Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12,
They alleged similarly with
1998
Per Curiam
Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the
first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the
mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act
No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying
out the lethal injection against him under the grounds
that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of
the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary
of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal
protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court
has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized
under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to
apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does
not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae.
Echegaray’s arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments.
The court gave due course to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and
its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster
for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of
our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.
Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the
dosage for each drug to be administered, and the
procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused;
(2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of execution,
which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and
suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of
"botched executions" or mistakes in administering the
drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,
degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For
reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No.
8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is
uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of
execution, and the date of execution and time of
notification of the death convict. As petitioner already
knows, the "court" which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.
The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen
(15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter,
the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is
there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the
time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section
15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction
with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177
which provides that the death sentence shall be carried
out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen
(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executory, without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek
executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and
spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton
pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an
untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and
administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders
lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented
evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only
of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.
Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States
wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in
prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without
any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third
paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should
be trained prior to the performance of such task. We
must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid
inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a
limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution
does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights
states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent
court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be
imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor
ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which
define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence
during the lethal injection as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is
sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict." The legislature also mandated that "all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such
task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose
would be served by requiring greater detail. The
question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No.
8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion
by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not
be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which omission is an impermissible contravention of the
provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was applicable law.
supposed to be confidential.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the aforecited must not override, but instead remain
implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply
has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the and implement.
manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of
review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of
the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections
could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary
of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the

Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of
the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.
Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances
when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF

THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection
shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three
years next following the date of the sentence or while
she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70)
years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall
be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for

being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid
exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended,
without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.
No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be
inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over
seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17
of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the
three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This
addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-
based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. PASAY by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., et al. (G.R. No. members should not and cannot be required to exercise
L-37878) any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
Ponente: Malcolm, J. judicial functions."

FACTS The SC held that because the power it has is exclusively

In its petition filed before the Supreme Court, Manila
Electric Company (MEC) asked members of the
Supreme Court to convene as arbitrators in order to
determine the compensation to be paid to MEC by
transportation companies that use the MEC-owned
Pasig bridge.
MEC cited Sec. 11 of Act No. 1446, the law which
granted franchise to MEC to operate an electric railway
and operate a power system in Manila, as its legal basis.
judicial, it would be improper and illegal for the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act
on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
Effectively, Sec. 11 of Act No. 1446 is unconstitutional
for being inconsistent with the Organic Act. Congress
cannot require or authorize the SC to exercise any other
jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty, apart
from purely judicial functions.

Said provision provides that: "Whenever any franchise or

right of way is granted to any other person or
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions
of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms
on which said other person or corporation shall use such
right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the
grantee herein by such other person or corporation for
said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."

Essentially, the subject provision requires SC justices,

who are exercising judicial functions, to also perform
administrative or quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUE
May members of the Supreme Court convene as a
board of arbitrators to determine the rate MEC may
charge to transportation companies that use MEC's
properties? -- NO.

RULING
The determination of rates following arbitration
proceedings is not a judicial function, but rather an
administrative or quasi-judicial function over which the
SC does not exercise jurisdiction.

Otherwise, it would result in an absurd situation where

members of the SC who have made an arbitration ruling
will be the same people to decide on such ruling should
the same be elevated and questioned before the
Supreme Court.

In his ruling, Justice Malcolm underscored that: "The

Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one
of the three divisions of power in our government. It is
judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised
by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government,
so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence
to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
 ITF vs Comelec
GR No 159139 13 January 2004
Facts:
RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing
COMELEC to conduct nationwide computerized election
system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for
the automated election system on 24 January 2003. The
bidding process commenced on the same month and out
of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC.
Although DOST’s evaluation report states that the two
obtained a number of failed marks in the technical
evaluation. Five individuals and entities protested the
matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.
Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition
Issue:
Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?
Decision:
The case at bar is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest, it is of paramount public
interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are
allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being
“deflected to any improper use,” or when petitioner seek
to restrain “wasting of public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”
ITFP v COMELEC
FACTS:
In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines
(lnfotech) v. Commission on Elections, the Supreme
Court (SC) nullified the COMELEC's award to Mega
Pacific Consortium of the procurement contract involving
the automated counting machines (ACMs) for the 2004
national elections. SC found that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it awarded the contract to an
entity which failed to establish itself as a proper
consortium, and despite the ACMs' failure to meet
certain technical requirements.
On January 13, 2004, SC promulgated the Decision in
lnfotech declaring as null and void: (a) COMELEC
Resolution No. 6074 which awarded the contract for
Phase II of the Comprehensive Automated Electoral
System to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC); and (b) the
procurement contract for ACMs executed between the
COMELEC and Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI).
They found that the COMELEC's failure to follow its own
rules, policies, and guidelines in respect of the bidding
process, and to adequately check and observe financial,
technical and legal requirements constituted grave
abuse of discretion. As a result of the foregoing lapses of
the COMELEC, they also directed the Ombudsman to
determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public
officials and private individuals involved in the nullified
resolution and contract.
As mandated by the Infotech Decision, the Ombudsman
initiated a fact-finding investigation. On January 21,
2004, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. also filed criminal
and administrative complaints against COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and other COMELEC
officials with the Ombudsman. Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation later filed a related
complaint with the Ombudsman against COMELEC
officials and stockholders of MPEI on September 19,
2004. The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental complaint on October
6, 2004. These cases were later on consolidated by the
Ombudsman.
In the meantime, the petitioners in the Infotech case filed
a Manifestation and Motion dated December 22, 2005,
as well as a Supplemental Motion dated January 20,
2006, alleging that the Ombudsman has yet to comply
with SC directive in the Infotech Decision. Thus, on
February 14, 2006, SC issued a Resolution directing the
Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be held in
contempt for its failure to comply with the Court's
directive. In compliance with the foregoing Resolution,
the Ombudsman filed its Comment contending that it
should not be held in contempt of court because it has
"long acted on the referral, or complied with this Court's
'directive' in this case, to its full extent." In a Resolution
dated March 28, 2006, SC directed the Ombudsman,
under pain of contempt, to submit quarterly reports to the
Court starting June 30, 2006.
On July 13, 2006, the investigating panel of the Office of
the Ombudsman reconvened to carry out further
investigation and clarificatory hearings. In all, the
investigating panel conducted a total of 12 public
hearings between July 13, 2006 and August 23, 2006,
interviewed 10 witnesses, and received no less than 198
documents.
Following these public hearings, the Ombudsman issued
a Supplemental Resolution dated September 27, 2006
which reversed and set aside the June 28, 2006
Resolution, and dismissed the administrative and
criminal complaints against both public and private
respondents for lack of probable cause. The
Supplemental Resolution stated that the Investigating
Panel "cannot find an iota of evidence to show that the
acts of [the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)] in
allowing MPC to bid and its subsequent
recommendation to award [the] Phase II Contract to
MPC constitute manifest [] partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence" and that it cannot
establish that any "unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference was extended to MPC or MP[E]I by [the] BAC
in the exercise of its administrative function in the
determination [of] MPC's eligibility and subsequent
recommendation made to [the] COMELEC." In sum, the
Ombudsman opined that a finding of grave abuse of
discretion in the lnfotech case cannot be considered
criminal in nature in the absence of evidence showing
bad faith, malice or bribery in the bidding process.
The dispositive portion of the Infotech decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court
hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution
No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES
to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null
and void is the subject Contract executed between
Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). Comelec
is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any
other contract or agreement entered into with regard to
this project.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman which shall determine the criminal liability,
if any, of the public officials (and conspiring private
individuals, if any) involved in the subject Resolution and
Contract. Let the Office of the Solicitor General also take
measures to protect the government and vindicate public
interest from the ill effects of the illegal disbursements of
public funds made by reason of the void Resolution and
Contract.
The Ombudsman maintains that it has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given the facts of the
case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, should
be filed. The respondents in G.R. No. 159139, the
COMELEC and MPEI, support the Ombudsman's
position. They point to the plain text of the dispositive
portion, i.e., the use of the phrase "if any," which clearly
demonstrates the Court's intent for the Ombudsman to
conduct its own investigation and render an independent
assessment based on whatever evidence the
Ombudsman gathers.
discretion is not necessarily indicative of probable cause.
To determine the latter, the constitutive elements of the
crime must first be considered. In the exercise of our
certiorari jurisdiction in Infotech, we only resolved
whether the COMELEC acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner. We never decided whether
the facts were sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondents were probably guilty thereof.
xxx
Having ruled that the Ombudsman did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, it is no longer necessary to belabor
the issue on contempt. Suffice it to say that our directive
to the Ombudsman was simply to determine if there was
any criminal liability on the part of the public and private
respondents in G.R. No. 159139. The Ombudsman
sufficiently complied with this directive when she found
that, based on the hearings conducted and documents
gathered, probable cause did not exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. No.
174777 is DISMISSED. The Motion dated October 17,
2006 filed by the petitioners in G.R. No. 159139 is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:
This case presents the question of whether the SC
conclusion in lnfotech that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion is tantamount to a finding of
probable cause that the COMELEC officials violated
penal laws, thereby making it the ministerial duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to file the appropriate criminal
complaints.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that:

In view of the constitutional delineation of powers, we

reject the petitioner’s contention that we already made a
determination in the Infotech case that a crime has been
committed. We could not have made such determination
without going beyond the limits of our judicial power and
thereby unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the
constitutionally created Office of the Ombudsman. In
Infotech, we only exercised our mandate to determine
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the COMELEC. However, a finding of grave abuse of
 Angara v. Electoral Commission
GR No. 45081, 63 Phil 139 [July 15, 1936]
Facts.
The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art
VI sec 4 of the 1935 Constitution (now sec 17) which
conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
ineffective for such power would be xxx subject at all
times to the regulation of the NA. The purpose of the
framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.
Administrative agencies, such as POEA, are vested with
two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-
judicial. This in itself is not violative of due process.

The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution

confirming the election of petitioner Angara as member
of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On Dec 9, 1935, the
respondent Electoral Commission formally organized for
the first time and resolved to fix the same date as the
final day of filing of election protests. Ynsua, a candidate
vying for the Angara’s position, filed his election protest
before the Electoral Commission on the same date.
Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral Commission from
taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion

Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the

Commission’s jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of such election contests. Moreover, the
Commission can regulate the proceedings of election
protests only if the NA has not availed of its primary
power to so regulate such proceedings.

Issues.
(1) Does the Electoral Commission have the
constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure
(such as fixing a deadline for filing election protests)
relating to election protests notwithstanding the lack of
express conferment of such power in the Constitution?
(2) Does it have the power to promulgate such rules
notwithstanding the resolution of the NA?

Held.
(1) Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission.

(2) Yes. The purpose of the creation of the Electoral

Commission was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the Legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging
[in the now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the NA. If the NA is permitted to claim the
power to regulate proceedings of election contests, then
the grant of power to the Commission would be
 Garcia vs. J. Drilon and
Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said
TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as
it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO
but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the
issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial
court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on
the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
2. WON the CA committed serious error in failing
to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the law
does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution
5. WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA
9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in
appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to
each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as
violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is
justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to
Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to
enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of

merit.
 MIRASOL VS CA
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a
crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops,
and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to
purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB
to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted
to the government. Believing that the proceeds were
more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners
asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it
ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans
from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their
accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle
their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the
proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations.
PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No.
579, there was nothing to account since under said law,
all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to
the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to
declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof
are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section
3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or
not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a
law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General
such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his
day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners'
stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
"any action" and not just actions involving declaratory
relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in
the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty,
presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the
Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its
implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation. Petitioners
now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for
the exercise of this power: First, there must be before
the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial review. Second, the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG,
for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, -versus-
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the
1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting
a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law
would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins,
it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
Reproductive Health Law (RH Law), because, among
others, it violates the right to life of the unborn.
Notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra- uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation
of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization.
However, the section of the RH-IRR allows
“contraceptives” and recognizes as “abortifacient” only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb. This cannot be done. Evidently, with the addition
of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The
State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
Contrary to the OSG’s position, these provisions are
self-executing. At this point, the Court is of the strong
view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision in Section 9 covering
the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is
not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. (NO)

RULING:
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives
that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non- abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible. The clear and unequivocal intent of the
Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of
the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion.
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with
this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
G.R. No. 208566, EN BANC, November 19, 2013 determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise
GRECO BELGICA, et al. –versus- EXECUTIVE of the power of appropriation as described in the
SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., et al. Bengzon case, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the
agencies must be confined to details for regulating the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.
FACTS:
Starting 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional and
the likely source of the congressmen’s kickbacks.
Unfortunately, for lack of “any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common
exercise of unscrupulous members of the congress,” the
petition was dismissed. In July 2013, the National
Bureau of Investigation began its probe into the
allegations that “the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel.” After criminal
investigations were filed following the Napoles
controversy, the Commission on Audit released its own
results of a three-year audit covering the legislators’
PDAF from 2007 to 2009. The total releases amounting
to billions of pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged
before the SC to declare the “Pork Barrel System” as
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the
constitutional provision on the non- delegability of
legislative power. (YES)

RULING:
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013
PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post- enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates
the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor held
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting
apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for
(b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also
 PACU vs Secretary of Education
GR No 5279 31 October 1955

Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive
owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of
law; (2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and
duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (3)
Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe
rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. However, the Solicitor General on the
other hand points out that none of the petitioners has
cause to present this issue, because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of
their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the
terms of law and had no need for relief.

Issue:
Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be
settled by the Court

Decision:
Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the
constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and
to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in
a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. The
power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises
only when the interests of litigant require the use of that
judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial
power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of
Education might under the law withdraw the permit of
one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.
 Montesclaros vs COMELEC
GR N 152295 09 July 2002

Facts:
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the
Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and
limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more
than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette
VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK
elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the
House of Representatives and the Senate on 20
February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on
SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to
postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11
March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK
election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership
age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This
was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002
respectively and signed by the President on 19 March
2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for
temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of
postponement of the SK election and reduction of age
requirement on 11 March 2002.

Issue:
Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision:
Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition
presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do
not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to prevent
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not
present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject
to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable
by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no
constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed
this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law.
After its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision
in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
 PROVINCE OF BATANGAS vs. ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled
“ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION” which was later
renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). The program was
established to “facilitate the process of enhancing the
capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
by the National Government Agencies concerned
pursuant to the Local Government Code.” The Oversight
Committee constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic
Act No. 7160 or The Local Government Code of 1991,
has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation. Thereafter the Oversight Committee
issued Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-
2002-001. The petitioner submits that the assailed
provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar
as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the
IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF
and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov.
Mandanas wrote to the individual members of the
Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of
Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres.
Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said
resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Ruling:
Yes, the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Under Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them. Also, in Section 284 of the Local
Government Code provides that, beginning the third year
of its effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the national internal
revenue taxes shall be 40% and Section 285 on the
allocation to Local Government Units in the internal
revenue allotment.
In the case at bar, the respondent put on hold the
distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF
and subject the same to the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to
time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.
Therefore, the provisos violate the Constitution and the
Local Government Code.

On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved

Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.

The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor,

Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and
void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(₱5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization
Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release
thereof.

Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto

G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Oversight
Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and
Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG).

Issue:
 David v. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
(The President as the Commander-in-Chief; Calling out
power)
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity
as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution
do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017, thus:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under
the Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the
AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25,
2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in
Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon
City were stationed inside the editorial and business
offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the
Manila Police District were stationed outside the
building.
Section 17, Article XII reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
Also on February 25, 2006, the police arrested
Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the
Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of
the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his
wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club
in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Petitioners filed this petition in view of these events.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the
declaration of a state of national emergency, Arroyo
lifted PP 1017.
Contentions of petitioners: (1) it is a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; (2) the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily
Tribune offices is a clear case of “censorship” or “prior
restraint;” (3) President Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear
and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless
violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so;”
(4) PP 1017 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such
as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not PP 1017 and GO5 are
unconstitutional; (Related: Can this Court
adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O.
No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general, does the illegal implementation of a
law render it unconstitutional?)
(2) Whether or not the President can validly take
over any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest during
national emergency;
(3) Whether or not the Supreme Court can review
the factual bases of PP 1017 and GO5;
 (4) Whether or not President Arroyo can enforce
obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military;
(5) Whether or not President Arroyo can issue
decrees pursuant to PP 1017.
Ruling:
(1) No. They are valid.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” x x x x
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon
the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary
police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra
vires. x x x x
(As to the abuse of the same:)
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from
its effects in a particular case.
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the
AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there
is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the
citizens’ constitutional rights.
[NOTE:]
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into
three important provisions, thus:
First provision: (Calling-out Power)
“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18,
Article VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: (“Take Care” Power)
“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: (Power to Take Over)
“as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution
do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
(2) No.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect
of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
While the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
(3) Yes.
However, judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy
the Court not that the President’s decision is correct, but
that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the
standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
It is incumbent upon the petitioner/s to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis and
that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion,
then the Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s
exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of
the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
(4) No.
Arroyo cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its
duty to suppress lawless violence.

(5) No.

PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the

laws and decrees x x x
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is

unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section
1, Article VI categorically states that, “the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.

[NOTE:]
The warrantless arrests and searches were all declared
illegal and unconstitutional.
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CAP), et al, Petitioners, -versus- THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE
ARTS, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
FACTS:
The Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP) and the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA) were bodies responsible for
administering the National Artists Award. They also
review the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artists Award.
In 2007, the Board of Trustees of CCP and the NCCA
Board of Commissioners opened the evaluation of the
2009 Order of National Artists and the nomination period
was set. After due deliberations, the bodies
recommended to the President the granting of National
Artist Award to Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro
Francisco and Frederico Aguilar-Alcuaz. Meanwhile, the
Office of the President allegedly received nominations
from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals
recommending Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Caparas,
Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo conferred the Order
of National Artists on Manuel Conde, Lazaro Francisco,
Frederico Aguilar-Alcuaz, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno.
The petitioners filed the present petition claiming that it is
the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select
those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists
and to set the standard for entry into that select group.
The petitioners pray that the conferment of Order of
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared
to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conferment of Order of National
Artists on the private respondents have been rendered in
grave abuse of discretion?
RULING:
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees
and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners with respect
to the conferment of the Order of National Artists are
clear. They jointly administer the said award and, upon
their recommendation or advice, the President confers
the Order of National Artists.
To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To
"recommend" is "to advise or counsel." To "advise" is "to
give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or
course of action; also to give notice. To encourage,
inform or acquaint." "Advise" imports that it is
discretionary or optional with the person addressed
whether he will act on such advice or not. This has been
clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma:
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give
"advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to
whom it is made."
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of
National Artists, the President may or may not adopt the
recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the
CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is
not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and
roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from
straying. In its classic formulation, "discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing."
The President’s power must be exercised in
accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the
laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order
of National Artists should be exercised in accordance
with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The
faithful execution clause is best construed as an
obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and,
corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not
above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
This is precisely why the law provides that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution."
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and
the CCP Boards in connection with the conferment of the
Order of National Artists by executive issuances were
institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential
Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act
No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated
May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National
Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer
the conferment of the category of National Artist" upon
deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the
rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National
Artists.
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted
pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the
rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of
National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of
Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law.
Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies, including the President
himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed
her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of
the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the
CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists
on said respondents was therefore made with grave
abuse of discretion and should be set aside.

Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-

Alvarez who was the Executive Director of the NCCA at
that time, the Guidelines expressly provides:

6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants

and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically
disqualified from being nominated.

Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been

nominated, hence, she was not qualified to be
considered and conferred the Order of National Artists at
that time. The President’s discretion on the matter does
not extend to removing a legal impediment or overriding
a legal restriction.

From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of

the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the conferment of
the Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr. Santos,
Francisco and Alcuaz was not binding on the former
President but only discretionary or optional for her
whether or not to act on such advice or
recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of control,
the President had the authority to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside such recommendation or advice. It
was well within the President’s power and discretion to
proclaim all, or some or even none of the
recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards,
without having to justify his or her action. Thus, the
exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the former President.

The conferment of the Order of National Artists on

respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno was an entirely different matter.

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1)

done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

There was a violation of the equal protection clause of

the Constitution when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former President’s
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA
and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for
Public International Law: Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon.
Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.
G. R. No. 167919
FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was
approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez.
This resolution recommended the award to China Road
& Bridge Corporation of the contract for the
implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I
(CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation
of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the
lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and
between the JBIC and the Philippine Government
pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and
between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then
Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their
respective governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204
between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a
kind of a treaty.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for
the delay of the implementing rules for foreign funded
projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we recall the
decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ
when the DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion
from the former, during the ZTE controversy.as ruled by
the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an exchange of
notes is considered a form of an executive agreement,
which becomes binding through executive action without
need of a vote by the Senate and that (like treaties and
conventions, it is an international instrument binding at
international law,
The second issue involves an examination of the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as
the “Government Procurement Reform Act”. Section 4 of
the said Act provides that it shall apply to: … the
Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and
Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds,
whether local or foreign, by all branches and
instrumentalities of government, its departments, offices
and agencies, including government-owned and/or -
controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138.
Any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the
Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction
with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999
between the Japanese Government and the Philippine
Government is an executive agreement.

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine

agreement that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession
of the one signed by the representative of the other.

…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,

declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus
vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to
international instruments binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by

title, they all have common features and international law
has applied basically the same rules to all these
instruments. These rules are the result of long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as binding
norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are
regarded as international customary law.

That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14

2007.

What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded

projects also undergo the procurement process.
 ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CARPIO, J., EN BANC, June 25, 2010
G.R. No. 176278

Facts:
Alan Paguia filed a Writ of Certiorari to invalidate
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of
respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to
the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent
Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March
2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post.
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA
7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23
imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career
or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the
DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA
officials and employees.

Department of Foreign Affairs questions the legal

standing of Alan Paguis because he is indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law as decided in
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 135 (2003).

Issues:
1. WON Paguia has capacity to sue as a citizen
and taxpayer

2. WON that suspension of Paguia from the

practice of law renders him incapacitated from
bringing legal actions.

Held:
1. The SC held that access to citizen suits is granted on
the narrowest ground, when what is raised are issues of
“transcendental” importance calling urgent resolution.
The parameters for the determination of allowing third
party suits which are: (1) Character of the funds or
assets involved in the controversy; (2) Clear disregard of
constitutional and statutory prohibition; and (3) Lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest to
bring suit. None of the foregoing is present in this case.

2. Petitioner Paguia is incapacitated to bring legal

actions. Paguia’s suspension from the practice of the law
bars him from performing “any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.” Petitioner’s act of
preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments
on equal protection grounds and employing highly
legalistic rules of statutory construction falls within the
proscribed conduct. Petition is dismissed.
 People vs Vera
G.R. No. L-45685
Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for the
probation under provisions of Act No. 4221. Cu Unijieng
states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge
Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the
granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an
opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article
III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the
said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to
make said law effective or otherwise in their respective
or otherwise in their respective provinces.
Judge Vera denied the application for probation of Cu
Unijieng. The respondent judge thereupon set the
hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937,
but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to
court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937.
Petitioners came to SC on extraordinary legal process to
put an end to what they alleged was an interminable
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which
fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence
imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the
courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent
inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng."
Petitioners contended that even if the respondent judge
originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he
nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for
reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu
Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution
of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's
application for probation.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 11 of Act. 4221 is
unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of
the laws.
Held:
Yes.
Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class.
It is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates
a situation in which discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant
authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection
of the law before court should assume the task of setting
aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that
section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the
equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection
of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or
several provinces and not be in force in other provinces,
but one province may appropriate for the salary of the
probation officer of a given year — and have probation
during that year — and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent
years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of
discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to
show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which
is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how
easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the
equality clause but "a rope of sand".
 Oposa v. Factoran
GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993]

Facts.
Concerned over the continued deforestation of the
country, petitioners, all minors represented by their
parents, instituted a civil complaint as a taxpayers’ class
suit “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for the
cancellation of all existing timber license agreements
(TLA) in the country and to order the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease
and desist from approving new TLAs. On motion of then
DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the
petitioners raise an issue political (whether or not logging
should be permitted) which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to
“represent their generation as well as the generation yet
unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology was violated by the granting of said
TLAs.

Issues.
(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest”
and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth”?
(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

Held.
(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the
said right.

(2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of

the complaint is of common and general interest to all
citizens of the Philippines and the petitioners are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for filing of a valid class suit44 are present.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. We find
enough averments to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights on which reliefs may be granted.
The case cannot be thus said to raise a political
question. What is principally involved is the enforcement
of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. Petition granted
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO et al v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, actions and appropriation of funds by the US
in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet et government, the suit is deemed to be one against the
al US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014 the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons
of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
While the doctrine [of state immunity from suit] appears
to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties.

FACTS:
In 2013, the USS Guardian, a US ship, was on its way to
Indonesia when it ran aground the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. Vice Admiral Scott
Swift, US 7th Fleet Commander expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement. Three months later, the
US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the
last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef. The
petitioners then filed this petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasan against Swift and other officials,
claiming that the grounding and salvaging operations
caused and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect several provinces in the
Visayas and Mindanao. They also seek a directive from
this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and
criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with
the grounding incident. Only the Philippine respondents
filed a comment to the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or
manifestation in the case

RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, the State may not be sued
without its consent. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
has been filed without its consent.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their

official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian
and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial
 Matibag v. Benipayo
(G.R. No. 149036 )
Facts:
Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the
COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the EID
and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made
appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman
and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments
were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the
pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the
Commission of Appointments to act upon the
confirmation of their appointments.
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as
COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing
petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to
the Law Department. Petitioner requested for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right
to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that
their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as
well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments
and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issue:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by
PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by
PGMA were temporary in character
Ruling:
NO.
(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC
“shall be independent”, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees
before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This
is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will
also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments –
did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do
away with ad interim appointments because the plan
was for Congress to remain in session throughout the
year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess.
However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in
essential government services, the framers of the
Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments.
Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of
the ad interim appointing power of the President was for
the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government
services that otherwise would result from prolonged
vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant
case of her constitutional power to make ad interim
appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil
sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to
make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President
to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two
modes in appointing officials who are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First,
while Congress is in session, the President may
nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second,
during the recess of Congress, the President may
extend an ad interim appointment which allows the
appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the
prospective appointee or extend an ad interim
appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
President because the Constitution grants her that
power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her
constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part,
which has not been shown in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments
extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting
appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until

such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and

irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy
any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint

permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes
the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
 Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc v. Robredo
G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
FACTS:
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de
Jesus Homeowners’ Association as well as the individual
petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy
Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are
occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the
cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively,
the LGUs). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of
eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and
(b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the
implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the
petitioners.
unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. By directly filing
Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners have unduly
taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to matters within our exclusive jurisdiction.
Worse, the petitioners only contributed to the
overcrowding of the Court’s docket. We also wish to
emphasize that the trial court is better equipped to
resolve cases of this nature since this Court is not a trier
of facts and does not normally undertake an examination
of the contending parties’ evidence.
Petition dismissed.

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions

and demolitions without any court order when: (1)
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and (2)
persons or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented.

On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a

petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court,
seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court
prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279.

The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this

Court by generally averring that they have no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts

RULING:
Yes, The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts when they directly filed the petition before the
Court.

The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of

courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition
for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioners appear to
have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of
courts should serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence
of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the
 MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO, et al. –versus-
BENIGNO AQUINO III, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, EN BANC, July 1, 2014
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury.
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
NB: Notwithstanding the above discussion, certain DAP
practices were declared unconstitutional based on other
grounds

FACTS:
Responding to Senator Jinggoy Estrada’s revelation that
some senators, including himself, had been allotted
millions as an incentive for voting in favor of Chief
Justice Renato Corona’s impeachment, Secretary
Florencio Abad explained in a statement that the funds
released to the senators had been part of the DAP, a
program designed by the DBM to accelerate economic
expansion. The DBM further listed the legal bases for
the DAP’s use of savings and that it had been sourced
from savings generated by the government and from
unprogrammed funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” (NO)

RULING:
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed
to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending.
In the context of the DAP’s adoption and implementation
being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main
actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate
to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could
appropriate but would have nothing more to do during
the Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act by
which Congress designates a particular fund, or sets
apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the
money in the public treasury, to be applied to some
general object of governmental expenditure, or to some
individual purchase or expense. In a strict sense,
appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to “the act of the
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.”

The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully

execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the
execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes
in the country’s economic situation. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had
been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, Petitioner, -versus- CHIEF
JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
FACTS:
Last May 22, 2014, Associate Justice Roberto Abad had
his compulsory retirement. As such, JBC announced the
opening for the application or recommendation for the
said vacated position. Dean Danilo Concepcion of the
University of the Philippines nominated Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of
the Republic, for the said position.
Jardeleza received telephone calls informing him that
during the meetings of JBC, Chief Justice and JBC ex-
officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief
Justice Sereno), manifested that she would be invoking
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza
was then directed to "make himself available" before the
JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying
that the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power
of supervision over the JBC to be given prior notice to
any proceedings relating to his application, to allow him
to cross-examine witnesses presented against him, to
reschedule the hearing and to disallow Chief Justice
Sereno from participating in the voting for the
replacement of Justice Abad.
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal
memorandum that would clarify the objection to
Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno.
According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned
Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as
shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his
handling of an international arbitration case for the
government. Secretary Leila de Lima then informed
Jardeleza of the appearance of Justice Carpio.
Jardeleza was then asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he
wanted to defend himself. He answered in the affirmative
provided that due process will be observed. Jardeleza
then put into record a written statement expressing his
views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its
meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet
the next day to act on his pending letter-petition.
Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently
denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the
proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the
shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the subject
shortlist of four (4) nominees. Jardeleza was not
included in the said list.
A newspaper article was later published stating that the
Court’s Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that
there were actually five (5) nominees, but one (1)
nominee could not be included because of the invocation
of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him
in the list of nominees for the replacement for the
position of Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC
and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal
that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the
alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to:
1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due
process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not
direct violation, of its own rules. Suffice it to say,
Jardeleza directly ascribes the supposed violation of his
constitutional rights to the acts of Chief Justice Sereno in
raising objections against his integrity and the manner by
which the JBC addressed this challenge to his
application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the
list of nominees.
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment
contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked procedural
and substantive bases that would warrant favorable
action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorari is only
available against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Anent the
substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that
Jardeleza was deprived of due process.
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa
Jr. (Executive Secretary) raised the possible
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
particularly the imposition of a higher voting threshold in
cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to due process is available in the
course of JBC proceedings. (YES)
RULING:
After a tedious review of the parties’ respective
arguments, the Court concludes that the right to due
process is available and thereby demandable as a
matter of right.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies
his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of
his scholastic records, work experience and laudable
citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for
the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible
step to verify an applicant's track record for the purpose
of determiningwhether or not he is qualified for
nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to
applicant to become a part of the roster from which the remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair
President appoints. and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the
June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became
The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014,
impressed with discretion, however, does not Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that preclude the very idea of due process in which the right
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise,
in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and
they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile
exercise.
Notwithstanding being "a class of its own," the right to be
heard and to explain one’s self is availing. Where an
objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither negates nor renders
illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in
the nomination process. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a
clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby
guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it.
The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of
evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant.
As applied in the case of Jardeleza and after careful
calibration of the case, the Court has reached the
determination that the application of the "unanimity rule"
on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right
to due process.

Any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be

filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days from the
publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely,
this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members.
Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period is only
applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members
themselves, this does not discount the fact that the
invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting
would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several
members of the Council expressed their concern and
desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-
010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only
during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the
Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a
meeting that would be held on the same day when a
resource person would shed light on the matter.

What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process

was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear
before the Council and to instantaneously provide those
who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he
given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the
context of his physical presence during the meeting.
Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a
defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear
in a meeting where he would be, right then and there,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, -versus-
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO AND REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the
nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Corona’s unexpected
departure.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and
partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional
Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend
nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC).
In particular, Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law,a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. xxx” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act
as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994, however, the composition of the JBC was
substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC
as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of
a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. During the existence
of the case, Sen. Escudero and Cong. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether JBC’s practice of having members from the
Senate and the House of Representatives making 8
instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional. (YES)
RULING:
From a simple reading of the Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph
calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same
under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second
part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC
composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative
of Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had
in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that
more than one (1) representative from the legislature
would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of
the Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. Verba legis non est recedendum –
from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on
whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is
being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition
of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide
a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a
single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any of the
sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and
eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially
in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose
would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it
would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers
provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the
best means to break a voting deadlock.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a

bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter- play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot
prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the
Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has
a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of
the co-equal branches of government.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the

current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); POLICE CHIEF
SUPERINTENDENT RAUL CASTAÑEDA, CHIEF,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION
GROUP (CIDG); ET AL., Petitioners, - versus- MARY
JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY.
FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo,
Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at
ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy
him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand,
Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related
that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk.
Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latter's Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis' whereabouts and activities either;
she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis' fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported
Tagitis' disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit
attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis' disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the
respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty.
Felipe P. Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine
Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National
Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief,
Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached
some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought
help from some of their friends in the military who could
help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband.
All of her efforts did not produce any positive results
except the information from persons in the military who
do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the
hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable
information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with
the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups
particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station
in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help
to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by
the police that her husband was not missing but was
with another woman having good time somewhere,
which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to
help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the
different police headquarters namely Police
Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga
City and eventually in the National Headquarters in
Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no
positive results. These trips exhausted all of her
resources which pressed her to ask for financial help
from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances,
she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of her husband, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors,
their intelligence operatives and the like which are in
total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional
rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners
to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours
from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of
January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause
of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active
measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and
to apprehend the persons responsible for his
disappearance.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming
that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN)
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. The CA thus extended the
privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed
the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief
Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel
Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the
CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents
from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-
CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
ISSUE:
Whether the Amparo petition was sufficient in form and
substance. (YES)
RULING:
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and
verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the
portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the
manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat,
act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section
5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses
a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able
to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In
this type of situation, to require the level of specificity,
detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want
to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings
while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The
petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than
in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if
the required elements – namely, of the disappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are
present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which
Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in
normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be
found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged,
too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15
and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and
security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and
boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then
taken "into custody by the respondents’ police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007,
specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x
held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to
involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups.
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate
facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State
in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release
Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right
to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that
reports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed. That the
petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather
generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to
perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least,
their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on
the completeness of the petition. To require the
respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority, as well the manner and conduct of the
investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section
5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in securing an
investigation with meaningful results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the
allegations of the petition on the investigations
undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of
bringing the petition forward.
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA, Petitioner, -
versus- HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
3, LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Estipona Jr. was charged for
violation of Sec 11, Art II of RA 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs).
Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter
into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw
his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty
for violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a
penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession.
He argued that Section 23 of RA 9165 violates: (1) the
intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of
powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA
9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the SC to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining
is a "rule of procedure." Without saying so, the accused
implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it
allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial
conference in criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it
encroached upon the power of the SC to promulgate
Rules of Procedure. (Yes)
RULING:
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the exclusive domain of the SC and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to
issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should
not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division) further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional
design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the
Court traced the evolution of its rule- making authority,
which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been
priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution
textually altered the old provisions by deleting the
concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers,
in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a
"[s]tronger and more independent judiciary." The records
of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
would show that the Framers debated on whether or not
the Court's rule¬ making powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the
sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino
proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to
be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal
to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby
leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5),
Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that
"both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature,
have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure. x x x.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
 GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero
G.R. Nos. 158090 October 4, 2010
FACTS:
Fernando Caballero & his wife secured a loan from
petitioner GSIS and executed a real estate mortgage of
a parcel of land registered under his name. Fernando
defaulted on the payment of his loan, hence, the subject
property was foreclosed, and the same was sold at a
public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder.
For failure to redeem the property, a new TCT was
issued in the name of petitioner.
When petitioner scheduled the subject property for
public bidding, Fernando’s daughter, Jocelyn, submitted
a bid. However, CMTC was the highest bidder, thus, it
was awarded the subject property. Thereafter, a new
TCT was issued in the name of CMTC.
Caballero filed a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS et
al. praying, among others, that the Deed of Absolute
Sale between petitioner and CMTC be declared null and
void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted
petitioner’s counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC which was collected
by Fernando from the CMTC. The amount represents
payment which was not turned over to petitioner GSIS,
which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of
the consolidation of its ownership over the subject
property.
Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification that the portion of the judgment ordering
Fernando to pay rentals in favor of petitioner, be deleted.
GSIS filed a petition which seeks the review of the CA’s
Decision insofar as it deleted the trial court’s award in its
favor.
ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner’s counterclaim for the rentals
collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim or a
permissive counterclaim.
2. Whether or not GSIS is exempt from payment of
legal fees
RULING:
1. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, the Court has devised the following tests:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions
would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. The
rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to
pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not
do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since
petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The
judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered
Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected
from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court.
2. Petitioner further argues that assuming that its
counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction
to try and decide the same, considering petitioner’s
exemption from all kinds of fees.
In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that
the provision in the Charter of the GSIS which exempts it
from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of
all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment
of legal fees. This was because the 1987 Constitution
removed the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, from Congress. The
Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. The claim of a legislative grant of exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA
8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for
the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court’s independence − fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and
authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees,
including legal fees. Legal fees do not only constitute a
vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also
comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal
fees granted by Congress to government-owned or
controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly,
such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the
Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. The petition is DENIED.