Table of Contents

Section 2 - Searches and Seizures...................1

Valmonte v. General de Villa.............................1
Guazon v. De Villa..............................................2
People vs. Andre Marti......................................3
Bache and Co. v. Ruiz.........................................4
Stonehill v. Diokno............................................6
Probable Cause..............................................7
Alvarez v. CFI.....................................................7
Burgos v. Chief of Staff......................................8
Personal Determination.................................9
Soliven v. Makasiar............................................9
Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros..........10
Lim v. Felix,......................................................11
Mata v. Bayona...............................................12
Particularity of Description...........................13
20TH Century Fox Film Corp vs CA.....................13
Nolasco vs Pano...............................................15
Valid Warrantless Searches..........................16
People vs Malmstedt.......................................16
Nolasco vs Pano...............................................18
Plain View Doctrine......................................19
People vs. Musa y Hantatalu...........................19
Stop and Frisk...............................................21
Terry v. Ohio....................................................21
People v. Solayao............................................23
Malacat v. Court of Appeals.............................24
Search of moving vehicle..............................25
Papa v. Mago...................................................25
People vs Tuazon.............................................26
Emergency Circumstances............................26

1
 People v. De Gracia..........................................26
Checkpoints..................................................27
Valmonte v. De Villa........................................27
Aniag v. Comelec,............................................28
Warrantless arrests......................................29
Espano v. Court of Appeals..............................29
People vs. Del Rosario.....................................30
Umil vs. Ramos................................................31
Webb v. De Leon.............................................32
People vs. Sucro..............................................35
People vs. Rodrigueza......................................37
Go. vs. Court of Appeals..................................38
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals...........................40
People v. Mengote..........................................42
People vs. Aminnudin......................................43

Section 2 - Searches and Seizures elsewhere as unconstitutional.In the alternative,

Valmonte v. General de Villa
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a
resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and
the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in
the implementation of checkpoints for the
protection of the people. Petitioners contended
that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket
authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the military and police
checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.
RULING:
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT
violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.

2
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
“sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions – which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times.Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
3
Guazon v. De Villa
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila.
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation
drive" or "areal target zoning" that were conducted
in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional.
The alleged acts committed during the raid are the
following:
1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific
target house to search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served.
2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification
cards.
3. The residents were rudely roused from
their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their houses.
4. The residents were at the point of high-
powered guns and herded like cows.
5. Men were ordered to strip down to their
briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
6. The residents complained that their homes
were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money
and valuables had disappeared after the operation.
7. The residents also reported incidents of
maulings, spot-beatings, and maltreatment. Those
who were detained also suffered mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information.
The respondents said that such accusations
mentioned above were total lies.
Respondents contend that the Constitution grants
to the government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of
peace in the state.
The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities where the said drives were
conducted.
Respondents averred that they have intelligently
and carefully planned months ahead for the actual
operation and that local and foreign media joined
the operation to witness and record such event.
ISSUE:
WON the areal target zoning and the saturation
drive is legal
HELD:
YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or
saturation drive is a valid exercise of the military
powers of the President.
According to the Supreme Court, everything stated
before them consists only of allegations. According
to petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were
arrested in the saturation drives covered by the
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in
Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz
Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the
Manila International Airport area. Not one of the
several thousand persons treated in the illegal and
inhuman manner described by the petitioners
appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in
courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been
tens of thousands of nearby residents who were
inconvenienced in addition to the
several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those
arrested has apparently been charged and none of
those affected has apparently complained.
The areal target zonings in this petition were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements particularly because of the blatant
assassinations of public officers and police officials
4
by elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were conducted.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution
which denies the authority of the Chief Executive,
to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming
communist activities.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual
rebellion, the police or military may go in force to
the combat areas, enter affected residences or
buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to
secure search warrants and without violating the
Bill of Rights.
The Constitution grants the Government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements
which would bring down constituted authority and
substitute a regime where individual liberties are
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of
security of the State.
People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-
law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and
asked if she could inspect the packages. Shirley
refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the
package making it ready for shipment. Before
being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of
Anita and proprietor of the courier company,
conducted an inspection of the package as part of
standard operating procedures.
Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious
odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the
NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the
package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job
Reyes opened the suspicious package and found
dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed
against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and
that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against hi
ISSUE:
WON the appellant can validly claim that his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure has been violated.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held based on the speech
of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual
and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals.
It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI
agents in his place of business. The mere presence
of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless
search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged was AFFIRMED.
Bache and Co. v. Ruiz 37 SCRA 323 (1971)
FACTS:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against Bache &
Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for
violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the
5
application for search warrant which was attached
to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and
his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with
them the following papers: Vera’s letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but
still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio
subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed
form of Logronio already accomplished and signed
by him but not yet subscribed; and a search
warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by
Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of
De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was
informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of the
Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could
be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search
warrant and Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant
2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly
issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents
served the search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript
of testimony was attached to the warrant. The
agents nevertheless proceeded with their search
which yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman
filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant be declared null
and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al.,
be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees.

After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued
an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of
the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April
1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
assessments on the corporation in the total sum of
P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized.
The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest
the legality of the seizure of documents from its
office.
HELD:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al.
(GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the
Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable
searches and seizures; holding that the
corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of the
corporate officers, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or the interest of each of them in
said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold
therein may be; and that the corporate officers
therefore may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations, since the right to object to the
admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the
present case is that: in the former case, only the
officers of the various corporations in whose offices
6
documents, papers and effects were searched and
seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the
corporation to whom the seized documents
belong, and whose rights have thereby been
impaired, is itself a petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the corporations in
Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant
was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the
basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against Bache & Co. and
Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search
Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to
the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be
consider a personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense. The search warrant was
issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax
Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a),
Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income tax
returns), which are interrelated. The second is the
violation of Section 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful
pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth
is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of
output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon). Even in their classification the 6
provisions are embraced in 2 different titles:
Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are
under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation).
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly
describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of
the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general
warrants, for the language used therein is so all-
embracing as to include all conceivable records of
the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly
render its business inoperative. Thus, Search
Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill v. Diokno 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
FACTS:
Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the
corporations they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code.”
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search
warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners
and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences to search for personal properties “books
of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the
offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.
The documents, papers, and things seized under
the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and
void for being violative of the constitution and the
Rules of court by:
(1) not describing with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized;
7
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were
seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were
not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.
The prosecution counters that the search warrants
are valid and issued in accordance with law; The
defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners
consent; and in any event, the effects are
admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ
of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving
insofar as paper and things seized from the offices
of the corporations.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant issued is valid. HELD:
NO the search warrant is invalid. The SC ruled in
favor of petitioners.
The constitution protects the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that
petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were
abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,”
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of
said laws or codes.
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure
of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal.
Thus, openly contravening the explicit command
of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.
However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot
assail the validity of the search warrant issued
against their corporation because petitioners are
not the proper party.
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each
of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
Probable Cause
8
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33
FACTS:
l Petitioner Alvarez asks that the warrant issued by
Judge Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of
certain accounting documents at any time of day
and night as well as the order authorizing the
agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the
articles seized be declared illegal and set aside and
the items be returned to him.
l Petitioner contends that Agent Almeda has no
personal knowledge of the facts which was served
as the basis for the issuance of the warrant. That he
got it only from a reliable source. Thus, the search
warrant issued is illegal.
l The articles had not been brought immediately to
the judge who issued the search warrant.
l The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer
that the petitioner cannot now question the
validity of the search warrant or the proceedings
had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he
has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a
compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of
P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal
proceeding or proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the requirements to find probable cause was
sufficiently made by the judge WON the search
and seizure warrant is valid.
HELD:
1.
l NO. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58
provides that the judge or justice must, before
issuing the warrant, examine under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing. It is the
practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit
of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application.
l It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant, in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the deposition
of any other witness. The affidavit of the agent, in
this case, was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay.
l When the affidavit of the applicant of the
complaint contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient the
judge is satisfied that there existed probable cause;
l when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact
is necessary.
l We conclude, therefore, that the warrant
issued is likewise illegal because it was based only
on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
2
l NO. In view of the foregoing and under the
above-cited authorities, it appears that the
affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the
search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the
search warrant in question
and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents, and other papers are illegal and do not
in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was subjected.
Moreover, Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58
authorizes that the search is made at night when it
is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to
be searched. However, as declared, the affidavits
are insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
upon it is illegal, Therefore, the search could not
legally be made at night.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
FACTS:
9
l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum”
newspapers were searched and its office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
"We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the
strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
l Petitioners averred that the search warrant
should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued
but pinpointed only one place where petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and
concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-
petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the
J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although
the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the
disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles,
instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the
affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted
surveillance of the premises could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause.
l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are
estopped by laches that they only impugned the
search warrant six months later.
ISSUE:
WON there is probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant.

HELD:
l NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general
warrants.
l Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. And when the
search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application
that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing
the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
serve as the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent
judge to have done so.
Personal Determination
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1988)
FACTS:
l In this three (3) consolidated cases it found
petitioners guilty of libel.
l President Corazon Aquino, the highest official of
the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented
public support asks for the prosecution of a
10
newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman
of the editorial board, the managing editor, and the
business manager in a not too indubitable a case
for alleged libel.
l Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose
a correlative disability to file suit." He contends
that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to a possible contempt
of court or perjury. In other words, the President
cannot sue him because he is immune from suit
and if he does, the President is exposing himself to
suit.
l Petitioners also questioned the validity of the
warrant of arrest. He averred that respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
l Furthermore, petitioners assert that to allow the
libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom
ISSUE:
WON the President is allowed to sue the
petitioners
WON the warrant of arrest was illegally secured.
HELD:
1. YES. The privilege of immunity from suit
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office;
not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.
The President cannot just stand by helplessly
bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or
maligns him or her.
2. YES. This constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses.
Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the
report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses.
Sound policy dictates the procedure laid down in
Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for tAhe
issuance of warrants of arrest, otherwise, judges
would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing
and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros
FACTS:
l RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search
warrant filed by M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, chief of
the PC NARCOM Detachment in Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental, to be served against Petitioner
Nicomedes Silva.
l The application was accompanied by
“deposition of witness” executed by Arthur Alcoran
and Pat. Leon Quindo.
l The search warrant stated that “You are
hereby commanded to make an immediate search
at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama
Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open
aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers,
forthwith seize and take possession of the
following property Marijuana dried leaves,
11
cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.”
l During the raid, the officers seized money
belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40.
l Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of
the search warrant was illegal because it was issued
on the sole basis of mimeographed and the judge
failed to personally examine the complainant and
witness by searching questions and answers.
l Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the
return of the said amount because her name is not
included in the search warrant. Thus, her
belongings shouldn’t be subject of the warrant.
l Acting on the said motion to return the
money, Judge Ontal issued an order stating that
the court “holds in abeyance the disposition of the
said amount pending the filing of appropriate
charges in connection with the search warrant.
l RTC’s new judge, replacing judge Ontal,
ruled against petitioners.
l MR was likewise denied by Judge Cruz
(new judge).
l Hence, this special civil action for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is validly issued by then
Judge Ontal
HELD:
NO. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined
the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition
of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to
comply with the legal requirement that he must
examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers in order
to determine the existence of probable cause. The
joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc.
Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted
together with the "Application for Search Warrant"
contained, for the most part, suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the
blanks provided thereon.
The above deposition did not only contain leading
questions but it was also very broad. The questions
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not
probing but were merely routinary. The deposition
was already mimeographed and all that the
witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the
blanks provided.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must
strictly comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that he must determine the
existence of probable cause by personally
examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers. His failure to
comply with this requirement constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
The officers implementing the search warrant
clearly abused their authority when they seized the
money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular
considering that Antonieta Silva was not even
named as one of the respondents, that the warrant
did not indicate the seizure of money but only of
marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the
search warrant was issued for the seizure of
personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b)
used or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense and NOT for personal
property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of
fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge
Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he
rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva
seeking the return of her seized money.
Petition granted.
Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-7, February 19, 1991
FACTS:
12
l Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with
his security escorts were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin at the airport vicinity in Masbate.
l Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a
gunshot wound.
l Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident.
l After conducting the preliminary investigation,
the court issued an order finding probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of herein
petitioners.
l In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of
the petitioners and recommended the amount of
P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of
each of the accused.
l Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was
designated to review the case containing 261 pages.
l Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which
affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against
the petitioners but differed in the designation of
the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the
accused should not only be charged with Multiple
Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of
MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims
and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot
wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante."
l MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also
denied.
l Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, four (4) separate information of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.
l Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana
Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue and was granted to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (from Masbate to Makati RTC)
l The cases were raffled to Branch 56
presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
l Petitioners questioned the validity of the
warrant of arrest because it was not personally
determined by the judge as he relied solely on the
certification or recommendation of a prosecutor
that a probable cause exists.
l RTC dismissed their petition upholding the
validity of the arrest warrants.
ISSUE:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable
cause exists.
HELD:
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of
the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records
of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in
Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There
was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his
own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.
He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the
petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the
mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever
13
necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances of the case so
require.
Petition granted.
Mata v. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984)
FACTS:
l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended
by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE
JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A
FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND
MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA
AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE
GREATER MANILA AREA".
l The information against herein petitioner alleged
that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai
Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as
‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or
from the government authorities concerned."
l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records
of the case.
l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and
annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized
l The court dismissed his motion stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and
the court made a certification that the documents
were not attached immediately and that there’s
nowhere in the rules which specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records.
l Petitioner’s MR was also denied
l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that
this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid
and all the articles confiscated under such warrant
as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid.
HELD:
NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality
for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later
that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Furthermore, While the SC held that the search
warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held
that the illegality of the search warrant does not
call for the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited.
Petition granted.
Particularity of Description
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
TH
20 Century Fox Film Corp vs CA
FACTS: The petitioner questions the application of
the constitutional provision against illegal searches
and seizures to raids conducted in connection with
the government's anti-film piracy campaign. The
main issue hinges on whether or not the judge
14
properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier
upon the application of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by
the petitioner.
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985,
petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of
searches and seizures in connection with the
latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape
outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant
violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted
surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed
three (3) applications for search warrants against
the video outlets owned by the private
respondents. The applications were consolidated
and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the
desired search warrants.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI
accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the
video outlets and seized the items described
therein. An inventory of the items seized was made
and left with the private respondents.
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and
release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated
October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of
the three search warrants which could not be a
basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the
possession of the National Bureau of Investigation
which under the law must be delivered to this
Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby
ordered to be returned to their owners through
their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or
representatives, against proper receipt, to be
forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as
proof that said properties have been returned to
the possession of the rightful owners."
The lower court denied a motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985
and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The
petition was dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Questioning the "probable cause" and
WON the respondent Court did commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned
orders.
HELD: This constitutional right protects a citizen
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his
privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and
effects. why the right is so important:
The government's right to issue search warrants
against a citizen's papers and effects is
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in
the searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133
SCRA 800), we defined probable cause for a valid
search "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to
believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched."
This constitutional provision also demands "no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified" in order to
convince the judge, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of a probable cause. (Alvarez v. Court
of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, supra).
15
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three
questioned search warrants against the private
respondents on the ground that it acted on the
application for the issuance of the said search
warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations
of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular
film have been committed. According to the
movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings
in the application for the three search warrants
testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet,
Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the
counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century
Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes
that were pirated, so that he did not have personal
knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness
Bacani also said that the video cassettes were
pirated without stating the manner it was pirated
and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge
of that fact.
The master tapes or at least the film reels of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
Court during the application gives some misgivings
as to the truth of that bare statement of the NBI
agent on the witness stand.
Again as the application and search proceedings is
a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD
49, the copyright infringement law, and although
what is required for the issuance thereof is merely
the presence of probable cause, that probable
cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a
time- honored precept that proceedings to put a
man to task as an offender under our laws should
be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the
government and liberally in favor of the alleged
offender.
So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the
Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of
comparison with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from
respondents, there was no way to determine
whether there really was piracy, or copying of the
film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3)
questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents
violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the
NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their
testimony which was the alleged commission of
the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during
the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge
that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master
tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the
lower court did not give much credence to his
testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes
of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to
the court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films from which the pirated films
were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have
in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of
application may not be necessary as these would be
merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative
of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not
meritorious. The court cannot presume that
duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
Although the applications and warrants themselves
covered certain articles of property usually found
in
a video store, the Court believes that the
search party should have confined themselves to
articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or
the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other
articles that are usually connected with, or related
to, a legitimate business, not
involving piracy of intellectual property, or
infringement of copyright laws. So that a television
set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax
tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette
recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search
Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged
16
in the video tape industry, and which could not be
the subject of seizure, The applicant and his agents
therefore exceeded their authority in seizing
perfectly legitimate personal property usually
found in a video cassette store or business
establishment."
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the lower court when it lifted the search
warrants it earlier issued against the private
respondents. We agree with the appellate court's
findings to the effect that A careful review of the
record of the case shows that the respondent Court
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of
discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.' But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the
assailed orders were motivated by a noble desire of
rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous
findings collided with the constitutional rights of
the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did
not even contest the righteousness and legality of
the questioned orders but instead concentrated on
the alleged denial of due process of law."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
Nolasco vs Pano, Executive Judge, RTC QC
FACTS: Prior to August 6, 1984 AGUILAR-ROQUE
was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal
Case, She was then still at large.
At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE
and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at Quezon City. The stated
time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by
respondents. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously been issued
against NOLASCO.
At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG
searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of
petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents.
In their COMMENT, however, respondents have
alleged that the search was conducted "late on the
same day"; that is late on august 6th.
On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col.
Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz
Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the
premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long
wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea
cases.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid.
HELD: NO. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this
Court, search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the
pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of
the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two
different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable
that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued
by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal
prosecution is initiated in another Court, or
Branch, as a result of the service of the Search
Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The later criminal case is more
17
substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding,
and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should
have the right to act on petitions to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained.
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been
charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against
public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not
been served for a considerable period of time; that
she was arrested within the general vicinity of her
dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was
made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the
opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the
interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may
be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as
evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and
to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return
to her any and all irrelevant documents and
articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84
issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set
aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent from introducing evidence
obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be
retained by the Constabulary Security Group for
possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case
No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military
commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner
Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance
and asking said Commission to return to her any
and all irrelevant documents and articles.
Valid Warrantless Searches
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
People vs Malmstedt
FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt was charged before the
(RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, for the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. He is a Swedish national. In the
evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City.
The accused planned to take a late afternoon trip
to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch
his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May
1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus,
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed
at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out
to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the
same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of
the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from
the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the
bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer
noticed that there were bulges inside the same
which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport. the officers opened
the teddy bears and they were found to also
contain hashish. In the chemistry report, it was
established that the objects examined were
18
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of
marijuana.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of
"not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also
claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the
two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian
couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no
more seats available in said bus, they decided to
take the next ride and asked accused to take charge
of the bags, and that they would meet each other at
the Dangwa Station.The trial court did not give
credence to accused's defense.The claim of the
accused that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise
such defense at the earliest opportunity. When
accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's
Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer
that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers
in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said
investigation when he told his lawyer about said
claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling
bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court
found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt,this
Court finds him GUILTY.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure
HELD: NO. Seeking the reversal of the decision of
the trial court finding him guilty of the crime
charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made
without a search warrant and, therefore, the
prohibited drugs which were discovered during the
illegal search are not admissible as evidence
against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in
requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside
said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish)
as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing
two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside
them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to
hide his identity by refusing to present his
19
passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive
the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in
law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
GR No. L-69803. January 30, 1987
Nolasco vs Pano
FACTS:
(At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th) Aquilar-Roque and
Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security
Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously been issued
against NOLASCO.
 (At 12:00 N. on August 6th) On the same day, a
searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno;
l (On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M)applied for
search warrant from the respondent judge Cruz-
Pano, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the
premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." after a month of “round the clock”
surveillance of the premises as a “suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA”,
 AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly
connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea
cases.
The searching party seized 428 documents and
written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
The City Fiscal filed the information for violation
of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive
Documents.
Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is
void because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure and that
probable cause had not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant’s witness.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is a general warrant
HELD:
YES. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all-embracing description
which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the
public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring the particular description of the
things to be seized.
Moreover, the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. The "probable cause" required to
justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will
induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act
in pursuant thereof.
Plain View Doctrine
20
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
People vs. Musa y Hantatalu
FACTS: The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this
appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August
31, 1990, (RTC) of Zamboanga City, finding him
guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
Prosecution evidence shows that in that the day
before the buy-bust, the team conduct surveillance
and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Zamboanga
City. Information received from civilian informer
was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place. The next day, December
14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned.
Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer
for which purpose he was given P20.00. The buy-
bust money had been taken. Ani gave Mari Musa
the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the
money, Mari Musa went back to his house and
came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened
the two wrappers and inspected the contents.
Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani
walked back towards his companions and raised
his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding
the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani.
Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the
house.
Finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and
pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine
of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without
subsidiary imprisonment.
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
impugns the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
ISSUE: 1. WON Musa is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. WON the seized plastic bag containing
marijuana is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
1. Yes. the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not
have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from
the appellant was marijuana because of the
distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated
the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled
to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the
following material points:
(1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to
conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on
the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on
December 13, 1989;
(2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to
their office and reported a successful operation and
turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana;
(3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation the following day;
(4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team
of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville,
Zamboanga City;
(5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt.
Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust
operation;
(6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to
the house of the appellant while some agents
stayed in the vehicles and others positioned
themselves in strategic places; the appellant met
Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place.
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga
strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani.
Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that
the police officers who accompanied the poseur-
buyer were unable to see exactly what the
appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their
distance or position will not be fatal to the
prosecution's case provided there exists other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the
testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient
21
to prove the consummation of the sale of the
prohibited drug.
2. No. The appellant next assails the seizure
and admission as evidence of a plastic bag
containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents
found in the appellant's kitchen. At the trial, the
appellant questioned the admissibility of the
plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the
trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
admissible in evidence. BUT’
"the most important exception to the necessity for
a search warrant is the right of search and seizure
as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly
authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched
the person of the appellant after arresting him in
his house but found nothing. They then searched
the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and
seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident
to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises
or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and
his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The
plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain
view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify
its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from
one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California,
where the police officer had reason to walk to the
doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which
position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM
agents in this case went from room to room with
the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask
the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and
found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California,
where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature
of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM
agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may
be said to be the object in their "plain view" was
just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic
bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the
plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency,
or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances
of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not
apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not,
however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect
of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold
by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime
charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
22
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
Stop and Frisk
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Facts:
Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon and sentenced to the statutorily
prescribed term of one to three years in the
penitentiary. The denial of a pretrial motion to
suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence
two revolvers and a number of bullets seized from
Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, by
Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden
Officer McFadden observed two men outside of a
store walking up to the window then away several
times. A third man met up with the initial two and
engaged in conversation. The plainly clothed
officer developed suspicion that the men may be
planning to rob the store. McFadden approached
the men and after identifying himself as an officer
asked what they were doing. The men mumbled
back a response. McFadden then grabbed Terry,
turned him around and patted him down to
determine if he was armed. The search revealed a
gun in Terry’s coat pocket. After conducting the
same search on the second man, another gun was
revealed. Once at trial, the officer testified he
thought the men may have been armed. his
attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and
Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road and
Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men
before, and he was unable to say precisely what
first drew his eye to them. However, he testified
that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a
detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to
patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for
shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He
explained that he had developed routine habits of
observation over the years, and that he would
"stand and watch people or walk and watch people
at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in
this case, when I looked over, they didn't look right
to me at the time." His interest aroused, Officer
McFadden took up a post of observation in the
entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet away from the
two men. "I get more purpose to watch them when
I seen their movements," he testified. He saw one
of the men leave the other one and walk southwest
on Huron Road, past some stores. The man paused
for a moment and looked in a store window, then
walked on a short distance, turned around and
walked back toward the corner, pausing once again
to look in the same store window. He rejoined his
companion at the corner, and the two conferred
briefly. Then the second man went through the
same series of motions, strolling down Huron
Road, looking in the same window, walking on a
short distance, turning back, peering in the store
window again, and returning to confer with the
first man at the corner.
The two men repeated this ritual alternately
between five and six times apiece -- in all, roughly
a dozen trips. At one point, while the two were
standing together on the corner, a third man
approached them and engaged them briefly in
conversation. This man then left the two others
and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and
Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering, and
conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12
minutes, the two men walked off together, heading
west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken
earlier by the third man.
On the motion to suppress the guns, the
prosecution took the position that they had been
seized following a search incident to a lawful
arrest. The trial court rejected this theory, stating
that it "would be stretching the facts beyond
reasonable comprehension" to find that Officer
McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the
men before he patted them down for weapons.
However, the court denied the defendants' motion
on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the basis
of his experience, "had reasonable cause to believe .
. . that the defendants were conducting themselves
suspiciously, and some interrogation should be
made of their action." Purely for his own
protection, the court held, the officer had the right
to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who
he had reasonable cause to believe might be
armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a
"frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-
blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it
held, was essential to the proper performance of
23
the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it,
"the answer to the police officer may be a bullet,
and a loaded pistol discovered during the frisk is
admissible."
Issue: WON a police officer detain an individual on
the street absent probable cause and conduct a
limited search to find weapons?
HELD: Yes. Officers may conduct a search limited
for weapons when they observe unusual conduct
leading them to reasonably suspect criminal
activity is afoot and the individual(s) involved
is/are armed.
An officer may identify himself as the police and
make initial inquiries. This conduct is proper when
the officer observes conduct leading him to
develop reasonable suspicion that a crime is
occurring or about to occur. If the officer believes a
threat to himself of others still exists after such an
inquiry, a limited search may be performed to find
weapons.
The Court held that an individual is seized when
stopped by a police officer on the street because he
is not free to walk away. As a result, the Fourth
Amendment protections prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures apply. The Court also stated
that a “pat down” of outer clothing constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the constitutionality of the
search depended on whether or not the scope of
the search was reasonable in light of the
circumstances. The test used to determine
reasonableness is that the interest in officer safety
must outweigh the suspect’s Fourth Amendment
right to privacy.
We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry
was properly admitted in evidence against him. At
the time he seized petitioner and searched him for
weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and
dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection
of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of
harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully
restricted his search to what was appropriate to the
discovery of the particular items which he sought.
Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be
decided on its own facts. We merely hold today
that, where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in
the course of investigating this behavior, he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the
person from whom they were taken.
People v. Solayao 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
FACTS:
SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy.
Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to conduct an
investigation regarding reports on the presence of
armed men roaming around barangays of Caibiran.
Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became
suspicious to the group of Solayao because the
accused-appellant himself is drunk and wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. What’s more
suspicious is when they noticed the team of SPO3
Nio, the group fled leaving behind Solayao, herein
accused-appellant.
According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is
carrying a “latong” (49-inch firearm) wrapped in
dried coconut leaves. He thought that it’s only a
torch which Hermogenes Cenining gave to him
and that he is not aware that there’s a concealed
weapon inside. He further claimed that this was
the third torch handed to him after the others had
been used up.
24
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before
the RTC of Biliran, with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition defined and
penalized under PD No. 1866.
The lower court found that accused-appellant did
not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino confiscated the
firearm from him and that he had no permit or
license to possess the same. It hardly found
credible accused-appellant's submission that he
was in possession of the firearm only by accident
and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he
followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes
Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir and
Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did
not know his companions.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject
firearm in evidence as it was the product of an
unlawful warrantless search.
HELD:
NO. There was no error on the part of the trial
court when it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence nor violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure
conducted in this case be likened to the Posadas
case where the suspicious conduct of Posadas
himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a
search even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-
appellant not to run away, the former identified
himself as a government agent.[16] The peace
officers did not know that he had committed, or
was actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the
report that there were armed men roaming around
in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their
attention was understandably drawn to the group
that had aroused their suspicion. They could not
have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a
firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an
instance where a search and seizure may be
effected without first making an arrest. There was
justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-
appellant when his companions fled upon seeing
the government agents. Under the circumstances,
the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.
However, the prosecution failed to produce
evidence that the accused-appellant has no license
to carry the firearm by merely relying on the lone
witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony that accused-
appellant admitted to them during the time he was
apprehended that he has no license to carry such
weapon.
The prosecution should have presented a
certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit
of the Philippine National Police that accused-
appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any
kind or caliber would have sufficed for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm.
Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence
Malacat v. Court of Appeals 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession
a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of
policemen when he was said to be acting
suspiciously when he was hanging around Plaza
Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with
other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen
approached the group of men, they scattered in all
directions which prompted the police to give chase
and petitioner was then apprehended and a search
was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower
court. Hence, the present petition wherein
petitioner contended that the lower court erred in
25
holding that the search made on him and the
seizure of the hand grenade from him was an
appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred
in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it
was admissible because it was a product of an
unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by
the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and
seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
and seizures refers to those effected without a
validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful —
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest;34and (6) a "stop and
frisk.’

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused
the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and
allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as
laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search
is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . .
26
Other notable points of Terry are that while
probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Search of moving vehicle
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
Facts: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the
counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released
the following day from the customs zone of the
port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of
the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1
at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the
Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two
trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the
two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief
of Police. Upon investigation, a
person claimed ownership of the goods and
showed to the policemen a “Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No.
147-5501”, issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to
have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention
of the two trucks and their cargo, Private
Respondents filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a petition “for mandamus with
restraining order. That the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without
search warrant issued by a competent court;
Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an
order ex parte restraining the petitioners from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the
same time set the hearing of the petition for
preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966.
However, when the restraining order was received
by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs
in the presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a
representative of herein respondent Remedios
Mago.
Issue: Whether a warrant issued by a competent
court is required to search and seize a moving
cargo or vehicle.
Held: No, The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said
“dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace. The court view, therefor, that except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. the
court defined the difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods
27
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling
house of similar place, and like goods in course of
transportation and concealed in a movable vessel,
where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. In the instant case, we note that
petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion
policemen did not have to make any search before
they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their
original petition, and amended petition, in the
court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa
did not even allege that there was a search. But
even if there was a search, there is still authority to
the effect that no search warrant would be needed
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case. he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. Emergency
circumstances
 People vs Tuazon
Emergency Circumstances
People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Facts:The records show that in the early morning
of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the
Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota
car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at EDSA, together with his team and
was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report
received by the division that said establishment
was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as
a communication command post. After a while, a
group of five men disengaged themselves from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of
Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they
were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be
caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at
around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were
able to find and confiscate contrabands inside one
of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano
which is located at the right portion of the
building. On February 22, 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
and sentenced him to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. That judgment of conviction is
now challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether in a state of emergency
circumstances exist, the arrest of the accused
involved in rebellious act is valid without securing
a arrest and search warrant.
Held: Yes, Under the foregoing circumstances, it is
our considered opinion that the instant case falls
under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under
the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
While it is true that the officers were not armed
with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however,
under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe
that accused was then and there committing a
crime. Probable cause has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
28
and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula
but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Checkpoints
Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, May 24,
1990
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a
resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s
Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and
the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in
the implementation of checkpoints for the
protection of the people. Petitioners contended
that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket
authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the
right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures?
HELD
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT
violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA
“sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions – which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
29
times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and
local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting
of firearm or other deadly weapons on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by
members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327
providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad,
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives,
wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms
issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and
return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint.
When the car driven by Arellano approached the
checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found
the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and
detained. He then explained the order of
petitioner.
Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only
complying with the firearms ban, and that he was
not a security officer or a bodyguard.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829
directing the filing of information against
petitioner and Arellano for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show
cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position.

Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons”
and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not
within the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327
is unconstitutional. The issue on the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the
elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid
for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue:Whether or not petitioner can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the
firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence
gathered from the warrantless search of his car
Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search
warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of
the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search.
In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in
Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as
they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed
inside a bag at the back of the car.
Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have
thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the
package without violating the constitutional
injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner
and Arellano, the search could not have been valid.
Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in
the facts that the PNP had not informed the public
of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by
the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
30
Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor
that he was a respondent in the preliminary
investigation. Such constituted a violation of his
right to due process. Hence, it cannot be
contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as
he was not informed that he was himself a
respondent in the case.
Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP
is declared illegal and the firearms seized during
the search cannot be used as evidence in any
proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No.
92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set
aside.
Warrantless arrests
Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
FACTS:
The accused was caught in flagrante by herein
police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an
investigation in the area reported being rampant of
drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after
he completed his transaction to a buyer and there
found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana.
Accused was asked by the police officers whether
he has some more of the marijuana and told them
he got more at his house. They went to the accused
house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana.
During the trial, accused denied all the allegations
against him and made an alibi that he was in his
house sleeping when the police officer went to his
house looking for his brother in law and instead
handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly
having in his possession 10 teabags of Marijuana.
The trial court did not believe his alibi and found
him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Accused appealed and said that the arrest was
illegally done and the search of his house is
deemed a violation of his constitutional right.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the
aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a
buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
petitioner handing over something to an alleged
buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana.
His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two
cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the
crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found
at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article
III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
31
marijuana seized at petitioners house after his
arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall
under the said exceptions.
Petition denied with a modification that the 10
bags of marijuana seized from his house is
inadmissible in evidence since no search warrant
was served to him.
People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20,
1994]
FACTS:
SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros applied for a search
warrant and was issued by RTC judge de Guia on
the same day.
The search warrant authorized the search and
seizure of an "undetermined quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the
premises of appellant's house located at 828 R.
Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City.
SPO3 Untiveros and his team then raided the
house of the accused.
It was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will
buy shabu from appellant and after his return from
appellant's house, the raiding team will implement
the search warrant.
After buying the shabu, PO1 Luna came back to the
headquarters and enter in the logbook the serial
number of the marked money used in buying the
Shabu from the accused.
PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to
appellant's house to implement the search warrant.
Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario, and
appellant witnessed the search at appellant's
house.
During the raid the following items were seized:
● SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3 Francisco found
a black canister containing shabu,
● An aluminum foil,
● A paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set
● Three used ammunitions in a cup and
three wallets, one containing the marked money.
● SPO1 Novero found inside a show box
aluminum foils, napkins, and a burner
All the specimen submitted for laboratory analysis
gave positive results for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs
in Criminal ( 2 separate criminal cases)
ISSUE:
WON the search and arrest conducted by the
police were legally done.
HELD:
NO. The operation conducted by the police is
illegal.
As to the crime of illegally selling prohibited drugs,
the testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Rogelio
Francisco that Veneracion Luna, the alleged
Poseur-buyer, bought shabu from accused-
appellant was derived solely from what Luna
supposedly told him and, therefore, is patently
hearsay evidence, without any evidentiary weight
whatsoever.
Likewise, the statements of prosecution witnesses
Policemen Reynaldo de la Cruz, Raymundo
Untiveros, and Eduardo Novera, Jr. as to the
alleged sale of shabu are hearsay, without weight,
as all of them were not present during the alleged
sale.
The prosecution failed to call to the witness stand
PO1 Venerando Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer.
There is, thus, a total absence of evidence to
establish the purported sale of shabu by accused-
appellant to Venerando Luna, the supposed
poseur-buyer. The omission to present the poseur-
buyer casts serious doubts that an illegal sale of a
dangerous drug actually took place.
32
Moreover, the accused-appellant cannot be
convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a
canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the
charge against him was for selling shabu with the
information alleging that the "accused, without
legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an
aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride . . ." The sale is totally different
from possession. The accused-appellant cannot be
convicted of a crime which is not charged in the
information for to do so would deny him the due
process of law.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The search warrant implemented by the raiding
party authorized only the search and seizure of ". . .
the described quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia". Thus, the raiding party was
authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia
for the use thereof and no other.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds
of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and
the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically
mandate that the search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized.
Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the
police officers to seize the firearm which was not
mentioned, much less described with particularity,
in the search warrant. Neither may it be
maintained that the gun was seized in the course
of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-
appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal.
Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same
is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno,
20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly
ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized
articles.
Accused is acquitted of both crimes charged
against him for lack of sufficient evidence and
inadmissibility of evidence.
Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
FACTS:
Military agents received confidential information
that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be
one of the five NPA sparrows who recently
murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot
wounds.
Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a
fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando
Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons.
Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of
the arrests and searches made by the military on
the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is
a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because
it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113,
Dural was committing an offense, when arrested
because he was arrested for being a member of the
New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of
Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in
the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
33
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did
not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at
the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who
the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the
St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot
the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of
his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not
end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot
or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of the organized
government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a
continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson,
etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of
the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing an organized
government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded
on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based
on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing
before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man
can say that it would have been better for the
military agents not to have acted at all and made
any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary
action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest
lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of the law and to
prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an
administrative measure. The power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest
in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant
is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines
not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the
peace officers, in the performance of their duties
and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers
more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But
if they do not strictly comply with the said
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable
for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for
other administrative sanctions.
Webb v. De Leon 247 SCRA 652
FACTS:
Accused Hubert Webb et. Al, the prime suspects of
the sensational Visconde Rape with Homicide case
filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
an application for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction.
The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño
to conduct the preliminary investigation.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI
presented the following:
34
(1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of
their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who
allegedly saw the commission of the crime;
(2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the
former housemaids of the Webb family in the
persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola;
(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal
who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a
passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound
for New York and who expressed doubt on whether
petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip;
(4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a
former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who
narrated the manner of how Biong investigated
and tried to cover up the crime at bar;
(5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita
and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids,
and the sworn statements of Normal White, a
security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an
engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were
also submitted and they showed that Carmela had
nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and
Jennifer nineteen (19). The genital examination of
Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner
Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production And Examination of Evidence and
Documents for the NBI to produce the documents
he’s asking.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the
NBI submitted photocopies of the documents.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary
investigation that he did not commit the crime at
bar as he went to the United States on March 1,
1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27,
1992. His alibi was corroborated by Honesto
Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina
Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and
Pamela Francisco. To further support his defense,
he submitted documentary evidence that he
bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car. While in
the United States on said dates and that he was
issued by the State of California Driver's License
No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.
Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter
dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal
Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records
tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at
San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a
passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page
Resolution "finding probable cause to hold
respondents for trial" and recommending that an
Information for rape with homicide be filed against
petitioners and their co-respondents.
Judge Raul de Leon (J.Escano’s pairing judge)
issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners.
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants
of arrest against the petitioners and their co-
accused because Judge Escano inhibited himself to
the case.
Webb, Lejano and Gatchalian voluntary
surrendered to the police authorities. Petitioners
fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable
cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn
statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and
uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May
22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her
credibility for her misdescription of petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did
not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT:
Respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them:
35
l the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its
discretion in holding that there is probable cause
to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide;
l the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary
investigation; and
l the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into
judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO. What the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.
l Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the
existence of probable cause.
l Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise,
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing
and deciding cases filed before their courts.
l Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and our case law34 repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have
conducted "searching examination of witnesses"
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
They also reject petitioners' contention that a
judge must first issue an order of arrest before
issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule
requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior
to a warrant of arrest.
2. NO. The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it found probable cause against
the petitioners.
l Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on
two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously
described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond
and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in
her two (2) sworn statement.
l The DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged
misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode
the credibility of Alfaro.
l In the case before us, complainant reasoned out
that Alfaro was then having reservations when she
first executed the first statement and held back
vital information due to her natural reaction of
mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the
inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements
have been sufficiently explained especially
especially so where there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort
the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit.
l As it has been often noted, ex parte
statements are generally incomplete because they
are usually executed when the affiant's state of
mind does not give her sufficient and fair
opportunity to comprehend the import of her
statement and to narrate in full the incidents
which transpired;
l In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a
crime has been committed and what is clear before
us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by
the complainant indicate a prima facie case that
respondents conspired in the perpetration of the
imputed offense.
l The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found probable cause against
the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
36
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put
in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify . . .
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
3. NO. The records will show that the DOJ
Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause against them.
l Petitioner Webb actively participated in the
preliminary investigation by appearing in the
initial hearing, second hearing, by filing a "Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents" , "Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for
Production and Examination of Evidence" ,
"Comment and Manifestation", "Counter-
Affidavit", and a "Motion to Resolve", ETC.
l Moreover, It must also be pointed out that
despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated
after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel
continued to conduct further proceedings.
l The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the
parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and
for the panel to study the evidence submitted more
fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the
petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the
petitioners. During the period of
twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to
adduce and present additional evidence before the
DOJ Panel.
l This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f)
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
investigating officer shall resolve the case within
ten (10) days from the termination of the
preliminary investigation.

l Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they
were denied due process during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ
Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed
the Information in court against them.
4. NO. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is
anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled "An
Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security
And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes"
enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its
Section 10.
l Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program,
Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-
inclusion in the criminal Complaint or
Information.
l The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938
which gives the court the prerogative to approve
the discharge of an accused to be a state witness.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the
faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to
execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
People vs. Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991]
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo,
Aklan, was instructed by their Station Commander
to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro,
because of information gathered by Seraspi that
Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned Roy
Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused
under the house of Regalado and near the chapel
37
where the accused was selling marijuana to a group
of persons around 5 pm. Pat. Fulgencio reported
this to their station commander and instructed
him to continue his monitoring.
At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up
Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified
as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with
appellant.
At that point, after Macabante bought from the
accused, they pursue Macabante and told them he
bought it from herein accused-appellant. The
police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans
Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and
another teabag from Macabante,
Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were
seized without serving upon him a search warrant.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was
illegal, is a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
He stresses that there was sufficient time for the
police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his
Station Commander of the activities of the accused
two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his
arrest.
ISSUE:WON the arrest without warrant of the
accused is lawful and consequently, WON the
evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the instances where an
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The
rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace
officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; (Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within
the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when
the officer sees the offense, although at a distance,
or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro
three times dealing drugs inside the chapel where
he is 2 meters away monitoring his nefarious
activities then after the 3rd deal, the police
intercepted the buyer Macabante and when
confronted by the police, Macabante readily
admitted that he bought the marijuana from Sucro.
Therefore, Sucro had just committed an illegal act
of which the police officers had personal
knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored accused-appellants nefarious activity.
The accused questions the failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even
prior to the former's joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three
days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had
known each other since their childhood years and
that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told
the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their
locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this
friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his
childhood friend and merely advised him not to
engage in such activity. However, because of
reliable information was given by some informants
that selling was going on every day, he was
constrained to report the matter to the Station
Commander.
38
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers
to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is
that probable cause existed.
The general rule is that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule... Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the RCP which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence
presented is admissible in evidence.
Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant
Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense
charged. The trial court's decision must be
upheld.`
People vs. Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February
4, 1992]
FACTS:
The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received
a confidential information regarding an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga,
Albay.
The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-
buyer. He was told by the informant to look for a
certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the
road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where be could find Don and where he could buy
marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he
returned, he was accompanied by a man who was
later on introduced to him as Don, herein
appellant.
After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams
of marijuana, Don left Taduran and Segovia and
when he came back, he’s already bringing with him
a plastic containing Marijuana. Thereafter,
Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a
report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
Based on that information, they apprehended the
accused without a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a
search warrant the house of the father (Jovencio
Rodrigueza) of herein accused-appellant. During
the raid, they were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among
others.
The next 2 days, the father was released and Don
and co-accused remained. The three accused (Don,
Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of
their alleged participation.
RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended) while the two co-accused
were acquitted.
Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality
of his arrest.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to
his constitutional right
HELD:
NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally
conducted.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search,
to be valid, must generally be authorized by a
search warrant duly issued by the proper
government authority. True, in some instances,
this Court has allowed government authorities to
conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant.
1. when the owner of the premises waives his
right against such incursion;
2. when the search is incidental to a lawful
arrest;
39
3. when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws;
4. when it is made on automobiles for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws;
5. when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view;
6. in cases of inspection of buildings and
other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations,
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by
the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search
warrant.
It does not appear, either, that the situation falls
under any of the aforementioned cases above.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable
search and seizure was clearly violated. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their act
by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had
already been put under surveillance
for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they
easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and
ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated
marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug
paraphernalia presented as evidence against
appellant.
From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-
buyer) bought 100 grams of marijuana from Don
but the evidence presented were the prohibited
articles were among those confiscated during the
so-called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza.
The unanswered question then arises as to the
identity of the marijuana leaves that became the
basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio,
this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic
bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime.
As such, the existence thereof must be proved with
certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so
would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to
sustain the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution
has failed to establish its cause. It has not
overcome the presumption of innocence accorded
to appellant. This being the case, appellant should
not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and
imaginary imputations against him.
Go. vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837,
February 11, 1992]
FACTS:
The incident happened along Wilson Street, San
Juan, Metro Manila where the car of Rolito Go
bumped the car of Eldon Maguan while Go was
traversing a one-way “wrong direction” road.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then
boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard
at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner's car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of
the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell
and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm
caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene
of the shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from. The police were informed that
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained an
impression of the credit card used by petitioner
from the cashier of the bake shop.
40
The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of petitioner and he positively identified
him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably
the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for
petitioner. 7 days after the shooting incident,
petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied
by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the
police station at that time, positively identified
petitioner as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide against
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa
Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the
presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself
of his right to a preliminary investigation but that
he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
refused to execute any such waiver.
2 days after and before the prosecutor filed the
information in court, Eldon Maguan died of
gunshot wounds.
Accordingly, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, the prosecutor filed an
information for murder before the RTC. No bail
was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and
that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed.

Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion,
wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he
interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
Petitioner was released when his cash bond was
approved. Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion
for leave to conduct a preliminary investigation
and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in
the court be suspended.
The prosecutor stated that petitioner had filed
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation, which motion had
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00.
The trial court issued an Order granting leave to
conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling
the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after
the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.
However, the respondent judge issued an order on
July 17, 1991, recalling his bail, the leave to conduct
P.I, and his omnibus for immediate release.
Likewise, the judge ordered the petitioner to
surrender within 48 hours.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing
the 17 July 1991 Order. Petitioner contends that the
information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all
proceedings in the case pending resolution by the
Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested
without a warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had
allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been “just committed” at the time
41
that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness
to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly, none
had the “personal knowledge” required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had
been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to a preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
lawful
WON petitioner effectively waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
1. NO. The arrest was invalid.
l First, the trial court’s reliance in the case of Umil
v. Ramos is incorrect. Herein, appellant was
charged with murder while in Umil, the accused
was charged with subversion, a continuing offense.
l The petitioner’s appearance to the police station
did not mean he was arrested at all. Petitioner
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that
he was or was not guilty of any crime.
l Second, the instant case did not fall within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
l Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after
the shooting of Maguan.
l The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the
time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
l Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
l Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
l The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's
wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge."
2. NO. Petitioner did not waive his right to P.I.
l Petitioner had from the very beginning demanded
that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As
earlier pointed out, on the same day that the
information for murder was filed with the RTC,
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation.
l Moreover, the Court does not believe that by
posting bail petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison,
we did hold that appellants there had waived their
right to a preliminary investigation because
immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial "without previously claiming
that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.
l In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release
on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation
before respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12
July 1991.
l Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver
of a preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a
motion in court asking for leave to conduct a
preliminary investigation, he clearly implied to
recognized that petitioner's claim to the
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
42
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139,
August 2, 1990]
FACTS:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National
Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting
a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.
While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying
a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner
where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a
smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunition for a .22 caliber gun.
They brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation. Petitioner failed to show
license or authority to possess the weapons.
Thus, he was charged and eventually convicted for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions by
the RTC of Davao. CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the seizure
conducted. However, even the OSG justified the
warrantless search that it is in accordance of
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a
commission of an offense without a search
warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without
a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the
circumstances.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:
YES. An arrest without a warrant may be effected
by a peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers, in this case,
identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. They just suspected that
he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant.
However, there are many instances where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost
of which is the "stop and search" without a search
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been
upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure
conducted at military or police checkpoints and
the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.
43
It is too much indeed to require the police officers
to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not
been violated.
People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992
FACTS:
l Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. l A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place.
l Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan
narrated that they saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried
to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them.
l The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
l His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right
pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
l Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to
police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
l One other witness presented by the prosecution
was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from
him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on
June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the
robbers.
l He had duly reported the robbery to the police,
indicating the articles stolen from him, including
the revolver.
l Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned
the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it
and claimed instead that the weapon had been
"Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.
l It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the
revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither
could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a
warrant.
l The defense also contends that the testimony
regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house
was irrelevant and should also have been
disregarded by the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest was lawful
HELD:
NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5
Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be
arrested after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused was merely “looking from
side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was
apparently no offense that has just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Court takes note that there was nothing to
support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his
abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense
44
had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where
the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected
while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was be actually committing or attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
short, there was no probable cause that, as the
prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with
the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at
the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact
just been committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what
offense if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later after Danganan
had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they
learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein.
As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on
Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
only after he had been searched and the
investigation conducted later revealed that he was
not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the
fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying
a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.
Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9
at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked like marijuana leaves took him to
their headquarters for investigation.
Later on, the information was amended to include
Farida Ali y Hassen and both were charged for
Illegal Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.
The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough
investigation. Then trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted.
In his defense,
● Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of
pants.
● He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant.
● At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying
the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.
● He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
● He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several
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bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its
own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried
only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not
to mention his other expenses.
Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches
in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely,
they were not discovered when he was bodily
searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. He also
said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and
gave away the other, although the watches
belonged not to him but to his cousin, to a friend
whose full name he said did not even know.
The trial court also rejected his allegations of
maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.
On appeal, the Court finds it necessary to answer
the legality of his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:WON The warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:NO. Aminuddin was arrested illegally.
The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a
valid search or arrest warrant shall be served first
before the authorities can check his personal
properties or deprived him of his liberty.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after a personal
determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught
in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed
or had just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
However, the present case presented no such
urgency unlike the case of Roldan v. Arca.
Based on the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained

the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were
caught red-handed, as a result of what are
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable
because at the precise time of arrest the accused
was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not,

at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that
he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them
to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.

As to the Court’s exclusion of the illegally seized

marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must, therefore, be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

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