Handout PIMS 04 - 05 Sept 2020 PDF

04 - 05 September 2020
Virtual Educational Training Programme
Pipeline Integrity Management System

04 - 05 September 2020
Technical Program
DAY - 1
08:45 - 09:00 Registration & Inauguration
09:00 - 10:00 Introduction to Integrity Management Plan Mr. N Manohar Rao,

former Executive Director, BPCL
10:00 - 11:00 Pre-Design Survey Mr. Pankaj Panchal
Corrosion Protection Specialist Pvt Ltd
11:00 - 12:00 Coatings Dr. Buddhadeb Duari
Lalita Infraprojects Pvt Ltd
12:00 - 13:00 Materials and Design Prof V S Raja
IIT Bombay
13:00 - 14:00 Pre-Commissioning Integrity Mr. Sumeet Kataria
Electro Corr-Damp Pvt. Ltd
DAY- 2 :
09:00 - 11:00 Integrity Assessment Tool Mr. Ashish Khera

Allied Engineers
11:00 - 12:00 Data Analysis and Interpretation Mr. Pankaj Panchal
Corrosion Protection Specialist Pvt Ltd
12:00 - 13:00 Risk Assessment Ms. Darshan Upama
GM(Elect), IEOT, ONGC
13:00 - 14:00 Regulatory Requirements Mr. N Manohar Rao
former Executive Director, BPCL
14:00 - 14:15 Q & A and Valedictory session
Correspondence Address
NACE International Gateway India Section
305-A, Galleria, Hiranandani Gardens,
Powai, Mumbai – 400076, India
Tel: 022-25797354 Email: rishikesh@naceindia.org / info@naceindia.org
Website: www.naceindia.org / www.corcon.org
Contact Person : Mr. Rishikesh Mishra : 9820459356 / Mr. Manoj Mishra 9820631320
8/29/2020
PIPELINE INTEGRITY & CORROSION-
AN OVERVIEW
N Manohar Rao
PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
World Energy Scenario
Primary Energy consumption of India with respect

to total world’s consumption
• US 20.4%
• China 17.7%
• Russia 6.0%
• Japan 4.5%
• India 3.8%
• Canada 2.9%
• Rest 44.7%
Energy Sharing in India
1%
1%
6%
31%
53%
9%
Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Energy Hydro electric
Dependency Coal Oil Gas

World 29% 35% 24%
India 53% 31% 9%
 Share of OIL & Gas in world is 59%, in India 40% of Total Energy
 To push the growth, Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 introduced
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy- June 2010
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HYDROCARBON VISION 2025

 Assure Energy Security domestic production and oil
equity abroad
 Cleaner Environment
 Globally competitive industry
 Free market, open competition
 Total appraisal of sedimentary basins, to optimize
exploration activities.
 Acceleration of Exploration efforts
Key Developments
• Increasing Domestic Oil & Gas Production
• Acquisition of acreage in other countries
• Better Reservoir Management
• APM dismantling
• LNG import
• Surplus refining and marketing capacity
• Improving pipeline Connectivity
Key Developments
• Encouraging Laying of Transportation

Infrastructure
• De licensing of various activities
• Attractive fiscal regime for inviting private

participation
• Regulatory mechanisms
• Strategic Storages
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Modes of transportation
 Road
 Rail
 Pipeline
 Sea route
Limitations of road transport
• No. of road tankers will increase

• Hazards /risk will increase manifold
• Infrastructure required for additional
traffic
• Diesel requirement to increase
• Vulnerable to calamities
• Pollution to increase
• Supply in discrete batches
Advantages of pipeline transport
• Safe mode of transport

• Least contact with population- minimal hazards
• Reliable & regular supply
• Economic mode for large distances
• No/ less pilferage
• Reduced road congestion
• Enhance efficiency
• Most environment friendly system
• Ability to traverse most difficult terrain
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Products transported through pipelines
 CRUDE OIL
 PRODUCT
 PETROL
 DIESEL
 ATF
 NAPTHA
 KEROSENE
Petroleum & Gas Pipelines
COMMON ISSUES - India
Pipeline Right of Way Interferences

Other Pipelines
AC/ DC Electric Systems
Public
National Code & Practices
Trained Manpower
GOI / Corporate Policies
Manpower Requirements
“Skilled manpower is the greatest Asset’”.

Skilled manpower is essential to achieve the
target set forth in the “ Hydrocarbon Vision
2025”.
• Skill Shortage in Up Stream, Mid stream &
Down stream Sector
• Shortage is in the field of Corrosion as
corrosion Engineer, Coating Inspector,
Cathodic Protection Specialist etc.
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Manpower Requirements
• Not enough talent is available to the sector at

the entry level because no specific subject on
corrosion in Engineering courses.
• NACE can provide better facility in the field of

corrosion to achieve “ Hydrocarbon Vision
2025”.
PIPEINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
 The energy demand in the form of Oil and Gas has

been increased.
 The energy exploration & transportation across

continents have expanded
 More and stringent demands are inflicted upon the

pipeline operators.
To face the challenges the Pipeline Integrity

Management [PIM] has been developed and practiced
widely in USA and Europe.
PIPEINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
 Pipeline Integrity Management starts from the time the

“Pipeline Project” is conceived
 It involves ,
1. Total Design Review
2. During Construction
3. Maintenance Program/ Plan.
 PIM is a business process and a tool to mitigate failure
causes and threat to the pipeline.
 PIM maximizes the profitability and productivity of the
pipeline assets through the proven strategies.
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WHY PIPEINE INTEGRITY?
 Fitness for the purpose and /or extending the

life of the pipeline.
 Accounting for accuracy and confidence level.
 To detect damage or defects before they
cause serious problems and ensures pipeline
do not become defective or damaged and
inoperative.
 To determine extent of pipeline replacement
and/ or repair work to ensure safe & Efficient
working of Pipelines.
WHAT IS ACHIEVED BY PIPEINE INTEGRITY?
 Demonstrate technical integrity of the pipeline

throughout the asset life.
 Reduction of pipeline failures resulting in cost
advantages in million of Rupees.
 Early risk characterization.
 To provide world class oil and gas transportation
system.
 Ability to control operation effectively.
 In short PIM ensures pipeline is safe and defect free.
MANAGEMENT OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY
 Various techniques are available to access

pipeline conditions including one or combination
of the following techniques
 In line Inspection / Intelligent Pigging
 Hydrostatic Testing.
 Use of Corrosion Monitoring / Survey Data
 Coating conductance Survey.
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DEFECTS DISTRIBUTION
CORROSION
defined as
deterioration of a substance
(usually metal) or its properties
because of reactions within its environment
is a well-known natural phenomenon
and
one of most important factors that affects
integrity & management
Industrial & Infrastructure assets
Source: Shri R P Nagar
PIPELINE INTEGRITY & CORROSION

Route Cause Category
Remarks
Nos. Name Nos. Name
1 Internal Corrosion 1 Internal Corrosion
Time
2 External Corrosion 2 External Corrosion Dependent
3 Stress Corrosio Cracking 3 Stress Corrosion Cracking
4 Defective Pipe Seam

4 Manufacturing and Related Defects
5 Defective Pipe
6 Defective Pipe Weld Girth
7 Defective Fabricaion Weld

5 Construction and Related Defects
8 Wrinkle Bend or Buckle
Stable
9 Striped Thread / Broken Pipe / Coupling
10 Gasket O'ring Failure
11 Control / Relief Equipment Malfunction

6 Equipment and Related Defects
12 Seal Pump Packing Failure
13 Miscellaneous
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PIPELINE INTEGRITY & CORROSION
Route Cause Category

Remarks
Nos. Name Nos. Name
14 Instantaneous Failure
7 Third-Party Inflicted Damage

15 Delayed Failure
16 Vandalism
17 Incorrect Operations and Procedures 8 Incorrect Operations and Procedures

Time Dependent
18 Cold Weather
19 Lightning Weather and Earth-Related and other

9
outside Forces
20 Heavy Rains / Floods
21 Earth Movements
22 Unknown
SELECTION OF MATERIALS FOR

ENGINNERING APPLICATIONS
Safety
Electrochemical
Cost & Unique
Availability
Chemical
Mechanical Corrosion Thermodynamic

Properties
Material Resistance
Metallurgical
Fabricability Appearance
Physical
Thermal & Electrical
Characteristics
Corrosion Resistance is one of major factors for the selection of

materials for engineering application
RECOMMENDED ROAD MAP
INCREASE AWARENESS OF
High Cost of Corrosion & Potential Savings
CHANGE MISCONCEPTION
That nothing can be done about corrosion
IMPROVE
Education & Training of Personnel
&
Corrosion Technology through Research
Development & Implementation
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RECOMMENDED ROAD MAP
DEVELOP ADVANCED
 Design practices for better Corrosion Management
 Life Prediction & Performance
Assessment Methods
INTRODUCE
Policies, Regulations, Standards
And Management Practices
To increase Corrosion savings through
Sound Corrosion Management
Thank You !
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PRE-DESIGN SURVEY
Presented by
Pankaj Panchal
NACE, Corrosion Specialist
NACE, Cathodic Protection Specialist
Mobile : +91 93772 76131
E-mail : info@corrosionps.com
Corrosion Cures Pvt. Ltd.
OUTLINE
 Soil Resistivity
 Soil Chemical Analysis
 Parallel Pipeline Details
 Existing CP System in vicinity
 AC / DC Powerlines
SOIL RESISTIVITY
 Wenner – 4 Pin Method

 Soil Box
 Probe
 Electromagnetic Induction Method
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SOIL RESISTIVITY – WENNER 4 PIN
Resistance Test
Instrument
C1 C2
P1 P2
a a a
C1 P1 P2 C2
r=2paR
SOIL RESISTIVITY – WENNER 4 PIN
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SOIL RESISTIVITY – SOIL BOX
SOIL RESISTIVITY – EM INDUCTION
SOIL ANALYSIS
 pH
 SRB
 Chloride
 Sulphates
 Other
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CORPS
CORROSION ASSESSMENT
I am CP Current and not following Owner, Project’s Paths.
I always take shortest path.
Pipeline Integrity Management System 11
CORPS
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CORPS
Minimum data required to design the CP system
 Pipe to soil potential at nearest existing pipeline.

 Existing cathodic protection station locations, rated
and operating parameters.
 Distance from existing anode bed to new pipeline.
 Soil resistivity at existing anode bed locations (Note:
Anode bed must be in OFF condition during the soil
resistivity measurement).
 Soil resistivity along the new pipeline route.
 Soil resistivity at proposed new anode bed locations.
 AC potential measurement at nearest existing
pipeline (Specially in case of an existing nearby high
tension AC Power line / Sub Station / Power Plant
that is found in close vicinity).
BONDING WITH EXISTING P/L
Bonding
■ Most common stray current mitigation method is

the installation of a bond.
■ A resistor installed between the two structures.
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BONDING WITH EXISTING P/L
Advantages of resistance bonds
 Relatively inexpensive installation
 Easy to adjust if stray current magnitude changes
 High current capacity
EXISTING STRUCTURES
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Attenuation
General
■ Attenuation is electrical losses in a conductor caused
by current flow.
■ Attenuation is a major factor in the design of CP
System for long pipelines.
■ The poorer the dielectric properties, the greater the
attenuation.
■ Attenuation can be significantly reduced with the
increase in dielectric properties of coating.
■ Good-quality coating will significantly diminish
attenuation, also at the same time it will enhance the
uniformity of current distribution.
Pipeline equivalent circuit diagram
Attenuation
Ideal Current Distribution
■ The current must enter the structure from remote earth to
complete the path.
■ The resistance of the structure to remote earth is
composed of an infinite number of individual parallel
leakage resistances that are equal in value.
■ Ideally the internal resistance of the structure is zero.
■ Because the assumptions made to produce ideal current
distribution are unrealistic, plus the fact that CP
equipment cannot be located at remote earth, the ideal
current distribution cannot be achieved in practice.
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Attenuation
■ When new a buried pipeline is bonded with existing
buried pipelines in a common corridor the attenuation for
existing and new pipelines gets altered.
■ Coating resistance for existing buried old pipeline and
new proposed pipeline is not the same.
■ Linear resistance for new pipeline and existing pipeline
that may be different in diameter, wall thickness and also
the materials of new pipeline may be different from
existing one.
■ The CP current density required for protecting the
existing old poorly coated pipeline shall be different then
the new pipeline.
rs = unit linear resistance of structure (ohms)

rL = unit leakage resistance (ohms)
g = 1/ rL = unit leakage conductance (S)
α = propagation of attenuation constant
rsx = unit linear resistance of structure (ohms)

rLx = unit leakage resistance (ohms)
x = pipeline number / name
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Attenuation
 The attenuation constant is dependent on unit linear

resistance of pipeline, coating resistance and
homogenous soil resistivity.
 A general practice for the attenuation considerations in
CP design of the pipelines to take an ideal equivalent
circuit for the calculations, but with the use of bonding for
interference mitigation, the equivalent circuit considered
for remote earth to pipeline gets altered, hence formulas
for attenuation calculations do not provide the realistic
attenuation value for common buried pipeline corridor.
Anode bed Gradient
OFFSHORE – PIPELINES
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AC CORROSION
AC CORROSION
AC CORROSION
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RISK OF AC CORROSION
DYNAMIC STAY CURRENT

 Crowded Right of Way
 High Voltage AC Lines
 Pipelines
 High Voltage DC Lines
 AC Tractions
 Occasional Powerline Faults
RISK OF AC CORROSION
 Caused by Current Exchange bet’n Soil and Metal

 Depended on Induced Voltage on P/L.
 Main Influencing Factors
AC Current Density
Size of Coating Defect
Local Soil Resistivity
AC CORROSION FAILURES
 Vary High Rate of Corrosion with Effective

CP System
 AC Corrosion Density
 NO CORROSION FOR ........... IAC < 20 A/m2
 UNPREDICTABLE FOR ......... 20 A/m2 < IAC < 100 A/m2
 CORROSION EXPECTED WHEN ... IAC > 100 A/m2
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We are Grateful to o
Y u
धन्यवाद | THANK YOU
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Pipeline Coating
Presented By
Dr. Buddhadeb Duari

Director: Lalitainfraprojects Pvt. Ltd
: bduari@yahoo.co.in
/ : +919830017548
Pipeline - Integrity Management System
CURRICULUM VITAE
Dr.Buddhadeb Duari is Director of Lalita Infraprojects Pvt Ltd who are major Manufacturer and Applicator of
corrosion resistant organic coatings and linings.
Dr.Buddhadeb Duari has done B. Tech (Hons) in Mechanical Engineering from I.I.T Kharagpur,
MBA from Jamnalal Bajaj Institute for Management Studies (JBIMS) and
Ph.D (Engg) in Metallurgy & Material Engineering from Jadavpur University.
He is a NACE Corrosion Specialist, a NACE Protective Coating Specialist from
NACE (National Association of Corrosion Engineers), Houston, USA and
SSPC Protective Coating Specialist from SSPC (Society for Protective Coating), Pitsburgh , USA.
He is a member of BIS (Bureau of Indian Standard) for CHD 20 (Chemical & Paint Division),CHD 21 (Raw Material
for Paints),MTD 24 (Metallurgical Technical Division - Corrosion Protection Group) and MTD 19 (Pipes and Tubes).
He has more than 35 years experience on Corrosion, Coating and Cathodic Protection of Metals, Structure and
Concrete. He has published more than forty five (45) Technical Papers in reputed journals out of which fifteen (15)
are international ones like MP Materials Performance, JPCL, Coating & Maintenance and Corrosion Management.
Dr. Buddhadeb Duari is also guiding students for doing their Ph.D in Jadavpur University as well as IIT - Guwahati.
Consultancy:
Dr. Buddhadeb Duari has been roped in by the following companies as their principal consultant on corrosion related
services :
(a) Engineers India Limited, (b) Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation, (c) Siemens Power, (d) L&T Power, (e) Kolkata
Municipal Corporation (KMC), (f) Different State Public Health Engineering Depts etc.
SIMPLIFIED RISK ASSESSMENT HIERARCHY
Relative Risk
Likelihood of Consequences
Failure of Failure
....
Third Party Health and Service

Corrosion Design Safety
Environment
reliability
Damage
Coating type
Coating Condition
Cathodic protection
Soil Type
……
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COATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH CATHODIC PROTECTION
 Coating are the first line of defense and they play a major role in protecting steel
(pipeline from corrosion).
 A good coating system always balances the surface environment design to obtain
desired performance and service life-cycle at least cost.
 An ideal coating system which is 100% holiday or pinhole free is good enough to
protect structural steel/ pipeline from corrosion.
 Practically it is not possible as there are damages during transportation and handling
leading to several holidays.
 Hence we need a secondary system know as cathodic protection in addition to

primary coating system.
 So coating in conjunction with cathodic protection to mitigate corrosion.
Coal Tar enamel wide range (plasticized) 1941
Polyethylene tape wrap 1952
Crosshead Extruded Polyethylene 1956
Fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) 1961
Polyurethane 1970
3 Layer Polyethylene/Polypropelene 1979
Pipe Coating Plant Application Field Application

Extruded
polyethylene:
Crosshead Yes No
Extruded
Side-extruded Yes No
Hard adhesive bonded Yes No
Coal Tar enamel Yes Yes

(Mainline/joints or re-hab)
Fusion Bonded Epoxy Yes Yes

Polyurethane Yes Yes

Polyethylene tape wrap Yes Yes
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SURFACE PREPARATION STANDARDS

NACE/SSPC/ISO
NON ABRASIVE NACE/SSPC ISO 8501
CLEANING
Solvent Cleaning SSPC SP-1
Hand Tool Cleaning SSPC SP- 2 St2 or St3
Power Tool Cleaning SSPC SP- 3/SP-11 St2 or St3
ABRASIVE
CLEANING
White Metal NACE 1/ SSPC SP- 5 Sa 3
Near White Metal NACE 2/ SSPC SP-10
Commercial NACE 3/ SSPC SP- 6 Sa 2
Brush Off ( Light NACE 4/ SSPC SP- 7 Sa 1

Blast)
REFERENCE PHOTOGRAPHS AFTER SURFACE PREPARATION
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POLYETHYLENE TAPE WRAP COATING
POLYETHYLENE TAPE WRAP SITE COATING
POLYURETHANE COATING
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3 LAYER PE/PP
FUSION BONDED EPOXY
JOINT COATING WITH FBE
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JOINT COATING BY HEAT SHRINK SLEEVES
Basis of Selection of Main Line Coating
PIPELINE OPERATING TEMPERATURE

PIPELINE DESIGN LIFE
PIPELINE DIAMETER
TYPE OF SOIL
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE
ROW CONDITIONS
CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE
ELECTRICAL INSULATION PROPERTIES
MOISTURE BARRIER PROPERTIES
ADHESION PROPERTIES TO PIPE SURFACE
RESISTANCE TO HOLIDAYS WITH TIME
WITHSTAND NORMAL HANDLING, STORAGE (UV DEGRADATION)
RESISTANCE TO DISBONDING
REASONS FOR DISBONDMENT
 Blistering
 Osmetic Blistering
 Blistering by hydrogen evolution
 Entrapped solvent blistering
 Electroendosmosis
 Saponification and Disintegration
 Blistering from wet and contaminated surface
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Basis of Selection of Main Line Coating-

Operating Temperature
Hot Applied Coal Tar Enamel (120/5 grade)-80°C
Polyethylene Coatings – 80°C
Polypropylene Coatings – 120°C
Fusion Bond Epoxy Coatings – 110°C
Cold Applied PE Tapes – 100°C
Polyurethane Coating – 100°C
Coating Thickness
Coating Thickness
Coal Tar enamel wide range (plasticized) 4 - 7 mm
Polyethylene tape wrap 2 – 3 mm
Fusion-bonded epoxy (FBE) 0.35 - 0.7 mm
Polyurethane 1 - 2 mm
3 Layer Polyethylene/Polypropelene 1.8 – 4 mm
Coaltar Enamel
PRIMER
COALTAR
ENAMEL
WITH TWO
LAYERS OF
FIBERGLASS
REINFORCEMENT
FIBREGLASS
OUTER WRAP
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Polyethylene tape wrap
Polyurethane Coating
3LPE/PP and FBE/DFBE
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Internal Lining with FBE
LINING USED TO PROVIDE CORROSION MITIGATION AND FLOW EFFICIENCY

IN WATER AND GAS TRANSMISSION ALSO PREVENT PRODUCT CONTAMINATION
STANDARDS
3 Layer PE / PP Coating
DIN 30670: Polyethylene Coatings for Steel Pipes and Fittings
ISO 21809-2011: Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries- External Coatings for Buried or
Submerged Pipelines used in Pipeline Transportation Systems- Part 1
IS 15659 (Part 1) : Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries- External Coatings for Buried or
Submerged Pipelines used in Pipeline Transportation of Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon
Fusion Bonded Epoxy

ISO 21809-2014: Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries- External Coatings for Buried or
Submerged Pipelines used in Pipeline Transportation Systems- Part 2
IS 15659 (Part 2) : Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries- External Coatings for Buried or
Submerged Pipelines used in Pipeline Transportation of Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon
Solvent free Epoxy

AWWA C-210 – Liquid Epoxy Coating Systems for interior and Exterior Steel Water
Pipe and Fittings
IS 16676 - Solventless Liquid Epoxy System for Application on Interior and Exterior
Surface of Steel Water Pipeline
STANDARDS
Coal Tar Enamel (Plasticized Pitch)
IS 10221 :2008 : Coating and Wrapping of Underground Mild Steel Pipelines-Code of Practice
AWWA C203-08: Coal- Tar Protective Coating and Linings for Steel Water Pipelines- Enamel and
Tape- Hot Applied
Polyurethane Coating
AWWA C222-18 : Polyurethane Coatings and Linings for Steel Water
Pipe and Fittings
IS 16719:2018 : Polyurethane Coatings for the Interior and Exterior of Steel

Pipe And Fittings- Specification
Polyethylene Tape Wrap

AWWA C214-14 : Tape Coatings for Steel Water Pipe
BIS Draft : Cold Applied Tape Coating System For Exterior of Steel Pipeline
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Three Layer Polyethylene Coating

Functional Properties
DIN- 30670 ISO-21809-1 IS 15659(Part 1)
N-n (Normal) Coating Thickness is a The selection of classification
function of type of depends on the expected
Thickness (Minimum) polyethylene,and dependent field duty. The more
on service conditions- aggressive the soil is, the
Pipe Size Min
water/humidity,soil condition, higher shall be the coating
Thickness
transportation, laying method, thickness.
DIN-100 1.8 pipe dimensions, weight &
DIN-250 2.0 pipe
DIN-500 2.2 Table 2 Minimum Total

Coating Thicknesses
DIN-800 2.5 Table-2 “Minimum Coating
Thickness”
>DIN 800 3.0 ISO 21809-1
N-v Thickness of FBE Coating
has been specified as 125μm
Thickness will be 0.7 mm Adhesive Thickness-150μm
greater for reinforced (v) (Minimum)
coatings.
Adhesive thickness-not
specified
No thickness of 1st Layer FBE
Coating Specified.
Three Layer Polyethylene Coating

Functional Properties
DIN-30670 ISO-21809-1 IS 15659 (Part 1)
Peel Strength N-n S-n A B C A B

(N/mm)@23°C ≥ 3.5 3.5 10 15 25 15 25
Impact Strength J/mm N-n S-n A B C A B

@23°C > 5 5 5 7 10 7 10
Indentation(mm) N-n S-n A B C A B

-23°C ≤ 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
-Tmax ≤ 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4
Cathodic
Disbondment(mm)
23°C/28 days(-1.5V),Max 7 7
65°C/24hrs(-3.5V),Max 7 7
T-max /28;-1.5V, Max 15 15
Flexibility At an angle 2.0° per At an angle 2.0° per pipe

No cracking pipe diameter length diameter length
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CONCLUSION
Ranking (based on quality)
Pipeline Coating
I) 3 Layer PE/PP
II) FBE
III) Polyurethane
IV) Cold Applied Tape Wrap
V) Epoxy
Joint Coating
I) Heat Shrink Sleeves
II) FBE
III) Polyurethane
IV) Epoxy
Rehabilitation Coating
I) Polyurethane
II) Cold Applied Tape Wrap
III) Epoxy
REFERENCES/ BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1) Corrosion Prevention by Protective Coatings by C. G .Munger – NACE Publication
(2) Fusion Bonded Epoxy (FBE) by J. Alan Kehr – NACE Publication
(3) CIP Level 2 - NACE Publication
(4) Coatings and Linings for Immersion Service – NACE Publication
(5) Corrosion and Coatings by Richard W. Dvisko, PhD ,
James F. Jenkins – SSPC Publication
(6) Surface Preparation Specification and Practices – SSPC Publication
(7) Protective Coatings by Clive H. Hare – SSPC Publication
(8) Paint Film Degradation by Clive H. Hare – SSPC Publication
(9) Protective Coatings for Water and Waste water Facilities – SSPC Publication
(10) Coating and Lining Inspection Manual –SSPC Publication
(11) SSPC – VIS 1 - Guide and Reference Photographs for Steel Surfaces
(12) SSPC – VIS 3 – Guide and Reference Photographs for steel Surfaces
(13) ISO 8501 – 1 Preparation of steel substrates before application of paints.
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Materials and Design for Structural

Integrity Against Corrosion Failure
V.S. RAJA
Professor
Department of Metallurgical Engineering and
Materials Science
I.I.T Bombay, Mumbai, INDIA
Email: vsraja@iitb.ac.in
Tel:+91-9869769984
Corrosion Basics
Environment
Material
Corrosion
Design
VS Raja, Aqueous Corrosion Laboratory
Corrosion: Deterioration of materials in

presence of a chemical environment leading
to loss in their function.
VS Raja, Aqueous Corrosion Laboratory 3
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Functional requirements of materials
• Mechanical • Physical
– Strength – Thermal Conductivity
– Ductility – Electrical Resistance
– Toughness – Magnetic
– Wear – Optical
• Dimensional Stability – acoustic
• Wear
• Machinability • Chemical
– Catalytic
Corrosion Tendency
Exposure to
Corrosive/chemical medium
Metal
Energy
level
Ore
State/time
Oxidation and Reduction reactions
R
Ox
e M+
e M+
Metal Environment
R
Ox
Ox  Electron acceptor (H+, M+, O2 )

R  Reduced species (H2,OH-,M )
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What are these cathodic/reduction reactions?
2H+ + 2e  H2
(Hydrogen reduction reaction)
O2 + 2H2O+ 4e  4(OH)-
(Reduction of dissolved O2 in water)
M+ + e  M (Cu ions from return condensate)

(metal deposition)
Mn+ + e  M(n-1)+ (Ferric to ferrous)
(metal ion reduction) VS Raja, Aqueous Corrosion Laboratory 7
Forms of corrosion
Uniform Corrosion Galvanic Corrosion
Crevice Corrosion Pitting Corrosion
Intergranular Corrosion Selective Leaching
Erosion/Cavitation Stress Corrosion Cracking/Hydrogen

Corrosion Assisted Failures
Microbial Corrosion High Temperature Oxidation
b
IGC
HIC
100 m
SCC
Cavitation
Microbe induced corrosion
Crevice
Corrosion
Pitting
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8/27/2020
Corrosion Control Management

Strategies/Practices
Prevention Methods
 Start at the Design Board
Cathodic protection  Fabrication
Inhibitors  Commissioning
Protective coatings  Operation
Selecting proper  Inspection
materials  Maintenance
Design  Education

10
Factors affecting service Failure Causes

life/performance of equipment
Failure reasons in chemical process Failure frequency
• Design industries
Plant design faults 60
• Materials of construction
incorrect application 52
• Specification poor process control 33
• Fabrication and quality control
• Operation
• Maintenance materials faults 32
human errors 27
• Environmental conditions
lack of awareness of corrosion risk 22
contamination of product 20
instrument failure 7
Material: Environment:
chemical, chemical
Material Environment
structural, species, pH,
microstructural temp….
Corrosion
Design:
DesignStresses,
geometry
Corrosion Basics
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General materials of construction

• Major uses
– Cast Iron
– Steels
– Low alloy steels
– Stainless steels
• Less use
– Cu-alloys
– Ni-base alloys
– Al-alloys
– Ti-alloys VS Raja, Aqueous Corrosion Laboratory 13
Material Temperature Applications

Limit, oC, based
on creep rate
Carbon steel 450 fractionation towers, separator drums, heat-exchanger shells, storage tanks, most piping, and all
structures are generally fabricated from carbon steel, liquified-propane storage, ammonia
storage, solvent dewaxing units,
and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) processing
0.5Cr-0.5Mo 510 reactor vessels, heat-exchanger shells, separator drums, and piping for processes involving
hydrogen
at temperatures above 260 °C
2.25Cr-1Mo steel 540 sulfidic corrosion as well as to high-temperature hydrogen attack; furnace tubes, heat-
exchangers shells, and piping and separator drums. ( need post weld heat treatment)
5Cr-0.5Mo 620 For sulfur corrosion in liquid hydrocarbons or for hydrogen service
7Cr-0.5Mo 635
9Cr-0.5Mo 650
Type 304/316 stainless 595 include linings and tray components in fractionation towers; piping; heat-exchanger tubes;
steel reactor cladding; tubes and tube hangers in furnaces; various components for compressors,
turbines, pumps, and valves; and reboiler tubes.
Incoloy 800 (18Cr-35Ni) <900 High temperature and reformer furnaces
High carbon 1100

centrifugally cast 25Cr-
20Ni
Nickel base alloys (sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid,

hydrofluoric acid, and caustic solutions) and
resistance to SCC
S.No Alloy Applications
1 Alloy 400 (N04400) lining for carbon steel equipment to prevent
corrosion
by hydrochloric acid and chloride salts , tubes
for HF
2 625 (N06625) and alloy 825 polythionic acid corrosion of flare-stack
(N08825), tips
3 Alloy B-2 (N10665) hydrochloric acid at all concentrations and
temperatures
(including the boiling point), Only in reducing
conditions
4 Alloy B-2 (N10665), alloy C-4 have excellent resistance to all concentrations
(N10002), and alloy C-276 of sulfuric acid up to at least 95 °C
(N10276
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Steel Protection (atmospheric corrosion) : Coatings
– Metallic – Paints ( Basic resins)

• Hot-dip • Alkyd
• Electro deposition • Epoxy ester
• Electroless deposition • Vinyl
• Thermal Spray • Acrylic
– Conversion • Epoxy
• Phosphating • Polyurethanes
• Chromating • Polyester
• Anodizing • Silicones
• Latex- Emulsion
• Inhibitors/Oils ( Temporary)
Hot dip coatings
Coatings giving substantial galvanic protection

Galvanized (Low Al additions <1%) coatings
Galfan (5 wt% Al) coatings
Corresponds to zinc aluminum eutectic
Zinc-rich coating without intermetallics at coating/steel interface for
improved formability
Galvalume (55 wt% Al) coatings
Galvanneal coatings
Hot-dip zinc-coated steel, heat-treated immediately after application of
zinc to promote interdiffusion of zinc and iron
Zn-Al-Mg coatings
Superior in corrosion resistance to all above
Presence of Mg makes corrosion products more stable
Difficult to produce and not been commercialized till date
General Guidelines for Materials Selection
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Basis for Materials Selection

 Operating conditions and the possible failure
mechanisms.
 Design and Fabrication
 Monitoring
 Maintenance
 Additional protection measures
 Cost
 Material availability
 Data availability
Properties to watch out for

• Heat treatment
• Hardness (macro & micro)
• Tensile
• Toughness
• Ductile brittle transition temperature
• Stability against temperature
• Corrosion (Environment & Materials
compatibility)
Stainless Steels
At least 10.5 wt% Cr steels
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Some of the commonly used stainless steels are
• Austenitic: 304, 304 L, 316, 347, 321, 904 L (prone

to SCC)
• Ferritic Grades: AISI Type 405, 409, (Lean Cr); 434,

436, 442 (prone to HE)
• Martensitic, AISI type 403, 414 (prone to HE)
• Duplex :2205, 2507, Ferralium 255 (resistant to SCC)

• Precipitation Hardenable: 17-4 PH, 13-4 PH, 15-5 PH
Alloying elements
Cr - Corrosion resistance
Ni - Stabilizes austenitic phase
Mn- Stabilizes austenitic phase (Detrimental to corrosion

resistance)
Mo- Ferrite Stabilizer (Corrosion resistance)
C - Enhances strength (Promotes weld decay)
N- Austenite Stabilizer (Improves

VS Raja, Aqueous corrosion resistance)
Corrosion Laboratory 23
Stainless steels composition-Pitting &

Crevice Corrosion
• PREN + % Cr + 3% Mo + 16% N.
• An increase in PREN (Pitting Resistance Equivalent
Number) means an increase in pitting resistance of a
stainless steel.
• The Adjective “Super” _ferritic, austenitic, duplex-
stainless steels ; based on PREN number ( 40)
• Used this concept for selecting material for “A”

beam for Dandi Memorial
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8/27/2020
Major problems associated with stainless steels
1. Pitting
2. Crevice corrosion
3. Weld decay
4. Stress corrosion cracking (austenitic)
5. Hydrogen embrittlement (ferritic and
martensitic)
Chemical composition of some duplex SS

S32760a 40-46
S39277 39-46
S39274, J93404 39-47
S32750 38-44
J93380 38-46
S32520 37-48
S31260 34-43
S32803b 33-41
S32550 32-44
S32950 32-43
J93345 31-47
S31200 30-36
J93370 30-34
S32404 27-32
S32900 26-35
PREN
Chemical compositions of some highly-alloyed austenitic stainless steels
S32654 54-60
J95370 48-54
S31266 46-62
J93254 42-47
42-45
S31254
N08926 41-48
N08925 40-47
N08320 34-43
N08904 32-40
N08020 29-40
S32200 29-40
N08007 25-32
20-23 N08367
PREN
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Performance of Stainless Steels on EAC

Classification SCC HE
Ferritic (BCC) No Yes
Austenitic (FCC) Yes* No

Martensitic (BCT) Yes Yes
Duplex (BCC + FCC) No Some what
Precipitation No No
Hardenable
* Also, temperature limit ( 50 oC)
Nickel base alloys VSperform

Raja, Aqueous Corrosionfor
better Laboratory
HE/SCC 28
Miss-understanding martensitic steel/stainless steels

Location of the Problem: Process Condensate
Welding
• Stainless Steels
• High Strength Low Alloy Steels
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Intergranular Corrosion
 Welding causes such an IGC attack.
 Selective attack of the grain

boundaries
 Grain boundary becomes highly active

or phases prone to selective attack
 Stainless steel subjected to heat

treatment between 400-900 oC under
goes (IGC)
 Formation of Cr23C6 and the

consequent grain boundary chromium
depletion.
1) Oxalic acid test

Polishing of specimen  Etch the specimen for 1.5 min. at 1.0 A/cm2 in oxalic acid 
Determine the type of surface morphology :
 Step (Non sensitized)  Ditch (Highly sensitized)

 Dual (Partial)
Weld decay(sensitization) in austenitic stainless steel and methods for it’s prevention .Panel of four
different AISI 300-series stainless steels were joined by welding and exposed to hot HNO3 and HF
solution.The weld decay evident in the type 304 panel was prevented in the other panels by reduction in
carbon content (type 304 L) or by addition of carbon stabilizing elements(Ti in 321, and Nb in 347 (ASM
Handbook Vol 13)
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8/27/2020
Cleaning after welding (See ASTM A380)

A. Degrease in solvent or caustic
B. Descale (remove heat tint,slig residue)
• Mechanical descale (avoid iron)
 Grind
 Sand
 Grit Blast
 Power brush
C. Chemical descale (pickling)
• 10-25% HNO3 + 2%HF
• Pickle pastes containing HNO3 + HF
• 10% H2SO4 followed by 10% HNO3
D. Electrochemical(electropolishing)(not in ASTM A380)

• 50% H3PO4 (85%concentration)-
• 50%H2SO4 (concentrated)
• 12 volts DC power,3000 amps per m2
• stainless as anode ,copper cathode
Welding high strength low alloy steels

• Hardness raise
• Martensite formation at the heat affected zone
• Hydrogen pickup
• Post weld stress reliving treatment/tempering treatment
Important properties to watch out for

• Hardness
• Higher the strength more prone to SCC/HE
• Material processing like pickling, electroplating
• Heat treatment
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8/27/2020
Care to be taken for Stainless Steels

• Proper Heat treatment
• Proper Storage
• Passivation/surface cleanliness
• Better in Oxidizing Media
• Chlorides are issues
• Localized forms of corrosion
Failure Investigation of Type 304L SS Tubes of Air Condenser

- Fertilizer Company
Air Inlet at 150
MOC = SS 304 Cooling
water outlet C to 160C
42C – 45 C Pressure
= 10
Kg./cm
1ST Stage Air Cooler
Cooling
water Inlet
Air outlet 31C – 33 C Tube leakages = 63 Nos.
38C – 42 C
COOLER IS IN OPERATION FOR 6 – 7 YEARS
TGSCC
MOC change to
DS 2205
13
8/27/2020
Failure Analysis of Nozzle of the

Steam line in Hydrogen
Generation Unit
Appearance of crack in the nozzle is shown. The crack seems to emanate from
the pipeline-nozzle joint. Stress concentration seems to be the reason for the
cracking
Solution
Replace type 304 ss with Cr-Mo steels
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8/27/2020
Ferrous Group
Resistant To Resistant To
SCC Super Duplex SS Pitting/Crevice
Resistance To SCC
+N, +Cr
Cost
Resistant To Inconel Higher
Duplex SS
SCC +Ni (30%)
+Cr ,-Ni
Pitting/Crevice 304L,316L SCC
Resistance Cu Base +Mo, +N
Alloys
IGC
Resistant
316SS Super
Austenitic/Ferrite IGC
High Strength Austenitic

Prone To Pitting,
Weld SS 3xx,2xx Crevice Corrosion
+Ni
Problems In
Exhibit Passivity Ferritic Welding,low
Strength HE
+Cr/-C
Basic Structural Poor Corrosion
Material C-steel
Resistance
-C
Lowest cost
VS Raja, Aqueous
CastCorrosion
Iron Laboratory Poor Fabrication 43
Structural Material
Superferriitic
stainless steels Ni-Cr-Fe Alloys
303, 303Se
Superduplex
stainless steels
Add Ni for corrosion resistance
in high temperature environment
Add Cr, Mo Add S or Se
Add Cr, Ni, Mo, N
for machinability
409,430 309,310,314,330
Duplex stainless
steels
No Ni, ferritic Add Cr and Ni for
strength and oxidation resistance Add Cr, No, N,
lower Ni
for strength
Add Nb + Ta to reduce Add Cu, Ti, Al,
347 304 Precipitation-hardening
sensitization lower Ni
Fe-19Cr-10Ni stainless steels
for
precipitation hardening
Add Ti to reduce
321 Add Mo for Add Mn and N,
sensitization
pitting resistance lower Ni for higher strength
304L
Lower C to reduce 316
316L
sensitization
201, 202
317L
Add more Mo for
pitting resistance No Ni addition,
lower Cr, Add Mo, N
martensitic
Superaustenitic Add Ni, Mo, N for 317

stainless steels corrosion resistance Low-S, high-N grades:
403, 410, 420 4565S, 2418 MoN,
Rex 734
Resistant to Pitting, Crevice, Dry Chlorine not

Erosion Corrosion Ti- Alloys Stable
Prone to Ammonia,
Resistant to Erosion 3m/s Cu, Ni Chlorination
-Zn +Ni
Resistant to Admiralty brass
Dezincification Prone to Erosion
Corrosion
(+P, As, Sb) +Sn)
High Strength Brass Dezincification
+Zn
Resistant to Low Strength
Cu
Pitting
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8/27/2020
Gas Turbines Thermal Barrier Limited Life

Coating
High Strength Super Alloys

Moderate temperature
High Strength, High Limited Temperature

temperature Ti- Alloy Application
Over Aged Alloy Loss in Strength, Low

Temperature Application
Heat Treatment
Prone to Pitting,
High Strength High Strength Al-Alloys Exfoliation SCC/HE
+Cu, +Zn/Cu, +Mg

Good Corrosion
Resistance Al Low Strength
Light Weight Material

Design and Fabrication and other processes

Design that can affect
o Stagnancy
o Stresses ( Concentration)
o Heat transfer
o Bimetallic Systems
Fabrication and other material processing affect materials reliability
o Welding
o Cold work
o Pickling
o Electroplating
Galvanic Corrosion
• Unprotected underground plain carbon steel pipelines connected to
above-ground tanks and other
• Structures that are electrically grounded with buried copper rods or
cables
• Stainless steel shafts in "canned" pumps rotating in carbon or graphite
bushings in a strong electrolyte
• Copper-nickel or stainless steel heat exchanger tubes rolled in plain
carbon steel tubesheets exposed to river water for cooling
• Aluminum thermostat housings on cast iron auto engine blocks in
contact with glycol-water mixtures
16
8/27/2020
Source of chloride is hard to avoid

• In water-cooled heat exchangers
from chlorides in the cooling water
• Under thermal insulation allowed to
deteriorate and become soaked
with water that leached chlorides
from the insulation
• Under chloride-bearing plastics,
elastomers, and adhesives on tapes
SCC control under insulation

• Addition of sodium metasilicate as an SCC inhibitor to the insulation (
>10 x chloride content) or metasilicate is painted . Works when the
insulation becomes. But may get leached with service
• Apply protective coating before insulation.
– Catalyzed high build epoxy paints effective upto 100 °C
– catalyzed coal tar-epoxy enamels to about 150 °C (300 °F)
– silicone-base coatings 200 °C (390 °F).
– Sandblasting helps better ( surface profile depth of 0.01 to 0.1 mm) produces
compressive stresses better for SCC
• Piping with aluminum foil under insulation: ( problem in alkaline conditions)
– provides both a physical barrier to chloride migration to stainless steel surfaces
– cathodic protection when the insulation becomes wet, ( effect between 60 and
500 °C) VS Raja, Aqueous Corrosion Laboratory 50
Prevention Methods
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8/27/2020
Landrum (1989) has suggested several remedial measures

to prevent crevice corrosion. They are:
1. Specify that crevices be welded shut.
2. Improve the fit of parts.
3. Specify that the crevices be filled with a plastic or an
elastomer or other nonporous materials.
4. Change the design to entirely eliminate the crevice.
5. Specify double-butt or double-lap weld joints when
practical and possible.
6. When single-butt joints must be used for critical pipelines,
consider using consumable or removable inserts.
7. For corrosive environments, specify continuous welds
instead of skip welding.
8. Be especially careful when designing tank supports

(especially for aluminum or stainless steel tanks) to
assure as a few crevices as possible.
9. Seal weld tubes to tube sheets when practical. If seal
welding cannot be specified, make sure that the tube
installation procedure will result in a tight fit of tubes to
tube sheet.
10. In critical rotating equipment, where crevices cannot be
eliminated, open the crevices enough so that they will
circulate the solution, thus avoiding crevice corrosion
problems.
11. Do not specify that any material, which absorbs water, be
placed next to metals or alloys.
12. If crevices cannot be eliminated use high PREN
stainless steels or Ti alloys.
For corrosive environments, specify

continuous welds instead of skip welding.
Be especially careful when designing

tank supports (especially for aluminum or
stainless steel tanks) to assure as a few
crevices as possible.
Seal weld tubes to tube sheets when

practical. If seal welding cannot be
specified, make sure that the tube
installation procedure will result in a tight
fit of tubes to tube sheet.
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8/27/2020
 Do not specify that any material, which absorbs

water, be placed next to metals or alloys.
 If crevices cannot be eliminated use high PREN

stainless steels or Ti alloys.
 In critical rotating equipment, where crevices

cannot be eliminated, open the crevices enough
so that they will circulate the solution, thus
avoiding crevice corrosion problems
Take Away
• Corrosion failures need to be addressed
• Materials selection is one of the important ways to control
corrosion
• Corrosion failures are complex-there is no universal
alloy/material that can withstand all types of corrosion
• Technologies evolve, there is a continuous need to develop
materials
Remember the Basics
• Environment?
– Chemistry, temperature, pressure,
Environment
Material
Corrosion
flow static, inhibitors,
• Design
– Stresses
Design
– Stagnancy
• Materials
– Compatibility
– Fabrication
– Process conditions
– Coatings/lining/cathodic protection57
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20
29-08-2020
Mechanical / Pre – Commissioning Integrity
For

(PIMS)

For
(PIMS)
By
Sumeet Kataria
Country Manager
International Certification Services Pvt. Ltd.
22-23, Goodwill Premises, Swastik estate, kalina, Mumbai 98.
www.icsasian.com
sumeet.kataria@icsasian.com
9324644271

A Mechanical Engineer with A Diploma in Financial management followed by An
Advanced Diploma In Industrial Safety.
25 Yrs plus Work Experience in:-
Offshore Hook-Up & Construction Services Pvt. Ltd. involved in more than 12+
construction projects at Bombay High covering module installation, hydrotest, jacket
installation, revamping, pipe laying etc..
Rajesh Construction Company in laying of Main Line and Tie-Inn activities for Cross
Country Pipelines including hydro testing, yard bending of pipes and coatings.
Vijay Builders and Construction Pvt. Ltd. Involved in the construction of various
POL Depots, LPG Bottling Plants and Retail Outlets covering Roads, Drains, Culverts,
Driveways, Buildings, Foundations etc.
Onland Offshore Engineering Services Pvt Ltd in the fabrication field covering
Structural Steel, Three Plate Construction, Cold Roll Formed Sections, Pressure
Vessels, Piping Components and Pipelines.
Sumeet Kataria Onland Graphics India Pvt Ltd a 3M authorised converter for the manufacture of
sumeet.kataria@icsasian.com Signages, Totems, Id Signs using Flex, Vinyls, Retro Reflective, ECF, ACP, etc also
9324644271 handled curtain wall and glazing works.

ICS Technologies a NABL Accredited Laboratory, IRCA approved Training Institute;
Institute approved by the MSBTE in the field of Training; a Recruitment Agency,
Placement; Laboratory Testing and Calibration Services.
Currently with International Certification Services Pvt Ltd a Conformity Assessment
Body as a Country Manager responsible for the growth and development of
Management of Certification and Inspection Services of the organisation.
1
29-08-2020
PHSMA-(Pipeline & Hazardous materials Safety Administration) DATA:
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_portal%2FGT%20Perf
ormance%20Measures&Page=Onshore%20Significant%20Incident%20HCA.
Pipeline integrity :
Pipeline integrity means ensuring a pipeline and all its related
components are running properly.
In short, it's about keeping the pipeline safe for life. ...
Pipeline operators use a variety of technologies to inspect their

pipelines to ensure they are operating safely and efficiently.
Pipeline integrity can be ensure by using number of methods at
before commissioning and during operation phase.
Mechanical method is one of the tool use for mechanical integrity

of pipelines.
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS CONSTRUCTION PHASE
 Design Requirements
 Materials & Equipments specification and Integrity check
 Pipeline route selection & maintaining inter distance between
various facilities.
 Development of procedures for construction and testing
activities as per best engineering practices
 Calibration, suitability and traceability check of instruments and
equipments required for testing/inspection.
 Qualifications requirement for welding procedures & welders.
 Selection of NDT methods & qualifications and acceptance
criteria.
 Field Joint Coating
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29-08-2020
MECHANICAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT TOOL CONSTRUCTION PHASE
 Holiday test before lowering.

 Concrete coating and quality requirement.
 Top cover, pre & post padding
 Backfill and others protections.
 Protections equipment
 Gauge pigging
 In-line Inspection (ILI)
 Pressure Testing
 Maintaining inspection records.
Design requirements

Design requirements for Pipelines
Reference Code’s and Standard’s
ASME B31.8: Gas Transmission and Distribution
ASME B31.4: Liquid petroleum transportation piping systems
ASME B31.3: Standard for Process Piping
ASME B31.11: Liquid slurry transportation piping systems
NFPA 59A: Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
PNGRB Regulation: Technical Standards and
G.S.R. 808(E). Specifications including Safety
Standards for Natural Gas Pipelines
PNGRB Regulation: Technical Standards and Specifications including
G.S.R. 612(E). Safety Standards for City or Local Natural Gas
Distribution Networks.
ASME B31.8S: Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines
3
29-08-2020

Design requirements ;
Piping Systems requirement as per ASME code- The design requirements
are intended to be adequate for public safety under all conditions
encountered in the gas industry. Conditions that may cause additional stress
in any part of a line or its appurtenances shall be provided for, using good
engineering practice.
As per GSR 808 (E)- The selection of design for Natural gas pipelines shall be
based on the gas properties, required flow rates, operating pressures and
the environment. All components of the pipeline shall be designed to be
suitable and fit for purpose throughout the design life.
As per GSR 612 (E)- Supply of gas at a constant pressure at consumer end,
and - The design should recognize the need for safe guard against
malfunction of any equipment and provide sufficient redundancy to ensure
that the supply is secured against such malfunctions.

Necessary calculations shall be carried out to verify structural integrity and
stability of the pipeline for the combined effect of
• pressure,
• temperature,
• bending,
• soil/pipe interaction,
• external loads and
• other environmental parameters as applicable, during all phases of work
from installation to operation. Such calculations shall include but not limited
to the following:
- Buoyancy control and stability analysis for pipeline section to be installed in
areas subjected to flooding / submergence,
- Crossing analysis of major rivers.
- Evaluation of potential for earthquake occurrence along pipeline route and
carrying out requisite seismic analysis to ensure safety and integrity of the
pipeline system.

Steel Pipe Design Formula :
where
S= specified minimum yield strength, psi (MPa),
t = nominal wall thickness, in. (mm)
D= nominal outside diameter of pipe, in. (mm)
F= design factor obtained from Table 841.
E= longitudinal joint factor obtained from
T= temperature derating factor obtained from Table
841.1.8-1
P= design pressure, psig (kPa)
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29-08-2020

Additional Requirement for Nominal Wall Thickness
- Overburden loads
- Dynamic and seismic loads
- Cyclic and vibratory loads
- Internal pressure fluctuations
-Geo-technical loads (including slides, differential settlement of
piping, loss of support, and thermal effect of the pipeline on soil
properties).

Location Classes for Design and Construction
(a) Location Class 1. A Location Class 1 is any 1.6-km section that has 10 or
fewer buildings intended for human occupancy. A Location Class 1 is intended
to reflect areas such as wasteland, deserts, mountains.
(b) Location Class 2 A Location Class 2 is any 1.6-km section that has more
than 10 but fewer than 46 buildings intended for human occupancy. A Location
Class 2 is intended to reflect areas where the degree of population is
intermediate between Location Class 1 and Location Class 3,
(c) Location Class 3. A Location Class 3 is any 1.6-km section that has 46 or
more buildings intended for human occupancy except when a Location Class 4
prevails.
(d) Location Class 4. Location Class 4 includes areas where multistory
buildings are prevalent, where traffic is heavy or dense, and where there may
be numerous other utilities underground. Multistory means four or more floors
above ground including the first or ground floor. The depth of basements or
number of basement floors is immaterial.

As per GSR 612 (E) regulations:

Location Class 1, 2 and 3 shall be used only for re-certification of
existing Installations and facilities, which were laid/built/constructed
before the date of notification of GSR 612 (E) regulations.
In any case minimum nominal thickness of pipe permitted as per this

standard shall be 6.4 mm for pipe size 4 inch nominal dia and above,
irrespective of the grade of the pipe material.
In all existing cases where thickness of pipe is less than 6.4 mm for pipe
size 4 inch and above. Quantitative Risk Assessment shall be carried
out and the risk level shall be reduced to ALARP (As low as reasonably
possible).
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29-08-2020

For both aboveground and underground pipe size less than 4

inch nominal dia., the minimum nominal thickness shall be as per
table below:
Minimum Pipe Wall Thickness (Ref ASME B36.10 M)

NPS Identification Schedule No.
0.5 XS 80
0.75 XS 80
1.0 XS 80
1.5 XS 80
2.0 XS 80
3.0 STD 40

Mainline /Sectionalizing valves : shall be installed on the

pipeline for the operation and maintenance and control of
emergencies. Spacing between mainline valves / sectionalizing
valve in various Location Classes shall not exceed values given in
Table 2.
In plastic should
distribution normally not
mains valve be more than
spacing 1 km
In steel should normally

distribution not be more
mains valve than 3 km
spacing

Pigging Facilities :
Main gas pipelines and feeder lines, spur lines and branch lines of
4" and above size and length greater than 10 km shall be provided
with pigging facilities.
Spacing between consecutive pigging stations shall be
determined based on the diameter of pipeline, nature of pigging
operation and capability of the pigs. Spacing in excess of 200 km
shall be avoided.
Pigging stations shall be provided with all weather access road
from the nearest road
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29-08-2020

Bends
The minimum radius of Cold
Field Bend shall be as per Table
Use of Mitre bends shall not be
permitted.
Insulating Joints
Insulating joints shall be provided
to electrically isolate the buried
pipeline from the above ground
pipeline and station piping

Branch Connections
Branch connections of size below NPS 2 are not recommended in
buried pipeline section.
Flanged or Threaded joints, Bolts, Nuts, Gasket and other

Fittings
Threaded joints shall not be used in underground sections of
cross country pipelines. Threaded joints may be permitted in
above-ground stations / above ground section of SV stations, only
if a welded isolation valve is provided before it. The flanged joint
shall be made using either spiral wound metallic gaskets or
metallic ring type gaskets. Plain asbestos sheet / reinforced
gaskets / CAF gaskets shall not be used.
Materials and Equipment &

Integrity check
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29-08-2020

Materials and Equipment & Integrity check
Specifications of Piping Materials :
All materials and equipment's forming a permanent part of any piping
system constructed according to this standard shall comply with the
design requirements and be suitable for the intended fabrication or
construction methods.
Materials to be used in facilities exposed to low ambient or low
operating temperatures shall have adequate impact properties to
prevent brittle fracture at such low temperatures.
Steel Pipe
As per Line Pipe Specification API 5L, shall be Seamless, Electric Arc
Welded (EAW) or Longitudinal / Helical Submerged Arc Welded
(LSAW/HSAW) conforming to (PSL 2).
Carbon Equivalent
Maximum limits on Carbon Equivalent for line pipes shall not be 0.43%.

Steel Pipe ....
API 5L Specification for Line pipes (Mini Grade API 5LGr. B)
ASTM A106 Seamless Carbon Steel Pipe for High Temperature
Service.
ASTM A333 Seamless and Welded Steel Pipe for Low-Temperature
Service
Mill Hydro Test

Line pipes should be hydrostatically tested in pipe mill using test
pressure that produces a hoop stress equal to 95% of SMYS
irrespective of material grade. For new pipeline, the test pressure period
15 sec.
Notch Toughness
For steel pipes of size NPS 2 and above, notch toughness shall be
specified
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Specifications of Piping Materials – Valves
API 6D : Pipeline Valves
ASME B16.34: Valves Flanged, Threaded and Welding End BS

EN ISO 15761: Steel gate, globe and check valves for sizes DN
100 and smaller, for the petroleum and natural gas industries
BS EN ISO 17292: Metal ball valves for the petroleum,

petrochemical and allied industries BS 1873 Specification for
Steel globe and globe stop and check valves (flanged and butt-
welding ends) for the petroleum, petrochemical and allied
industries

Specifications of Piping Materials - Valves
BS 5352- Specification for steel wedge gate, globe and check

valves 50 mm and smaller for the petroleum, petrochemical and
allied industries
BS 5351- Specification for steel ball valves for the petroleum,

petrochemical and allied industries - Small Floating ball valve
BS 1873- Specification for Steel globe and globe stop and check
valves (flanged and butt-welding ends) for the petroleum,
petrochemical and allied industries
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Valves and Pressure Reducing Devices -
Valves body, bonnet, cover and/or end flanges components made

of cast iron and / ductile iron (as per ASTM A 395) shall not be
used in CGD networks. However, in case of regulators, the body
or components may be made of material as permitted under the
specific code as mentioned in GSR 612 (E) regulations.
Valves used in service lines of size NPS 2 and below shall

conform to BS EN 331 as mentioned in GSR 612 (E) regulations.

Specifications of Piping Materials
Flanges :
Flanges made of cast iron, ductile iron and non-ferrous materials (brass
or bronze) shall not be used in CGD networks.
Use of flanges in natural gas transmission and distribution piping is not
permitted except for station piping e.g. CGS, DRS, MRS etc.
For piping class 150 or above all the flanges shall be with raised face.
• ASME B16.5 Steel pipe flanges and flanged fittings - Size upto 24"
NB.
• ASME B16.36 Orifice Flange
• MSS SP-44 Steel Pipeline Flanges
• API 590 Steel Line Blanks
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Specifications of Piping Materials –
Fittings other than Valves and Flanges

Fittings made of cast iron and ductile iron shall not be used in CGD
networks.
ASME B16.9 Factory-Made Wrought Steel Butt welding Fittings
MSS SP-75 Specification for High Test, Wrought, Butt Welding

Fittings
MSS SP 97 Integrally Reinforced Forged Branch Outlet Fittings -

Socket Welding, Threaded and Butt welding Ends
IS 1239 (Part-2): Steel Tubes, Tubular and Other Steel Fittings-

Specification-Part 2: Steel pipe fittings

Specifications of Piping Materials ---
Fittings other than Valves and Flanges
All plastic fittings used in CGD networks must have been type
tested by an internationally recognized testing agency prior to
their use.
Thermoplastic / thermosetting fittings shall not be used in above

ground piping system.
Thermoplastic fittings conforming to ISO 4437 Part 3 or EN 1555

Part 3 shall be acceptable
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29-08-2020

Specifications of Piping Materials
Stud Bolts and Nuts :All stud bolts and nuts used in CGD
networks shall be hot dipped galvanized as per ASTM A 153 or
equivalent.
ASTM A194 Standard Specification for Carbon and Alloy Steel Nuts
for Bolts for High Pressure or High Temperature Service, or both.'
ASTM A193 Standard Specification for Alloy-Steel and Stainless

Steel Bolting Materials for High Temperature or High Pressure
Service and Other Special Purpose Applications
ASME B18.2.1 Square and Hex Bolts and Screws, Inch Series
ASME B18.2.2 Square and Hex Nuts


Integrity Check :
All materials and equipments shall confirm design ,
specification and standard requirement.
Inspection shall be carried out by competenet inspection
agency before installation.
Inspected and Accepted material shall reched at site and same
shall be verified with manufacture record and inspection
reports/ rlease notes at site before installation.
Material damaged during transportation shall not use.
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Pipeline route
selection &
Inter distance
between
various
facilities
Pipeline Route :
construction for crossing road, pipeline, cable, railway, river, canal and
other existing obstacles.
The risks associated with proposed pipeline, mains and service routes
shall be assessed to ensure that all reasonably practicable steps have
been taken to minimize the risks to people & property in the event of an
unplanned release of Gas.
Pipeline, which is constructed inside the area of high voltage lines, may
be electrically influenced by this high voltage line. The voltage caused
by the influence may at times be so high as to pose a danger to
personnel working on the pipeline.
If it is not possible for plant and / or materials to come beyond 50m of
the centre of the high voltage system, special measures must be taken
to prevent any pproach beyond that distance,
As per GSR 612 E- City Gate Station (CGS)

As far as possible the CGS shall be installed at the periphery of
populated area. The entity should make best endeavor to have more
than one CGS for supply security.
Facility shall be provided with proper boundary wall / fencing with
gate(s) in line with Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines.
Properly laid out roads around various facilities shall be provided
within the installation area for smooth vehicular access.
Platforms and crossovers shall be provided for ease of operation and
maintenance
Provision should be made for venting, purging and draining
All vents shall be routed to a safe area.
Gas detectors shall be installed
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(a) City Gate Station (CGS) : Inter distance between various

facilities required at CGS shall be as per table:
Sr. From / To 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Compound Wall - 6 6 6 6 6
2 Control Room / Office Building / Store 6 - 12 12 2 15
3 Pressure Regulation and / or Metering 6 12 - 2 12 15
4 Odorant System 6 12 2 - 12 15
5 Electrical Sub Station # 2 12 12 - 15
6 Gas fired heaters 6 15 15 15 15 -
Notes :
1. All distances are in meters.
2. For all the distance from the compound wall
# As per State Electricity Board recommendations.
(a) As per GSR 808 (E) - MINIMUM INTER DISTANCES FOR VARIOUS
STATION FACILITIES : All distances are in meters.
Sr. From / To 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Small Compressor/ Pump House - 15 15 15 16 30 15 15 15 16

2 Main Compressor House 15 - 15 15 30 30 15 15 30 30
3 Gas Handling System (PB /GC) 15 15 - 5 16 30 15 15 5 16
4 Equipment Room 15 15 5 - - 30 15 15 5 16
5 Control Room /Office building 16 30 16 - - 30 15 15 5 -
6 Fire Pump House/Fire water 30 30 30 30 30 - - 30 12 -

storage tanks
7 Water Spray Deluge Valve 15 15 15 15 15 - - 15 - 16
8 Cold Blow Down 15 15 15 15 15 30 15 - 5 30

9 Compound wall 15 30 5 5 5 12 - 5 - 5
10 Elect Sub station, 16 30 16 16 - - 16 30 5 -
Notes : PB - Pig receiver / Launcher Barrel, GC- Gas Coolers / Meters / filterste
Electricity Board recommendations.
Development of procedures for

pipeline construction and testing
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Development of procedures for pipeline construction and

testing -
Construction and testing Procedures shall developed before start
construction activities for the below listed activities
Material inspection at manufacturer premises
Pipeline construction and laying
Preparation of procedure for site safety
Quality Assurance Plan / Inspection test Plan for materials
required for pipeline & construction activities at site
Transportation of material at site
Drawings Issued for Construction (IFC)
Right of use
Route survey

testing -
Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment (HIRA) – monitoring &
control
Right of way clearing & grading
Cable locator survey
Ground Penetrating survey for identification of underground
utilities
Trail Pit excavation
Marking of pipeline center & trench width
Line pipe stringing
Excavation of trench
Electrode batch qualification test

testing -
Welding Procedure Specifications (WPS)
Welding Procedure qualification tests
Welder performance Qualification / Evaluation
Fit up and Welding of pipeline joints
Non-destructive test (NDT- RT,UT,PT & MT)
Abrasive blasting
Field joint coating
Filed joint Holiday testing
Inspection of pipeline section and Holiday testing
Concrete coating (if water body crossing)
Lowering of pipeline section in to trench
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testing -
Top Padding -sot soil / sand
Back filling of pipeline
Compactions of Back filling soil
All types of Crossings Cased (Boring) / Uncased (HDD/Open)
like Rail, road, river, canal etc
Critical Crossing including other utilities by HDD (Road, Canal,
Pipelines, Drains, etc.)
Pre-hydro testing of constructed pipeline for crossings
Tie-in weld with crossing section
NDT & field joint coating of tie-in joints
Backfiliing & Restoration

testing -
Installation of Pipeline route Markers
Header installation at both ends
Pipe book preparation
Mechanical clearance
Flushing & water filling
Hydro testing
Swabbing/ drying
Installation of markers and final clean up
Valves testing & Installation in pipeline
Installation of Electric isolation / Monolithic insulation joints or
Electrical Insulation.

testing -
Construction of valve chambers / stations
Purging
Construction of Civil structures/building for operation &
maintenance
Painting
Activity report and pipe book
Material reconciliation – monitoring & control
Pipeline Pneumatic test & Pressure Holding
Final Pipe book and activity report
Construction drawing as laid drawing
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testing -
Deviation / variation analysis and obtain change order approvals
from client
Pipeline Integration Management System
All Pipeline station construction work at Compressor station,
SVs, IPs, Receipt / Dispatch Stations, CNG Stations etc. or
related to various engineering disciplines namely Civil,
Mechanical, Electrical, and Instrumentation.
Installation of Cathodic Protection system (Temporary and
Permanent)
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)
Interference & mitigation

testing -
Cathodic protection (CP) – Performance test
Project pre-commissioning including cleaning & pigging of
pipeline & commissioning
All quality aspect related to Civil/ Structural Construction Work.
Commissioning
Calibration, Suitability and

Traceability check
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Calibration, suitability and traceability check
•All measuring Instrument / testing equipment shall be

available be identified Sr./ID No.
•All instrument/ equipment shall be in operation and
good working condition
•Reading scale should be clearly visible
•Shall be free from any mechanical damage.
•Instrument /equipment shall be suitable for measuring
range / range.
•Calibration shall be done from NABL accredited Lab. or
master shall be traceability to national/international
stanadrd.
•Instrument identification/ Sr.no. shall be recorded
Below information shall be recorded in calibration

certificate.
•Instrument identification/ Sr.no.
•Instrument name.
•Make.
•Measuring / testing range.
•Least count
•Date of calibration
•Date of expiry/next calibration

•Detail (name, range, sr., least
count, traceability, calibration) of
master used for calibration.
•Instrument reading and master
reading in ascending and
descending order covering
complete testing / measuring range
•Error in reading
•Uncertainty
•Signature of lab in-charge
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Qualifications of welding procedures

& welders
QUALIFICATION OF PROCEDURES AND WELDERS
Welding procedures and welders for welding of gas pipelines shall

be qualified as per API 1104 and shall include toughness testing
requirements as applicable for the line pipe.
Welding procedures and welders, for station piping shall be

qualified as per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code
Section IX or API 1104.
When welders qualified under API 1104 are employed for station
piping, their qualification shall be based on destructive mechanical
testing as per API 1104.
GENERAL REPAIR OR REMOVAL OF DEFECTIVE WELDS
Welds having defects shall be removed or repaired in accordance

with API 1104 or ASME BPV code Section IX as applicable.
Welders employed for repairs shall be qualified in accordance with
"Qualification of Procedures and Welders". Weld repair areas
shall be subjected to additional radiography or ultrasonic testing
after repair.
Notches or laminations on pipe ends are not permitted and must

be removed by cutting the pipe as a cylinder and re- beveling of
pipe end prior to welding.
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NDT Methods & Procedure

Qualification

INSPECTION OF WELDS –NDT
All Non Destructive Testing (NDT) including radiographic examination and /

or ultrasonic testing shall be performed in accordance with the requirements
of API 1104 Demonstration of the Testing Procedure shall be performed
Prior to final written approval. A procedure demonstration report shall be
generated and the results documented prior to use on actual field welds.
The demonstration process shall be as follows.
a) For UT: Welds containing defects and acceptable imperfections shall be

prepared from actual production pipe material samples utilizing an approved
welding procedure specification. Changes in wall thickness, bevel design,
acoustic velocity, welding process, repair welds, and other variables that
can have an effect on the detectability and resolution of the system shall
require additional demonstration welds from other corresponding approved
welding procedures. Radiographs shall be made of the welds and the
results documented.

INSPECTION OF WELDS -NDT
b) For RT: Radiographic film produced by the use of procedure shall
have the density with in range, clarity, contrast & requisite sensitivity to
define clearly the essential wire diameter of the proper image quality
indicator (IQI) is required
All NDT procedures shall be demonstrate before perform on job.

Regardless of operating hoop stress as well as location class all carbon
steel butt welds shall be 100% radiographed. In case radiography is not
possible due to safety reasons, weld shall be examined by using ultra
sonic techniques.
All butt welded golden joints (i.e. welds joints which are not subjected to
pressure testing, shall be subjected to 100% radiography as well as
examination by ultrasonic techniques. Socket welded golden joins shall
be tested by using Liquid Penetrant Inspection (LPI) method or wet
Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) method.
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Radiographic Testing (RT)
Radiographic Testing (RT) is a non-destructive testing (NDT)

method which uses either x-rays or gamma rays to examine the
internal structure of manufactured components identifying any
flaws or defects.
In Radiography Testing the test-part is placed between the

radiation source and film (or detector)
The material density and thickness differences of the test-part will

attenuate (i.e. reduce) the penetrating radiation through
interaction processes involving scattering and/or absorption. The
differences in absorption are then recorded on film(s) or through
an electronic means.
In industrial radiography there are several imaging methods

available, techniques to display the final image, i.e. Film
Radiography, Real Time Radiography (RTR), Computed
Tomography (CT), Digital Radiography (DR), and Computed
Radiography (CR).
There are two different radioactive sources available for industrial

use; X-ray and Gamma-ray. These radiation sources use higher
energy level, i.e. shorter wavelength, versions of the
electromagnetic waves. Because of the radioactivity involved in
radiography testing, it is of paramount importance to ensure that
the Local Rules is strictly adhered during operation.
Gamma radiography is the method of using of radioactive

isotopes to detect internal defects and inhomogeneities in
material.
Two of the more common industrial gamma-ray sources for
industrial radiography are iridium-192 and cobalt-60.
No power source is required for Gamma radiography hense it is

more comfortable than x-ray radiography.
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Hazards -
When X-ray radiation is absorbed within our bodies, it can
damage molecular structures and potentially cause harm.
Very high doses of radiation cause damage to human cells, as
evidenced by skin burns, loss of hair, and increased incidence of
cancer.
Radiation safety
The guiding principle of radiation safety is “ALARA”.

ALARA stands for “as low as reasonably achievable”. This
principle means that even if it is a small dose, if receiving that
dose has no direct benefit, you should try to avoid it

Benefits
Minimum surface preparation required
Detects both surface and subsurface defects
Provides a permanent record of the inspection
Verify internal flaws on complex structures
Isolate and inspect internal components
Automatically detect and measure internal flaws
Sensitive to changes in thickness, corrosion, flaws and material
density changes
Field Joint Coating integirity

check
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Field Joint Coating

A liquid epoxy coating layer, which may be applied onto
the blast cleaned and pre-heated steel surface to
improve the adhesion of the heat shrink sleeve to the
pipe surface.
Heat Shrink Sleeve :

A type of field joint coating, applied to a pipeline in the
form of a sleeve, which shrinks in the circumferential
direction under the influence of heat for field coating.
Field Joint Coating

The ends of existing mill coating shall be inspected. Unbounded
portions of the coating shall be removed and then suitably
trimmed. Portions where parent coating is removed shall be
thoroughly beveled, and cleaned as specified.
If Humidity is greater than 85 % and pipe temperature is below or
equal to 3°c compared to dew point than coating should be
stopped.
Using copper slag clean blast only the bare steel part of the girth
weld area to SA 2½ and a roughness profile (anchor pattern)
between 50 to 70 microns.
Field Joint Coating
BEVELLING OF
POLYETHYLENE
COATING EDGES
If not factory beveled,

bevel the line coating
edges on both sides of the
weld bead to
approximately 15°.
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Field Joint Coating

The embossed pattern on the sleeve ( dimpled PCI
– Permanent Change Indicator) of the backing
should disappear and a smooth backing profile
should be seen as illustrated below :
Dimples still visible = more heat Smooth

profile = O.K
Field Joint Coating

The ends of the sleeve shall be firmly bonded to the mill coating.
There shall be no upstanding edges.
Adhesive flow shall be evident at both edges of sleeve around
entire circumference of pipe / sleeve.
The sleeve shall be smooth; there will be no dimples, cold
spots, bubbles, punctures, burn holes or any signs of holidays.
There shall be no signs of entrapment of foreign materials in the
underlying adhesive.
Sleeve shall overlap minimum 50mm onto the adjacent PE line
coating on each side of joint.
Field Joint Coating

HOLIDAY INSPECTION TEST
After complete cooling down, each sleeve shall pass holiday detection
test. Holiday inspection shall be done using a voltage setting can go
upto 25kv. The holiday test shall be carried out after 4 hrs.
ADHESION PEEL STRENGHT TEST

One out of every 50 sleeves, or alternatively one out of each day’s
production (whichever is lower) shall be subjected to a manual peel test.
The peel test shall be done after 24 hrs.
Peel strength inspection shall be done at a sleeve temperature of
around 23°C or 60°C in order to compare with Owner’s specification;
both the substrate and the sleeve shall be at this temperature.
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Field Joint Coating

PEEL VALUE Vs. TEMPERATURE CHART
Temperature in Peel Value Peel value in ( N/cm)

(°C) in Kg
23 9.0 35
30 7.75 30
35 6.5 25
40 5.0 20
45 3.8 15
50 2.5 10
55 2.0 7.5
60 1 5
Holiday Test
HOLIDAY TEST
A holiday test is a non-destructive test method applied on
protective coatings to detect unacceptable discontinuities such as
pinholes and voids. Holiday testing involves checking an electric
circuit to see if current flows to complete the circuit. This testing is
used to find coating film discontinuities that are not readily visible.
A holiday test is usually performed buried structures and pipelines

because of the importance of maintaining adequate coating
protection in aggressive service environments.
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HOLIDAY TEST
A holiday test is also known as a continuity test Pipeline section

shall be holiday tested befor lower in the trench.
 In addition the holiday detectors batteries shall be checked
every 4 hours and replaced/ recharged if required.
 Calibrate holiday detector daily
 All holiday detection and holiday repairs shall be conducted to
the satisfaction of the Coating Inspector.
Concrete Coating
Concrete Coated Pipe

A pipeline coating is a cost-effective and sensible solution that is
done purposely to maintain pipelines' integrity. This coating helps
in providing a constant protective lining that helps in saving
pipelines from the damaging effects of corrosion. ... Though, that
corrosion can be removed
it is the steel pipe external with concrete weight coating (Mixed
with cement, aggregates, reinforced steel mesh and water), to
provide the strong downward force protection or a negative
buoyancy for the pipelines. This pipe is commonly used in sub-
sea pipelines & water body crossing with adding the proper
weight of the concrete coatings to support a resistant pressure
against sea water.
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Before coating the concrete, the steel pipe normally shall be
coated with an FBE coating.
First is to calculate the proportioned quantity of cement, iron ore,

sand and granite aggregate, them mixed them together to create
a specified density required; During concrete buildup processes,
control the steel wire mesh position will get a certain wire depth
with the coating; Weighing each joints to verify if they meet the
requirements of the project; Clean the concrete coated pipe ends
and trimmed the excess wire. After curing in 30 days, the material
could be ready for delivery.

Benefits of concrete coated pipe :
• Mechanical protection and negative buoyancy
• Anti-corrosion protection
• Excellent Compatibility
• Long-term adhesion to steel
• Well suited to reel laying methods
• High resistance to cathodic disbondment
Top cover, pre & post padding
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Cover Requirements for Buried Steel Pipelines and Mains :
Location Min. Cover (mtr.)

Normal / rocky terrain 1.0
Minor river / unlined canal / nala crossings, tidal areas 1. 5
and other watercourses
Major river crossings 2.5
Rivers with rocky bed 1.5
Lined canals / drains / nalas etc. 1.5
Drainage ditches at roadways and railroads 1.0
Rocky Areas 1.0
Cased / uncased road crossings 1.2
Cased railroad crossings 1.7
In rocky areas and areas with hard soils / gravels, minimum 150
mm thick padding of soft soil / sand shall be provided all around
the pipe. If required protective layer of rock-shield / rock guard or
concrete coating may be provided to prevent damage to coating /
steel pipe during installation and testing in place of soft padding,
No dwellings or construction in any form shall be permitted within
RoU.
Clearance between
Pipelines
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Clearance between Pipelines or Mains and other

underground structures
(a) When a buried steel pipeline or main has to cross any existing
underground pipeline, cable, drain or other services, the pipeline
shall be laid at least 300 mm below from such services.
(b) When laid parallel to any existing underground cable, drain or
other utilities, the pipeline or main shall be laid with a clear
distance of at least 300 mm from existing utility.
(c) As far as practical, a minimum separation of three (3) meter
should be maintained between the steel pipeline or main and
footing of transmission tower.
Clearance between Pipelines or Mains and other

underground structures
(d) A clearance sufficiently large to avoid electrical fault current

interference shall be maintained between the pipeline and the
grounding facilities of electrical transmission lines.
(e) While laying more than one new hydrocarbon pipelines or

mains in the same trench, clear separation of minimum 500 mm
shall be maintained between adjacent pipelines.
Casing Requirements under Railroads, Highways, Roads or

Streets
Steel casing at road/railway crossings, when provided to meet

statutory requirements, shall be designed in accordance with API
1102. Casing pipe diameter shall be minimum two pipe sizes
bigger than carrier pipe. In case of PE, the casing can be RCC
pipe of min NP3 class.
Bends, Elbows and Miters in Steel Pipelines and Mains
Miters bends and wrinkle bends are not permitted in pipelines and
mains used in CGD networks regardless of operating hoop stress.
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Backfill and Others

protections.

Protections
Backfilling shall be carried out immediately to the extent possible after

the pipeline has been lowered into the trench.
Excavated soil from the trench shall be used for backfilling unless the
same is not suitable . The backfill material shall contain no extraneous
material and / or hard lumps of soil, which could damage the pipe and /
or coating or leave voids in the backfilled trench.
In cultivable land and other specifically designated areas, top soil

excavated from the trench and stored separately, shall be restored to
normal conditions.
Slope breakers or other measures shall be installed in trenches dug in

steep areas (slope of generally 10 percent and more) to prevent erosion
of the back fill. RoU should be provided with drainage ditches to allow
water run-off and avoid backfill wash out .
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SAFETY DEVICES AND FEATURES
SAFETY DEVICES AND FEATURES
The safety system for compression facilities and gas

transportation system shall consist of following:
Emergency Shutdown System

Compressor station shall be provided with an emergency
shutdown system (ESD) for reliably and safely shutting down the
station facilities in case of emergency and for venting out of gas
when situation demands so. The ESD system shall have provision
of shutdown all gas compressing equipments, all gas fired
equipment, and shall de-energize the electrical facilities located in
the vicinity of gas headers and in the compressor shed, except
those that provide emergency lighting and those that are
necessary for protection of the equipment.
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Pressure Limiting Devices
Over pressure shut off valves shall be provided upstream of

pressure controlling system/ regulators along with alarm provision
in case of failure of the pressure control system / regulators.
Vent Lines
Vent line shall be designed and installed to vent out the gas from
relief valves , if provided, to atmosphere. Blow down piping
connected to vent line should extend to location where the
discharge of gas shall not create a hazard to the compressor
station or the surrounding area. The discharge from safety valve
shall be vented vertically upwards to atmosphere at an elevation
of 3 meter (minimum) above working level
Gauge Pigging
Pipeline Gauging
Pipeline gauging is the process of locating and identifying internal

defects such as dents, debris or other internal restrictions that
affect the I.D. of the pipeline.
Why is this important?

The pipeline is designed to deliver a certain throughput based on
a minimum diameter. It is in the best interest of the construction
company to ensure the minimum diameter isn’t lost before
finalizing the project. Pipeline pigs are used to accomplish this
task, but not just any pig, the pig must be dressed with a gauge
plate.ig,
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Pipeline Gauging
In the early days of pigging, gauge

plates were made from steel.
Today’s gauge plates are made from
aluminum to avoid causing damage
to the pipe walls. The plate is sized
proportionately to the minimum
internal diameter of the pipeline, then
added the appropriate style of pig,
such as Steel Mandrel or MULTI-
CAST™ depending on the
application.
In-line Inspection (ILI)
In-line inspection (ILI) tools, sometimes referred to as “intelligent”

or “smart” pigs, are used to inspect pipelines for evidence of
internal or external corrosion, deformations, laminations, cracks,
or other defects.
Selecting the correct tool is typically based on the perceived

threats to the pipeline integrity as well as the pipeline’s physical
and operational characteristics.
Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) and Ultrasonic Testing (UT) are the
two primary methods for in-line inspection of pipelines and each
have their own strengths and weaknesses. UT Intelligent Pigging
is used for its higher accuracy and easier mobilization.
33
29-08-2020
UT tools are well suited for heavy walled pipe. UT tools do require
a liquid cuplant through which ultrasonic pulses can travel to and
from the pipe wall. The presence of any gas between sensors and
pipe wall will interfere with the inspection but gas pipelines can
still be inspected using ultrasonic techniques by running the tool in
a liquid slug between two high-sealing pigs.
MFL tools have difficulty magnetizing heavy walled pipe to

saturation meaning they have an upper wall thickness limit
ranging from 12.7 to 25.4 mm (0.5 to 1.0 inches depending on the
specific tools.

Both types of intelligent pig require a clean pipeline to function
correctly & a pipeline cleaning program should be carried out
before the intelligent pig is run through the line
Most in-line inspection tools and hard body utility pigs are
designed to negotiate bends with a radius of 3D or greater,
Non pigable piping system with short radious bands are used in
the CGD network hense ILI could not performed on the CGD
network.
Hydrostatic Testing
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29-08-2020
Test Requirements for steel pipeline:

Test Required to Prove Strength of Pipelines and Mains to
operate at Hoop Stresses of 30% or more of Specified Minimum
Yield Strength of Pipe
All buried steel pipelines and mains shall be pressure tested after
installation using water as a test medium. Minimum test pressure
shall be equal to 1.4 times Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure.
Hold-up time for the pressure testing shall be minimum 24 hours
for underground and 4 hour aboveground pipeline.
Testing equipments / instruments shall be properly inspected and
shall have valid calibration certificates before they are used for
testing.
Test duration shall be minimum 24 hours for plastic distribution

mains of length greater than 1 km and minimum 4 hours for length
shorter than 1 km.
In case water is used as test medium, test duration shall start after
achieving thermal stabilization.
Suitable relief valve set at 5% higher than test pressure shall be

fitted at the test heads to avoid over pressurization during testing.

Hydro Test Header
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Maintaining Construction
&
Inspection Records.
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28-08-2020
Pipeline Integrity Management
Integrity Assessment Tool:

Direct Assessment (DA)
By:
Ashish Khera, P.Eng Date: 29th August 2020
Integrity Threats from DA– Internal Corrosion
Internal Pitting Corrosion
TLC
Integrity Threats from DA - SCC

External pitting corrosion inlaid with SCC
SCC
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28-08-2020
Integrity Threats from DA – External Corrosion & MIC
External corrosion
MIC
How DA helps in Pipeline Integrity (9 Q’s)?

 Maintain safe, reliable operations with an increase in asset availability
 1- Can the line remain in service?
 Assess the feasibility of increasing the severity of operations

 2- Can I increase the through put of the line?
 Rationalising fabrication flaws from construction found by in-service inspections

 3- Are immediate or scheduled repairs required?
 Re-rating of damaged equipment

Maintain a safe asset!
 4- What is my P safe for EACH pipeline? Find problems “proactively”
 Development of inspection plans and intervals and not “reactively”
 5- When should I do my next inspection? What technology?
= No LEAKS or No Failures!
 Life extension
 6- What is the remaining life of my pipeline (days/months/ years)? Can I increase it?
 Shut-down planning
 7- Do I need to make a planned shut down to assist in integrity management for a pipeline?
 Repair planning/schedules/retrieval
 8- Repair plan and type of repair to manage my P safe and support the asset?
 Leak detection during Commissioning, Operation and Mapping?

 9- How soon can I do confirmation of containment ($$$)?
INTEGRITY VALIDATION TOOLS – ASME

B31.8S?
ILI HYDRO
- Piggable TEST
- Unpiggable
Our team hired by NACE DA

International to develop the 5-day (ECDA,
DA course, launched in US in 2012- ICDA,
launched in India 2014 SCCDA)
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28-08-2020
OISD Std 233- Inspection of Non-Piggable pipelines..& US- DoT
“For non piggable pipelines, primary assessment method like

External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) and Internal
Corrosion Direct Assessment (ICDA) can be used to identify
potential threats.”
“For pipeline systems where general external or internal

corrosion or SCC may be a risk of concern, DA may be a
more cost effective and rational approach to hydro testing
or smart pigging.”
What does OISD say about Non-piggable / Piggable Pipeline Inspection?
When?
If line < 25 years old then
within 10 years of
Why is OISD asking for ICDA or commissioning
“complete wall thickness”? When?
If line > 25 years old then
within 26th years of
commissioning
DA Model Process
Data collection and assessment, Corrosion/ leak
History, Selecting DA regions, Appropriate IDI
tools, Suspectibility
Above ground inspection (EC)/ Corrosion

modeling (ICPM)/ Terrain modeling (SCC),
future threat areas, potential corrosion
locations
In the ditch investigation, Coating assessment,

Environment classification, Corrosion deposits
and areas, NDE, Remaining Strength
Reassessment Intervals, Remaining Life, DA

effectiveness & Health assessment
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28-08-2020
Benefits of Direct Assessment
• Predict future problems (proactive)

• Applicable for both piggable as well as non-piggable pipelines.
• No productivity down time (non-intrusive)
• No modifications to the pipe required
• Performs root cause analysis (Why corrosion exists?)
• Provides a Mitigation plan (How to manage corrosion?)
Very beneficial if the sole purpose is for pipeline’s integrity rather than a
regulatory compliance
NACE DA Standard Practices

Title Applicable (Regulator??)
External Corrosion Direct Assessment
(ECDA)
General and/or localized external corrosion
NACE SP0502-2010
External Corrosion – Confirmatory Direct Assessment

General and/or localized external corrosion
(ECCDA)
NACE SP0210-2010
(Must have a baseline already)
Stress Corrosion Cracking Direct Assessment (SCCDA) External SCC on the pipe surface and underneath the coating
NACE SP0204-2008
(low and high pH)
- Buried lines only

- Onshore Petroleum pipelines (all products)
- All Coating types
NACE DA Standard Practices

Title Applicable (Regulator??)
Dry Gas
(DG-ICDA) H2O < 112 µg/L (or 7 lbs/MMSCF) at STP.
NACE SP0206-2006 (infrequent short term water upsets)
Liquid Petroleum - (LP-ICDA)

NACE SP0208-2008 Hydrocarbon liquid lines with BS&W < 5% by Vol.
Wet Gas
On upstream systems, GLR > 5,000 (i.e., a ratio of
(WG-ICDA)
5,000 ft3 gas at STP/ 1 ft3 H2O ) or ~ 35 bbls
NACE SP0110-2010 H2O/MMSCF
Multiphase Flow
(MP-ICDA)
BS&W > 5% by vol.
NACE SP0116-2016
STP: 15C at 1 atm
- Onshore/ Offshore
- All products
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ICDA- Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment
Non-Intrusive Applicability through PROVEN models:

- Onshore/ Offshore
- Piggable/ Non Piggable
- Dry Gas/ Wet Gas/ Liquid Petroleum/Multiphase/ Water products
- Sweet/Sour Service
Why the ICDA

Subject Matter
Expert (SME) should
be involved?
Liquid sample collected to be analyzed
SEM analysis performed on pre- Diffraction pattern from XRD

washed solids on washed solids
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Pre-Assessment- ICDA Best Practices – Sample and Bacteria Testing at Field
DNA - Taxonomic Breakdown of Identified Microbial Strains in Pipeline
Firewater PipelineNitrosomonas
Nitrospira 2%
3%
Planctomyces
5%
Extensimonas
6%
Leptolinea
29%
Merismopedia
7%
Terrimonas
8%
Stenotrophomonas
10%
Thauera
Candidate_division_OP11 20%
10%
East India- 36” x 8 kms
Terrain vs. Flow Regime
Courtesy of Nicholas Petalas and Khalid Aziz
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Pipeline Inclination on Flow Regime
Flow pattern of gas-condensate system at +10o Flow pattern of gas-condensate system at -

upward inclination 10o downward inclination
Flow Regimes – Stratified Slug
Flow Regimes – Stratified Bubble
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Example:
To show the different flow regimes encountered in a gas pipeline for a typical time period era.
Total 4 flow regimes found and 15 ICDA sub-regions made for a 0.8 km gas pipeline
Case Study 1- 8” Non-Piggable Gas Pipeline

– Pre Assessment
No. Parameter Units 8” Wankaner
1 Year of Commission 2010
2 Nominal Pipe Diameter mm 219.1

3 Wall Thickness mm 6.35
4 Operating Temperatures oC 25
5 Operating Pressures Psi Scenario-1 & 2 = 435; Scenario-3 & 4 = 652

Multiple gas flow rates utilized. Please refer Item-2, page-
6 Gas Production Rate m3/d
8 of IDI report submitted
Gas Line. No oil flow assumed. Water flow rate assumed –
7 Oil/Condensate Production Rate m3/d as back calculated (please refer IDI report submitted for
calculations of water flow rate)
Average CO2
Multiple values utilized for different scenarios while
8 Concentration mol %
modeling. Please refer IDI report.
(in Gas)
Multiple values utilized for different scenarios while
H2S Concentration
9 mol % modeling. Please refer IDI report.
(in Gas)
Is it really DRY GAS?

Should we use NACE DG-ICDA or WG-ICDA and prove it as DG!
PrA:8” pipeline Google Earth View
Downstream Client
Terminal
Upstream
Operator
Terminal
Flow Direction (Current)
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Internal Corrosion Predictive Modeling – Four Scenarios in past 4 years…
• Scenario 1 – (Reverse flow – Current Client to Operator) 9 times within a period

of 1 year
• Scenario 2 – Shut-in under pressure - period for 1157 days before gas flow
commenced from Operator terminal
• Scenario 3 – Continuous flow from Operator to Current Client Terminal with a
shut-in of around 2 hours per day – Total continuous flow days = 338
• Scenario 4 – Shut-in period as a result of the 2 hr shut-in that had occurred in the
stipulated twelve months (Scenario – 3)
8” Pipeline – Indirect Inspection
Inclination angle and Pressure drop profile for 8” gas line
Bi-directional flow……
Liquid hold-up profile for 8” gas line

Flow = Elongated Bubble and Stratified Wavy Flow
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General “uniform” corrosion rate profile for 8” gas line
Number of Locations???
Finally DA provides quantifiable DEx locations!!
Minimum Number of Final Assessment Sites
Continuous
Pipeline Minimum
Length of All Number of
WG-ICDA Low Wall Moderate Wall High Wall Severe Wall Final
Regions and
Subregions in
Loss Loss Loss Loss Assessment
Pipeline < 20% 21–40% 41–60% > 60% Sites per
Segment (km) Pipeline
(1 km = 0.62 Segment
mi)
0.1–10.0 0(A)** or 1(B)** 1 1 1 4

10.1–50.0 1 1 2 2 6
50.1–100.0 1 2 2 3 8
100.1–500.0 1 2 3 4 10
> 500 2 3 4 5 14
** Please refer WG-ICDA standard page-21
8” Pipeline – results from ICPM…
Wall loss profile considering pitting factor. The red circle indicate the sites recommended for direct examination
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Internal Corrosion Mapping
1 2
3
4
7
• Documented lowest wall

thickness measurements
taken from UFD (not to
use a UT D- meter for IC)
for ICDA within EACH
grid
• Such grids with

remaining wall thickness
readings MUST be
included within the report
as part of the Dex step
Direct Examination Results – 8” gas pipeline
Absolute Difference in
Nominal Wall ICPM Predicted Internal Wall
Actual Measured Internal Wall Loss
SITE Thickness Loss with Pf
Wall Loss (%) [Predicted – Measured]
(mm) (%)
(%)
5 15.41% 12.3% 3.11%
3 4.19% 2.36% 1.74%

6.35
2 4.16% 0.78% 3.38%
7 17.39% 16.22% 1.17%
“Excellent Correlation”
Operator managed to assess the
integrity “non-intrusively”
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Post Assessment
Key Ingredients for “Successful” ICDA:
1. Subject Matter Expert- SME
2. Internal Corrosion Predictive Model - ICPM (Solid, Liquid, Bacteria, Sour,

CR- general and pitting)
3. SME + ICPM + ICDA Team = Experience of performing “successful”

ICDA’s
$$$$$
Case Study 2: Offshore Crude Line
• 48” x 19 kms “non-piggable” Offshore crude oil pipeline

• Commissioned in 2006
• Line divided into 2 regions and multiple scenarios for EACH region
• Line experienced 100+ different crude compositions
• Up to 2013 in operation 35% of the time and after 2013 to present in
operation 55% of the time
• Hydrotest done every 6 months for flexible lines
LP-ICDA performed in 2015 to FINALLY assess the UNKNOWN
integrity of the pipeline
Pipeline Segment – 18.7 km
Region 1 – 8.5 km Region 2 – 10.2 km
LFP Valve
Geographical layout of Crude Oil pipeline

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28-08-2020
STEP 2 – Indirect Inspection

• A few representative crude types were used for the internal corrosion
predictive modeling.
• These crude types were transported through pipeline most of the time
during the lifetime of the pipeline.

• Each crude type resulted in specific corrosion rate.
• The corrosion rates were layered up on each other to give a cumulative
corrosion rate for each scenario for this particular pipeline
West India- 48” x 19 kms

SMART DIGGING
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Based on the prediction of solids deposition and water accumulation, pitting factor and the
cumulative % wall loss was calculated
Comparison of ICPM with In-the-ditch direct UT measurements
Actual Measured Wall

Location downstream of ICPM Predicted Internal Wall Worst Measured Internal % Difference
Thickness
PLEM Loss(%) Wall Loss (%) Measured vs ICPM
(mm)
8,515.47 15.9 22.45 27.09 4.64

9,017.88 14.8 15.88 18.91 3.03
10,820.47 14.8 15.89 21.06 5.17
12,341.91 14.8 15.93 21.06 5.13
13,483.85 14.8 15.6 16.21 0.61
15,583.67 - 15.65 Not performed -
17,747.96 - 15.65 Not performed -
“Excellent Correlation”
Operator managed to assess the integrity of Offshore line “non-intrusively” and now way forward……
STEP 4 – Post Assessment
- Remaining Life calculations based on CR

- Reassessment Intervals
- Root cause Analysis: “Why is Corrosion Occurring”
- Recommendation & Mitigation Measures: “How to Fix it”
- DA effectiveness and Possible Finalization of Areas
Case Study 3: Mutiple Refined Products Non-Piggable Lines

UNITY PLOT: ICDA for Product Lines
The predictions compared with the actuals are all within the average ±10% wall loss criteria as specified by the
NACE International MP-ICDA (SP0116-2016) Standard Practice
20
-10% Tolerance
Measured Actual Wall Loss (%)
18
+10% Tolerance
16 12" WO-1
14 12" MS/LAN - R2
12
10
12" HSD/SKO - R2
8 24" MS/LAN
6
24" HSD CCK - R4
4
2 12" BO-1
12" HSD/SKO-R1
24" HSD/SKO 12" BO-2 12" MS/LAN - R1
0
0 5 10 15 20
Predicted Wall loss (%)
Average ICPM wall loss (%) and the measured actual wall loss (%) for the 8 pipelines
India- 8 pipelines
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Case Study 3: To manage CR: Critical Velocities to Prevent Water-Wetting
Pipelines transporting aromatic products (lower density) require higher critical velocities to entrain water in the
product during transfer
5
4.57
4.5
4.01
4
Critical Velocity (m/s)
3.5 3.38 3.35

3.2
2.96 2.94
3 2.77 2.7
2.5 2.38 2.5
2.03 2.01
1.89
2
1.5
0.93 0.93
1
0.55 0.65 0.55 0.65
0.5
0
LAN
LAN
LAN
LDO
LDO
SKO
SKO
HSD
HSD
HSD
MS
MS
MS
HFHSD
HFHSD
Benzene
FO-180
FO-380
FO-180
FO-380
12” BO-1 12” BO-2 12” HSD/SKO 24” HSD/SKO 24” 12” WO-1 12” 24”
CCK MS/LAN MS/LAN
Case Study 3: Internal Corrosion Monitoring

Recommended Monitoring Locations & Types
10 12” A
8 12” B and C
10
Elevation (m)
6 8
Elevation (m)
1016 m , 8601.7 m, 6
4
IC WA 4 1356 m ,
2 8601.7 m,
2 IC WA
0 0
-2 0 5000 10000 -2 0 5000 10000
Distance (m) -4 Distance (m)
-4
12” D and E 10 24” F and G

10
Elevation (m)
8
Elevation (m)
5
6 3921.4 m 8197 m,
4 1149.9 m 1285 m, , WA IC
0
2 , WA IC 0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0 -5
-2 0 1000 2000 Distance (m)
Distance (m)
IC – Location selected based on identified Internal Corrosion during DEx step

WA – Location selected based on ICPM
Case study 4- ICDA - Root Cause & Mitigation of “Piggable” Pipeline

- AFTER UT-ILI
• Piggable line transports export quality crude oil
• Runs parallel to 2 x identical service 34” pipelines and 1 x parallel 48” pipeline
- Why did the corrosion occur found by ILI?

March May Dec. Jan. 2015 Jan. Aug.
2009 - How to manage2014 asset in future?2015
such an2014 2016
Present
Commissioning date - What not to do in future

Secondfor design and
failure Line removed from
operations from a “corrosion perspective” service

1 st PO for ICDA started
First failure – 1 km UT- ILI completed – in Aug. 2016
downstream of launcher Extensive metal loss
found
ME- 34” x 9.5 kms

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ICDA and ILI Compatibility as per NACE

As per the MP-ICDA standard from 2016, ILI can be used during ICDA:
“This standard is intended to provide an integrity assessment methodology for internal corrosion for
pipelines where ILI cannot be performed; however, the MP-ICDA methodology may also serve,
complement, or assist in those cases in which ILI was conducted or is contemplated to demonstrate the
reliability of the ICDA process.
“It can also be used for optimizing the selection/justification, inspection frequency, or prioritization of
pipelines that are subjected to ILI.”
- NACE International SP0116-2016 Multiphase Flow Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment MP-ICDA Methodology
for Pipelines
Predicted General/Uniform Corrosion rates of 34”

• Predicted general/uniform corrosion rates were <1 mpy (<0.0254 mm/yr)
• Too low to cause significant metal loss in ~5.8 years!!!
• However, severe metal loss was found at North and South sections by using ILI tool
• Solids deposition, water accumulation, chlorides, and corrosive microbes???

120 2.00 120
1.40 Cummulative wall loss (%) Cummulative wall loss (%)
115 1.80 115
1.20 Elevation (m) Elevation (m)
110 1.60
110
1.00 1.40
Elevation (m)
105 105
Metal loss (%)
Metal loss (%)
Elevation (m)
0.80 1.20
100 100
1.00
0.60 95 95
0.80
0.40 90 90
0.60
0.20 85 85
0.40
0.00 80 0.20 80
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Distance (m) Distance (m)
North South
Prediction of Solids Deposition for 34” Pipeline
16
14 Critical velocity (m/s)

500, 13.64
12
Critical Velocity (m/s)
10
8
250, 7.73
6
150, 5.40
4
2
50, 1.25
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Solids particle size (microns)
Calculated critical velocity (m/s) for solids deposition as a function of the solids particle size
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Prediction of Localized Pitting Corrosion- SME + ICPM

• Localized pitting corrosion was predicted at different Cl - ion and Fe2+ ion concentrations at average operating conditions (0.28
MPa, 41oC, 2.2 mol% CO2 and 35 ppm H2S)
• The chlorides levels observed and the operating conditions indicate the pits formed in the pipeline was found to
passivate in about 59 – 72 days.
• Failures due to internal corrosion.

• A result of synergistic contribution between the halophilic microbial activity and the elevated chloride levels aided by
water accumulation and solids deposition
450
[Cl-] - 5659 ppm; [Fe2+] - 550 Minimum concentration
400
Pitting Corrosion Rate
ppm measured
350 Pitting Corrosion Rate is
300 [Cl-] - 13332 ppm; [Fe2+] - 133 Maximum
Never Linear! ppm
(mpy)
250 concentration
measured
200
[Cl-] - 20000 ppm; [Fe2+] - 50 Sensitivity test - 1
150 ppm
100 mpy =
100 2.5 mm/yr
50 [Cl-] - 30000 ppm; [Fe2+] - 50 Sensitivity test - 2
ppm
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Days
Effect of chloride ion on pitting corrosion rate showing pit initiation & propagation and pit
passivation
Comparison between ICPM predictions and ILI measurements in pipeline
• Comparison between ICPM predictions and ILI measurements
100
90 enpICDA™
80
70
Wall Loss (%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
tie-in Distance from Tie-in (m) Tankage
NORTH
Comparison between ICPM predictions and ILI measurements

• Comparison between ICPM predictions and ILI measurements
100
90 ILI enpICDA™
80
70
Wall Loss (%)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
tie-in Distance from Tie-in (m) Tankage
NORTH
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Prediction of Water Accumulation in the Pipeline

tie-in to northern tankage
0.9 130
0.8 Predicted Water Layer Thickness (m) - T2 Elevation (m)

110
0.7
Water layer thickness (m)
0.6 90
Elevation (m)
0.5
70
0.4
0.3 50
0.2
30
0.1
0 10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Distance (m)
Prediction of Water Accumulation in the Pipeline

tie-in to northern tankage Science being proven!!
0.9 130
Predicted Water Layer Thickness (m) - T2
0.8 Actual Metal Loss (%) - ILI
Elevation (m) 110

0.7
Water layer thickness (m)
0.6 90
Metal Loss (%) - ILI
Elevation (m)
0.5
70
0.4
0.3 50
0.2
30
0.1
0 10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Distance (m)
Prediction of Solids Deposition Vs. ILI

NORTH
0.31
125
0.26
105
0.21
85
Solids deposition (%)
Predicted Solids Deposition - T2 (01 Jan 2010 - 31 Dec 2015)
0.16
65
Elevation (m)
0.11 45
Elevation (m)
0.06 25
0.01 5
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Distance (m)
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Prediction of Solids Deposition Vs. ILI

NORTH
Science being proven!!
0.31
125
0.26
105
0.21
85
Solids deposition (%)
Predicted Solids Deposition - T2 (01 Jan 2010 - 31 Dec 2015)
Metal Loss (%) - ILI

0.16 Elevation (m)
65
Actual Metal Loss (%)- ILI
0.11 45
Elevation (m)
0.06 25
0.01 5
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Distance (m)
Root Cause Analysis- for Piggable Line from ICDA
The contributing factors that led to metal degradation in a Middle East crude oil pipeline are:
• Low flow velocity in the pipeline
• Water accumulation
• Solids Deposition
• Initiation and acceleration of under-deposit pitting corrosion under a high chloride ion
concentration
• Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC)
Mitigation of Internal Corrosion for 34”

Mitigation Scenarios- “What iff’g”
Two different what-if scenarios are investigated to determine options for

minimizing the current internal corrosion mechanisms
Scenario 1: Transporting the crude oil through one (1) 34” line and one (1) 48” line
instead of the existing three (3) parallel running 34” lines and one (1) 48” line = 2 lines
instead of 4!
Scenario 2: Transporting all the crude oil from through only one (1) 34” line; with the
other three pipelines depressured, cleaned and subsequently suspended with proper
anti-corrosion measures = 1 lines instead of 4!
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Initial What If Scenarios…..then GO Forward Plan

Calculated liquid velocities at the different pipeline regions for 34” for EACH Scenario….FUTURE CORROSION!
Scenario 1: Liquid Velocity

Liquid Velocity in 34” Scenario 2: Liquid Velocity
Region in one 34” line and one 48”
current scenario (m/s) in one 34” line (m/s)
line (m/s)
Regions – Flow to NORTH

R1&R2 1.718 5.154 8.59
R3 1.256 3.768 6.28
R4 0.784 2.352 3.92
R5&R6 0.551 1.653 2.755
R7 0.372 1.116 1.86
R8&R9 0.297 0.891 1.485
R10 0.175 0.525 0.875
R11 0.076 0.228 0.38
CR137 regions – Flow to SOUTH
R12&R13 0.854 2.562 4.27
R14 0.427 1.281 2.135
R15 0.175 0.525 0.875
R16 0.078 0.234 0.39
Learnings……
• Owner has realized the strength of
Key Ingredients forICDA for managing ICDA:
“Successful” integrity of piggable
and non-piggable pipelines
1. SME’s
• Now(Subject
applying it Matter
for their Experts)
critical lines in the pre-FEED stage, engineering time,
as a PROACTIVE assessment to design and operate within the Integrity
2. ICPM Liquid,( IOW’s)
(Solid,Window
Operating Bacteria, Sour, CR- general and pitting, % Wall
Loss)
• Be informed about susceptible locations and corrosion rates BEFORE they
occur and operate the asset safely
3. SME + ICPM + ICDA Team WITH Experience of performing
“successful” ICDA’s
• Trying to get out offor
the ALL 4 circle
vicious stepsof REACTIVE inspection and
+ Verymaintenance
Keen and Mature Pipeline Owner
• Increase the LIFE and VALUE of the asset
Deliverables of ICDA
• Inclination angle (critical angles of and velocity for liquid/ solid accumulation)
• Flow regime in each sub region
• Pressure variation
• Temperature drop
• Average pH in each sub region
• Water accumulation rates and locations
• Liquid and Solid hold-up rates and locations
• Uniform corrosion rate
• Sensitivity analysis- amount of gas/ water on CR, production rates, composition of gas
variations
• TLC (water dew point and hydrocarbon dew point calculations)
• Assessment of MIC’s, Erosion and corrosion due to oxygen
• Root cause analysis
• Inhibitor/ biocide/ scavanger requirement and effectiveness- mitigation
• Remaining wall thickness
• Mitigation recommendation
• Types and locations for Monitoring
• Chemical Treatment engineering
• Reassessment interval
• ICDA effectiveness
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28-08-2020
External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA)

It involves a 4-step process:
1) Pre-assessment (PrA) = Scrutinizing Previous data & field investigation
2) Indirect Inspection (IDi) = Above ground “indirect” surveys
3) Direct Examination (DEx) = On the pipe “direct” Investigation
4) Post Assessment (PoA) = Integration, remaining life & overall health
Historically (prior to ECDA standards), managed external corrosion using
some of the ECDA tools and techniques, especially for Indirect Inspection
(IDi), but NOT in an “integrated way”
Big revolution in technology has come in the 2nd step of IDi for the
Traditional CP and Coating survey techniques – CP CIPS, DCVG, CAT,
ACVG etc.
Pre-Assessment (1.2.2.1)
• Collects historic and current data – must be sufficient to go on to the next points
• Must be performed in a comprehensive and thorough fashion
• Used to determine if ECDA is feasible
• Defines ECDA regions
• Selects indirect inspection tools
• Document pre-assessment results and decisions
What other data is needed?
ECDA- Start Pre-Assessment (Step 1) with a CP Audit

Includes, historic review of data, directly visiting and testing of:
•T/R’s (all that can affect surveys)

•Anode bed with Anode Junction Boxes
•Cathode Junction Box
•Permanent reference electrodes and associated cables
•TLP’s various types maybe?
•IJ’s
•Grounding cells
•Surrounding lines with/ without CP system = Interference
To Understand the Performance of all these Components
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28-08-2020
ECDA- Results of CP Audit

• Gain confidence on the asset in hand
• Plan for “customized” CP surveys for each line to answer:
• Which ones?
• Where?
• Unique procedures based on this asset?
• How many?
• Managing the unknown locations of underground bonding
• Interference concerns affecting data?
• Ensure the correct settings are in place, all concerns and issues have been looked into by operator BEFORE the
surveys get planned, otherwise will get INCORRECT data leading to an INCORRECT ECDA program.
2nd Step of Indirect Inspection can ONLY start upon COMPLETING the above…. Are we almost there??
Table 2 – NACE SP0502

This table assists in survey tool selection based on the specific ECDA segment
conditions and may be used as a guideline:
Current Voltage AC Current

Close Interval
CONDITIONS Gradient Surveys Pearson Electro-magnetic Attenuation
Surveys (CIPS)
(ACVG and DCVG) Surveys
Coating Holidays 2 1, 2 2 2 1, 2
Anodic Zones on Bare Pipe 2 3 3 3 3
Near River or WaterCrossings 2 3 3 2 2
Under Frozen Ground 3 3 3 2 1, 2
Stray Currents 2 1, 2 2 2 1, 2
Shielded Corrosion Activity 3 3 3 3 3
Adjacent Metallic Structures 2 1, 2 3 2 1, 2
Near Parallel Pipelines 2 1, 2 3 2 1, 2
Current Voltage AC Current

Close Interval
CONDITIONS Gradient Surveys Pearson Electro-magnetic Attenuation
Surveys (CIPS)
(ACVG and DCVG) Surveys
Under High Voltage Alternating Current

(HVAC) Overhead Electric 2 1, 2 2 3 3
Transmission Lines
Shorted Casings 2 2 2 2 2
Under Paved Roads 3 3 3 2 1, 2
Uncased Crossings 2 1, 2 2 2 1, 2
Cased Piping 3 3 3 3 3
At Deep Burial Locations 2 2 2 2 2
Wetlands (limited) 2 1, 2 2 2 1, 2
Rocky Terrain/Rock Ledges/ Rock
3 3 3 2 2
Backfill
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28-08-2020
As per NACE:
ECDA is NOT
Feasible i.e.
- Coating and CP
Surveys are NOT
feasible when……
Reference: NACE ECDA Standard
The Need for Technology for Indirect Inspection (IDi)

• Traditional IDi coating inspection techniques do not
record continuous raw survey data for the entire
pipeline length
• Only anomalies that the Surveyor identifies and
subjectively assesses to be reportable are
documented
Legacy equipment resulted in subjectivity
• Subjectivity in a survey that is already indirect (IDi)
= unreliable or non-repeatable
• Location of data readings may be un-reliable
• Position over subject pipe cannot be confirmed –
locator separate from survey
• No way to audit results
• Tedious to document anomalies (manually logged
and manually integrate)
TRADITIONAL SURVEY OUTPUTS….

• Typical outputs
are spreadsheets
that are manually
editable for all
CIPS, CAT,
DCVG, ACVG
etc.
DCVG • DCVG is
subjective –
based on
Surveyors
observation
• Data manually
aligned is tedious
• No traceability
where NIL DCVG
indication is
reported
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Results of No Access!
Typical problems faced during survey due to access..
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12” – Surveyor Movement & CP Data Should ALWAYS be recorded
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28-08-2020
Ideal CIPS Waveform from “good” Interruption Cycle and Electrode Having
a Good Soil Contact
This is what we want with PROOF!

New Age Surveys- Transperently show Bad data- Inaccurate data on Concrete
New Age Surveys- Transperently show Bad data- Broken Copper Wire
CIPS wire breakdown

due to frequent
obstruction on ROW.
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28-08-2020
New Age SURVEY OUTPUTS- CIPS- If T/R switches off unscheduled momentarily on 4”
Pipeline
New Age Waveform: Detects & Records Interference in a 48” Pipeline
CP CIPS
Chart
PSP vs
Distance
300mV positive /
anodic Influence @
SAME
Pipeline Integrity Management location!
System
Influence (if any) from HT/LT/Railway Crossings
AC Interference nearby cluster of HT AC

andInterference
LT nearby Railway Crossing
Reference DCVG Waveform
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New Gen. Integrated IIT= CP CIPS, DCVG, ACVG, ACCA, DOC, & Depth of Cover with
Elevation profile
New generation – GIS & Integrated IIT
Pipeline Integrity Management System Copyright Spectrum XLI
Other Advantages of new age Survey reporting–

Terrain data auto-exported with common DGPS
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Improvement in pipeline Integrity Validation

• Avoid False Positives/ False Negatives!
• Pipeline integrity assessment techniques of ILI and Hydrotesting provides
auditable records so why not Above ground surveys….within DA or just a
survey!
New Age = Continuous recorded non-editable raw logs that are auto-integrated
makes this possible
Indirect Inspection (IDI) results used for Direct Examination (Dex)
Indirect Inspection (IDI) results used for Direct Examination (Dex)
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28-08-2020
DEx – Documentation- Data to collect

 Description of Terrain Conditions
 Characterization of Surrounding Soils
 Correlate the IDI indication because of which
Dex location selected
 Assessment of Coating Conditions
 Identification of Corrosion Deposits
 External Corrosion Defect Mapping and MPI
for SCC measurements
 Define interacting anomalies as per Operator
requirement and perform Engineering
Analysis (Ex. ASME B31G Calculations) for anomaly
cluster and get the P safe
 Assessment of any other threats found (IC,
MIC, Dents etc)
Step-3: Direct Examination
GPS
Coatings Soil measurements
NDT
Environment
Anomalies
“Most Accurate”
Direct Examination (DEx) Program

• Multiple in the ditch site investigation/ pipeline
• Immediate (I) action sites investigated
• At least 1 Null site / pipeline (n+1)
• Not ‘bell holes’ but rather sites with at least a girth weld (approx. 15
m long)
• Standardized inspection protocols
• Multiple coatings assessed separately
• Consistent and proven data collection procedures
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Coating Condition – Before & During DEx:
Coal tar coating intact but non adhered to pipe surface
Coating Assessment- Field Vs. Factory Applied:

Outer wrap along with field
applied coal tar coating on
the girth weld is found to be
very poorly adhered to the
pipe surface.
Factory applied coal tar

coating on the pipe body is
found to be well bonded
during DEx inspection.
DA- Step 3 – Direct Examination- Coating Assessment

3LPE = Fail!
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8” Gas line DEx-3LPE Factory Coatings
• Well Bonded FBE layer

• Passed all peel tests
• 100% of 3LPE classified as “Excellent- Well Bonded”
8” Gas line: DEx-Shrink Sleeves Field Coatings- Good
• An example of Passed Shrink Sleeve- only a few locations for subject line based on DEx
8” Gas line : DEx- Shrink Sleeves Field Coatings- Bad
• Minimal adhesive present on pipe surface

• Bare pipe visible with no/ spotty substrate
• Failed peel tests in majority locations circumferentially
• 75% of inspected SS failed and was found to be in “Fair to Poor” condition
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10” Insulated line: DEx- Electrolyte Present between for PUF and HDPE
Findings of DEx during an ECDA Program: Pipe Body
G
W
FeCO3
Poorly adhered Tape Coating
FeO
Coal tar coating

disbonded but intact
External Corrosion – Engineering Assessment
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28-08-2020
Corrosion Profile/ Feature

Pit Depth (mm) Effective Length Inner Pipe Wall
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

0.0
-1.0
-2.0
Output Imperial
-3.0
Effective Length of Corrosion: 5.000 in
Start: 10.000 in
-4.0
End: 15.000 in
Pit Depth (mm)
-5.0
Total Length of Corrosion: 19.000 in
-6.0
Effective Area of Corrosion: 0.710 in2
Maximum Pit Depth: 0.240 in
-7.0
Max. Pit Depth / Wall Thickness:

-8.0 64.2%
-9.0
Modified B31G (0.85dL) Method: Fail
Maximum Safe Pressure:
-10.0 833 psig
Burst Pressure: 1067 psig Pit Length (mm)
Factor of Safety: 0.84 Is my P Safe > P operating?
ASME B31G Method:
Maximum Safe Pressure: 503
Fail
psig
If Not
Burst Pressure:
Factor of Safety:
644
0.50
psig
What can I do to bring my P safe higher?
External Corrosion Direct Assessment – after 4th step = Post Assessment:
- Remaining Life calculations
- Reassessment Intervals
- Root cause Analysis
- Recommendation & Mitigation Measures

For EACH
- DA effectiveness Pipeline!
- Possible finalization of DA regions
5-year DA Program- Post DA- Operator Action Planned / Pipeline

• Change in Operating pressure
• Use the DA reports as the baseline assessment
• Immediate Repairs AND Repair Plan for future
• Monitor Prioritized Sections
• Data Integration for each of the DA stages
• Revised Centerline
• Coating Rehabilitation
• Make the line Piggable or schedule for ILI
• Perform Hydrotest
• Line Not Fit for Service
• Rerun Risk Assessment & Re rank the lines
• Plan for turnkey DA based on reassessment interval
• Appropriate inhibitors ? and corrosion monitoring ?
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28-08-2020
Conclusions….
• Direct Assessment is an integrity assessment process through which an
operator may be able to assess and evaluate the integrity of a pipeline
segment.
• It is one of the regulatory approved and/or recognized methodologies to

assess pipeline integrity:
– Pressure testing
– ILI
– Direct Assessment
• Direct Assessment methodologies are quite successfully applied to both

new/old; piggable/non-piggable pipelines.
• Direct Assessment is intended to address EC, IC, and SCC threats to pipeline
integrity.
Conclusions….
• Direct Assessment will usually include the following stages:
1. Pre-assessment — Detailed data gathering and integrating corrosion threat factors

2. Indirect inspection — Identify suspected areas of corrosion
3. Direct examination — Confirm corrosion sites (i.e. most probable locations)
4. Post-assessment — Evaluation
• Each DA methodology will employ at least one non-destructive (NDE) inspection technique to
physically inspect and assess pipeline.
• Provides Root Cause Analysis – Why is the Corrosion occurring?
• Mitigation plan provided- How to manage the corrosion?
ADVANTAGES OF DA
Proactive and designed to prevent lapses in pipeline integrity
Answers the key questions- Why corrosion exist? And How to mitigate it (go forward plan)?
Defect modeling can be developed from the DA process which can be used for forecasting and “what if.. Scenarios”
to optimize production with existing threats
Provides input for prioritizing and planning remedial integrity activities
When possible, complementary to ILI and Hydrostatic testing for greater data accumulation, data verification etc
A pipeline need not be put out of service during the process of assessing, thus no productivity downtime
No cost required for preparing the pipeline to enable the usage of this assessing technique
35
29-08-2020
Data Analysis & Interpretation
Presented by
Pankaj Panchal
NACE, Corrosion Specialist
NACE, Cathodic Protection Specialist
Mobile : +91 93772 76131
E-mail : info@corrosionps.com
1
OUTLINE
 CIPL Survey Data

 DCVG Survey Data
 CAT Survey Data
 Soil Resistivity Data
 Inline Inspection
 Comparison
2
CIPL SURVEY
Voltmeter
Copper Wire
Test Station
Electrolyte
Pipe
3
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CIPL SURVEY
4
CIPL SURVEY
5
CIPL SURVEY
ON/Off Potentials On/Off & Depolarized Potentials
Potential Profile
ON
OFF
Depolarized
6
2
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CIPL SURVEY
7
CIPL SURVEY
8
CIPL SURVEY
9
3
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CIPL SURVEY
10
CIPL SURVEY
Distributed anodes Expanded scale
11
DCVG SURVEY
12
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DCVG SURVEY
13
DCVG SURVEY
14
DCVG SURVEY
 dA  
SD  S A   SB  S A 
 dA  dB  
where:
SD = signal strength at defect (mV)
SA = signal strength at Point A (mV)
SB = signal strength at Point B (mV)
dA = distance from A
dB = distance from B
1372 m
SD = 200 mV + (300 mV -200 mV ) = 275 mV
1372 m+ 457m
15
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DCVG SURVEY
Pipe-to-Remote Earth =
Σ Earth Gradients
= 25+15+6+4+3+1+1 mV
= 55 mV
55mV
 10020% IR
275mV
Perpendicular line between electrodes intersects defect

16
DCVG SURVEY
17
DCVG SURVEY
18
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DCVG SURVEY ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
 0 – 15% IR Small Coating Fault (Minor)

 15% - 35% IR Medium Coating Fault (Moderate)
 35% - 70% IR Medium – Large Coating Fault (Large)
 70% - 100% IR Large Coating Fault (Major)
19
DCVG SURVEY
 Wenner – 4 Pin Method

 Soil Box Probe
 Electromagnetic Induction Method
20
DCVG SURVEY
21
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DCVG SURVEY
22
DCVG SURVEY
23
PIPELINE CURRENT MAPPING
24
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25
26
AVERAGE & LAYER RESITIVITY
a1 r1 avg rL1 L1
a2 r2 avg
r3 rL2 L2
a3 avg
rL3 L3
27
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LAYER RESISTIVITY
r1 avg = 2a1R1
L1 = a1
RL1 = R1
rL1 = 2L1 RL1
Resistances R1, R2, and R3 r2 avg = 2a2R2
measured with respect to spacings L2 = a2 – a1
a1, a2, and a3 or L1, L2 and L3 RL2 = (R1 R2)/(R1 – R2)
rL2 = 2L2 RL2
r3 avg = 2a3R3
L3 layer = a3 – a2
RL3 = (R2 R3)/(R2 – R3)
rL3 = 2L3 RL3
28
LAYER RESISTIVITY
RESISTIVITY
RESISTIVITY LAYER LAYER
SPACING RESISTANCE AVERAGE RESISTANCE rlayer
(ft) [cm] R (Ω) rave (Ω–cm) RL(Ω) (Ω–cm)
5.22 [159.1] 10.0 10,000 10.0 10,000
10.44 [318.2] 7.4 14,795 28.46 28,450
15.66 [477.3] 3.1 9,295 5.33 5,328
29
IN LINE INSPECTION
30
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IN LINE INSPECTION
31
IN LINE INSPECTION
32
DATA COMPARISON
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धन्यवाद | THANK YOU
34
12
RISK ASSESSMENT
by:
Upama Darshan
GM(Elect)
IEOT, ONGC
Upama Darshan
Name : Upama Darshan
Designation: General Manager (Electrical), IEOT, ONGC
Qualification: M. Tech (Integrated Electronics), IIT Delhi

B. Tech (Electrical), G.B. Pantnagar University - Gold Medalist
Job Experience: 35 years in ONGC

16 years in the field of Safety Studies
Currently working in Institute of Engineering & Ocean technology since 2004.
Executed more than 120 HAZOP & QRA Studies for various Onshore & Offshore
Installations of ONGC including some commercial projects for OPaL and Nicco.
Training/ Professional Course:

Certified HAZOP Leader
Had 5 days Risk Analysis Training at IIT Mumbai.
Had 5 days SAFETI Software Training from DNV-GL.
Had 2 days Process Safety Training at Dubai
Honorary faculty in training programmes of National Safety Council and IPSHEM Goa.
Presented papers in International forums.

HAZID/ HAZOP

OUTLINE
• Introduction to HAZID/ HAZOP
• HAZOP Guidewords
• HAZOP Methodology
• Benefits of HAZOP
• HAZOP Limitations
• Exercise

WHAT IS HAZARD?
Hazard is a “physical situation” with a

potential to cause harm
• To people (Fatalities/ Injuries)

• To property (Equipment, Buildings)
• To environment (Air, Water or Land)
• To business (Production loss, Clean up)

WHY HAZARD
Inherent Nature
Physical Property of Matter
• Flammable
• Toxic
State of Matter
• Pressure
• Temperature
• Kinetic Energy
• Potential Energy
Unsafe Work Practices
UNSAFE WORK PRACTICES

ACCIDENTS TRIANGLE
Herbert Heinrich
showed that for
every accident
resulting in a
fatality or major
disabling injury,
there are
approximately 300
unsafe incidents.

SOURCES OF HAZARD
 Hardware Failures–Piping/Flanges/Valves/Fittings etc.
 Operator Error - Failure to close / open valves
- Failure to respond to an alarm
 Management System Failure - Policies, Training
- Operating/Emergency Procedures
- Supervision/Monitoring
 Natural Events - Earthquakes, Lightning, Storm etc.
 Man-made Events - Sabotage, Collision, Dropped Objects
etc.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES
• Hazard Identification (HAZID)
• Periodic Maintenance
• Inspection, Testing
• Condition Monitoring
• Corrosion Monitoring – Cathodic Protection
• Safe Operating Procedures
• Awareness Programmes
• Training
HAZID TECHNIQUE
• Hazardous Events
• Loss of Containment from piping, valves, flanges, fittings etc.
• Causes
• Corrosion, Impact, Material & Construction Defects,
Inadequate Design, Improper Operation etc.
• Consequences
• Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Fireball, Explosion etc.
• Safeguards
• Prevention, Detection, Control & Mitigation
• Recommendations
• Further Actions required
• Close-out Responsibility
QUESTIONS CATEGORIES
• Integrity Failures/ Loss of Containment

• External & Internal Corrosion
• External Effects or Influences
• Material & Construction Defects
• Design Defects
• Operational Lapses
• Natural Hazards

HAZID METHODOLOGY
• Identify hazards associated with facility/ activity

• Assess consequence/ potential incident events
for all identified major hazards
• Check for Preventive Measures for all consequences
• Where necessary suggest suitable remedial measures
• Record the workshop findings

HAZID WORKSHEET FORMAT

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZID
• Knowledge of System/ Facility
• Equipment Layouts
• PFDs (Simulation Report)
• Design Basis/ Criteria & Specifications
• F&G Detection Layout & Philosophy
• Fire Fighting Equipment Layout & Philosophy
• Safety Equipment Layout & Philosophy

WHAT IS HAZOP?
• Formal, systematic review of the process plant
design to assess the hazard potential of mal-
operation/mal-function of individual items of
equipment & their consequential effect on the
facility as a whole.
• Structured around a set of specific guide-words
• Performed by a team having knowledge &

experience

HISTORY OF HAZOP
• In early 1960’s ICI (Imperial Chemical Industry)
wanted a better Design Review process
• Suggested a team to address deviations from

normal
• Introduced a set of guidewords to identify

possible deviations

MAJOR ACCIDENTS
• Flixborough, U.K 1974 – 28 lives lost due to Full bore
release of 40 tons of pressurized cyclohexane as a
connecting pipe failed.
• Seveso, Italy 1976 - Highly toxic chemical dioxin released
into atmosphere due to Spontaneous exothermic reaction.
No fatality known but 2 square miles of land had to be
sterilized.
• Bhopal Tragedy 1984 - 30 metric tons of Methyl Isocynate
(MIC) escaped into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes.
Govt. confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths.
• Piper Alpha 1988 - Large riser exposed to pool fire failed
catastrophically and resulted in loss of 167 lives.

HAZOP OBJECTIVES
• Identify potential hazards in process

• Rigorous, systematic check of design, for
safety, operability and conformity to codes, etc.
• Demonstrate that possible actions taken to
eliminate hazards

TIMING OF HAZOP STUDY
• Concept Phase
• Design Phase
• Pre- Start Phase
• Operation Phase
• Modification Phase
• Expansion Phase

HAZOP PREPARATIVE WORK
• Obtain basic informations like P&ID’s, process
description, SAFE charts, etc.
• Plan the sequence of the study
• Prepare a time and meeting schedule

HAZOP TERMINOLOGY
 Node
• Locations at which process parameters are
investigated for deviations
• Points where the process parameters have an
identified design intent
 Parameter
• An aspect of the process that describes it physically,
chemically, or in terms of what is happening
 Intention
• Defines how the system is expected to operate at the
nodes
Upama Darshan
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY
 Guide-words
• Words or phrases used to qualify or quantify the
intention & associated parameters in order to
discover deviations
 Deviations
• Departures from the design intention discovered by
systematically applying the guide-words to the
parameter at each node
 Causes
• Reasons why deviations may occur
 Consequences
• Results of the deviations
Upama Darshan
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY
 Safeguards
• Protective provisions present either to reduce the
chances of a deviation occurring or to mitigate the
consequences
 Recommendations
• Suggested actions necessary either to reduce the
chances of a deviation occurring or to mitigate the
consequences or for further study
 Recording
• Documented in HAZOP worksheets
Upama Darshan
HAZOP TEAM COMPOSITION
• Typically HAZOP team is Multi-disciplinary
• Process Engineer
• Design Engineer
• Instrumentation Engineer
• Operations Engineer
• Health, Safety & Environment Engineer
• Experts with different backgrounds can identify
problems more efficiently when working together than
if working separately and combining their individual
results.
• Team should have knowledge & experience on the
facility under consideration
Upama Darshan
HOW TO PERFORM HAZOP ?
• Plant considered section-by-section, line-
by-line and item-by-item but never in
complete isolation.
• Using guide-words, process deviations from
design intention are identified and study
considers:
• Possible causes of deviations
• Possible consequences of deviations
• Checks for available safety measures
• Suggests remedial action if required
Upama Darshan
HAZOP GUIDEWORDS
No/Not/ None :The complete negation of the
intention
More of :Quantitative increase
Less of :Quantitative decrease
As well as :Qualitative increase
Part of :Qualitative decrease
Reverse :Logical opposite of the intention
Other than :Complete substitution
Upama Darshan
PROCESS GUIDEWORDS
Guideword Process parameters
Flow Temp Presuure Level
No, None No Flow
Less Less Flow Less Less Less
Temp Pressure Level
More More Flow More More More
Temp Pressure level
As well As Contamination
Part of Composition
Reverse Reverse Flow
Upama Darshan
HAZOP WORKSHEET

NO FLOW
Wrong routing
Blockage
Incorrectly fitted check valve
Large leak, Rupture of Pipe
Equipment failure (isolation valve, pump etc.)
Upama Darshan
REVERSE FLOW
Defective check valve
Siphon effect
Incorrect pressure differential
Leakage/ Rupture
Upama Darshan
MORE FLOW
 Exchanger tube leaks
 Increased pumping capacity,
 Increased suction pressure, reduced delivery
head
 Restriction orifice plates deleted
 Cross connection of systems
 Control faults
Upama Darshan
LESS FLOW
Line restrictions
Clogged filter/ strainer
Defective pumps
Upama Darshan
MORE LEVEL
Outlet isolated or blocked
Inflow greater than outflow
Faulty level measurement
Upama Darshan
LESS LEVEL
Inlet flow stops
Leak
Outflow greater than inflow
Draining of vessel
Upama Darshan
MORE PRESSURE
Connection to high pressure system
Defective isolation procedures for relief

valves
Thermal overpressure
PCV Malfunction
Upama Darshan
LESS PRESSURE
Generation of vacuum condition
Condensation
Restricted pump/compressor suction line
Undetected leakage
Vessel drainage
PCV Malfunction
Upama Darshan
MORE TEMPERATURE
Ambient conditions
Fire situation
Cooling water failure
Defective control

LESS TEMPERATURE
 Ambient conditions
 Reducing pressure
 Leakage in exchanger tubes
 Loss of heating

UTILITIES FAILURE
Failure of
Instrument air, steam, water, nitrogen
Hydraulic power, electric power
Telecommunications, computer and
interfaces

HAZOP METHODOLOGY

HAZOP STEPS
• Select a node, apply a guideword
• Develop a deviation
• Examine possible causes
• Examine consequences consider
hazards, or operability problems
• List existing safeguards
• Decide upon action, make a record of
the discussion and decision
Upama Darshan
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Awareness of Toxic and hazardous properties of
process materials
Fire and gas detection
Emergency shutdown
Fire-fighting facility
Testing of emergency equipment
Emergency Response Plans
Training
Upama Darshan
HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
 Recommendation must be:
• Clear
• Concise
• Unambiguous
• Relevant
• Prioritised
• Follow the “3Ws” Rule
• What do you want?
• Where do you want it?
• Why do you want it?
Upama Darshan
WRITING HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
Notes Full Recommendation
• Remove the Remove the manual valve on
manual valve the drain line from pH meter
No. xyz, to prevent the meter
being over-pressurised if the
valve is closed.
Upama Darshan
WRITING HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
Notes Full Recommendation
Avoid small Small bore fittings should not

bore fittings be provided in the up-stream
of the shutdown valve XSDV-
361
Upama Darshan
EXERCISE -1
Pipeline Integrity Management System Worksheet -

EXERCISE -2
Upama Darshan
PROCESS FLOW
Upama Darshan
Pipeline Integrity Management System Worksheet -2
STRENGTHS OF HAZOP
•Based on well- understood HAZOP approach
•Uses experience of operating personnel as part of
team
•Systematic, comprehensive & can identify all
process deviations
•Aids to design of safe & operable plant

•Helps in preparation of O&M manuals

WEAKNESSES OF HAZOP
• Benefits depend on experience of team leader and the
knowledge of the team
• Very time consuming process
• Documentation is lengthy and difficult to audit
Upama Darshan
EXERCISE -1

EXERCISE -1
Pipeline Integrity Management System Back

EXERCISE -2

EXERCISE -2

EXERCISE -2

EXERCISE -2

EXERCISE -2
Pipeline Integrity Management System Back

QUANTITATIVE
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk
WHAT IS RISK ?
RISK IS A FUNCTION OF LIKELIHOOD
OF POSSIBLE UNDESIRED EVENTS
AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THEIR
ASSOCIATED CONSEQUENCES.
Upama Darshan
RISK MANAGEMENT
Understanding
Risk
What can go How

What are the
wrong? likely is
impacts?
it?

OUTLINE
•Introduction to QRA
•Hazard Identification
•Consequence Analysis
•Frequency Analysis
•Risk Estimation
•Risk Criteria
•Risk Assessment
•Risk Presentation

WHAT AT RISK
 Human Life
 Property
 Environment
 Corporate Reputation

RISK MATRIX

DRIVING FORCE FOR SAFETY
STUDIES
 Flixborough, U.K (1974) – VCE (28 fatalities)
 Bhopal, India (1984) - Toxic Gas Release

(4000 fatalities)
 Piper Alpha, U.K (1988) – Fire & Explosion

(167 fatalities)

PIPER ALPHA, U.K
(1988)
Piper Alpha Accident
• 6th July, 1988
• 226 people on board, 167 people killed
• Production: 300,000 BOPD
• Property Damage 1.4 billion US Dollars
• QRA became mandatory since Piper Alpha accident

WHY RISK ASSESSMENT?
•Regulatory requirement
•Decision-making tool
•Good business practice

INTRODUCTION TO QRA
•Risk Analysis is a means of objectively measuring
the risk from hazardous activities of a facility or
operation.
•The risks are quantified in terms of their probability

and consequences.
•By comparison with suitable risk criteria, the results

can be used to decide whether the facility is
unacceptable, or whether improvements are
necessary.
WHAT IS QRA?
QRA tries to answer the following six simple
questions:
Question Technical Term Used
• What can go wrong ? Hazard Identification
• How bad ? Consequence Analysis
• How often ? Frequency Estimation
• What’s its cumulative effect ? Risk Analysis
• So What ? Risk Assessment
• What do I do ? Risk Management
Upama Darshan
QRA METHODOLOGY
Identify Hazards
Evaluate Estimate
Consequences Frequencies
Risk Analysis
Risk Criteria Risk Assessment
Options to Mitigate No No
Options to Decrease
Risks Controlled ?
Consequences Frequencies
Yes
Optimize Options to
Manage Risks
Upama Darshan
SYSTEM DEFINITION
W/F
COMPRESSOR
R S GDU Gas out
E Well Manifold E
C P
E
E
R
I A
V T
O
E
R
R SURGE
TANK Oil out
MOL PUMP
Upama Darshan
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
 Hazard identification is one of the most critical
steps in any risk analysis study. A hazard
omitted is a hazard not analyzed.
 Hazard identification is a qualitative review of

possible accident scenarios which may occur, in
order to select a list of possible failure cases for
quantitative modeling through QRA.
Upama Darshan
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
• Frequency analysis involves estimating the likelihood of
each of the selected failure cases, which were defined in
the hazard identification stage. Typical requirements are
frequencies of pipe leaks, flange/valve/small bore fitting
leaks, heat exchanger leaks, vessel leaks, pump leaks etc.
• Frequency is the expected number of occurrences of the

event per unit time, usually a year. The frequency is
usually presented in scientific notation, e.g. 6.5 x 10-3 yr-1.
Upama Darshan
FREQUENCY ESTIMATION
• Fi = Fn/ Ni
• where, Fi is individual equipment failure frequency per
year
• Fn is number of failures of that equipment in past
• Ni is number of exposed equipment-years (number of
that equipment multiplied by the number of years)
• Ft = Fi * Nn
• where, Ft is total failure frequency per year (future)
• Fi is individual equipment failure frequency per year
• Nn is number of that equipment present
Upama Darshan
FREQUENCY ESTIMATION
EXAMPLE
• Example Description
• Say, there were 30 valve leaks observed in a plant over
a period of past 10 years among 3000 valves present of
that type
• Now, in a new plant it is proposed to install 10 valves of
the same type
• Then what is the likelihood of having a valve leak in the
new plant?
Example
Upama Darshan
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
• Effect modelling to evaluate the physical effects of
• Discharge (gas, liquid, 2-phase)

• Dispersion (gas, liquid)
• Fire (Jet fire, Pool fire, Flash fire, BLEVE/ fireball
• Explosion
Upama Darshan
RISK ESTIMATION SOFTWARE
Software are available in the market for risk
calculation.
For offshore QRA : SAFETI Offshore
For onshore QRA : SAFETI Onshore

Shepherd (Shell projects only)
Non Integrated Software Risk Curve, Effect,

Damage
Upama Darshan
RISK PRESENTATION
• Risk is generally expressed in two forms
• Individual Risk
• The risk experienced by an individual in a given time period,
usually fatality risk as it is easy to measure.
• It reflects the severity of the hazards and the amount of time
the individual is in proximity to them.
• Group (Societal) Risk
• The risk experienced by a group of people in a given time
period, usually fatality risk as it is easy to measure.
• It reflects the severity of the hazard and the number of people
in proximity to it.
• When applied to general public, it is known as societal risk.
Upama Darshan
RISK CRITERIA
• Risk criteria are the standards which are used to
translate numerical risk estimates (e.g. 10-7 per
year) as produced by QRA into value judgement
(e.g. negligible risk) which can be set against
other judgement (e.g. high economic benefits) in
a decision-making process.
• It comprise the technical aspect of the decision-

making process, which is one of the key links
which integrate QRA into risk management.
Upama Darshan
RISK CRITERIA TERMINOLOGY
• An Intolerable region, within which the risk is generally
intolerable whatever the benefit may be. Risk reduction
measures or design changes are considered essential.
• A middle band (or ALARP region) where the risk is

considered to be tolerable only when it has been made
ALARP (As Low As reasonably Practicable). This requires
risk reduction measures to be implemented if they are
reasonably practicable, as evaluated by cost-benefit
analysis.
• A Negligible region, within which the risk is generally

tolerable, and no risk reduction measures are needed.
Upama Darshan
INPUTS FOR QRA
• PFD/ P&IDs
Pressure
Temperature
Inventory
Pipeline/ Equipment sizing
Meterological Data
Onsite Manning/ Offsite Population Data

INTRODUCTION - SAFETI SOFTWARE

SOFTWARE INPUT - PARAMETERS

SOFTWARE INPUT - LEAK

SOFTWARE INPUT – HOLE SIZE

SOFTWARE INPUT – FREQUENCY

SOFTWARE INPUT – PIPELINE

SOFTWARE INPUT – PIPELINE

SOFTWARE INPUT – PIPELINE PARAMETERS

SOFTWARE INPUT – PIPELINE PARAMETERS

SOFTWARE INPUT – WEATHER

MATERIAL PROPERTIES

SOFTWARE INPUT - LAYOUT
INPUT – PLANT LAYOUT

SOFTWARE INPUT POPULATION
INPUT - POPULATION

SOFTWARE INPUT - IGNITION SOURCE
INPUT - IGNITION SOURCES

IGNITION SOURCES
• Static electricity
• Welding and other hot work
• Exhausts
• Engine and motors
• Flares
• Hot surfaces
• Human activity
• Impact
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SOFTWARE RUN
SOFTWARE RUN

VIEW RESULTS
VIEW RESULTS

SOFTWARE OUTPUT
SOFTWARE OUTPUT

SOFTWARE OUTPUT

SOFTWARE OUTPUT

QRA OUTPUT (PIPELINE)
INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOUR
QRA OUTPUT (PIPELINE)


QRA OUTPUT
SOCIETAL RISK F-N CURVE
QRA OUTPUT
SOCIETAL RISK F-N CURVE

QRA OUTPUT (PLANT)
QRA OUTPUT (PLANT)

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QRA OUTPUT
SOCIETAL RISK
Upama Darshan
INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA
Upama Darshan
INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA
(Suggested by Health & Safety Executive, U.K)
for onshore installations
RISK LEVELS PUBLIC PLANT
(per year) PERSONNEL
(per year)
Maximum 1x 10 -4 1x 10 -3
Tolerable
Negligible 1x 10 -6 1x 10 -6
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SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA
Upama Darshan
SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA
(Suggested by Health & Safety Commission, U.K)
for onshore installations

RISK MANAGEMENT
100% Safe?
Absence of risk is hardly possible and very
expensive
Cost of safeguards
Cost of accidents
Degree of Safety
Upama Darshan
CHALLENGES IN QRA
• Understanding Risk Profile

• Lack of participation of field personnel in safety studies
• Continuous modifications in facilities
• Data Availability
• Uncertainty of too many assumptions
• Absence of Benchmarking Criteria
Upama Darshan
Upama Darshan
29-08-2020
Regulatory Requirements
N Manohar Rao
PNGRB NOTIFICTION for CGD IMS
PNGRB Notification No. F.No.INFRA/IMP/CGD/1/2013

Dated 16th May 2013
These regulations may be called the Petroleum and

Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Integrity Management
System for City or Local Natural Gas Distribution
Networks Regulations, 2013.
PNGRB Notification No. F.No.INFRA/IMP/CGD/1/2013, Dated 16th

May 2013
These regulations may be called the Petroleum and Natural Gas

Regulatory Board (Integrity Management System for City or Local
Natural Gas Distribution Networks Regulations, 2013.
Applicability
shall apply to all the entities laying, building, operating or

expanding city or local natural gas distribution networks
1
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PNGRB Notification No. F.No.INFRA/IMP/CGD/1/2013 Dt 16 May 2013
Scope
shall cover all existing and new city gas distribution networks
including sub-transmission pipelines, city gas station, distribution
mains and piping facilities downstream of inlet isolation valve of city
gate station (inclusive of primary, secondary and tertiary networks)
including consumer meter for commercial or industrial customer and
up to final isolation valve including connecting hose to gas appliances
for domestic consumer.
Objectives.
• evaluating the risk associated with city gas distribution networks

and effectively allocating resources for prevention, detection and
mitigation activities.
• improving the safety of city gas distribution networks so as to
protect the personnel , property, public and environment
• bringing more streamlined and effective operations to minimize
the probability of CGD network failure.
Requirement under other laws
It shall be necessary to comply with all statutory rules, regulations

and Acts in force as applicable and requisite approvals shall be
obtained from the relevant competent authorities for the CGD
networks.
2
29-08-2020
Default and consequences
• compliance to the provisions of these regulations through

implementation schedule as described in these regulations at
Schedule 7 and Schedule 8 in conjunction to Appendix II.

Default and consequences
• In case of any shortfall, the entities shall be liable to face the following
consequences, namely –
 The entity shall be required to complete each activity within the
specified time limit. Any deficiency in achieving in one or more of
the activities, the entity shall submit a mitigation plan within the
time limit for acceptance of the Board and make good all short
comings within the time agreed by the Board.
 In case the entity fails to implement the approved Integrity
Management System, the Board may issue a notice to defaulting
entity allowing it a reasonable time to implement the provisions of
Integrity Management System. In case the entity fails to comply
within the specified time, the relevant provisions of the Act and
regulations shall apply.

Schedule 1
Objectives
The objective of Integrity Management System (IMS) is to –
ensure the integrity of CGD networks at all times to ensure public protection of
environment, maximum availability of CGD networks and also minimizing
business risks associated with operations of gas network.
ensure the quality of CGD network integrity in all areas which have potential
for adverse consequences
promote a more rigorous and systematic management of CGD network

integrity and mitigate the risk
Increase the general confidence of the public in operation of CGD network
optimize the life of the CGD network

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Schedule 2
Introduction to the Integrity Management System (IMS)

CGD network expose people, communities and the environment to risks in case
of failure. CGD network are themselves exposed to external damages caused by
third parties causing for network failure. the life-line of the masses in regard to
domestic cooking of food and movement in vehicles are fully dependent on
CGD network. In case of failure, normal life may be badly disrupted. It is,
therefore, essential that a system is introduced which ensures maximum
availability of the network with minimum disruption and damages.
IMS for CGD networks provides a comprehensive and structured framework

for assessment of CGD networks condition, likely threats, risks assessment and
mitigation actions to ensure safe and incident free operation of CGD networks

Schedule 2
integrity management system essentially comprises of the
following elements
Integrity Management Plan (IMP): collection and validation of data,
assessment of spectrum of risks, risk ranking, assessment of integrity with
reference to risks, risks mitigation, updation of data & reassessment of risk;
Performance evaluation of Integrity Management Plan: mechanism to monitor
the effectiveness of integrity management plan adopted and for further
improvement
Communication Plan: a structured plan to regulate information and data

exchange within and amongst the internal and external environment
Management of Change
Quality Control
Schedule 3
Description of CGD Network
• Sub Transmission Pipeline (STPL)

• City Gas Station (CGS)
• Odorization System
• Steel pipeline networks
• Secondary PE networks
• Tertiary networks, PE, GI and/ or copper
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29-08-2020
Schedule 3
• District Regulating Station (DRS)

• Isolation Valves (Steel, PE)
• Customer base (PNG, CNG, Industrial and Commercial)
• CNG station-Mother, Online, Daughter Booster Station (DBS)
• Individual Pressure Regulating Station (IPRS), Common Pressure
Regulating Station (CPRS), Metering Station (MRS)
Schedule 3
• Control room and/or Master Control Station (if any)

• Instrumentation and Electrical systems
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (if any)
• Safety Equipments
• Customer base (PNG, CNG, Industrial and Commercial)
Schedule 3
Other description
• Interfaces with other Geographical Area / pipeline / Facilities (if

available);
• Incident reporting;
• Information on Documentation Relating to design, construction,
operations, maintenance, etc.;
• Statutory requirements
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29-08-2020
Schedule 4
Selection of appropriate Integrity Management System
Prescriptive type Integrity Management System if CGD industry

has gathered a reasonable good experience of CGD operations
and such CGD industry is fairly mature, a Performance based
Integrity Management System are appreciated globally.
Prescriptive type Integrity Management System where CGD

networks are in developing stage. This is more rigorous as it
considers the worst case scenario of the failures in the CGD
networks
Schedule 4
Selection of appropriate Integrity Management System
A prescriptive type mandates the implementation of an

established process for addressing the risks, their consequences
and proven methods for mitigation.
A prescriptive type mandates the in-house development of

Integrity Management Plan and Management of Change
pertaining to technical aspects.
In India till date, the preparation of prescriptive type has been

considered for implementation to all CGD networks in India
Schedule 5
Integrity Assessment Tools
Direct assessment and evaluation - External Corrosion Direct

Assessment (ECDA) can be used for determining integrity for the
external corrosion threat on CGD network segments
Thickness assessment and periodic review against baseline values

- Periodic thickness assessment for all CGD network skids and
pressure vessels and comparison to baseline values shall be done
once a year
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Schedule 5
Integrity Assessment Tools
Cathodic protection system surveys - to cover the entire steel

network of pipelines so as to detect insufficient Cathodic
Protection levels and other irregularities and anomalies in the
steel pipeline.
Pressure testing - Pressure testing shall comply with the

requirements of applicable Petroleum and Natural Gas
Regulatory Board regulations

Schedule 6
Designing applicable Integrity Management System for the CGD

Network
Initial data gathering, review and integration to support a risk
assessment will vary depending on the threat being assessed.
Four aspects should be visualized during data collection
• Data alignment - Integration of disparate data sources to a common
location
• Data history - Ability to manage the temporal aspects of any data
• Data Normalization - Integration of disparate data sources that analyze
same attributes from different aspects
• Data accuracy and confidence

Schedule 6
Identification of Threats
Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI) represents 22 root causes
(threats) for threat to pipeline integrity
Time Dependent Threats:

– External Corrosion
– Internal Corrosion
– Stress Corrosion Cracking
Stable Threats:
– Manufacturing related defects
– Defective pipe seam
– Defective pipe
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Schedule 6
Welding /fabrication related
• Defective pipe girth weld
• Defective fabrication weld
• Wrinkle bend or buckle
• Stripped threads /broken pipe /coupling failure
Equipment
• Gasket O-ring failure
• Control/relief equipment malfunction
• Seal pump packing failure
• Miscellaneous

Schedule 6
Time independent Threats:
Third party /mechanical damage:

• Damage inflicted by first, second or third party (instantaneous
/immediate failure)
• Previously damaged pipe (delayed failure mode)
• Vandalism
• Rat bites
• Electric Arching

Schedule 6
Incorrect operational procedure
Weather related and outside force:

• Weather related
• Lightning
• Heavy Rains or Floods
• Earth Movements
based upon the land pattern:

• Creek Area effects
• Muddy Land effects
• River bed movements
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Schedule 6
Consequence and Impact Analysis

Once the hazardous events are identified, the risk analysis is to analyse
their consequences, i.e., estimate the magnitude of damage to the
public, property and environment of all the indentified threats by using
mathematical models . These consequences may include leak, fire,
explosion, gas cloud etc
Identification of High Consequence Area (HCA)
these are high-population-density areas, difficult-to-evacuate facilities

(such as hospitals or schools), and locations where people congregate
(such as places and worship, office buildings, or fields).

Schedule 6
Risk Management and Risk Assessment

Risk rating = Probability rating X Consequence rating
Probability rating - based on industry experience and company’s

past experience. scale 1 to 4, 1 to 5 or 1 to 6 may be applied.
Consequence rating - these may be individually characterized

under impact on people, environment, financial and business loss
value and legal consequences. 1 to 4, 1 to 5 or 1 to 6 may be
applied.

Schedule 6

A company should carry out the following activities as part of risk
assessment –
– Carry out Cathodic Protection system and CP adequacy survey;

– Carry out periodic analysis to determine the level of risks to
assets;
– Risk analysis and assessment for all reported asset-related
incidents and findings;
– Prepare, maintain and update a register of known risks to
assets, including their risk rating.
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29-08-2020

Schedule 6

Risk results could be evaluated simply on a “high–medium-low”
basis or as a numerical value.
Prioritization usually involves sorting risk ratings in decreasing

order
The risk ratings shall be reviewed and necessary changes made

after a pre-decided interval or when changes take place or when
additional data or information becomes available.

Schedule 6
Integrity Assessment
The following methods can be used for Integrity Assessment -
– Hydro testing before commissioning at test pressure as per
T4S standards;
– External Corrosion Direct Assessment(ECDA);
– Cathodic protection system surveys etc
The operator of a CGD networks shall develop a chart of most

suited integrity assessment method and assessment interval
for each threat and risk. The operator shall further develop
appropriate specifications and quality control plan for such
assessment

Schedule 6
Responses and Mitigation
Responses may be immediately implemented, scheduled over a
period of time or the system may be simply monitored based on
the inspection outcome
Some of the mitigation actions are listed below
– Actions for increasing the adequacy levels of Cathodic

Protection, like increasing Cathodic Protection current levels,
installation of additional capacity etc.
– Replacement / repair of assets based on analysis outcomes
– Consultation with equipment suppliers for deciding course of
actions
10
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Schedule 6
Performance Plan
Performance evaluation should consider both threat-specific and
aggregate improvements.
Threat-specific evaluations may apply to a particular area of

concern, while overall measures apply to the entire CGD network
under the integrity management programme
Performance indicator measures
– Process measures
– Operational measures
– Direct integrity measures
Schedule 6
Communication Plan
The CGD entity shall develop and implement a communications

plan in order to inform about their integrity management efforts
and the results of their integrity management activities to
– appropriate company personnel

– jurisdictional authorities
– the public

Schedule 6
Management of Change Plan
management of change process includes the following -
– Reason for change
– Authority for approving changes
– Analysis of implications
– Acquisition of required work permits
– Documentation
– Communication of change to affected parties
– Time limitations
– Staff involved
– Planning for each situation
– Unique circumstances if any
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Schedule 6
Quality Control Plan
The following activities are usually required –
– Identify the processes

– sequence and interaction of these processes
– Prepare standard operation procedures and guidelines for
critical processes
– Provide the resources and information necessary to support
the operation and monitoring of these processes
– Monitor, measure, and analyze these processes
– Implement actions necessary to achieve planned results and
continued improvement of these processes

Schedule 6
Internal audits are conducted by the audit group nominated by

Head of the Operations Team of the entity at least once in a year.
Essential items will be focused for any internal and external audit
– Baseline Plan is being updated and followed
– qualifications of Operation and Maintenance personnel and
contractors based on education qualification, formal training,
demonstrated practical skills, and experience records
– adequate documentation to support decisions made
– Achievement of annual performance measures

Schedule 6

Essential items will be focused for any internal and external audit
– written integrity management policy and program for all
elements
– written integrity management system procedures & task
descriptions
– responsible individual has been assigned for each task
– all actions & non-conformances are closed in a timely manner
– risk criteria used have been reviewed and documented
– prevention, mitigation and repair criteria have been
established, met and documented
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Schedule 7
Approval of Integrity Management System (IMS)
A CGD networks Integrity Management System is a management
plan in the form of a document that explains to operator’s
employees, customers, regulatory authorities, etc., by stating
– who is responsible for each aspect of the asset and its

management
– what policies and processes are in place to achieve targets and
goals related to ensuring integrity of the assets
– how they are planned for implementation
– how Integrity Management System performance is measured
– how the whole system is regularly reviewed and audited

Schedule 7
Approval of Integrity Management System (IMS)
The document shall be agreed at Board level of the entity,
constantly and systematically reviewed and updated, and all levels
of management comply with its contents.
Preparation of the document and approval steps –
Step 1 - Prepared by In-house team or Consultant
Step 2 - Checked by In-house team Head or Consultant head
Step 3 - Provisional approval by Head of Operation team of entity
Step 4 - Conformity of Integrity Management System document
with the Regulation by Third Party Inspection Agency
(TPIA) and duly approved by CEO or Full time Director of
the Entity

Schedule 7
Preparation of the document and approval steps –
Step 5 - Acceptance by Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory

Board
Step 6 - Approval of integrity management system document for
implementation by the Board of the entity for the first
time and approval of subsequent periodic review by CEO
or Full time Director of the entity
A certificate regarding the approval of integrity management
system document duly approved shall be submitted to the
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
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Schedule 8
Implementation Schedule of IMS
Sr. No. Activities Time Schedule
1 Compliance with Petroleum and YES/NO confirmation within 1

Natural Gas Regulatory Board month from date of notification of
(Technical Standards and Specifications the Petroleum and Natural Gas
including Safety Standards for City or Regulatory Board (Integrity
Local Natural Gas Distribution Management System for City or
Networks) Regulations, 2008 Local Natural Gas Distribution
Networks) Regulations, 2013
2 Preparation of Integrity Management 1 year from date of notification of
System document and approval by the Petroleum and Natural Gas
Head of Operation team of the entity Regulatory Board (Integrity
Management System for City or
Local Natural Gas Distribution
Networks) Regulations, 2013

Schedule 8
Implementation Schedule of IMS
Sr. No. Activities Time Schedule
3 Conformity of Integrity Management System 3 months from the approval by Head

document with regulation by TPIA of Operation team of the entity
authorized by PNGRB
4 Submission of Integrity Management System 1 month from the conformity of
document to PNGRBwith timelines for the Integrity Management System by
actions TPIA
5 Approval by Petroleum and Natural Gas Within 3 months from submission of
Regulatory Board for implementation by the Integrity Management System
entity document to PNGRB
6 Submission of Compliance Statement to Immediately after approval at Sr.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory No. 4 above
Board

Schedule 9
Review of The Integrity Management System

Entities shall review their existing Integrity Management System
every 3 years based upon
– Revised Baseline data
– Critical Inputs from various departments
Review of Internal and External Audit

– Internal Audit as per the checklist for CGD Networks provided
by PNGRB shall be carried out by the CGD entity every year
– External Audit (EA) by third party, approved by the Board, as
per the methodology specified by the PNGRB once every 3
years
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Schedule 10
Adequacy of Manpower positioned at different stage of project
Minimum Qualifications and experience for personnel involved in

various CGD activities as per Appendix – III
– Design Stage
– Construction Stage (Commissioning)
– Facilities (erection, commissioning and O&M stage) – i.e. City
Gate Station, Odorant stations, Pressure Reducing Station
(PRS), Metering and Regulating Station (MRS)
– Operation and Maintenance (gas network)

List of Critical Activities In CGD Network
Sr. No. ActivitiesCritical infrastructure/ activity/ processes Time period for
implementation
1 Cathodic Protection adequacy survey to ensure an 6 months for
integrated Cathodic Protection system baseline survey
2 Odourant smell survey at farthest point (s) from 6 months
odoriser
3 GIS mapping of the network 3 years
4 Establish system for testing of Compressed Natural 3 months
Gas cascade
5 Gas Loss computation based on the mass or volume 6 months
balance for 3 months or other selected interval
depending upon the billing cycle.
6 Integrity inspection system for Galvanized Iron and 6 months
copper piping forming part of tertiary network and the
Last Mile Connectivity
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04 - 05 September 2020

Virtual Educational Training Programme

Pipeline Integrity Management System

09:00 - 10:00 Introduction to Integrity Management Plan Mr. N Manohar Rao,

09:00 - 11:00 Integrity Assessment Tool Mr. Ashish Khera

PIPELINE INTEGRITY & CORROSION-

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

World Energy Scenario

Primary Energy consumption of India with respect

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Energy Sharing in India

Oil Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Energy Hydro electric

Dependency Coal Oil Gas

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

HYDROCARBON VISION 2025

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

• Increasing Domestic Oil & Gas Production

• Acquisition of acreage in other countries

• Better Reservoir Management

• Surplus refining and marketing capacity

• Improving pipeline Connectivity

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

• Encouraging Laying of Transportation

• De licensing of various activities

• Attractive fiscal regime for inviting private

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Limitations of road transport

• No. of road tankers will increase

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Advantages of pipeline transport

• Safe mode of transport

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Products transported through pipelines

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

Petroleum & Gas Pipelines

COMMON ISSUES - India

Pipeline Right of Way Interferences

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

“Skilled manpower is the greatest Asset’”.

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

• Not enough talent is available to the sector at

• NACE can provide better facility in the field of

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

PIPEINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

 The energy demand in the form of Oil and Gas has

 The energy exploration & transportation across

 More and stringent demands are inflicted upon the

To face the challenges the Pipeline Integrity

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

PIPEINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

 Pipeline Integrity Management starts from the time the

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

WHY PIPEINE INTEGRITY?

 Fitness for the purpose and /or extending the

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

WHAT IS ACHIEVED BY PIPEINE INTEGRITY?

 Demonstrate technical integrity of the pipeline

PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

MANAGEMENT OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY

 Various techniques are available to access

 In line Inspection / Intelligent Pigging

 Use of Corrosion Monitoring / Survey Data