GR.

no 102390

Rey Lanada v Court of Appeals, February 1, 2002

FACTS:

Spouses Hemedez filed a civil case against Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos,

Pacifico Galasao, and Capt. Rey Laada, praying for indemnity for the death of their son,

actual compensation for the destruction of the car, moral and exemplary damages. The

defendants filed their respective Answers denying liability. Thereafter, the spouses

Hemedez served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set

forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended

thereto. Through their respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Laada, and

Alimagno and Galasao filed their verified answer to the request for admission. Spouses

Hemedez sought the striking out of said answers contending that under Section 2 of

Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and not their counsel should

personally answer the request for admission and hence the answer filed by their

counsel in their behalf was by nature based on hearsay. On the other hand, the

defendants asserted that they observed the rules in filing their answers, through their

lawyers, to the request for admission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the

counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26

of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The issue in this case may be stated in this wise: should a person to whom a request for

admission is addressed personally answer the request? It calls for an interpretation of

the phrase the party to whom the request is directed. This is not the first time that the

Court is faced with the said issue. In PSCFC Financial Corporation v. CA, the following

has been cited:

“Section 21 of Rule 138 states that “an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized

to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is

required to authorize him to appear in court for his client x x x” Furthermore, Section 23

of Rule 138 provides that “attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by

any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all

matters of ordinary judicial procedure x x x .” Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party

shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to

mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his

behalf.”

GR. no. 129442

Pallada v RTC of Kalibo, March 10, 1999

FACTS:

Private respondents commenced a civil case for recovery of possession and ownership
of land with damages before Branch 1 of the RTC-Aklan. RTC-Aklan declared the

defendants, petitioners herein, as the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of

subject land. Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals

which reversed and set aside the same. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was to

no avail.

Petitioners found their way to this court via the Petition for Review on Certiorari under

consideration, docketed as G.R. No. 126112. But the same was denied in a Resolution,

which disposition became final and executory.

The private respondents filed an Ex Parte Motion for Execution with RTC-Aklan, which

granted the said motion. The respondent court then issued the Writ of Execution

directing the Sheriff of the Province of Aklan or any of his deputies to implement subject

Decision. Execution was partially satisfied, as shown in the Officer's Return of Services.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of execution was invalid for private respondents’ ex-parte motion

for execution was granted without notice to petitioners.

RULING:

There is tenability in petitioners' contention that the Writ of Execution was irregularly

issued insofar as the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of private respondents did not

contain a notice of hearing to petitioners. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised

Rules of Court, read: Sec. 4. Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the

applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof,
together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers

accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter

notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion. Sec. 5.

Contents of notice. — The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall

state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.

The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned,

and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if

not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not

comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a

worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the

court has no authority to act upon. The Court is not prepared, however, to invalidate the

Writ of Execution issued below. The petition is obviously a dilatory move on the part of

petitioners, designed to prevent the final disposition of the case. In People v. Leviste, it

was held that:

While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15

should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this

Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest

failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the

case. Litigations should, as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on

technicalities.

In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not

authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers
requested of them by private respondents in the latters written request for admission.

As the Court has said, there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase the party to

whom the request is directed to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves.

GR no. 168208

RAMIREZ et, al,. v Mar Fishing Co, Inc., et. al., June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Mar Fishing Co., Inc. engaged in the business of fishing and canning of tuna, sold its

principal assets to co-respondent Miramar through public bidding. Proceeds of the sale

were paid to the Trade and Investment Corp. to cover Mar Fishing‘s outstanding

obligation in the amount of ₱ 897,560,041. In view of that transfer, Mar Fishing issued a

Memorandum informing all its workers that the company would cease to operate by the

end of the month. It notified the DOLE of the closure of its business operations.

Then, Mar Fishing‘s labor union, Mar Fishing Workers Union – NFL – and Miramar

entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the acquiring company, Miramar, to

absorb Mar Fishing‘s regular rank and file employees whose performance was

satisfactory, without loss of seniority rights and privileges previously enjoyed.

Unfortunately, petitioners, who worked as rank and file employees, were not hired or

given separation pay by Miramar, so they filed Complaints for illegal dismissal with

money claims before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

The LA granted separation pay but not claims for illegal dismissal. The NLRC modified

the LA’s Decision and ruled for the petitioners. The CA Dismissed the action for

certiorari against the 225 other petitioners without ruling on the substantive aspects of

the case in finding that only 3 of the 228 petitioners signed the Verification and

Certification against forum shopping. Petitioners asked the CA to reconsider by invoking

the rule that technical rules do not strictly apply to labor cases. The CA still denied

petitioners’ contentions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing their Petition for Review on the ground that

their pleading lacked a Verification and Certification against forum shopping? (NO)

RULING:

The Rules of Court provide that a petition for certiorari must be verified and

accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. Failure to comply with

these mandatory requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Considering that only 3 of the 228 named petitioners signed the requirement, the CA

dismissed the case against them, as they did not execute a Verification and Certification

against forum shopping.

Petitioners invoke substantial compliance with procedural rules when their Manifestation

already contains a Verification and Certification against forum shopping executed by

161 signatories. They heavily rely on Jaro v. Court of Appeals, citing Piglas-Kamao v.

National Labor Relations Commission and Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, in which we

discussed that the subsequent submission of the missing documentary attachments

with the Motion for Reconsideration amounted to substantial compliance.

However, this very case does not involve a failure to attach the Annexes. Rather, the

procedural infirmity consists of omission – the failure to sign a Verification and

Certification against forum shopping. Addressing this defect squarely, we have already

resolved that because of noncompliance with the requirements governing the

certification of non-forum shopping, no error could be validly attributed to the CA when it

ordered the dismissal of the special civil action for certiorari. The lack of certification

against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of a complaint, but shall be

a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.

Indeed, the general rule is that subsequent compliance with the requirements will not

excuse a party's failure to comply in the first instance. Thus, on procedural aspects, the

appellate court correctly dismissed the case. However, this Court has recognized that

the merit of a case is a special circumstance or compelling reason that justifies the

relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

GR no. 179695

FERMIN v COMELEC, June 18 2008

FACTS:

After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly of the ARMM, on

November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 205 creating the Municipality of
Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted by

separating Barangays Balong, Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P.

Labio, Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting from the Municipality of

Kabuntalan.

Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan,

Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay

Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer

of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North

Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making

Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.

Thereafter, the COMELEC approved petitioner’s application for the transfer of his voting

record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern

Kabuntulan. Consequently, Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntulan in

the 2007 National and Local Elections.

On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another

mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against

Fermin, docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-003 [re-docketed as SPA No. 07-372 before

the COMELEC] with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff

Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of

residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his

application for transfer of voting record.

Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said
case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with

1,849 votes over Fermin’s 1,640. The latter subsequently filed an election protest

(Election Case No. 2007-022) with the RTC, Branch 13 of Cotabato City.

On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin

for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration

that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before

Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for

at least one year. The COMELEC En Banc, on September 20, 2007, affirmed the

Division's ruling. Thus, petitioner instituted G.R. No. 179695 before this Court and

contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC

under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for

disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the

last day for filing of the CoC but not later than the candidate’s proclamation should he

win in the elections.

During the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September

27, 2007, with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022. The

RTC, however, denied this motion on September 28, 2007. On motion for

reconsideration, the trial court remained steadfast in its stand that the election protest

was separate and distinct from the COMELEC proceedings, and that, unless restrained

by the proper authority, it would continue hearing the protest.

Assailing the RTC’s denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. On February 14, 2008, the COMELEC 1st Division set aside the aforesaid

orders of the trial court for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, prohibited

the said court from acting on and proceeding with the protest, and ordered it to dismiss

the same. The COMELEC En Banc, on March 13, 2008, denied petitioner’s motion for

the reconsideration of the division’s ruling on account of Fermin’s failure to pay the

required fees.

These developments prompted Fermin to file another certiorari petition before this

Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 of the OEC. (NO)

RULING:

The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the

candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a

material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to

run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the

false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for

public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would

otherwise render him ineligible. It likewise appropriately raises a question on a

candidate’s eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the oneyear

residency requirement under the law.

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a

material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of

the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC

that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to

be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or

eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation

in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due

course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding

under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since

they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction

mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition

for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate.

At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or

confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different

grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence,

therefore, that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the

nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a "Petition

for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.