Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . LEO ECHEGARAY

y PILO , accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; REGARDED WITH

DISFAVOR IN CASE AT BAR. — This is one occasion where an a davit of desistance must
be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court
that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant. This court
explained in the case of People vs. Gerry Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, promulgated on
November 19, 1996, that: "As pointed out in People vs. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990],
which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an a davit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the
retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the
witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." In the case at bar, all that the accused-
appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh
the positive identi cation and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the
a davit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed,
must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant,
particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RULE IS THAT THE CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE MISTAKE OF THE
COUNSEL; EXCEPTION. — The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or
mistakes of his counsel. One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross
incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect,
from having his day in court to defend himself.
3. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POSSESSES POWER TO SECURE THE SOCIETY
AGAINST THREATENED AND ACTUAL EVIL. — One of the indispensable powers of the
state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this,
the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that de ne and punish illegal acts
that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws,
and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; DEATH SENTENCE; IMPOSABLE WHERE THE LAW
ITSELF PROVIDES THEREFOR. — In Harden, we ruled: "The penalty complained of is neither
cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life." (81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948]). Consequently, we have time and
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again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality
or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in speci c and
well-de ned criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that: ". . . there
are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition on certain cases,
it is the duty of judicial o cers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions." (88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951]) and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People
vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR THE RESTORATION THEREOF. — Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose
the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." This power is not
subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing
of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The constitutional exercise of this
limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress de ne or describe
what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the de nition or description set in the
death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in
which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the de nition
or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death
penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in
the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should rst be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant
that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes," for the
same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, nds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEINOUS CRIME, DEFINED. — In the second whereas clause of the
preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we nd the de nition or description of heinous crimes. Said
clause provides that: ". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society." Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 (1995) traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the
Early Spartans words, "haineus," meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from
the Greek prefix "haton," denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. We find the foregoing
de nition or description to be a su cient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous
crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the
accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and
effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority su cient
leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A.
No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more exible penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. No. 7659, IDENTIFIES CRIMES WARRANTING MANDATORY
DEATH PENALTY AS WELL AS THOSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA TO
DEATH. — Insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identi ed crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A.
No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable
than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their
heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass
on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A.
No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the
crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the exible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In the
rst place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it
speci es circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by
the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN IMPOSABLE. — Construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari materia with
the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances
attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty, and (2) other circumstances
attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without di culty, we understand the rationale for
the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize
the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an in nity of circumstances that
may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil
that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law
each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is su cient thus that R.A. No. 7659
provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTORATION THEREOF; RATIONALE. — The death penalty is imposed
in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals
and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any
rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have
held in the case of People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29,
1996 "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the
victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an outrage upon decency and dignity
that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM : p
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case a rming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The
crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely led a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the
ling of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We nd no substantial
arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian
R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion raises the following
grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon
by the offended party and her mother before the ling of the complaint acted as a
bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a de nite allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant
from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in nding that the accused-appellant was the
father or stepfather of the complainant and in a rming the sentence of death
against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19 (
I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues:
(1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and ndings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question
of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor
raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the rst time on appeal
before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay
Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 1
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the
rst time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
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It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the
defense attempted to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the
alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the
alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in Parañaque during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the
accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have
caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-
appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of
conviction, we are asked to consider for the rst time, by way of a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the a davit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to
the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in
the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately
defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance
that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death
Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial
court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the
only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the A davit of Desistance which
touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution
of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any time, even during appeal. 2
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in
open court that she had signed an A davit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly
pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter
might do the same sexual assaults to other women." 3 Thus, this is one occasion where an
a davit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her
tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare, 4 that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also
cited by the accused-appellant, an a davit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with
the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given
by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge." 5
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identi cation and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the a davit of desistance, which
the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the
criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's
jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel. 6 One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way
that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court
to defend himself. 7
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to
whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the required
ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to
his client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the
time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof.
Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for
Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his
line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted
from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he
acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The
main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous
counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of
conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment
for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that
our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law
was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in
the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization
throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state
power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual person with
inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to
serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against
threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts
criminal laws that de ne and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own
subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences
the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes
of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been
perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal
Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty
provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for
the death penalty in speci ed crimes under speci c circumstances. As early as 1886,
though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code,
which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of
Harden v. Director of Prison, 8 People v. Limaco, 9 People v. Camano, 1 0 People v. Puda 1 1
and People v. Marcos, 1 2 In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.'" 1 3
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law
itself provides therefor in speci c and well-de ned criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the
1951 case of Limaco that:
". . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as
long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial o cers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions." 14
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, quali ed piracy, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The
list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the
times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the
1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for
leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more
laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-
Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted
penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an
unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led
to the nulli cation of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the
people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a
rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working
committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr.as
Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill
of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive nes shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, or the death penalty in icted. Death penalty already imposed shall
be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus
among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on
how the abolition was to be done — whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution or by the legislature — and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
". . . [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be
done by the Constitution — in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature —
or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the
death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the
convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be
saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous
for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from
time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more
valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So, basically,
this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in support of the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty". 16
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate
that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama rst pointed out that "never in our
history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith
during the last decade". 1 7 Ultimately, the dissent de ned itself to an unwillingness to
absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the
face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico
F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution,
we should afford some amount of exibility to future legislation," 18 and his concern was
ampli ed by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A.
Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Teodoro C. Padilla put it
succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. . . . At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. . . . So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right
even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of
view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact . . . we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is
needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or not
under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular
stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever under
all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine,
under certain speci ed conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of the
death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe this
Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a
month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even
the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the
most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating
circumstances." 1 9
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The
move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod,
Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations
even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
". . . [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the
Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and con
have been given. . . . But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the
legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in
effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this
piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the
legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the
legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us
not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal
Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of
legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to
the legislature to impose this again.
. . . The temper and condition of the times change . . . and so we, I think we
should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that
we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to
the legislature 100 percent." 20
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it,
followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive nes shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment in icted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty
provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of the
scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be
capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra, 21 we stated that "in view of the abolition of the death
penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be
imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" 22
thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of
the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods,
to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay, 23 People v.
Atencio 24 and People v. Intino 2 5 divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of
reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal
maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the
three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz, 26 however, we
reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not re ect the intention of the framers. The crux of the
issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty,
for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one
where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be
read from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot
as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be
divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These
should be maintained intact. cdt
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for
it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language,
while rather awkward, is still plain enough". 27
Nothing is more de ning of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the
death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process
consisting of: rst, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or
not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a erce and ery exchange of arguments for and against
capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty.
The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body

suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the
Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death
penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote
on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a
vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties
as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against
the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal
Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx xxx xxx

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would rst
decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and
thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill
in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the
death penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on
which death penalty would be imposed. It a rmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime,
and that certain re nements on how the penalty would be imposed would be left
to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx xxx xxx

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAÑADA
In reply to Senator Tañada's query, the Chair a rmed that even if a

senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic
policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of
penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down,
the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules,
but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be
appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to
it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.

REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a
penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised
Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death
penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which
the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the
constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the
death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply
because the crime is heinous." 28
With seventeen (17) a rmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention,
the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the
scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was
subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate
of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the
committee would be the determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on
the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to
why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not de ne or punish
crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator
Tolentino stated:
". . . [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty
on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of drafting a
bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this
Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed
originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death
penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on
heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was
affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in
the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed — all
provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by
the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such
penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles
of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional
provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code
itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the
proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the speci c
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended or
both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally
repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained.
And some of them had to be amended because the Committee thought that
amendments were proper." 2 9
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it

would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely de ned
and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
". . . [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that
the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised
Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death
penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we
thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as
heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole

trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special
bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to de ne the crime for which the death
penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of
kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same —
merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of
keeping the de nition of the crime as the same and merely adding some
aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses
originally punished in the Revised Penal Code." 3 0
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until
August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding
the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for which
the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of
the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of
each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a signi cantly higher incidence of
each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution was rati ed by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
rati cation. 3 1 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with
su cient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes
as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina
concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative,
Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the
State has done everything in its command so that it can be justi ed to use an inhuman
punishment called death penalty". 3 2 The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even
the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice
system that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of
a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the
absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions,
Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers
to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to speci c crimes. He added that one crime
may not have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the
public demand to impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason. 3 3
Equally t to the task was Senator Wigberto Tañada to whom the battle lines were
clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: rst, the de nition of "heinous crimes" as
provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for
each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his
objections to the bill:
"Senator Tañada. . . . But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President?
Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or
are crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and
malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that
is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most
important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should
consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea of
the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government have
made them fall under the classi cation of heinous crimes. The compelling reason
for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery
becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then
there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.
Senator Tañada . With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President,
does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for
the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly
stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are
these crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the
reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino . Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by

the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the
compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute
measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to show
these compelling reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when
converted into law, would be su cient notice as to what were considered
compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these
different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would
suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court
would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be
applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for
each and every offense.
Senator Tañada . Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially
the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling
reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly
define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law,

this is su cient. The question of whether there is due process will more or less be
a matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution
with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive
law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Tañada . Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the
reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death
penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and

3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does

the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as
well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino . Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I

believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state why
a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the
Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the
Supreme Court will fell as a su cient compelling reason or as to the heinous
nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the
matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will
go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So
that would be entirely separate from the matter of due process." 3 4
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated
our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment,
the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clari ed, however, that in the
United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on
them for consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the
plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this
respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and
protocol considering that these agreements have reached only the committee level. 3 5
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No.
891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) a rmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and
one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993
was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress,
earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty
for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the
Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill
No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which
was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives on October
27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781,
955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower
House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed
the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional
pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling

reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for
it. . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then
Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the
death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it
merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it
at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the ne provision, Comm.

Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the nal say on the subject, because, at
some future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through
initiative and referendum.

Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is

entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today.
xxx xxx xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness
in which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a
patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes — the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses,
and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them
because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by
the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their sel sh interest above that
of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the agrantly violent

manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and
order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness
and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock
the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely
daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the epitome
of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young

business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our
people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultman, a comely 16 year-old high

school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the
hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities
of Christians and non-Christians alike. cdasia
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom

Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines,
is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn
in utter disgust.
xxx xxx xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by

this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming
clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law
Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve,
there are sown the seeds of anarchy — of self-help, of vigilante justice and
lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands and exact
vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill
No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to

listen to our constituents and heed their plea — a plea for life, liberty and pursuit
of their happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat
that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for
justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future
animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their sel sh interest over and above
that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that

we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty." 3 6
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House
of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to
the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death
penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more uni ed in the perception of what crimes
are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the
imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing
general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of
Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not
only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for
other heinous crimes such as treason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape
as de ned by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally de ned
circumstances; plunder, as de ned in R.A. 7080; piracy, as de ned under Section
2 of PD 532; carnapping, as de ned in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner,
driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as de ned in . . . RA 6235; and arson
resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which quali es them to the
level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and
civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is de ned as a breach of allegiance to a

government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1
Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of delity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their
sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his
or her own will in some unidenti ed . . . house by a group of scoundrels who are
strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any
person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is
being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the
commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees
it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason
of the robbery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange
for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the
parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the
traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and
permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to
undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the

universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers
and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no
one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims. For
the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil
motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of
an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of subjecting
the passengers to terrorism." 3 7
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993.
On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on
third reading. 3 8 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of
Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to
incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal
Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect. 3 9
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time,
criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-
appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for
raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's a rmation of his
death sentence and raises for the rst time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659.
His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having
been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty
for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's
view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin requirements
of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as
unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the
following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes".
This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject
to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails (1) that Congress de ne or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance
with the de nition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed
upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to
be heinous in accordance with the de nition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we nd the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
". . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40 traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning,
hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek pre x "haton", denoting acts
so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We nd the foregoing de nition or description to be a su cient criterion of what is
to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime,
its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the
sentencing authority su cient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the
appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of
death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Tañada
grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of
capital crimes without a speci cation of the elements that make them heinous. They were
oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: rst,
there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were
crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain
specified qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death:

(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more
than three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c)
serious physical injuries were in icted on the victim or threats to kill
him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice;
(b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane
for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public utilities;
(e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
a crime; (f) an arsenal, reworks factory, or government museum; and
(g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an
inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is
perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is
committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or
more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and
committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs (Id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (Id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (Id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain speci ed amounts
(Id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (Id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (Id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (Id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec.
15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs
confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of
another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of
them being not mandatory death but the exible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In other words, it is premature to demand for a speci cation of the heinous elements in
each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with
death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in
these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to
impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has,
in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the
accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of signi cance to
the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society, which
circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society. cda
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed
in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public o cer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public o cer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the
death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing
acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of
death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec.
10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or a nity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military

authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is a icted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof,
the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a
prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use
the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person

using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20
of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec.
14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case
where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using
the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall
be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government o cials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6,
7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19
of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found
guilty or any of the same offenses are government officials, employees or officers
including members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the

mandatory death penalty if convicted are government o cials, employees or
officers
"Any such above government o cial, employee or o cer who is found
guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to
implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum
[of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is speci cally against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness
must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an
animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her
growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life,
and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual
personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he
or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and
needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were in icted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the signi cance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state nds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for
its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and
psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like quali ed bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government o cials, employees or o cers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identi ed crimes warranting the mandatory penalty
of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death,
they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The
proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic
review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in
exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing
the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the
crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the exible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
In the rst place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659,
while it speci es circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be
punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari
materia with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating
circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of
the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other
circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the
same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death,
albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without di culty, we
understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize
circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is
an in nity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same extent
that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not
foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is su cient
thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal
situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we
are not unaware of the ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of
executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete
with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application
of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that
the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we note
that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of
the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous crime and
statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are
either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards
of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic
agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether
eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until
we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission. cda
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms rst be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort
to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled
criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required
by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and signi cant change in the socio-
cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only
of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an
unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the
death penalty rst proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there
was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty
was suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent
during the years before its suspension. Su ce it to say that the constitution in the rst
place did not require that the death penalty be rst proven to be a deterrent; what it
requires is that there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in
the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should rst be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant
that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the
same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, nds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of
the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant rst claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia. 4 1 To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled
that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of
the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black
accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road
of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously ghting against racial discrimination.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not
restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties.
Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing
these crimes should die . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no
permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of
judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be
selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.
They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per
se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nulli ed all discretionary death penalty statutes in
Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and
sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards
intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases,
prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their
death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by the U.S.
Supreme Court, said court a rmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes
in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 4 2 Jurek v. Texas, 4 3 and Profitt v. Florida. 4 4
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does
not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies
on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia. 4 5
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
". . . It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it
always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established
that imposing capital punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the
procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the
in rmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment
statute in Furman v. Georgia . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

In Gregg [v. Georgia] . . . the Court's judgment was that the death penalty
for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe
punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court
reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed
for other crimes. . . .
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as re ected in the statutes
providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In
reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that
had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital
felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three
provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes —
Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty
was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those
decisions, again revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death
penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to
our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes since July
2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that
had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to
Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for which
death was an authorized punishment.
xxx xxx xxx

It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized
the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and
the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the
death sentence was mandatory. . . . The upshot is that Georgia is the sole
jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of
death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions
provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not
wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily
on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman.
. . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly

con rms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the
personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege
of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short
of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it
normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will
and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by
physical injury to the female and can also in ict mental and psychological
damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public
injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of

moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjusti ed taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by de nition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer
kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' . . . is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: rst, that the
public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while
concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical
privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the rst ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of
whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of
the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have
already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life
simply because life was taken, never was a de ning essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable
acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive
effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they
have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court
has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the
case of People v. Cristobal: 4 6
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and
physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave
damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . .
an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society
itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the
heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question
to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing
with the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with even more
basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the
meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the
rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if in nitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet
the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized
hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears
harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to
retain su cient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that
tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital
punishment is a . . . necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social
tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge
in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of
social survival." 47
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED 48 for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I wish to
believe, a humane and compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a society that recognizes the good in every
man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow, however, certain
vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human life continues, at
least in some penal systems, to be an acceptable punishment.
In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death
penalty has recently been resolved with the rati cation, on 02 February 1987, of the
Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:
"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive nes shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment in icted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely apply
and interpret the law. It cannot, and it will not, spare itself from this constitutionally-
mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge of its grave
responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest caution and strictest
circumspection for there can be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be
graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound
discretion of the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the
conditions that the fundamental law has set forth, viz:
(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the
death penalty; and
(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of
the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or
just because of it.
The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the
1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute
prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from bad to worse.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous nature" of
the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be
spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime could
become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death, or in the crime of rape when
the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.
I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional at
(now being raised for the rst time in the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the
imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.
I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the next
lower penalty than death).
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 led by his
newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the rst time a very crucial ground for his
defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration led by his previous
counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by
this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 19. (1 ) Excessive nes shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment in icted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for
(Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been
written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the
imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty
of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is signi cant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely
suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the
statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any
death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while
the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate,
Mme. Justice Ameur na Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr.
Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he
had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death
penalty. This became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception
and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty
from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future
time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds
"compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is
emphatic (even if "awkward" 10 ): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not
absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became
effective; and
(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or de ne or characterize as
"heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the
existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could
exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I
emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and
courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to
"provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special
laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the
Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its
provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify
the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death
penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as
follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which
was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited
authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did
Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the
death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not de ne or characterize the meaning of
"heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a
standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness
of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited
power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas"
clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insu cient de nition
or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no
useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness
can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for
an objective juridical de nition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not
detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with
thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction
to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the
authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as
the maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of
aggravating circumstances. 16 There's nothing really new that Congress did which it could
not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental law. cdt
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already
punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and quali ed bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659.
The offenses punished by death under said law were already so punishable by the Revised
Penal Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not
have any impact upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in
enacting the capital punishment law.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose
Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 1 9
"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and
from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had
already death as the maximum penalty."
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were
already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress, I submit, has not
ful lled its speci c and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission
intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would
not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it
did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make
its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only
from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an
amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes
could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or
"brutal murder of a rape victim". 2 0 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the
debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that,
when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind
the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:
1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have
an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or
viciousness unheard of until then; or
2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient
like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity,
odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried
out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty,
atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to
qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a
homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution
also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital
penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some
attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is
sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe
that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words
of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very speci c reasons" requiring the return of
the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659,
Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel
Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 2 3
"MR. LAGMAN:
So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .

MR. GARCIA (P.).
The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is
one.
MR. LAGMAN.
So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or
serve as an anchor for the justi cation of the reimposition of the death
penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman
claims that is one of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this
particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the other compelling
reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.)
Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice
was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty?
Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an
organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be
punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense
committed.
MR. LAGMAN.
The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the
compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to
reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987
Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a
commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in
1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people
ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because
of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice
demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who
have committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justi cations of "worsening

peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not
"compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that
these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show
that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did
not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect,
and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate 2 4 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
"MR. LAGMAN.
Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from
Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).

The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN.
So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the
volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the
crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was
reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of
robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN.
No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question .
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN.
This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the
Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN.
Obviously the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of
robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to
16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman con rm that,
Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the same
document.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22
percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent.
Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.)

As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not
want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have
here.
MR. LAGMAN.
But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.).

The document speaks for itself ."
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the
number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as
compared to 1991: 2 5
"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the
persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the gure dropped to 2,686
in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in
1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-
related cases are concerned, the gure continued a downward trend, and there
was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death

penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous
crimes." 2 6 However no statistical data, no su cient proof, empirical or otherwise, have
been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription
of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof.
This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another
proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and
inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued inde nitely. 28 This
debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen
the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is
included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the
accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the rst one ordained at Malolos,
guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 3 1 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in
dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact forti ed by its
other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 3 2 expressly prohibits
any form of torture 3 3 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the
individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the
moment of conception 3 4 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology
and education. 3 5
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people
more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict
application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the nal and
irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly
and even religion. But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life.
Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the
death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Pro le
of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights
this sad fact:
"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been
sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at
the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per
month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year.
From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an
average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed in 1995.
(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent (21%)

earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent
(27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000
monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999,
four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn
between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise
only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%).
Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two
percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another ve percent (5%) earning
variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they
earn in a month.
(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn
below the government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of
these earn below the o cial poverty line set by government . Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the
middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn
variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fteen (15) convicts
do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn
nothing at all.
(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are
agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or
almost one- fth thereof, are farmers. Thirty ve percent (35%) are in the transport
and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in
allied elds (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport
workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of
them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries,
with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or sh, cigarette or rice
vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards,
shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
clerks, janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are
government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP,
PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives
comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication .
About forty four percent (44%), orslightly less than half speak and understand
Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand
Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national
and speaks and understand Niponggo.
(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about
forty seven percent (47%) nished varying levels of elementary education with
twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty ve percent (35%) ,
fty eight (58) convicts, nished varying levels of high school, with more than
half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts nished vocational
education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."
The foregoing pro le based on age, language and socio-economic situations

su ciently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless
in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital crimes, where
extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best
example to show the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial
issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings ill the trial court and
even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in
a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves
complicated, intimidating and damning. The effect of having a death penalty that is
imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the
latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal
balance of the scales of justice. cdtai
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular,
the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that
regardless of the socio-economic pro le of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment
does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the
underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the
law would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved
be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the
penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of
people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and
employment opportunities, are consequently con ned to living, working and subsisting in
less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as
themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the
death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise,
such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a
much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the
situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what
they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our
laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves,
they can be powered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for
such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that
we cannot better ourselves individually to any signi cant degree if we are unable to
advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution
point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively in icts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of
cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all
hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal,
judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It
did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the
death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a statute
denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny
equal justice to the underprivileged.liblex
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be
ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent
requirements:
(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which

the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from
the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why
and how these circumstances de ne or characterize the crime as
"heinous".
(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and speci c
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution
compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these
requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of
the speci c constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must ow from
the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling
reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just for all
crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to

the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 3 8 While the
Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong, acknowledges the power
of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative
only to "cases of extreme gravity." 3 9 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical
Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 4 0 40a "punishment must be carefully evaluated and
decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases
of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend
society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably
abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the
primacy of human life over and above even the state which man created precisely to
protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment
only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly
permits it only for reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity",
which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply
discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to
prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for under RA 7659,"
and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.

Footnotes
1. 249 SCRA 303, 307-308.
2. See Amigo v. Court of Appeals , 253 SCRA 382, 390 [1996]; De Leon v. Court of Appeals , 245
SCRA 166, 172 [1995].
3. RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 19.
4. G.R. No. 108871 promulgated on November 19, 1996.
5. People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695 [1982]; citing People v. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469 [1960].
6. Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , 245
SCRA 384, 389 [1995]; Arambulo v. Court of Appeals , 226 SCRA 589, 601 [1993]; Que v.
Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980].
7. Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 274, 279-280 [1993].
8. 81 Phil. 741 [1948].
9. 88 Phil. 36 [1951].
10. 115 SCRA 688 [1982].
11. 133 SCRA 1 [1984].
12. 147 SCRA 204 [1987].
13. 81 Phil. 741, 747 [1948].

14. 88 Phil. 36, 43 [1951].
15. 249 SCRA 246, 253 [1995].
16. Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 676.
17. Id., p. 678.
18. Id., p. 680.
19. Record, CONCOM, July 17, 1986, Vol. I, p. 712.
20. Id., p. 744.

21. 155 SCRA 327 [1987].
22. Id., p. 335.
23. 155 SCRA 113 [1987].
24. 156 SCRA 242 [1987].
25. 165 SCRA 637 [1988].
26. 170 SCRA 107 [1989].
27. Id., p. 121.

28. Journal, Senate, February 15, 1993, Vol. 2, p. 1246.
29. Record, Senate, March 17, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 77.
30. Id., May 18, 1993, Vol. IV, p. 596.
31. Record, Senate, March 18, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 106-112.
32. Journal, February 10 & 11, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1223.
33. Journal, Senate, March 22, 1993, Vol. II, pp. 1574-1575.
34. Record, Senate, May 11, 1993, Vol. IV, pp. 500-501.
35. Journal, Senate, February 2, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1161.

36. Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp. 417-418.
37. Record, House of Representatives, Vol. III, November 9, 1992, pp. 419-420.
38. Record, House of Representatives, Vol. V, February 23, 1993, p. 98.
39. People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994].
40. 251 SCRA 293 [1995].
41. 408 US 238, 33 L Ed 2d 346, 92 S Ct. 2726.
42. 428 US 153 49 L Ed 2d 859, 96 S Ct 2909.

43. 428 US 262, 49 L Ed 2d 929, 96 S Ct 2950.
44. 428 US 242, 49 L Ed 2d 913, 96 S Ct 2960.
45. 433 US 584, 53 L Ed 2d 982, 97 S Ct 286.
46. G.R. No. 116279, promulgated on January 29, 1996.
47. Donald Atwell Zoll, "A Wistful Goodbye to Capital Punishment," National Review, December
3, 1971, pp. 1351-1354.
48. Three members of the Court voted to declare RA. 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
reimposes the death penalty. Two of them wrote Separate Opinions, which are attached
as annexes hereto, without indicating the names of the authors consistent with the
Court's policy that, in death cases, ponentes of opinions — whether majority or minority
— are not to be indicated.
SEPARATE OPINION:
1. It is called "Supplemental" because there was a (main) Motion for Reconsideration led by
the previous counsel of the accused, which this Court already denied.
2. The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group — Pablito V. Sanidad,
Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R. Abaya and Ma.
Victoria I. Diokno — led its Notice of Appearance dated August 22, 1996 only on August
23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision of this Court was promulgated on June 25, 1996.
3. Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.
4. The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the rst time only on appeal. See, for
instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13,
1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995;
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21,
1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the question of constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7659 in this case, anticipating that the same question would be raised anyway in
many other subsequent instances. The Court resolved to determine and dispose of the
issue once and for all, at the rst opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved just
because it was raised after the promulgation of the decision a rming conviction may
result in grave injustice.
5. In People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989, the Court, prior to the enactment and
effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 9-6 (J. Cruz, ponente, C.J. Fernan, JJ. Gutierrez,
Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, concurring) that the
death penalty was not abolished but only prohibited from being imposed. But see also
the persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice Ameur na Melencio-Herrera (joined
b y JJ. Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who contended that the
Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and removed it from the statute books.
People vs. Muñoz reversed the earlier "abolition" doctrine uniformly held in People vs.
Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987, (per C.J. Yap); People vs. Masangkay, 155
SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per J. Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA
242, December 10, 1987 (per C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these cases are revisited by
this Court.
6. This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676 (July 17, 1986)
as follows:
"Fr. Bernas:
xxx xxx xxx
"My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on
whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution — in which case it cannot be restored by
the legislature — or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman
for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals,
hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man.
The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial
should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution
intended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summary of the reasons
which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty.
(emphasis supplied)
7. Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 129.
8. Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a statute which
allows an exception to a constitutional right (against warrantless arrests) should be
strictly construed.
9. In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus curiae in People vs.
Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that RA
7659 has validly restored the death penalty which may now be imposed provided that
the prosecution proves, and the court is convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty of a
crime designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied by
aggravating circumstances as de ned by Arts. 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c)
the accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which can be characterized
by the court as making the crime "heinous", and (d) that the execution of the offender is
demanded by "compelling reasons" related to the offense. In other words, according to
him, it is the courts — not Congress — that have the responsibility of determining the
heinousness of a crime and the compelling reason for its imposition upon a particular
offender, depending on the facts of each case. I cannot however subscribe to this view.
The Constitution clearly identi es Congress as the sovereign entity which is given the
onus of fulfilling these two constitutional limitations.
10. People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 121.
11. Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos, 234 SCRA 555, 569,
July 29, 1994; People vs. Godoy , 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995; People vs. Albert,
251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
12. Art. 114 — Treason; Art. 123 — Quali ed Piracy; Art. 246 — Parricide; Art. 248 — Murder; Art.
255 — Infanticide; Art. 267 — Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Art. 294 —
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Art. 320 — Destructive Arson;
Art. 335 — Rape.
13. Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
14. Section 2, RA 7080 — Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of RA 6425 — Prohibited
Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425 — Carnapping.
15. A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Second
Edition 1990; Martin, Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The function of the
preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to confer power or determine
rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or effect of a statute.
(C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Volume IA, sec.
§20.03).
16. Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty for rape, regardless
of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, "(w)hen by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed," or when it is
"committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated" in said section.
17. While plunder and quali ed bribery are "new" capital offenses, RA 7659 nonetheless fails to
justify why they are considered heinous. In addition, the speci c compelling reasons for
the prescribed penalty of death are not laid out by the statute.
18. In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances which the
prosecution must prove before courts can impose the extreme penalty. Just the same
however, the law did not explain why said circumstances would make the crimes
heinous. Neither did it set forth the compelling reasons therefor.
19. Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993, Volume III, No.
48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
20. I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742-743:
"MR. SUAREZ. The Gentleman advisedly used the words 'heinous crimes', whatever is the
pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give examples of 'heinous crimes'? For example,
would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution or dope smuggling fall
within the quali cation of a heinous offender such as to preclude the application of the
principle of abolition of death penalty?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that would qualify for
a heinous crime. Another would be organized murder. In other words, yesterday there
were many arguments for and against, and they all had merit. But in the contemporary
society, we recognize the sacredness of human life and — I think it was Honorable Laurel
who said this yesterday — it is only God who gives and takes life. However, the voice of
the people is also the voice of God, and we cannot presume to have the wisdom of the
ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which
we should not preclude today. We know that this is very di cult question. The fact that
the arguments yesterday were quite impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this
is far from a well-settled issue. At least in my personal opinion, we would like the death
penalty to be abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National Assembly,
in its wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose the death penalty for
the common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman's de nition of 'heinous crimes.' Would the
brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling within that classification?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority. He would,
therefore, add as an aggravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of his position in
authority.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you."
21. Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US 40, like
"gratuitous violence" or "needless mutilation" of the victim.
22. Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:
"WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the loss
of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected the nation's
efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the same
time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability to
maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need
to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, nds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;"
23. Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Volume IV,
February 10, 1993, p. 674, emphasis supplied.
24. Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Vol. III, November
10, 1992, p. 448; emphasis supplied.
25. Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993, Volume III, No.
50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176-177.
26. See "Sponsorship Remarks" of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House of
Representatives, November 9, 1992, pp. 40-42.
27. Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners Joaquin Bernas
and Napoleon Rama (I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 678):
FR. BERNAS. When some experts appeared before us and we asked them if there was evidence
to show that the death penalty had deterred the commission of deadly crimes, none of
them was able to say that there was evidence, conclusive evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA. I am curious. Who are these experts then — social scientist or penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS. Penologists.

MR. RAMA. Of course, we are aware that there is also another school of thought here, another
set of experts, who would swear that the death penalty discourages crimes or criminality.
Of course, Commissioner Bernas knows that never in our history has there been a higher
incidence of crime. I say that criminality was at its zenith during the last decade.
FR. BERNAS. Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.
MR. RAMA. Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death penalty. At any rate,
does the sponsor think that in removing the death penalty, it would not affect, one way
or another, the crime rate of the country?
FR. BERNAS. The position taken by the majority of those who voted in favor of this provision is
that means other than the death penalty should be used for the prevention of crime."
28. Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and Control, United
Nations Social Affairs Division. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Vienna,
1988, p. 110.
29. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The Bill of Rights, (Second Edition,
1972, p. 4) states: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable without an
assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure that
in the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every
human being is duly safeguarded. . . ." In the context of the role of a bill of rights the vast
powers of government are clearly to be exercise within the limits set by the constitution,
particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City Mayor
of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that the exercise of police power, insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry.
The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III of the Constitution embraces life, liberty and
property. In the words of Justice Roberto Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez, (99 Phil.
515,551-2 [1956]), " . . . individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a
republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satis ed with guaranteeing its enjoyment
in the very rst paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our
Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom. . .
." These guarantees are preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
30. See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995, and People vs.
Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702-703, November 10, 1995.
31. At. III, Sec. 1.
32. Art. III, Sec. 11.
33. Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
34. Art. II, Sec. 12.
35. Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
36. For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant dated September
26, 1996 led by the Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs. Malabago, G.R. No.
115686, December 2, 1996.
37. The FLAG-submitted Pro le states that 186 have been sentenced to death by trial courts
since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star issue of December 9, 1996, page 17,
however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera, the total number of death row
inmates has gone up to 267, as of November, 1996, of whom more than one half (139)
are rape convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila
Standard) in their February 3, 1997 issue up the death row gure to 300, as of the end of
January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at the end of 1997.
38. The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the "sovereign Filipino people's"
imploration of the "aid of Almighty God".
39. Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:
"2266. Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor unable to
in ict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as
well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by
means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases
of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons those holding authority
have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the community in their charge.
40. Evangelium Vitae, items no. 55 and 56, states:
"55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the image of God is
present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from the
beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases which occur in the life of
individuals and society, Christian re ection has sought a fuller and deeper
understanding of what God's commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in fact,
situations in which values proposed by God's Law seem to involve a genuine paradox.
This happens for example in the case of legitimate defense, in which the right to protect
one's own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are di cult to reconcile in
practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to love oneself no less than
others are the basis of a true right to self-defense. The demanding commandment of
love of neighbor, set forth in the Old Testament and con rmed by Jesus, itself
presupposes love of oneself as the basis of comparison: "You shall love your neighbor
as yourself ' (Mk 12:31). Consequently, no one can renounce the right to self-defense out
of lack of love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love which
deepens and trans gures the love of self into a radical self-offering, according to the
spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes (cf. Mt. 5:38-40). The sublime example of this self-
offering is the Lord Jesus himself.
Moreover, 'legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible
for another's life, the common good of the family or of the State.' Unfortunately it
happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes
involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor
whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because
of a lack of the use of reason.
56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty . On this matter there
is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be
applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must
be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice even more in line with human
dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of
the punishment which society in icts is "to redress the disorder caused by the offence."
Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on
the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to
regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also ful lls the purpose of
defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the
offender an incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
Its is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of
executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it
would not be possible other wise to defend society. Today however, as a result of steady
improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not
practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid:
"If bloodless means are su cient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to
protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such
means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good
and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person."

Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force

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Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Free Legal Assistance Group Anti-Death Penalty Task Force

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . LEO ECHEGARAY

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; REGARDED WITH

b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

In reply to Senator Tañada's query, the Chair a rmed that even if a

The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it

Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole

Senator Tolentino . Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law,

2. There are compelling reasons; and

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does

Senator Tolentino . Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I

'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the ne provision, Comm.

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We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the agrantly violent

Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young

The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultman, a comely 16 year-old high

The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by

As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to

Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that

For instance, the crime of treason is de ned as a breach of allegiance to a

Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the

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(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

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2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person

(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly

Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of

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So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker?. . .

Yes, Mr. Speaker.

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justi cations of "worsening

MR. GARCIA (P.).

So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. GARCIA (P.)

MR. GARCIA (P.).

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty-one percent (21%)

The foregoing pro le based on age, language and socio-economic situations