G.R. No.
L-16749 January 31, 1963 whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of
the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who
was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue
of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
1
which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that
the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen
Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was
filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was
alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that
the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from
the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through
counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST
SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNAL LAW.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V in the State of California.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no question that at
the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself
in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board
the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until
1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching
school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July
of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the
United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs.
2
"MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more
to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at
his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at
the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home
or properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship
that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost
by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of
the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken
to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he
has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which
he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while
living in it. But if he went on business which would require
his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place
to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to
insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p.
29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is
used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national
law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator
may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner
he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the
provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to
by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.)
It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law
being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by
various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
3
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality
of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict
of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict
of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see
why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have
looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting
the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should
be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It
is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps
the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors
to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is
the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as
to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or
both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary
with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought
in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and where
the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these
cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or
the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by
the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by
the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of
the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last
domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French
statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a
French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of
things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions,
on the assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law,
the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process
is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp.
523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to
be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the
courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of
frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by
them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then
apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined
and the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol.
27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the
article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating
not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute
of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of
the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
4
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right
to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of
the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute
the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with
the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman,
Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living
in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of
the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution
of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled
at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of
the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized
as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the
doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property,
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one
of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of
civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and
the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule
is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
law of California. But as above explained the laws of on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, against appellees.
one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for
the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared
in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law
of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is

no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the
law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained
in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;

Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil.
130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by
appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in
the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in
the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it
does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical
with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California..

5
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees
E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court
6
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a
total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
— pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case
is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in
Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art.
11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,
while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.]
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo), Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO,
Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. September 30, 1975.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672)
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
administrator-appellant, v. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO,
7
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other
his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA
MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No.
1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
SYNOPSIS
In regard to a decision decided by the Supreme Court
on March 29, 1974 the following pleadings were filed
before the Court: a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the petitioner-appellant, a motion for
modification of the judgment by the heirs of the
testator, and a motion for the assessment of damages
suffered by reason of the lifting of the preliminary
injunction filed by respondent-appellee Magno.
The Supreme Court, not finding any new matter in the
said motions sufficient to induce a modification of its
judgment, reaffirmed its previous opinion, denied the
first two motion, and authorized the trial court to make
the assessment to the damages prayed for. Because of
the length of time that the subject estates have been
pending judicial settlement, the parties were enjoined
to exert all efforts to have the inventories of said
estates finalized and to extrajudicially settle their
remaining differences. The respondent court was
likewise directed to expedite proceedings and to close
the same upon the payment of the corresponding taxes
due within three months from notice.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR
MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE
NO NEW MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO
CHANGE THE PREVIOUS DECISION OF THE COURT. —
Where the Court, upon consideration of the motions
filed in regard to a previously decided case, had not
found any new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to
induce a modification of its judgment, the previous
decision is reaffirmed and the motions for
reconsideration and for modification of its judgment are
denied.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. JUDGMENTS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR
MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE
NO NEW MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO
CHANGE THE PREVIOUS DECISION OF THE COURT;
DIRECTIVE TO RESPONDENT COURT TO EXPEDITE AND
TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THREE MONTHS
SUPERSEDES PRO TANTO THE DISPOSITION IN THE
ORIGINAL DECISION. — The resolution’s directive to
respondent court to expedite and terminate the
protracted proceedings within three months supersedes
pro tanto the disposition in the original decision of
March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the minimum
one-fourth of the community properties adjudged to be
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery and to
exclusive administration by respondent as her estate’s
administrator, with the other one-fourth to remain
under the joint administration of said respondent and
petitioner and Charles Newton Hodges’ one-half share
to be administered by petitioner exclusively as his
estate’s administrator, since such physical segregation
8
and separate administration could not possibly be
accomplished before the more pressing and
indispensable matters of submittal of the two estates’
inventories and determination by respondent court
within the limited three-month period given in the
Court’s resolution.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner-appellant
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and motion
for modification filed by Joe Hodges and "the other
heirs of Charles Newton Hodges" in regard to the
decision of this Court of March 29, 1974.
Upon consideration of said motions, the Court has not
found any new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to
induce a modification of its judgment, for which reason,
the Court, with its members reaffirming their previous
opinions and vote resolved unanimously to DENY as it
hereby DENIES the motions for reconsideration and
modification above referred to.
Anent the motion of respondent-appellee Avelina
Magno 1 the assessment of the damages she claims she
and the Estate Linnie Jane Hodges have suffered by
reason of the preliminary injunction in this case which
was lifted per resolution of 1 Court of September 8,
1972, the Court resolved to authorize trial court to
make the assessment prayed for, subject to appeal, to
this Court, if necessary.
Considering the substantial value of the subject estates
the length of time they have already been pending
judicial settlement and for the reason that the payment
of the corresponding taxes thereon are being unduly
delayed, and because the properties of said estates
have to be disposed favor of Filipinos before May 27,
1976, the Court enjoins the parties to exert all efforts to
have the inventories of said states finalized without
further delay, and if possible to extrajudicially settle
their remaining differences to further complications,
expenses and unnecessary loss time. The respondent
court is directed to expedite processing by giving due
priority thereto, requiring the parties to submit the
inventories within thirty days from notice hereof, and to
resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court’s
decision and to close the proceedings upon payment of
the corresponding taxes within three months from
notice hereof. Respondent judge is further directed to
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
"Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and
the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred
to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-
five (25) years that they lived together as husband and
wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted
serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church,
in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines
Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to
United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by
the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American
Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave
by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
9
report to this Court from time to time the action taken
by him hereon.
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
"Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the
child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s
name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In
fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family
allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of
Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s
daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2)
they would dissolve their marital union in accordance
with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property
acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate
from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized
by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became
final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente
in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres
and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO
exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including
ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my
real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my
wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-
mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold,
ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the
sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in
her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or
her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
10
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils,
or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed,
signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no
relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side
should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children
with respect to any real or personal properties I gave
and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by
virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion
for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still
alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court
a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s
will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate
proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was
published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint
decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found
that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for
the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise,
she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate
even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is
under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula
Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the
intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated
March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as
conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir,
Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the
estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal
administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond
in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her
to make a return to the court within three (3) months a
true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels,
rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time
come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same,
or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or
required by this court; to render a true and just account
of her administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions
for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s
motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier
decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they
were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its
11
decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate
and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is
declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and
the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through
the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple.
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution
of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted
and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the
Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back"
to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of
New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven
statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining
the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!
1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law.
There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State
of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens
and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer
to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for
or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid
since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial
court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
12
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their
cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the
complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent
was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose
her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce
(as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
and other public instruments shall be governed by the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
laws of the country in which they are executed.
No costs.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the SO ORDERED.
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to

his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in
the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall

inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign
law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the
will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that

whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon

the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego, made
final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of

origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the
parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with

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