G.R. No.

L-7708             May 30, 1955

JOSE MONDANO, petitioner, 
vs.
FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the
Provincial Board, respondents.

D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.

Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27
February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for
cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive
Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate
action and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons
and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day,
the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the
Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.

The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further
proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension
issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.

On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of a bond for P500.

The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that are inferences and
conclusions of law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised Administrative Code which clothes the
department head with "direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official
or person who shall conduct such investigations; . . ."and the rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67
Phil. 452, which upheld "the power of the Secretary of Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of charges
against local elective municipal officials and to suspend them preventively," on the board proposition "that under the
presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established
and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive."

The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the approval of the
Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise."1 Section 10,
paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by
law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been
invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local
governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law.
The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon
the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for
the reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If
"general supervision over all local governments" is to be construedas the same power granted to the Department
Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the
import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress
has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor
who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the
matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered
mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if
in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of . . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.

In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove officials from office
as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done "conformably to law;" and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he "may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal must be
exercised conformably to law.

In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested immediate investigation,
appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention to section 2193 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides for the institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon
direction of the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a
designation of the provincial governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the
Executive, but the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188,
2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the respondent are not
malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, because
rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or
involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." True, they may
involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by
the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an
information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of
concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse.4 The charges preferred
against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in
section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently,
unlawful and without authority of law.

The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino
for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction   providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this
1

prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of
legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as
being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer.
That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza.   Impressed with a highly persuasive
2

quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of
Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2,
1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any
appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E.
Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in
their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle
is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or
limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be
installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to
be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each
piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction.   Thereafter, on November 15, 1976,
3

it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby
amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to
procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d
bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also
promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'"   There was issued
4

accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976.   They were not
5

enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the
installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned.   Then on
6

June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction   the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
7

implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended.   It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu
8

issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30,
1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring
the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1.
LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is
equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall
be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official
receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately.   It was for immediate
9

implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications.  10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as
an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as
well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission,"   alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and
11

delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."   He contended that they are
12

"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;"   are "one-sided,
13

onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at
the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P
56.00 to P72.00 per set."   are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
14

Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's."   He therefore prayed for a
15

judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v.
Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments
adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to
(require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the
petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing
until otherwise ordered by this Court.16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15,
1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they
"specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car,   they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI
17

(including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by
Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and
its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law
and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided,
onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis
and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."  Unlike petitioner who
18

contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of
the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there
was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a
citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They
are Calalang v. Williams,   Morfe v. Mutuc,   and Edu v. Ericta.   Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
19 20 21

Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory
and which was duly ratified.   Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and
22

dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and
the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive
quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the
outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner
and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the
latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally
Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty"   was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
23

Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the
totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes
aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that
were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare."  24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law,   an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
25

statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads * * *.   As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
26

1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,   with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
27

imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations
becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the
presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila.   The rationale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American
28

Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute.  29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was
pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's
naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved
rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As
aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face,
which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to
require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death
of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled
vehicles?"   It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior,
30

careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to
give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known
penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in
the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy,
nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and
rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who
sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is
a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.  31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order
No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All
that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this
early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning
device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at
the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded
speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or
to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the
challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged
against it.
32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its
wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It
bears repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice
or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as
laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy
and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers
has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a
sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to
be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained.  33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any
support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the
aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the
roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long
after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-
legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed."  34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The
petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed
by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * "   It cannot be disputed then
35

that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *."   The 1968 Vienna Convention
36

on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment
to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt
on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation
should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as
"the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co.,   namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not
37

be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued."   "Equal protection" is
38

not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will
crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, G.R. No. 155746

DOROTEO LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners, Present:
DAVIDE, C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA,
Branch 23, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU,
Respondent. Promulgated:
 
October 13, 2004
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
 
CORONA, J.:
 
Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City [1] upholding the validity of the City
of Cebus Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the lower courts order dated August
26, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
 
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of
these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of
4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment
basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
Province of Cebu.[2] Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot
1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue
the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First
Instance.
 
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered
the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners.
On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu
executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of
petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was
issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao. [3]
 
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a
decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order
of demolition.
 
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City
Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters[4] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment
of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation
site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from February 22,
1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which
identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. [5] Then,
on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 [6] which
included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July,
19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 [7] was enacted by the SP of Cebu City
authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for
the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners.
The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after
its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the
ordinance appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the
subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.
 
On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of
nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional. The trial court
rendered its decision on July 1, 2002 dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
on August 26, 2002.
 
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional
as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it
to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use
contemplated in the Constitution. [8] They allege that it will benefit only a
handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously
passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
 
In sum, this Court is being asked to resolve whether or not the intended
expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land
owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
 
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, [9] otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991,[10] local legislative power shall
be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances.
 
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. [11] By virtue of RA
7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA
7160:
 
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent lawsxxx. (italics supplied).
 
 
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was
enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless
and low-income residents of the City.
 
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious
social problems of the country, local government units do not possess
unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking
solutions to this problem.
 
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1)
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; [12] and (2)
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
[13]
 Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states
that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
 
The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowners
right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right
necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and
intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. [14] Whether directly
exercised by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent
domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights. [15] For this reason, the
need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be overemphasized.
 
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance
orders the expropriation of a private
individuals property. The courtscannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply
because public use or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just
compensation has been fixed and determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we
said:
 
It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due
process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates
state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so
often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands
as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any
governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to
it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under
pain of nullity. xxx.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. [17] Government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners
property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843
stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a
socialized housing project.
 
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or
the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few
tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use
contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property
for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. [18]
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for
purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
provide:
 
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing
shall be acquired in the following order:
 
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
 
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
 
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
 
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
 
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which
have not yet been acquired; and
 
(f) Privately-owned lands.
 
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to
the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The
local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands. (Emphasis supplied).
 
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
 Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx.
(Emphasis supplied).
 
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes
et al. vs. City of Manila, [19] we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict
limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in
acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation
proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are
the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against
what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is
forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
 
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu
complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843
sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to first acquire
the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed
to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were
first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there
was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as
required by Section 19 of RA 7160. [20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to
be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due
process.
 
 It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already
obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their
property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained
finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia
requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the
City was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead
of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council
suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot.
It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in
which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that respondent
City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
 
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-
established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require
that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. [21]
 
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive
requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus
established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We
recapitulate:
 
first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
 
second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain
oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
  
third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for
expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few
squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and
 
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation
between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of
the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the
means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was
legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
 
Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and
the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not
achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government has tried to
remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however,
governments kid-glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication and
proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor program that
is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly respectful of
everyones basic rights is what this problem calls for, not the improvident
enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in no
rational fashion.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002
decision of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999]

ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON

ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, repondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the resolutions issued by
the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in
SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San
Antonio, Zambales. Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions
declared herein petitioner Romeo Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has been
proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an
election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997
declared a failure of elections. The court ruled:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results of the
election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995 as null and void on
the ground that there was a failure of election.

Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby
declared vacant.

Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the election protest
filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488
votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to
vacate the post, which obeyed, and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San
Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from
running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive
terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the
First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon
a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is
therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the
expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. The finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by
the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run
for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only
two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13,
1997 in EAC no. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant,
wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner
also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was
proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the
appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain the questioned
resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification.The private
respondent states that the petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998
mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for
disqualification filed with the COMELEC before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be
disqualified may still be herd and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the said
party without distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election
offense or for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the merits of the
petition for disqualification were issued within the commissions jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case,
the private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as
service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or
barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying for the
dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43
(b), Chapter I of the Local Government Code which bar a local government official from serving more than
three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of service of a term and so the rule should be examined in
this light. The public respondent contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor
from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated, because he
served as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or de
facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three term limit because the
prohibition speaks of service of a term which was intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt
to monopolize political power. It is likewise argued by the respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the
regional trial court is proper when the petition for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant
petition for disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by the COMELEC thereafter
regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have served a valid
term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period because he was no t lawfully
elected to the said office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term and so his
service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner
reiterated in his Reply that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the
petitioners proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
 Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.

The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of
applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is now embodied
in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local
government official from running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective
local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also
considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to
infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of
nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful
chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty. [1] The drafters however,
recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office before they reach forty
years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years
may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an
elective local government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive
terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.[2]
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of barangay officials
from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs.
COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.[3] where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office
of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term
should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. This
court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates
proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court stated:[4]

Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that
the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.

It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on
the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear from
the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in
Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:

MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator
to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
 MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before-if the Gentlemen will remember-was: How long will that
period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during
the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the
sixth year thereafter, his particular member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committees stand.
xxxx xxxx xxxx

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the
COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and
bars such officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states
that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term
served must therefore be one for which the the official concerned was elected. The purpose of the
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official
may serve.

This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of
San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and
duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision
dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez,
the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-
appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all [5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on
the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes
office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. [6] Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC
when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
 Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered
to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term
has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full term;
hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run
in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then
opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an
office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There
is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his
stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the
election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the
regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume
office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been
intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be
elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was
filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the
petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad[7] that the proclamation
nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the
merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing
of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the
petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of
the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ
delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall
signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which
must be enforced. Theimplication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed
with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal
of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in
effect disallows what R. A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial
legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued
beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative
agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of
course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress.Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to forsee. A candidate guilty of
election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of
thedisqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any
reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by
the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ
delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses
would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly
is not the main intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not
divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide
the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held-

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It
of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondents petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded
from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC declaring petitioner
Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.