FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".

On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She
left a holographic will. On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of
the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-
23304, hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).

On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the
sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First
Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for
brevity).

Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited
the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs.
Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1

In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that
in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by the decedent. 2

On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case.

ISSUE: W/N the court a quoacted in excess of its jurisdiction when it denied the Testate Case.

RULING:

We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.

No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.  4

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso 

... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, ...

_______________________________________________________________________

SECOND DIVISION

DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, G.R. No. 176943

DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD,
and CONNIE ALUAD, Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ZENAIDO ALUAD, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 17, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless
spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).

Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar
Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. [1]
 
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos[2] (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria[3] covering all the six lots which
Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. 

Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,
[6]
 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her remaining properties including Lot
No. 674 to respondent.
 
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year. [7]
 
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,[8] for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot
Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:

That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described
until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land
claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession
until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and
 until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of
land x x x;
 
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance
by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole
and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.][9]

Respondent filed an Amended Answer[15] contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is

forged and falsified and petitioners change of theory showed that said document was not existing at
the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by them after realizing that their false claim
that their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by
them;[16] and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde  when
[she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until
her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad. [17]
 
The trial court, by Decision[18] of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted
any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria
via the Deed of Donation.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has acquired right over the subject property.

RULING:

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having
followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.[42] Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to
respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matildes)
will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold
by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
 
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of
their mother is indeed  mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should
nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription,
they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good
faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.[43]

______________________________________________________________________________
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 78646             July 23, 1991

PABLO RALLA, substituted by his wife and co-defendant CARMEN MUÑOZ-RALLA, and his
legal heirs, HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, BELISTA, RENE RALLA-BELISTA and GERARDO M.
RALLA, petitioners, 
vs.
PEDRO RALLA, substituted by his legal heirs, LEONI, PETER, and MARINELA all surnamed
RALLA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo and Pedro. The father apparently loved the former but not the
latter, Pablo and his family lived with Rosendo, who took care of all the household expenses. Pablo
administered part of the family properties and received a monthly salary of P250.00 plus part of the
produce of the land. Pedro lived with his mother, Paz Escarella, in another town. He was not on
good terms with his father.

Paz Escarella died in 1957 and the two brothers partitioned 63 parcels of land she left as her
paraphernalia property. The partition was sustained by this Court in G.R. Nos. 63253-54 on April
27, 1989.1 Meanwhile, on December 22, 1958, Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and
leaving everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he said he had earlier sold a part of his property for
P10,000.00. Rosendo himself filed for the probate of the will but pendente lite died on October 1,
1960.

On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. On
February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the probate of Rosendo's will in SP
1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979, the order of November 3, 1966, was
set aside.

ISSUE:

What is involved in the present petition is the correctness of the decision of the respondent court
annulling the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla in favor of Pablo over 149 parcels of land.

RULING:

But we find that, regardless of these curious resolutions, the petition must nevertheless be
sustained albeit not on the ground that the deed of sale was indeed valid. The Court is inclined to
support the findings of the respondent court. However, we do not and cannot make any decision on
this matter because of one insuperable obstacle. That obstacle is the proper party personality of
Pedro Ralla to question the transaction.

The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general rule, one having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

As the sole heir, Pablo Ralla had the right to inherit the totality of his father's estate after payment
of all its debts. Even if it be assumed that the deed of sale was indeed invalid, the subject-matter
thereof nevertheless devolved upon Pablo as the universal successor of his father Rosendo. In his
wig, Rosendo claimed the 149 parcels as "part of my property" –– as distinguished from the conjugal
estate –– which he had earlier sold to Pablo. Significantly, Pedro did not deny this description of the
property in his Comment to the present petition, confining himself to assailing the validity of the
sale.

The Court must note the lackadaisical attitude of the heirs of Pedro Ralla, who substituted him
upon his death.1âwphi1 They seem to have lost interest in this litigation, probably because of the
approval of their father's disinheritance by the respondent court. When the parties were required to
submit their respective memoranda after we gave due course to this petition, the petitioners did but
not the private respondents. Although the period to do so had already expired, the Court relaxed its
rules to give the private respondents another opportunity to comply with the requirement. When the
resolution of August 22, 1990, could not be served upon the private respondents' counsel, we
directed that it be served on the private respondents themselves. 9 On January 18, 1991, the heirs of
Pedro Ralla informed the Court that they were retaining another counsel and asked that they be
furnished a copy of the petition and given 30 days within which to file their memorandum. 10 This
motion was granted. The records show that they received a copy of the petition on February 26,
1991, but their memorandum was never filed. On May 29, 1991, the Court, noting this omission,
finally resolved to dispense with the memorandum and to decide this case on the basis of the
available records.

Our decision is that as a validly disinherited heir, and not claiming to be a creditor of his deceased
father, Pedro Ralla had no legal personality to question the deed of sale dated November 29, 1957,
between Rosendo Ralla and his son Pablo. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the
transaction as he did not stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered
him hors de combat.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated January 23, 1987, is set aside and
another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing Civil Case 194 (originally Civil Case 4624) in this
Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 5.

____________________________________________________________________________________
 G.R. No. L-23638            October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners, 
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-23662            October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners, 
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will and
testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.

It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent,
submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will
instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.

Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion
of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which
conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3,
1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).

After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found
that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of
estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely
presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the
issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but
"reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the
sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

ISSUE:

In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or not the
decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal;
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked
by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta
de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
RULING:

As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate
should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation
propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand
is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montañano
vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As
such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a
will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of
their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to
the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly
enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time,
the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said
decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged
against the decree was correctly dismissed.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament
was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be
nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an
express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the
revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, supra.).