied. CA also affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Essentially, Pajarillaga questions whether or not the taking of Kalangeg’s deposition by written interrogatories is proper.

DOCTRINE:
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, THE PRIMARY FUNCTION of which is to supplement the pleadings for the
purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during
the preparation for trial . It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded
a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired
into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.

It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where
their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has
been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function of being
a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after
trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand . There is no
rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and
executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated .

Such being the case, there is really nothing objectionable, per se, with Pajarillaga availing of this discovery measure
after Kalangeg has rested his case and prior to Pajarillaga’s presentation of evidence. To reiterate, depositions may
be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

But when viewed vis the several postponements made by Pajarillaga for the initial presentation of his evidence, we
are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The records before us show that he stopped attending the hearings
after Kalangeg presented his first witness. He offered no excuse for his and his counsel’s absences. Moreover, the
trial court has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting
without invoking the grounds which he now presents before us.

Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation at Pajarillaga’s instance coupled with the belated and
unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to his life , more than sufficient reasons for the trial court to deny his
motion.

h. Letters rogatory and commission

Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Rodrigo Dulay is a naturalized American citizen living in Massachusettes. He opened a trust account in the Bank of
Boston in favor of his nephew Pfeger Dulay in the amount of $230,000. Much to his surprise, Pfeger squandered the
money away. Thus, Rodrigo filed a Complaint for Recovery of Bank Deposit against Pfeger et al.
Thereafter, Rodrigo filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters Rogatory to get the depositions of several witnesses residing
abroad. Pfeger et al moved to be allowed to file cross-examination quetions to Rodrigo’s written interrogatories which the
RTC granted. Said order stated that the Clerk of Court in Boston conduct examination of Rodrigo Dulay and the bank
manager of the Bank of Boston.

However, the depositions were instead taken before a notary public in New York. Thus, Pfeger et al filed an Omibus
Motion praying that the written interrogatories be declared inadmisible. However, this was denied by the RTC and stated
that there was substantial compliance with the Rules. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to take the
depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely
brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Rodrigo cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought about by this
circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict
adherence to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated.

Obviously, it was not within the trial court’s power, much less the Rodrigo’s to force the Clerk of Court of Boston
to have the deposition taken before it . It would be illogical and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the
letters rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and requested to
examine the witnesses. After all, while a court had the authority to entertain a discovery request, it is not required to
provide judicial assistance thereto . This reality was recognized by the trial court when it ordered Rodrigo to have the
questioned depositions authenticated by the Philippine consulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in
issue would be going directly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts
which are relevant to the proceedings in court.

More importantly, the Court finds that Rodrigo substantially complied with the requirements for depositions taken in
foreign countries. In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken:

(1) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or
(3) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties.

While LETTERS ROGATORY are requests to foreign tribunals, COMMISSIONS are directives to officials of the issuing
jurisdiction.

Generally, a COMMISSION is an instrument issued by a court of justice , or other competent tribunal, directed to a
magistrate by his official designation or to an individual by name, authorizing him to take the depositions of the
witnesses named therein, while a LETTER ROGATORY is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by its
power, to secure desired information. Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down by the court
issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign
tribunal.

Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and the defendant’s answer has already
been served. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person
or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary public who
took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through
letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its Order dated 28
September 2000. With the ratification of the depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.
Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the adverse party. They were
given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn
answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any
injury they suffered as a result of the trial court’s action.

i. Failure to answer written

interrogatories Jaravata v. Karolus, G.R. No. 154988,

June 21, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Felisa Jaravata filed an Action for Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of Titles and Damages against Diana Karolus.
She claims that she is the lawful owner and actual occupant of a parcel of land in Zambales which is subdivided into 3
different lots. She further alleges that Karolus illegally secured titles to 2 of the 3 subdivided lots.

In their Answer, Karolus contended that the issuance of the free patents was not fraudulent and that there was no
overlapping of the lots. They also set up the defense of prescription. Thereafter, a Third Party Complaint was filed against
Javarata’s lawyer, Atty. Tacorda.

Later on, Jaravata served two separate sets of written interrogatories upon Karolus. However, the latter objected to them
but was denied by the RTC. As such, Karolus filed a Manifestation and Compliance attaching their answers to the written
interrogatories.

Jaravata and Atty. Tacorda then filed a Joint Omibus Motion to compel Karolus to fully and completely answer the
written interrogatories. Failing this, RTC declared Karolus in default pursuant to Sec 3 (c) of Rule 29. Thereafter, RTC
ruled for Jaravata. However, CA reversed the decisión and ruled in favor of Karolus.

DOCTRINE:
The CA rightly held that the RTC erred in rendering a judgment by default against Karolus for refusal or failure to
answer written interrogatories, without first requiring an application by the proponent to compel an answer. This
is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

NEVERTHELESS, the CA erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was as yet no trial or
presentation of evidence in the RTC . Jaravata’s prayer to affirm the trial court’s December 18, 1997 default decision
does not mean that there was a trial . The decision of the RTC was based on constructive admissions by Karolus of the
allegations of the plaintiff due to the court’s application of the sanction for not answering the written interrogatories. In
reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to substantiate by evidence
their respective claims at the trial court.

This is particularly true with respect to the Jaravata’s claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding
which the CA said that clear and convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is because the wrong procedure
followed by the trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.

j. Consequences of failure to answer interrogatories

Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9,

2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Zepeda filed a Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure Proceedings and Loan Documents with Damages against
Chinabank before the RTC. It was claimed that they obtained a loan from CBC secured by a real estate mortgage. When
the Sps Zepeda encountered difficulties in paying the loan, CBC allegedly agreed to a restructuring plan. Despite their
agreement, CBC extrajudicially foreclosed on the property and bécame the highest bidder. Later, title was consolidated in
its favor.

CBC filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied. So, it filed an Answer with affirmative defenses. Also, CBC filed a set of
written interrogatories with 20 questions. However, RTC denied the affirmative defenses and directed the COC to set pre-
trial conference. A Motion to Expunge the complaint for being premature was also denied. Thus, CBC filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA which was granted on the ground that Sps. Zepeda failed to answer CBC’s written interrogatories,
among others. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
We do not agree with the CA ruling that the complaint should be dismissed for failure of Sps. Zepeda to answer CBC’s
written interrogatories. It should be noted that CBC filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule
29 which states:

SEC. 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey
an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an
order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or
to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28
requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard
to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:

(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party[.]

As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of
Rule
29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served , refuses to answer a
PARTICULAR QUESTION in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular
question, still refuses to obey the order.

In the instant case, Sps. Zepeda refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular
question. Clearly then, CBC should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.

Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. — If a party or an officer or managing agent of a
party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper
service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any
pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment
by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by
the other, including attorney’s fees.

Due to CBC’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the Motion to
Expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3 .

This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24
to 29 of the Rules of Court. The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Thus, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, we held:

For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency,
they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine
well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination thereafter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 24, 2006 Decision and the March 31, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, which granted CBC’s petition to annul the April 1, 2004 and October 22, 2004 Orders of the RTC
denying CBC’s affirmative defenses without a hearing as well as its motion to expunge the complaint because of
Zepeda’s failure to answer the written interrogatories are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, for further proceedings.
 k. Request for Admission not answered

Sime Darby v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
By reason of a bargaining deadlock, Sime Darby declared and implemented a lockout against its hourly employees who
belong to the Union. Thus, the Union filed a Complaint for Illegal Lockout. Meanwhile, stockholders of Sime Darby
sold tire manufacturing assets and closed down its Sale of Tire Manufacturing Operation. Thus, its employees were
terminated. As a result, these terminated employees filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. Later, a Complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice was filed. These cases were then consolidated.

LA dismissed the complaints and found the lockout as well as the mass termination legal and valid. On appeal, NLRC
affirmed. CA also affirmed. Hence this petition.

The Union claims that the LA erred in not considering as admitted the matters contained in their Request for Admission
after Sime Darby failed to file a sworn answer thereto.

DOCTRINE:
The submission that the Union’s Request for Admission should have been deemed admitted in their favor after Sime
Darby had failed to file a sworn reply or objection thereto cannot be sustained.

A REQUEST FOR ADMISSION is a remedy provided by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file and
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of:

(1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; or
(2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.

Said request must be answered under oath within the period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters of
which admission were requested should be deemed admitted. The Union claims that Sime Darby, instead of filing an
answer under oath, filed an unsworn reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their
favor.

The Union’s Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for
Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the consolidated cases, and/or
irrelevant matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the company’s motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of
notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and quitclaim, etc. Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading . That
is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.

Otherwise stated, the Union’s request constitutes “an UTTER REDUNDANCY and a USELESS, POINTLESS PROCESS which
Sime Darby should not be subjected to.” The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended “to expedite trial and
to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry.” Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting
redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

l. Request for Admission instead of Offer to

Stipulate Manzano v. Despabiladeras, G.R.No. 148786, December

16, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from Roger Manzano various construction materials to be used by the former in a
construction project. According to Manzano, he delivered to Despabiladeras a total of P307,140.50 worth of construction
materials. Having paid only about P130K, Manzano filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Despabiladeras in the
RTC of Iriga City.
In her Answer, Despabiladeras claimed that Manzano altered the prices. So, there was a dispute on how much the
materials really were. Thereafter, the case was set for Pretrial. After said pretrial, the RTC ordered that, upon agreement of
the parties, Manzano shall submit an Offer to Stipulate showing an itemized list of the materials delivered to
Despabiladeras within 15 days to Despabiladeras who shall be allowed to object thereto.

Instead of submitting an Order to Stipulate, Manzano filed a Request for Admission which asked Despabiladeras to admit
within 15 days from receipt that Manzano in fact delivered construction materials amounting to 300k and that
Despabiladeras only paid 130K thereof.

The Request for Admission remained unheeded during the 15 day period. It was only during trial wherein Despabiladeras
filed a list of ítems it admits to having been delivered by Manzano. Thereafter, RTC ruled that the facts requested to be
admitted are confirmed in light of the fact that Despabiladeras did not file an answer. Then, RTC finally ruled in favor of
Manzano and ordered Despabiladeras to pay the balance. On appeal, CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference of October 2, 1990, as reflected in the pre-trial order of even
date, was that “Manzano shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to
Despalidares together with the cost claimed by Manzano within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to
Despalidares who will state her objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of time.” In substantial
compliance with said agreement, Manzano chose to instead file a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, a remedy afforded by a
party under Rule 26.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it ordered Despalidares to
file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner submit “an offer to stipulate.”

For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had been joined .

Despalidares having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is, to deny under oath the
facts bearing on the main issue contained in the “Request for Admission,” she was deemed to have admitted that
she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in
the amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less the partial payment of P130,000.00).

m. Failure to respond to a Request for

Admission Limos v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.186979,

August 11, 2011

QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Odones filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title, and Damages against Limos in the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac. It alleges that Odones are the owners of a parcel of land by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal.

When they decided to register the document, they found that the land’s OCT was cancelled and a new one was issued
under the names of Limos et al. The latter allegedly obtained title thereto by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Lardizabal and her husband Razalan in 1972.

Odones seeks to cancel the Limos’ TCT on the ground that the signatures in the Deed of Sale were forgeries because its
signatories were already dead prior to 1972. Thus, Limos had to file an Answer. Thereafter, Odones filed a Reply. Then,
Limos served on Odones a Request for Admission on several matters.

Odones failed to respond. Thus, Limos filed a Motion to Set Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses
arguig that Odones’ failure to respondo or object to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission. RTC
denied this Motion on the ground that the matters subject to the Request for Admission were essentialy redundant or have
already been challenged in the pleadings already filed. MR denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material
and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request
unless copies have already been furnished.

SEC. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days
after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the
request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons
why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.

Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly
admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on
modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine
thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in
mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice.

The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery also
rests on sound judicial discretion. Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of whether or not to
impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.

As correctly observed by the RTC, the matters set fort in Limos’ Request for Admission were the same affirmative
defenses pleaded in their Answer which Odones already traversed in their Reply . The said defenses were likewise
sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, Limos sought to compel Odones to deny once
again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the
proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is “to expedite trial
and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s
pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere
redundancy.

Verily then, if the RTC finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous
pleadings by the requested party , the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting
party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the
implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.

In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of Limos’ Request for Admission rendered it
ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of
the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to Odones’ failure to respond, the argument that a
preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
 n. Documents to be produced should be described with particlularity

Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Gateway obtained from Solidbank 4 foreign currency denominated loans evidenced by promissory notes. To secure the
loans, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds from its “Back-end Services Agreement” with Alliance
Semiconductor. Incidentally, Gateway defaulted and had an outstanding debt of $1.9M. After demands went unheeded,
Solidbank filed a Compaint for Collection of Sum of Money against Gateway.

Thereafter, Solidbank received information that Gateway already received from Alliance proceeds of the Back-end
Services Agrrement. As such, Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. Essentially,
Solidbank asked the court to inspect all documents involving said Agreement and copies of all documents and statements
connected thereto.

RTC granted the Motion for Production and Inspection. Gateway submitted invoices related thereto. Unsatisfied, it filed
Motion to cite Gateway in contempt. RTC denied said motion and chastized Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to
produce said documents evidencing payment. MR denied. When Gateway appealed, CA reversed and ruled that the
Motion for Production and Inspection failed to comply with Rule 27 Section 1. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party or permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify
the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

The aforecited rule provides the mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection of things during the
pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such as land or other
property in the possession or control of the other party. This remedial measure is intended to assist in the
administration of justice by facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and guarding against
undesirable surprise and delay; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and
evidence, thereby shortening costly and time-consuming trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More
specifically, the purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material information which, by reason
of an opponent’s control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny , and to provide a convenient and
summary method of obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the custody or under the control
of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept of pretrial.

The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits
“fishing” for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not
privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any
matter involved in the action. The lament against a fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the
facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
However, fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without limitations.
In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the REQUISITES in order that a party may
compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz.:
 (1) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause
therefor;
(2) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(3) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(4) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(5) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action, and
(6) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.

In order to ascertain the veracity of the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The
purpose of Solidbank’s motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received from
Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement. Solidbank was able to show good cause for the
production of the documents. It had also shown that the said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an
issue involved in the action. However, Solidbank’s motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of
its failure to specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbank’s motion for
production and inspection of documents called for a BLANKET INSPECTION. Solidbank’s request for inspection of “all
documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement” was simply too
broad and too generalized in scope.

A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass
of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the
motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce .

Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement were already
received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case.

XX. TRIAL, TRIAL BY COMMISSIONERS, HEARINGS AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES (RULES 30 TO 32)

1. Lourdez de Castro v. Crispino de Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Crispino and Lourdes De Castro are spouses. The RTC granted Crispino’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
base don psychological incapacity for failure of Lourdes to file an Answer. The latter filed a Motion for Leave to FIle an
Omnibus Motion Seeking a New Trial or Reconsideration on the ground that she was misled and prevented from
participating in the annulment case because Crispino promised support for their children. RTC granted said motion.

On July 17, 2002, the RTC had to reset the hearing because there was no return of the notice sent. Thereafter, the hearings
were reset 12 more times. On Aug 20, 2003, the RTC denied Lourdes’ request to cancel the hearing due to unavailability
of witnesses. RTC deemed to have waived her right to present evidence due to her failure to present evidence that day.

On Dec 12, 20003, RTC denied Lourdes’ request to Reconsider the denial claiming that her absence was justifiable with
no intent to delay the proceedings. Lourdes filed a Petition fo Certiorari which the CA denied. Hence, this petition. She
now questions Judge Umali’s act of ruling that her right to present evidence was waived when she failed to appear at the
August 20 hearing.

DOCTRINE:
We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by Lourdes were made on the scheduled hearing dates
themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no further postponement would be
allowed, she still failed to appear. We agree with the CA when it pointed out that she obviously knew in advance that
she could not make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. As of the last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still
out of the country. The least that petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely
representation with the RTC by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing.
Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the court of
the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After having been granted numerous
motions for postponement, she cannot now claim that she was denied due process.

In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, we ruled that:

Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his own
inofficiousness, lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his own interests
or to the interests of those he represents , thereby resulting in his failure to present his own evidence,
the court would not extend to him its mantle of protection. If it was he who created the situation
that brought about the resulting adverse consequences, he cannot plead for his day in court nor
claim that he was so denied of it.

Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company, we sustained the trial court’s denial of a motion for
postponement on the ground that the defendant’s witnesses, officers of the company, could not come because it was the
beginning of the milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental and their presence in the Central was
necessary. We held that the reason adduced was “not unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.”

In the case at bar, Lourdes’ excuse — that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild , while her
witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the
country, attending a convention — was unjustified. These reasons were “not unavoidable and one that could not
have been foreseen.” The date of the trial was set one month prior, and as of July 25, 2003, Lourdes was in the U.S.
Certainly, Loures would know in advance if she could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a
convention is a scheduled event, also something known in advance.

It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for postponement BEFORE THE DAY OF THE HEARing, so that the court could
order its resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the new date . This was not the case at bar for the subject
motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any justification. We thus hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for postponement.

2. Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

QUICKIE FACTS:
Asia Brewery and Zulueta entered into a Dealership Agreement where Asia Brewery would manufacture and distribute
beer for Zulueta to sell in the outlet he operates. Thereafter, alleging violation of said Dealership Agreement, Zulueta filed
a Complaint for Breach of Contrat, Specific Performance, and Damages against Asia Brewery in the RTC of Iloilo. While
said case was pending, Asia Brewery likewise filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money in the RTC of Makati
against Zulueta for the latter’s unpaid beer products bought.

Zulueta moved to dismiss the Complaint in Maati on the ground of splitting causes of action and violation against the
principle of multiplicity of suits but was denied. Later on Zulueta moved that the cases be consolidated. This was granted.
On appeal, CA reversed the ruling anstated that there is no common issue of law or fact between the two cases since the
Iloilo case was about the alleged violation of the Dealership Agreement while the Makati case was about Zulueta’s debt
for unpaid beer products. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
True, Zulueta’s obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by Asia Brewery can exist regardless of an alleged
breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and the relationship between Asia Brewery
and Zulueta, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement which is now the
subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case. In fact, Zulueta herself claims that her obligation to pay was negated by Asia
Brewery’s contractual breach. In other words, the nonpayment — the res of the Makati case — is an incident of the
Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more, practical and
convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases
pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction as
well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the
two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related
issues.

Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated
and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
resolution of common questions of law or facts.

Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the
issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo
case.

3. Roque Yu v. Magno, G.R. No. 138701, October 17, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps Roque and Asuncion Yu, as controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber, entered into a verbal agreement with Engr.
Magno where Leyte Lumber would supply Magno with building materials he may need his construction business. Magno
then established BG Magno Construction and Development Enterprises. Thereafter, Roque and Magno entered into a joint
venture called the Great Pacific Construction Company. This continued until Magno died.

A year after Magno’s death, Sps Yu and Leyte Lumber filed separate Complaints for Sum of Money with Damages and
Preliminary Attachment against BG Magno and the estate. In the case instituted by Leyte Lumber, it wanted to collect on
the principal amount of 1.2M for construction materials. In the case instituted by Sps. Yu, they wanted to collect on loans
and advances amounting to 3.5M.

Both cases were raffled to separate RTC branches which rendered decisions in favor of BG Magno. Howeever, the 2
decisions were penned by Judge Francisco. The parties did not file an MR nor called the attention of Judge Francisco on
the absence of an Order for Consolidation. Instead, they directly filed appeals before the CA.

In the CA, the 2 cases were consolidated. CA modified in the case instituted by Leyte Lumber but reserved the one
instituted by Sps. Yu. Sps. Yu filed an MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
On the question of the propriety of Judge Francisco of Branch 6 formulating the decision in Civil Case No. 5822 which
was pending and tried in Branch 8, we declare that there was nothing irregular in the procedure taken. The records
show that there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate the two cases for
decision by the presiding judge of Branch 6 .

Indeed, when the Magno filed a Motion to Lift, Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on
January 20, 1993, the caption thereof indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Likewise, on October 29, 1993, when
the Sps. Yu’s new counsel entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof was also written the docket numbers
of both cases. Sps. Yu’s previous counsel of longstanding (whose representation dates back to the filing of the two
complaints in 1979) filed his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on October 30, 1993, and the caption thereof similarly
indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Subsequent orders of the court which emanated from Branch 6 also bear, in
the caption thereof, the titles and docket numbers of both cases.

In other words, as early as 6 months prior to the promulgation of Judge Francisco’s decisions in the 2 cases, there
appears to have been a transfer or consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties knew of it, albeit the actual
date when the two cases were consolidated or transferred does not appear on record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that
no opposition or objection in any manner was registered by either of the parties to the same , thereby evincing their
consent thereto. It is, therefore, already too late in the day for the Sps. Yu to question the competence of Judge
Francisco to render the separate decisions in the two cases.
The two cases were filed just a few months apart; they involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between
identical parties and no other; Magno’s claim, in both cases, essentially the same defense, which is overpayment; they
cover the same period of transacting continuous business that spans 4 years; they relate to simple issues of fact that
are intimately related to each other; they entailed presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in
fact, a broad part of the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or
both parties. And the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or
both cases on their own.

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same
act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the
same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a
joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of
the parties.

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression
and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in
short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.

Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the
parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context
of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to
the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of their cases before the courts. Another compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation
is the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which
would otherwise require a single judgment.

4. Mega Land v. C-E Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 165211, July 31, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
Mega Land and CE Construction had an arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC). CIAC rendered a decisión ordering Mega Land to pay CE 1.6M. After Megal Land received the decisión on June
20, 2002, pursuant to Rule 43, it had 15 days (July 5) to appeal to the CA.

On July 4, Fajardo Law Offices filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review and sought an
extensión until July 20 on the ground that the legal issues are complex and the records are voluminous. This case was
raffled to the 16th Division. However, on July 5, Mega Land’s President and GM (Sy) also filed a Motion for Extension
which was assigned a different docket number. This was raffled to the 5th división (now 3rd Division) The reason for the
second Motion was because it was no longer availing of the services of Fajardo Law Offices. No move was undertaken to
withdraw or disavow the Motion earlier filed by Fajardo Law Offices. These 2 Motions for Extensions were granted and
thus prolonging the period to July 20.

Meanwhile, Mega Land secured the services of Atty. Flores. As such, he filed a 2nd Motion for Extension of Time with
Formal Entry of Appearance on July 15. Flores sought a new 15 day period to appeal or on Aug 4. In his Motion, the
caption was that of the 2nd case. This was granted thus further prolonging the period to appeal from July 20 to August 4.

On August 1, Flores filed a Petition for Review on behalf of Mega Land but the caption thereof was that of the first case.

As a result, the 16th Division handling the first case dismissed the Petition for Review for having been filed out of time
because the time extensión was only until July 20. As for the 3rd Division handling the 2nd case, the appeal was
dismissed on the ground that Mega Land did not file a Petition for Review within the period granted or on August 4.

Mega Land filed an MR to the 1st case but was denied. Hence, this petition. Essentially, Mega Land contends that the 2nd
Motion for Extension of Time should have bound the 16th Division which would thereby make its period Aug 4 than
merely July 20.
DOCTRINE:
The fact that the petition for review intended for filing in the second case bore instead the docket number of the first case
indicates that Mega Land and its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the first case earlier initiated by Fajardo Law
Offices. In short, at the time the petition was filed with the CA, Mega Land had known that there were two similar
cases involving the same parties and causes of action.

There were a variety of options Mega Land could have resorted to in order to rectify the anomaly. Upon learning that
there were actually two different cases pending before the Court of Appeals, it could have moved to withdraw either any
of the motions for extension of time, so that there would be only one case pending with the appellate court.

Had Mega Land done this at the onset, even if later the filed petition itself stated the wrong docket number, the Court
of Appeals could have easily recorded the pleading under the case that remained in existence since it would
anyway be incapable of filing the same under the records of a case that had already been withdrawn.

NO MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION IN THE CA

We have duly considered that perhaps this entire untidiness could have been avoided had the Court of Appeals at the
outset consolidated the two cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no moment to Mega Land. For one, under the
2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is no mandatory obligation to consolidate related
cases. The language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation of cases, is merely
directory in character, providing as it does: “[w]hen related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be
consolidated and assigned to one Justice.”

More importantly perhaps, the consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the defect of forum shopping. If one
litigant has filed multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, the consolidation of these
suits is not the correct palliative. These suits should instead be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.

5. Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 703 SCRA 350 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 2 criminal Informations in connection with the ZTE Project. First, it filed an
Information against Abalos (Abalos case) for violation of RA 3019. This was raffled off to the Fourth Division.
Subsequently, an Information was filed against Romulo Neri (Neri case) also for violation of RA 3019. This was raffled
off to the Fifth Division.

During Pretrial of the Abalos case, Neri took the stand against Abalos. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor in the Neri case
moved that the Neri case be consolidated with the Abalos case to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction. Neri opposed the consolidation claiming
that it would be oppressive and would violate his rights as an accused.

Nonetheless, the Fifth Division granted consolidation subject to the conformity of the Fourth Division. Neri’s MR was
denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
ISSUE IS MOOT ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENING EVENTS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
As may be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division ordering the consolidation of the Neri
case with the Abalos case pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the “conformity of the said (4th) Division.”

On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the premise that consolidation is addressed to the sound discretion of both
the transferring and receiving courts, but more importantly the latter as the same transferred case would be an added
workload, issued a Resolution refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division RESPECTFULLY DECLINES
to accept SB-10-CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation with SB-10-CRM-00998 (Abalos case)
pending before it.
It declined the consolidation on the ground that it already Heard Neri testify against Abalos. As such, the Fourth Division
had already formed their respective opinions on the matter of Neri’s credibility.

IMPROPRIETY OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF CASES

CONSOLIDATION is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward
this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket or consolidation of issues within those cases
are permitted by the rules.

The term “consolidation” is used in THREE (3) DIFFERENT SENSES OR CONCEPTS, thus:

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (QUASI CONSOLIDATION)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between
the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (ACTUAL
CONSOLIDATION)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the
entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause
the parties to one action to be parties to the other. ( CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL)

To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled
“Consolidation or Severance.” And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:

Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for CRIMINAL CASES is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating:

Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. — Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or
forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the
court.

as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the SANDIGANBAYAN REVISED INTERNAL RULES which states:

Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. — Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or
involving common questions of fact and law , may be consolidated in the Division to which the case
bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.

Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in criminal or civil cases, the rule
allowing consolidation — in whatsoever sense it is taken, be it as a merger of several causes of actions/cases, in the sense
of actual consolidation, or merely joint trial — is designed, among other reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard
against oppression and abuse, attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants.

While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there is nothing in the
records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth Division approved went beyond
consolidation for trial or joint trial.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted
Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial. Given the above perspective, Neri should now disabuse
himself of the unfounded notion that what the Fifth Division intended was a fusion into one criminal Proceedings of
the
Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable from the other, or worse, where he will be tried as coaccused in the
Abalos case.

Jurisprudence has laid down the REQUISITES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL. As held in Caños v. Peralta, joint trial is
permissible “where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.”

Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of
the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts constituting, or the
elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in the information are crucial to the
success or failure of a criminal prosecution .

As can be gleaned from the charges in the Informations, the inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and
specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the
negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in
the pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the people’s witnesses lined up to testify in the
Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders.

A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever
in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case.

Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or
immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be resolved –– a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against him.

XXI. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 33)

1. Radiowealth v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Vicente and Del Rosario jointly and severally executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a PN for P138K
on installments with an acceleration clause. When the Sps Vicente defaulted, demands for payment were sent but went
unheeded. Thus, Radiowealth filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money before the RTC of Manila.

During the trial, Radiowealt’s Collection and Credit Officer (Famatico) presented in evidence in check payments, demand
letters, etc. However, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the transaction or the exectuion of any
documentary evidence which had been merely endorsed to him. As a result, RTC ordered the termination of the
presentation of evidence.

Thereafter, Sps. Vicente filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. RTC granted it on the ground
that the evidence presented by Radiowealth was merely based on hearsay. On appeal, however, CA reversed and stated
that its genuiness and due execution were deeed admitted thereby establishing the Vicente’s indebtedness. As such, CA
remanded it for further proceedings.

DOCTRINE:
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a
demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as follows:
 SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion
is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.

Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced:

The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without
waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal
that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion , i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient for
an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court
which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and
evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as
before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the
established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered
evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus
assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a
correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly
excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays.
The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial
court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present
evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency
of plaintiff’s case and evidence . In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of
dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence.

In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present their own
evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a
demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.

In the case at bar, the RTC, acting on Sps. Vicente’s demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground
that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the trial court because
the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.

Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the
evidence submitted by Radiowealth. While the CA correctly ruled that “the documentary evidence submitted by
Radiowealth should have been allowed and appreciated,” and that “it presented quite a number of documentary exhibits
enumerated in the appealed order,” we agree with Radiowealth that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide
the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of
the facts on record.

2. People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 148712, January 21, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
Cachola et al were charged with murder in the RTC of La Union. During trial 12-year old Jessie Barnachea, his older
brother Robert, and their neighbors were presented as witnesses for the prosecution.

Jessie testified that armed men entered their house and shot and stabbed to death his uncle, mother, brother, and cousin.
Meanwhile, Robert testified that while he was in his uncle’s house next door, he saw armed men running towards their
house. After several shots, they saw them running away and noticed a stainless jeep with “fruits and vegetables dealer”
marked on it
parked in front of their house. Some neighbors at a nearby store likewise saw the same jeep with an “El Shaddai” marked
in front and “fruits and vegetables dealer” marked on the side.

After reporting this to the pólice, they intercepted said jeep carrying the 8 accused at a checkpoint in the highway. During
a pólice lineup, Jessie identified Cachola et al as assailants.

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense orally asked for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. However,
RTC denied this outright and set the Schedule for presentation of evidence for the defense. Instead of presenting evidence,
the Defense filed another Demuruer without leave of court.

Thereafter, RTC no longer allowed the presentation of he defense and convicted Cachola and Amay as principals, and the
6 others as accomplices. Hence, this automatic review. It is contended that the RTC wrongly disallowed the Defense’s
presentation of evidence.

DOCTRINE:
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the Cachola to present evidence after filing their demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter, thus:

SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The filing by Cachola of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their
right to present their own evidence . To sustain their claim that they had been denied due process because the evidence
they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow them to “wager on the outcome of judicial
proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.”

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the motion for
demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the
position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the
waiver of the presentation of evidence.

XXII. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RULE 34 AND 35)

1. Wood Technology v. Equitable Banking, G.R. 153867, February 17, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Equitable filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against WTC, Cordova, and Young. It was alleged that WTC obtained a
loan from Equitable in the amount of $75K as evidenced by a PN which was signed also by Cordova and Young as
representatives of the WTC. Likewise, Cordova and Young executed a Surety Agreement binding themselves as WTC’s
sureties for the loan.

In their Answer, WTC admitted that they obtained a loan and that Cordova and Young bound themselves as sureties.
However, they claimed that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date was purposely left blank subject to the
agreement by the parties at a later date. Thus, since no maturity date had been fixed, the Complaint was filed prematurely
and that it failed to state a cause of action.

Equitable moved for Judgment on the Pleadings. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Equitable. CA affirmed and stated
the PN’s genuiness and due execution were deemed admitted and that there was no need to present eveidence to prove the
maturity date of the PN since it was payable on demand. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court seeks to shorten the procedure in order to allow the speedy disposition of a case. Specifically, we
have rules on demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgments. In all these instances, a full
blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions of the parties.

In this case, at issue is the propriety and validity of a judgment on the pleadings. A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS is
proper when an answer fails to tender an issue , or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading.

We note now that (1) the RTC knew that the Answer asserted special and affirmative defenses ; (2) the Court of
Appeals recognized that certain issues were raised, but they were not genuine issues of fact; (3) WTC insisted that
they raised genuine issues; and (4) Equitable argued that WTC’s defenses did not tender genuine issues.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

However, whether or not the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all . The essential question in such a case is whether there
are issues generated by the pleadings . This is the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment, compared to
a proper case for judgment on the pleadings. We have explained this vital distinction in Narra Integrated Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, thus,

The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or
fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a
judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, there is no ostensible
issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other
hand, in the case of a SUMMARY JUDGMENT, issues apparently exist — i.e. facts are asserted in the
complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings
are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.

Indeed, WTC’s Answer apparently tendered issues. While it admitted that WTC obtained the loan, that Cordova and
Young signed the promissory note and that they bound themselves as sureties for the loan, it also alleged special and
affirmative defenses that the obligation had not matured and that the promissory note and surety agreement were contracts
of adhesion.

Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings vis-à-vis a summary judgment, the judgment rendered by the
RTC was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary judgment. Although the Answer apparently raised
issues, both the RTC and the CA after considering the parties’ pleadings, petitioners’ admissions and the documents
attached to the Complaint, found that the issues are not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.
The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine
issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by
petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment?

A “GENUINE ISSUE” means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial .

We note that this is a case for a sum of money, and WTC have admitted that they obtained the loan. They also
admitted the due execution of the loan documents and their receipt of the final demand letter made by Equitable.
These documents were all attached to the Complaint. WTC merely claimed that the obligation has not matured.
Notably, based
on the promissory note, the RTC and the CA found this defense not a factual issue for trial, the loan being payable on
demand.

We agree with both the RTC and CA that this matter proffered as a defense could be resolved judiciously by plain resort
to the stipulations in the promissory note which was already before the trial court. A full-blown trial to determine the
date of maturity of the loan is not necessary. Also, the act of leaving blank the maturity date of the loan did not
necessarily mean that the parties agreed to fix it later. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have so indicated
in the promissory note.

2. Bascug v. Aranday, A.M.-RTJ 00-1591, April 11, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
In the case of Ditching v Odisco Farms System Cooperative, Bascug, President of Odisco, filed an Administrative
Complaint charging Judge Aranday with grave misconduct when he directed a judgment on the pleadings. Bascug claims
that Judge declared that the parties agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings even if Odisco had never agreed
to it. In fact, Odisco never submitted any memorándum for judgment on the pleadings required by the Judge in an Order.

In his defense, Judge claimed that the parties manifested that they had no objection to the submission of the case for
judgment on the pleadings.

DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 34, of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides —

Where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleading, the court may on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.

In his order, dated 20 December 1994, Judge required the parties to submit their respective memoranda for a
judgment on the pleadings. Bascug was the President of the corporation who maintained that the corporation never
agreed to have the case submitted for judgment on the pleadings. As so aptly put by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of 14 August 1998 —

It is believed that under the circumstances of the case, judgment on the pleadings was not called for
and prevented a fair and full resolution of controversy. The trial court stated that both parties agreed to
have judgment on the pleadings, the minutes of the session held on December 20, 1994 merely stated that
‘both parties will submit their respective memoranda for judgment on the pleadings’. Only the
plaintiffs submitted Memorandum praying for judgment on the pleadings; the defendants did not
submit their memorandum for judgment on the pleadings. In fact, in their Motion for Reconsideration
of the Judgment on the pleadings, the defendants pointed out that the parties presented ‘widely opposing
contentions’ in their respective pre-trial brief, and the court cannot rely on ‘conjectures’ on the ‘wild’
monetary claims of plaintiffs. In view of the objections expressed by the defendants to the issues raised,
there was no clear agreement to submit the case to a judgment or the pleadings, much less an implied
admission of each other’s factual allegations, which the defendants-appellants correctly describe as
‘widely opposing,’ that would support a submission by the parties to a judgment on the pleadings.

3. Eland Phil. V. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
Garcia et al filed a Complaint for Queting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC against Eland Phils.
Inc. They claimed that they are owners of a parcel of land by occupation and possession. They further claim that they
were not aware of any person who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until they were requesting that
the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was subject to a Land Registration Proceeding which had
already been decided.

RTC declared Eland in default and allowed Garcia to present evidence ex parte. Eland filed an MR which was granted.
Then, the RTC admitted Eland’s Answer Ad Coutelam. Thereaafter, Pretrial Conference was set and the parties submitted
their
respective Pretrial briefs. Eland tried to suspend the proceedings by filing a Petition for Certiorari which was however
denied. Hence, the RTC ruled that the reception of evidence presented by Garcia remained as part of the records subject to
Eland’s right to cross-examine. Eventually, Garia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which Eland filed its
Opposition. RTC granted Summary Judgment. Hence, this petition.

Eland questions the propriety of the Summary Judgment rendered in this case of Quieting of

Title. DOCTRINE:
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant.—A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.—The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions,
and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.

NO VIOLATION OF THE 10-DAY NOTICE RULE

Eland contended that the 10-day notice rule was violated, because the copy of the motion for summary judgment was
served only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing.

The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation that there was substantial
compliance with due process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the 10-day notice rule was substantially
complied with because when Garcia et al filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they
furnished Eland with a copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for
hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing thereof.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLIES TO QUETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTIONS

This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception of
actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.

IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear
to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine.

It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for
summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The RTC found no genuine issue
as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows
otherwise.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Garcia failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised
by the Eland in its Answer Ad Cautelam.

Clearly, the facts pleaded by Garcia in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested
by Eland, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial . When the facts as pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial .
In the present case, Eland was able to point out the genuine issues. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact that requires
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.

By granting the summary judgment, the RTC has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession
and ownership of the same land for more than 30 years without the benefit of a full-blown trial . The fact that Garcia
et al seek to nullify the original certificate of title issued to Eland on the claim that the former were in possession of the
same land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists.

4. Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, supra

DOCTRINE:
At the outset, the RTC erred in granting Smart’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the dismissal of Aldecoa’s
Complaint in Civil Case. Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.

In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper:

For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting
the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no
genuine issue as to a material fact exists , the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the
opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. A
GENUINE ISSUE is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.

On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences
as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the
moving party and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto.

Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual
issues disputed or contested by the parties.

XXIII. JUDGMENT (RULE 36)

1. Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143584, March 10, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
As sugar-farm owners, Sps Consing purchased various grades of fertilizer from Sugar Producer’s Cooperative Marketing
Association (SPCMA), an association assisting planters to procure fertilizer and other farm needs. The debt was
evidenced by a PN. When SPCMA presented the PN to PNB in which Sps. Consing had a Fertilizer Credit Line, the latter
refused to honor the note.

Thus, SPCMA filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against the Sps Consing with the RTC of Negros. RTC,
through Judge Querubin, ruled in favor of SPCMA. In its 2-page judgment, it merely narrated the facts showing the
indebtedness of the Sps. Consing and immediately went to the dispostive part holding the Sps liable to SPCMA in the
amount of P1.2M. On appeal, CA affirmed. Sps Consing’s MR denied. Hence this petition.

Sps. Consing allege that their the RTC decisión failed to state the legal basis of its ruling which is in violation of the
express mandate of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE:
While Judge Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of his ruling is not set out in the decision. Judge
Querubin failed to meet faithfully the requirement demanded by the Constitution from the courts in rendering their
decisions.

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution declares that:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

The court must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for the court’s decision so that if a party appeals, it
can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees . Every judge should know the
constitutional mandate and the rationale behind it. Judge Querubin should have known the exacting standard imposed on
courts by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and should not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for
brevity’s sake.

The failure of the RTC decision to measure up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross to ignore as it is in stark
contrast to the CA’s decision. The CA’s decision, while also brief, being only three pages long, laid down the factual
and legal reasons why Antonio and Soledad are the ones liable to SPCMA, and not PNB. The Court of Appeals’
discussion of the merits of this case enabled the parties to pinpoint the proper issues that we now review .

2. Heirs of Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163208, August 13, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
In an action for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of TCTs entittled Manila Construction Development v. Sps.
Dela Rosa et al, the RTC granted the Heirs of Valdez & Sps Malvar an Injunction Order and a Writ of Preliminar
Mandatory Injunction to place them in possession of a parcel of land in dispute. Thus, the Sheriff implemented the order
and writ in the property in possession by Lopez Resources. In doing so, they tore down the fence enclosing the said
property.

Aggrieved, Lopez Resources questioned the RTC decisión in the CA which was assigned to the Ninth Division. Here, the
CA issued 2 conflicting resolutions. One resolution dismissed the petition without prejudice for violation of the
provision against fórum shopping. Subsequently, another resolution was issued which required the Heirs of Valdez &
Sps. Malvar to file their comments to the Petition while requiring Lope Resources to rectify the deficiency in its
fórum-shopping certification.

Confusion arose when some parties were not able to get both resolutions. As a result, 86 days after the issuance of the
conficliting resolutions, the CA again issued another resolution clarifying that the first resolution was merely a clerical
error.

Pursuant to this, Lopez Resources made the necessary corrections in its petition and refiled the case. Thereafter, the Heirs
of Valdez and Sps Malvar moved to dismiss the re-filed Petition on the ground that CA has no jurisdiction because the
prior resolution had already become final and executory. However, the CA went to proceed with the case. Hence, this
petition.

DOCTRINE:
The fact that the Ninth Division of the CA committed a monumental error cannot be erased. But the error was not in the
court’s intent on what to do with the forum shopping violation it found. In both resolutions, what is clear is that the
court intended to allow a rectification of the deficiency in Lopez Resources’ non-forum shopping certification in
view perhaps of what it perceived to be the merits that the face of the petition showed.
We have no doubt that it was within the CA’s power and prerogative to issue what either resolution decreed without
committing an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
To look at the matter from another perspective, the issuance of two conflicting resolutions — one for dismissal, the other
for the continuation of the case, with one cancelling out the other — can only mean that no definite, specific
determination was made by the court; at least, there was uncertainty on what the court really intended to do. Under this
situation, we find it fallacious to conclude that one resolution lapsed to finality while the other did not. In legal
effect, there was effectively no definite resolution that could have lapsed to finality because of the mistake the
court committed. This status continued until a clarification was made by the issuing court.

Even granting that the first Resolution became final and executory , the rule on immutability of judgment does not
apply in cases where what is to be modified or altered involves:

(1) the correction of clerical errors;

(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments [such as a dismissal without prejudice that was not intended to be issued] and those where
circumstances transpire after the finality that render the execution or enforcement, as in this case, of the judgment
unjust or inequitable.

To be sure, the rule does not apply in cases where a supervening event — such as the mistake undisputably committed
by the court (i.e., the unintended release of one of the resolutions, thus resulting in the conflict and confusion) — took
place.

3. Intramuros Tennis v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
PTA owns Victoria Tennis Courts located in Intramuros. Pursuant to a MOA, PTA transferred the management, operation,
administration, and development of Victoria to the Philippine Tennis Association (PhilTA) for 10 years. Intramuros
Tennis Club is affiliated with PhilTA and its members are tennis players who frequently use the facilities of Victoria.

During the pendency of the MOA, PTA alleged that PhilTA violated its terms and conditions and thus demanded the
surrender of its possession of Victoria. It likewise asked PhilTA to vacate the premises.

As such, Intramuros filed a case for Preliminary Injucntion, Damages, and TRO in the RTC of Manila against PTA
alleging that PTA’s demand to vacate was tantamount to a unilateral pre-termination of the MOA. RTC granted the TRO
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Thereafter, PTA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action bécame moot and academic in light of
the expiration of the MOA. As a result, MOA dismissed the case and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It also
declared that PTA is entitled to the possession of Victoria. Aggrieved, Intramuros appealed.

Before the resolution of the appeal, PTA filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. CA granted said Motion. MR
denied. Hence, this petition. Intramuros contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering execution pending
appeal.

DOCTRINE:
Based on the Sec 2 Rule 39 (Discretionary Execution), the CA may order execution pending appeal subject to the
following conditions: (1) there must be a judgment or final order; (2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the
case; (3) there must be “good reasons” to allow execution; and (4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order
after due hearing.

Undoubtedly, the RTC order which granted PTA’s Motion to Dismiss and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is a
“final order” within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Intramuros maintains that
the said RTC order could not be the proper subject of execution because it was still appealed to the CA, but this merely
confuses the concept of a “final” judgment or order from one which has “become final” (or to use the more
established term, “final and executory”) — a distinction that is definite and settled.
A “FINAL” JUDGMENT OR ORDER is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in
respect thereto — such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance.

It is to be distinguished from an order that is “interlocutory,” or one that does not finally dispose of the case, such
as an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, or granting a motion for extension of time to
file a pleading. As such, only final judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable.

Now, a “FINAL” JUDGMENT OR ORDER in the sense just described becomes “final and executory” upon expiration of
the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken,
the judgment of the appellate court in turn becomes final. It is called a “final and executory” judgment because
execution at such point issues as a matter of right.

By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires only a “final” judgment or order (as
distinguished from an “interlocutory” order) and not a “final and executory” judgment or order . In the instant case, the
RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted PTA’s motion to dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
held that PTA entitled to possess the Victoria Tennis Courts is a final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, inasmuch as it makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and dismisses
Intramuros’ action. Intramuros, in fact, impliedly recognized the finality of this RTC order when they filed an ordinary
appeal (and not a petition for certiorari) therefrom with the CA.

4. Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding, 702 SCRA 153 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Salamuding et al were employees of Polymer Rubber Corporation of which Ang was the highest ranking director. They
were dismissed by Polymer for committing certain irregularities. Thus, in 1990, they filed a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal and Nonpayment of Monetary Benefits. LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Salamuding et al. An Entry of
Judgment was made and an Alias Writ of Execution issued based on the NLRC ruling. On certiorari, the SC affirmed.

Soon after the SC decisión in 1993, Polymer ceased operations. On motion, another Alias Writ of Execution was issued
but was returned unsatisfied.

In 2004, Polymer’s office was gutted by a fire. As such, LA issued its 5th Alias Writ of Execution and commanded the
sherrif to collect an amount of P2.9M. In the implementation of the Writ, Ang’s shares of stock at USA Resources
Corporation were levied. As such, Polymer moved to quash the 5th Alias Writ of Execution alleging that Ang cannot be
made solidarily liable with Polymer considering that it was only the latter whom the LA, NLRC and SC adjudged to be
liable previously.

LA quashed the Writ and ruled that Ang can no longer be held liable because the decisión had become final and executory
and would thus vary the tenor of the judgment. NLRC affirmed. MR denied. On certiorari, CA reversed and held Ang
liable after it pierced Polymer’s corporate veil. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The CA imputed bad faith on the part of Polymer and Ang when Polymer ceased its operations the day after the
promulgation of the SC resolution in 1993 which was allegedly meant to evade liability. The CA found it necessary to
pierce the corporate fiction and pointed at Ang as the responsible person to pay for Salamuding’s money claims. Except
for this assertion, there is nothing in the records that show that Ang was responsible for the acts complained of. At
any rate, we find that it will require a great stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would cease its operations
if only to evade the payment of the adjudged monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its employees.

The dispositive portion of the LA Decision dated November 21, 1990 which Salamuding attempts to enforce does not
mention that Ang is jointly and severally liable with Polymer. Ang is merely one of the incorporators of Polymer and
to single him out and require him to personally answer for the liabilities of Polymer is without basis. In the absence of a
finding that he acted with malice or bad faith , it was error for the CA to hold him responsible .
To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and
later by the SC had already long become final and executory. It has been held that a final and executory judgment can
no longer be altered. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. “Since the alias writ of
execution did not conform, is different from and thus went beyond or varied the tenor of the judgment which gave it life,
it is a nullity.

5. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 705 SCRA 430 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
FTC manufactures and produces cigarettes. Originally, its cigerette brands were subject to ad valorem tax. However, with
the passage of RA 8240 in 1997, a specific tax system was adopted which imposed excise taxes on cigarette brands.
Pursuant to RRs issued to impement the law, FTC paid excise taxes on all cigarettes manufactured. Thereafter, FTC
sought administrative redress for refund for 3 different periods (2000, 2001, 2002) before the CIR.

Since the claims were not acted upon, FTC filed 3 Petitions for Review in the CTA with claims for refund of the overpaid
excise taxes. As such, the CTA ordered CIR to refund FTC for 3 different periods. MR denied. As a result, CIR went to
the CA on Petition for Review assailing the ruling in the consolidated cases involving the claims from 2000 and 2001.
Subsequently, CIR filed another Petition for Review for the case involving the period 2002.

CA denied the CIR’s Petitions for Review. MRs were likewise denied. In the SC, it ruled against the CIR in July 21 2008.
In its fallo, it only said that, “The Decision of the CA in CA-GR SP No. 80675 (which consolidated only the claims
for 2000 and 2001) are affirmed.”

In 2009, upon FTC’s motion, CTA issued a Writ of Execution and ordered CIR to refund FTC the amounts stated in the
2008 SC decisión which attained finality by virtue of an Entry of Judgment in Nov 2008. In said Entry of Judgment,
however, only the claims in years 2000 and 2001 were mentioned. Thus, FTC filed a Motion for the Issuance of an
Additional Writ of Execution covering the judgment in the claims for year 2002. However, this Motion was denied. MR
was likewise denied. CTA en banc also denied.

Hence, FTC comes now via Petition for

Review. DOCTRINE:
After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 Decision, the Court finds it necessary to render a judgment
nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision. The office of a JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC is to
record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a
court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually
been taken.

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record , that has been previously rendered , to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such
as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render , not
to supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. The Court would thus have the record
reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a
judicial error. The body of the decision in question is clear proof that the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey
the ruling of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The dispositive portion of the Court’s July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos.
167274-75 is corrected to reflect the inclusion of CA-G.R. SP No. 83165 therein. As amended, the fallo of the aforesaid
decision shall read:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases
of CA-G.R. SP No. 80675 and 83165 (2002 claim) dated 28 September 2004, and its Resolution, dated 1
March 2005, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

XXIV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL (RULE 37)

1. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Olivarez filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Fernandez in the MTC. MTC dismissed the Complaint for lack
of sufficient cause of action. On appeal, RTC reversed the MTC and ordered Fernandez to pay rent in a decisión dated
May 2, 1994. Fernandez received a copy thereof on June 28, 1994. On July 12 1994 (14 days after), Fernandez filed an
MR. On Nov 29, 1994, Fernandez received the denial of his MR. Thus, on Dec 1, 1994, he filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review in the CA.

Meanwhile, upon discovering new evidence of receipts proving his rental payments, Fernandez filed a Motion for New
Trial in the RTC on Dec 9, 1994. On Dec 12, 1994, CA granted his Motion for Extension. However, on Dec 29, 1994,
Ferndandez filed a Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review.

On Feb 6, 1995, RTC denied the Motion for New Trial and stated that by filing a Motion to Extend in the CA which was
eventually granted, CA already had jurisdiction over the the case and not the RTC.

Thereafter, upon motion of Olivares, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. This prompted Fernandez to File a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA. However, CA dismissed the Petition. MR denied. Hence this petition.

Fernandez questions whether or not his mere filing of a Motion for Extension (which was later withdrawn) automatically
divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case as to take cognizance of a Motion for New Trial.

DOCTRINE:
It may seem at once apparent that the CA had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been repeatedly held that
an appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless
by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person.

As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required for jurisdiction to
attach
therein, to wit:

(1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time for doing so;
(2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so;
(3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and
(4) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.

The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees . In the discussion of the
Committee on the revision of the Rules of Court, it was emphasized that to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the
petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and
unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees.

Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez
merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself. Withal, sans the petition, it
cannot be said that the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say that the trial court is without authority to act on
a motion for new trial. It is axiomatic that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
On this point we fully agree in the position taken by Fernandez that when he filed the motion for extension of time to
file petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had not yet attached , such that his failure to file the
petition itself would normally have the effect of rendering the decision of the lower court final and executory.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the period to file a motion for new trial in relation to Rule
41, Section 3 is in point.

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the
period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or
final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party.

Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

It is without question that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994. Fourteen (14) days after the
receipt of the decision or specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied by
the RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, he had only one (1) day left to file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should
be filed within the period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new
trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be
perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the reglementary period
within which to appeal.

Applying the foregoing, Fernandez’s motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day period for filing
a motion for new trial cannot be extended .

IN SUM, considering that a motion for new trial must be filed during the period for filing an appeal and that such period
cannot be extended, Fernandez, by filing his motion for new trial beyond the period to appeal, had unwittingly
sealed his fate and stripped himself of any further relief .

2. Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003, supra

QUICKIE FACTS:
Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. The latter was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in
Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion
of said property. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. Benedicto’s lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate.

Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. RTC ruled in
favor of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all improvements thereon.

On May 30, 1997 or 5 days before the expiration of the period to appeal, Republic filed through registered mail a
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decison. However, on June 11, 1997, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground
that it failed to incorporate any notice of hearing as required by the Rules. The Republic received said order on June 18,
1997. Thereafter, on July 22, 1997, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. In opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere scap of paper and thus did not toll the running of the reglementary period
for perfecting appeal.
Pending all this, the RTC judge retired. On Jan 28, 1999, the new judge issued an order giving due course to Republic’s
Appeal but was again reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention. Peralta et al then moved for the execution
which was granted. Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of
Execution. MR denied.

On certiorari in the CA, Republic’s petition was again dismissed. Hence, this petition. Essentially, the Republic assails the
CA’s declaration that they failed to perfect their appeal.

DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a
new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule , a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to
all the parties concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice
of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.
The requirements, far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of
procedural due process.

Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court
would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear
him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The
requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma;a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right
to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the
reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of
said motion.

In this case, the Republic, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until
June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal
from said adverse decision. Although the Republic filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within
the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there
is no proof that Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of
the Rules of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

3. People v. Odilao, April 14, 2004, G.R. No. 155451 ????

QUICKIE FACTS:
Odilao et al were charged with Estafa in an Information filed in the RTC of Cebu. A Warrant of Arrest was issued.
However, upon motion of Odilao, reinvestigation was conducted. Based on the reinvestigation report, no probable cause
was found. Thus, the Prosecution sought to dismiss the case. As a result, the prívate complainant (Bugash) opposed the
reinvestigation report and filed a Petition for Review in the DOJ. Thus, the RTC did not rule on the Motion to Dismiss
until the DOJ resolves the petition.

A year later, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Thus, Odilao filed an MR which was denied. Consequently, Odilao
went up to the CA via Petition for Certiorari. CA granted the Petition and directed the RTC to wait until the DOJ resolves
the Petition filed before it. As a result, the People filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.

While said Petition was pending resolution before the SC, Bugash filed an MR before the CA seeking reversal of its
decisión which granted Odilao’s Petition. This MR was granted and the CA reversed itself and denied the Motion to
Dismiss the case filed by the Prosecutor.
Thereafter, DOJ denied the Petition for Review and held that there was no probable

cause DOCTRINE:
It cannot be avoided that we remind the Court of Ap-peals of the provisions of Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (effective August 22, 2002), which explicitly provides thus:

SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. — No motion for reconsideration or
rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.

We are, therefore, quite perplexed why the CA did not act in accord with the aforequoted Rule and instead resolved
the motion for reconsideration of its Decision dated September 27, 2002, filed by Bugash, despite service on it of a
copy of the Motion For Extension To File Petition For Review dated October 15, 2002, filed by the OSG.

At the very least, prudence dictates that the CA should have first required Bugash to secure the conformity of the
OSG, or required the latter to comment on the motion for reconsideration of Bugash. The positions taken by the Office of
the Solicitor General and Bugash are practically identical. In any event the Court of Appeals ought not to have acted on
the said motion for reconsideration of private complainant Bugash. It should have considered said motion which, in the
first place, was without the conformity of the OSG, the representative of the People of the Philippines, as having been
abandoned by the filing of herein petition by the OSG, pursuant to the aforequoted Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.

4. Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Neypes et al filed an Action for Annulment of Judgment and Titles and Reconveyance before the RTC against Bureau of
Forests, Bureau of Lands, et al. However, in Feb 12, 1998, RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the action
already prescribed. Neypes received the order on Mar 3, 1998. On Mar 18, 1998 or 15 days later, Neypes filed an MR. On
July 1, 1998, RTC dismissed the MR on and the order was received on July 22, 1998. On July 27, 1998 or 5 days later
after receipt, Neypes filed a Notice of appeal and paid docket fees on August 3, 1998.

RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed 8 days late. MR was denied. Neypes went up the CA via Petition
for Certiorari and assailed the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal. He claims that they filed it on time and argued that the
15-day period started to run only from the date they received the order dismissing the MR on July 22. Thus, when they
filed their MR 5 days later, it was still within the reglementary period.

CA dismissed the Petition and reckoned the 15-day period from March 3. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Essentially,
Neypes questions the period within which to properly file its Notice of Appeal.

DOCTRINE:
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of
the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.

An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

FINAL ORDER
As already mentioned, Neypes argues that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their MR should be construed as the
“final order,” not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the
denial of their MR only on July 22, 1998 , the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
We sustain Neypes’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their MR was the final order contemplated in the
Rules.
START OF THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; FRESH PERIOD RULE
Under Rule 41, Section 3, Neypes had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the
trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), Neypes did not file a notice of appeal but
instead opted to file a MR.

According to the RTC, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that Neypes, having filed
their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal
upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Neypes, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a
fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the “final order” or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration .

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this “FRESH PERIOD RULE” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial , motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
or resolution.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration . Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3.

5. Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998

QUICKIE FACTS:
Annie Tan leased a portion of her building in Binondo in favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing Inc. For alleged
violations of the lease contract, Tan filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Bloomberry. Bloomberry likewise filed a
Case for Consignation on account of Tan’s refusal to accept its rental payment. These 2 cases were consolidated. As a
matter of course, MTC dismissed the Complaint as well as Bloomberry’s counterclaim.

On appeal, RTC affirmed. Consequently, Tan filed an MR which however did not include a Notice of Hearing as required
by the Rules. Thus, Bloomberry filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment on the ground that the MR was a mere
scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglemantary period. In other words, Bloomberry contends that the
RTC decisión has already become final and executory.

Thereafer, Tan filed a Motion to Set for Hearing the MR. Tan avers that she inavertently omitted said Notice on account
of her lawyer’s messenger’s honest mistake. Also, she claims that, due to work-related pressures, her lawyer was not able
to follow up the motion. Over the vehement opposition of Bloomberry, the RTC granted the Motion and set the hearing at
a specified date and time. Aggrieved, Bloomberry filed an MR which was denied. As such, Bloomberry filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA. CA granted the Petition and reversed the RTC in favor of Bloomberry. Hence, this petition.

Tan questions whether or not the omission through inadvertence of a Notice of Hearing for an MR is a fatal defect which
does not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal.

DOCTRINE:
We are not in the least convinced. First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger. The burden
of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsel’s shoulders, not on the messenger’s. The counsel is ultimately
responsible for the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence, the messenger’s conduct can neither justify the counsel’s
mistake nor warrant a departure from the mandate of the aforesaid procedural rules.
Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due to honest mistake .
In fact, there was no such page. Tan’s claim is belied by the very MR she filed which ended exactly on the 3rd page as
evidenced by the “copy furnished” notation. It is safe to conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in
not including a fourth page in this case. In other words, Tan’s counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing.

Finally, the fact that Tan’s former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for August 23, 1996 belies the excuse that an
alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a notice of hearing had been included in the MR, there
would have been no need for Tan to file the Motion to set the time and date of hearing . What is clear is that said
counsel filed the latter Motion, only after Bloomberry had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment — with copy
furnished Tan’s counsel — on the ground that Tan’s MR was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for appeal.

XXV. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (RULE 38)

1. Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.156021, September 23, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Francisco Provido, filed a Petition for Probate of the will of Soledad Provido Elevencionado who died in January 2000 in
the RTC of Iloilo. He alleged that he was an heir of the decedent. The Probate Court allowed the probate of the will.
Meanwhile, Flores filed an Petition for Letters of Administration with the RTC of General Santos. However, RTC of
General Santos dismissed the Petition because the Probate Court in Iloilo already had jurisdiction over the case.

After 4 months from the finality of the Probate Court, Alaban, Flores, et al filed a Motion to Reopen the probate
proceedings claiming that they were intestate heirs of the decedent. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order denying the Motion.

Consequently, Alaban, Flores, et al filed with the CA an Petition for Annulment of the Decision and Order of the RTC.
They claimed that Provido fraudulently secured the probate of the will by making them think that they were going to enter
into a Compromise Agreement.

However, CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that Abalan, Flores, et al failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of
New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, or other appropriate remedies. MR was denied. Hence, this
petition.

Abalan, Flores, et al essentially claim that since they were not made parties to the proceedings in the RTC of Iloilo
(Probate Court), they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from
Judgment, etc.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ABALAN COULD FILE A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT WITHOUT AVAILING OF
ORDINARY REMEDIES LIKE PETITION FOR RELEIF FROM JUDGMENT.

HELD: NO. SINCE IT IS AN ACTION IN REM, THEY BECAME PARTIES TO THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BY PUBLICATION.
THUS, THEY SHOULD HAVE AVAILED OF THE ORDINARY REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 37 allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of an MR on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of
evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be
filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the
judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and
within six (6) months after entry thereof.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties
in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a
party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.

NOTICE BY PUBLICATION
However, Alaban, Flores et al are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings.

It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement
of the estate of the decedent.

It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
to hear and decide it. Thus, even though they were not mentioned in the petition for probate , they eventually became
parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. As parties to the probate proceedings,
they could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief
from judgment.

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER REMEDY

Conceding that they became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for
relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only
on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of
the remedy.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, they could no longer resort
to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.

ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation . It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.

A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

2. Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
Filomena Crisostomo owns a parcel of land in Noveleta. After her death, she was survived by her sister Leonor Raon.
Raon filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Regalado Samartino in the MTC of Noveleta and alleged that the lease with
Crisostomo already expired and still she refused to vacate.

Summons was served upon Samartino’s brother because he was then confined in rehab in Tagaytay. As a result, the liason
officer of the rehab appeared before the MTC with a certification that Samartino cannot comply with the directive file an
Answer within the reglementary period. Nonetheless, upon motion of Raon, MTC declared Samartino in default and
ordered Raon to present evidence ex parte. Then, MTC ruled in favor of Raon and ordered Samartino to vacate.

After learning of the adverse decision by the MTC, Samartino filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment in the RTC.
However, RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling. The RTC decision became final. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued
and the parcel of land was levied upon.
Thus, Samartino filed in the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment with an affidavit of merit alleging that Filomena
Crisostomo sold the land to him as evidence by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Nevertheless, RTC dismissed the Petition for
Relief from Judgment. MR was likewise denied. On certiorari, CA dismissed Samartino’s petition. MR was denied as
well. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DISMISSED SAMARTINO’S PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT. HELD: NO. NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS. ALSO, THE PETITION FOR RELIEF WAS FILED ON TIME.
There being no valid substituted service of summons (no explanation of impossibility of personal service; brother was not
proven to be of sufficient age and discretion and resident thereof), the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person Samartino.

In addition, the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment for having been
filed out of time. According to the RTC, the petition for relief, filed on November 25, 1996, was late because Samartino
had actual knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a
petition for relief should have been reckoned from the date Samartino learned of the judgment of the RTC. It
should not have been counted from the date of the MTC’s decision because, precisely, Samartino appealed the
same. It was the RTC’s decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief from
judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final and executory judgment.

It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when Samartino learned of the decision of the RTC affirming the
judgment of the MTC. What appears is that the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been
entered sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the 6-month
period prescribed by the Rules.

3. Purcon v. MRM Philippines et al., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Purcon was a seaman working for MRM. He suffered a hernia and was thus repatriated back to the Philippines. After the
doctor declared that he was fit to work, he reported to MRM. However, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. As
such, he filed Complaint for Reimbursement of Disability Benefits and other monetary benefits in the NLRC. In its
defense, MRM averred that since the hernia was not work related, Purcon was not entitled to disability benefit and related
claims.

LA dismissed Purco’s Complaint. On appeal, NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal which became final and executory.
Thereafter, Purco filed in the CA a Petition for Certiorari which was however denied. The CA’s resolution also became
final and executory. Nonetheless, Purco filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC which was also denied. As a
result, Purco filed before the SC a Petition for Relief from Judgment.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PETITIONER CAN AVAIL OF A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FROM AN SC DECISION
WHICH DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.

HELD: NO. IT IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE SC.

FIRST, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:

Section 1. Original cases cognizable. — Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme
Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
SECOND, while Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to MTCs and RTCs. As revised, Rule 38 radically
departs from the previous rule as it now allows the MTC which decided the case or issued the order to hear the
petition for
relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court.

The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for MTCs and RTCs and
designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.

THIRD, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court.
It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of
petition for relief in the CA.

There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The
procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies
the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47),
motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38
mentioned.

If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy
cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law . A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this
Court.

Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the
petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Purco’s lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without
demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of
counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence , or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.

XXVI. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT (RULE 39)

1. Capa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160082, September 19, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Capa owns a motor boat which was used for their fish trading business called MB CLM Zoltan. On the other hand, United
Vismin Shipping Lines (UVSL) owns a vessel called MV Cebu Pearl. One evening, these two vessels collided resulting in
the sinking of the Zoltan. Thus, Capa filed a Complaint for Damages in the RTC of Cebu against UVSL RTC ruled in
favor of Capa and ordered UVSL to pay damages.

As a result, UVSL filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC who then orderd the records to be
elevated to the CA. Prior to this, however, Capa filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal because UVSL already
notified the MARINA that it was ceasing its operations. After the RTC granted said Motion, a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal was issued to Sheriff Belarmino.

Pursuant to this, Belarmino levied upon 2 of UVSL’s vessels called MV Island Pearl and MV Sea Pearl. Subsequently one
Jocelyn Raco filed a Third Party Claim stating that it claimed ownership over the 2 vessels levied upon. As a result, the
Sheriff sent to Capa a notice which required them to file an indemnity bond amounting to 2.7M.

Thereafter, UVSL filed a Motion to Quash Levy on the ground that Capa were not required to put up a bond in favor of
UVSL. RTC no longer entertained said Motion to Quash Levy because the RTC has lost jurisdiction at the time the appeal
was perfected.
Then, Capa filed in the CA a Motion to Approve Sheriff’s Indemnity Bond. However, CA denied this. Likewise, Capa
filed with the CA a Motion to Deny Third Party Claim. Unfortunately, CA also denied the Motion stating that it should
have been filed in the RTC of Cebu.

ISSUE: WHETHER CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT ACT ON CAPA’S MOTION TO DENY THIRD
PARTY CLAIM.

HELD: NO. CA CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION.

Based on Rule 39 and Rule 41, as long as the motion for execution pending appeal is filed within the period for
perfecting the appeal and prior to the transmittal of the records to the CA, the trial court may order execution
pending appeal upon good reasons to be stated in the Order granting execution pending appeal. The RTC granted
Capa’s motion for execution pending appeal and issued the writ of execution commanding sheriff Belarmino to levy the
properties of United Vismin.

However, a third party-claim was filed by Raco through her attorney-in-fact Tolosa pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If the property levied on is claimed by
any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his
title thereto or right to the possession thereof , stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the
same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall
not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value
of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the
court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be
enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty days (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant if such bond is filed.

In this case, Raco availed of the remedy known as terceria, by serving on the officer making the levy an affidavit of
his title and a copy thereof upon Capa. Upon receipt of such affidavit, sheriff Belarmino who is not bound to keep the
properties because of such third party claim, notified Capa of such claim and required them to post an indemnity
bond in the amount of P2,700,000.00 on February 4, 2002 to answer for any liability he may incur by reason of such
execution.

VALIDITY OF THE THIRD PARTY CLAIM WAS NOT QUESTIONED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
The matter of the invalidity of the affidavit of the third-party claimant (Raco) was never raised by Capa in the trial
court which could have still ruled on the same since the records were still with it at the time such third party claim was
filed. Moreover, Capa even filed an indemnity bond in the amount of P1,400,000.00 with the Office of the Sheriff on
February 18, 2002.

As the appeal of UVSL had already been perfected and the records were elevated to the CA on February 6, 2002, Capa
then filed with the CA a motion seeking for the approval of the sheriff’s indemnity bond they posted on February
18, 2002. The CA then held in abeyance the action therein pending submission of a certified true copy of a surety bond
and a certification from the Supreme Court that the surety bond is not black-listed. Subsequently, Capa’s motion to
approve bond in a Resolution dated October 1, 2001 was denied for failure to comply with such directive. Despite
motions for extension of time to look for a qualified and sufficient indemnity bond affordable, Capa failed to do so which
prompted the CA to deny the same.

Capa then filed a Motion to Deny Third-Party Claim with Motion to Admit Claim for Damages which is a complete
turn around from their motion to approve indemnity bond . The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not
acting on the same since the invalidity of the affidavit of third-party claim should have been raised at the earliest
opportunity which is in the trial court.

Capa could have then moved for the quashal of the same, thus they could not now invoke the jurisdiction of the CA to
rule on the same when they in fact had already waived the alleged defect in the affidavit when they sought from the
CA the approval of the indemnity bond they posted in the trial court.

2. Navarosa v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003

QUICKIE FACTS:
After the elections for Mayor of Libacao, Aklan, Navarosa was proclaimed the winner with a margin of 3 votes over Esto.
As such, an election protest was filed in the RTC. In its decision, RTC annulled Navarosa’s proclamation and declared
Esto as winner with a margin of 42 votes over Navarosa. RTC also awared damages in favor of Esto.

Navarosa appealed to the COMELEC. Likewise, Esto filed in the MTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. As a
matter of course, Navarosa opposed the Motion and, in the alternative, offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution pending appeal in case the RTC grants Esto’s motion. Thereafter, RTC granted Esto’s motion as well as
Navarosa’s prayer to stay execution pending appeal upon filing of a P600k supersedeas bond. Both parties filed an MR
but were denied.

Consequently, Esto filed a Petition for Certiorari in the COMELEC. In his defense, Navarosa raised for the first time the
issue that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the election protest allegedly because Esto failed to pay the COMELEC filing
fees. COMELEC Division affirmed the granting of the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal but nullified the stay of
execution. Navarosa’s MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS TO GRANT THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

HELD: YES. THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR THE GRANT OF THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur:

(1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) there must be “good reasons” for the execution pending appeal; and
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the “good reasons.”

Navarosa concedes Esto’s compliance with the first and third requisites. What she contests is the RTC’s finding that
there are “good reasons” to order discretionary execution of its decision.

In Ramas v. Commission on Elections, the Court, after reviewing pertinent jurisprudence, summarized the circumstances
qualifying as “good reasons” justifying execution pending appeal, thus:

In a nutshell, the following constitute “good reasons,” and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to
grant execution pending appeal:

(1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;

(2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
(3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

The RTC in the present case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas, invoked two “good reasons” to justify its order
allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order will “give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate.”
Second, “more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term” of the office in question had already lapsed. The
COMELEC found these “good reasons” sufficient. Being consistent with Ramas, we find no grave abuse of discretion
in the ruling of the trial court or of the COMELEC.
FILING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND TO STAR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL NOT APPLICABLE TO ELECTION PROTESTS
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies in suppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution
pending appeal in the discretion of the court.

A primordial public interest — to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by the trial
court — lies behind the present rule giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy
consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2.

In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal , Navarosa
neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that
Section 3 of Rule 39 applies also in a suppletory character because its “Siamese twin” provision, Section 2, is already
being so applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying Section 2’s
application. We cannot countenance such argument.

Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in
election protest cases. Section 3 provides:

Stay of discretionary execution. — Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be
stayed upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom it is
directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it
shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion
with notice to the surety.

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of its affirmation.
Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of
pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate
sentence of Section 3 states: “[T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.”

Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are
not capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.

By allowing the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of a judgment in an election protest declaring the
protestant as the winning candidate who is entitled to the right to hold and perform the functions of the contested public
office, would render the judgment in an election protest illusory. While the supersedeas bond ensures that the
appealed decision if affirmed is satisfied, in an election protest case, such bond, in the event the appealed case is
affirmed and the execution pending appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot adequately answer for the deprivation
of a duly elected candidate of his post , and his constituents of their leader of choice , such deprivation being
unquantifiable.

As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond Navarosa filed can only answer for that portion of the trial
court’s ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual damages , attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit. It
cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by
popular will of the electorate and authorizing him to assume the office. This anomalous situation defeats the very
purpose for the filing of the supersedeas bond in the first place.

3. International School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131109, June 29, 1999
QUICKIE FACTS:
The son of Sps. Torralba died while in the custody of ISM. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Damages against the latter
and its officers. RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Torralba. As a result, ISM appealed to the CA. However, during the
pendency of said appeal, Spouses Torralba filed in the RTC a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the ground that
the appeal is merely dilatory and that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution pending appeal.
Naturally, ISM opposed this.
Nonetheless, RTC granted Execution Pending Appeal upon the filing of a 5M bond in favor of Spouses Torralba.
Consequently, ISM filed an MR and, in the alternative, for approval of supersedeas bond to stay the execution pending
appeal. However, RTC denied the MR. Thus, ISM filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to seek the nullification of the
order
granting the execution pending appeal. Unfortunately, CA dismissed the petition and found that the grounds for granting
the execution pending appeal constituted good reasons (i.e. appeal was dilatory, filing of bond). Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE GOOD REASONS FOR THE COURT TO GRANT THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL .

HELD: NO. DID NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD REASONS FOR GRANTING THE EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.
A petition for certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon
good reasons.

In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the CA observed that the RTC had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the
presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, allowing execution as an
exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:

(1) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(3) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.

RTC SAYING THAT APPEAL IS MERELY DILATORY IS NOT A GOOD REASON TO GRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Likewise, the CA accepted as ‘good reasons’ that ISM’s appeal appears to be dilatory in view of its virtual admission of
fault when it adopted the project “Code Red” only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses Torralba’s son, and the delay of the
case which already affected plaintiffs-spouses Torralbas financially.

This Court has ruled in Ong vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot
be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to
disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right
to appeal. The authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court.

For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal, we cannot see how the lower
courts came upon the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange
where ISM’s swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article introducing “Code Red.” As correctly
pointed out by ISM, the article was not an official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author.
Moreover, we cannot see how the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article on “Code Red” can be construed as
an admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of the RTC that the appeal is dilatory based solely
on the foregoing exchange rests on shaky ground.

MERE FILING OF A BOND IS NOT A GOOD REASON TO GRANT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
In the case of Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, this Court had occasion to address this issue directly, as follows:

To consider the mere posting of a bond a ‘good reason’ would precisely make immediate execution
of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do
was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither
contemplated nor intended by law.

In fine, the rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering
execution pending appeal, as “a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of
immediate execution, the requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection of
the defendant’s creditor.” Since we have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify
execution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same. Moreover, ISM
could not be faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond inasmuch as the lower court granted the execution
pending appeal and rejected its offer of supersedeas bond.
AWARDS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
Finally, we note that writ of execution pending appeal covered the moral and exemplary damages adjudged by the lower
court against ISM. In this regard, we likewise reproduce what was said in Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) vs. Lantin, et al. that awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of execution pending
appeal, under the following rationale:

The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main
case. Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach
a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral
and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending
resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the
factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners’ act will have to be
determined in the light of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for
actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the
Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

4. Manacop v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 162814, August 25, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Inc insured its building and supplies with PhilFire, Rizal Surety, TICO, First Lepanto,
Equitable Insurance, and Reliance Insurance. All but one of the policies provided that loss is payable to Equitable Bank-
Greenhills, as their interest may appear. Subsequently, a fire gutted Lavine’s buildings. So, claims were made against the
various insurance policies in the aggregate amount of 112M as determined by the Insurance Commission.

Chandru, one of Lavine’s Board Members requested that the payments be made first to Lavine who shall thereafter pay
Equitable as the latter’s interest may appear. Nonetheless, the insurance companies released the proceeds directly to
Equitable. As a result, Chandru filed, in behalf of Lavine, a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
TRO in the RTC of Pasig against the insurance companies. Thereafter, as Lavine’s incumbent directors, Manacop, et al
intervened.

The intervenors alleged that its liabilities to Equitable Bank were extinguished because it already received proceeds
exceeding the amount of Lavine’s obligations. As such, the mortgages given as security by Lavine should be released and
the excess be returned to Lavine. In its defense, Equitable Bank denied that the obligations were fully paid and prayed that
the insurance companies pay their outstanding debts, that the directors be held solidarily liable, and that the REMs be
foreclosed.

RTC dismissed the Complaint and ordered Equitable Bank to refund Lavine through the intervenors and also ordered the
insurance companies to pay Lavine through the intervenors.

As such, the intervenors filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Without filing and MR and even before the RTC
could rule on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, Equitable filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. Lavine
likewise filed a similar petition. Thereafter, the RTC granted the Motion and issued a Writ of Execution which was
implemented the next day. As such, the insurance companies likewise filed their Petitions for Certiorari. CA consolidated
said petitions.

CA set aside the RTC decision and set aside the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal and ordered the case remanded.
Hence, the intevenors filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL THROUGH
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI

HELD: CERTIORARI IS A PROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL AN EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO GOOD
REASONS SHOWN IN THIS CASE
These certiorari petitions initiated by PhilFire and First Lepanto were directed against the RTC’s orders granting
Execution Pending Appeal and the concomitant
issuance of a Writ of Execution. The proper recourse to be taken from these orders is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reasons. The fact that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari
proceedings, as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution . Additionally, there is
no forum shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal
and at the same time questions the decision on the merits in a regular appeal before the appellate court. After all, the
merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa.

NO GOOD REASONS FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

The GENERAL RULE is that only judgments which have become final and executory may be executed. HOWEVER,
discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed under Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure upon concurrence of the following requisites:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional circumstances of
such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer , should the appealed judgment
be reversed later. Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the existence of
good reasons is essential.

ADMISSION OF LIABILITY IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON

In the case at bar, the intervenors insist that execution pending appeal is justified because the insurance companies
admitted their liabilities under the insurance contracts and thus have no reason to withhold payment.

We are not persuaded. The fact that the insurance companies admit their liabilities is not a compelling or superior
circumstance that would warrant execution pending appeal. On the contrary, admission of their liabilities and
willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against execution pending appeal since there is
little or no danger that the judgment will become illusory.

THAT APPEAL IS MERELY DILATORY IS NOT A GOOD REASON

There is likewise no merit in intervernors’ contention that the appeals are merely dilatory because, while the
insurance companies admitted their liabilities, the matter of how much is owing from each of them and who is
entitled to the same remain unsettled . It should be noted that the insurance companies are questioning the amounts
awarded by the RTC for being over and above the amount ascertained by the Office of the Insurance Commission. There
are also 3 parties claiming the insurance proceeds, namely: petitioners, Equitable Bank, and Lavine as represented by the
group of Chandru.

Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for granting execution pending appeal . As held in
BF Corporation v. Edsa Shangri-la Hotel:

It is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the
appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for
execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as basis for
finding good reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of an
appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending appeal.

THAT THE PREVAILING PARTY WHO IS A CORPORATION IS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS IS NOT A GOOD REASON
Lastly, the intervenors assert that Lavine’s financial distress is sufficient reason to order execution pending appeal. Citing
Borja
v. Court of Appeals, they claim that execution pending appeal may be granted if the prevailing party is already of
advanced age
and in danger of extinction. Borja is not applicable to the case at bar because its factual milieu is different. In Borja, the
prevailing party was a natural person who, at 76 years of age, “may no longer enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he
finally passes away.” Lavine, on the other hand, is a juridical entity whose existence cannot be likened to a natural
person. Its precarious financial condition is not by itself a compelling circumstance warranting immediate
execution and does not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory
judgments.

5. Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Batangas Port Zone was placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the PPA. As a result, PPA filed a Complaint
for Expropriation over 185 lots in Batangas. One of the affected owners was the Dimayacyac Group (Curata et al).
Thereafter, Commissioners were appointed by the RTC. These Commissioners reported that the FMV of the lots was
4,800 per sqm. Nonetheless, the RTC ordered that the Dimayacyac be compensated at the amount of 5,500 per sqm.

Subsequently, on motion of the Dimayacyac Group, the RTC issued Writs of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment of
PPAs bank accounts. PPA ultimately appealed to the CA. As a result, CA nullified the RTC’s orders. The Dimayacyac
group assailed the CA order contending that the CA should not have entertained the appeal and that the RTC orders
should be executed pending appeal.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS AVAILABLE TO EXPROPRIATION CASES

HELD: NO.
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 39 does not apply
to eminent domain proceedings. As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held:

When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely
requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal
judgment against the Government could not be realized upon execution.

In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
explained the
rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of execution, thus:

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action ‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution’ and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects , as appropriated by law.

PPA’s monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by
virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out
governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an
attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505.

An undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may not be garnished
absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant . If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its properties,
being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the RTC
likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established jurisprudence
that government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. From
the above discussion, we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in its July 24, 2000 Order directing the
execution of the First Compensation Order (July 10, 2000 Order) pending appeal.
6. Garcia v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
PAL dismissed Garcia and Dumago for allegedly violating the PAL Code of Discipline after they were caught sniffing
shabu during a raid on the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom. Thus, both of them filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
with Damages with the LA. Prior to the LA’s decision, PAL was placed under corporate rehabilitation. Then, LA ruled in
favor of them and ordered PAL to immediately comply with the decision reinstating them. On appeal, NLRC reversed the
LA and dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. Garcia and Dumago’s MR were denied.

Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution with respect to the reinstatement order in its prior decision which had
already been reversed on appeal. LA also issued a Notice of Garnishment. As such, PAL moved to quash the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment in the NLRC. NLRC affirmed its previous order but suspended the action and
referred it to the Rehabilitation Receiver.

Thus, PAL appealed to the CA. CA nullified the NLRC’s decision on the ground that the finding of a valid dismissal
removes the basis for the implementation of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s prior ruling.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REINSTATEMENT ORDER BY THE LA CAN STILL BE IMPLEMENTED DESPITE THE NLRC’S
REVERSAL OF THE FINDING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

HELD: YES.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court . It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter’s order of
reinstatement is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to
exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries.

7. Arcenas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150233, February 16, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
In an Action for Annulment of Foreclosure of a Sale of a Barge, the RTC dismissed the Complaint and ordered Espino
(Arcena’s co-defandant) to return the barge to a certain Dela Riva and pay damages. Arcenas, as co-defendant was
absolved from liability. On appeal, CA affirmed and modified the amount of damages. Thus, Dela Riva filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution with the RTC and it was granted. However, Dela Riva failed to enforce the judgment.

After 5 years from the entry of the judgment, Dela Riva filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment and Sum of Money
with Damages in the RTC. However, the Summons was returned unserved due to the fact that Arcenas was already
residing in the US. As such, alias summons was served on him via substituted service. For failing to answer, Arcenas was
declared in default. RTC then allowed Dela Riva to present evidence ex parte. As a matter of course, the RTC ruled
against Arcenas. In the revived judgment, Arcenas was directed to pay Dela Riva double the value of the barge (P171K),
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees — which was substantially different from the original judgment of
P46K with moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

Aggrieved, Arcenas filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to annul the revived judgment on the ground that it
substantially altered the original judgment.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REVIVED JUDGMENT COULD SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT

HELD: NO.
Even assuming that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Arcenas, still, the judgment rendered
by it is a nullity for the reason that the original judgment which was the subject of the action for revival was
substantially modified.
In Civil Case No. 35349, the judgment of the RTC ordered only Arcenas’ co-defendant Emilio Espino to return the
barge ‘MV Sta. Lucia I’ to Jose de la Riva and to pay P48,000.00 a month as unrealized profit from February 3, 1980
or until June 18, 1980. The said judgment absolved Arcenas from any liability insofar as the barge is concerned but
found him jointly liable to private respondent and Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and exemplary damages.

On the other hand, THE REVIVED JUDGMENT now subject of this case, substantially modified the original judgment by
directing Arcenas to pay private Dela Riva the sum of P171,022.00 representing double the value of the barge ;
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and 15% of the amount recoverable by way of attorney’s fees.

These new monetary awards can not be allowed since they were not adjudged in the original judgment which had
long become final and executory. For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.

Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.

The PURPOSE OF THE ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF A JUDGMENT is not to modify the original judgment subject of the
action but is merely to give a creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of revival. The rule seeks to protect
judgment creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in order to evade attachment or execution, cunningly
conceal their assets and wait until the statute of limitation sets in.

8. RCBC v. Serra, 701 SCRA 124 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Serra, as owner, leased to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate pursuant to a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy. RCBC
informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy. However, Serra replied that it was no longer interested in
selling the property. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra in the RTC of
Makati. In Jan 1989, RTC of Makati ordered Serra to execute and deliver the Deed of Sale in favor of RCBC. Serra
appealed.

After the RTC’s ruling, Serra donated the property to his mother who, in turn, sold the property to a certain Liok. A new
TCT was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale
with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Serra, and his mother in the RTC of Masbate.

Meanwhile, CA and the SC affirmed the RTC of Makati in 1994 which became final and executory upon entry of
judgment. Thereafter, in 2001, the RTC of Masbate likewise ruled in favor of RCBC and nullified the donation to Serra’s
mother and subsequent sale to Liok. CA and the SC affirmed this in 2009.

In 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the judgment by the RTC of Makati for Specific Performance and alleged that
it as legally impossible to ask for execution of said judgment while the case in the RTC of Masbate for the nullification of
the donation and sale was still pending. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended. However, Serra contended
that the Motion for Execution was already barred by prescription and laches.

As a result, RTC of Makati denied the Motion for Execution. RCBC’s MR was also denied.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RCBC IS BARRED FROM HAVING ITS 1989 DECISION EXECUTED THROUGH MOTION GIVEN THE
FACT THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER CASE PENDING INVOLVING THE SAME PROPERTY AND THE SAME PARTIES .

HELD: NOT BARRED. RCBC CAN EXECUTED. PERIOD FOR EXECTION DEEMED SUSPENDED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
ANNULMENT CASE.
The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within 5 years from the
date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in .

This Court, however, ALLOWS EXCEPTIONS when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of 5 years.
These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own
initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the 5-year period allowed for
enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended .

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15
April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to
evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok.
Serra’s action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was
caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the 5-
year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case . Since the decision in the
Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011,
RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties
from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality.
While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

9. Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Aran filed an Action for Revival of Judgment in the RTC of Muntinlupa against Infante. The judgment sought to be
revived was rendered by the RTC of Makati. The original judgment was for an Action for Specific Performance which
ordered Infante to execute a Deed of Sale over Ayala Alabang properties.

In her defense, Infante filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the venue was improperly laid since the original
judgment was rendered in Makati. RTC denied. On appeal, CA affirmed and ruled in favor of Aran. It stated that since it
was an action involving title to or possession of real property, it should be filed in the RTC where said property is located
— in Muntinlupa. Infante’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Infante insists that the Action for Revival of Judgment is an action in personam which, therefore, must be filed in the RTC
where the plaintiff or respondent resides.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT CONCERNING TITLE TO OR POSSESSION OF REAL
PROPERTY SHOULD BE FILED IN THE PLACE WHERE THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION IS SITUATED .

HELD: YES.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgment
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced BY
ACTION. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.

In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held that:

An action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court where said judgment was
rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by
the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.
but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must be
considered.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real
action or a personal action. Applying Rule 4 on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession
of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real
property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action that may be
filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

The ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT determine whether it is a real action or a
personal action. The Complaint for Revival of Judgment alleges that a final and executory judgment has ordered
Infante to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of Aran; pay all
pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to
Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of Aran . The same judgment ordered Aran to pay
petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon Infante’s compliance with the aforementioned order . It is further alleged
that Infante refused to comply with her judgment obligations despite Aran’s repeated requests and demands, and that the
latter was compelled to file the action for revival of judgment. Aran then prayed that the judgment be revived and a writ of
execution be issued to enforce said judgment.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared Aran’s right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that Aran has an established interest over the lot in question; and to
protect such right or interest, Aran brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to
revive is the enforcement of Aran’s adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of
a real action, for it affects Aran’s interest over real property. The present case for revival of judgment being a real
action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.

Thus, it is now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and
processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.

10. Josef v. Santos, G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Albino Josef was made liable by the RTC of Marikina for failing to pay Otelia Santos the shoe materials which the former
bought on credit. On appeal, CA affirmed. SC likewise affirmed. The judgment became final and executory. Thus, Santos
filed a Motion for Writ of Execution. Despite Josef’s opposition, RTC granted and ordered the issuance of the Writ of
Execution.

Pursuant thereto, Josef’s personal and, subsequently, real properties located in Marikina were levied upon and auctioned
off. As such, Josef filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA assailing the vailidity of the levy and sale. He alleges that the
personal properties did not belong to him but to his children and that the real property was his family home and thus
exempt from execution. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the petition for failing to file an MR.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FAMILY HOME CAN BE EXECUTED UPON.

HELD: NO.
Josef, in his opposition to Santos’ motion for issuance of a writ of execution, claimed that he was insolvent; that he had no
property to answer for the judgment credit; that the house and lot in which he was residing at the time was his family
home thus exempt from execution; that the household furniture and appliances found therein are likewise exempt from
execution; and that these furniture and appliances belonged to his children Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef Isidro. Thus, as
early as during proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of execution , Josef brought to the fore the issue of
exemption from execution of his home , which he claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the civil law.
However, instead of inquiring into the nature of Josef’s allegations in his opposition, the RTC ignored the same and
granted Santos’ motion for execution.
The RTC’s Order did not resolve nor take into account Josef’s allegations in his Opposition, which are material and
relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This is serious error on the part of the RTC. It
should have made an earnest determination of the truth to Josef’s claim that the house and lot in which he and
his children resided was their duly constituted family home. Since it did not, its July 16, 2003 Order is thus null and
void.

Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

The FAMILY HOME is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases.

Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioner’s family home, the RTC
should have observed the following procedure:

(1) Determine if petitioner’s obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article
155 of the Family Code;
(2) Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner’s claim that the property was his family home;
conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title ; an interview of members
of the community where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner
actually resided within the premises of the claimed family home; order a submission of photographs
of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination
of the petitioner, his children and other wit nesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the
opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary;
(3) If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner’s family home, the court should
determine:

a. if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the
Family Code;
b. if petitioner’s spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home;
c. if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if
any, is his family home;and
d. its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160
of the Family Code.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as
a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the
tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family
home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the RTC’s failure to observe the proper
procedures to determine the veracity of Josef’s allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite Josef’s allegations in his
Opposition, the RTC did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from
execution or not, or whether they belonged to Josef or to someone else.

The RTC had enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared Josef the trouble of having to
seek relief all the way to this Court. Indeed, the trial court’s inaction on Josef’s plea resulted in serious injustice to the
latter, not to mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry based on the latter’s claim bordered on gross ignorance of the
law.
11. D-Armoured Security v. Orpia, G.R. No. 151325, June 27, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
Orpia et al, as security guards employed by D’Armoured Security and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, filed with the LA a
Complaint for lllegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against D’Armoured and Fortune Tobacco. LA ruled in favor
of the security guards. As such, Fortune Tobacco appealed but D’Armoured did not. As a result, NLRC dismissed the
complaint as to Fortune Tobacco but held D’Armoured Security liable. The decision became final and executory.

Theraefter, upon motion of the security guards, the LA issued a Writ of Execution. Pursuant thereto, D’Armoured
Securities’ receivables with Foremost Farms Inc (where it had a services agreement with) were garnished.

D’Armoured filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ and Notice of Garnishment in the NLRC. LA denied the Motion. MR
was likewise denied. On appeal, NLRC dismissed. MR was also denied. Thus, D’Armoured filed in the CA a Petition for
Certiorari. However, CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RECEIVABLES FROM FOREMOST FARMS ARE NOT EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION.

HELD: NO. THEY ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.

We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable,
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.

Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant petition. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC
Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:

SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. — Only the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of execution,
except:

(a) The losing party’s family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as may
be provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily
used in connection therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months;
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors,
clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the month preceding the levy
as are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a value not exceeding three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law.

The above Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent that the exemption
pertains ONLY TO NATURAL PERSONS and not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA correctly ruled that
D’Armoured, being a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus:

Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt from
execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:

SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
 (i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services
within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family.’

The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the
substantive law which proscribes the execution of employee’s wages, thus:

‘ART. 1708. The laborer’s wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts
incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.’

Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil
Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to
this class usually look to the reward of a day’s labor for immediate or present support, and such persons
are more in need of the exemption than any other.

In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to juridical
entities such as petitioner . Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the ‘personal
services’ rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for
the support of the judgment debtor’s family.

12. Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
Triangle Ace filed an Action for Collection of Sum of Money against Subic Realty Corporation, and Florentino and
Erickson Caja. RTC ruled in favor of Triangle Ace and awarded P956K.Thereafeter, a Writ of Execution was issued
addressed to Sheriff Nanquil.

Pursuant thereto, Nanquil sent a Notice of Garnishment to Pag-Ibig and informed it not to deliver, transfer, or dispose the
funds therein except upon orders of the court. For this reason P157K of one Edgar Ballesteros was garnished. Due to the
insufficiency of the amount, the Return indicated that the Writ was unsatisfied.

Thereafter, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and Nanquil levied upon a parcel of land in the name of Subic Realty
with an assessed value of P1.7M.

Later, Nanquil levied upon Caja’s personal properties in the form of a Payloader Truck, Dump Truck, and 77 pieces of
Galvanized Iron. During the case, a Third Party Claim was filed by BAP Credit Guaranty Corp. informing the sheriff that
the trucks were previously mortgaged therewith and requested that the levy be lifted. Nonetheless, the RTC denied this.

Then, Caja filed a Motion to Lift Levy on Execution praying that they levy on the parcel of land be lifted since the levy on
their personal properties was sufficient to satisfy the judgment and thus requested that the court conduct an execution sale.
However, RTC denied the Motion arguing that it cannot be determined at that time if the amount levied is way above the
amount needed to satisfy the judgment. As such, the RTC ordered Nanquil to immediately schedule the auction sale of the
real and personal properties levied.

Consequently, Caja filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on
Execution under the Rules against Nanquil before the OCA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SHERIFF NANQUIL IS GUILTY OF THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT.

HELD: GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT. FINED P79K.

ALLEGATION 1: LEVY OF REAL PROPERTY BEFORE PERSONAL PROPERTY — GUILTY FOR OVERLEVY OF REAL PROPERTY
It is clear in Section 8 (a) of Rule 39 that satisfaction of the judgment must be carried out first through the personal
property of the judgment debtor, and then through his real property. This directive is evident from the Writ of
Execution and Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC.
Going over the record of the case, it appears that after the decision of the lower court became final and a writ of
execution was issued, the first thing Nanquil did was to serve a Notice of Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG
(Take-Out Office) advising the latter not to deliver, transfer or dispose of money credits, shares, interests, and
deposits in his control and possession belonging to Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja and Erickson Y.
Caja. Subsequently, an alias writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto, he levied the real property of Caja
on May 19, 1997 and then the latter’s personal properties on July 1, 1997.

Clearly, what Nanquil levied first was personal property via garnishment. GARNISHMENT is considered as a species
of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the
litigation. It involves money, stocks, credits, and other incorporeal property which belong to the party but is in the
possession or under the control of a third person. Since the properties involved in garnishment are personal
properties, garnishment is thus a levy on personal propert y.

We, however, find that Nanquil still violated the rule that satisfaction of the judgment must be carried out first
through the personal property of the judgment debtor, and then through his real property . After levying the real
property of Caja, Nanquil then levied Caja’s personal properties which is a direct violation of Section 8, Rule 39 and of
the writ and alias writ of execution issued by the court.

There was negligence on his part when he immediately levied the real property of Caja without checking if the
latter has other personal properties that could satisfy the judgment. He could have easily asked the LTO if Caja had
vehicles registered in his name. If he had done so, Nanquil could have known that Caja had vehicles which he could levy
first before levying any real property. He should have exhausted all means before going after the real property. This,
he did not do. It was only after levying CAja’s real property and after discovering that said property was
encumbered did he look for other personal property.

ALLEGATION 2: EXCESSIVE LEVY — GUILTY

We find Nanquil’s contention that “the levy on complainant’s real property was not continued” because it was previously
mortgaged to be untenable. The levy thereon was completed as shown by the annotation of the Notice of Levy on TCT. It
is clear that the levy on the real property is still subsisting. There was a valid levy on the real property. Thus, it is
improper for Nanquil to rely, as a defense, on his claim that the levy on the real property was not continued. It was the
sale of the levied real property in an execution sale which did not push through.

Levy is different from an execution sale. LEVY has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or
appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment debtor’s property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the
writ of execution. On the other hand, an EXECUTION SALE is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the
authority of a writ of execution which he has levied on property of the debtor .

In the case before us, there was a levy on real property but the levied property was not sold in an execution sale
because said property, if sold, will not satisfy the judgment debt because of an existing encumbrance thereon .

There being a levy on the complainant’s real property, the amount thereof must be considered in determining if there was
an overlevy. As gathered from the Tax Declaration of the real property involved, including its improvements, its assessed
value amounted to
P1,786,870.00. It must be remembered, however, that said property is mortgaged for P10,000,000.00 in favor of Town
Savings and Loan Bank of Bulacan. The fact that the property is mortgaged for P10M only means that its value is
more than said amount. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the value of a property is usually bigger than
the amount for which it can be mortgaged . No person, in the ordinary course of business, would give a loan which is
bigger than the value of the property that is used to secure such debt.

The amount of the real property levied upon is definitely more than P10M since the property was mortgaged for
10M. This amount alone is more or less ten times greater than the judgment debt. As it is, there is already a clear case of
overlevy. Although the levied realty was not auctioned at an execution sale , its value should still be taken into
account in computing the total amount levied by Nanquil.
Nanquil’s act of levying Caja’s real property despite its being mortgaged is tantamount to negligence. As an officer
of the court, he knew fully well that the property cannot be used to satisfy the judgment debt since the mortgagee is the
preferred creditor in relation to said property.

Anent the levy on the Caja’s personal properties, he avers that Nanquil made an overlevy since the value of the
payloader and the dumptruck amounted to P3M which is over and above the judgment debt. In the determination of the
value of the two vehicles, it is the duty of Caja to show their true value as substantiated by competent proof. In the
case before us, Caja failed to present the best proof to accurately show their value. He should have adduced in
evidence the deeds of sale of said vehicles, but instead, he merely presented the invoices and delivery receipts . These
pieces of evidence are not sufficient to prove the value of these properties as claimed by Caja considering that when
the same, together with the G.I. sheets, were sold in public auction, the bid amounted only to P705,500.00 which is way
below the judgment debt.

ALLEGATION 3: LEVY OF PERSONAL PROPERTIES WITHOUT SERVING A NOTICE OF LEVY OR ISSUING RECEIPT — GUILTY
Nanquil’s answer that he cannot remember if he did leave a copy of the Notice of Levy with the judgment debtor only
shows that he was not performing his duty as sheriff. As sheriff, it was his duty to give the notice of levy or receipt
to the person to whom the personal properties were taken. If no one would like to receive the same, it was his duty to
leave copies of the notice at the place where he levied the personal property . Thereafter, he should have reported
the proceedings by filing a report or return to the court.

In the case at bar, even assuming that no one was willing to accept the notice of levy, the record is bereft of any
evidence showing that Nanquil reported his failure to leave a copy of the notice of levy. Sheriffs are officers of the
court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns of their
proceedings. On this score, Nanquil was again remiss in his duty as a sheriff.

ALLEGATION 4: DELIVERY OF LEVIED PERSONAL PROPERTIES TO THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR WITHOUT CONDUCTING
AUCTION SALE — GUILTY
Nanquil’s argument that he kept the levied personal properties at the judgment creditor’s place because the RTC of
Olongapo City does not have any warehouse or place to keep the same does not hold water.

A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody. The levied property must be in the
substantial presence and possession of the levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant .
They should not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The court’s lack of storage facility
to house the attached properties is no justification . Nanquil could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or
could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution .

In the case at bench, Nanquil brought the personal properties he levied directly to the vacant lot of Triangle Ace in
violation of the rule requiring him to safely keep them in his capacity, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
There is nothing in the record that shows that prior to his delivery of the levied properties to Triangle Ace Corporation, he
sought permission of the court that issued the writ he enforced to keep the properties.

ALLEGATION 5: SOLD LEVIED PROPERTIES IN AN AUCTION SALE ALMOST 4 YEARS AFTER BEING LEVIED — NOT GUILTY
The delay of the scheduling of the auction sale cannot be attributed to Nanquil. There were pending incidents that had to
be resolved by the court before the execution sale can be held. From the foregoing, Nanquil cannot be held liable for
any delay of the scheduling of the execution sale for he merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to
the properties he had levied.

13. Zamora v. Villanueva, A.M. P-04-1898, July 28, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Zamora was counsel for the plaintiffs in Sps. Cruel v. Sps. Lim. The RTC granted the plaintiff’s Motion for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution. Thus, he informed Sheriff Villanueva that the defendants had real property in Nasugbu and
requested him to prepare a Notice of Levy thereon.
In turn, Villanueva demanded 10K allegedly to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings. Zamora initially gave
5K as an advance payment the balance of which would be paid upon the transfer of property in his client’s name.

After the Notice was annotated in the title, Villanueva refused to proceed with the execution sale unless he is paid the 5K.
As such, Zamora paid the remaining balance after Villanueva assured him that he would proceed with the execution sale.
However, before the date of the sale, Villanueva demanded an additional 5% of the bid price.

To this, Zamora refused. So, Villanueva did not proceed with the execution sale. Thus, Zamora filed an administrative
complaint charging Villanueva of Gross Misconduct.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SHERIFF IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE

HELD: YES.DISMISSED FROM SERVICE

VIOLATED SEC 9 RULE 141 IN RELATION TO THE EXPENSES OF THE EXECUTION SALE
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the court’s prior approval of the estimated
expenses and fees needed to implement the writ. Thus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe
the following:

(1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the court’s
approval;
(2) render an accounting; and
(3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.

The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the
approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex
officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same
period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the
deposit.

In the present case, there was no evidence showing that Villanueva submitted to the court, for its approval, the
estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded P10,000 from Zamora. Neither was it shown
that he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid
down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.

As regards Villanueva’s refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due to the parties’ refusal to pay the sales
commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred that payment of any such commission is a prerequisite to an
execution sale. Villanueva’s refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and illegal.

PREMATURELY ADJOURNED EXECUTION SALE IN VIOLATION OF SEC 22 OF RULE 39

As to the validity of the adjournment of the execution sale, Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that a
sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon WRITTEN CONSENT of the judgment obligor
and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time
agreed upon.

The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement but only if it becomes necessary to do
so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned .
Consequently, Villaneuva’s act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.

14. Landrito v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133079, August 9, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Landrito obtained for 350K from Carmencita San Diego secured by REM over a parcel of land in Muntinlupa. Later,
Landrito obtained another loan from San Diego in the amount of 1M. To secure this, they stipulated that the loan shall be
paid within 6 mos otherwise, San Diego may foreclose upon it.
Upon default by Landrito, San Diego made demands which went unheeded. Thus, San Diego filed in the Clerk of Court
and Sheriff of RTC Makati a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the REM. Pursuant thereto, a Notice of Sheriff’s
Sale was sent announcing that the sale of the property. As announced, the sale took place and the property sold to San
Diego as the highest bidder for 2M. As such, San Diego caused the registration of the Certificate of Sale in the ROD.
Since Landrito failed to redeem within the 1-year redemption period, title was consolidated in favor of San Diego.

Aggrieved, Landrito filed a Complaint for Annulment of the Foreclosure and Auction Sale before the RTC of Makati on
the ground that the property was illegally foreclosed because to foreclose a mortgage, it must be limited to the amount of
the mortgage document which was only 1M but was allegedly bloated to P1.9M.

San Diego filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that there was failure to state cause of action. RTC dismissed the
Complaint. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR dismissed. Hence, this petition.

Landrito contends that they were not able to redeem the property because San Diego bloated their original loan of 1M to
1.9M. Thus, they claim that the action for foreclosure must be limited to the 1M amount as mentioned in the mortgage
document.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FORECLOSURE WAS VALID.

HELD: YES.
The law on redemption of mortgaged property is clear. Republic Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
Under Special Powers Inserted In Or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages), as amended by Republic Act No. 4118,
provides in Section 6 thereof, thus:

Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to,
the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property
is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the
sale[.]

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the 1-year redemption period should be counted not from
the date of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds .

Here, it is not disputed that the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered on 29 October 1993. Under Article 13 of the
New Civil Code, a year is understood to have 365 days each. Thus, excluding the first day and counting from 30 October
1993 (under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the New Civil Code), and bearing in mind that 1994 was a leap year, petitioners
had only until 29 October 1994, the 365th day after registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale on 29 October 1993,
within which to redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law. And since 29 October 1994 fell on a Saturday,
Landrito had until the following working day, 31 October 1994, within which to exercise their right of redemption.

From the foregoing, it is clear as day that even the complaint filed by Landrito with the trial court on 09 November
1994 was instituted beyond the 1-year redemption period. In fact, Landrito no less acknowledged that their
complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale was filed about eleven (11) days after the
redemption period had already expired on 29 October 19947. They merely harp on the alleged increase in the
redemption price of the mortgaged property as the reason for their failure to redeem the same. However, and as already
pointed out herein, they chose not, despite notice, to appear during the foreclosure proceedings.

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that they were indeed granted such an extension, the hard reality, however, is that at
no time at all did Landrito make a valid offer to redeem coupled with a tender of the redemption price. For, in
Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., this Court has made it clear that it is only where, by voluntary agreement
of the parties, consisting of extensions of the redemption period, followed by commitment by the debtor to pay the
redemption price at a fixed date, will the concept of legal redemption be converted into one of conventional
redemption.
Here, there is no showing whatsoever that Landrito agreed to pay the redemption price on or before 11 November
1994, as allegedly set by Mrs. San Diego’s husband. On the contrary, their act of filing their complaint on 09
November 1994 to declare the nullity of the foreclosure sale is indicative of their refusal to pay the redemption
price on the alleged deadline set by the husband . At the very least, if they so believed that their loan obligation was
only for P1,000,000.00, they should have made an offer to redeem within 1 year from the registration of the sheriff’s
certificate of sale, together with a tender of the same amount. This, they never did.

It must be remembered that the period of redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent provided
by law to restrict the right of the person exercising redemption. Correspondingly, if a person exercising the right of
redemption has offered to redeem the property within the period fixed , he is considered to have complied with the
condition precedent prescribed by law and may thereafter bring an action to enforce redemption. If, on the other
hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the right of redemption is exercised, then the action to enforce redemption will
not prosper, even if the action is brought within the ordinary prescriptive period.

Moreover, the period within which to redeem the property sold at a sheriff’s sale is not suspended by the institution
of an action to annul the foreclosure sale. It is clear, then, that Landrito have lost any right or interest over the subject
property primarily because of their failure to redeem the same in the manner and within the period prescribed by law.
Their belated attempts to question the legality and validity of the foreclosure proceedings and public auction must
accordingly fail.

15. Marsmony Trading v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170515, May 6, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Hubilla was dismissed as a Techincal Salesman of Marsmony. As such, he filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
Marsmony. LA ruled in favor of Hubilla and ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages. This was affirmed by the
NLRC on appeal. Eventually, the NLRC decision became final and executory. As a result, Hubilla filed a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted.

Pursuant thereto, the NLRC ordered the levy on execution of the real property of Morales, as president of Marmosy.
Marsmony appealed but it was denied. Said decision again became final and executory. When the case was elevated to the
CA and SC, the finding of illegal dismissal was affirmed.

An Alias Writ of Execution was issued ordering the sheriff to execute the judgment and execute on Marsmony’s personal
and real properties. As such, the sheriff garnished the bank account of Marsmony. Morales claimed that the account
belonged to Marsomony and to himself.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN ALLOWING THE NOTICE OF LEVY TO BE ANNOTATED ON THE TCT OF THE
REAL PROPERTY OF VICTOR MORALES?

HELD: NO. VALID LEVY

The decision of the Labor Arbiter, rendered on 31 May 1999, has been elevated to, for review by, the NLRC, the Court of
Appeals and finally this Court which entered judgment on the matter 9 years ago, or on 13 August 2001. Until the present,
the decision in 1999 has not yet been executed .

The Labor Arbiter’s decision has long become final and executory and it can no longer be reversed or modified.

We disfavor delay in the enforcement of the labor arbiter’s decision. Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party .
Final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered except for correction of clerical errors, even if the
purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole
action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings
in the execution are proceedings in the suit.
Furthermore, Marsmony did not succeed in overturning the decisions of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. As well,
this Court denied petitioners’ petition in G.R. No. 145881. Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an
order
or writ of execution in this case is the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision as affirmed by the NLRC,
the Court of Appeals and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter does not vary but is in
fact completely consistent with the final decision in this case , the order of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is
beyond challenge.

It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the expediency of a petition questioning
the order of execution. This late in the day, Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from advancing
the argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the monetary award in favor of Hubilla.

16. Benitez v. Acosta, A.M. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001

QUICKIE FACTS:
A judgment was renderd against Amparo Osila for a sum of money. On behalf of her mother, Gloria Osila Benitez filed a
Complaint alleging that Sheriff Acosta committed the following irregularities in the impelementation of the Writ of
Execution:
(a) ignored the bid of Benitez; (b) sold the jeepney to the highest bidder who was absent and only represented by one
Castillo;
(c) the jeepney was sold at an unconscionably low price of 15K; (d) that the plaintiff merely used fronts because he was
interested in the jeepney; (e) the jeepney was not delivered; (f) no return of execution was made; and (g) there was no
compliance with Sec 14 of Rule 39 as there were no notices of posting attached to the certificate of sale.

Meanwhile, Amparo Osila filed a Motion to Declare Null and Void the Auctio Sale on the ground that it was simulated.
As a result, the MTC nullified the public auction sale and held Sheriff Acosta liable for gross misconduct. OCA
recommended that Acosta be dismissed from service.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SHERIFF ACOSTA WAS LIABLE FOR THE SIMULATION OF THE AUCTION

SALE. HELD: YES. GUILTY OF NONFEASANCE

NO RETURN WAS MADE
As per the pertinent portion of the order issuing the writ of execution, Acosta should have made a return on the writ
within 60 days from his receipt of the order, or by February 9, 1998. To date, Acosta has not submitted or made a
return on the writ and has violated a mandate of the court. It is well settled that the sheriffs duty in the execution of
a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. As such, any failure to comply with such constitutes nonfeasance in
the performance of his duties.

VIOLATION OF SEC 14 RULE 39

Rule 39, §14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Sec. 14. Return of the writ of execution. — The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied
in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and
state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days
on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The
returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the
court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

Thus, under this provision, Acosta is required:

(1) to make a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment; and
(2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a report to the court within 30 days after his receipt of
the writ and state why full satisfaction could not be made. The Sheriff shall continue making a report every 30
days on proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied.
The reason for this requirement is to update the court as to the status of the execution and give it an idea why the
judgment has not been satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how efficient court processes are after the
judgment has been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.

In this case, the records show that Acosta received the writ of execution on December 11, 1997. Following Rule 39, §14
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, he was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after December
11, 1997, or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment has been satisfied. However, as of
July 17, 2000, he failed to make any report to the court as it was his ministerial duty to do so. He was thus guilty of
nonfeasance.

VIOLATION OF SEC 9 RULE 39

Rule 39, §9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how, enforced. — a) Immediate payment on demand. — The
officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the
immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment
obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee or any other form of
payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the
judgment obligee, or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall
be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the
same day to the clerk of court that issued the writ.

If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment
obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the
amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the
writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest
government depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.

The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court
that issued the writ which clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in
satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the
lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the
executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be payable to him.

Thus, fees collected by the sheriff are required to be paid over to the judgment obligee or the latter’s authorized
representative. In the absence of both, Acosta is obligated to pay them over to the clerk of the court who issued the
writ or, if this is not possible, to deposit the amount in the nearest government depository bank.

The records show that when Mario Timbol paid the bid price to Acosta , the latter did not turn over the amount to
Atty. Delfin Gruspe, as counsel of Leon Basas, Sr., or the Clerk of Court, but rather to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of
plaintiffs counsel. The Minutes of the Public Auction Sale reveal that during the said sale, the judgment obligee, Leon
Basas, Sr., was absent and so was Cesar Gruspe. As such, under Rule 39, §9, Acosta was under the obligation to turn
over the P15,000.00 to Atty. Delfin Gruspe , the authorized representative of Leon Basas, Sr. Instead, as evidenced by
the Minutes of the Public Auction, Acosta paid the amount to Cesar Gruspe, who was not even present at the
bidding, nor authorized by Leon Basas, Sr. to receive the amount from Acosta.

DISCREPANCIES IN THE MINUTES OF THE PUBLIC AUCTION

As Benitez points out in her Reply to Respondent Medel P. Acosta’s Counter-Affidavit dated June 29, 1998, there are
discrepancies in the Minutes of Public Auction Sale prepared by Acosta.

It is unusual for the sheriff not to know his duties and functions as laid down by law. These include, among other
things, the preparation of a written account of all his proceedings pursuant to any process issued by the court,
particularly the return of a writ of execution. Because of the irregularities above pointed out, the public auction sale
conducted by respondent appears to have been simulated.
17. St. Aviation Services v. Grand International Airways, G.R. No.140288, October 23, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Grand International Airways (Phil) failed to pay St. Aviation Services (SG) for the services it rendered to maintain GIA’s
aircraft. Thus, St. Aviation filed with the High Court of Singapore an Action for Sum of Money amounting to $452K. A
Writ of Summons was served extraterritorially upon GIA. However, despite receipt of said Summons, GIA failed to
answer. As a result, a judgment by default was rendered against GIA.

Thereafter, St. Aviation filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment in the RTC of Pasay against GIA. In opposition, the
latter filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of GIA and that the foreign judgment is void for having been renderd in violation of GIA’s right to due process.
Nonetheless, RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. MR was likewise denied.

Thus, GIA filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition and set aside the RTC’s orders without
prejudice. It stated that since the action was in personam, only personal or substituted service was available and not
extraterritorial service. Aggrieved, St. Aviation filed an MR. However, this was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT RENDERED IN SINGAPORE IS ENFORECEABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES. HELD:
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries .
Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines.

The CONDITIONS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT in our legal system are
contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a SPECIFIC THING, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing ; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order AGAINST A PERSON, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of
notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of its validity.

GIA, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons is void and that
the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum,
which in this case is the law of Singapore . Here, St. Aviation moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of
Summons outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted “leave to serve
a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for
service of any
originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229
Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines.”

This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of
Singapore.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper
court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ
of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel
(formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriff’s Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998 by
Joyce
T. Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of GIA.But GIA completely ignored the summons, hence, it was
declared in default.

Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon GIA in accordance with our Rules , jurisdiction was
acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person . Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against
GIA is valid.

18. City Government of Makati v. Odena, 703 SCRA 460 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Odena was employed as a public school teacher by the City of Makati since 1980. For allegedly going AWOL, Mayor
Elenita Binay dropped her from the roll of employees. As a result, she appealed to the CSC. CSC found that she was
illegally dropped from the roll. Thus, the CSC ordered her reinstatement and payment of back salaries. Makati’s MR was
denied. On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of illegal termination but modified the award of back salaries to a
maximum of 5 years only. This was later affirmed by the SC. The decision became final and executory.

Upon Odena’s motion, CSC directed the Mayor to comply with the decision. However, the city did not comply. Instead,
Odena opted to avail of early retirement wherein Makati paid her 558K representing her back salaries and signed a
Release, Quitclaim, and Waiver.

Afterwards, though a Letter-Complaint, Odena complained to the CSC contending that she was not paid what she was
legally entitled to because 5 year back salaries paid to her did not compensate for her 8 years of suffering. Makati denied
the allegations and contended the SC decision limiting the award to 5 years already attained finality. Nonetheless, CSC
ruled in Odena’s favor and awarded her back salaries covering a period of 7 years. It stated that the 5 year limit was
inequitable. Makati’s MR was denied.

Thus, Makati filed an appeal by way of Rule 43. However, the CA dismissed the Rule 43 Petition considering that the
CSC ruling was an order of execution of the SC judgment. As a result, resort to Rule 43 was unavailing because orders of
execution cannot be subject to appeal, the proper remedy being Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari. MR denied. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CITY OF MAKATI UNDERTOOK THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN IT FILED A RULE 43 PETITION TO
QUESTION THE CSC RESOLUTION

HELD: YES. REMEDY IS PROPER.

Makati insists that its filing of a Rule 43 Petition to assail the CSC Resolutions was proper, as these supposedly involved
a new subject matter and were thus issued pursuant to CSC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial function . They were not
merely incidental to the execution of this Court’s 2007 Decision. We rule that filing a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is
the proper remedy to assail the CSC Resolutions, but not for the reasons advanced by Makati.

RULE 43 COVERS AWARDS, JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS OF THE CSC

First, the jurisdiction of the CA over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the
CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Section 1, Rule 43
of the Rules, provides in part:
 Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission.

In PAGCOR v. Aumentado, Jr., this Court ruled that it is clear from the above-quoted provision that the CA’s
jurisdiction covers not merely final judgments and final orders of the CSC, but also awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the CSC.

ORDERS OF EXECUTION MAY BE APPEALED AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE

Second, although the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to consider that
there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.

A WRIT OF EXECUTION is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the mandate of the writ, which is
normally the enforcement of a judgment. By analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in
connection with the implementation of this Court’s 2007 Decision.

It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC Resolutions that they carried instructions to
enforce this Court’s 2007 Decision, albeit erroneously made. The dispositive portion of CSC Resolution No. 082264,
directed Makati to pay Odena’s backwages:

WHEREFORE, the incumbent City Mayor of Makati is hereby directed to recompute the full back
salaries and other benefits of Emerita B. Odeña which she is entitled for seven (7) years, eight (8)
months, and twenty-eight (28) days, the entire period she was out of the service as a result of her
illegal dismissal.

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of execution that were issued
in connection with the implementation of this Court’s 2007 Decision. The CA, however erred in dismissing Makati’s
Rule 43 Petition for being improper.

Indeed, the GENERAL RULE is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end. The CA,
however, failed to consider that there are exceptions to this rule . This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon enumerated the
exceptions as follows:

Even prior to the promulgation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that no appeal lies from
an order or writ directing the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not attain
finality, is not absolute since a party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution of a judgment
is not without a remedy. Thus, in Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court enumerated the
exceptional circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to
wit:

There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution
proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for
correction by a superior court, as where —

(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust; x x x x
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
In these exceptional circumstances , considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
 elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus.

The aforementioned pronouncement has been reiterated in cases subsequent to the adoption of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds no sound justification to abandon the aforequoted
pronouncement insofar as it recognizes the filing of an ordinary appeal as a proper remedy to assail a writ
or order issued in connection with the execution of a final judgment, where a factual review in the manner
of execution is called for to determine whether the challenged writ or order has indeed varied the tenor of
the final judgment.

To rule that a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and exclusive remedy to assail a writ or order of
execution would unduly restrict the remedy available to a party prejudiced by an improper or illegal execution . It
must be borne in mind that the issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the lower court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, the appeal of the CSC Resolutions under Rule 43 is proper on 2 points: (1) they varied the 2007
Decision and (2) the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied .

First, the CSC Resolutions have varied the 2007 Decision, considering that instead of directing the payment of
backwages for a period not exceeding five (5) years, the CSC ordered petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to
almost eight (8) years.

Second, the judgment debt arising from the 2007 Decision has been satisfied as Odena has already received
payment from Makati the amount of ₱558,944.19, representing her back salaries not exceeding five (5) years, as
computed by Makati.

Clearly, these circumstances fall under the abovequoted enumeration of the exceptions to the general rule that an order of
execution is not subject to appeal. Thus, the CA committed grave error when it denied petitioner’s appeal for being
the wrong remedy.

XXVII. APPEALS/ORIGINAL ACTIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS (RULES 40 TO 56 EXCEPT
RULE 47)

1. Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
Ferndando owns a parcel of land in Makati. She obtained a loan from Chua which was secured by a REM over a parcel of
land in Makati. Thereafter, Fernando signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Chua concerning the same property upon
assurance of Borres (Chua’s agent) that the Deed was a mere formality. Later on, she discovered that a new TCT was
issued in favor of Chua. Fernando agreed to buy it back for 10M but Chua sold it to Uy for 7M to whom a new TCT was
issued.

Thus, Fernando filed a Complaint against Uy, Chua, and Borres for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale, Recovery of Sum of
Money and Damages. However, as a result of Chua’s Motion to Dismiss, the RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground
of prescription and abandonment of cause of action. Thereafter, the Complaint was reinstated insofar as Borres was
concerned.

As a result, Fernando filed a Notice of Appeal questioning both rulings for the RTC. In response, Chua moved to
dismissed the appeal for failure to file a Record on Appeal within the required period. As such, RTC granted the motion
and dismissed the appeal. Consequently, Fernando filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, CA denied. It
stated that a Record on Appeal in addition to a Notice of Appeal should have been filed within 30 days from notice of the
assailed order. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FERNDANDO WAS ABLE TO PERFECT AN APPEAL WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
HELD: NO. A RECORD ON APPEAL SHOULD BE FILED BECAUSE IT IS A SEVERAL JUDGMENT
A SEVERAL JUDGMENT is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-
parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. In the instant case, the RTC correctly applied the foregoing
provision because the complaint was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several
judgment is proper.

Sections 2 (a), 3 and 13 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides —

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. — (a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.

No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require . In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, appeal in habeas corpus. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.

SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to
the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having
been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period.

The rationale for requiring the filing of a record on appeal in cases where several judgment is rendered is to enable
the appellate court to decide the appeal without the original record which should remain with the court a quo
pending disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.

Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of Rule 41, Fernando is required to file a record on appeal within 30 from
November 15, 2001, her date of receipt of the October 25, 2001 order. Considering that no record on appeal was filed ,
the CA correctly sustained the order of the RTC dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the same within the
reglementary period.

A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for being
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly discharge of judicial business. The
strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in
respect to the perfection of appeals. Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having been perfected, the assailed
order or decision becomes final and executory and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case.

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities , it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice . In instances
where we applied a liberal interpretation of the rules on filing a record on appeal, the parties although late, filed the
required record on appeal. Such, however, is not the case here because Fernando adamantly refused to file the required
record on appeal.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law . The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
2. Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Madrigal Transport entered into a JVA with Lapanday for the purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping
requirements of Del Monte based on the representations of the Chairman and President of Del Monte, Lapanday, and
Macondray. Pursuant to this JVA, Madrigal obtained a 10M loan. However, Lapanday failed to deliver the charter hire
contracts for the vessels.

Madrigal initially filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency in the Branch 49 in RTC Manila. Subsequently, it filed a
Complaint for Damages against Lapanday and Macondray before Branch 36 of the same RTC. Madrigal was declared to
be insolvent. Thereafter, Lapanday et al filed a Motion to Dismiss in the other case which was granted on theg ground that
Madrigal lost its right to file a Complaint for Damages upon the filing of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. Madrigal’s
MR was denied.

As a result, Madrigal filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. The CA treated the Petition as an exception to the rule that
certiorari is not proper when appeal is available and gave due course to the Petition. Aggrieved, Lapanday filed an MR.
As a result, CA reversed itself and ruled that certiorari cannot lie when appeal is still an available remedy. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY.

HELD: NO. CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE WHEN APPEAL IS AVAILABLE.

APPEAL
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be appealable.

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done
with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court . Au contraire, an
interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the
latter.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65. A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any
other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. For certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“WITHOUT JURISDICTION” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is “EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. “GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

APPEAL V. CERTIORARI
AS TO THE PURPOSE. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction , not errors of
judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be
allowed.
 The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari.

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the
case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it
has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.

AS TO THE MANNER OF FILING. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review.
Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and
supervision over the proceedings of lower courts . An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a
petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of.

The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are
the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).

AS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory
order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment ; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.

AS TO THE PERIOD OF FILING. Ordinary appeals should be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a RECORD ON APPEAL is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within 30 days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A PETITION FOR REVIEW should be filed and
served within 15 days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. In an APPEAL BY CERTIORARI, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days from the notice of judgment, order,
or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from
the denial of the motion.

AS TO THE NEED FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to
the filing of a petition for certiorari , in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also
that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.

CERTIORARI NOT PROPER IF APPEAL IS AVAILABLE

Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.

3. BPI v. Sarabia Manor Hotel, 702 SCRA 432 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sarabia Corporation obtained loans from Far East Bank to finance the construction of a hotel building. The loans were
secured by REMs. By virtue of a merger, BPI assumed all of FEBTC’s rights against Sarabia. Due to cash flow
problems,
Sarabia filed a Petition for Corporate Rehabilitation in the RTC with a prayer for the issuance of a Stay Order since the
maturity date of the loan obligations were approaching and Sarabia foresaw the impossibility of meeting them. For this
purpose, Sarabia submitted a rehabilitation plan. After it was found that the plan was sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC issued a Stay Order and appointed a Receiver. Thereafter, RTC approved the rehabilitation plan over the opposition
of BPI.

As a result, BPI appealed. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. MR was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
BPI contends that the RTC and the CA did not give due regard to its interests as a preferred creditor when it granted
Sarabia’s rehabilation plan and Stay Order.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 SHOULD PROSPER.

HELD: PETITION IS IMPROPER. IT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT.

It is fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of
law. In this relation, questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless, the following
exceptions are found to exist:

(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both parties;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is well-defined. A QUESTION OF LAW exists when the
doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts . A QUESTION OF FACT, on the other hand,
exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are
final and conclusive and the Court will not review them on appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds BPI’s petition to be improper ― and hence, dismissible ― as the issues
raised therein involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

To elucidate, the determination of whether or not due regard was given to the interests of BPI as a secured creditor
in the approved rehabilitation plan partakes of a question of fact since it will require a review of the sufficiency and
weight of evidence presented by the parties ― among others, the various financial documents and data showing
Sarabia’s capacity to pay and BPI’s perceived cost of money ― and not merely an application of law.

Therefore, given the complexion of the issues which BPI presents, and finding none of the above-mentioned exceptions to
exist, the Court is constrained to dismiss its petition, and prudently uphold the factual findings of the courts a quo
which are entitled to great weight and respect, and even accorded with finality. This especially obtains in corporate
rehabilitation proceedings wherein certain commercial courts have been designated on account of their expertise and
specialized knowledge on the subject matter, as in this case.
4. NAPOCOR v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 28, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
In implementing its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC filed a Complaint for Expropriation covering parcels of
land in Cebu in the RTC of Danao. It covers lands co-owned by Petrona Dilao and her siblings as well as land owned by
one Estefina Enriquez. Dilao filed an Answer with Counterclaim while Enriquez did not.

Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of NPC and appointed Commissioners to determine just
compensation. Said Commissioners appraised the land owned by the Dilaos at P516 per sqm. Despite NPC opposition,
RTC adopted the Commissioners’ findings and ruled that the same amount would be used to determine just compensation
for the Dilaos.

Consequently, NPC filed a Notice of Appeal. However, RTC denied it for failure to perfect the appeal within the
reglementary period since there was no Record on Appeal. NPC’s MR was also denied. Then, NPC filed a Petition for
Relief which was also denied. As such, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the
Petition stating that the filing of a Record on Appeal is required in cases of multiple or separate appeals. Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A RECORD ON APPEAL IS REQUIRED FOR APPEALS ARISING FROM A COMPLAINT FOR
EXPROPRIATION

HELD: YES.
While admittedly a Complaint for Expropriation is not a special proceeding, Sec 2 of Rule 41 requires the filing of a
record on appeal in “other cases of multiple or separate appeal .”

Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation. The case
of
Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia vividly expounds on the matter, viz.:

There are 2 stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would
be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the
Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of
“the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis
of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of
the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.

Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation
of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek
reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

Thus, in Municipality of Biñan, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than 2 appeals are
allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is 30 days counted from notice thereof and
not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed for actions in general . As such, the complaint falls under the
classification of “other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require” in above-
quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required to be filed and
served.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a record on
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial court’s decision . The trial court’s dismissal of its appeal, which was
affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.

5. State Investment v. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444

QUICKIE FACTS:
State Investment filed an Action for Sum of Money against Delta Motors in the RTC. Later on, RTC rendered a judgment
by default in favor of State Investment and ordered Delta to pay. After publication of the decisión, State Investment
moved for the issuance of a Writ of Execution which the RTC granted.

Meanwhile, Delta belatedly obtained a copy of the RTC decisión. Thus, it asked the CA to annul the RTC decisión on the
ground that the summons were served upon a person not authorized to receive the same. However, CA ruled that the
summons was properly served. Nonetheless, it also stated that the RTC decisión had not yet attained finality.

As such, Delta filed its Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, it was dismissed. As a result, Delta filed a Petition for
Certiorari in the CA assailing the RTC’s order dismissing its Notice of Appeal. CA granted the Petition and ordered the
RTC to elevate the records of the case to the CA on appeal.

Aggrieved, State Investment questioned the granting of Delta’s Petition to the SC. While pending in the SC, Delta filed a
Motion in the CA to Annul the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC previously. CA dismissed this because the Writ of
Execution was not raised during the proceedings in the CA considering that only the denial of Delta’s Notice of Appeal
was passed upon. As such, Delta went up to the SC to question the CA’s decisión. However, the SC affirmed the CA.

Later, State Investment filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion asking for the issuance of another Order to Continue the
Writ of Execution. RTC granted this. So, Delta appealed to the CA. CA held that the RTC judgment had not yet attained
finality. Thus, it stated that the RTC acted without jurisdiction to grant the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED STATE INVESTMENT’S OMNIBUS MOTION TO CONTINUE THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION.

HELD: NO.
Considering further that the RTC Decision sought to be executed by the Order was not yet final and executory, Section 2
of Rule 39 of the new Rules on Discretionary Execution should apply:

Discretionary execution. — (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. — On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction
over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a
judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in
the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explains the instances when the trial court loses jurisdiction over a case:

A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties .
 In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.

In the case at bar, the appeal filed by Delta was perfected on November 12, 1991, when it filed its Notice of Appeal.
Considering that it had already filed such Notice, and that the period of appeal for State Investment had already
expired, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case.

Hence, the RTC acted improperly when it issued its May 27, 1998 Order granting State Investment’s Omnibus
Motion. That Motion was filed 4 years after this Court had affirmed the CA Decision directing the elevation of the
records on appeal. For having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order is plainly null and void.

6. Aguilar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
During the barangay elections in Brgy Bansarvil I, Aguilar won over Insoy by a margin of 1 vote for the position of
Barangay Captain. Naturally, Insoy instituted a protest in the MTC. MTC nullified Aguilar’s proclamation and ruled that
Insoy was the winning candidate. Aggrieved, Aguilar filed his Notice of Appeal and paid to the MTC the P1,000 appeal
fee in accordance with the Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials.

COMELEC First Division received the records elevated from the MTC. However, it dismissed Aguilar’s appeal on the
ground that it failed to pay the required fee. Accordingly, Aguilar filed an MR. Nonetheless, the COMELEC First
Division denied the MR. Thus, another MR was filed by Aguilar on the ground that it should have been the COMELEC en
banc who should have ruled on the MR. However, COMELEC First Division again denied the MR stating that it was a
prohibited pleading. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION CORRECTLY DENIED AGUILAR’S APPEAL.

HELD: NO.
Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in accordance with Article
IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court on certiorari. But this RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY when
a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion
for reconsideration, as in this case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision or
resolution sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute nullity.

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, complementing the constitutional provision, also details the course of action to be
undertaken in the event motions for reconsideration are filed; thus, Rule 19, Sections 5 and 6 provide that —

Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. — Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-
four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Reconsideration. — The Clerk of
Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.

Being a violation of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the assailed September 4 and October 6,
2008 Orders are null and void. They were issued by the COMELEC First Division with grave abuse of discretion.
PROPRIETY OF THE DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following procedure in the appeal to the
COMELEC of trial court decisions in election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials:
 SEC. 8. Appeal. — An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on Elections,
within five days after promulgation , by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the
decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.

SEC. 9. Appeal fee. — The appellant in an election contest shall pay to the court that rendered the
decision an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) , simultaneously with the filing of the
notice of appeal.

It should be noted from the aforequoted sections of the Rule that the appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the
COMELEC but to the trial court that rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment
of the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the appeal, consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the same Rule.

Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department of the COMELEC within 15 days. The trial court may only exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve
pending incidents if the records have not yet been transmitted and before the expiration of the period to appeal.

The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials
is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the 5-day reglementary period.

The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash
Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the
perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal . Following, Rule 22,
Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same
rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.

Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioner’s appeal, as it in fact did, for
petitioner’s failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
order dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were,
respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21, 2008.

On that date, the petitioner’s appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule
on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July
31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioner’s appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.

Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees , petitioner’s
appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 .

Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated
clarificatory resolution — which had taken effect only a few days earlier.

7. Cardona v. Amansec, G.R. No. 147216, April 15, 2004

QUICKIE FACTS:
Cardona filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Amansec in the MTC for allegedly entering and building houses on a
parcel of land owned by her sole heir who died intéstate. In the Answer, Amansec contended that there was a tenancy
relationship between him and Cardona’s predecesor in interest (Raroque) who ended up selling the land to Cardona
without his knowledge and consent.
Upon Amansec’s discovery, he filed in the DARAB a Petition for Nullification of the Deed of Sale between Raroque and
Cardona and issuance of an Emancipation Patent in his favor over said lot. The PARAD rendered a decisión in favor of
Amansec. Instead of appealing to the DARAB, Cardona filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 with the CA. In said motion, Cardona averred that she only had until August 30 to file said Petition
so she prayed to be given an extensión of 15 days or until Sept. 15 to file. After the Motion was granted, Cardona filed the
Petition on Sept 15. In its Resolution however, CA dismissed the Petition for having been filed 1 day late. Cardona’s MR
was also denied.

Thereafter, MTC found the existence of a tenancy relationship and dismissed the Complaint. As a result, Cardona
appealed to the RTC. On appeal, RTC reversed the MTC upon a finding that Amansec failed to prove the tenancy
relationship. Amansec’s MR was denied. The latter also did not file a Petition for Review. As such, Cardona moved for
the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Likewise, Cardona filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC in order that
the prior resolutions of the CA dismissing her petition be nullified. She alleged that she was guilty of excusable negligence
when she overlooked that August had 31 days instead of only 30.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA PROPERLY DISMISSED CARDONA’S PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43.

HELD: YES. ALTHOUGH SHE WAS GUILTY OF EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE, SHE SHOULD HAVE APPEALED IT TO THE DARAB
We agree with Cardona that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she overlooked that the month of August
consists not of 30 days, but of 31 (31) days. In Samala vs. Court of Appeals, we held that a 1-day delay does not justify
the outright dismissal of an appeal.

Nonetheless, we resolve to deny due course to and dismiss the instant petition for review on certiorari on the ground that
the proper remedy from a decision of the PARAD was an appeal to the DARAB and not a petition for review in the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule XIII, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure provides, thus:

SECTION 1. Appeal to the Board. — a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or
decision of the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a
period of fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof
on the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a
copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oral
appeal.

SECTION 2. Grounds. — The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order,
resolution or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors in the findings of facts or conclusions of laws were committed which, if not corrected,
would cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to the appellant;
(b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or
(c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.

SECTION 3. Where to File. — The notice of appeal shall be filed with the Adjudicator concerned in three
(3) legibly written copies.

SECTION 4. Caption.—In all cases appealed to the Board, the party appealing shall be called the
“appellant” and the adverse party the “appellee,” and the case shall be assigned a docket number.

SECTION 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. — a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date, when the appellant
received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice to the adverse party;
and
 b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary
period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant shall,
however, be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee. Non-compliance with the above-mentioned
requisites shall be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.

Under the said rules, Cardona should have appealed the decision of the PARAD to the DARAB orally or in writing,
and perfected the said appeal within the requisite period and in the manner provided therefor. Cardona failed to do
so. The well-entrenched rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be availed of within the period and in
the manner provided for by law ; otherwise, upon the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision or final order and no
appeal has been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or decision ipso facto becomes final and executory. The
appellate court does not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a belated appeal from the said order or decision.

8. Canedo v. Kampilan Secutiry and Detective Agency, 702 SCRA 647 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Kampilan Security hired Canedo as security guard and assigned him at NPC’s Power Barge. He was suspended for a
month for not wearing the proper uniform. NPC then requested for Canedo’s replacement. Canedo requested Kampilan’s
GM (Arquiza) to issue a Certification regararding his intended retirement. Thus, Arquiza issued said Certification stating
that he was terminated from his employment as per client’s request.

Canedo filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. LA held that Canedo was illegally dismissed. On appeal, after Kampilan
filed its Memorandum of Appeal and Canedo his Appellee’s Memorandum, NLRC initially affirmed the LA’s decisión.
On MR, however, NLRC reversed itself and set aside the finding of illegal dismissal. Canedo’s MR was denied. As such,
he filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. However, this was dismissed. After the MR was denied, he filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

Canedo submits that the CA’s findings are erroneous and inconsistent with the evidence on record.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN BE RAISED VIA PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.

HELD: YES. THERE IS NO UNIFORMITY IN THE FACTUAL FINDINGS IN THE TRIBUNALS BELOW.
At the outset, the Court notes that this is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. However, when there is no uniformity in the factual findings of the tribunals below, as in this case,
this Court is resolved to again examine the records as well as the evidence presented to determine which findings
conform with the evidentiary facts.

The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive and convincing.
Thus, in this case, it is incumbent upon Canedo to prove his claim of dismissal.

Petitioner relies on the word “terminated” as used in the June 25, 2003 Certification issued him by Arquiza and argues
that the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service. We are, however, not persuaded. Canedo cannot
simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an
employer indicating an intention to dismiss. Here, aside from this single document, Canedo proffered no other
evidence showing that he was dismissed from employment . While it is true that he was not allowed to report for work
after the period of his suspension expired, the same was due to NPC’s request for his replacement as NPC was no longer
interested in his services. And as correctly argued by Kampilan, Canedo from that point onward is not considered
dismissed but merely on a floating status. “Such a ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards
employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency
with third parties.”

9. Esteban v. Marcelo, 703 SCRA 82 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Esteban allowed Sps. Marcelo to reside in their land for a monthly rental fee. However, they stopped paying rentals.
Naturally, Esteban sent a demand letter requiring them to settle the rents due and to vacate within 5 days. As their
demands remained
unheeded, Esteban filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the Sps. Marcelo in the MTC. The MTC ordered the
Marcelos to vacate. RTC affirmed. On appeal, Marcelos raised the defense that they cannot be evicted since they were
protected by PD 1517 (Urban Land Reform) and that they qualified as beneficiaries under RA 7279. Hence, Esteban filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA CAN RULE UPON MATTERS ONLY RAISED ON APPEAL.

HELD: NO. ISSUES NOT RAISED MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AND RULED UPON.
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts cannot be raised on appeal: “points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to
be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of
due process impels this rule.”

As Esteban correctly observed, the Spouses Marcelo never intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the
protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not have any authority to rule that they qualified as beneficiaries
under RA 7279.

10. Dycoco v. Court of Appeals, 702 SCRA 566 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Dycoco are registered owners of a parcel of land in Albay. Sanchez and 6 others entered the property, registered as
tenants for agrarian reform, and cultivated the property without paying rentals which was in violation of agrarian laws.
Thus, Sps. Dycoco filed a Complaint for Ejectment, Cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer, and Damages against
the 7 before the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB.

PA ejected Sanchez, Berma, and Talagtag. Thereafter, the PA issued a Writ of Execution in favor of Dycoco. As such,
Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash considering that they previously filed a Notice of Appeal thereby not making the
decisión final and executory. However, the PA denied the Motion to Quash and held that the Notice of Appeal was filed
out of time. PA considered the receipt of Berma’s daughter of the decisión by registered mail on July 10. As such, the
Notice of Appeal filed on Aug. 29 was filed out of time. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the PA and ruled in favor of
Sanchez and Berma.

Dycoco received DARAB’s decisión on Apr 3 2000 and had Apr 18 to appeal. Upon their Motion, CA granted them an
extensión of 15 days to file an appeal. So, they had until May 3 to file an appeal. However, Dycoco filed a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 by registered mail only on May 8. As a result, CA denied the petition for being filed beyond the
required period.

As a result, Dycoco filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the SC. They asked for the SC’s liberality considering
that they hired new counsel who still had to study the voluminous records. Also, they contend that they were deprived of
due process after the DARAB granted the appeal even after the PA’s decisión already bécame final and executory.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SPS DYCOCO’S PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS PROPERLY DENIED

HELD: YES. ALSO, RULE 65 IS NOT A PROPER REMEDY

Firstly, Dycocos are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is a
wrong remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .

Contrary to the claim of Dycoco in the opening paragraph of their petition that there was no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition, the right recourse was to appeal to
this Court in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds
true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law
set out in the
decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari
because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.

The failure of Dycoco to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be remedied by the mere
expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost
through fault or negligence. In this case, Dycoco received the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 on January 19, 2001
and, under the rules, had until February 5, 2001 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari in this
Court. Dycoco allowed this period to lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on
March 16, 2001.

PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS FILED OUT OF TIME

The CA granted Dycoco a 15-day extension , within which to file their intended petition. The action of the CA was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of Dycoco was April 18, 2000,
they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Dycoco, however, filed the petition on May 8, 2000. They
even admit that their petition in the CA was filed 5 days after the extended period. It is therefore clear that the CA simply
applied the rules, while Dycoco concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the CA’s dismissal of the
petition of Dycoco was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.

ISSUED CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

Dycocos make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition – deprivation of property without just
compensation and denial of due process. The Dycocos, however, belatedly raised these issues and failed to substantiate
the same.

There is no question that they are entitled under the law to receive just compensation for the property taken from them and
transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. Due process guarantees that taking of
private property by the State for public use should be with payment of just compensation. Unfortunately, they
themselves did not consider the issue of just compensation as compelling enough because they did not raise it in the
complaint or in the position paper which they filed in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. They only claimed
just compensation for the first time on appeal, that is, when they filed their petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.

The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the
bubble that is the alleged compelling nature of Dycoco’s claim. They ask for due process, but fairness and due process
dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal .

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION RULE IS NOT A LICENSE TO DISREGARD PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

Dycocos primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on liberality in the construction of procedural rules.
However, the “liberal construction rule” is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural
rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.

They caused their own predicament when they decided to change horses in midstream and engaged the services of
their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week before the expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of
Appeals, discharging the services of their former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial
Adjudicator to the DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of their
new counsel for more time to study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the case. Moreover, as shown
above, they not only failed to show any persuasive reason why they should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules
when they filed their petition for review in the Court of Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the
rules in various ways absent any compelling reason when they filed this petition.
11. Ang v. San Joaquin, 703 SCRA 269 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Virose Furniture and Glass Supply is a single proprietorship owned by Ang. San Joaquin and Fernandez worked for Ang
as a helper and driver. In a case filed by a co-employee against Ang, San Joaquin and Fernandez testified against Ang.
After the hearing, Ang started treating them with antagonism.

Later on, an altercation ensued between Ang’s wife and San Joaquin. Angered by this, Ang tore his Daily Time Record.
Fernandez’s was also torn. They were then suspended for insubordination. As such, San Joaquin and Fernandez filed a
Complaint for Constructive Dismissal against Ang. LA dismissed the Complaint. On appeal, NLRC affirmed. MR was
denied. As such, they filed a Petititon for Certiorari in the CA. CA reversed the LA and NLRC rulings and found that
there was illegal dismissal. Ang’s MR was denied. Hence, this Petition.

Ang contends that the findings of administrative special agencies should be given due respect.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE THAT THE FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIAL AGENCIES SHOULD BE
RESPECTED MUST BE FOLLOWED.

HELD: NO. THERE WAS A DIVERGENCE IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT
When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there is a need to review
the records. In the present case, not only is there a divergence of findings of facts; the conclusions arrived at by the
two tribunals are diametrically opposed . For this reason, the doctrine that the findings of specialized administrative
agencies or tribunals should be respected must be set aside for a moment.

There is considerable reason to believe that Ang began to treat the employees with disdain and discrimination after
the hearing of the criminal cases on August 24, 1999, when they testified against him. Indeed, they claim in their
Position Paper that Ang began to subject them to verbal abuse, as well as assigning them tasks which were not part of
their work, is not far-fetched. All these are rooted in the 41 charges of estafa pending against Ang, where they were
compelled to testify as witnesses for the State. Ang did not successfully dispute this claim; indeed, on this issue, he has
remained silent all along. His silence on this issue is telling; considering that upon him lay the burden of proof to show
that no illegal dismissal was effected. He should have addressed this issue, which is material and significant to the case
as it forms the foundation for employees’ claim of illegal constructive dismissal.

XXVIII. PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT (RULE 47)

1. Orbeta v. Sendiong, July 8, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Montenegro sold to Sps. Orbeta a portion of a parcel of land in Dumaguete. In the sale, the portion occupied by
Montenegro’s grandmother was not inlcuded. Thereafter, Orbeta sold to Sps. Sendiong the parcel of land it bought from
Montenegro. However, Montenegro was deprived of the possession of the excluded portion of the lot originally sold to
Orbeta by the Sendiongs. Thus, Montenegro and Orbeta filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title,
and Damages against Sendiong. Montenegro reiterated its claim over the unsold portion while Orbeta claims that it was
sold without the consent of his wife.

Sendiong filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that some of the indispensable parties were not impleaded. RTC denied
this. After Orbeta rested its case, Sendiong filed another motion to include indispensable parties. However, this was again
denied. As such, RTC ordered Sendiong to restore to Orbeta the title and possession of their respective shares in the
property.

Sendiong filed a Notice of Appeal but the RTC denied it since the Certification Against Forum Shopping was signed by
counsel. Thus, a Petition for Certiorari was filed but the CA dismissed this. After Sendiong’s MR was denied, the decisión
lapsed into finality.
Subsequently, Sendiong filed a Petition for Annulment of Decision with the CA and alleged that it belatedly learned of the
decisión as he was not made a party thereto despite being an indispensable party. Essentially, it claims that the RTC had
no jurisdiction because the indispensable party was not impleaded. CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
due to the absence of an indispensable party.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA PROPERLY GRANTED THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT HELD:

YES.
Annulment of judgment is not a relief to be granted indiscriminately by the courts. Annulment of judgment is a recourse
equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Under
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If the action is based on extrinsic fraud, it must be brought within four (4) years from
discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

Sendiong’s petition for annulment is grounded on lack of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the
indispensable parties. The cited ground is ample basis for annulment of judgment. We have long held that the joinder of
all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act , not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

It takes no great degree of legal sophistication to realize that Paul Sendiong and Lourdes Sendiong were indispensable
parties to Civil Case No. 10173. Paul and Lourdes Sendiong derived their rights to the subject property from their
father Luis Sendiong, who acquired the property by way of donation from the spouses Juan Sendiong and Exequila
Castellanes, who in turn purchased the property from Maximo Orbeta in 1934.

Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar. The petition for annulment alleges that Sendiong learned of the existence
of Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the decision therein had been rendered. Since he was not
impleaded in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no basis to presume that Sendiong was aware of the civil case during its
pendency before the RTC. Moreover, at the time Sendiong according to petitioners learned of the civil case, there was no
pending appeal from the RTC decision therein, the Notice of Appeal having been earlier denied. Under these
circumstances, it would be difficult to discern how in 1999 respondent could have still participated in Civil Case No.
10173. There was no pending appeal to speak of which he could have involved himself. Nor could have he participated in
the special civil action for certiorari, an original action, then pending before the Court of Appeals.

Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment was, at that point, the only viable remedy for respondent to avail of,
and it was utilized only 1 year after Sendiong learned of the existence of Civil Case No. 10173. Laches has been
defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier — negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Consi dering that a
petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed within 4 years from discovery of the
fraud, a similar petition based on lack of jurisdiction is generally not barred by laches or estoppel if the petition is
filed within one year after petitioner learns of the questioned decision. This moreover holds true, as in this case, since
Sendiong is a foreign resident restrained by time and distance to undertakean immediate and proximate response, such as
judicial
recourse.

PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT PRECLUDES THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA

It is the height of sophistry to argue that res judicata would bar a petition for annulment of judgment whose, as in this
case, prior judgment happens to be that which is sought to be annulled. The petition for annulment of judgment
precisely challenges the validity of the “first judgment,” and to adopt petitioners’ argument would lead to
permanent preclusion of annulment of judgment as a remedy. Significantly, the reverse is true for the rationale
underlying annulment of judgment is incongruent with the concept of res judicata. Hence, the action for annulment of
judgment precludes the defense of res judicata. The grounds for annulment of judgment are either lack of jurisdiction
or the presence of extrinsic fraud in the rendition of the judgment sought to be annulled.
2. Nery v. Leyson, G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Nery et al are the children of Mercedes del Rio. When the latter died, she left Nery et al a parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu
City coverd by an OCT in the name of Agatona del Corro, grandmother of Nery et al. Thereafter, they executed an
Extrajudicial Partition of the land in question. However, a Notice of Lis Pendens was executed and annotated on the OCT
by the lawyer of Leyson et al pursuant to a case filed in the RTC of Cebu regarding the Annulment & Cancellation of said
OCT which was ruled in favor of Leyson et al. However, Nery claims that they were not impleaded therein. Also,
although their mother was impleaded in said case, she was impleaded after she had already died. Thus, they claim that the
ruling in said case did not bind them.

Thereafter, Nery et al filed in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a case seeking the Declaration of Nullity of the TCT issued in
favor of Leyson et al as well as the Nullification of the Proceedings in the case for Annulment & Cancellation of OCT. In
their defense, Leyson et al contends that the case between them and Nery et al’s mother already bécame final and
executory. As a result, the RTC ruled in favor of Leyson et al and the case was dismissed. CA denied Nery et al’s appeal
on the ground of conclusiveness of the earlier judgment. It was likewise stated that an RTC (Lapu-Lapu City) has no
jurisdiction to annul the judgment of a co-equal RTC (Cebu) because said jurisdiction lies with the CA. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CAN ANNUL THE JUDGMENT OF A CO-EQUAL COURT.

HELD: NO.
The Nery et al’s action suffers from a fatal defect which prevents their action for annulment from prospering. The reason
why the herein Petition cannot be granted is the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of a coequal
court.

Section 9 of BP 129, as amended, vests in the CA “[e]xclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of regional trial courts.” Hence, even if the trial court in Civil Case No. R8646 did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioners, the trial court in Civil Case No. 2379L cannot annul the final judgment in Civil Case No. R8646, as
jurisdiction over the subject matter, which in this case is annulment of final judgment, is vested by law in a higher
court, the CA.

3. Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Rosilyn Delantar complained that her father abused him by exposing her to prostitution. After her father was incarcerated,
a Petition for Voluntary Commitment of Rosilyn in favor of DSWD was filed because her mother’s (Librada Ceruila)
whereabouts was unknown. RTC of Pasay granted said petition.

Thereafter, Ceruila filed a Petition in the RTC of Manila for the Annulment of the Birth Certificate of Rosilyn Delantar
praying that it be declared null and void since said birth certifícate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of
birth. As such, the RTC ordered the hearing of the case and caused publication of said order. However, no representative
appeared. Thus, RTC granted the Ceruila’s petition and declared the birth certifícate void

Later on, Rosilyn, represented by DSWD, filed in the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment in the Petition for
Cancellation of her birth certifícate. It was claimed that they were not notified of the Petition and that the decisión was
rendered without jurisdiction since the RTC judge had no authority to declare her illegitimate. CA granted the petition,
nullified the order of the RTC, and resolved the merits of the case. Ceruila’s MR was denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA, IN A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT, CAN RULE ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED.

HELD: NO.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial
court’s decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
 Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. — A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or
final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original
action being refiled in the proper court . However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing
more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the
birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.

4. Salera v. A-1 Investors, G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
Teodora Salera obtained a loan from A-1 in the amount of 50K. However, she failed to pay. As a result, A-1 filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money with the MTC of QC against Teodora and her husband Saturnino who was mayor of Bohol.
However, summons was served and received by their son in their residence in Cebu. For failing to file an Answer, Salera
was declared in default and thus ordered by the MTC to pay A-1. A copy of the decisión was again sent to their home and
was received by a certain Joel Arino. No appeal was filed so the decisión bécame final and executory.

As such, a Writ of Execution and Notice of Levy was received by their daughter who was of age but did not bother to read
it. She only told her parents a week after receiving it. Claiming to have been unaware of the entire proceedings, Mayor
Salera filed a complaint denominated as “Injunction with Damages” against A-1 in the RTC of Cebu. Said RTC ruled in
his favor and issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the MTC decisión. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
subsequently issued.

Aggrieved, A-1 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ. However, this was denied
by the RTC. MR was also denied. A Petition for Certiorari was filed in the CA which was granted thereby prohibiting the
RTC from proceeding with the injunction against the execution of the MTC judgment.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE “INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES” IS A PROPER REMEDY.

HELD: NO. THE PROPER REMEDY IS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT SINCE THE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC
WAS BEING ASSAILED.
While Salera is correct that a complaint for injunction is a recognized remedy to enjoin the performance of an act, which
action falls within the province of Regional Trial Courts, it must be taken into account that Saturnino, Sr. sought to
permanently enjoin the public auction of property levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
15996 on the ground that he was not served with summons and was denied due process.

In doing so, Saturnino, Sr. was actually seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 which was the
basis of the writ of execution pursuant to which the public auction was to be held. The proper remedy for Salera’s
predicament is therefore not an action for injunction, but for annulment of judgment.

It is thus understandable why Salera is staunch in claiming, in hindsight, that although the complaint filed in the RTC of
Cebu was captioned “Injunction with Damages,” the allegations therein suffice to constitute an action for annulment
of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 for lack of due process amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or extrinsic
fraud. The issue of whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Saturnino,
Sr. in Civil Case No. 15996 and his exclusion from the proceedings in said case amounted to extrinsic fraud which denied
him of due process should be properly resolved in an action for annulment of judgment as mandated by Sections 1 and 2
in relation to Section 10 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Sec. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.

Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a
judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the former. It shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
this Rule shall be applicable thereto.

NOT A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

Unfortunately for the Salera, the complaint filed by Saturnino, Sr. in the RTC of Cebu was, without a shadow of
doubt, not for annulment of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 15996. Not only was the complaint captioned
“Injunction with Damages,” but it likewise did not pray for annulment of judgment.

Section 4 in relation to the abovequoted Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of
judgments or final orders provides, viz.:

Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition. — The action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition
alleging therein with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. The petitioner shall
also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action
or defense and a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if
he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

It is clear from the contents of the complaint filed by Salera that the action is not for annulment of the decision in
Civil Case No. 15996. It does not allege “with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well
as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action” which Salera now claims are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 attached to the
original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits of
witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, submitted together with the complaint. Salera cannot now mislead the court into
treating the complaint for injunction as an action for annulment of judgment with the ancillary remedy of
injunction.

NO JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER

More importantly, even assuming arguendo that the action was for annulment of judgment, the RTC of Cebu did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
 Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a
judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the former.

It is therefore the RTC of Quezon City which has jurisdiction over a case seeking annulment of the final decision of
the MTC of Quezon City, Branch 36, which is similar in rank as the abovementioned Municipal Trial Court.

5. Cole v. Court of Appeals, December 26, 2000, G.R. No. 137561

QUICKIE FACTS:
Cole et al filed a Complaint for Non-Delivery of Titled before the Arbiter of the HLURB against one Agda and PNB
(mortgagee) pursuant to a sale of certain townhouse units owned by Agda. As a result, the Arbiter ruled against Agda and
PNB and ordered them to deliver the title to the property as well as the ROD to cancel the annotation of the mortgage
indebtednes.

PNB appealed to the Board of Commissioners who affirmed the same. As such, PNB thereafter appeald to the Office of
the President. However, the Arbiter’s decisión was affirmed. As for Agda, she appealed to the CA via Petition for
Certiorari which was however dismissed.

Thereafter, Agda a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA questioning the Arbiter and the Office of the
President’s decisions on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, Cole moved to dismiss. Nonetheless, the CA via
Justice Ibay-Somera, declared the decisions of the Arbiter and the Office of the President null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISIONS OF THE HLURB ARBITER AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CAN BE
SUBJECTED TO A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47.

HELD: NO. IT IS CONFINED TO DECISIONS OF THE RTC.

What was filed in the CA was a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the decisions of the Arbiter and the Office of the
President. Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the
RTC on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition
cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be annulled was not rendered by the RTC but by
an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the CA.

There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the President. Assuming
arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the same should have been dismissed by the CA, because no error of judgment was imputed to the HLURB
and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of judgment.

A petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy, hence no error of judgment can be the subject
thereof. Besides, the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have jurisdiction over the cases brought
before them in line with our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 17, 2000, where
the aggrieved townhouse buyers may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise
known as “Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree.”

6. Arcenas v. Queen City Development Bank, G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Arcenas filed an Action for Declaratory Relief against Queen City Development Bank (QCDB) to declare their
rights as lessors under a contract of lease. However, RTC dismissed the petition. Thereafter, Arcenas filed in the RTC
another case for Breach of Contract of Lease. QCDB filed an Answer with Counterclaim. As such, the case was set for
Pre-Trial.
However, due to conflicting Schedule, only QCDB’s counsel showed up. As such, on motion of QCDB’s Arcenas was
declared non-suited and set the date for the presentation of QCDB’s evidence. In said date, Arcenas again failed to appear.
Thus, the RTC submitted the case for decisión. As a result, Arcenas filed a Manifestation with Motion claiming that their
failure to appear was due to their mistaken belief that QCDB wanted to settle. However, RTC denied the Manifestation
and allowed QCDB to present evidence on its Counterclaim.

Aggrieved, Arcenas filed in the CA a Petition for Annulment of the Order declaring them non-suited on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. However, CA dismissed the Petition stating that Arcenas failed to avail of ordinary remedies before
resorting to the Petition for Annulment under Rule 47. Further, it stated that they could have filed a Petition for Relief
under Rule 38. CA likewise denied Arcenas’ MR. Thereafter, the RTC ruled on the merits of the case in favor of QCDB.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY OF PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS PROPER.

HELD: NO.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a Petition for Annulment of Judgment if other
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails
to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.

The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pretrial conference and QCDB was allowed to
present evidence on its counterclaim. Such Order was received by the secretary of Arcenas’ counsel. Arcenas did not
move to set aside the RTC’s order of non-suit. While Arcenas’ counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of
non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Arcenas did not take any remedial
action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In fact, Arcenas and her counsel did not
also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing wherein QCDB presented evidence on its counterclaim and
submitted the case for decision.

It was only on January 14, 2004 when Arcenas and her husband filed a pleading captioned as Manifestation and Motion,
wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of the Orders dated November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further
pretrial conference. The RTC denied such Manifestation and Motion in its Order dated March 9, 2004, as the same was
filed beyond the reglementary period, and such Order was received by Arcenas on March 12, 2004. They then filed with
the CA a Petition for Annulment of Order of non-suit under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. The CA denied the petition as Arcenas failed to avail of the appropriate remedies provided by the Rules
to which we agree.

CANNOT USE EXTRINSIC FRAUD AS A GROUND

Since Arcenas claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by QCDB’s counsel, she could have filed a petition for
relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly
states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a Motion for New Trial or Petition for Relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it
could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.

XXIX. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

A. ATTACHMENT (RULE 57)

a.1 Security Pacific v. Amelia Tria-Infante, G.R. No. 1444740, August 31, 2005.
QUICKIE FACTS:
Anzures’ complaint caused the filing of an Information for Violation of BP 22 in the RTC of Manila against Villaluz.
Anzures likewise filed an Ex Parte Motion for Preliminary Attachment was filed. As a result, the RTC ordered the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment after Anzures posts a bond amounting to 2.1M. Pursuant to said order, said
bond was posted and approved by the RTC. As a result, the sheriff attached the properties of Villaluz. Thereafter, RTC
acquitted Villaluz but held her civilly liable for 2.1M. On appeal by Villaluz, CA affirmed. When the case was elevated to
the SC, Villaluz posted a
Counterbond amounting to 2.5M which was issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation. On the same day, Villaluz
filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge the Attachment. Nonetheless, SC affirmed the CA decision and the decision reached
finality.

Thus, upon Anzures’ motion, RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff sent a Notice of Garnishment
on Security Pacific in the amount of 2.5M. However, Security Pacific refused to assume its obligation on the counterbond.
As a result, Anzures filed a Motion to Proceed with the Garnishment. Over Security Pacific’s opposition, the RTC granted
said Motion.

Aggrieved, Security Pacific filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging that the sheriff gravely abused its discretion
when it proceeded against Security Pacific’s counterbond even if the SC did not approve of the same. However, CA
dismissed the petition. Security Pacific’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Security Pacific contends that since the SC did not approve the counterbond and cause the discharge of the attachment, it
cannot be held liable for the counterbond. Essentially, it argues that the mere filing of a counterbond cannot automatically
discharge the attachment without first obtaining an order of discharge and approval of the bond.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC’S ORDER ALLOWING THE EXECUTION ON THE COUNTERBOND ISSUED SECURITY
PACIFIC IS PROPER.

HELD: YES. IT WAS PROPER.

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in Vanguard Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, we held:

[A]fter the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is ‘returned unsatisfied,’
as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the
judgment against the defendant despite demand therefore, writ of execution may issue against the
surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.

In Luzon Steel Coporation v. Sia, et al.:

[C]ounterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a writ of attachment is due to these bonds being
security for the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may obtain ; they are thus mere
replacements of the property formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final
judgment in the case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties
ascertainable after the judgment has become final.

In Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we further held that “the counterbond is
intended to secure the payment of ‘any judgment’ that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.”

In view of the nature and purpose of a surety agreement, Security Pacific, thus, is barred from disclaiming liability .

Security Pacific’s argument that the mere filing of a counterbond in this case cannot automatically discharge the
attachment without first an order of discharge and approval of the bond, is lame.

Under the Rules, there are 2 WAYS to secure the discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose property has been
attached or a person appearing on his behalf may post a security. Second, said party may show that the order of
attachment was improperly or irregularly issued . The first applies in the instant case.

It should be noted that in G.R. No. 106214, per our Resolution dated 15 January 1997, we permitted Villaluz to file a
counter- attachment bond. On 17 February 1997, we required the Anzures to comment on the sufficiency of the
counterbond posted by Villaluz. It is quite palpable that the necessary steps in the discharge of an attachment upon
giving counterbond have been taken. To require a specific order for the discharge of the attachment when this
Court, in our decision in
G.R. No. 106214, had already declared that Security Pacific is solidarily bound with Villaluz would be mere surplusage.
 a.2 Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Torres siblings own a 20,000 sqm parcel of land in Dasmarinas, Cavite. Satsatin was authorized to negotiate the sale
of the property to Solar for 35M. Satsatin was supposed to remit 28M to the Torres siblings. However, even after Solar
already paid Satsatin the entire purchase price, Satsatin only remitted a total of 9M. Despite repeated demands to remit the
balance, Satasatin failed to do so. Thus, Torres filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages in the RTC of
Dasmarinas against Satsatin.

An Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment was filed. RTC directed Torres to post a bond of 7M. Pursuant
thereto, RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and deputized a sheriff to serve the writ on Nov. 15, 2002. On Nov 19, said writ
was served upon Satsatin and the sheriff levied that the latter’s properties. On Nov 21, the summons and the copy of the
Complaint was subsequently served to Satsatin.

Thereafter, Satsatin filed an Answer and a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment. Nonetheless, RTC denied the
motion and directed Satsatin to file a counterbond in the amount of 7M. Motions were filed opposing this but were all
denied. Aggrieved, Satsatin filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
and set aside the RTC order by lifting the levy on Satsatin’s properties. Torres’ MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY LIFTED THE ATTACHMENT.

HELD:YES. WHEN THE ATTACHMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE RTC HAD NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an
action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by
the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the
attaching creditor against the defendant.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in approving the bond posted by Torres despite the fact that not all the
requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the SC showing that the company concerned is qualified
to transact business which is valid only for 30 days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the
Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show
that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati,
Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the
RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time
of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the abovementioned cities. Thus, the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment
founded on the said bond.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the ISSUANCE and
the IMPLEMENTATION of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is
indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in
order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person .

This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases
where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of
the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment.” This phrase refers to the date of
the filing of the complaint, which is the moment that marks “the commencement of the action.” The reference plainly is to
a time before summons is served on the defendant , or even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of defendant issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment these do
not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is
eventually obtained by the court , either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his
voluntary submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant
not only a copy of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment ,
as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well
as a copy of the complaint.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves THREE
STAGES:

(1) First, the court issues the order granting the application;
(2) Second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
(3) Third, the writ is implemented.

For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the IMPLEMENTATION of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon
consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment,
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit and
bond, and the order must be served upon him.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the RTC validly issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, which
was implemented on November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
served only on November 21, 2002.

At the time the RTC issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for
its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment.” However, at the
time the writ was implemented, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Satsatin since no
summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon Satsatin in order for the RTC to
have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect . Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect Satsatin.

Assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the RTC later acquired jurisdiction over the
respondents by service of the summons upon them, such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be
deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The RTC cannot enforce such a coercive
process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person .

The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the
defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the
case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person
because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
 a.3 Insular Savings v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.123638, June 15, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Far East Bank (FEBTC) instituted an Arbtration case against Insular Savings Bank on account of a dispute involving 3
unfunded checks amounting to 25.3M drawn against FEBTC. Insular refused to refund the money to FEBTC. Thus,
pending arbitration, FEBTC filed a case in the RTC of Makati praying for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. RTC asked
FEBTC to post a bond of 6M. Thereafter, RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment for 25.3M. Therafter, the parties
agreed to divide the amount while the dispute was not yet resolved. So, 12.6M was already in FEBTC’s possession.

Subsequently, Insular moved to discharge the attachment by counterbond in the amount of 12.6M. However, RTC denied
the motion stating that the counterbond should be in the amount of 27.2M. MR was likewise denied. Thus, Insular went to
the CA on Petition for Certiorari. However, CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING INSULAR’S MOTION TO DISCHARGE ATTACHMENT BY
COUNTERBOND IN THE AMOUNT OF 12.6M.

HELD: YES.
The then pertinent provision of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court under which the appellate court issued its assailed decision
and resolution, provides as follows:

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an order of attachment
has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, may upon reasonable notice to the
applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order or to the judge of the court which the action is
pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall,
after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed
to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where
the application is made in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by
the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the
action.

Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become insufficient, and the party furnishing
the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching party may apply for a new order of
attachment.

As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the aforequoted Section 12, to be
measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action . Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and
without necessarily diminishing the sound discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no
serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached property — and logically the counterbond necessary to
discharge the lien on such property — should as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match
the attaching creditor’s principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoidedat all times, shall
ensue.

The following excerpts from Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. VII, 1997 ed., p. 61, citing retired Justice Jose Y. Feria,
drive home the same point articulated in Asuncion:

The sheriff is required to attach only so much of the property of the party against whom the order is
issued as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, the amount of which is stated in the order,
unless a deposit is made or a counterbond is given equal to said amount. However, if the value of the
property to be attached is less than the amount of the demand, the amount of the applicant’s bond may be
equal to the value of said property, and the amount of the adverse party’s deposit or counterbond may
be equal to the applicant’s bond. The writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon approval of the
requisite bond.
Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of FEBTC, as plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of
P25,200,000.00, representing the three (3) unfunded checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, FEBTC.
Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages , and other
unliquidated or contingent claim.
The order of attachment dated January 22, 1992 fixed the bond to be posted by FEBTC, as applicant, at P6,000,000.00.
The writ of attachment issued on January 27, 1992, in turn, expressly indicated that Insular is justly indebted to FEBTC in
the amount of P25,200,000.00. On February 11, 1992, before the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation, Insular and FEBTC, however, agreed to equally divide between themselves, albeit on a temporary basis, the
disputed amount of P25,200,000.00, subject to the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. Thus, the release by Insular of
the amount of P12,600,000.00 to FEBTC. On March 7, 1994, Insular filed a motion to discharge attachment by
counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00 which, to Insular, is the extent that FEBTC may actually be prejudiced in
the event its basic complaint for recovery of money against Insular prospers.

As things stood, therefore, FEBTC’s principal claim against Insular immediately prior to the filing of the motion to
discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The RTC was fully aware of this reality.
Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counterbond based on the reduced
claim of FEBTC. If a portion of the claim is already secured, we see no justifiable reason why such portion should
still be subject of counterbond.

It may be that a counterbond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may
recover in the main action. Simple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, dictates that a part of a
possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied or secured need not be covered by the
counterbond.

With the view we take of this case, the RTC, in requiring Insular to post a counterbond in the amount of
P27,237,700.00, obviously glossed over one certain fundamental . We refer to the fact that the attachment FEBTC
applied for and the corresponding writ issued was only for the amount of P25.2 Million. FEBTC, it bears to stress,
did not pray for attachment on its other claims, contingent and unliquidated as they were. Then, too, the attaching writ
rightly excluded such claims. While the records do not indicate, let alone provide a clear answer as to the actual value of
the property levied upon, it may reasonably be assumed that it is equal to FEBTC’s principal claim. Be that as it may, it
was simply unjust for the RTC to base the amount of the counterbond on a figure beyond the P25,200,000.00
threshold, as later reduced to P12,600,200.00.

The RTC, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied Insular’s motion to discharge attachment
by counterbond in the amount of P12,600,000.00, an amount more than double the attachment bond required of, and
given by, respondent. As a necessary consequence, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed
petitioner’s recourse thereto in CA-G.R. SP No. 34876.

a.4 Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868, February 6, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Yu bought bars of detergent soap from Te in the amount of 594K and issued 3 postdated checks in favor of Te.
However, these were dishonored. After demands for payment were left unheeded, Te filed in the RTC of Valenzuela an
action for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. After Te posted an
attachment bond, RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff attached Yu’s properties
consisting of a parcel of land and several vehicles.

Yu filed their Answer with Counterclaim for Damages on account of the wrongful attachment of their properties.
Likewise, it filed a Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Attachment and claimed against the bond. RTC only lifted
the attachment on the vehicles. On appeal, however, CA lifted the attachment on the parcel of land. Aggrieved, Te filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari in the SC but was denied. This ruling became conclusive and binding.

Not knowing that the SC already ruled on the matter, RTC ruled in favor of Te and did not rule on Yu’s counterclaim. As
such, Yu filed an MR which was again denied. Yu’s Notice of Appeal was likewise denied. Thus, they filed in the CA a
Petition for Certiorari. As a result, CA granted the petition but it stated that Yu failed to adduce evidence to their
entitlement to damages in its Counterclaim. Yu’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
Yu contends that they are entitled to their Counterclaim for Damages because of the final judgment on the wrongful
attachment of their properties.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT WAS PROCURED IN BAD
FAITH AFTER IT WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED BY FINAL JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO GROUND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
SAID WRIT.

HELD: NO. SPOUSES YU STILL HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE FACTUAL BASIS OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
As early as in Lazatin v. Twaño, we laid down the rule that where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment
defendant may recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in
obtaining the attachment. However, if it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but
also malicious, the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well.

Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to the
attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or
injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment.

In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful DID NOT RELIEVE
Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.

ACTUAL DAMAGES NOT PROVEN

To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove ,
with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof . Such loss or injury must
be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty .
As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular,
if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and
supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.
Moreover, Yu did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No.
11.

TEMPERATE DAMAGES AWARDED

Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were
wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained . Hence, an award of temperate or
moderate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.

MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES NOT PROVEN

As to moral and exemplary damages, to merit an award thereof, it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was
obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith, such as by appending a false affidavit to his application.

Spouses Yu argue that malice attended the issuance of the attachment bond as shown by the fact that Te deliberately
appended to her application for preliminary attachment an Affidavit where Sy perjured himself by stating that they had no
intention to pay their obligations even when he knew this to be untrue given that they had always paid their obligations;
and by accusing them of disposing of their properties to defraud their creditors even when he knew this to be false,
considering that the location of said properties was known to him. However, the testimony of Josefa Yu herself negates
their claim for moral and exemplary damages.

Thus, we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. We cannot hold her liable for
moral and exemplary damages.
B. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (RULE 58)

b.1 Universal Motors Corporation v. Rojas, A.M. RTJ 03-1814, May 26, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
UMC had a dealership agreement with Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC). Pursuant thereto, NSSC ordered
5.4M worth of Nissan spare parts from UMC. However, the checks used for payment were all dishonored. Despite
demands, no payment was made. As a result, UMC terminated its agreement with NSSC and filed a complaint for BP 22
and Estafa against NSSC.

On the other hand, NSSC filed a case in the RTC of CDO denominated as Complaint for Breach of Contract, Damages,
with Preliminary Injunction and TRO against UMC and its officers and was raffled to the sala of Judge Rojas. Thereafter,
judge ordered a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a TRO. Subsequently, NSSC filed an Amended
Complaint which inserted a prayer for TRO which was not found in the original complaint. After hearing, the judge issued
a 20-day TRO against UMC.

Thereafter, the judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction after NSSC posted its bond. Aggrieved, UMC filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari in the CA assailing the issuance of said Writ. Later on, CA found that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion. It also stated that it issued a TRO without requiring a bond and that NSSC never applied for a TRO in their
complaint.

As a result, UMC filed an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rojas for Serious Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Manifest Partiality, and Grave Abuse of Discretion. In his defense, the judge denied the charges and claimed that he
fact that the caption included a “TRO,” it was already tantamount to an express application for said TRO. Nonetheless, the
OCA found him guilty of Grave Abuse of Discretion and fined him 20K.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ROJAS IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING A TRO EVEN IF IT WAS NOT PRAYED
FOR IN THE COMPLAINT.

HELD: YES.
NOT ALLEGED FACTS TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF TRO
We are not impressed with Judge’s argument that the caption and the body of the complaint showed an intent to include a
prayer for a TRO. Nowhere in the allegations in the complaint was it shown that great or irreparable injury would
result to the NSSC, pending hearing on the preliminary injunction.

Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard . In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is
clear with regard to the procedure to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary
injunction or TRO may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows
facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.

We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted mainly of its reinstatement as dealer of Nissan
vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao, and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC and
NICAD. NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a TRO to prevent any great or irreparable
injury that it might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being heard. In one case, the Court penalized a judge
who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs without any showing that such reliefs were applied for.

NO BOND WAS REQUIRED TO BE POSTED

The judge issued the TRO without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure states:

Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
 (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto . Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall be issued.

While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a bond before granting a temporary
restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the
prejudice of the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law. The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person
against whom the temporary restraining order or injunction is issued may sustain by reason thereof should the
court finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Hence, it follows that unless it appears that the
enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding judge must require the applicant to post a bond , otherwise
the courts could become instruments of oppression and harassment.

The present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by requiring a hearing, but
also by imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this relief by litigants.

The TRO issued by the judge effectively enjoined the defendants therein, UMC and NICAD, from doing business as
dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It does not require deep thinking to realize the losses that these
companies will suffer if the court orders them to freeze operations . Not only will they be deprived of potential
earnings from sales but they will also have to expend for their overhead even if they are not able to do business.

b.2 Greenstar Mangandingan v. Andiong, A.M. RTJ 041826, February 6, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Greenstar charged Judge Adiong of the RTC of Lanao del Sur with Gross Ignorance of the Law, among others. He claims
that he was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay during a special election. Thereafter, his opponent, Alizaman Sangcopan,
filed an Action for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the COMELEC commissioners and
himself.

Before summons could be served on them, Adiong already issued a TRO without hearing. It is also alleged that 6 days
after the issuance of said TRO, another order was issued extending the effectivity thereof for another 20 days even before
the first TRO had expired. Thereafter, Adiong granted the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and, as a matter
of course, issued a Writ.

In his defense, Adiong claims that there was valid service of summons and that the issuance of TRO without prior notice
was valid pursuant to Admin Circular which authorizes ex parte issuance of a TRO in matters of extreme urgency. He
likewise claims that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was also valid.

Nonetheless, OCA found Adiong administratively liable and fined 20K.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE ADIONG IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.

HELD: YES.
No matter how urgent a case may be, this fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts employed by respondent judge, i.e.
dispensing with the proper service of summons , and the violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court .

It is glaringly obvious from the service return of the sheriff that the proper service as provided for in the rules was not
followed. No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were natural persons. Neither was a copy
left at any of their residences or offices. What the sheriff did was to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of
Datu Hassan Mangondaya, a total stranger to the case .
Worth stressing, Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for
a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided.

Within the said twenty day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified
time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple sala court
or the presiding judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for
only seventy two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the
next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter,
within the aforesaid seventy two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the
application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy two hours provided
herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period,
the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall
have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

Judge Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. He could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour
TRO under the second paragraph of the rule quoted above because, first, he was not the executive judge. Second,
his order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72 hours only. On the contrary, the defendants were ordered to
desist from releasing the subject funds “until further orders from this Court.” Third, there was no showing that the order
was being issued because of extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72 hour TRO. Judge Adiong only stated in his
order that he was “[a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, without finding that the
plaintiff was entitled thereto.” Judge Adiong’s violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable.

This Court already ruled that failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes the offense of grave
abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Indeed, a judge is
presumed to know this Circular. Judge Adiong’s failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs constitutes
gross ignorance and gross inefficiency.

We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of judicial functions on the part of
Judge Adiong were negated by the circumstances on record. First, there was no proper notice to the herein complainant
and the other defendants in Civil Case No. 191203 that an application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed.
Second, Judge Adiong did not conduct a summary hearing before granting the TRO. Third, as will be discussed
hereafter, he contravened the circular on the raffle of cases.

All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of and participation in the
TRO proceedings and ensured the unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein. These three points, taken together,
paint a picture of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Adiong.
b.3 Aldover v. Court of Appeals, 706 SCRA 188 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
Reyes were registered owners of a parcel of land in Pasig. They obtained a loan from Aldover secured by REM over said
property. When they failed to pay, Aldover extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and emerged as the winning bidder.
After the Certificate of Sale was annotated, Aldover filed in the RTC a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession which
was granted. In compliance thereto, the Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate. However, this was not fully implemented
because other persons (Respondents) occupying the lot claimed to be owners thereof.

Respondents later on filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Reconveyance, Damages with
Prayer for TRO or Preliminary Injunction against Aldover and Reyes. However, the RTC denied the prayer for TRO.
Thus, they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA with Prayer for TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However,
CA dismissed it. On MR, however, CA reconsidered and granted the issuance of TRO and set for hearing for
determination of the propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Aggrieved, Aldover filed an MR but was denied by the CA. After Respodents filed a bond, the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued. Hence, this petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUCNTION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.

HELD: NO.
Nothing indicates that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Measured against jurisprudentially established parameters, its disposition
to grant the writ was not without basis and, hence, could not have been arrived at capriciously, whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically.

Respondents amply justified the grant of the provisional relief they prayed for . A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
issued at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order to prevent threatened or continuo us irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated. To justify its issuance, the
applicants must prove the following REQUISITES:

(1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and
(4) there is no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Here, respondents alleged in their CA Petition that they possess and own portions of the property subject of the
Writ of Demolition. In support thereof, they annexed to their Petition and Reply deeds of conveyances, contracts to sell,
receipts, etc. showing that the Reyeses already sold to them the portions of the subject lot they respectively occupy.
A number of these documents predate the REM which the Reyeses executed in favor of Aldover while others were
executed subsequent thereto. Respondents’ allegation of actual possession is likewise confirmed by the Sheriff’s Partial
Report which states that there are several other persons who occupy portions of subject lot and claim to be the owners
thereof. In fine, respondents have indubitably shown that they are in actual possession of the disputed portions of
subject property. Their possession, under Article 433 of the Civil Code, raises a disputable presumption that they are the
owners thereof.

In fine, the CA cannot be said to have acted capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically in issuing its
January 3, 2005 Resolution and February 10, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction to prevent a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury. There is preliminary showing that respondents have clear and unmistakable right over the disputed
portions of the property which must be protected during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 86363. Indeed, the precipitate
demolition of their houses would constitute material and substantial invasion of their right which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation. Hence, the need for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, it has been held that the trial court (or the CA in this case) has a wide latitude in determining the propriety
of issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to it for its determination. Hence, absent a clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion, the trial court’s disposition in injunctive matters is not generally interfered with by
the appellate courts.

Furthermore, we note that although the scheduled hearing on the propriety of issuing a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction did not push through, the parties were nonetheless amply heard thru their pleadings . At the time the CA
issued its challenged January 3, 2005 Resolution, petitioners had already filed their Comment and Rejoinder where they
argued at length why no injunctive relief should be granted in favor of the respondents. In Land Bank of the Phils. v.
Continental Watchman Agency, Inc., we reiterated our ruling that there can be no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent court in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction when the parties were amply heard thereon.

b.4 Bacolod City Water v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157994, December 10, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bacolod City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against BCWD
for announcing that increased water rates will be implemented on April 1, 1999 without any public hearing. As such, the
City prayed that before hearing the main case, a TRO of Preliminary Injunction be issued.

After Position Papers and Motions were filed by the parties, the City filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and set the same for hearing. After hearing on Feb 24, 2000, the Judge Labayen of the RTC
issued an order commanding BCWD to stop, desist, and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates. Thereafter,
the City prayed that the RTC issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BCWD.

Thereafter, the RTC rendered a decision granting Final Injunction. Aggrieved, BCWD filed an MR alleging that the case
was not yet ripe for decision. However, this was denied. As such, BCWD filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA alleging
grave abuse. Nonetheless, CA dismissed the Petition. It stated that the order on Feb 24, 2000 was actually a Preliminary
Injunction and not a TRO. Thus, the RTC merely confirmed such Preliminary Injunction wen it rendered a decision
granting a Final Injunction.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY RENDERED A DECISION GRANTING FINAL INJUNCTION WHICH CONFIRMS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

HELD: NO. THE PREVIOUS ORDER WAS A TRO AND NOT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS ISSUED
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the RTC make a clear conclusion that the Order issued
was a TRO and not a preliminary injunction.

It can be gleaned from the aforequoted Order that what the RTC issued was a TRO and not a preliminary injunction. The
RTC has always referred to it as a TRO in the succeeding Orders it issued on March 10, 2000 and April 6, 2000. The
parties, in their succeeding pleadings, also referred to the assailed Order as a TRO.

Again, it was only when BCWD expressed its vehement objection on the ruling that the final injunction confirmed
the preliminary injunction previously issued, when the City and the RTC started to insist that the questioned
Order was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous undeviating references to it as a TRO, City cannot now
consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and
circumstances clearly show that the RTC issued a TRO.

INJUCTION AS A MAIN ACTION AND AS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain
act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.
The MAIN ACTION for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction
which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course,
in AN ACTION FOR INJUNCTION, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct
from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is
to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard . A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order . It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the
action without the court issuing a final injunction.

TRO
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
TRO with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue.

If before the expiration of the twenty (20) day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the TRO
would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force
of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.

Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the TRO granted automatically expired after
twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that the RTC merely ordered “the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or
any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase
which will start on March 1, 2000” without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the TRO to a
preliminary injunction.

The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20) day limited period of effectivity of a TRO is absolute if
issued by a RTC. The failure of the RTC to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the TRO a breath of
semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20) day period
provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It
is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its
application of a preliminary injunction. The City cannot take advantage of this omission by the RTC.

DECISION GRANTING FINAL INJUNCTION IS PREMATURE

Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary injunction, BCDW is correct in contending that the assailed
Decision is premature.

The records reveal that the RTC did not resolve BCWD’s MR of the Order denying its Motion to Dismiss before it
issued the assailed Decision. Consequently, there was no answer filed by BCWD, no joinder of issues, no
mandatory pretrial conference, and no trial on the merits, yet, a Decision was handed down by the RTC.

b.5 Calawag v. University of the Philippines-Visayas, 703 SCRA 373 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Calawag et al were enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries in UP Visayas. After they enrolled in their thesis
program, the drafted their thesis titles and obtained the consent of a certain professor to be their thesis adviser and other
faculty members’ consent to constitute their respective thesis committees.This was sent to Dean Baylon for approval.
However, the Dean disapproved the composition of the thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics because they
were not appropriate for their Master’s Degrees.

Aggrieved, Calawag et al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in the RTC asking the Dean to approve and
constitute the said thesis committees and approve their titles. Likewise, they asked for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against the Dean to order him to perform such acts while the case was pending.
RTC granted the Writ which the Dean refused to follow. Thereafter, UP assailed the said order by filing a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA with a Prayer for TRO. CA issued the TRO against the implementation of the RTC’s order
stating that Calawag et al had no clear right to compel the Dean. Hence, this petition stating that the CA’s decision should
be set aside.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE RTC’S PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST
UP’S DEAN.

HELD: NO. CA WAS CORRECT. THERE WAS NO CLEAR RIGHT TO COMPEL THE DEAN TO APPROVE THE THESIS TITLES AND
THE COMMITTEES.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction , the petitioners must establish the following requisites:

(a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
(b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Since a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the
status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a FOURTH REQUIREMENT: it is justified only in a clear case, free from
doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

The CA did not err in ruling that the Calawag et al failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the
protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CA’s conclusion that the Dean has the discretion
to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee , and, hence, the Calawag et al had no right for an
automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees .

Under the UP System’s faculty manual, the Dean has complete discretion in approving or disapproving the
composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and
the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CA’s interpretation that the thesis
committee’s composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided.

C. RECEIVERSHIP (RULE 59)

c.1 Citibank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999
QUICKIE FACTS:
Douglas Anama executed PNs in favor of Citibank after it obtained a loan from the latter. Said loan was secured by a
Chattel Mortgage over machineries and equipment of Anama. For failing to pay the installments, Citibank filed a
Complaint for Collection of his unpaid balance and delivery of the chattels before the CFI of Manila. Later on, the CFI
issued an Order of Replevin over the chattels covered. Despite said order, actual delivery of possession did not take place
in light of negotiations for amicable settlement.

After pre-trial conference was held, the CFI ordered the joint management by Citibank and Anama of the latter’s business
for 10 days. After which, Citibank would be appointed Receiver for said business. Thereafter, Citibank took over as
Receiver. When the amicable settlement failed, CFI tried the case on the merits.

On motion of Citibank, the CFI issued an Alias Writ of Seizure of the chattels and the sheriff removed and delivered them
to Citibank’s possession. They were likewise advertised for public auction. Anama’s MR was denied. Thus, he filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA granted the petition and ruled that the CFI gravely abused its discretion because,
among others, there was non-compliance with the Receiver’s Bond and Oath of Office. As a result, Citibank filed this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CITIBANK COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF POSTING A RECEIVER’S BOND AND OATH.
HELD: NO. RULES ON RECEIVERSHIP WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH. PARTICULARLY, THE OATH.
Citibank contends that although it is in agreement with the CA that a receiver’s bond is separate and distinct from a
replevin bond, under the circumstances it was not required to file a receiver’s bond because it did not assume
receivership over the properties. It is further argued that assuming that it did assume receivership, the Chattel Mortgage
expressly provides, that:

In case the MORTGAGEE institutes proceedings, judicially or otherwise, for the foreclosure of this
Chattel Mortgage, or to enforce any of its rights hereunder, the MORTGAGEE shall be entitled as a
matter of right to the appointment of a receiver, without bond, of the mortgaged properties and of
such other properties, real or personal, claims and rights of the MORTGAGOR as shall be necessary or
proper to enable the said receiver to properly control and dispose of the mortgaged properties.

From the evidence on record, it is palpably clear that Citibank did, in fact, assume receivership. Citibank cannot
therefore deny that 9 days after the CFI issued the order of receivership, it informed Anama that it would, as it did, assume
receivership.

BOND NOT REQUIRED UNDER THE OLD RULES OF COURT

It should be noted that under the old Rules of Court which was in effect at the time this case was still at trial stage, a
bond for the appointment of a receiver was not generally required of the applicant, except when the application was
made ex parte. Therefore, Citibank was not absolutely required to file a bond . Besides, as stipulated in the chattel
mortgage contract between the parties, Citibank, as the mortgagee, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver
without a bond.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OATH

However, the CA was right in finding a defect in such assumption of receivership in that the requirement of taking an
oath has not been complied with. Section 5, Rule 59, states:

SEC. 5. Oath and bond of receiver. — Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to
perform them faithfully, and must file a bond, executed to such person and in such sum as the court or
judge may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action and obey
the orders of the court therein.

Consequently, the CFI erred in allowing the Citibank to assume receivership over the machine shop of Anama
without requiring the appointed receiver to take an oath.

c.2 Republic v. Saludares, G.R. No. 111174, March 9, 2000

QUICKIE FACTS:
PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration against Lianga Bay Logging Company (LBLC) on the ground that the shares stock
in LBLC owned by one Sabido was illegally acquired wealth. Thereafter, the Republic via PCGG filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution, and Damages against Sabido before the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration which the SB granted. PCGG filed an MR.

Meanwhile, Hung Ming Kuk filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against LBLC with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment
in the RTC but PCGG was not impleaded. Thus, PCGG filed a Petition for Certiorari in the SC.

Later on, SB denied PCGG’s MR. Also, RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment in favor of Kuk. For failure to
file an Answer, the RTC rendered a judgment by default in favor of Kuk. As such, Republic filed this Petition for
Certiorari questioning whether the RTC can decide on Kuk’s claim considering that LBLC’s properties were already
sequestered.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC PROPERLY GRANTED THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IN FAVOR OF KUK.
HELD: NO. LBLC PROPERTIES WERE ALREADY UNDER VALID SEQUESTRATION WHEN THE ATTACHMENT WAS ISSUED
In BASECO vs. PCGG, SEQUESTRATION is defined as the process, which may be employed as a conservatory writ
whenever the right of the property is involved, to preserve, pending litigation, specific property subject to conflicting
claims of ownership or liens and privileges.

The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and sequestration, freeze
order and provisional takeover on the other. The latter are ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth
of the previous Marcos regime. The Court observed that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to
the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership .

By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or
otherwise, pending the action. When a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein
belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution . This well-
settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.

Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The attaching
creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res
when the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing
and results in its virtual condemnation to pay for the owner’s debt. The law does not provide the length of time during
which an attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the judgment, and it must therefore continue until the
debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued in the judgment , or until the judgment is satisfied , or the
statement discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.

In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under Custodio legis by virtue of a valid writ of
sequestration issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in
favor of Hung Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting . Said
writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga , because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal
body. The PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final
determination of the case or until its dissolution.

c.3 Tantano v. Espino-Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Tantano et al are children of Caboverde. Caboverde’s children are registered owners of certain parcels of land in
Zamboanga del Norte after they purchased the same from their parents. Later on, some of the siblings filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Deed of Sale in the RTC against the other siblings, Tantano et al. In their Answer, Tantano et al argued
for the validty of the sale.

Fearing that the properties would be squandered, Caboverde filed in the RTC a Petition/Application to place the parcels of
land under Receivership. She claimed that she could not enjoy the property since the income derived was solely
appropriated by her children and that she needs share in the income for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. After
hearing on the Application, the RTC granted it but did not appoint one of the children to be receiver since she was party to
the other case. Thus, Caboverde nominated her husband’s relative and one of the children nominated a former barangay
kagawad.

Aggrieved, Tantano filed an MR questioning the grant of the application. However, the RTC denied the MR. Thereafter,
both nominees took their oaths and posted the approve bond of 100K each. Thus, Tantano filed a Petition for Certiorari in
the CA contending that substantial requirements under the Rules on Receivership were not complied with such as the bond
requirement and lack of factual and legal basis. However, CA denied the petition. MR was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED THE APPLICATION FOR RECEIVERSHIP.
HELD: NO.
We have repeatedly held that receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in
extreme situations. The doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive:

The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only
under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent
danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted .
The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be
exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts
demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as
much consideration from the court as those of the complainant.

To recall, the RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that receivership was the most
convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer the disputed properties. As a corollary, the RTC, agreeing with
Caboverde, held that placing the disputed properties under receivership would ensure that she would receive her share in
the income which she supposedly needed in order to pay for her vitamins, medicines, her regular checkups and daily
sustenance. Considering that, as the CA put it, the applicant was already an octogenarian who may not live up to the
day when the conflict will be finally settled, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the application for receivership since it was justified under Sec. 1(d), Rule
59 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. Appointment of a receiver. — Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the
property subject of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court where the action is pending, or
by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the following cases:

(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient
and feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation.

Indeed, Sec. 1(d) above is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing instances not covered by the other
grounds enumerated under the said section. However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this
section, courts must remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of
being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must
be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and
immediate loss or damage.

Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider:

(1) whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury
ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and
(2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration
from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.

Moreover, this Court has consistently ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take real estate
out of the possession of the defendant before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appointment
should be made only in extreme cases.

After carefully considering the foregoing principles and the facts and circumstances of this case, We find that the grant of
Caboverde’s Application for Receivership has no leg to stand on for reasons discussed below.

First, Caboverde’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for
the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only
unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1
of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership . The RTC’s insistence that the
approval of the
receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be
clear, even in cases falling under such provision , it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent
danger that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.

Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and
that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of
them. Caboverde has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of
being wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means
to preserve their integrity.

Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Caboverde from grave and
immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions, Caboverde is assured of receiving income under
the PSA approved by the RTC providing that she was entitled to receive a share of 1/2 of the net income derived
from the uncontroverted properties.

Finally, it must be noted that the defendants in Civil Case No. S760 are the registered owners of the disputed
properties that were in their possession. In cases such as this, it is settled jurisprudence that the appointment should
be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage.

A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in litigation , just as a writ
of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another
where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear
case of evident usurpation.

Furthermore, this Court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper when the rights of the parties,
one of whom is in possession of the property, depend on the determination of their respective claims to the title of
such property unless such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost , as by the prospective foreclosure
of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title.

In any event, Dominalda’s rights may be amply protected during the pendency of Civil Case No. S760 by causing her
adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title covering the disputed properties.

FILING OF APPLICANT’S BOND IS MANDATORY; RECEIVER’S BOND IS DISCRETIONARY

As regards the issue of whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that a bond was not required prior to the appointment
of the receivers in this case, We rule in the negative.

Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the
applicant to file abond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word “shall”
denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no
moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a
receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court . Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its
discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.

D. REPLEVIN (RULE 60)

d.1 Twin Ace Holding v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006.
QUICKIE FACTS:
Twin Ace manufactures liquors and uses new bottles for the purpose. It filed in the RTC of Manila a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession of Personal Property against Rufina because the latter allegedly used Twin Ace’s bottles for its
manufacture of patis without authority from Twin Ace. After Twin Ace posted a bond, RTC granted the application for
the Issuance of Writ of Replevin. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff was able to seize around 26K empty bottles from Rufina.
In its Answer with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina claims that it was the owner thereof because it purchased said
bottles from junk dealers. As such, RTC ruled in favor of Rufina and dismissed the complaint and dissolved the writ. On
appeal by Twin Ace, CA affirmed with modification. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DISSOLVED THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN.

HELD: YES.
Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying for the recovery of possession of
personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts that
he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof.

It must be borne in mind that REPLEVIN is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession
that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be
replevined. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued.

In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and consequently
there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation.

d.2 Superlines Transportation v. PNCC, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007
QUICKIE FACTS:
One of Superlines’ buses swerved and crashed into the radio room of PNCC. The incident was initially investigated by
PNCC’s toll way patrol. Subsequently, the investigation was turned over to Alabang Traffic Bureau. However, due to lack
of space, upon request of traffic investigator Lopera, the bus was towed by the PNCC to its compound.

Thereafter, Superlines requested for PNCC to release the bus but it was denied in spite of PNCC’s undertaking to repair
the damaged radio room. Consequently, Superlines filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Property (Replevin) with
Damages against PNCC in the RTC. Superlines opted to forego with the Writ of Replevin and just waited for the RTC’s
decision because it could not post a bond.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, PNCC claimed that they could not release the bus because they merely towned the same
for safekeeping pursuant to an order by the police. As a result, RTC dismissed the Complaint and awarded to PNCC their
Counterclaim. On appeal, the ruling was essentially affirmed and the CA stated that Superlines should have brought the
case against the police. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SUPERLINES IS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY .

HELD: YES. THE SEIZURE BY PNCC PURSUANT TO POLICE ORDERS WAS UNLAWFUL.
Tillson v. Court of Appeals discusses the term replevin as follows:

The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a person of goods or
chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or the common law action
in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin”; and to
replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels
under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as “a form of action which lies to
regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully , (or
as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein
described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to
prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail to do; the same authority states that the term, “to
replevy” means “to redeliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his
giving pledges in an action of replevin.” The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for
the recovery of personality, or the provisional
 remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the
plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.”

In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the
possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that Superlines’ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC,
consideration of whether PNCC have been wrongfully detaining it is in order. Following the conduct of an investigation
of the accident, the bus was towed by PNCC on the request of Lopera, the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession
thereof, wrongfully detains the same.

It was thus NOT distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of
execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.

The seizure and impounding of Superlines’ bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of “the right to be
let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. As explained in
Bagalihog v. Fernandez:

It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone
in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, “A thing is in custodia legis when it is
shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal writ .” Only when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.”

d.3 Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M.-RTJ No. 06-2017, June 19, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
PNP Regional Maritime Group headed by Gen. Dagudag and the DENR intercepted and inspected shipping container
vans owned by NMC Container Lines containing illegal forest products from CDO to Cebu. The shipments were falsely
declared as cassava meal and corn grains. The crew of the vessel failed to produce certificates and documents covering
said forest products as required by the DENR. Thus, since nobody claimed said products within a reasonable period, they
are considered abandoned. DENR thus issued a seizure receipt to NMC. Then, it was recommended that the products be
confiscated in favor of the government.

Thereafter, one Roger Edma filed before the RTC under Judge Paderanga a Complaint for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin
praying that DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag to deliver the forest products to him. As a result, the judge issued a Writ
of Replevin and ordered the sheriff to take possession of the products.

Aggrieved, Dagudag et al filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Replevin and prayed that said Writ be set aside and
dismissed. Nonetheless, the judge denied said motion.

As a result, Dagudag filed an Administrative complaint in the OCA charging the judge with gross ignorance of the law
because Edma cannot avail of the remedy of replevin from the RTC without first exhausting administrative remedies
available to him. Dagudag claimed that the judge should have dismissed the replevin suit. OCA recommended that the
judge be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGE IS LIABLE FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN EVEN THOUGH ADMINSTRATIVE
REMEDIES WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY EXHAUSTED .

HELD: YES. LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal
documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products. Judge
Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.

First, under the DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies . In Dy v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of,
any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.

Second, under the DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry
laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest
products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have
alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products , that administrative proceedings may
have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright.

Third, the forest products are ALREADY IN CUSTODIA LEGIS and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in
our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to
an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise.

Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross
ignorance of the law.

E. SUPPORT PENDETE LITE (RULE 61)

e.1 Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Belen Mangonon filed a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with Application for Support Pendente Lite
on behalf of her twin daughters Rina and Rica. It was alleged that her daughters were born out of her marriage with one
Federico Delgado. However, the marriage was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, she was married again and claimed that
her daughters were raised by her and her second husband.

Mangonon filed the case because their daughters were about to enter colleges in the States. Despite their admissions to
respective universities, they were financially incapable of pursuing for said education. Demands were likewise made upon
the grandfather, Francisco Delgado. Mangonon prayed that they should be ordered to provide general and educational
support in the amount of $50,000 per year.

After Francisco and Federico filed their Answers, Mangonon filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support
Pendente Lite for Hearing. Over the opposition of the Deglados, the RTC ordered that a monthly support of P5K for each
child be provided.

Unsatisfied with the measly amount, Mangonon filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. MR
was denied. Hence, this petition. Mangonon contends that in default of the parents (Federico), the grandfather (Francisco)
is obliged to give support.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DAUGHTERS ARE ENTITLED SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE.
HELD: YES.
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent
portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:

SECTION 1. Application. — At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time
prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any
party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.

SEC. 4. Order. — The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such
orders as justice and equity may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such
other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as
should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the
adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied,
the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.

Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or
final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it
can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits
or other documentary evidence appearing in the record .

After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that Mangonon was able to
establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to the Delgados and the twins’ entitlement to
support pendente lite.

GRANDFATHER IS OBLIGED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT

Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the RTC’s grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next
question is who should be made liable for said award. The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the
claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.

In this case, both the RTC and the CA held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the
total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. We
are, however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by the RTC and the CA.

The RTC gave full credence to Federico’s allegation in his Answer and his testimony as to the amount of his income. We
have, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to support his assertions
regarding his employment and his earning. Notably, he was even required by Mangonon’s counsel to present to the
court his income tax return and yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of said document. This, to our mind,
severely undermines the
truthfulness of Federico’s assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide support to Rica and
Rina. In addition, Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as far as he knew, his son, Federico did not own
anything.

Francisco’s assertion that Mangonon had the means to support her daughters’ education is belied by the fact that
Mangonon was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. If
she were really making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. The fact
that she was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to
send her daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the circumstances
they found themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.

There being prima facie evidence showing that Mangonon and Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, they are
primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco.

It bears stressing that Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages 12 gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in
shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation
which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here
and abroad. It having been established that Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’
education, he, in lieu of Mangonon and Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.

MANNER OF PROVIDING SUPPORT

Anent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support Rica and Rina, Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that
offered in the USA. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides:

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.

The OBLIGOR is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support . Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second
option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances , legal or moral, which should be considered.

In this case, this Court believes that Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between Francisco, on one hand, and Mangonon
and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs presented by Mangonon
as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things of
the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships
among the parties had certainly been affected . Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those
who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these,
we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned
them.

AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the
amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient .
Guided by this principle, we hold Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and
Rina as
support pendente lite. As established by Mangonon, Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his
various business endeavors.

The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on Mangonon and her twin daughters raised by Francisco is
best left for the resolution of the RTC. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to
support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from
the dates of actual payment.

XXX. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. INTERPLEADER (RULE 62)

a.1 Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

FACTS:
Ocampo owns a 500 sqm parcel of land in Pasay City. He bought such property from Rosauro Breton, heir of the land’s
registered owner. Even though the TCT is not yet in Ocampo’s name, the possession and administration of said property
was already with Ocampo.

On the other hand, Tirona is a lessee occupying a portion of said land. When Ocampo bought the property, he wrote a
letter to Tirona informing her of the change of ownership. Thus, in recognition of Ocampo’s ownership, Tirona paid the
monthly rentals due. Later on, however, Ocampo received a letter from Tirona’s letter which states that Tirona will
temporarily stop paying monthly rentals pursuant to a P.D. which declared the property in question an “area for priority
development.”

Consequently, Ocampo wrote a demand letter to Tirona to pay the rentals in arrears (1,200/mo) and to vacate the
premises. Nonetheless, Tirona refuses to heed Ocampo’s demands.

Thus, Ocampo filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Tirona before the MTC. In her Answer, Tirona asserted
that one Dona Lourdes Yaneza actually owns the land. Then, she was allowed to amend her answer because she filed her
first Answer without the assistance of counsel.. In her Amended Answer, she claimed that the actual owner was a certain
Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. MTC ruled that Tirona has no reason to stop paying rent. As such, she was ordered to
vacate. In the RTC, the MTC ruling was affirmed. In the CA, however, Ocampo’s complaint was dismissed because,
according to the CA, the property in question should have been partitioned first. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT OCAMPO CAN EJECT TIRONA?

HELD: YES. ALL THE REQUISITES OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT. SHE SHOULD HAVE FORCED THE CLAIMANTS TO
INTERPLEAD.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to
prosper are present (i.e. fact of lease; expiration or violation of the lease). Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the
subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to
Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

INTERPLEADER
The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder,
Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader .

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether
personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or
claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that
the persons
who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation , be
required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability . When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in
reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is
called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

a.2 Maglente v. Padilla, G.R. No. 148182, March 7, 2007

QUICKIE FACTS:
Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owns a parcel of land in Intramuros. It entered into a Lease Contract with Maglente which
provided that Maglente had the Right of First Refusal in case PRC would sell the property. During the lease, Maglente
subleased the property to Gabello et al. When the lease was about to expire, PRC offered to sell the property to Maglente.
The latter expressed its desire to purchase the same.

Thereafter, PRC filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the RTC against Maglente and Gabello et al so they could litigate
among themselves who had the right to purchase said property. RTC ruled in favor of Maglente. Aggrieved, Gabello et al
reached the SC. However, it was affirmed that Maglente had the right to purchase. Thus, judgment was entered.
Subsequently, a Writ of Execution was issued for PRC to execute a Contract of Sale in favor of Maglente. PRC complied.

Afterwards, Maglente filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. However, Gabello et al, who were in
possession of said property, objected on the ground that the decision on the Interpleader case only resolved Maglente’s
right to purchase but did not declare them as owners. Thus, the RTC denied the Motion of Maglente. Aggrieved, they filed
this Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MAGLENTE IS ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AFTER BEING ADJUDGED AS THE PROPER
PARTIES TO BUY THE PROPERTY IN THE INTERPLEADER CASE

HELD: NO. THE INTERPLEADER CASE DID NOT RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, Maglente seeks the writ as a consequence
of the RTC’s decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie
in such a case.

Furthermore, the RTC’s decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the
question of who had the right to purchase PRC’s property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary
contract in favor of Maglente as the winning parties , nothing else.

It was clear that, at that point, Maglente were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the “deed of sale”
in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. Likewise, although we stated in
G.R. No. 111743 that the contract of sale between Maglente and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained from
declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet
to transfer to them at that time.

Thus, Maglente’s argument that the RTC’s writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a
writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of
possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case
obviously did not delve into that issue .
 a.3 Arreza v. Diaz, G. R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bliss Development Corporation owns a housing unit in QC. In the course of a case involving Arreza and Diaz in the RTC
of Makati, Bliss filed a Complaint for Interpleader against the two. RTC ruled in favor of Arreza and ordered the transfer
of rights in favor of Arreza. Said decision became final and was executed when Bliss executed a Contract to Sell in favor
of Arreza. Also, Diaz was made to deliver the property with all its improvements to Arreza.

Subsequently, Diaz filed a Complaint against Bliss and Arreza in the RTC of Makati seeking reimbursement of the costs
of acquisition and improvements on the property. In response, Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. However, this was denied. Arreza’s MR was likewise denied. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA
but it was dismissed. MR was also dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DIAZ’S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA

HELD: YES. HE SHOULD HAVE PUT IT IN ISSUE IN THE INTERPLEADER CASE.

Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader filed with Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case
No. 942086, was settled with finality with this Court’s resolution in G.R. No. 128726. The judgment therein is now
final.

In its assailed decision, CA pointed out that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a case for interpleader, the
court shall determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims.
The CA noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader case, namely Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the
issue of damages and reimbursement although the answer of Diaz did pray for affirmative relief arising out of the
rights of a buyer in good faith.

Diaz in effect argues that it was incumbent upon Arreza as a party in Civil Case No. 942086 to put in issue Diaz’s
demands for reimbursement. However, it was not Arreza’s duty to do the lawyering for Diaz. As stated by the CA,
the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate, their
respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in
assertion of his rights.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
interpleader action may file counterclaims, crossclaims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto,
“as provided by these Rules.” The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional
pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its
incidents.

Pursuant to said Rules, Diaz should have filed his claims against Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted
his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer , and praying relief therefor, Diaz should have crystallized his
demand into specific claims for reimbursement by Arreza. This he failed to do.

Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement , said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim is now barred.

B. DECLARATORY RELIEF (RULE 63)

b.1 Almeda v. Bathala Marketing, G.R. No. 150608, January 28, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
Almeda leased its property to Bathala Marketing Industries Inc for 4 years. One of the provisions of the lease contract
stated that if a new tax is imposed, Bathala will pay additional rent. In another provision, it was also stated that the rent
would likewise be adjusted in cases of extraordinary inflation.
Thereafter, Almeda demanded that Bathala pay VAT and pay the adjusted rentals pursuant to the provisions of its lease
contract. However, Bathala refused to pay. To prevent further damage and prejudice, Bathala instituted an Action for
Declaratory Relief to determine the correct interpretation of said provisions. Then, Almeda commenced in another court a
separate Action for Rescission, Ejectment, and Damages.

Thereafter, Almeda moved to dismiss on the ground that Bathala was already in breach of its obligation. However, the
RTC denied the motion. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER.

HELD: YES.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The vv in such a petition
is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such
an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

Decisional law enumerates the REQUISITES of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:

1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests
are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that Almeda insist that Bathala was
already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree.

After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, Bathala complied with the terms
and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Bathala religiously
fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that Bathala
committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, Bathala is not barred from
instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory relief
should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the
same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court
before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for
declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer.

Conversely, in the case at bench, the RTC had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the RTC, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the
suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action
instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The
resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties’ dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of
the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
 b.2 Malana v. Tapa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Malana filed in the RTC of Tuguegarao a Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against Tappa.
They claimed that they were compelled to file in the RTC to remove the cloud from their title over the property in
question. However, before they could file an Answer, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after it was
found that the property had a value less than P20,000 and thus was properly within the MTC’s jurisdiction.

In Malana’s MR, it averred that the principal cause of action was Quieting of Title. Thus, the Complaint should not have
been dismissed because under Rule 63 Section 1, an action to quiet title fell under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Nonetheless, RTC denied the MR. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED MALANA’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

HELD: NO. SECOND PARAGRAPH OF RULE 63 SEC 1 SHOULD BE READ WITH THE LAWS OF JURISDICTION (BP 129)
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a
distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court .

The FIRST PARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a
person may file a petition for declaratory relief. A petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its SECOND PARAGRAPH that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds
therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, MAY be brought under this
Rule.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to:

(1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code;
(2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and
(3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.

These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the
legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 ,
as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word “may” — that an action for quieting of title “may be
brought under [the] Rule” on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief
“may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court.” The use of the word “may” in a statute denotes that
the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word “SHALL”
and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00.

CONTRACT WAS ALREADY BREACHED

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before
the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.

A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at
rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the
courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an
action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

In the present case, Malana’s Complaint for quieting of title was filed after Malana already demanded and Tappa
refused to vacate the subject property . In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of
ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to Malana’s title.

Since Malana averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed 1 year after the occurrence of the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object
one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

Malana’s Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would
depend on the value of the property involved.

b.3 Sabistana v. Muertegui, 703 SCRA 145 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale over an unregistered land in Leyte in favor of Muertegui. The latter took
actual possession of said lot. Years later, Garcia again sold the lot to Atty. Sabitsana, Muertegui’s family lawyer through a
notarized Deed of Sale which was registered in the ROD. Title was thereafter issued in Sabitsana’s name.

Years later, Sabitsana wrote a letter to the DENR and claimed that he was the true owner of said property. As a
consequence, Muertegui filed an Action for Quieting of Title and Preliminary Injunction in the RTC against Sabitsana
and claimed that they bought the lots in bad faith.

In their Answer, Sabitsana contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved title to or interest
in a parcel of land with an assessed value of merely P1,230. Nevertheless, RTC ruled in favor of Muertegui. After
Sabitsana’s MR was denied, he appealed. However, CA denied the appeal. Hence, this petition.

Sabitsana contends that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE EVEN IF THE AMOUNT
OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IS ONLY P1,230.

HELD: YES. (THIS IS IN STARK CONTRAST WITH THE RULING IN MALANA V. TAPA)
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC .

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by Sabitsana’s August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to
Muertegi’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title,
Muertegi filed Civil Case No. B1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for
declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

b.4 Republic v. Roque, 706 SCRA 273 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Atty. Harry Roque et al filed a Petiton for Declaratory Relief in the RTC assailing the constitutionality of several
provisions of the Human Security Act. The proceedings were suspended on account of several petitions filed in the SC
which likewise assailed the constitutionality of the HSA. Then, in 2010, SC upheld the constitutionality of the law in the
Southern Hemishphere case.

In 2012, the Republic filed their Motion to Dismiss stating that Roque failed to satisfy the requisites for Declaratory
Relief and that the HSA was already upheld as valid in Southern Hemisphere. However, the Motion to Dismiss was
denied by the RTC which stated that the action was properly filed. MR was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

HELD: YES. NOT ALL REQUISITES OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WERE PRESENT.

The Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found
that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases , it, however,
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that Roque’s petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.

Case law states that the following are the REQUISITES FOR AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF:

(1) first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
(2) second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
(3) third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
(4) fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;
(5) fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
(6) sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the 4th, 5th, and 6th
requirements, however, remain
wanting. NO ACTUAL JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one
exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory . Corollary thereto, by “ripening seeds” it is meant,
not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The
concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled
and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of Roque’s petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left
to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed
provisions of RA 9372.

It is well to note that Roque also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the abovestated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest
in the case.

NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is
ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, remain highly speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled
that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.

NO NEED TO CONSIDER RELIEFS SINCE NO THREAT OR INJURY EXISTS IN THE FIRST PLACE
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the Roque exists in the first place .

C. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF COA OR COMELEC (RULE 64)

D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65)

D.1 CERTIORARI

Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
Carmel Development filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against the DECS and Caloocan School Board to
recover possession of a parcel of land occupied by Pangarap Elementary and High School which were established by
DECS. For failure to file an Answer, RTC ruled that DECS was in default and allowed Carmel to present evidence ex
parte.

Upon DECS’ motion, the RTC lifted the default order. However, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss the case. Thus,
DECS filed an MR which the RTC likewise denied. Aggrieved, DECS filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA seeking to
annul the RTC’s previous ordrs. Nevertheless, CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that the petition was not
accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed orders of the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 but only by duplicate originals.
MR was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

DECS contends that either duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed orders is allowed under Rule 46. On
the other hand, Carmel insists that Rule 65 is the rule that governs.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

HELD: NO.
This issue has been settled in Rosa Yap Paras and Valente Dy Yap vs. Judge Ismael O. Baldado and Justo De Jesus Paras
wherein it was
held that:

The filing of original actions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by Section 3, Rule 46
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition for certiorari “be accompanied by
a clearly legible duplicate original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or
ruling subject thereof x x x.” The same Section provides that “the failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules which read in pertinent parts:

SECTION 1. Title of cases. — In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party instituting
the action shall be called the petitioner and the opposing party the respondent.

SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. — This Rule shall apply to original actions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto.

Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be governed by Rule 47, for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo warranto by Rule 66.

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. — x x x.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent
with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and
other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.

Rule 46 applies to original actions for certiorari because Section 2 thereof expressly states that “[t]his Rule shall apply to
original actions for certiorari, x x x.” That Rule 46 applies to actions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals can
hardly be disputed.

Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its provisions useless. This is evident in
Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides that “[i]n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
the provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed.”

In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but Rule 65 generally
serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 coexist with each other and should be construed so as to give effect
to every provision of both rules.

Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the Department of
Education on the ground that it was accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the
assailed orders.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 396 defines DUPLICATE ORIGINALS in this wise:

(1) The “duplicate original copy” shall be understood to be that copy of the decision, judgment,
resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in the
court or adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same.
(2) The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal
thereof or any other official indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy.

Jiao et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 182331, April 18, 2012

QUICKIE FACTS:
Jiao et al were regular employees of Philbank with at least 10 years of service. Said company likewise provided for a
Gratuity Plan for its employees. Thereafter, Philbank merged with Globalbank wherein Philbank was the surviving
corporation. However, the bank operated under the name of Globalbank. Due to the merger, Jiao et al’s positions became
redundant. As such, they availed of the Separation Package and were required to sign a Release and Quitclaim in
consideration of their receipt of their separation pay.
Years later, Metrobank acquired the assets and liabilities of Globalbank. Thereafter, Jiao et al filed Complaints for Non-
payment of Separation Pay before the NLRC. LA dismissed the complaint and absolved Metrobank from liability upon
finding that Jiao et al were already separated from the company even before Metrobank came into the picture. On appeal,
NLRC affirmed. Aggrieved, Jiao et al elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari.

CA dismissed the petition for failure of Jiao et al to file an MR of the NLRC decision before resorting to the Petition for
Certiorari. MR denied. Hence, this petition. Jiao et al contends that they opted not to file an MR because the issues were
already passed upon by the NLRC.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR FAILURE TO FILE AN MR AGAINST
THE NLRC DECISION.

HELD: NO. DISMISSAL WAS PROPER.

To begin with, Jiao et al do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the propriety of complying with procedural
rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in various cases involving the tedious attempts of litigants to relieve
themselves of the consequences of their neglect to follow a simple procedural requirement for perfecting a petition for
certiorari that he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with
the provisions of the law and the Rules.

The Jiao et al may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a MR, they must show a concrete, compelling, and valid
reason for doing so.

As the CA correctly noted, Jiao et al did not bother to explain their omission and only did so in their MR of the
dismissal of their petition. Aside from the fact that such belated effort will not resurrect their application for a writ of
certiorari, the reason proffered by them does not fall under any of the recognized instances when the filing of a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be
condoned in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every claim of
injustice and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and claiming to be victims of a wrong.

PNB v. Arcobillas, 703 SCRA 226 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Arcobillas, working as teller at PNB, erroneously posted $5,517 in one of its clients accounts which should have only been
$138. Said amount was later withdrawn by the client to the damage of PNB in the amount of P214,641. After discovery,
Arcobillas was administratively charged with neglect of duty.

In her affidavit, Arcobillas admitted and apologized for her mistake and stated that she did not benefit from the
misposting. Later, PNB found Arcobillas guilty of gross neglect and imposed on her a penalty of forced resignation with
benefits. After her plea for reconsideration was denied, Arcobillas filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against PNB in
the NLRC.

LA ordered Arcobillas’ reinstatement. On appeal, NLRC affimed the LA but held her to be equally liable for the losses
suffered. Still aggrieved, PNB, without filing an MR of the NLRC decision, filed a Motion to Extend Time to Flle a
Petition for Certiorari. Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA. Despite the non-filing of an MR, CA took
cognizance of the petiion but nonetheless dismissed it. Thus, PNB filed an MR which was denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PNB’S FAILURE TO FILE AN MR BEFORE IT FILED ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS A FATAL
INFIRMITY.

HELD: YES. MR SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED BEFORE RESORTING TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
It is a well-established rule that “a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved
party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the
NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to courts of justice
can be had.
Of course, the RULE IS NOT ABSOLUTE and jurisprudence has laid down EXCEPTIONS when the filing of a [P]etition for
[C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration,” such as:

(1) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(4) where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless;
(5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial
court is improbable;
(7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(8) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of the above mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any
plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior MR before the NLRC.

Despite this, the CA still took cognizance of PNB’s Petition for Certiorari and ignored this significant flaw. It bears to
stress that the filing of a MR is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory
requirement which must be strictly complied with. Thus, PNB’s “failure to file a [M]otion for [R]econsideration with
the NLRC before availing [itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity.”

In view thereof, the CA erred in entertaining the Petition for Certiorari filed before it. It follows, therefore, that the
proceedings before it and its assailed Decision are considered null and void. Hence, the final and executory Decision
of the NLRC dated August 31, 2004 stands.

D.2 PROHIBITION

City Government of Quezon City v. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
Initially, Bayantel, a franchise holder allowed to operate telecoms business, enjoyed tax exemption as regards real
property and franchise tax. When the LGC was passed, said exemptions were withdrawn. Thereafter, Bayantel’s
legislative franchise was likewise amended in accordance with the LGC. Likewise, the QC government also enacted an
Ordinance imposing real property tax on telecoms which included Bayantel who had properties in QC. Subsequently, the
Public Telecoms Policy Act was passed which stated that any advantage, privilege, or exemption granted shall be
accorded to grantees of such franchises.

Pursuant thereto, Bayantel wrote the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties from property tax. After
being denied, Bayantel appealed to the LBAA. Insisting on its exemption, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes
assessed against it by QC. As such, the QC Treasurer sent out Notices of Delinquency with Warrants of Levy against its
properties for sale at public auction.

Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel withdrew its appeal in the LBAA and instead filed in the
RTC of QC a Petition for Prohibition with TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction. RTC ruled that Bayantel was exempt. QC
filed an MR but was denied. Thus, QC filed a Petition to the SC on pure questions of law contending that the RTC should
have denied the Petition for Prohibition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BAYANTEL IS REQUIRED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL
RELIEF.
HELD: NO. THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. With the reality that
Bayantel’s real properties were already levied upon on account of its non-payment of real estate taxes thereon, the
Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of
the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on
July 30, 2002.

Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies rule is when, as here, only
legal issues are to be resolved . In fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due
course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe:

Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action
can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve
questions of fact but only of law.

Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment under protest of the
amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been
difficult to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and,
instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. Q0247292. The
remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld.

LTFRB v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., 706 SCRA 675 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
LTFRB sought to implement a law which required PUV operators to obtain accident insurance policies. For this purpose,
the LTFRB created the Passenger Personal Accident Insurance Program. In this program, LTFRB will accredit 2 groups
of insurance providers selected through public bidding to provide insurance policies to PUV operators. UNITRANS and
Stronghold were chosen as insurance providers under a 5-year contract.

Shortly before the expiration of the agreement, Stronghold participated again in the biddings. To be qualified, an
insurance provider should go through 3 levels of biddings to be qualified. Unfortunately, Stronghold did not qualify in the
3 rd bidding. As a result, Stronghold was excluded by LTFRB from the pool of qualified bidders.

Before LTFRB could choose the winning bids, Stronghold sought a Writ of Prohibition from the CA to enjoin LTFRB
from opening bid documents and to nullify the bid proceedings. Despite this, CA merely required LTFRB to comment.
Thus, LTFRB was allowed to declare the winners and sign contacts with the 2 new insurers. Thereafter, LTFRB moved to
dismiss Stronghold’s petition. It contended that it was properly exercising its regulatory powers.

Eventually, CA ruled in favor of Stronghold and nullified the 3 rd round of bidding. Likewise, it enjoined LTFRB from
enforcing the agreement until Stronghold shall have been given the right to match the best bidder. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND THUS ANNULLING LTFRB’S BIDDING
PROCEEDINGS.

HELD: CA SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings “are [conducted] without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” It is the extra-jurisdictional
nature of the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a tribunal or officer from further
acting on the matter before it.

Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the Program or to issue the References for
each round of bidding to set the parameters for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested its case on the
theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB
required in the Third Reference a minimum capital requirement on a “per insurer” basis. Stronghold’s case
therefore, rises or falls on the question whether such act of LTFRB amounts to “grave abuse of discretion.”

The CA answered in the affirmative, holding that “LTFRB had abused its discretion when it unceremoniously released
the 3rd Reference without considering the legal ramifications on the terms of the [First] MOA.”

In the first place, the standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is “grave abuse of
discretion” and not mere “abuse of discretion.” The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs governed
by Rule 65 — certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition — are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere
errors of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of jurisdiction (i.e., lack or
excess of jurisdiction).

By conflating “abuse of discretion” with “grave abuse of discretion,” the CA failed to follow the rigorous standard of
Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional errors .

Further, LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in disqualifying Stronghold from the third
round of bidding. It is not disputed that Stronghold did not meet the minimum capitalization required for a lead
insurer under the Third Reference, leaving LTFRB no choice but to disqualify it. To find fault in its exclusion,
Stronghold charges LTFRB with committing grave abuse of discretion in abandoning the aggregated mode to reckon
compliance with the minimum capitalization requirement under the First and Second References and in adopting the new
nonaggregated, “per insurer” basis under the Third Reference. In short, Stronghold questions the change in the manner by
which the minimum capitalization of lead and member insurers is determined under the Third Reference.

Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP, 703 SCRA 290 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Vivas et al acquired controlling interest in the Rural Bank of Faire and transformed it into EuroCredit Community Bank
Inc. (ECBI). As a matter of course, the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI. It was found that there were many
unsound banking practices. Years later, ECBI refused to go through another general examination. As such, BSP fined the
bank and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of the appropriate legal action.
Thus, OSI filed a Complaint for Estafa through Falsification against ECBI and some of its officers in the DOJ.

Later on the Monetary Board of the BSP released Resolution 276 which placed ECBI under receivership. In assailing said
Resolution, Vivas filed a Petition for Prohibition in the SC and ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the Monetary Board
for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION THE MONETARY BOARD’S RESOLUTION.

HELD: NO. VIVAS AVAILED OF THE WRONG REMEDY. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
The Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653.
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may
not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.

Granting that a Petition for Prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a “writ of prohibition” is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by
law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred . Its office is to restrain subordinate courts,
tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction
in matters of which it has cognizance.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant
to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a
writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy
for acts already accomplished.
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of
ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the
closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished . Apparently, the
remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is
already a fait accompli.

PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN THE CA

Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The Vivas has not
advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a
party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual
issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.

Corales v. Republic, supra

QUICKIE FACTS:
Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr.
Angeles as Municipal Administrator. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved. However, in the last 2
terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles’ unsatisfactory
performance. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.

Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) to Corales and
asking the latter to comment/reply. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal
and the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. MR denied. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. CA granted the petition
in favor of the Republic. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales’ action for Prohibition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF THE SUIT FOR PROHIBITION WAS RIPE.

HELD: NO. IT WAS FILED PREMATURELY.

As can be gleaned from the AOM, Corales was simply required to submit his comment/reply on the observations
stated in the AOM. As so keenly observed by the CA, any mention in the AOM that Corales shall reimburse the
salaries paid to Dr. Angeles in light of the repeated disapproval or rejection by the Sangguniang Bayan of his
appointment as Municipal Administrator was merely an initial opinion , not conclusive, as there was no showing that
Andal had taken any affirmative action thereafter to compel Corales to make the necessary reimbursement. Otherwise
stated, it has not been shown that Andal carried out or enforced what was stated in the AOM.
Corales was given an opportunity to refute the findings and observations in the AOM by requesting him to
comment/reply thereto, but he never did. Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any recommendation to the effect
that Corales would be held personally liable for the amount that would be disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to
conclude that the said AOM is tantamount to a directive requiring Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and
received by Dr. Angeles during the latter’s stint as Municipal Administrator after his appointment thereto was held
invalid for want of conformity from the Sangguniang Bayan.

Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any actual case or controversy to warrant the exercise of its power of
judicial review. A question is considered RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

The action taken by the Corales and Angeles to assail the AOM was, indeed, premature and based entirely on surmises,
conjectures and speculations that Corales would eventually be compelled to reimburse Dr. Angeles’ salaries, should the
audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. Further, as correctly pointed out by the Republic in its
Memorandum, what Corales and Angeles actually assail is Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired
comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition , as such request is neither an
actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be illegal.

Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law .”

From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper . It is the
decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.

Clearly, Corales and Angeles have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to
exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just
begun but they already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.

D.3 MANDAMUS

Raul Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Pursuant to the Initiative and Referendum Act, Lambino gathered signatures for an Initiative Petition to amend the
Constitution and ultimately change the form of government from bicameral to unicameral. When the filed said Petition,
they alleged they were able to gather the requisite signatures and had said signatures verified. They prayed that, after
publication of their Petition, the COMELEC should conduct a plebiscite.

However, COMELEC issued a Resolution denying due course to the Petition because there was no enabling law regarding
Initiative Petitions to amend the Constitution. Thus, Lambino prayed to the SC for the issuance of Writs of Certiorari and
Mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and compel COMELEC to give due course to their Initiative Petition

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANDAMUS WILL LIE TO COMPEL THE COMELEC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INITIATIVE
PETITION.

HELD: NO.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of a public
duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or
duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done . If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor
judgment.

To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing
disquisitions.

Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
A raid was conducted by the police which led to the arrest of gambling syndicates connected to Municipal Mayor
Esquivel. Irked by this, Mayor Esquivel and his brother, as barangay captain, along with several other members of the
police, abducted and maltreated PO2 Eduardo and Catacutan, police officers involved in the raid. Before they released
them, Esquivel made them sign a certification that they were in good condition.

As such, they charged Esquivel for Illegal Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, Maltreatment, Attempted Murder, and Grave
Threats. After investigation, the records were forwarded to the Ombudsman. After preliminary investigation, informations
for Less Serious Physical Injuries and Grave Threats were filed in the Sandiganbayan. Later, they filed an MR regarding
the Ombudsman’s decision to file the informations. However, this MR was denied.

Thus, they filed a Peition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. In their Mandamus petition, they sought to compel
Ombudsman to consider the certification signed by Eduardo and Catacutan that they left the custody of Esquivel in good
condition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MANDAMUS MAY LIE TO COMPEL THE OMBUDSMAN TO EXERCISE A DISCRETIONARY

DUTY. HELD: NO.

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not
a
discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment.

Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the
Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision
has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it,
however erroneous it may be. Moreover, as earlier discussed, Esquivel had another remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.

Dolot v. Paje, 703 SCRA 650 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Dolot et al are residents of Matnog, Sorsogon. The filed a Petition for Continuing Mandamus, Damages, and TEPO with
the RTC of Sorsogon against DENR and the government of Sorsogon and alleged that due to the small scale mining of
various corporations against the mining laws, their area became susceptible to various environmental dangers.

The Petition was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there was no final court order, decree, or
decision that the public officials should act on; that they failed to attach required affidavits; and that they failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Aggrieved, Dolot et al filed this Petition to the SC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR THE RTC TO SUMMARILY DISMISS THE WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS.

HELD: YES. IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay. Now cast in stone
under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil
actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure).

Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance
before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned,
however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion
that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of
seeing to it that justice is served.

On MATTERS OF FORM, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or
omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.

Sufficiency of SUBSTANCE, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for
the issuance of the writ, viz.:

(1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right;
(2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law
as a duty;
(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and
(4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein . The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree
that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or
decree shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment
has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is
only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court
and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the
court docket.

A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
“permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court’s decision.”
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942. Indeed, as pointed out by the
respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. But the petition filed below does not involve a mining
dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small scale mining operation
being conducted.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits .
As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of nonforum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion
of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of
witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must
be attached to the petition/complaint

E. QUO WARRANTO (RULE 66)

1. Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Liban and other members of the QC Red Cross Chapter filed a Petition in the SC denominated as Petition to Declare
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. It alleged that during Gordon’s incumbency as Senator, he was
elected as Chairman of the PNRC. By accepting said chairmanship, pursuant to the Constitution, he is deemed to have
forfeited his seat in the senate.

In his defense, Gordon avers that Liban has no standing to file the action which appears to be a Quo Warranto because
Liban et al do not claim to be entitled to his Senate seat; that it is barred by prescription. Moreover, he contends the PNRC
is not a GOCC and thus does not render applicable the constitutional prohibition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION SHOULD PROSPER.

HELD: NO.
NO STANDING TO FILE QUO WARRANTO PETITION
Liban et al are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, Liban et al filed an action for usurpation of public office against
Gordon, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public
office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting
quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in
dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, Liban et al do not claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of Gordon. Clearly, they have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on
the merits.

2. Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
CBS and PBS are radio networks comprising “Bombo Radyo Philippines.” They are grantees of legislative franchises. In
said franchises, it there was a provision which encouraged the democratization of ownership of public utilities pursuant to
the constitution.
Divinagracia, who claims to each own 12% shares of stock in CBS and PBS, filed 2 complaints in the NTC against both
networks. It alleged that despite the provisions of their legislative franchise which mandated a public offering of at least
30% of its common stocks, the networks failed to make such offerings. Thus, it claimed that they violated their franchise.

NTC consolidated the cases and dismissed both complaints. It stated that the complaints amounted to collateral attacks on
the legislative franchises. As such, NTC was not competent to rule on said issue. After Divinagracia’s MR was denied, he
filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 in the CA. However, CA upheld the NTC and stated that a Petition for Quo
Warranto was the proper remedy to address the issue raised by Divinagracia.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NTC’S POWER TO DECIDE VIOLATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISES CAN BE BROUGHT VIA
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO.

HELD: YES. QUO WARRANTO IS PROPER

There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law. Such
remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of Appeals — the resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66
of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 1 of Rule 66, “an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public
office, position or franchise.” Even while the action is maintained in the name of the Republic, the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case
specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to
show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that “[t]he determination
of the right to the exercise of a franchise , or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by nonuser,
is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs
to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and
not a private injury.”

A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State
because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government . Quo
warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has offended against its
corporate charter or misused its franchise .

To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise.
By law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional
authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional separation of
powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons,
the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the
franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law , and not for an
administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that
availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by
appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing
its own prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the
franchisees’ violation of the franchises extended to them.
F. EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67)

1. Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003

QUICKIE FACTS:
Barangay Masili filed a Complaint for Expropriation against Bardillon in the MTCof Calamba for the purpose of
acquiring parcel of land to erect a multi-purpose hall for the barangay. MTC dismissed the case for failure of the Barangay
and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. MR was likewise denied.

Subsequently, a Second Complaint for Eminent Domain was filed in the RTC of Calamba and sought to expropriate the
same property for the same purpose. In response, Bardillon moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.
However, the judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that there was no res judicata because the MTC which
previously dismissed the case had no jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. Thereafter, the RTC ruled in favor of
the Barangay and issued a Writ of Possession in its favor.

On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this Petition. Bardillon claims that the MTC has jurisdiction of the case because the value
of the land was only P11,448.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE EXPROPRIATION CASE.

HELD: NO. RTC HAD JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNARY ESTIMATION. SINCE MTC HAD NO
JURISDICTION, NO RES JUDICATA.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be filed with the RTC. This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque
v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor:

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is
the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
dutybound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the
propriety of the expropriation.

To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because
the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of eminent domain — a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application
even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES WAS PROPER

The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically
governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units,
expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation
proceedings, the REQUISITES FOR AUTHORIZING IMMEDIATE ENTRY are as follows:

(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15%of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based
on its current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of the Barangay after it had filed the Complaint for
expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.

The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation
proceedings. If Bardillon objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to
the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

2. Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010

QUICKIE FACTS:
Iron and Steel Authority (now National Steel Corporation) was created in 1973 pursuant to PD 2729. Its existence was
only until 1988. In 1983, ISA filed a Complaint for Expropriation against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC) and its
mortgagee, PNB in the RTC presided by Judge Mangotara.

During the pendency of the case, ISA’s statutory existence expired. Thus, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss for ISA’s lack
of capacity to sue. RTC granted the Motion. CA likewise affirmed the dismissal. On appeal to the SC, the SC remanded
the case to the RTC so the Republic could be substituted in place of ISA. This became final and executory. However, no
motion for execution was filed.

In the 1997 Cacho case, part of the land in question was adjudged in favor of Cacho and the decision lapsed into finality.
Because of this, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to implead Cacho and their
successors-in-interest. MCFC opposed this contending that the Republic was already time barred.

As a result, RTC denied the Republic’s Motion for Leave. An MR was filed to assail the said order. Later on, MCFC filed
a Motion to Dismiss for failure of Republic to implead indispensible parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner
of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated but rather it was Cacho. As a result, the RTC dismissed the case for not
having been filed against the owner-indispensible party. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY IN AN EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDING.

HELD: NOT NECESSARILY. AN OWNER IN AN EXPROPRIATION CASE IS NOT NECESSARILY THE INDISPENSIBLE PARTY .
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less
than this Court in the ISA case. The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made.

The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void . A writ of
execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The November
16, 2001 Order of the RTC Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of
this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.

Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court72 described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:

Section 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint
which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each
defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise
obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners,
averment to that effect may be made in the complaint.

For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are NOT LIMITED to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and
just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals:
 The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is
taken by eminent domain, the owner is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to
compensation.

At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over
the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed . Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC Branch 1 evidently erred
in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.

Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having
been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is
not the remedy for misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties .

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. Now, is the
owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when “title to the property sought to
be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals.” The same rule
provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants “all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest” in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already

3. Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 14, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Reyes owns a parcel of land in CDO. DPHW wanted to built an extension road on Osmena St. Without initiating an
expropriation proceeding, DPWH took possession of Reyes’ property on Dec 20, 1990. Thus, Reyes sent letters to DPWH
to express its objection to the taking of the property. Likewise, Reyes requested to appraise her property but this was
denied. Thus, Reyes filed a Complaint Claiming Just Compensation and Damages in the RTC of CDO against DPWH.

Before the reports could be sent by the commissioners, DPWH said that it was ready to pay Reyes just compensation of
P3,200 psm. Thus, Reyes filed an Urgent Motion for DPWH to deposit said amount. However, DWPH was only able to
deposit P2,121,600 in the RTC months later.

Meanwhile, new commissioners submitted their report based on the values of 1990. Thereafter, RTC held that Reyes is
entitled to 4,696,000 based on the values in 1990 but the basis was obscure in the actual decision. Thus, the CA remanded
the case. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN REMANDING THE CASE TO RECONVENE THE COMMISSIONERS TO DETERMINE
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE REMAINING LOT.

HELD: NO.
VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.

JUST COMPENSATION is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to
be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker.

Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the
complaint.
The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the
taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.

Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the
expropriator. If no such complaint is filed , the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation .

In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the
case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before
commissioners is dispensable.

RTC HAD NO BASIS IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION

In this case, DPWH took possession of the subject property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
Consequently, Reyes filed the instant case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation, the
RTC appointed 3 commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the
parties objected to such appointment.

The RTC’s appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to
aid the RTC in determining just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the RTC is not bound
by the commissioners’ recommended valuation of the subject property. The court has the discretion on whether to adopt
the commissioners’ valuation or to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records.

However, we agree with the CA that the RTC’s decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation.
The RTC simply gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property owner without laying down its basis.
Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence. For this
reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order.
Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily
or capriciously. The decision of the RTC must be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and
competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED

No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a
result of the expropriation made by DPWH , the remaining lot (i.e., the 297square meter lot) of Reyes suffers from
IMPAIRMENT or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to Reyes.

On the other hand, if the expropriation results to BENEFITS to the remaining lot of Reyes, these consequential benefits
may be deducted from the awarded consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the expropriated
property.

An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property
owner.

4. NPC v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC expropriated various parcels of land in the Municipality of
Carmen in Cebu. Among the affected lots were those owned by Santa Loro vda. De Capin. Thus, to be able to enter into
their property, NPC obtained their permission. Later, Capin signed the permits in return for NPC’s payment of just
compensation.

After construction was completed, restrictions were imposed upon the use of Capin’s property such that they lost income.
After NPC paid Capin just compensation, Capin found out that the other landowners in their Municipality who brought
the expropriation proceedings to court and entered into compromise agreements with NPC and were able to receive much
greater just compensation.
Accordingly, Capin filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal
of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages, etc against NPC in the RTC. Thereafter, the parties during pre-trial that they
would submit to Summary Judgment. Later, RTC ruled in favor of Capin and ordered NPC to pay damages amounting to
448 psm for the 3,199 sqm taken by NPC. MR denied. On appeal, CA affirmed. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

NPC contends that the RTC should have appointed commissioners in accordance with Rule 67 and not according to the
rules on Summary Judgments because the case was “Reversed Eminent Domain.”

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RTC SHOULD HAVE FIRST APPOINTED COMMISSIONERS BEFORE HOLDING NPC LIABLE.

HELD: NO. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE FOR DAMAGES.

It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of
Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs filed by the
Capin against NPC. It was an ordinary civil action for the rescission of Capin’s agreement with NPC, as well as
recovery of the possession of the lots taken, for failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation
for the respondents’ properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative remedy, akin to
specific performance by the NPC of its obligation under its agreement with respondents, which would prevent the
rescission of the agreements altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to Capin. The parties, at the
Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment of damages rather than rescission of the
agreement. Clearly, the proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation, but were for damages, to which
Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant.

Reference may be made to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. In the said case, after therein petitioner
NAPOCOR withdrew its second Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the trial court’s determination was
the counterclaim of therein private respondent Antonino Pobre, contained in his Motion to Dismiss, for damages.
The Court ruled therein:

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no
longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession.
The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

5. Apo Fruits v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009

QUICKIE FACTS:
Apo Fruits (AFC) and Hijo Plantation (HPI) offered to sell land to the government through DAR pursuant to CARP. DAR
issued a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) in favor of AFC and HPI in order to pay for the lands for 165,000 per hectare.
This was rejected for being unreasonably low. As such, DAR directed Land Bank (LBP) to deposit amounts in the
accounts of AFC and HPI. They each withdrew the amounts. Thereafter, TCT was issued in favor of DAR which would
be distributed to the farmers.

Later, AFC and HPI filed separate Complaints for Determination of Just Compensation in the DARAB. Since DARAB
did not act on the complaints for more than 3 years, 2 complaints were then filed with the RTC and the cases were
consolidated. RTC ruled in favor of AFC and HPI and ordered just compensation of 1.383 Billion in T-Bills, interests,
attys fees, costs, and Commissioner’s fees.

Lanbnd Bank’s MR was denied. Thus, Land Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. However, pending appeal, a case was decided
stating that the mode of appeal from the RTC as Special Agrarian Court should be via Petition for Review. So, RTC
denied the appeal. In the CA, RTC’s order was nullified. AFC and HPI’s MR was denied. Thus, they went up to the SC
via Rule 45.
SC partially granted Petition. When Land Bank filed an MR, SC deleted the interest rate and attorney’s fees. So, AFC and
HPI filed their MR which was denied by the SC. Thereafter, judgment was entered.

Unfazed, AFC and HPI still filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit a 2 nd MR regarding the denial of the award of
interest and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AFC AND HPI ARE ENTITLED LEGAL INTEREST AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.

HELD: NO. LAND BANK ALREADY PAID JUST COMPENSATION WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.
The Second MR is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison the immutability of a final decision — a matter of
public policy and public interest, as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law; and secondly, to award interest
and attorney’s fees despite the fact that Land Bank paid the just compensation without undue delay is legally and
factually unwarranted.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court allows the reopening of a final judgment, AFC and HPI are still
not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and attorney’s fees.

The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation
on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell.

It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, however, the Court came to explicitly rule that interest is to be imposed on
the just compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established. Significantly,
Wycoco was moored on Article 2209, Civil Code.

The history of this case proves that Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. As earlier
mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS
applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare,
that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for HPI.
However, they both rejected Land Bank’s initial valuation, prompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in the
their names, and to credit in said accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew the
amount of
P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separate complaints for
determination of just compensation.

The Third Division justified its deletion of the award of interest thuswise:

AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring delay in the determination and payment of just
compensation. However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPI’s proper recourse after rejecting
the initial valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC , and
not to file two complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR, which was just
circuitous as it had already determined the just compensation of the subject properties taken with the aid
of LBP.
 6. Republic v. Holy Trinity Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) sought to expropriated parcels of land to construct the NLEX. Thus, it filed
Consolidated Complaints for Expropriation in the RTC of Malolos. Holy Trinity Realty was one of the respondents. In
accordance with RA 8974 (An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site, or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes), TRB made a deposit of 28M in the DPWH account in Land
Bank. Thereafter, TRB filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession since it already made a
deposit and, thus, pursuant to Rule 67 Sec 2, the issuance of the Writ if ministerial. RTC the motion. However, the
landowners did not voluntary vacate the properties. So, they sought help from the PNP.

Later on, Holy Trinity filed a Motion to Withdraw the Deposit in the RTC and sought to withdraw the principal amount
and any interest accruing thereon. Withdrawal of the principal was allowed but the withdrawal of the accrued interest was
still to be determined in a proceeding. Pending the proceedings, the account earned interest. Then, RTC ruled that said
interests belonged to Holy Trinity pursuant to the principle of accession.

TRB’s MR was granted and stated that the issue as to interest should be determined before the Board of Commissioners.
Holy Trinity filed an MR but was denied. On certiorari, CA granted the petition and ruled that the intresest belonged to
Holy Trinity by accession. Hence, this petition.

TRB contends that pursuant to RA 8974 and Rule 67 Sec 2, the landowner is entitled to an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation/current zonal valuation of the BIR.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT INTEREST ACCRUED FROM THE DEPOSIT MADE IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELONGED TO THE
LANDOWNER.

HELD: YES.
At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRB’s line of reasoning. It failed to distinguish between the
expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation
proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held:

There are at least TWO CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67.
Under the STATUTE, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in RULE 67, the Government is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which
provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration OR the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is
higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means
does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example,
Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67 ,
inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government
infrastructure projects.” Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues
to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended for a national
government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No.
8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.

LANDOWNER OWNS THE INTEREST

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just compensation twice:

(1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and
(2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and executory,
where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the
just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).

Holy Trinity never alleged that it was seeking interest because of delay in either of the two payments enumerated
above. In fact, Holy Trinity’s cause of action is based on the prompt initial payment of just compensation, which
effectively transferred the ownership of the amount paid to it. Being the owner of the amount paid, Holy Trinity is
claiming, by the right of accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank.

That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of no moment. Considering that the
expropriation account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH should at most be deemed as the trustee of the amounts
deposited in the said accounts irrefragably intended as initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the
expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same.

G. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (RULE 68)

1. Huerta Alba Resort v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
Huerta Alba mortgage 4 parcels of land in favor of Intercon Fund Resource Inc. The latter assigns its rights over the
mortgage to Syndicated Management. Syndicated filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure against Huerta Alba to
foreclose on said properties. RTC, CA, and the SC all ruled in favor of Syndicated. Thereafter, the decision became final
and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

As such, Syndicated filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution in the RTC which was granted. Huerta Alba
sought nullify the other by filing a Motion to Quash contending that the 150-day period for Equity Redemption has not yet
lapsed. However, RTC denied this. On appeal, CA dismissed the appeal. Consequently, Huerta Alba filed in the CA a
Motion for Clarification as regards the commencement of the 1-year period for the Right of Redemption of the properties
in question. Again this was denied. Hence, this petition.

Huerta Alba contends that it should be allowed to redeem the properties within 1 year from the sale as a result of a
foreclosure of mortgage

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HUERTA ALBA IS ENTTILED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER THE GENERAL BANKING ACT

HELD: NO
From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that what Huerta Alba has been adjudged to
have was only the equity of redemption over subject properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption
and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the
Court in the said case:

The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of
redemption. The RIGHT OF REDEMPTION in relation to a mortgage — understood in the sense of a
prerogative to reacquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale — exists only
in the case of
 the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution .

Where a mortgage is FORECLOSED EXTRAJUDICIALLY, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of
redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale .
Where the FORECLOSURE IS JUDICIALLY EFFECTED, however, no equivalent right of redemption
exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.’ Such rights exceptionally ‘allowed by
law’ (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the
Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337).

These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court
of the foreclosure sale — which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property. But, to repeat, no such right
of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or
a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the
court shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the
purchaser.’ There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right
of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance
with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.

Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —

If upon the trial x x the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period of
not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in default of such
payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs.’

This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by
him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the
foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer.”

The failure of Huerta Alba to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 precludes it from
so doing at this late stage of the case. Estoppel may be successfully invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the
early stages of the proceedings. Thus, “a party to a case who failed to invoke his claim in the main case, while having the
opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his claim, even if it were true, after the decision has
become final, otherwise the judgment may be reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in
disrepute.”

2. Bacaling v. Muya, G.R. No. 148404, April 11, 2002

QUICKIE FACTS:
Sps. Bacaling owned parcels of land which they subdivided into 110 sub-lots. Later, the Bureau of Lands approved the
subdivision plan for purposes of developing it into a low-cost housing residential community known as the Bacaling-
Moreno Subdivision. To get funds for the development, Bacaling obtained a loan from GSIS. To secure said loan,
Bacaling executed in favor of GSIS a REM over the said property. However, the Bacalings were not able to pay.
Consequently, in 1961, GSIS foreclosed on the lots. The case reached all the way to the SC. It was only in 1989 wherein
Bacaling was restored as the owner.
Meanwhile, while the case was pending, a dispute over the property arose between Bacaling and Muya. Bacaling claims
that Muya clandestinely entered and occupied the property. On the other hand, Muya claims that they started out as
assigns as tenat-tillers of the land and eventually became agricultural tenants under a leasehold. As such, they were able to
secure Certificates of Land Transfer in their names.

After the SC case ruled in favor of Bacaling, the latter filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer
against Muya in the DAR. However, this was dismissed. As a result, Bacaling appealed to the Office of the President
which reversed the DAR and ordered the cancellation of said Certificates. Aggrieved, Muya appealed to the CA. CA
reversed the OP and validated the Certificates.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MUYA ET AL ARE AGRICULTURAL TENANTS

HELD: NO.
The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One legal conclusion adduced from the
facts in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of
the subject properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of the sale of the subject
properties.

Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have been vested to GSIS way back in
1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial
court of the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.

Thus, Muya cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized tenants of the subject parcels of land for
the reason that their agreement to till the land was not with GSIS, the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS
consented to such tenancy relationship nor is there proof that GSIS received a share in the harvest of the tenants.
Consequently, Muya cannot claim security of tenure and other rights accorded by our agrarian laws considering that they
have not been validly instituted as agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land. And from the time Bacaling
recovered the subject properties from GSIS up to the time the former changed her legal position in the instant case,
Bacaling has consistently disclaimed Muya as her alleged tenants. Bacaling’s current legal posture cannot also overturn
our finding since, as earlier mentioned, the said change of mind of Bacaling has little or no evidentiary weight under the
circumstances.

3. Monzon v. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, September 17, 2008

QUICKIE FACTS:
Monzon executed separate PNs in favor of Spouses Relova and Spouses Perez. Said PNs were secured by REM over
separate lots in Tagaytay. Thereafter, Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Relova and Perez. As it happens, Monzon
previously mortgaged both properties in favor of Coastal Lending Corp to secure its indebtedness with the latter. Since
Monzon defaulted on its obligation to pay Coastal, the latter Extrajudicially Foreclosed on the mortgage which covered
both lots.

Addio Properties acquired the lots at auction. However, there was a residue because the bid price exceeded the mortgage
debt. Consequently, Relova and Perez filed a Petition for Injunction against Monzon and the Clerk of Court of RTC of
Tagaytay and claimed that the residue be delivered to them pursuant to Rule 68 Section 4. In its Answer, Monzon claimed
that the Petition failed to state a cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Relova and Perez. On appeal, CA dismissed.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RELOVA AND PEREZ ARE ENTITLED TO THE RESIDUE PURSUANT TO SEC 4 OF RULE 68.
HELD: NO. THIS IS A CASE FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE.
Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of Relova’s alleged cause of action entitling them to the
residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale, provides as follows:

SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. — The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the
mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due,
the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the
court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to
the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages , which was
what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No. 9910050, issued on
14 December 1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Thus, we clarified the different types of sales in Supena v. De la Rosa, to wit:

We have three different types of sales, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure
sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. An ORDINARY EXECUTION SALE is governed by the
pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments.
Rule 68 of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of Mortgage, governs JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALES. On
the other hand, Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the
Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages,” applies in cases
of EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALES of real estate mortgages.

Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 9910050
grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only right given to
second mortgagees in said issuances is the RIGHT TO REDEEM the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:

Sec. 6. Redemption. — In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor
of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one
year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections four hundred and sixty four to four hundred and sixty six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with this Act.

Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such right can only be
given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper
and in a sense even a necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property , he is not an
indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without
regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the
proceeding is that the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of
foreclosure.

In view of the foregoing discussions, we find that Relova and Perez do not have a cause of action against the Clerk of
Court for the delivery of the subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, for the reason
that the foregoing Rule does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
CASE MAY PROSPER AS TO MONZON
However, while the case should indeed be dismissed insofar as Atty. Luna is concerned, the same is not necessarily true
with respect to Monzon. Other than Relova’s prayer that the amount due to them be delivered by Atty. Luna to them, they
also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon liable for such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself, may
constitute a cause of action for collection of sum of money against Monzon.

The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action
to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor
including the subject matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he
cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.

However, due to the fact that construing Relova’s Petition for Injunction to be one for a collection of sum of money would
entail a waiver by Relova of the mortgage executed over the subject properties, we should proceed with caution before
making such construction. We, therefore, resolve that upon the remand of this case to the trial court, Relova should be
ordered to manifest whether the Petition for Injunction should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum
of money.

4. Nagtalon v. UCPB, 702 SCRA 615 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Nagtalon entered into a Credit Accommodation Agreement with UCBP which was secured by a REM over parcels of land
in Aklan. When Nagtalon failed to pay, UCBP extrajudicially foreclosed on the properties. UCPB likewise bought the
properties at auction. After the lapse of the redemption period without redemption being made, UCPB consolidated
ownership over the properties. Also, they filed an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the RTC.

As a result, Nagtalon opposed on the ground that there was a civil case pending assailing the validity of the Credit
Accommodation Agreement. Consequently, RTC held in abeyance the Writ of Possession on the ground of prematurity
due to the pendency of the civil case. MR was denied. On appeal, CA reversed stating that the issuance of the Writ was
ministerial and ordered the RTC to issue the same. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE CAN BAR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION.

HELD: NO. WRIT OF POSSESSION MUST ISSUE. IT IS A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OF THE RTC.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction
is a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained , even by the filing of a civil case for
the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale.

We have long recognized the rule that once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer’s name upon
failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the 1-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a
MATTER OF RIGHT belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at
anytime.

Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes
a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court’s discretion. The court, acting on an application
for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay.

In Spouses Ruben and Violeta Sagun v. Philippine Bank of Communications and Court of Appeals,19 the Court laid down
the established rule on the issuance of a writ of possession, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. The Court said that a writ
of possession may be issued either

(1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or
(2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

DURING the one-year redemption period, as contemplated by Section 7 of the abovementioned law, a purchaser may
apply for a writ of possession by filing an ex parte motion under oath in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in case the property is registered under the Mortgage Law. In this case, a
bond is required before the court may issue a writ of possession.
On the other hand, UPON THE LAPSE of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale, also upon a proper ex parte motion. This time, no bond is necessary for its issuance;
the mortgagor is now considered to have lost any interest over the foreclosed property. The purchaser then becomes the
owner of the foreclosed property, and he can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership of
the property and the issuance of the corresponding TCT in his/her name. It is at this point that the right of possession of
the purchaser can be considered to have ripened into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. The issuance of the writ,
upon proper application, is a ministerial function that effectively forbids the exercise by the court of any discretion. This
second scenario is governed by Section 6 of Act 3135 , in relation to Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

PENDING CASE NOT A BAR

In the case of Spouses Montano T. Tolosa and Merlinda Tolosa v. United Coconut Planters Bank, a case closely similar to
the present petition, the Court explained that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure (where the
nullity of the loan documents and mortgage had been alleged) does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. It
reiterated the well- established rule that as a ministerial function of the court, the judge need not look into the
validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the questions that should be properly decided by
a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed before it. It added that questions on the regularity and the
validity of the mortgage and foreclosure cannot be invoked as justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the new owner.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE MINISTERIAL ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION

(1) Gross inadequacy of purchase price
In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court which involved an execution sale, the court took exception to the general rule
in view of the unusually lower price (P57,396.85 in contrast to its true value of P500,000.00) for which the subject
property was sold at public auction. The Court perceived that injustice could result in issuing a writ of possession
under the given factual scenario and upheld the deferment of the issuance of the writ.

(2) Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor

In Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, consistent with Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that
the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage case ceases to
be ministerial when a third party in possession of the property claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-
mortgagor.

In this case, there was a pending civil suit involving the rights of third parties who claimed ownership over the disputed
property. The Court found the circumstances to be peculiar, necessitating an exception to the general rule. It thus ruled
that where such third party claim and possession exist, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of
the adverse possession.

(3) Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor

We also deemed it proper to defer the issuance of a writ in Sulit v. Court of Appeals in light of the given facts, particularly
the mortgagee’s failure to return to the mortgagor the surplus from the proceeds of the sale (equivalent to an excess
of approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt). We ruled that equitable considerations demanded the deferment of the
issuance of the writ as it would be highly unfair and iniquitous for the mortgagor, who as a redemptioner might
choose to redeem the foreclosed property, to pay the equivalent amount of the bid clearly in excess of the total
mortgage debt.

H. JUDICIAL PARTITION (RULE 69)

1. Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
Pelaez filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership of his undivided share of several parcels of land
against Pedro Sepulveda, his grand uncle. The parcels of land were inherited from his mother who, in turn, inherited it
from her grandmother. Essentially, it was alleged that Pedro made it appear in under a Project of Partition executed in
1937, that he owned Pelaez’s mother’s share in the parcel of land. Despite his demands for Pedro to deliver his mother’s
share, Pedro refuse to deliver the same.
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died. He was then substituted by the adminstratrix of his estate, Soccoro. As
Pedro’s representative, Soccoro averred that Pelaez failed to implead indispensible parties who were likewise co-owners
of the parcel of land.

Nonetheless, RTC ruled in favor of Pelaez. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD PROSPER DESPITE THE FACT THAT INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES WERE NOT
IMPLEADED.

HELD: NO.
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the Pelaez failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in
his complaint.

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property
shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable
parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the Pelaez does not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition,
the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property ; and, second, the conveyance of
his lawful shares. As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:

The FIRST STAGE of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is
not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired
partition either because a co- ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may
also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition
is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order .

The SECOND STAGE commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by
the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in
the rents and profits of the real estate in question.

In the present action, the Pelaez, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties:
his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of
Danao which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) from
Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property.

Rodolfo Pelaez (father) is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct , equal to the share of the
Pelaez’s in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.

To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the RTC should have ordered
the dismissal of the complaint.
I. EJECTMENT (RULE 70)

1. Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, 706 SCRA 388 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Hospicio leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio for 1 year and renewed for 1 year periods. The lease stipulated that
the contract is non-transferrable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in writing. During the pendency of the lease,
Inocencio built 2 buildings on the land which he subleased. The rents he earned were, in turn, paid to Hospicio.

Later on, German Inocencio died. As such, his son Ramon was the one collecting rents from the sublessees and paid them
to Hospicio. Thereafter, Hospicio informed Ramon that it was terminating the lease effective March 31, 2001. On March
3, 2005, Hospicio reiterated the termination of the lease and gave Ramon 30 days to vacate.’

On June 28, 2005, Hospicio filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Ramon and his sublesees before the MTC of
Pasay. It alleged that the parcel of land was being illegally occupied since March 31, 2001. MTC ruled in favor of
Hospicio. On appeal, RTC denied it. MR was likewise denied. Thus, Inocencio went up the CA via Rule 42 which
affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.

HELD: NO.
The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
actions for unlawful detainer must be filed “within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.” In interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court, in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,
held that:

[T]he one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning
period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period
should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.

Hospicio’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on 28 June
2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the period provided under the Rules of Court.

2. Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006

QUICKIE FACTS:
Gutierrez filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Serrano et al in the MTC. They claim that they are the registered
owners of the lot in question and that Serrano et al entered and occupied said lot. Despite their demands to vacate, Serrano
et al refuse to vacate. In their Answer, Serrano et al claims that the lot was part of the estate of their heir.

MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because it found that the real issue involved is ownership and not merely
possession. Thus, it refused to assume jurisdiction. On appeal, RTC ordered Serrano et al to vacate. Moreover, it
concurred with the finding that the MTC had no jurisdiction. Aggrieved, Serrano appealed. CA affirmed the RTC but
stated that the MTC had jurisdiction over the case even if the issue involved was ownership. MR denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE WHERE OWNERSHIP IS AT ISSUE.

HELD: YES.
The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended
by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in
such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession
 cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession .

Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further affirms this provisional determination of ownership in ejectment
cases, thus:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

As the law now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to
decide the question of possession in an ejectment case. Corollarily, the RTC erred when it agreed with the MTC’s
decision to dismiss the case. Along with the erroneous premise, the RTC also blundered in applying Section 8, Rule 40
of the Rules of Court.

3. Esteban v. Marcelo, 703 SCRA 82 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
Estaban owned a parcel of land in Mandaluyong wherein they constructed a foundry shop. When this business became
unproductive, Estaban allowed Sps. Marcelo to reside therein for a monthly rental fee. However, the Marcelos stopped
paying rent on March 2001. On Oct. 31, 2005, Estaban sent the spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their
arrears and vacate within 5 days. Since the Marcelos did not comply, Estaban filed an Action for Unlawful Detainer.

MTC ordered that the Marcelos to vacate since there was a valid ground to eject. RTC affirmed this. On appeal, CA
reversed. It stated that the reckoning point to determine when the action interdictal can be filed started in March 2001
when the Marcelos stopped paying rent. Since the action was filed only in 2005, the action was no longer cognizable by
the MTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RECKONING POINT TO FILE AN ACCION INTERDICTAL STARTS ON THE DAY THE CONTRACT
WAS BREACHED.

HELD: NO.
As correctly pointed out by the Esteban, there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease
and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.

Since 1947, case law has consistently upheld this rule. “Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful
tenant’s possession of the premises. It is the owner’s demand for tenant to vacate the premises , when the tenant has
failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession.”

Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for
filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the
defaulting lessee remain in the premises.

4. Philippine Tourism Authority v. Sabandal-Herzentiel, 701 SCRA 517 (2013)

QUICKIE FACTS:
In 1981, PTA purchased a parcel of land in Cebu from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings Inc. It had been in actual, physical,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession thereof. In 1997, Sabandal-Herzentiel entered into a portion of said land and cut
down trees and introduced improvements. Despite demands to vacate, Sabandal ignored them. As such, PTA filed a
Complaint for Forcible Entry against them in the MTC.

In their Answer, Sabandal averred that the sale by Tri-Island to PTA was void and that PTA did not prove prior possession
of said land. Nonetheless, MTC ordered Sabandal to vacate. On appeal, RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to file a
memorandum. MR denied. In the CA, the MTC and RTC rulings were reversed and ruled that Sabandal was the lawful
possessor because PTA failed to establish that it had prior possession of the property. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SABANDAL ET AL MAY BE LAWFULLY EJECTED FROM THE PROPERTY.

HELD: YES. SABANDAL DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
In an ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed
property and that the defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

In this case, Sabandal failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject property after its sale in
favor of PTA in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their Answer to the complaint that PTA exercised
dominion over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons .

Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding PTA’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC
properly adjudged it to have prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who never
claimed ownership or possession thereof.

PTA’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of Sabandal’s entry into the subject property is inconsequential.
Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor — as PTA had
sufficiently demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego,
Sr.:

Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily
imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does
not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus,
irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested
from them through violence and force.

Similarly, in Arbizo v. Santillan, it has been held that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a
structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force, as in this
case.

In fine, the Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging PTA to be the lawful possessor of the
subject property, square as they are with existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, the CA’s ruling on the merits
must perforce be reversed and set aside.

J. CONTEMPT (RULE 71)

1. Curata v. PPA, supra

QUICKIE FACTS:
In connection with the case filed by PPA to expropriate lots part of the Batangas Port Zone, Presiding Judge Tac-an of
RTC of Batangas issued 2 Orders against PPA despite the previous issuance by the CA of a TRO and Writs of Preliminary
Injunction. As such, PPA a Petition to Cite Judge Tac-An for Contempt. CA resolved to deny the petition for lack of
merit. Thus, the case was elevated to the SC.

However, the First Division considered as moot the issue raised by PPA on the denial of the contempt charge in light of
Judge Tac-an’s compulsory retirement. PPA however still filed an MR.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE TAC-AN’S RETIREMENT RENDERED MOOT THE RESOLUTION OF PPA’S PETITION TO SET
ASIDE THE CA RESOLUTION DENYING PPA’S PETITION FOR CONTEMPT.
HELD: NO.
The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. It is an effective instrument of preserving and
protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any act or omission that degrades or demeans the integrity
of the court must be sanctioned, lest it prejudice the efficient administration of justice if left unpunished.

Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or
employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt . Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to
avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would be
made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of justice
dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government
official or employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench. While there is still no definitive ruling on this
issue when the judge charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in administrative
disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render the case moot and academic.

JUDGE TAC-AN COMMITTED CONTUMACIOUS ACTS

We find that Judge Tac-an committed contumacious acts in utter disobedience of the January 10, 2005, March 15,
2005, April 19, 2005 and June 3, 2005 Resolutions of the CA. Prior to the Order of Judge Tac-an, he was already
aware of the January 10, 2005 Resolution of the CA’s Ninth Division granting a TRO.

Thereafter, Judge Tac-an was already notified that a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against him. Despite
the March 15, 2005-issued writ of preliminary injunction and the April 19, 2005 TRO, Judge Tac-an still acted on the
Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury pertaining to the money deposited by PPA with said bureau, when
he knew fully well that such incident was already subject of the injunctive writ and the CA TRO, which was a clear
breach of said processes.

Lastly, Judge Tac-an set and conducted a hearing of Civil Case No. 5447 on June 21, 2005. On June 21, 2005, the
Judge was already notified of the June 3, 2005 CA Resolution ordering him to “cease and desist from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 5447 until further orders from the Honorable Court.”

Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt
of court.

2. Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, April 15, 2005

QUICKIE FACTS:
JS Francisco & Sons filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry aganst Fuentes et al. After trial, MTC Judge Albarracin ruled in
favor of JS Francisco. Thus, Fuentes et al filed with the RTC a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. During the pendency
of the Petition, Judge Albarracin issued a Writ of Demolition. Aggrieved, Fuentes et al filed a Petition for Prohibition to
restrain the judge from acting on the cases while the Petition for Annulment of Judgment was pending.

During the pendency of the Petitoin for Prohibition, the judge issued Writs of Execution and Writs of Demolition. Later
on, JS Fransico filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion seeking the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to enforce said writs
of execution and demolition. Fuentes et al claims that there were not served a copy of said motion and that no hearing was
set therefore. Nonetheless, the judge still granted it.

Thus, Fuentes et al charged the judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. OCA recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case. Likewise, it recommended that Fuentes et al pay a fine. It stated that the Ex Parte Motion was merely
to request the sheriff to implement the writs of execution and demolition which had previously been issued after several
hearings. Thus, it was considered non-litigious.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.

HELD: NO. FINE WAS LIKEWISE EXPUNGED.

This Court has ruled that when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s
confidence in the competence of our courts . Such is gross ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance of the law is
more than an erroneous application of legal provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other like motive. Such circumstances are not obtaining in the case at bar.

The evidence reveals that the judge notified complainants and conducted a hearing before the issuance of the writ of
execution and special writ of demolition. It was only when the execution and demolition were not implemented that,
upon ex parte motion of the plaintiffs, the judge directed Sheriff del Campo to enforce the writ of execution and
special writ of demolition despite the absence of notice and hearing considering that these rights had already been
availed of by Fuentes.

Thus, in issuing the assailed order, the judge merely sought to carry out the expeditious implementation of a
judgment
which was already final and executory. For such commendable act, the judge should be praised, not condemned.

NO CONTEMPTUOUS ACT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST THE COURT ITSELF TO PENALIZE FUENTES WITH A FINE
Nonetheless, assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as “delaying tactics,” remedial action
may be enforced against them through contempt of court proceedings. A brief review of the rules governing contempt
proceedings is useful.

CONTEMPT OF COURT is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or
their witnesses during litigation.

There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt.

DIRECT CONTEMPT is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same , including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so.

INDIRECT CONTEMPT or CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under
this latter category.

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following REQUISITES prior to conviction of indirect
contempt:

(1) a charge in writing to be filed;

(2) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and
(3) to be heard by himself or counsel.

With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of the court, it is
essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the
charges before punishment is imposed . The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.
The modes of procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those used in
criminal prosecutions.

Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed against this tribunal , but against respondent
judge.
There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or condemn the complainants to suffer the penalty for
contempt, considering that the “contemptuous” act was not directed against the Court itself . The penalty as
recommended by the OCA cannot be sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be penalized for
filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.