Criminal Procedure Cases

1. Lucas vs. Fabros

The motion for reconsideration prohibited by Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure is that
which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the case.
The order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the
preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case.

Facts:

Lucas charged Judge Fabros with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion. She
alleged that she was a defendant in an ejectment case pending before the sala of said judge. Judge Fabros
dismissed the ejectment case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary
Conference. However, she granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Lucas
averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that a motion for
reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for
reconsideration.

Issue: Did Judge Fabros erred in granting the motion for reconsideration?

Held:

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus,

"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the
merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion
prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after
trial on the merits of the case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a
party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of
the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading
contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to
the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. (Lucas vs. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-
1226. January 31, 2000)
 2. Ruel Francis M. Cabral vs. Chris S. Bracamonte [G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019]

“In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed
must be proven and not just alleged.”

FACTS:

In 2009, Chris S. Bracamonte and Ruel Francis Cabral executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in
Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver
International Corporation (AVIVER). Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a
postdated check to Cabral. When the check was presented for payment, however, the drawee bank in
Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to settle the
obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Parañaque City. Finding
probable cause, the prosecutor filed an Information with the RTC of Parañaque City.

After arraignment and presentation of prosecution evidence, Bracamonte moved to quash the Information
contending that the venue was improperly laid in Parañaque City, because the postdated check was
delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Thus, the prosecution failed to show how the supposed elements
of the crime charged were committed in Parañaque City. In contrast, Cabral maintained that the
averments in the complaint and Information are controlling to determine jurisdiction. Since the complaint
affidavit alleged that negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a warehouse in Parañaque City where
Cabral was convinced to sell his shares in the two corporations, then the RTC of Parañaque City properly
had jurisdiction. Moreover, Cabral contented that Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by
laches as it took him four (4) years before he raised the issue of jurisdiction, actively participating in the
proceedings by cross- examining the prosecution witness.

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it has jurisdiction over the case because Bracamonte
employed fraudulent acts against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the issuance of the postdated check.
According to the trial court, based on the complaint affidavit, Cabral narrated that it was during their
meeting in the old warehouse of AVIVER and WFC in Parañaque City that Bracamonte was able to
persuade and convince him to sell his entire shares of stock. There, they triumphed in misleading and
fooling him until he finally accepted their offer. Thus, since the complaint affidavit and the Information in
the instant case duly alleged that Bracamonte deceived Cabral in Parañaque City, the Parañaque RTC
appropriately had jurisdiction over the instant case.

In an appeal, however, the CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against
Bracamonte. Cabral moved for Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Cabral filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
A. Whether Cabral, a private complainant in a criminal case has the authority to file appeal in CA and
SC?

a. Who has the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court and the CA? Are there any exceptions?

B. Whether the RTC Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the estafa case filed by Cabral.

a. What is territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases?

b. How is jurisdiction over the criminal case determined?

c. What are the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code?

C. Whether Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by laches.

RULING:

A. In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.

Here, Cabral filed the present petition without the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the
Government.

Thus, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended
party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned [Chiok v. People, 774 Phil. 230, 245, (2015)].

The rationale behind is that, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not
the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution.

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its
agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, when there is
grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires [Morillo v.
People, et al., 775 Phil. 192, 210-211 (2015)].

In the instant case, however, the petition before the Court essentially assails the criminal, and not only the
civil, aspect of the CA Decision. Thus, the petition should have been filed only by the State through the
OSG and not by Cabral who lacked the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision.

B. Nevertheless, even assuming the procedural propriety of the instant petition, the Court still resolves
to deny the same. Time and again, the Court has held that “territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential
ingredients took place.” [Brodeth v. People, G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017].

Moreover, it has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction [Treñas v. People, 680 Phil.
368, 380 (2012)].

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of such crime consists of the following: (1) the offender has postdated
or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at
the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.

In the present petition, Cabral vehemently insists that since he alleged in his complaint affidavit that the
business transactions with regard to the terms and conditions of the subject MOA were conducted in a
warehouse in Parañaque City, the element of deceit definitely occurred therein, and as such, the RTC of
Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the case. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to said contention.

It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his complaint affidavit, that the crime of
estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there that he was convinced to sell the subject
shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would support or corroborate the assertion.

On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence on
record are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2) Bracamonte
issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the agreement; (3)
the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court
does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not only were the
MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even expressly
stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from the
MOA because that was where it was executed. It is clear from the foregoing that the element of deceit
took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was
inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
While Cabral is not wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may
be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of
evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City. Time and again, the Court has ruled that “in
criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must be
proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a
man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be
made equivalent to proof.”There being no showing that the offense was committed within Parañaque
City, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

C. As to Cabral’s contention that Bracamonte’s motion should be considered barred by laches as it

took him four (4) years before he raised the issue of jurisdiction, actively participating in the proceedings
by cross- examining the prosecution witness, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that
the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the
court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since
such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by
law in the manner and form prescribed by law [Fukuzume v. People 511 Phil. 192 (2005)].

3. [G.R. NO. 144159 : September 29, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and MANUEL S. ALBA,

Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 23, 2000, quashing the Information in Criminal
Case No. 25653 and acquitting the respondent of the crime charged therein.

The Antecedents

On February 17, 1999, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Luis G. Pabalan in the Office of the
Ombudsman against the respondent, then City Administrator Manuel S. Alba of Quezon City, and the
Chairman of Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Jeremias T. Cruz. The case
was docketed as OMB-0-99-0346 and was assigned to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB) which, in turn, assigned Graft Investigator Romeo M. Pamute to conduct an evaluation
and a preliminary investigation.
Based on the records, the Graft Investigator found that the case stemmed from the following facts:

Respondent MANUEL S. ALBA is a high ranking government official being the City Administrator of
Quezon City with a salary grade of 27 while respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ is a private person. The
latter is the Chairman of the Evangelist Methodist Church in the Philippines Novaliches Congregation,
Novaliches, Quezon City.

In his sworn complaint, complainant, LUIS PABALAN, stated that he is the owner of a lot located at
Susano Road, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the Congregation of Evangelist Church of the Philippines
(IEMELIF) headed by respondent Architect JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when improvements on
their structure were made sometime in February 1997. The construction was done without the necessary
building permit. The Quezon City building official was, accordingly, informed and consequently after
hearing, the Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of the structure. The Order becomes final
and executory upon failure of the religious congregation (IEMELIF) to appeal on time to the DPWH.

On November 4, 1998, however, IEMELIF, through respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ, wrote respondent
City Administrator, Mr. MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said order be not enforced pending
appeal to the DPWH stating, among others, that the Order of the Assistant Building Official is illegal and
the implementation of the same will cause irreparable damage and injury to the church (IEMELIF).

The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the respondent MANUEL
ALBA but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition order was dated November 4, 1998 or a
day before the receipt of said letter.

The complainant objected and in a letter requested respondent ALBA to revoke the Order recalling the
demolition, but respondent City Administrator refused and failed to respond and, as a result, the Building
Official was not able to effect the demolition.

Complainant presented his title to the lot, the Resolution of the Building Official ordering the demolition
of the structure; the Order granting the Motion for Execution; the letter of Appeal by respondent
JEREMIAS T. CRUZ to the Mayor of Quezon City thru respondent MANUEL ALBA stamped received
by the City Administrator's Office on November 5, 1998; the Memorandum of respondent MANUEL S.
ALBA to Engr. Romualdo Santos showing that the date is November 4, 1998; and the letter of objection
and request that the recall order on the demolition be corrected was, likewise, presented by the
complainant.1
In his Counter-Affidavit, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that he acted on the appeal of respondent Cruz
and recalled the demolition order which was issued by the building official. He did so on the basis of the
authority delegated to him under the January 12, 1994 Memorandum issued by the Mayor, as well as the
guidelines implementing the said memorandum, where it was stated that no demolition shall be allowed
pending an appeal to higher authorities.

The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic (Rep.) Act No. 3019 and recommended the filing of the Information against him. The
Ombudsman approved the recommendation.

On September 9, 1999, an Information was filed with the SB, charging the respondent with violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about November 5, 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the City
Administrator of Quezon City while in the performance of his official function and acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue a
Memorandum recalling the Order of Demolition issued by the Acting Building Official knowing fully
well that he has no authority to do so, thus, giving unwarranted preference to Jeremias T. Cruz in the
discharged (sic) of his official functions.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Appended to the Information were the following: (a) the memorandum of the Legal Counsel, Office of
the Ombudsman duly approved by the Ombudsman, which recommended the approval of the resolution
of the EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, finding probable cause against the respondent, as well as the
prosecution of the crime charged; (b) the affidavit-complaint; (c) the counter-affidavit of the respondent;
and (d) the Resolution of the EPIB. As ordered by the SB, the special prosecutor submitted Annexes "A"
to "F" of the affidavit-complaint and Annexes "1" to "4" of the respondent's counter-affidavit on
September 24, 1999.

On October 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the SB a Motion for Leave to Order Reinvestigation and/or
Quash Information on the following grounds:
I THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE
ACCUSED, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE.

II THE FACTS RECITED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT IN SUBSTANCE TO

INDICT THE ACCUSED CRIMINALLY, BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUS
PREMISES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

During the hearing of the motion, the respondent, through counsel, agreed to convert his motion into a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him. Since
no objection was made by the special prosecutor to the motion for a reinvestigation, the SB issued an
Order on October 8, 1998, granting the motion and ordering the special prosecutor to take appropriate
action on the respondent's motion for reconsideration. It, likewise, directed the Special Prosecutor to
inform the SB of its findings and recommendation, as well as the order of the Ombudsman, within sixty
(60) days from the said date.4 On December 8, 1999, the respondent filed a Memorandum in support of
his motion for reconsideration.

On January 25, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion,5 informing the SB that,
after a review of the case, the Office of the Ombudsman was affirming its finding of probable cause
against the respondent and prayed for his arraignment. Appended to the motion was the memorandum
duly approved by the Ombudsman, recommending that the resolution of the EPIB be affirmed.6
Accordingly, the SB set the arraignment of the respondent at 8:30 a.m. of February 18, 2000. On February
2, 2000, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve the Opposition to the Manifestation and Motion of the
Special Prosecutor dated January 21, 2000, with a motion to reset his arraignment. He later filed a motion
for postponement/deferment of his arraignment and the pre-trial to enable him to file the appropriate
motion with the SB. The arraignment of the respondent was reset to 8:30 a.m. of March 27, 2000.

In its Comment on the Opposition of the respondent to the Manifestation and Motion7 dated January 28,
2000, the prosecution averred that the said opposition and motion had been mooted by the re-setting of
the respondent's arraignment on March 27, 2000. On even date, the SB issued an Order8 holding in
abeyance the arraignment of the respondent until after it shall have resolved the motion for leave to order
reinvestigation and/or quash information filed by him.

Nevertheless, on April 10, 2000, the respondent, assisted by counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. On the same day, the SB issued an Order9 granting his motion for leave to travel abroad without
prejudice to the resolution of his motion to quash information. On April 14, 2000, the Special Prosecutor
filed her Comment/Opposition10 to the respondent's motion to quash.

On June 23, 2000, the SB issued a Resolution granting the motion to quash the information of the accused
and acquitting the respondent of the charge.11 The SB held that based on the records, there was no
probable cause to charge the respondent of the crime. It based its findings on the Memorandum of then
Mayor Ismael A. Mathay to the respondent dated January 12, 1994, and a portion of the Resolution of
Graft Investigator Romeo Pamute dated July 23, 1999 which was duly approved by the Ombudsman. The
SB lifted the Hold Departure Order it earlier issued on June 26, 2000.12
The Present Petition

On August 15, 2000, the People of the Philippines, through the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO), filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the June
23, 2000 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (SB). It anchors its petition on the following arguments:

1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ACQUITTED MANUEL ALBA OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2565 DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS NOT YET BEEN
ARRAIGNED OR THE PROSECUTION ALLOWED TO PROVE ITS CASE.

2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED MANUEL ALBA'S MOTION TO
QUASH ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THE QUEZON CITY MAYOR,
WHICH MEMORANDUM HAS ALREADY BEEN SUPERSEDED.

3. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONER ITS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.13

On the first issue, the petitioner avers that the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information.

We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the SB quashed the information with the ruling that
the respondent acted on the basis of the January 12, 1994 Memorandum to him of then Mayor Ismael
Mathay, quoted infra:

MEMORANDUM

TO : DR. MANUEL ALBA

City Administrator
In view of the multifarious duties attendant to my dual position as Chairman, Metro Manila Authority and
Mayor of Quezon City, the authority to issue orders for the demolition of illegal structures is hereby
delegated to you. You may sign as follows:

BY AUTHORITY OF THE CITY MAYOR

MANUEL S. ALBA

City Administrator

It is understood that the aforementioned authority shall be exercised pursuant to the attached copy of
guidelines issued by the undersigned. Periodic reports of demolition undertaken under this authority
should be submitted to this Office.

This Memorandum takes effect immediately.

(Sgd.) ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR.

City Mayor14

The SB concluded that, having acted on the basis of the memorandum of the Mayor, the respondent could
not be considered as having usurped the authority of the building official or of the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways, or that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. The SB also relied on the resolution of the Graft Investigator, Romeo Pamute, dated July 23,
1999, duly approved by the Ombudsman, which reads:

It is our view that the relief granted by respondent City Administrator in his Memorandum is only
temporary in nature and will last only for a meantime that the legality or otherwise of the contested
demolition order is being determined by the DPWH. We agree that greater injury could have been caused
had the questioned demolition order was carried out but later on if it will be found that the property
claimed by the complainant as his belongs not to him but to the religious congregation represented by the
private respondent. We see nothing wrong if the complainant could wait a little while in the interest of
justice and fair play. It has to be realized that the ownership issue should share equal attention as that of
the demolition issue raised by the complainant. It is a reality in our system of government that resolving
an issue via a judicial or administrative remedy, is a long and tedious process if we have to be meticulous
in the just dispensation of justice. The government has not yet invented a system, a sure-fire formula
wherein justice could be dispensed with in just a click of a finger. To hurry demolishing a structure where
an appeal has been made and taken cognizance of by higher appellate agency of the government is
recklessness and may result to grave injustice. We agree with the rationale in the assailed Memorandum
issued by the respondent City Administrator to the Acting Building Official. '15

The SB ruled that, based on the facts and the evidence on record, there was no probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the respondent; hence, the information should be quashed and the
respondent be acquitted of the crime charged.

However, as pointed out by the petitioner, the January 12, 1994 Memorandum of the Mayor had already
been amended by a subsequent issuance, Memorandum No. 4, which states, inter alia, that the authority to
act on violations of the Building Code no longer rested on the respondent as City Administrator, but on
the City Engineer or his assistant, viz:

a. For violation of Building Code City Engineer/Asst. City Bldg. Official

b. Illegal Structures under RA 7279

(Squatting) City Administrator16

We also agree with the petitioner's contention that the January 12, 1994 Memorandum of Mayor Mathay
is even contrary to Section 307 of Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the "National
Building Code of the Philippines," which reads:

"Section 307. Appeal. Within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of advice of the non-issuance,
suspension or revocation of permits, the applicant-permittee may file an appeal with the Secretary who
shall render his decision within fifteen days from date of receipt of notice of appeal. The decision of the
Secretary shall be final subject only to review by the Office of the President.17

To rectify his erroneous January 12, 1994 Memorandum, Mayor Mathay had to issue Memorandum No. 4
to the respondent.

Moreover, in Opinion No. 36, Series of 1996, the Secretary of Justice succinctly ruled that only the city
engineer, as the building official, has the exclusive authority to act on matters relating to the issuance of
demolition permits or the revocation or suspension thereof.
The law is clear that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways has jurisdiction over
appeals from the decisions of building officials involving the non-issuance, suspension or revocation of
building permits. His decision is final subject only to review by the Office of the President.

In line with existing jurisprudence, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. (Bacalso v. Ramolete, 21
SCRA 519; Garcia v. De Jesus, 206 SCRA 779) Section 307 of P.D. No. 1096 is the law that confers
jurisdiction upon the DPWH Secretary to adjudicate appeals from the orders or decisions of the building
officials.

Section 477 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is cited to support the view that the appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of building officials has been devolved to the city/municipal mayor. But
Section 477 which reads:

"Section 477 - Qualifications, Powers and Duties '

xxx

The appointment of an engineer shall be mandatory for the provincial, city and municipal governments.
The city and municipal engineer shall also act as the local building official"

should be read in conjunction with Section 205 of the National Building Code which provides:

"Section 205. Building Officials.

xxx

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District
Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers to act as Building Officials of their respective areas
of jurisdiction.
["Section 201] - Due to the exigencies of the service, the incumbent city and municipal engineers have
been designated to act as building officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction. (Section 205) x x x
When acting as building officials the city and municipal engineers, who are local officials, should be
deemed national officials subject to the supervision of the Minister of Public Works (Opinion No. 144,
Series of 1979)." (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

It does not appear from the Local Government Code that vesting of power in the local chief executive to
appoint engineer who, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall likewise act as local building official,
also carries with it the power to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions in matters involving
non-issuance, suspension, revocation of building permits.

Absent any clear and explicit provision in the said code to this effect, we cannot conclude that the
appellate jurisdiction vested in the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section 307 of the
National Building Code has been transferred to the city or municipal mayor.18

What is worrisome is that, to justify its illegal quashal of the information, the SB quoted only a portion of
the resolution of Special Prosecutor Pamute, and omitted, either deliberately or inadvertently, the

ratio decidendi thereof:

We agree with the rationale in the assailed Memorandum issued by the respondent City Administrator to
the Acting Building Official. It is alright if only the same is issued by the officials authorized to do so - by
the DPWH officials where appeal of that nature is vested by law. But it appears that respondent Manuel S.
Alba is bereft of power to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the action of local building official relative
to building permits. We find merit in complainant's submission in his reply that nowhere in the National
Building Code or in the DILG law could we find a provision "which empower the local chief executive to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the local building officials relative to the non-
issuance, suspension or revocation of building permits. x x x Absent any clear provision of law we cannot
conclude that the appellate jurisdiction vested in the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under
Section 307 of the National Building Code has been transferred to the city or municipal mayor. Moreover,
the action made by respondent City Administrator is flawed by the fact that the date of the assailed
Memorandum is earlier than the date of receipt of the letter that has to be acted upon. We viewed this as
irregular." (Underscoring supplied)19

We note that during the hearing of October 8, 1999, the respondent agreed that his motion for leave to
order reinvestigation and/or quash the information be converted to a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019. This can be gleaned from the following Order of the SB:

When the "Motion for Leave to Order Reinvestigation and/or Quash Information" dated October 4, 1999
filed by the accused, through counsel, was called for hearing, Pros. Jacqueline Ongpauco-Cortel
manifested in open court that the prosecution has no objection if the said motion is converted by movant-
accused into a "Motion for Reconsideration" under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act) inasmuch as the five-day period provided therein was not observed. The accused, assisted by
counsel, Atty. Danny B. Gille, agreed to convert the said motion into a "Motion for Reconsideration"
under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.20

With the conversion of the Omnibus Motion of the respondent into a motion for reconsideration, he, in
effect, withdrew his motion to quash the information. Accordingly, the required reinvestigation was
conducted to ascertain, once again, if there was probable cause for the filing of the information. There
was, thus, no motion to quash the information pending resolution by the SB.

Moreover, on January 12, 2000, the SPO filed a Manifestation and Motion21 with the SB stating, among
others, that the Ombudsman had affirmed his finding of a probable cause against the respondent and
prayed for the arraignment of the accused. The respondent was accordingly arraigned, on April 10, 2000,
and pleaded not guilty. He even posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty, which was duly approved
by the SB. The court, thus, had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the
need for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for his apprehension and incarceration. The SB should have
set the pre-trial of the case instead of quashing the Information and even acquitting the respondent. The
arraignment of the respondent and his posting a bail bond for his provisional liberty proscribed the SB
from dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.

Under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to quash an Information may be
filed only for the following grounds:

SEC. 3. Grounds.' The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; andc\

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.22

To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow.23 The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the
case.

It bears stressing that, even before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Regional Trial Court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused only upon a finding of probable cause
based on the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, the affidavits and other evidences appended to the
Information, whatever evidence the Prosecutor may adduce upon order of the court. If the court finds that
there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss the case. The dismissal of
the case is without prejudice to the refiling thereof unless barred by prescription. Indeed, the procedure is
now encoded in Section 6, Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court is
mandated to immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of
arrest, and after having evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.' (a) By the Regional Trial Court.' Within ten (10) days from
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved
by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
The absence or presence of probable cause is to be determined from the material averments of the
information and the appendages thereof, as enumerated in Rule 112, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz:

SEC. 8. Records.' (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed
in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution of the case.

By quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable cause instead of merely dismissing the
case, the SB acted in violation of case law and, thus, acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.

On the second issue, we find and so rule that in acquitting the respondent of the crime charged before
trial, and without the latter having prayed for such relief, the SB acted without jurisdiction, thereby
depriving the petitioner of its right to due process. The records show that the only prayer of the
respondent in his Omnibus Motion was as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the Motion for Reinvestigation
and/or Motion to Quash be granted and in the interim, an order for suspension of proceedings be issued
during the pendency thereof.

Other reliefs and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.24

And yet, the SB acquitted the respondent. It is basic that the dismissal of a case is different from the
acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal of the case based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed
by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal
case will not result in the acquittal of the said accused. As fully explained by the Court in People v.
Salico:25

This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal.
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is
not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in
form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used,
instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the ground that the evidence fails to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an
acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an
acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of
competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for
the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.26

By its precipitate and patently illegal acts, the SB deprived the petitioner of its right to due process, an
aberration that should not be countenanced. The assailed Resolutions of the SB are, thus, null and void.
We reiterate our pronouncement in Paulin v. Gimenez:27

Where the order of dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication,
the order is null and void (People v. Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98 [1969]).

In People v. Bocar (138 SCRA 166 [1985]), this Court found that the prosecution was denied due process
as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court in view of
the trial court's order of dismissal. The trial court was thereby ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its
evidence and, therefore, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. Hence, the remand of the case for
further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.

In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this Court reiterated its previous
ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse
of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the case and as a
consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders are, therefore null and void
and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.28

The respondent cannot even invoke double jeopardy, conformably to our ruling in People of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,29 where we had the occasion to state:
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its
authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors
of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by
writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is
a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the
judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of
subject - matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of
law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent
Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court's jurisdiction.30

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan are NULLIFIED. The records are remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

4. RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY, GR No. 199113, 2015-03-18

Facts:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines... they purchased a 600-square meter lot
along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro... where they constructed a residential house... in
the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone.

filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application[3] (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said... application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents... petitioner re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225... petitioner averred that at the time he
filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by
a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the
property from the
Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondent's family.

finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
filing of the corresponding information in... court.

CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner's MLA. It ruled that petitioner's subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio... the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of any... proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in
committing the act of falsification... filed before the MTC... a warrant of arrest was issued... against the
petitioner.

petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition[15] for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a... pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court that issues a
warrant of arrest

RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court

Issues:

in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the... said court's jurisdiction by his
voluntary appearance... the MTC... properly denied petitioner's motion for re-determination of probable
cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).

Ruling:

contentions have no merit... petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3
who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As... the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance

Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost...
their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law's effectivity.
Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in... favor of the accused.[23] R.A.
9225, however, is not a penal law.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian... citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having... no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document
under Article 172, paragraph 1.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly... ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion... petition is DENIED