REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CA-G.R. CR No. 43449

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Members:

- versus - LAMPAS PERALTA, F.,

Chairperson
ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, N. G., and
MARIO LORDIOS @ ERNING, PAYOYO-VILLORDON, T. M. B., J.J.
Accused-Appellant.
PROMULGATED:

August 26, 2020

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
LAMPAS PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present appeal is the Judgment dated March 29,

1
2019 in Criminal Case No. 5572-R of Branch 53, Regional Trial
Court, Rosales, Pangasinan, First Judicial Region, finding accused-
appellant Mario Lordios @ “Erning” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide for the killing of Willy Boy Corpuz y Obedoza.

1
pp. 60-65, Rollo; pp. 247-252, Original Records.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 2
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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THE ANTECEDENTS

According to the prosecution, around 9:00 A.M. of July 5, 2010,

accused-appellant Mario Lordios @ “Erning”, the victim Willy Boy
Corpuz, and Mar Pulido had a drinking session at the back of the
house of Josephine Licudo (victim’s sister), which was located at
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. 2 The victim was
then residing at the house of his sister Josephine Licudo. During the
drinking session, Josephine Licudo was inside the kitchen of the
house.3

Around 1:00 P.M., during the drinking session, an argument

ensued between accused-appellant and the victim. Suddenly,
accused-appellant challenged the victim to a fist fight, which the latter
refused.4 Mar Pulido, whose house was adjacent to Josephine
Licudo’s, went home and slept. After a while, accused-appellant
proceeded to the house of Mar Pulido and tried to wake him up by
banging his door. The victim followed accused-appellant and tried to
pacify the latter. When Mar Pulido woke up and opened the door,
accused-appellant told the victim to punch Mar Pulido, but the victim
did not heed him. Accused-appellant approached and tried to throw a
punch at Mar Pulido, but the victim intervened. Accused-appellant
choked the victim.5

Josephine Licudo, who was then at the door of her house and
saw the whole incident, sought help from a relative. When the victim
and accused-appellant were separated, the latter, who lived about 30
meters away from Josephine Licudo’s house, 6 went home.7 However,
accused-appellant came back, armed with a kitchen knife and chased
the victim who was then standing outside the house of Josephine
Licudo’s neighbor, Luis Obedoza. The victim ran at the back of Luis
Obedoza's house where accused-appellant caught up with him. 8
2
pp. 5-7, TSN, August 14, 2012.
3
pp. 7-8, Id.
4
pp. 9-10, Id.
5
pp. 11-14, Id.
6
pp. 5-6, Id.
7
p. 15, Id.
8
pp. 16-18, Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 3
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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Accused-appellant stabbed the victim hitting him on the hand.

The victim grappled for the knife, but accused-appellant pushed the
victim, causing the latter to lose his balance. Thereupon, accused-
appellant repeatedly stabbed the victim on the chest. The victim got
up and tried to run away, but he fell on the ground face down. 9 Then,
accused-appellant stabbed him on the back and immediately ran
away from the crime scene. Josephine Licudo, who was then
standing nearby, came and brought the victim to the hospital where
he was declared “Dead on Arrival”.10

The Autopsy Report dated July 5, 2010 issued by Dr. Elizabeth

Alimorong of the Office of the Municipal Health Center, Rosales,
Pangasinan,11 showed that the victim sustained abrasions and stab
wounds on the following parts of his body:

abrasions in the ridge of nose and chin

stabbed wounds

(i) Level of 2nd Intercostal space, Anterior Axillary Line, left

Anterior Chest

(ii) Beside xiphoid process, 6th intercostal space, Right Anterior

Chest

(iii) Beside xiphoid process, 6th intercostal space, Left Anterior

Chest

(iv) Suprascapular area Right, Posterior Chest

(v) Second Thoracic vertebrae, Posterior Chest

(vi) Left Hand in between 1st and 2nd digit

Accused-appellant, at first, denied any participation in the

incident, alleging that he was at his house sleeping during that time. 12
9
pp. 21-25, Id.
10
pp. 26-27, Id.
11
p. 5, Original Records.
12
pp. 4-6, TSN, March 30, 2017.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 4
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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Subsequently, he admitted stabbing the victim by accident. Allegedly,

around 1:00 P.M. of July 5, 2010, he was invited by the victim to have
a drinking spree at the latter's house. 13 Suddenly, the victim hacked
accused-appellant on the chin and fingers using a “tabas” (a long-
bladed bolo)14 when the latter tried to collect the money that the victim
borrowed from him.15 Then, accused-appellant and the victim
grappled for the knife on the top of the table. 16 The victim got hold of
the knife and tried to stab accused-appellant, but missed. They again
grappled for the knife, and accused-appellant was able to get
possession thereof. As they grappled for the knife, accused-appellant
accidentally stabbed the victim six (6) times. 17 Thereafter, accused-
appellant allegedly voluntarily surrendered to the police station of
Rosales, Pangasinan.18

On July 6, 2010, a “Criminal Complaint” was filed with the trial

court against accused-appellant charging him with murder. 19 On July
7, 2010, the trial court issued an Order giving accused-appellant a
period of 5 days to request for a preliminary investigation. 20 Accused-
appellant filed a motion for preliminary investigation 21 which the trial
court granted in an Order dated July 27, 2010. 22

On July 5, 2011, an information was filed with the trial court

against accused-appellant charging him, this time, with homicide,
committed as follows:

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 5,

2010, at Brgy. San Bartolome, municipality of Rosales, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

13
p. 3, TSN, December 1, 2017.
14
p. 4, Id.
15
pp. 4-5, TSN, November 9, 2018.
16
p. 5, TSN, December 1, 2017.
17
p. 6, Id.
18
p. 7, Id.
19
p. 1, Id.
20
p. 7, Id.
21
p. 9, Id.
22
p. 10, Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 5
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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and feloniously assault, attack and stab several times the body of
WILLY BOY CORPUZ y OBEDOZA, which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said WILLY BOY
CORPUZ y OBEDOZA.

CONTRARY to Art. 249, Revised Penal Code. 23

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the

charge.24 The trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing wherein the
parties stipulated only on the identity of accused-appellant. The
prosecution marked its exhibits consisting, among others, of the (i)
sworn statement of Josephine Licudo, and (ii) Autopsy Report dated
July 5, 2010 issued by the Office of the Municipal Health Center,
Rosales, Pangasinan. On the other hand, accused-appellant marked
as exhibit the Medico Legal Certificate dated July 6, 2010 issued by
the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital, Tayug, Pangasinan. 25

During the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses

Josephine Licudo26 and Luzviminda Corpuz27 (the victim’s mother
who testified on the expenses incurred for the burial of the victim).

The testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Alimorong was dispensed with

after the parties stipulated on the existence, due execution and
authenticity of the Autopsy Report dated July 5, 2010 which she
issued.28

On the other hand, accused-appellant 29 was the lone witness

for the defense.

On March 29, 2019, the trial court rendered a Judgment

convicting accused-appellant of homicide. The decretal portion of the
Judgment reads:

23
p. 32, Id.
24
Per Order dated August 2, 2011, p. 38, Id.
25
Per Pre-Trial Order dated January 17, 2012, pp. 60-61, Id.
26
p. 3, TSN, August 14, 2012.
27
p. 2, TSN, March 5, 2013.
28
Per Order dated September 24, 2013.
29
p. 3, TSN, March 30, 2017.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 6
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the

accused MARIO LORDIOS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim the following amounts:

1) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral

damages;

2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for

the death of the victim; and

3) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as temperate

damages.

SO ORDERED.30

Hence, accused-appellant filed the present appeal which is

premised on the following assignment of errors allegedly committed
by the trial court:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO

RECOGNIZE THAT IT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING

THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF HOMICIDE AND IMPOSING THE

30
p. 65, Rollo.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 7
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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PENALTY THEREOF, DESPITE FAILURE OF THE

PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH ITS ELEMENTS.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED [IN] GIVING CREDENCE

TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS.

V.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING

THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.31

THE ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in finding accused-

appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
in not giving credence to accused-appellant's plea of self-
defense.

THE COURT'S RULING

In holding accused-appellant guilty of homicide, the trial court

gave weight and credence to the positive testimony of eyewitness
Josephine Licudo, sister of the victim Willy Boy Corpuz, who was
merely 5 to 7 meters away from where the stabbing incident
occurred. The trial court did not dignify accused-appellant's plea of
self-defense for absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Likewise, the trial court gave no credence to accused-
appellant's claim that the stabbing of the victim was accidental. Said
the trial court in its Judgment dated March 29, 2019:

Examining thoroughly the testimony of the witness

Josephine Licudo, this Court finds no cogent reason not to believe
her claim that she positively identified the accused as the author of
the crime charged. She categorically recounted how the incident
transpired, from the time the accused and the victim were having a
31
pp. 45-46, Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 8
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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drinking spree at the back of their house, until the accused started
challenging the victim to a fistfight. When the victim refused, he
vented his ire to their drinking buddy, but the victim got in between
them, thus the accused git (sic) mad at him and choked him
instead. They were separated by the witness and her aunt, but the
accused subsequently came back armed with a knife and attacked
the victim by initially stabbing his hands, and then the stomach
portion.

The victim tried to run but the accused chased him and
stabbed him at the back several times. She was able to recount all
these because she was merely about 5 to 7 meters away from
where the stabbing occurred (TSN, September 24, 2012, pp. 11-
19). The said statement was strongly corroborated by the autopsy
report of the victim indicating that he suffered three (3) stab wounds
on the chest (anterior) on different location, two just above the
stomach and two stab wounds at the back (posterior chest) (Exhibit
“D”) and the wounds in the victim's hand.

Clearly, accused was the aggressor, while the victim tried but
failed to wrestle the knife away from the accused. x x x.

On the other hand, the accused posted two contrasting

defense, one is “alibi” and the other defense was that the stabbing
incident was merely “accidental”. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

[H]is subsequent defense that he “accidentally stab” the

victim while grappling possession over a knife is plain outrageous.
First, he claimed that he was stabbed in the chin and in his finger
with a “tabas” by the victim. But all of a sudden, they grappled for
the possession over a knife, and that same knife was the one that
accidentally struck the victim. Why would the victim, armed with a
“tabas”, if he is “hell bent” on attacking the accused get a knife
when he was already armed with a deadlier weapon? All he should
do is press on with his attack. Further, the claim of the accused that
what happened was merely an accident was belied by the number,
nature and location of the wounds inflicted on the victim. The victim
suffered three (3) stab wounds in the anterior chest and two (2)
stab wounds at the back, posterior chest, as shown by the medical
findings of Dr. Elizabeth Alimorong (Exhibit “D”).32

32
pp. 63-64, Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 9
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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Accused-appellant impugns his conviction, arguing that (i) the

information was filed by the 3 rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
without the prior written authority of the Provincial Prosecutor which
constitutes a defect in the information that prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case; 33 (ii) accused-appellant merely
acted in self-defense, considering that there was unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim when the latter hacked the chin and fingers of
accused-appellant,34 (iii) the testimony of Josephine Licudo was
uncorroborated and contrary to logic and human experience; 35 and,
(vi) accused-appellant's voluntary surrender, which was an indicia of
his innocence, should have been considered by the trial court as
mitigating circumstance.36

Accused-appellant's asseverations are bereft of merit.

Anent accused-appellant's claim that the information was filed

without the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan,
accused-appellant is already barred by estoppel by laches, for the
unjustified delay in raising the issue. The supposed lack of written
authority or approval in the filing of information is a waivable ground
to quash an information.

In any event, any defect in the prior “Criminal Complaint” signed

rd
by 3 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emeliano M. Matro, charging
accused-appellant with murder, had been cured with the filing of a
subsequent information signed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Noel
C. Bince, amending the charge to homicide after the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.

In Ongkingco v. Sugiyama,37 the Supreme Court clarified that

if the lack of authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor
is raised only “after arraignment, at any stage of the proceeding or
33
pp. 50-51, Id.
34
p. 54, Id.
35
p. 55, Id.
36
p. 56, Id.
37
G.R. No. 217787, September 18, 2019.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 10
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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even on appeal, the same should no longer be a ground to declare

the information as invalid, because it is no longer a question of
jurisdiction over the case”. Thus:

[I]n instances where the information is filed by an authorized

officer, like a public prosecutor, without the approval of the city
prosecutor appearing in the information, but the resolution for filing
of the information bears the approval of the city prosecutor, or
his/her duly authorized deputy, and such lack of approval is timely
objected to before arraignment, the court may require the
prosecutor to have the signature of the city prosecutor affixed in the
information to avoid undue delay. However, if the objection is raised
after arraignment, at any stage of the proceeding or even on
appeal, the same should no longer be aground to declare the
information as invalid, because it is no longer a question of
jurisdiction over the case. After all, the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor attached to the information carries with it
the recommendation to file the information and the approval to file
the information by the prosecutor, or his or her duly authorized
deputy.

It must be stressed that accused-appellant does not dispute

that he stabbed and killed the victim, as he pleads self-defense. It is
axiomatic that if the accused interposes self-defense, in effect, he
admits the authorship of the crime. Considering that self-defense will
totally exonerate the accused from any criminal liability, it becomes
incumbent upon him to prove self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence.38

Basic are the elements of self-defense, to wit: (i) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (ii) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and, (iii) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.39

The most important and primordial element, unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim, is wanting in this case. Unlawful
aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and
38
Miranda vs. People, G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019.
39
People vs. Doca, G.R. No. 233479, October 16, 2019.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 11
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual peril.

Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must
be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. 40

Accused-appellant's version of self-defense is uncorroborated

by competent and independent evidence. According to him, he was
in a drinking session with the victim and Mar Pulido, when the victim
suddenly hacked him on the chin and fingers. Then, he and the
victim grappled for the knife on the table. The victim was able to get
hold of the knife and tried to stab him, but missed. While struggling
again for possession of the knife, he got possession of the knife and
accidentally stabbed the victim six (6) times. Notably, no other
witness was presented to corroborate accused-appellant's story.
Settled is the rule that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is uncorroborated by competent and separate
evidence.41

Moreover, accused-appellant's self-defense version and

accidental stabbing are diametrically opposed to each other. In self-
defense, the stabbing cannot be considered merely accidental as the
stabbing was supposedly intentionally done in order to prevent or
repel the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the trial court, why would the
victim grapple with accused-appellant for a knife on the table when he
was already armed with a “tabas” which he allegedly used in hacking
accused-appellant? This all the more rendered incredible accused-
appellant's inconsistent claims of self-defense and accident.

Accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense is further negated by

the six (6) stab wounds sustained by the victim mostly on the chest
part. The gravity of the victim's injuries is undeniable, as he died
immediately before he was brought to the hospital on the very same
day of the incident. The location and number of wounds suffered by
the victim only indicate accused-appellant’s intent to kill the victim
and not merely to defend himself.42
40
People vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015.
41
People vs. Gayon, G.R. No. 230221, April 10, 2019.
42
People vs. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 12
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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According to accused-appellant, he accidentally stabbed the

victim six (6) times. In Miranda v. People,43 which involved the
continuous hacking by the accused even after the aggressor had
been neutralized, the Supreme Court held that said constinuous
hacking “constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to
repel the private complainant's attack - and is certainly unjustified”
and “was in no way a reasonable and necessary means of repelling
the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter”.

Moreover, accused-appellant's contention that it was the victim

who initiated the attack, is bereft of evidentiary support. Nonetheless,
the fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto
show that there was unlawful aggression. Jurisprudence teaches that
“although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased
to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon.
Whatever the accused did thereafter is no longer self-defense, but
retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing
when the accused injured the aggressor.44

In the present case, when accused-appellant stabbed the victim

several times after he was able to take possession of the knife from
the victim, the latter had ceased to be the aggressor. Accused-
appellant was undeniably the unlawful aggressor retaliating to the
alleged earlier unlawful aggression of the victim. Notably, the
prosecution evidence showed that the victim was merely standing in
front of his neighbor’s house. There was no threatening act of the
victim upon accused-appellant. Josephine Licudo, the victim's sister
who was nearby and witnessed the whole incident, testified that the
victim was merely standing by the house of their neighbor when
accused-appellant, armed with a kitchen knife, came, chased the
victim and stabbed him to death.

43
G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019, citing Espinosa vs. People, G.R. No. 181071, 615 SCRA
446, March 15, 2010.
44
Miranda vs. People, supra.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 13
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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Pertinent portions of the testimony of Josephine Licudo during

direct-examination read:

PROS. ASUNCION:

Q- And what did Mario Lordios do when he returned to your

compound?

A- When he entered our compound, my brother ran away and it

was there that he stabbed my brother, sir.

COURT:

Q- Your brother ran towards what direction?

A- My brother ran towards the back of the house of my uncle

and it was there where he stabbed my brother.

Q- So you mean to say Mario Lordios chased your brother going

towards the back of the house of your uncle Luis Obedoza?

A- Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q- How far were you from the accused when he stabbed your
brother?

A- From here up to the door, sir. (Witness indicating a distance

of 5 meters, more or less.)

Q- So, all the time you saw the stabbing incident?

A- Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q- Now, Madam Witness, since you claimed that you saw how
Erning stabbed your brother at the back of the house of your
uncle Luis Obedoza, could you tell this Honorable Court what
was the relative position of your brother when he was
stabbed?
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 14
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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A- It was the hand of my brother that was hit and then he tried
to wrestle away the kitchen [knife] from him but he could not
take it away from Mario Lordios then Mario Lordios pushed
away my brother and that was the time that he repeatedly
stabbed my brother, sir.

COURT:

Q- Where was your brother facing at the time he was stabbed

by the accused? Was he facing in front of (sic) facing back?

A- They were facing each other, sir.

Q- And when the accused pushed your brother, your brother

was stabbed standing when he was stabbed?

A- My brother was still standing when he was repeatedly

stabbed by Manong Erning, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. ASUNCION:

Q- And what part of the body of your brother was stabbed

repeatedly?

A- He was stabbed first in his hand and then on his stomach

and when he ran, he was still stabbed at the back and when
he was stabbed at the back he fell down facing the ground
and out of extreme pain he bit a piece of wood, sir.

COURT:

Q- You mean to say when your brother was stabbed at the back,
he was still standing or he was already on the ground?

A- He already fell down on the ground facing the ground, sir.

Q- So, how many times did Lordios stab him at the back?

A- Many times I cannot count it, sir.

PROS. ASUNCION:
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 15
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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At this point, may we make of record that the witness is

crying and trembling.

COURT:

Manifestation noted.

PROS. ASUNCION:

Q- So, what did you do, Madam Witness, if there was anym (sic)
when Mario Lordios was repeatedly stabbing your brother?

A- I was standing and I was able to go near my brother when he

said, “manang”, sir.

COURT:

Q- What about Mario Lordios, where did he go?

A- Yes, sir, he ran away already.

xxx xxx xxx

Q- And what did you do when you went near your brother?

A- I embraced him and then we brought him to the hospital, sir.

Q- And were you able to bring him to the hospital, Madam

Witness?

A- Yes, sir, we were able to bring him but he already expired.

COURT:

Q- By the way, what kind of weapon did Mario use at that time?

A- Yes, sir, kitchen knife.45

Accused-appellant assails the credibility of Josephine Licudo as

her testimony was allegedly uncorroborated and contrary to logic and

45
pp. 18-27, TSN, August 14, 2012.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 16
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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human experience since she failed to lend help to the victim despite
her presence at the crime scene during the stabbing incident.

It suffices to state that “when the issues involve matters of

credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect” because it has “the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best
position to discern whether they are telling the truth”. 46

The fact that Josephine Licudo failed to immediately help the

victim during the incident does not make her testimony less credible.
Her reaction was not at all uncommon or unnatural as persons react
differently when confronted with a startling or horiffying occurrence,
as in this case. As held:

x x x It is settled that there could be no hard and fast gauge

for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with
a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case.
Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon
their situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience. The workings of the human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react
differently to shocking stimulus — some may shout, some may
faint, and others may be plunged into insensibility. 47

Moreover, the record is bereft of any showing that Josephine

Licudo had ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. Since the
victim is Josephine Licudo's brother, it is with more reason that she
would not implicate an innocent person and let the guilty go away
with the crime with impunity. Thus, when there is no evidence to
show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely
against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is
that no such motive exists and that the former's testimony is worthy of

46
People vs. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019.
47
People vs. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 17
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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full faith and credit.48 Also, as correctly observed by the trial court,
Josephine Licudo's “act of crying while testifying in (sic) an indicia too
of her being truthful of recounting a tragic ordeal of seeing her brother
killed by a relative”.49

Verily, there is no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that

there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and hence,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense was absent. Said the trial
court:

Aside from that, he also had wounds in the left hand and
abrasions on frontal area; forehead bridge of nose and chin. It only
goes to show that the accused was the aggressor, consistent with
the claim of the witness Josephine Licudo that the accused stabbed
him in the stomach area, and at the back portion. x x x. The
discrepancy as to the claim of the witness that the accused stabbed
the victim on the stomach as opposed to the findings that the victim
was stabbed in the chest area does not negate the testimony of
Josephine Licudo, but in fact shows her sincerity and good faith.
When she said the victim was stabbed in the stomach that shows
good faith even if it later turned out to be part of the chest. After all,
she is not an expert who could very well identify precisely if it is still
part of the stomach or chest knowing the horrific ordeal she
witnessed. To a layman, the sketch of the autopsy shows that two
stab wounds are just above the abdominal area (Exhibit “D”).

Assuming in arguendo that the victim was the initial

aggressor, the act of the accused cannot also be considered as
self-defense since he became the unlawful aggressor when he
continued stabbing the victim despite being able to wrest the
control over the knife. In the case at bar, the victim sustained
several fatal wounds at the chest, front and back portion. x x x.

As such, the accused should be held liable of the crime

charged considering that all the elements of the crime are present
and that he was positively identified by the witnesses as the
perpetrator of the crime.50

As to accused-appellant's claim that the mitigating circumstance

48
People vs. Advincula, supra.
49
p. 63, Rollo.
50
pp. 64-65, Id.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 18
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
x-------------------------------x

of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the trial

court, the same is unavailing. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the following requisites must be established by the
accused: (i) he has not been actually arrested; (ii) he surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (iii) the
surrender is voluntary.51 The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused is give oneself up and
submit to the authorities either because he/she acknowledges his/her
guilt or he/she wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense
that may be incurred for his/her search and capture. 52

In the case at bar, except for accused-appellant's bare

allegation that he gave himself up to the authorities immediately after
the stabbing incident, the record is bereft of any evidence to support
the same. In fact, accused-appellant did not admit stabbing the
victim at the first instance, and invoked self-defense only later during
the hearing. Also, the “Excerpt from the Police Blotter” dated July 5,
2010 issued by the Rosales Police Station did not mention anyting
about the alleged surrender of accused-appellant.

Then again, the general rule is that factual findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance which if
considered, would have altered the result. 53 The Court sees no
cogent basis to depart from the general rule.

In sum, the trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of

homicide. Under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, homicide is
committed when (i) a person was killed; (ii) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (iii) the accused had the intention
to kill, which is presumed; and (iv) the killing was not attended by any
of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. All of these elements are present in this case.

51
People vs. Sabalberino, supra.
52
Tadena vs. People, G.R. No. 228610, March 20, 2019.
53
People vs. Vega, G.R. No. 216018, March 27, 2019.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 19
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
x-------------------------------x

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion temporal54, to be imposed in its medium period if
there is no modifying circumstance to aggravate or mitigate criminal
liability, as in this case, or 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-
appellant is entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor which ranges from 6
years and 1 day to12 years. Thus, the trial court correctly sentenced
accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of “[e]ight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal[,] as maximum”, which is within the
range prescribed by law.

The Court sustains the trial court's awards of civil indemnity of

P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the
victim. The same are automatically imposed upon the accused
without need of proof other than the death of the victim, owing to fact
of the commission of homicide.55 However, the trial court’s award in
favor of the heirs of the victim of P30,000.00 as temperate damages
must be increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to People v. Jugueta56.

Furthermore, 6% interest per annum is imposed on all monetary

awards, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence that all damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of judgment until full payment. 57

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Judgment dated March 29,

2019 convicting accused-appellant of homicide is affirmed, subject to
the modification that the award of temperate damages is increased to
P50,000.00, and accused-appellant is further ordered to pay interest
at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum on all the damages
awarded to the heirs of the victim, to be computed from date of finality
of this judgment until full payment. In all other respects, the
Judgment dated March 29, 2019 is affirmed.
54
Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
55
People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 788 SCRA 331, April 5, 2016.
56
Supra.
57
People vs. Jugueta, supra.
CA-G.R. CR No. 43449 20
People vs. Lordios
DECISION
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SO ORDERED.

FERNANDA LAMPAS PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA
Associate Justice

TITA MARILYN B. PAYOYO-VILLORDON

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

FERNANDA LAMPAS PERALTA

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division