SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999.]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
petitioners, vs . HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM , respondents.

Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. Law O ce and Muntuerto Almendras & Associates and
Emphasis Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Pimentel Yusingco Pimentel and Garcia Law O ces and Lagman Mangali and
Associates Law Office for Intervenors.

SYNOPSIS

This case refers to two motions for reconsideration with motion to refer the matter
to the court en banc led by respondents and intervenors assailing the Court's resolution
dated November 17, 1998, otherwise known as "Win-Win" resolution, wherein the division
of the Court voted two-two. This November 17 resolution a rmed the decision of this
Court denying intervenors' motion to intervene.
The case has its origin from a decision of the O ce of the President vesting rights
to the land in dispute to petitioners and those similarly situated and denying bene ts to
intervenors who were seasonal farmworkers.
It is alleged that the "Win-Win" resolution should have been referred to the Court
sitting En Banc pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution when the 3-vote
requirement was not secured. Petitioners further alleged that the issues raised — whether
or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to approval of
the DAR — are of first impression.
The motions led by petitioners assailing the Resolution of this Court dated
November 17, 1998 partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is
clearly prohibited by Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, in exceptional cases, the Court may entertain a second motion
for reconsideration, but the same must be led with express leave of court. Petitioners
failed to secure the required prior leave from the Court and the issue raised had been
settled in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. CA in the negative.
A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution reveals that there is
a distinction between "cases" and "matters", that "cases" are decided while "matters" are
resolved. Therefore, only "cases" are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever
the required number of votes is not obtained and does not apply in the resolution of
motions for reconsideration.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 MOTIONS DENIED WITH FINALITY.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; SUPREME COURT; DISPOSITION OF

CASES; "CASES" ARE DECIDED WHILE "MATTERS" ARE RESOLVED; REFERRAL TO EN
BANC REFERS TO "CASES" NOT "MATTERS". — A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4
(3) of the Constitution, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction
between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are
"decided" while matters, which include motions, are "resolved." Otherwise put, the word
"decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters," applying
the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-
quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where
these words appear. With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter." The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The
only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if
a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party les a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the
voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed a rmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. aIcDCT

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; SECOND

MOTION MUST BE FILED WITH LEAVE OF COURT SUPPORTED WITH EXTRAORDINARY
PERSUASIVE REASONS. — True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain
a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive
reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be
led with express leave of court rst obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask
for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are
exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration.
Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions
subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for
reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be
sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon
by this Court in the said Resolution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL BASED ON FINALITY OF CASE, NOT A QUESTION OF
TECHNICALITY BUT OF SUBSTANCE AND MERIT; CASE AT BAR. — The crux of the
controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We
maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996
decision of the O ce of the President had already become nal and executory even prior
to the ling of the motion for reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-
Win" Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the
part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the
case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as what
the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the nulli cation of the
"Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary
period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was
the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party has the right to le an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the nality of the resolution
of his/her case." In other words, the nality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly
vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be bene ted by the development of
the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; INTERVENORS MUST HAVE ACTUAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST IN CONTROVERSY; SEASONAL FARMWORKERS IN CASE AT BAR
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT INTEREST OVER LAND IN CONTROVERSY. — In their present
motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have
already been issued certi cates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they
are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identi ed by the DAR as
quali ed bene ciaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in
fact they have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our
April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez,
intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or
actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to
own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the quali ed bene ciaries have yet to
be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent
any de nitive nding of the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be
deemed vested with su cient interest in the controversy as to be quali ed to intervene in
this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from
a resolution that is null and void.
MELO, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; SUPREME COURT; CASES OR
MATTERS HEARD BY DIVISION WHEN REQUIRED MAJORITY OF AT LEAST THREE (3)
VOTES IS NOT OBTAINED, SAME SHALL BE HEARD AND DECIDED BY COURT EN BANC. —
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at
least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En
Banc. Speci cally, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that: . . .
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence
of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of
such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modi ed or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is
not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger
division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the Banc shall be automatic. Explicit,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any case or matter
heard by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3 votes is not obtained,
the case or matter will have to be decided by the Court En Banc. In a situation where a
division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise
not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required
before there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be
instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that
under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the required
majority is not reached in a division, the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF THREE (3) VOTES EQUALLY APPLIES TO
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATIONS. — I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally
applies to motions for reconsideration because the provision contemplates "cases" or
"matters" (which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision
in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority
of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the
Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the
motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be
sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is
not a "case" but only a "matter" which does not concern a case, so that, even though the
vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to be elevated to the
Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfolded hairsplitting.IEaATD

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEAVING AN EVEN VOTE SUSTAINED ONLY WHERE THERE IS
NO RECOURSE TO A HIGHER ASSEMBLAGE. — Furthermore, I humbly submit that the
theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be sustained only in
cases where there is no recourse to a higher assemblage. In the Court of Appeals, for
instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the motion
not being carried, but only because there is and there cannot be recourse to the Court of
Appeals En Banc which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even vote
results in the failure of the proposition, only because there is no higher body which can
take over. In our own Court En Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote 1 slot vacant,
or with 1 justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be
carried because that is the end of the line. But in the situation now facing us, the even vote
is in a division, and there being recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being
expressly directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and intervenors'
separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well
as their motions to refer this case to this Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in ne, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 was deemed a rmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration
inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our
Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without action the intervenors'
"Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc" led
on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit:
"the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the
Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April
24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also
denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid
motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of
movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering that
all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them (movants) in seeking a
reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution." 1

Subsequently, respondents, through the O ce of the Solicitor General, led their

"Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral
Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A
Restraining Order)" on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a "Manifestation and Motion" 2
and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill 3 evidencing ling of the said motion for
reconsideration to this Court by registered mail. llcd

In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors

pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their
earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by
a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met.
Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying
on the following constitutional provision:
"Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc." 4

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the

intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters,
on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include motions, are
"resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word
"resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is
true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of
the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear. 5
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not
obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of
the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the
case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been
decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of
the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly,
if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is
not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed a rmed. Such was the ruling of this
Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this
case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of rst
impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the resolution
of the motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following was expressed:
"Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of
no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Speci cally,
the issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify
lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been
decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al . vs. Court of
Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case
states:
'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nulli es the trial court's
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur
to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
'xxx xxx xxx' (Emphasis supplied.)

"Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a

unanimous vote of all ve (5) members of the Second Division of this Court.
Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by
movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en
banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants'
motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate." 6

The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose
of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is awed.
Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of
a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and unambiguous
language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we
have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be led with express leave
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 of court rst obtained. 7 In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of
court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional
reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of
the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this
resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have
been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained
therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said
Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering
that the March 29, 1996 decision of the O ce of the President had already become nal
and executory even prior to the ling of the motion for reconsideration which became the
basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of
protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal
interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-
reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not
as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nulli cation of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to
the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying
consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The
succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the November 17,
1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz: "Just as a losing party has the right to le an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case." 8
In other words, the nality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be bene ted by the development of
the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit. 9
Before nally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once
and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been
issued certi cates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal
farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identi ed by the DAR as quali ed
bene ciaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they
have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24,
1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who
are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land.
Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. 1 0 Moreover, the
"Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the quali ed bene ciaries have yet to be carefully
and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. 1 1 Absent any
de nitive nding of the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be
deemed vested with su cient interest in the controversy as to be quali ed to intervene in
this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from
a resolution that is null and void. LLphil

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely: intervenors'

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc,"
dated December 3, 1998; respondents' "Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution
Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc
(With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)," dated December 2, 1998; and
intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The
Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May
1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all
DENIED with FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this
case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., please see separate opinion.
Puno, J., concurs in the result; I maintain my original position that the case should go
to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
MELO, J.:

On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should be
referred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under the
rules is generally proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in
regard to cogent procedural points. cdrep

At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the Court
En Banc's Resolution No. 99-1-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the issue of an
even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote with the majority in denying all of the
subject motions in the above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my views on
this issue and put them on record, so, in the event that the Court decides to re-open and re-
discuss this issue at some future time, these considerations may be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the majority's position regarding an
even (2-2) vote in a division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority
of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court
En Banc. Speci cally, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:
cdphil

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with
the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is
not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger
division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, may I ask some questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT:
Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO:
Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of divisions: one would be a division
composed of 3 justices in which case there will be 5 divisions; another
division is composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3
divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in which case,
there will be 2 divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3
votes. Should it immediately go to the court en banc of 15 justices or
should it first go to a bigger division?
cdasia

MR. CONCEPCION:
Yes.
MR. RODRIGO:
They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ:

Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO:
Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is 2-1,
automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ:
Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this last phrase would
operate automatically — "WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT
OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED EN BANC."
xxx xxx xxx
(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)

Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any
case or matter heard by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3 votes is
not obtained, the case or matter will have to be decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having
inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum
of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any valid decision or resolution by
that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986
Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should
automatically go to Court En Banc. aisadc

A distinction has been made between "cases" and "matters" referred to in the above-
quoted constitutional provision. "Cases" being decided, and "matters" being resolved. Only
"cases" are referred to the Court En Banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. "Matters" are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that "cases" would only refer to deliberations at rst instance on
the merits of a case led with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions,
including motions for reconsideration, are "matters" to be resolved. To give esh to this
distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of "cases", no
decision is passed, whereas, if a tie occurs in the voting on motions for reconsideration,
the decision which had already been passed stands. llcd

This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to
appealed cases, led with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the only original cases which are taken cognizance of by this Court are those
wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably, these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. So, there will be no instance when a division
will be ever taking cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the divisions are either petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari is not a
matter of right. Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of a "case" by the
division, although apparently no action is passed, a decision may still be rendered — the
petition is thereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This is de nitely in
consonance with the majority's line of reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for
reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the deliberation of the "case" at the rst
instance should still be referred to the Court En Banc? The reason is simple. Because the
express provision of the Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for there to
be a valid and binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to
motions for reconsideration? Even on this score alone, it is my view that, in all instances,
whether it be in the deliberations of a case at rst instance or on a motion for
reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for
reconsideration because the provision contemplates "cases" or "matters" (which for me
has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heard by a division, and a
motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to
be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the
matter of the motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the
division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading of
the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a "case" but only a
"matter" which does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon in the
division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to be elevated to the Court En Banc, is to
engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting. prcd

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2
vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a
higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1
abstaining) would result in the motion not being carried, but only because there is and
there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En Banc which, does not act on judicial
matters. In a legislative body, an even vote results in the failure of the proposition, only
because there is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if the
voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or disqualifying
himself, the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that is the end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being
recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being expressly directed by the
Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration should, by all means, be decided
by the Court En Banc. Cdpr

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, even as I abide by the Court's Circular on the issue of
a tie (2-2) vote in the division, I maintain my view that the matter should have been referred
to and accepted by the Court En Banc.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 1310. References to the Rollo pages are omitted.

2. Rollo, p. 1313.

3. Rollo, p. 1319.

4. Article VIII, Section 4 (3).

5. See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Section 12 to 14.

6. Rollo, pp. 1243-1244; citation omitted.

7. Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al., 254 SCRA 234 (1996).

8. Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50, 56 (1996).

9. Opinion of Justice Martinez, November 17, 1998, p. 10.

10. Ibid., pp. 12-13, citing the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4, and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, The
1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.

11. Ibid., p. 13.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com