1. Feiti vs Bautista G.R. No.

L-21278

BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

 The President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President of the University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the Faculty Club as
a labor union, duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations; Another letter was sent, to which was attached a list of demands consisting
of 26 items, and asking the President of the University to answer within ten days from date of receipt thereof;
 That the University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to be the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked
proof that the Faculty Club had been designated or selected as exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said employees;
 The Faculty Club filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain
collectively with the representative of the faculty members;
 That the members of the Faculty Club went on strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby disrupting the
schedule of classes;
 That the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair labor practice against the University, but which was later dismissed (on April 2, 1963
after Case 41-IPA was certified to the CIR); and that a petition for certification election, Case No. 1183-MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the
CIR.

Feati University Feati University Faculty Club

BACKGROUND
 President of FC informed President of Uni of the organization of
the Faculty Club into a registered labor union
 Faculty Club - composed of members who are professors and/or
instructors of the University
 President of FC sent another letter containing twenty-six
demands that have connection with the employment of the
 The President of the Uni requested that she be given at least 30 members of the Faculty Club by the University
days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands.
 Counsel for the Uni demanded proof of its majority status and
designation as a bargaining representative.
BUREAU OF LABOR
 President of FC rejected the request for extension of time, and
filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason
the refusal of the University to bargain collectively.
 Parties were called to conferences at the Conciliation Division of
the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them failed
 members of the FC declared a strike and established picket lines
in the premises of the University, resulting in the disruption of
classes in the University

President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management of the University and the Faculty.
In connection with the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club and certain incidents related to said dispute, various cases were filed
with the CIR. The three cases now before this Court stemmed from those cases that were filed with the CIR.

1. CASE NO. L-21278

On May 10, 1963, the University filed before this Court a "petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction", docketed as
G.R. No. L-21278, praying:
(1) for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR to desist from proceeding in CIR
Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC, and V-30;
(2) that the proceedings in Cases Nos. 41-IPA and 1183-MC be annulled;
(3) that the orders dated March 30, 1963 and April 6, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA, the order dated April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC, and the order
dated April 29, 1963 in Case No. V-30, all be annulled; and
(4) that the respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss said cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the CIR.

A. CIR Case 41-IPA - relates to the case in connection with the strike staged by the members of the Faculty Club

Feati University Feati University Faculty Club

 During the hearing it was agreed upon that the striking faculty
members would return to work and the University would readmit
them under a status quo arrangement.
 March 30, 1963 order: the respondent Judge issued an order
 the University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case (1) denying the motion to dismiss and
upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, (2) declaring that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both
because: parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over

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 (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable
a. to the University, it being an educational
institution,
b. nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being
independent contractors; and
(2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the
Industrial Peace Act, as
a. the University is not an industrial establishment
and
b. there was no industrial dispute which could be
certified to the CIR.
 Before the above-mentioned order of March 30, 1963 was issued
by respondent Judge, the University had employed professors
and/or instructors to take the places of those professors and/or
instructors who had struck.
the case by virtue of the presidential certification.
 In the same order, the respondent Judge, believing that the
dispute could not be decided promptly:
(1) ordered the strikers to return immediately to work and the
University to take them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose, and
(2) likewise enjoined the University, pending adjudication of the
case, from dismissing any employee or laborer without
previous authorization from the CIR.
 the Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to
declare in contempt of court certain parties, alleging that the
University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers,
in violation of the return-to-work order
 April 6, 1963 order: "said replacements are hereby warned and
cautioned, for the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner
commit any act tending to disrupt the effectivity of the order of
March 30,1963

B. CIR Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty Club before the CIR, praying that it be certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the University.

Feati University Feati University Faculty Club

 The University filed an opposition to the petition raising the very 
same issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA, claiming:
a. that the petition did not comply with the rules promulgated by
the CIR;
b. that the Faculty Club is not a legitimate labor union;
c. that the members of the Faculty Club cannot unionize for
collective bargaining purposes;
d. that the terms of the individual contracts of the professors,
instructors, and teachers, who are members of the Faculty Club,
would expire on March 25 or 31, 1963; and
e. that the CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
because the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the members
of the Faculty Club nor to the University.

C. CIR Case No. V-30 relates to a complaint for indirect contempt of court filed against the administrative officials of the University.

2. CASE NO. L-21462

This case, G.R. No. L-21462, involves also CIR Case No. 1183-MC - relates to a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty Club as a labor
union, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of the University.

3. CASE G.R. NO. L-21500

This case, G.R. No. L-21500, involves also CIR Case No. 41-IPA - relates to the strike staged by the members of the Faculty Club and the dispute was
certified by the President of the Philippines to the CIR.

In this petition for certiorari the University alleges: … xxx 4) that the Faculty Club has no right
 to unionize or organize as a labor union for collective bargaining purposes and
 to be certified as a collective bargaining agent within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act, and consequently
 it has no right to strike and picket on the ground of petitioner's alleged refusal to bargain collectively where such duty does not exist in law
and is not enforceable against an educational institution.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V- 30, brought
before it, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 875 is not applicable to the University because it is an educational institution and not an
industrial establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of said Act;
2. W/N neither is Republic Act No. 875 applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are independent contractors and,
therefore, not employees within the purview of the said Act.

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HELD:
1. Meaning of employer

(A) The ruling that “certain educational institutions, and other juridical entities, are beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875 in the sense that
the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of charges of unfair labor practice filed against them” is not applicable in
this case. The principal reason why those institutions are excluded from the operation of Republic Act 875 is that those entities are not
organized, maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends to stockholders.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos:

"On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to believe that our labor legislation from Commonwealth Act No. 103,
creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight- Hour Labor Law, to the Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the
Legislature to apply only to industrial employment and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations
for purposes of profit and gain, and their industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated and
maintained not for profit or gain, but for elevated and lofty purposes, such as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital
and medical service, the encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism and kindred virtues in youth of the nation, etc.

"In conclusion, we find and hold that Republic Act No. 875, particularly, that portion thereof regarding labor disputes and unfair labor
practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and consequently, the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the action or petition filed by respondent Araos. Wherefore, the appealed decision and resolution of the CIR are
hereby set aside, with costs against respondent."

University of Santo Tomas v. Hon. Baltazar Villanueva

… on the face of the record the University of Santo Tomas is not a corporation created for profit but an educational institution and
therefore not an industrial or business organization.

We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any organization or entity — whatever may
be its purpose when it was created — that is operated for profit or gain.

Does the University operate as an educational institution for profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it does not, it must be declared
beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it does, Republic Act No. 875 must apply to it. The University itself admits that it has declared
dividends. The CIR also found that the University is not for strictly educational purposes and that "It realizes profits and parts of such earning is
distributed as dividends to private stockholders or individuals. Under this circumstance, and in consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this
Court, above cited, it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein petitioner Feati University.

(B) But the University claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 875, because it is not an industrial
establishment. At most, it says, it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or instructors pursuant to a contract of services entered
into between them. We find no merit in this claim. Let us clarify who is an "employer"

 Section 2(c) of said Act provides: (c) The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such
labor organization.

It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word "includes", which it also used in defining"employee". [Sec. 2
(d)], and "representative" [Sec. 2(h)]; and not the word "means" which the Act uses in defining the terms "court" [Sec. 2(a)], "labor
organization" [Sec. 2(e)], "legitimate labor organization [Sec. 2(f)], "company union" [Sec. 2(g)], "unfair labor practice" [Sec. 2(i)],
"supervisor" [Sec. 2(k)], "strike" [Sec. 2(l)] and "lock-out" [Sec. 2(m)]. A methodical variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and
distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot be presumed to have been the inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must
have been the result of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875
had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not
intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly
understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition
includes not only "a principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer"; and, secondly, the Act itself specifically
enumerated those who are not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an
employer), (2) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization [Sec. 2(c)], and (3) the Government and any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the
terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not
included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are
not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.

As stated above, Republic Act No. 875 does not give a comprehensive but only a complementary definition of the term "employer".

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  The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly meant by "employer"? The term "employer"
has been given several acceptations. The lexical definition is "one who employs; one who uses; one who engages or keeps in service;" and
"to employ" is "to provide work and pay for; to engage one's service; to hire." (Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd ed.,
1960, p. 595). The Workmen's Compensation Act defines employer as including "every person or association of persons, incorporated or
not, public or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer" and "includes the owner or lessee of a factory or
establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business carried on in the establishment
or place of work but who, for reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct
employer of laborers employed there." [Sec. 39(a) of Act No. 3428.]

 The Minimum Wage Law states that "employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer in relation
to an employee and shall include the Government and the government corporations". [Rep. Act No. 602, Sec. 2(b)].

 The Social Security Act defines employer as "any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade,
business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the
employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or
controlled by the Government." (Rep. Act No. 1161, Sec. 8[c]).

 This Court, in the cases of the The Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al., G.R. Nos. L-10934
and L-10944, December 28, 1957, which cases involve unfair labor practices and hence within the purview of Republic Act No. 875,
defined the term employer as follows: An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who
pays their wages or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618). An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act 875).

Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every professor, instructor or teacher in
the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the University itself, has a contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit for one
semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their
services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is
included in the term "employer". "Running through the word `employ' is the thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person
to perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his
employment, the thought that he is under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant and paramount."

(C) To bolster its claim of exception from the application of Republic Act No. 875, the University contends that it is not included in the definition
of 2 (c) of the Act. This contention cannot be sustained.
 In the first place, Sec. 2 (c) of Republic Act No. 875 does not state that the employers included in the definition of the term "employer"
are only and exclusively "industrial establishments"; on the contrary, as stated above, the term "employer" encompasses all employers
except those specifically excluded by the Act.
 In the second place, even the Act itself does not refer exclusively to industrial establishments and does not confine its application
thereto. This is patent inasmuch as several provisions of the Act are applicable to non-industrial workers, such as Sec. 3, which deals with
"employees' right to self-organization"; Sections 4 and 5 which enumerate unfair labor practices; Section 8 which nullifies private
contracts contravening employee's rights; Section 9 which relates to injunctions in any case involving a labor dispute; Section 11 which
prohibits strikes in the government; Section 12 which provides for the exclusive collective bargaining representation for labor
organizations; Section 14 which deals with the procedure for collective bargaining; Section 17 which treats of the rights and conditions of
membership in labor organizations; Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 which provide respectively for the establishment of conciliation service,
compilation of collective bargaining contracts, advisory labor-management relations; Section 22 which empowers the Secretary of Labor
to make a study of labor relations; and Section 24 which enumerates the rights of labor organizations.
 This Court, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos, supra, had occasion to state that the Industrial Peace Act "refers only to
organizations and entities created and operated for profits, engaged in a profitable trade, occupation or industry". It cannot be denied
that running a university engages time and attention; that it is an occupation or a business from which the one engaged in it may derive
profit or gain. The University is not an industrial establishment in the sense that an industrial establishment is one that is engaged in
manufacture or trade where raw materials are changed or fashioned into finished products for use. But for the purposes of the Industrial
Peace Act the University is an industrial establishment because it is operated for profit and it employs persons who work to earn a living.
The term "industry", for the purposes of the application of our labor laws should be given a broad meaning so as to cover all enterprises
which are operated for profit and which engage the services of persons who work to earn a living. The word "industry" within State Labor
Relations Act controlling labor relations in industry, cover labor conditions in any field of employment where the objective is earning a
livelihood on the one side and gaining of a profit on the other.

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2. Meaning of employee
The University urges that even if it were an employer, still there would be no employer-employee relationship between it and the striking members
of the Faculty Club because the latter are not employees within the purview of Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875 but are independent contractors.
This claim is untenable.

(A) Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 875 provides: (d) The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the employee of
a particular employer unless the act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment.

This definition is again, like the definition of the term "employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use of the term "include", complementary. It embraces not only
those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees, but also those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute. The
term "employee", furthermore, is not limited to those of a particular employer. As already stated, this Court in the cases of The Angat River
Irrigation System, et al. v. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al., supra, has defined the term "employer" as "one who employs the services of
others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. "Correlatively, an employee must be one who is engaged in the
service of another; who performs services for another; who works for salary or wages. It is admitted by the University that the striking professors
and/or instructors are under contract to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their services. They are, therefore, employees of the
University.

(B) That teachers are "employees' has been held in a number of cases. This Court in the Far Eastern University case, supra, considered university
instructors as employees and declared Republic Act No. 875 applicable to them in their employment relations with their school. The professors
and/or instructors of the University neither ceased to be employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Rep. Act 875 includes among employees any
individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in connection with a current labor dispute. Striking employees maintain their status as
employees of the employer.

(C) The contention of the University that the professors and/or instructors are independent contractors, because the University does not exercise
control over their work, is likewise untenable.

This Court takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects
that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration;
that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot
substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not
satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent
contractors.

There are authorities in support of this view.

The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner of
doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right by interfering with the work, but the right to control, which constitutes the test.

Where, under Employers' Liability Act, A was instructed when and where to work . . . he is an employee, and not a contractor, though paid specified
sum per square.

Employees are those who are compensated for their labor or services by wages rather than by profits. Services of employee or servant, as
distinguished from those of a contractor, are usually characterized by regularity and continuity of work for a fixed period or one of indefinite
duration, as contrasted with employment to do a single act or a series of isolated acts; by compensation on a fixed salary rather than one regulated
by value or amount of work.

Independent contractors can employ others to work and accomplish contemplated result without consent of contractee, while "employee" cannot
substitute another in his place without consent of his employer.

(C) Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by Rep. Act No. 875. In the case of
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, supra, this Court observed that Republic Act No. 875 was modelled after the Wagner Act, or the
National Labor Relations Act, of the United States, and this Act did not exclude "independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees". It was in
the subsequent legislation — the Labor Management Relation Act (Taft-Harley Act) — that "independent contractors" together with agricultural
laborers, individuals in domestic service of the home, supervisors, and others were excluded.

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3. Right to unionize
It having been shown that the members of the Faculty Club are employees, it follows that they have a right to unionize in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Republic Act No. 875) which provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization.—Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. . . .

We agree with the statement of the lower court, in its order of March 30, 1963 which is sought to be set aside in the instant case, that the right of
employees to self-organization is guaranteed by the Constitution, that said right would exist even if Republic Act No. 875 is repealed, and that
regardless of whether their employers are engaged in commerce or not. Indeed, it is Our considered view that the members of the faculty or
teaching staff of private universities, colleges, and schools in the Philippines, regardless of whether the university, college or school is run for profit
or not, are included in the term "employees" as contemplated in Republic Act No. 875 and as such they may organize themselves pursuant to the
above-quoted provision of Section 3 of said Act.

Certainly, professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who teach to earn a living are entitled to the protection of our labor
laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875. The contention of the University in the instant case that the members of the Faculty Club can not
unionize and the Faculty Club can not exist as a valid labor organization is, therefore, without merit. The record shows that the Faculty Club is a
duly registered labor organization and this fact is admitted by counsel for the University.

Labor dispute
4. The other issue raised by the University is the validity of the Presidential certification. The University contends that under Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 875 the power of the President of the Philippines to certify is subject to the following conditions, namely: (1) that here is a labor dispute,
and (2) that said labor dispute exists in an industry that is vital to the national interest. The University maintains that those conditions do not obtain
in the instant case. This contention has also no merit.

We have previously stated that the University is an establishment or enterprise that is included in the term "industry" and is covered by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 875. Now, was there a labor dispute between the University and the Faculty Club?

Republic Act No. 875 defines a labor dispute as follows: The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employees. The test of
whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves or concerns "terms, tenure or
condition of employment" or "representation."

… All these admitted facts show that the controversy between the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment,
and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute between the University and the Faculty Club, as contemplated by Republic
Act No. 875. It having been shown that the University is an institution operated for profit, that is an employer, and that there is an employer
employee relationship, between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been shown that a labor dispute existed
between the University and the Faculty Club, the contention of the University, that the certification made by the President is not only not
authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act 875 but is violative thereof, is groundless.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 provides: When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may
cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees, and if no other solution to the
dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment.

To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the
exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive. Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to the presidential
certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in Commonwealth Act 103. All phases of the labor dispute and the employer-
employee relationship may be threshed out before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.

And so, in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000 students and employed approximately
500 faculty members", that `the continued disruption in the operation of the University will necessarily prejudice the thousand of students", and
that "the dispute affects the national interest", and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the correctness
of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor dispute to the CIR.

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5. Legality of Return-to-Work Order
(A) The contention of the University that Republic Act No. 875 has withdrawn the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to issue a return-to-
work order exercised by it under Commonwealth Act No. 103 can not be sustained. When a case is certified by the President to the Court of
Industrial Relations, the case thereby comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and the Court may exercise the broad powers and
jurisdiction granted to it by said Act. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an order "fixing the
terms of employment." This clause is broad enough to authorize the Court to order the strikers to return to work and the employer to readmit
them.

(B) Untenable also is the claim of the University that the CIR cannot issue a return-to-work order after strike has been declared, it being contended
that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the CIR can only prevent a strike or a lockout — when either of this situation had not yet occurred.

There is no reason or ground for the contention that Presidential certification of labor dispute to the CIR is limited to the prevention of
strikes and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where the President believes that public interest demands arbitration and
conciliation, the President may certify the ease for that purpose. The practice has been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the
strikers to work, pending the determination of the union demands that impelled the strike. There is nothing in the law to indicate that
this practice is abolished."

(C) There is no reason or ground for the contention that Presidential certification of labor dispute to the CIR is limited to the prevention of strikes
and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where the President believes that public interest demands arbitration and conciliation, the
President may certify the ease for that purpose. The practice has been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the strikers to work, pending
the determination of the union demands that impelled the strike. There is nothing in the law to indicate that this practice is abolished."

(D) Likewise unsustainable is the contention of the University that the Court of Industrial Relations could not issue the return-to-work order
without having resolved previously the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike. The University, in the case before Us, does not claim that it no
longer needs the services of professors and/or instructors; neither does it claim that it was imperative for it to lay off the striking professors and
instructors because of impending bankruptcy. On the contrary, it was imperative for the University to hire replacements for the strikers. Therefore,
the ruling in the Philippine Can case that the legality of the strike should be decided first before the issuance of the return-to-work order does not
apply to the case at bar. Besides, as We have adverted to, the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an
agreement between the University and the Faculty Club during a prehearing conference on March 23, 1963.

(E) The University also maintains that there was no more basis for the claim of the members of the Faculty Club to return to their work, as their
individual contracts for teaching had expired on March 25 or 31, 1963, as the case may be, and consequently, there was also no basis for the
return-to-work order of the CIR because the contractual relationships having ceased there were no positions to which the members of the Faculty
Club could return to. This contention is not well taken. This argument loses sight of the fact that when the professors and instructors struck on
February 18, 1963, they continued to be employees of the University for the purposes of the labor controversy notwithstanding the subsequent
termination of their teaching contracts, for Section 2(d) of the Industrial Peace Act includes among employees "any individual whose work has
ceased a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other
substantially equivalent and regular employment."

7
2. Gold City vs NLRC G.R. No. 103560

CORE ISSUE: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike?

FACTS:
Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding
wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-
FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the
port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port.

The strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike
with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order.

Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest. Counsel for private
respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by the MLUFFW before the remaining strikers could be
accepted back to work. Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From
the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the
individual notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and
members and without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and
returned to work.

LABOR ARBITER - ordered INPORT to reinstate/accept the remaining workers as well as to accept the remaining union officers after the latter sought
reconsideration from INPORT.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, the strike staged by petitioner's workers on April 30, 1985
was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal.
 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they
participated in illegal acts.
 After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents
should similarly be allowed to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-
FFW).
 As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been "duped or
tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was
going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner.

NLRC

It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union officers,
should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation
pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

Original Decision Modified Decision

Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, to
 pay respondents the equivalent of twelve (12) months
salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is further
ordered to
 pay respondents two (2) years backwages based on their
last salaries, without qualification or deduction. The appeal
of complainant INPORT is Dismissed for lack of merit
 The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not
actually terminated from service, there was no basis for
reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary as
separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of "equitable
relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of
factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation
equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
 WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991 is Modified
- reducing the award for separation pay to six (6) months each
in favor of respondents, inclusive of lawful benefits as well as
those granted under the CBA, if any, based on the latest salary of
respondents, as and by way of financial assistance while
- the award for backwages is Deleted and Set Aside. In lieu
thereof, respondents are granted compensation for their sudden
loss of employment in the sum of P1,000.00 each.

8
ISSUE:
W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite the declaration that the
strike was illegal.

HELD:

1. W/N the strike was illegal.

Yes.
A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as
a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.

Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits.
What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute. The complaint before the
Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of
Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
 The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be filed since they were
represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.
 Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting requirements.

…the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory.
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or
without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry…. In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the
avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement' during the cooling-off period. . . . xxx xxx xxx

The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable
restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.

From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of the law.

2. W/N the effect of such illegal strike make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.

Yes.

A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status.
An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts
during a strike.

3. W/N strikers are entitled to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages.

Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when he is unjustly dismissed.

Reinstatement
Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement and backwages are
separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee.

Separation Pay
Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to strained relations between employer and employee.
It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found
to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law.

9
 Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is
designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment. It is oriented
towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.
Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to separation pay. Well-settled is it that separation
pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those
reflecting on his moral character.

Backwages
Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.

It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work,
before reinstatement and backwages may be granted. And in cases where reinstatement is not possible or when dismissal is due to valid causes,
separation pay may be granted.

We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to accept them back to work after the former refused to submit
to the "screening" process.

Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union members and the union officers
among private respondents in granting the reliefs prayed for.

UNION MEMBERS – Separation pay only, no award of backwages

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from his employment. It is only when
he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union
members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus
entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal.

However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate.

No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued
participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award.

(However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot be effected in view of a manifestation filed by INPORT. In said
Manifestation, it attached a Certification by the President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the private
respondents/remaining strikers have ceased to be members of said union. The MLU-FFW had an existing collective bargaining agreement with
INPORT containing a union security clause. Article 1, Section 2(b) of the CBA provides:
The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or terminate any employee who may be a member of the Union but loses his good standing with the Union
and or corporation, upon proper notice of such fact made by the latter; provided, however, . . . after they shall have received the regular
appointment as a condition for his continued employment with the corporation. . . .

Since private respondents (union members) are no longer members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. In lieu of reinstatement, which was a
proper remedy before May 1987 when they were dismissed from the union, we award them separation pay. We find that to award one month
salary for every year of service until 1985, after April of which year they no longer formed part of INPORT's productive work force partly through
their own fault, is a fair settlement.)

UNION OFFICERS – No award/relief

The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is
unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from
employment.

Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot
be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. Moreover, an illegal strike
which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation
of the sanctions prescribed by law. The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

10
In sum, reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient bases exist under the law,
particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to
receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible.

One month salary for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as separation pay.

11
3. RCPI vs Phil Comm G.R. No. L-37662

(1) Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Petitioner suggests that Our decision did not resolve squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Industrial Court gravely abused its discretion
in declaring petitioner as having waived its right to make an offer of its evidence and in forthwith considering the matter of the implementation of
the return-to-work order as directed in the writ of execution submitted for resolution.

It is claimed that this issue is pivotal, for if it is resolved in its favor, the ordered reinstatement of the 167 employees and workers enumerated in
respondent court's order of October 5, 1973 may not be complied with until after the issues of fact regarding their identity and status as such
workers and employees have been reviewed and passed upon in the light of the evidence offered by petitioner at the hearing.

Petitioner submits that in ignoring or refusing to take into account evidence already in the record albeit not duly offered, respondent court
sacrificed substance for technicality.

As We have said in Our decision, "(a) bare recital of the above facts renders undeniable the far-from-commendable efforts of petitioner to set at
naught a return-to-work order. Considering that it is of a peremptory character and its execution was long overdue, the challenged actuation of
respondent court had all the earmarks of legality."

It is not true then that We have not resolved the issue referred to. Indeed, all that need be added here is that while it is true that labor cases,
especially those involving claims for compensation due the workers, must be resolved on the basis of all material facts, and it is the inescapable
duty of all parties concerned, including the court, to disregard all technical rules in barring and discovering them, on the other hand, it is as
important that said cases must be decided on time for the obvious reason that the claimants are not in a position to engage in any long drawn
proceedings without risking either their wherewithal or their convictions. The Courts cannot leave the progress of the case to the convenience of
the parties, particularly, the employer who can afford to keep it dragging.

Accordingly, where the inquiry into the material facts is unreasonably delayed by unwarranted and unexplained actuations of any of the parties, no
abuse of discretion is committed by the court if it deems the right of such offending party to present his factual side of the issue waived. This is
particularly true in the case at bar, for, as the record shows, the order of reinstatement which has remained unobeyed by petitioner to this day was
issued more than seven years ago and was in fact already nearing five years old when the above-quoted order of February 15, 1973 had to be
issued in exasperation by respondent court. The duty of the court spoken of in Ang Tibay to ferret out all facts necessary for the just determination
of the rights of the parties without regard to technical rules ceases when the court is disabled by the very indifference and inattention, if not
disregard, of a party of the orders of the court designed to expedite proceedings already being protracted through maneuvers of the same party.

Besides, it is noteworthy that petitioner did not even care to move for the reconsideration of the order in question. Taking the court for granted, it
merely went ahead and made its required offer of evidence, at long last, eighteen days late. If only to make all and sundry understand that no one
can thus trifle with the court with impunity, petitioner should suffer the consequences of its patent lack of diligence in the protection of its interest
which it has coupled with inexplicable failure to accord the orders of the court due attention, considering it was undertaking a task of vital public
interest, the implementation of a peremptory return-to-work order it had issued five years back.

It is of no consequence that respondent union's motion to strike out the offer of evidence belatedly filed by petitioner was not resolved by
respondent court. The fact of the matter is that said offer had already been deemed waived by the court. Procedurally, therefore, there was no
need to strike out something that had not been included legally in the record.

In view of the foregoing considerations, and for the reason that the arguments of petitioner relative to Presidential Decree No. 21 have been more
than adequately discussed in Our decision, petitioner's motion is denied for lack of merit.

(2) Manifestation and motion for intervention of United RCPI Communications Labor Association- Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(URCPICLA- PAFLU)

The motion to intervene of URCPICLA-PAFLU is likewise without merit.

Aside from the fact that it had already intervened in the court below but later on did nothing to protect its pretended rights relative to the orders
assailed here, on the merits, its position suffers from the same fatal defect of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in that it is premised on
erroneous assumptions regarding the objective and purpose of Presidential Decree No. 21.

The members of movant union were hired or employed by petitioner in open violation of the order of reinstatement of the Industrial Court and as
such they cannot have any legal standing as employees protected by said Presidential Decree. It would be absurd if an employer were to be
required to seek prior clearance from the Department of Labor before he can layoff workers he has hired as substitutes for strikers subsequently

12
ordered reinstated by the courts, particularly if the employer has, as in the instant case, hired said substitutes in violation of a restraining order not
to hire anyone without the permission of the court. The motion to intervene is, therefore, denied.

(3) Prayer for a modified judgment filed by respondent union, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation, RCPI
Employees' Union (RCPIEU)

It is the plea of respondent unions for modification of Our decision that deserves favorable consideration. The prayer is for Us to include in the
judgment an award of backwages to the employees and laborers concerned, in addition to their immediate reinstatement. The plea is opposed by
petitioner upon the ground that the issue of payment of backwages was neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court and is, in fact, not
even touched in the previous pleadings of the parties in the instant case. Additionally, it is averred that the matter is now actually being looked into
by the National Labor Relations Board, hence it is not necessary for this Court to take it up.

We are of the considered opinion that, indeed, the award prayed for is in order. The fact that nothing was done in the court below about it is not
a valid objection to the granting thereof. Neither can its denial be justified just because it was not expressly demanded by respondents before Our
decision was handed down. Such award is such a logical and inescapable consequence of the order of reinstatement that actually one is
incomplete without the other.

In the present instance, what is involved is a failure to comply with, nay a veiled defiance by respondent of a return-to-work order of the Industrial
Court issued seven years ago. Worse, from all appearances, such continued resistance of petitioner to said peremptory order can hardly evoke
sympathy.
 To begin with, its attempt to question the identity of those entitled to reinstatement claiming that they were not actually in their employ
at the time of the declaration of the strike sounds hollow. It is inconceivable that strangers and outsiders would try to be taken in such a
surreptitious manner.
 Neither can the allegation that petitioner has presented evidence of abandonment prior to the strike and of resignations subsequent
thereto be of help to petitioner. Voluntary abandonment of work before a strike is too unusual to be readily credible whereas purported
resignations after a strike and during the pendency of protracted reinstatement proceedings are at least suspect and do not affect the
employee status of the persons concerned, unless there is patent evidence that the pretended abandonment or resignation was due to
another employment.
 Moreover, the proceedings below had been stalled by transparent dilatory moves of petitioner which are basically irreconcilable with the
attitude of cooperativeness and obedience an employer is expected to maintain at all times towards orders of the court issued by virtue
of powers expressly granted to it by law.

The Industrial Court had no discretion in the matter. There was no controversial issue of fault it had to decide. It was a plain case of exacting the
most natural sanction for a defiance of its order. If it overlooked the award, seemingly engrossed as it was in resolving the issue of identity of the
strikers raised by petitioner, that was plain error which it is within Our prerogative to correct motu propio, as We do in appeals by writ of error in
respect to a manifest error not assigned nor discussed by appellant in his brief. (Section 7, Rule 51.)

Employees and workers deprived of their means of livelihood in defiance of a judicial order the legality of which is beyond dispute do not have
to remind the court of their right to get compensated of their lost earnings upon their actual reinstatement. Award thereof should come as a
matter of course. For us not to rule on this point now only to leave it for action by the National Labor Relations Board and thereby give rise to
another possible appeal to Us is to unnecessarily lengthen even more the tortuous road already travelled by respondents in their effort to get what
has been rightfully due them since years ago. We would be recreant to our constitutional duty to give protection to labor that way.

(4) This formula of making a flat award for a given period has been adopted in subsequent cases. Accordingly, each of the 167 members of
respondent unions named in the decision under review and found by the Industrial Court to be entitled to reinstatement should be paid backwages
for two years, without any deduction or qualification, at the respective rates of compensation they were receiving at the time of the strike,
November 17, 1967.

It goes without saying that all those who can be shown by incontestible evidence to have died prior to the date of the strike shall be disregarded,
but the heirs of those who have died after the strike shall receive the respective proportional amounts due their predecessors-in-interest as of the
time of death, if the same occurred less than two years from the date of the strike, and the full two-years backwages, if after two years from said
date. Any amount paid by reason or on the occasion of supposed resignations after the strike shall not be deducted. Before closing, it must be
mentioned that the Court understands that notwithstanding that its decision of August 30, 1974 is immediately executory, the employees
concerned have not yet been reinstated up to now. Petitioner is warned that the pendency of the present incidents is no excuse for its failure to
comply immediately with said decision and appropriate action would have to be taken to protect the dignity of the court, if such attitude continues.

4. Kiok Loy vs NLRC G.R. No. L-54334

13
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July 20, 1979 which:
a. found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article 2492 of the New Labor
Code, and
b. declared the draft proposal of the Union for a collective bargaining agreement as the governing collective bargaining agreement between the employees
and the management.

In a certification election held the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently
certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied.

Thereafter, and more specifically, the Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same
time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid request, the Union again wrote the Company
reiterating its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for the Company to furnish them with its counter proposals. Both requests
were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.

Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the Union, , filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.

Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed,
prompting the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended.

LABOR ARBITER
The labor arbiter, Andres Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the initial hearing.
For failure however, of the parties to submit their respective position papers as required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to another date.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its position paper. The Company did not, and instead requested for a resetting which was granted.
The Company was directed anew to submit its financial statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978.
The case was further reset due to the withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record.
Atty. Fortunato Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel for thes Company only to request for another postponement allegedly for
the purpose of acquainting himself with the case.
Meanwhile, the Company submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.

When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined,
failed to appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested for another postponement which the labor arbiter denied. He also ruled that the Company has
waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution.

NLRC
Labor arbiter Andres Fidelino submitted its report to the National Labor Relations Commission. The National Labor Relations Commission rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden Ice Cream is hereby declared guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248
(now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the draft proposal for a collective bargaining agreement (Exh. "E ") hereto attached and made
an integral part of this decision, sent by the Union (Private respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein) and which is hereby found to be
reasonable under the premises, is hereby declared to be the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties
herein.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the company is guilty of unfair labor practice.
2. W/N the company is deprived of due process.
3. W/N the company’s consent is required to the validity pf the CBA.

HELD:
1. Yes

1. Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in
support of its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied.
2. Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law
and the evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the Union's demands; and finally,
3. that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal basis.

14
The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order.

Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor
Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual
responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either
party.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. The
mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant
case.

From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to
complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by
the Labor Code — to bargain in good faith.

We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been
indubitably established that:
(1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent;
(2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once
but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and
(3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.

A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is
especially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the
NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing
conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands
set forth by the Union much less justify its opposition thereto.

Doctrines:
Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald Publications: "unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer,
after having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said
proposal.”
Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations: wherein it was further ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it
does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement.

2. NO.

Petitioner capitalizes on the issue of due process claiming, that it was denied the right to be heard and present its side when the Labor Arbiter
denied the Company's motion for further postponement.

Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and factual
support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored respondent Union with any reply to the latter's successive letters, all geared
towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal despite
persistent requests made therefor. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitionercompany were in total derogation of the policy
enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is not prepared to affix its
imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.

3. NO.

15
Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement which was approved and adopted by the NLRC
is a total nullity for it lacks the company's consent, much less its argument that once the Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the
Company will face the prospect of closing down because it has to pay a staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union that will equal if not
exceed its capital. Such a stand and the evidence in support thereof should have been presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper
forum for the purpose.

We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals
of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through
empty gestures. More so, as in the instant case, where the intervention of the National Labor Relations Commission was properly sought for after
conciliation efforts undertaken by the BLR failed. The instant case being a certified one, it must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate
of P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of employment embodied in
any Collective Bargaining Agreement. To that extent, utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement as
the governing agreement by the employees and management must be accorded due respect by this Court.

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