Manufacturing DA - UTNIF 2019

Manufacturing DA – UTNIF 2019
File Notes
This DA is a mix of impacts for the Defense Industrial Base and US manufacturing.
The thesis of the DA is that the affs reduction of arms sales causes the US to
produce less weapons which hurts the domestic manufacturing industry and
weakens the US military/whatever impact you choose to read.
Replace the generic link with a specific aff link. If you are debating SP1 (Taiwan
Aff), use link cards under the Taiwan section.
The uniqueness CP is included if students are facing difficulty winning the

uniqueness debate on the neg side for current industrial base strength.
* Terms you should know

CAT = Conventional Arms Transfers
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council (includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates)
DIB = Defense Industrial Base: a political science term that refers to tech and production
of military equipment
Questions? email dylan.scott@utexas.edu
** Neg **
1NC
1NC – DA
The US industrial base is strong now because of foreign arms sales
Navarro 18 (Peter Navarro; Professor Emeritus of Economics and Public Policy at the University of California-
Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University; 4/19/18; “A win for America and its allies”;
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/19/president-trumps-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/; DS)
Our allies and partners want

to “buy American.” They know U.S. industries produce the most
technologically sophisticated and effective defense systems in the world. When our allies and
partners are better equipped to defend themselves, there is greater regional peace and stability — and far less need for American
service members to be in harm’s way.
For too long, we have made it too hard to provide our allies and partners with the defense capabilities they require and that are in
Trump administration announced Thursday two landmark

America’s interests. That’s why the
policies aimed at reforming the international sale of U.S.-produced arms and the
export of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
By approving a new and updated U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer ( CAT ) Policy
Presidential Memorandum and updating the processes for the exports of UAS, President Donald J. Trump
is strengthening both our economic and national security, fortifying critical bilateral defense relationships that extend U.S. influence
and bolstering the capabilities of our allies and partners to advance shared security objectives.
Mr. Trump’s new CAT

policy provides the organizing principles and objectives the U.S.
government seeks to achieve through arms sales and the criteria the U.S. government considers when
making arms transfer decisions. This policy’s adoption, and the reforms to follow, will ensure that American interests are put first in
our decision-making.
The CAT Policy is the first step in a wider effort to achieve greater efficiency and
flexibility in U.S. defense trade. The presidential memorandum directs a government-wide initiative to improve our
conventional arms transfer processes while advancing our national security and economic interests. Under this administration, there
will be no prouder and more active advocate for U.S. sales than the U.S. government itself.
The State Department, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will continue to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether these arms transfers to allied and partner nations support our national interests and conform to applicable laws and
international commitments.
The U.S. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost a trillion dollars annually to our
economy and support about 2.5 million jobs while maintaining a significant global trade surplus. As Mr. Trump works to balance our
trade with the rest of the world, further strengthening a critical part of our export economy and defense industrial base is a logical
and critical step.
The international sale of American-made military and commercial UAS offers an important tool to take this step. The UAS sector
represents one of the most dynamic emerging areas of defense technology.
Although the U.S. leads the way in UAS technology, overly restrictive policies enacted by the previous
administration have accelerated an undesirable outcome: Strategic competitors like China
are aggressively marketing to and making sales in international markets that are
forecast to be worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade .
Already we are seeing Chinese replicas of American UAS technology deployed on the runways in the Middle
East. In June, at the Paris Air Show, China’s Chengdu Aircraft group featured its Wing Loong II medium-altitude long-endurance UAS
— a knockoff of General Atomics’ Reaper.
The Trump administration’s UAS
export policy will level the playing field by enabling U.S. firms
to undertake direct sales to authorized allies and partners . By expanding international sales
opportunities, American industry will be further incentivized to do what it does best — invest and innovate.
This will keep our defense industrial base in the vanguard of emerging defense
tech nologies while creating thousands of additional high-wage jobs and generating
substantial export revenues.
Ending foreign arms sales decks US defense manufacturing

Gholz 19 (Eugene Gholz; associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, US Department of
Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal, senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is coauthor
of two books and author of multiple articles and book chapters; Spring 2019; “Conventional Arms Transfers and US
Economic Security”; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf; DS)
Arms exports still sometimes contribute directly to innovation in a way that should be considered in arms
transfer decisions. Specifically, foreign buyers sometimes purchase upgraded equipment compared to
what the US DOD has purchased in the past, and foreign buyers then pay the R&D cost
of producing those upgrades. In some instances, as with Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the
US has not purchased any of the upgraded product—meaning that the particular innovations created for
export sales to the United Arab Emirates and others have not contributed directly to US national security. In those cases, perhaps
CAT decision makers should have considered the option value that creating those upgraded F-16s offered to the US Air Force. On
other occasions, the US has directly benefited from export-supported technology upgrades —
as on Patriot, Aegis, and other missile defense systems—where DOD has continued to purchase post-upgrade weapons from US
contractors after export sales funded technology investments. Considering this pathway to innovation in an assessment of the
economic effects of a potential arms sale requires detailed knowledge of the likely trajectory of future US defense procurement
spending. In general, the more recently the exported system has joined the US weapons inventory, the more likely that this pathway
could contribute some economic security (innovation) benefit to the United States through approval of an arms transfer. This is
because it would be more likely that the US military would still be building its inventory of the newly upgraded system.
CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense
manufacturing . Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so
long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete.
DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those
spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original
manufacture of the defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases,
demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to maintain
quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the government does not realize how
much the cost of production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the
part profitably, so production drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These
situations create
potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage
(DMSMS) problems.20 Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts
business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares production by
keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills , and ameliorating the risk
of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain. These effects have
been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, among others.
Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical
characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of
the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime contractors.
Finally, CATs
can contribute economic benefits to the United States through the
economies of scale that are often available in defense systems production. If foreign
sales are figured into the cost estimates from the start of a project, and foreign buyers
contribute to development and capital investment spending, the cost of a project to
the US defense budget will be proportionately reduced, benefiting US economic
security . For example, the F-35 program claims to have benefited from this dynamic, although the higher overhead cost of
managing a multinational development program and the redundancies of building extra final assembly and sustainment facilities
overseas cut against the economies of scale benefits.21 In some European multinational aircraft development programs,
governments have presumed that programs would gain very large benefits from economies of scale that have not materialized. This
is due to technical and management challenges in the programs or the countries’ failure to follow through on their initial purchase
commitments. The result in those cases was that including projected economy of scale benefits of foreign sales in a program’s
management baseline added to rather than reduced program instability and hurt economic security.22 Estimating the net economic
effect of expected economies of scale as part of a CAT decision would require sophisticated, reliable understanding of program
dynamics that might be beyond what the US government should reasonably count on in its decision making.
A strong defense industrial base is key to US military strength and tech

innovation
Gouré 18 (Daniel Gouré; Senior Vice President with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research
organization, Masters and Ph.D. degrees in international relations and Russian Studies from Johns Hopkins University
and a B.A. in Government and History from Pomona College; 2018; “Winning Future Wars: Modernization and a 21st
Century Defense Industrial Base”; https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-
09/2019_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_CHAPTERS_GOURE.pdf; DS)
Conclusion The U.S. military’s ability to defeat its opponents in battle depends largely ,
though not exclusively, on the equipment , weapons, and supporting capabilities that it
possesses. In turn, these depend on an industrial base that is viable and healthy
enough to produce them and the relative effectiveness of new capabilities that spring from
competition in design. All of this implies some level of competitive redundancy among
manufacturers that can come only from a defense funding stream that is large enough
and consistent enough to keep companies that produce the wherewithal of America’s
military power in business. To be clear: This is not some form of corporate welfare. It is an investment in the nation’s
fundamental security.
Modernization requires the ability of the military to keep place with the tech nological
evolution of the battlefield. A force able to modernize in turn requires an industrial
base healthy and diverse enough to develop and apply emerging technologies that are relevant
to war. Failure in either area—a weak, moribund defense industrial base or obsolete forces— means
failure in war and the fatal compromise of the nation’s security. Conversely, a healthy and
effective force, made possible by a healthy and relevant industrial base, means a secure and prosperous
country.
US military dominance prevents global nuclear war
Ochmanek et al 17 (David Ochmanek; senior international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, M.P.A.
in international relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; B.S. in
international affairs and political science, United States Air Force Academy; Peter A. Wilson; Brenna Allen; John Speed
Meyers; Carter C. Price; 2017; “U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World”;
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1782-1.html; DS)
The Challenge Facing U.S. Forces and Their Capability to Respond Presidents Obama and Bush
(like many of their predecessors) were both correct in their observations that the United States fields the most capable armed forces
in the world. And both have made good on their promise to keep U.S. forces number one. But lest such assertions create an
unwarranted sense of complacency, we should be clear that many parts of the force are under
considerable stress from a prolonged high tempo of deployments; readiness levels generally fall
well below historical standards; and modernization in some key capability areas is lagging . More to
the point, for the United States, having the finest force in the world does not, in and of
itself, guarantee that those forces will be able to meet all of the demands being placed
on them. Since the United States’ entry into World War II, this nation has espoused and largely practiced a uniquely ambitious
national security strategy. Today, that strategy calls on U.S. military forces t o, among other things, deter
aggression and coercion by adversary states in several parts of Eurasi a; if deterrence fails, to
defeat such aggression; to carry out a long-term campaign aimed at containing and,
ultimately, defeating Salafist-jihadi groups abroad; and to protect the U.S. homeland . In
light of these requirements, having the world’s most capable armed forces can be thought of as
a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition for enabling the United States to play the international role it has
defined for itself. Consider the following realities—some enduring and some new—that bear on the question of the adequacy of U.S.
forces today:
• The United States rarely has the luxury of fighting adversaries on the ground of its choosing. Indeed, the reality is quite the
opposite: Whether the adversary is a nation-state or a non-state actor, U.S. forces nearly always find themselves fighting far from
home and on or close to the adversary’s “home turf,” with all of the associated logistical and cultural disadvantages that entails.
• The United States has interests and allies worth fighting for in multiple parts of the world, and multiple adversaries that pose
challenges to those interests. Therefore, U.S. force planners cannot count on being able to fight only one war at a time. Indeed, U.S.
forces were conducting two large-scale expeditionary operations from 2003 until very recently. And U.S. forces must plan on having
to provide a sizable deterrent presence in key regions, even when conducting a large-scale operation elsewhere.
• As technologies and systems relating to remote sensing, data processing and transmission, precision guidance, autonomy, and a
host of other functions proliferate, U.S. forces are finding themselves confronted by adversaries
that are gaining mastery over military capabilities analogous to those that enabled U.S. forces to win swift
and lopsided victories in the 1990s and early 2000s. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons adds to
this trend.
• With China ’s emergence as a major international player and Russia ’s recently demonstrated ability and
will to use military might in pursuit of a revisionist policy agenda, the United States
now faces the challenge of dealing with two great power adversaries . In short,
providing the military power called for by the United States’ ambitious national
security strategy, which has never been easy, has recently become considerably more challenging. The
coincidence of this new reality with a period of constrained defense budgets has led to a situation in
which it is now far from clear that our military forces are adequate for the tasks being placed before them. The significance of this
reaches well beyond issues of military planning. This nation’s approach to safeguarding and advancing its security and well-being
internationally centers on maintaining strong ties of influence and partnership with its treaty allies. The United States’
unique ability to project large-scale military power into the Eurasian periphery in the
defense of common interests provides the foundation for these relationships . It follows
that if adversaries perceive U.S. military capabilities as inadequate to the task of deterring and
defeating coercion or aggression, the viability of this nation’s entire national security strategy and, indeed, the rules-based
liberal order that it has promoted for more than 70 years, will be called into question.
UQ
Author Indicts
2NC – AT: Navarro = Bad
Their Lendman evidence is an indict of state capitalism with zero qualifications
and data to cite. Prefer Navarro who cites international markets trends of
foreign arms sales and is an author with a PhD in Economics from Harvard.
Navarro’s work is supported by a consensus of literature and praised among

academic peers
Navarro and Autry 11 (Peter Navarro; Professor Emeritus of Economics and Public Policy at the University of
California-Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University; Greg Autry; PhD, MBA, University of California,
Irvine, researches the influence of government in the emergence of new industries; 2011; “Death by China:
Confronting the Dragon - A Global Call to Action”; https://the-eye.eu/public/concen.org/State-Sponsored
%20Terrorism%2C%20Crimes%2C%20and%20Lies%20-%20Collection%2011%20%28China%29/Navarro
%20%26%20Autry%20-%20Death%20by%20China%3B%20Confronting%20the%20Dragon%20-%20A%20Global
%20Call%20to%20Action%20%282011%29.pdf; DS)
Praise for Peter Navarro’s previous book,
Navarro has captured the breadth of areas where China and the
The Coming China Wars “Peter
United States have fundamental conflicts of business, economic and strategic

interests. He puts this into a global context demonstrating where China’s current development course can lead to conflict. His
recommendations for nations to coalesce to respond to the challenges posed by China are practical. This book should be
in the hands of every businessperson, economist, and policy-maker .”
—Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, Chairman, US–China Economic and Security Review
Commission
“The Coming China Wars is a gripping, fact-filled account of the dark side of China’s
rise that will be of interest to anyone interested in this complex and fascinating
country. Navarro makes no pretense toward searching for the middle ground in the China debate. He issues a call to arms for
China and the rest of the world to act now to address the country’s mounting problems—pollution, public health, intellectual
property piracy, resource scarcity, and more—or risk both serious instability within China and military conflict between China and
other major powers.”
—Elizabeth C. Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies, Council
on Foreign Relations
“What Al Gore does for climate change, Peter Navarro does for China . This book will hit you
right between the eyes. A gargantuan wake-up call.”
—Stuart L. Hart, S.C. Johnson Chair of Sustainable Global Enterprise, Cornell

University; author of Capitalism at the Crossroads
“TheComing China Wars has a wealth of fascinating information about the impact of
China on the world and the perils it creates. Because of China’s great importance, this is a book we should all
read.”
—D. Quinn Mills, Alfred J. Weatherhead Jr. Professor of Business Administration,
Harvard Business School
“This is a well researched and illuminating book, and is a necessary counter to a

large body of opinion that posits an inevitable and even peaceful rise of China and
chooses to ignore most of the author’s message.”
—Richard Fisher, Vice President, International Assessment and Strategy Center
Arms Sales
2NC – AT: Arms Sales Low
US global arms sales are increasing now
Bershidsky 19 (Leonid Bershidsky; Russian Berlin-based journalist and columnist for Bloomberg View, cites the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for data about global arms sales; 3/12/19; “Trump Is Winning,
Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales”; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-
sales-as-russia-loses-market-share; DS)
Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The
U.S. and its allies have been the main beneficiaries. Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a
sign that Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence.
The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in
recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just
some examples.
The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Between 2011 and
2017, the average annual death toll from conflict neared 97,000, three times more than in the previous seven-year period.
That helps to explain the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to
2018 compared with the previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade . The
Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by 87
percent in the last five years.
Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales. It
was the only one of the world’s top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in
market share. It remains the world’s second-biggest arms exporter.
SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the
equipment traded rather than on its market price. But in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S.
Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15
billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling.
By contrast, the U.S. closed $ 55 .6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent more than
in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports.
According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through
2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year period.
For the U.S.,
Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi
Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52 percent of U.S. weapons
sales were to the Middle East in the last five years. Under President Donald Trump, the
relationship with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry .
For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt
and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped significantly as its government sought to
diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing
key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client, Venezuela, and the current
potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian sales look unlikely.
Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s international influence. The market isn’t all about price and
quality competition; it’s about permanent and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows
that Putin’s forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region. Although Putin’s
warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran, which has a lot of influence over Iraq, are
paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere.
The U.S.’s allies, France, Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too. That’s a rarely
mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling
arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, European Union member states need markets for their defense industries,
which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less desirable partners
– that is, in most of the world.
Many tears have been shed in the U.S. about the collapse of the American-led global order. But if you take arms sales
as a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient . In a more
conflict-prone, competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding
geopolitical rivals stumble.
Trump guarantees a boom in foreign arms sales

Castagno 19 (Peter Castagno; writer with a Master’s degree in International Conflict Resolution “The Arms Trade
Is Intensifying Under Trump”; https://truthout.org/articles/the-arms-trade-is-intensifying-under-trump/; DS)
The revolving door between public officials and defense contractors has long distorted
U.S. foreign policy to serve war profiteers at the expense of the public interest and basic
humanitarian norms. From U.S. weaponry ending up in the hands of ISIS, to supplying arms fueling civil conflict and therefore
contributing to the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, the lack of oversight on arms deals has enabled human rights
atrocities.
The global arms trade is experiencing its greatest boom since the Cold War, fueled
by horrific wars in the Middle East and revitalized power rivalries among China, Russia and the
United States. In their most recent report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute revealed a 44 percent
increase in arms sales from 2002 to 2017. The United States is the world’s biggest arms exporter by
far, holding 34 percent of total market share — a 58 percent lead on Russia , its
closest competitor. From 2017 to 2018, U.S. arms sales to foreign governments increased 33
percent, in part due to the Trump administration’s diminished legal restraints on
supplying foreign militias.
Industrial Base/Manufacturing Strong
1NC – UQ
The US industrial base is strong now because of foreign arms sales
Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University; 4/19/18; “A win for America and its allies”;
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/19/president-trumps-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/; DS)
Our allies and partners want

to “buy American.” They know U.S. industries produce the most
technologically sophisticated and effective defense systems in the world. When our allies and
partners are better equipped to defend themselves, there is greater regional peace and stability — and far less need for American
service members to be in harm’s way.
For too long, we have made it too hard to provide our allies and partners with the defense capabilities they require and that are in
Trump administration announced Thursday two landmark

America’s interests. That’s why the
policies aimed at reforming the international sale of U.S.-produced arms and the
export of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
By approving a new and updated U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer ( CAT ) Policy
Presidential Memorandum and updating the processes for the exports of UAS, President Donald J. Trump
is strengthening both our economic and national security, fortifying critical bilateral defense relationships that extend U.S. influence
and bolstering the capabilities of our allies and partners to advance shared security objectives.
Mr. Trump’s new CAT

policy provides the organizing principles and objectives the U.S.
government seeks to achieve through arms sales and the criteria the U.S. government considers when
making arms transfer decisions. This policy’s adoption, and the reforms to follow, will ensure that American interests are put first in
our decision-making.
The CAT Policy is the first step in a wider effort to achieve greater efficiency and
flexibility in U.S. defense trade. The presidential memorandum directs a government-wide initiative to improve our
conventional arms transfer processes while advancing our national security and economic interests. Under this administration, there
will be no prouder and more active advocate for U.S. sales than the U.S. government itself.
The State Department, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will continue to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether these arms transfers to allied and partner nations support our national interests and conform to applicable laws and
international commitments.
The U.S. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost a trillion dollars annually to our
economy and support about 2.5 million jobs while maintaining a significant global trade surplus. As Mr. Trump works to balance our
trade with the rest of the world, further strengthening a critical part of our export economy and defense industrial base is a logical
and critical step.
The international sale of American-made military and commercial UAS offers an important tool to take this step. The UAS sector
represents one of the most dynamic emerging areas of defense technology.
Although the U.S. leads the way in UAS technology, overly restrictive policies enacted by the previous
administration have accelerated an undesirable outcome: Strategic competitors like China
are aggressively marketing to and making sales in international markets that are
forecast to be worth more than $50 billion a year within the next decade .
Already we are seeing Chinese replicas of American UAS technology deployed on the runways in the Middle
East. In June, at the Paris Air Show, China’s Chengdu Aircraft group featured its Wing Loong II medium-altitude long-endurance UAS
— a knockoff of General Atomics’ Reaper.
The Trump administration’s UAS
export policy will level the playing field by enabling U.S. firms
to undertake direct sales to authorized allies and partners . By expanding international sales
opportunities, American industry will be further incentivized to do what it does best — invest and innovate.
This will keep our defense industrial base in the vanguard of emerging defense
tech nologies while creating thousands of additional high-wage jobs and generating
substantial export revenues.
2NC – UQ
Strong defense exports are upholding manufacturing strength
Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University; 7/23/18; “Strong defence exports will boost US
manufacturing base”; https://www.ft.com/content/57db9114-8c10-11e8-affd-da9960227309; DS)
The US plans to remain the global leader for interoperable defence systems, partnering with
allies and friends to develop cutting-edge military capabilities and then exporting them. That is why President Donald Trump sent a
high-level delegation to the UK’s Farnborough Airshow this month.
The global defence market has evolved over the course of the past decade and prior US
restrictions on arms
transfers, including those regarding drones, have not kept up with the changing
marketplace. That has created opportunities for China and Russia. Both are attempting to leverage defence sales
to strengthen their military capabilities, economies and defence industrial bases — even as civilians in areas of
conflict are put at risk because neither China nor Russia factor into their sales end-use monitoring or human rights considerations.
While China and Russia will continue their efforts, the US intends to remain the global partner of choice for defence co-operation.
America’s allies know that acquisition of our defence systems brings state-of-the-art capabilities with attractive industrial
partnership opportunities.
To ensure America’s global leadership, and to improve alignment of conventional defence trade policies with his national security
strategy and the national defence strategy, Mr Trump is reforming US policies and procedures. The new rules will reflect the
demands of today’s global threat environment. This policy change has been codified in two strategically integrated reforms
announced in April.
One reform updates the US policy on unmanned aerial systems, known as drones. The
other better aligns
conventional arms transfers with US goals. Together, these changes emphasise the
administration’s enthusiasm for arms exports that are in the interests of national
security, foreign policy and economic security.
One key tenet of Mr Trump’s policy is that “economic security is national security”. The administration believes that responsibly
expanding defence exports will strengthen the US’s manufacturing and defence
industrial base , while strengthening partnership opportunities with allies .
Key security alliances such as Nato benefit greatly from the ability of forces to be interoperable. Strong US exports and common
Nato standards allow our armed forces to work together to deter and defend against common threats. When the US transfers
weapons systems — the most technologically sophisticated and effective in the world — our friends and partners become more
capable and our regional alliances become more integrated, stable and secure. This reduces the cost to US taxpayers of defending
critical interests.
On the economic front, a

vigorous US defence export policy means more jobs for American
workers in aerospace and advanced manufacturing, which offer strong wages and
attractive career opportunities. Higher defence sales will also help reduce the more than $500bn-a-year trade
deficit, a massive and persistent burden that represents an unacceptable transfer of American wealth, jobs and manufacturing
capacity.
US manufacturing and the industrial base is growing now because of foreign
arms sales
Mehta 18 (Aaron Mehta; Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and
acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners; 11/8/18; “The US brought in $192.3
billion from weapon sales last year, up 13 percent”; https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/11/08/the-us-brought-in-1923-
billion-from-weapon-sales-last-year-up-13-percent/; DS)
Combined weapon sales from American companies for fiscal 2018 were up
WASHINGTON —
13 percent over fiscal 2017 figures, netting American firms $ 192 .3 billion , according to new numbers released
Thursday by the State Department.
55.66 billion in foreign military sales, an uptick of 33

The department previously announced that FY18 brought in $
percent over FY17’s $41.93 billion. Through the Foreign Military Sales process, the U.S. government serves as a go-
between for foreign partners and American industry .
total direct commercial sales, the process through which foreign customers can
What had not been released until now is the
directly buy systems from industry. Those figures topped $136.6 billion for FY18, a 6.6 percent
increase from FY17’s $128.1 billion .

Trump administration has made selling American defense goods abroad a key plank of its
The
governance plan, under the guiding principal that “economic security is national security.” Earlier this year, the department
rolled out its new Conventional Arms Transfer policy, or CAT, as well as new guidance for selling
unmanned systems, with the explicit goal of increasing arms sales.
However, tying this year’s figures to the CAT changes may be a stretch. Sales can fluctuate year by year because of the size of certain
weapons packages; a pair of large Saudi Arabian purchases in 2012 famously set that year up for a massive $287 billion annual total.
And there has already been steady growth each of the last three years, even before the Trump administration’s
reforms kicked in, with $148.6 billion in total sales in FY16; $170 billion in FY17; and $192.2 billion in FY18.
A State Department official, speaking on background ahead of the official release of these figures, acknowledged to Defense News
that these figures can’t be tied directly to changes in policy, noting they represent a “dynamic picture” and that the department is
aware there are some factors “we do not control.”
Still, the official expressed confidence that as the CAT policy is enacted, it will lead to a natural
growth in sales. How much, however, is hard to nail down.
Industrial Base At Risk
2NC – DIB At Risk
Structural factors weakening defense industry – demos, infrastructure, foreign
dependence
MEHTA 18 – Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and
acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. [Aaron, America’s
industrial base is at risk, and the military may feel the consequences, 5/22/2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/22/americas-industrial-base-is-at-risk-and-the-military-may-feel-
the-consequences/, DKP]
WASHINGTON ― Underneaththe rosy picture of a strong U.S. defense industry lies a

demographic challenge for the workforce and contraction issues, a new government study has
concluded.
The annual Industrial Capabilities report, quietly released May 17 by the Pentagon’s Office of Manufacturing and
Industrial Base Policy, found that America’s defense industry continued to outperform other industrial sectors in fiscal
2017.
However, long-term trends “continue to threaten the health of the industrial base, limit
innovation, and reduce U.S. competitiveness in the global markets,” the report states.
The greatest challenge that could harm domestic defense capabilities is the
demographics of the workforce. Only 39 percent of the current workforce is under the age of
45. And while jobs in the aerospace and defense sectors are seen positively by the majority of young professionals, only 1.5
percent of 25- to 34-year-olds in the U.S. have a science degree.
Taken together, the challenge is obvious to the authors of the report: Aerospace and defense companies are
“faced with a shortage of qualified workers to meet current demands as well as
needing to integrate a younger workforce with the ‘right skills , aptitude, experience, and interest to
step into the jobs vacated by senior-level engineers and skilled technicians’ as they exit the workforce.”
The report notes that the Department of Defense had a trio of meetings with the Aerospace Industries Association in FY17 to
address workforce issues, with promises for those dialogues to continue in the future.
The report also describes what it sees as the biggest threats to the industrial base for different domains of warfare.
According to the Pentagon, the
biggest risk for the aerospace sector is its ability to “sustain the
design and manufacturing skills and capabilities needed for future aircraft design and
manufacture.” Specifically, the authors of the report are concerned that “foreign
dependency, single or sole sources, and financial viability continue presenting a risk
for the aircraft” puts lower-tier suppliers at risk in the defense and aerospace sector.
For the ground vehicle sector, the Pentagon is concerned that a lack of innovation
over the last decade has led to stagnation, and hence “any new combat vehicle design
will face cost, schedule, and performance challenges.” And notably, the authors warn that around
the world, combat vehicles are slowly approaching parity with the U.S. at a time that “the lack
of new development programs for tracked systems is challenging the U.S. ability to innovate in this subsector.”
The shipbuilding sector remained stable for FY17, but continues to face potential consequences if
something were to happen to the small, highly concentrated industrial base. The DoD should continue to closely monitor shipbuilder
workload to ensure enough production exists to keep the industrial base alive, the report says.
The space sector is “increasingly dependent” on the commercial market, which
evermore so is focused on nonmilitary launches. While that has provided technological developments in
the last decade, it also means certain parts and qualifications used for national security space
missions are in short supply. “Unless a timely investment to establish a domestic capability is made, the United
States will be at high risk of putting multiple [national security] programs in jeopardy,”
the report found.
There are also major concerns about the “organic industrial base ” ― those internal suppliers who
handle acquisition, sustainment and maintenance issues. But the infrastructure that makes up the organic
industrial base is struggling mightily, which is impacting the ability to do work in a
timely fashion. For example, each year, a “significant number of work stoppages are
attributable to the age and condition” of the naval shipyard infrastructure , which is on
average seven years older than industry standard.
Defense industrial base vulnerable now

GREEN 18 – president of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based in Washington, D.C. He
previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department. [Jeff, The decline of the
defense industrial base – and what to do about it, 10/5/2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2018/10/05/the-decline-of-the-defense-industrial-base-and-what-to-do-
about-it/, DKP]
A new report released by the White House documents the gravity of the situation facing the
defense industrial base, while also offering solutions to counteract these challenges. By evaluating seven tiers deep into
the supply chain, the report has documented more than 280 major supply chain
vulnerabilities and an alarming dependency on foreign nations, especially China.
The report is not all bad news, however: it notes that a targeted approach involving funding, policy, legislation, and regulation could
combat these declines and significantly improve the outlook for American defense production.
Keen observers of the defense industrial base have noticed many of the problems identified by the report, classified into ten
different “archetypes,” for years. Foreign dependencies abound within the defense supply chain, especially at the “sub-tier” levels of
component or raw material manufacturing. Even when the U.S. military is not entirely dependent on a foreign source for these
supplies, it is often the case that a sole source or a single source, often fragile, is the only remaining producer of the material.
These risks are among those clearly identified by the report, which offers solutions to help them, ranging from additional funding to
keep domestic manufacturers in business to sourcing restrictions, such as the proven Berry and Specialty Metals amendments, that
protect manufacturers from hostile foreign acts.
In addressing the prevalence of hostile foreign trade practices and other strategies designed to produce foreign dependence and
weaken the American industrial base, the report goes further than the Department of Defense has traditionally wanted to venture.
The report clearly identifies five macro factors that have weakened the defense
industrial base, including the “Industrial Policies of Competitor Nations.” Though U.S. manufacturing has
declined for a variety of reasons, the report notes that China, in particular, has used
illegal means to dominate critical global markets. These means include espionage, evasion of export
controls, market access restrictions, subsidies, and dumping, among others.
Defense industry in shambles – ideological underpinnings and budgeting

previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department. [Jeff, Industrial Base
Gears Up for Great Power Conflict, 1/24/2019,
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/24/viewpoint-industrial-base-gears-up-for-great-power-
conflict, DKP]
For decades, free-trade ideology has dominated discussions about manufacturing and
economic development in the United States, even with respect to the defense industrial base. Though policies
stemming from this ideology have succeeded in generating great wealth for the U.S. economy, they have also led to a
number of unintended consequences, including the erosion of the manufacturing segment of the defense industrial
base.
With new authorities included in this year’s defense authorization bill, however, the Pentagon is well-equipped
to reverse the decline in U.S. defense manufacturing and to provide secure supply of crucial military components for the
future.
The Defense Department is, of course, unlike any private sector business. It is responsible for responding to unforeseen events
worldwide and is also subject to threats and challenges that no private sector actor confronts.
A mistaken emphasis on free-trade ideology and a selective aversion to “picking
winners and losers,” however, has led to the false conclusion that the department ,
which has a budget larger than many midsize European countries, cannot and should not attempt to shape the commercial sector
that supplies it. This
mindset has produced weak points in the supply chain that potential
adversaries have recognized and exploited.
A recent op-ed by retired Air Force Gen. Hawk Carlisle, former commander of Air Combat Command, and current president and CEO
of the National Defense Industrial Association, argues that today’s
industrial base is vastly different than
the one that propelled the United States to military greatness in World War II and throughout the
Cold War. Even as defense spending increased following 9/11, the defense industrial base has
continued to shrink and consolidate.
This process was greatly accelerated by budgetary uncertainty during the Obama
administration. A study on the impacts of budget sequestration by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Aerospace Industries Association, “Measuring the Impact of Sequestration and the Defense Drawdown on the Industrial Base, 2011-
2015,” notes that over 17,000 companies left the defense industrial base during those years. This
greatly reduced the scope of competition within the industry and left the defense
supply chain with a large number of single points of failure.
Looking at U.S. industry more broadly, it is clear that while certain segments of manufacturing output are
doing well, industries that supply defense manufacturing have sustained deep
declines in recent years. The mining of non-fuel resources, for example, peaked in early 2006 and has declined ever since. The
decline in textile production has been even more dramatic. At a time when the economy is increasingly dominated by service
businesses, both
the executive branch and Congress must take a hard look at the
ideological underpinnings driving our industrial policy.
Defense industrial base weak – decades of decline, reliance on China

conflict, DKP]
Thankfully, the 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledged the deeply troubling decline of the defense industrial base. The
document notes: “A healthy defense industrial base is a critical element of U.S. power and the national security innovation base. The
ability of the military to surge in response to an emergency depends on our nation’s ability to produce needed parts and systems,
healthy and secure supply chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce. Theerosion of American manufacturing over the
last two decades, however, has had a negative impact on these capabilities and threatens to undermine the ability
of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements.”
One of the best-known single points of failure in today’s defense industrial base is the
near sole-source dependence on China for rare earth elements. Due to their unique
properties, this select group of minerals is essential for the construction of much of
the U.S. military’s high-tech hardware, including everything from radars to night vision goggles.
The lack of viable domestic sources for the elements creates a significant strategic
vulnerability.
An incident in 2010 shows just how dangerous this dependence can be. In the midst of
an international dispute over control of fishing waters, China abruptly cut off rare
earth element exports to Japan, only resuming them a month later after Japan declined to prosecute the Chinese
ship captain involved in the incident. Had the export restrictions continued, the impact on the
Japanese high-tech industry could have been catastrophic.
Concerningly, there are indications that China may try to use the export of critical raw materials to
gain geopolitical leverage over the United States. At a public forum in Beijing in September, China’s former
finance minister Lou Jiwei reportedly told an audience that China could restrict exports of
core items for the U.S. manufacturing supply chain. This speech was after the
Communist Party’s People’s Daily printed a story stating: “We are looking forward to a
more beautiful counterattack and will keep increasing the pain felt by the U.S.” This
statement is an important reminder that our strategic materials vulnerabilities are real , and our senior
government officials must heed this call to action to build on the advances made this year.
UQ CP
1NC
1NC – CP
The United States federal government should increase funding and provide
targeted relief for programs that support the defense industrial base as per the
Green evidence.
The counterplan revitalizes the US industrial base and provides uniqueness for
our DA scenario
conflict, DKP]
Thankfully, governmentpolicy is rapidly changing to create a more secure industrial base,
highlighted by efforts to create a more favorable business climate to sustain
potentially low-volume, high priority production of key materials . This process started with a
number of executive orders issued by the administration.
For instance, Executive Order 13806, “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense
Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” mandated a comprehensive study of
the defense industrial base. Likewise, Executive Order 13817, “Presidential Executive Order on a
Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” initiated an intra-
governmental strategy to end U.S. reliance on foreign suppliers of 35 critical mineral
commodities.
The push to secure the defense industrial base was advanced greatly by the recently-passed National Defense
Authorization Act. For example, section 871 of the NDAA prohibits the Defense Department and its
contractors from acquiring certain sensitive materials, including rare earth magnets,
from non-allied foreign nations including China, Russia and Iran. Once fully implemented in
regulations, this language will help catalyze a resurgence in U.S. domestic production
of critical minerals and components.
As production scales up under the stimulus of steady demand, downstream consumers of these
products are likely to find that U.S. producers can outcompete foreign suppliers on
both price and quality. As it reviews the results of the administration’s industrial base study, Congress
should consider adding more materials to the list in future years.
This year’s NDAA, coupled with sustained attention from the executive branch, is the
best thing to happen to the defense industrial base in years. However, Congress and the
executive branch must do more to get this vital sector on solid footing for the era of
renewed great power competition. As Congress gears up for the next authorization act, it should
use the recently-released executive branch assessment of defense industrial base
vulnerabilities as a template for action. The report highlights numerous single points of failure in the
defense supply chain. Though some can be fixed through executive branch action alone, others will require legislative
support.
First, Congress must increase funding for the programs that directly support the
industrial base, including Defense Production Act purchases, Industrial Base
Analysis and Sustainment and Manufacturing Technology.
Second, Congress needs to provide targeted relief from regulatory restrictions
applicable to key industries that support the defense industrial base. For example,
language included in the original House-passed version of the NDAA, introduced by Rep. Mark Amodei, R-Nev., would
have sped the mine-permitting approval process for strategic and critical mineral projects. Unfortunately, this
language lacked sufficient support in the Senate and was stripped out in conference. Without such language, a revival
in the defense industrial base will be significantly delayed.
In addition to addressing specific areas of concern such as mine-permitting reform, another
area where
Congress could be helpful is in addressing the substantial overlap in regulations at the
federal, state and local levels. Many regulations, which pertain to areas such as worker safety and
environmental health, are duplicative and add no real value. They do, however, substantially increase costs.
These are felt most strongly by smaller producers who lack the economies of scale necessary to afford an office of
full-time compliance specialists.
By working in a collaborative manner,
Congress can help reduce this overlap and thereby improve the business environment
for small- and medium-sized producers.
Third, Congress should encourage the use of long-dormant tools such as loan
guarantees and conversion of key facilities to government-owned, contractor-
operated centers of excellence for low volume, but critical, strategic materials
like specialty chemicals. T he authorities for these types of projects already exist — they are present to
some extent in programs such as the Defense Production Act and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program
— however, Congress needs to increase funding for them to be effective.
Finally, Congress should continue to include domestic sourcing requirements in
future bills, recognizing that the inherent market demand to drive lowest cost
production may not always be in our national security interest.
This year, the government made significant progress in addressing a number of strategic vulnerabilities. Even more
welcome, there appears to be a growing consensus that the free-market mindset that has worked well in other policy
areas is not optimal for the defense sector. Support for the defense industrial base has been, and should continue to
be, an area of bipartisan agreement. In the years ahead, Congress and the administration should work together to
find additional ways to strengthen the defense industrial base.
2NC
2NC – CP Solves
The counterplan solves the defense industrial base
previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department. [Jeff, The decline of the
defense industrial base – and what to do about it, 10/5/2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2018/10/05/the-decline-of-the-defense-industrial-base-and-what-to-do-
about-it/, DKP]
Fortunately, the report goes beyond problem identification to provide a Blueprint for
Action. Though many of these are locked away in a classified annex to the report, the White House has provided some clues as to
how it wishes to proceed.
First , and probably most importantly, is the creation of a national industrial policy
to support national security efforts. This is an area where the Department of Defense has been deficient for
decades. Though the Pentagon retained an office of industrial policy, defense observers will tell you that its resources and power
were quite limited. It had no power over the major program offices, who tended to pursue low-cost globally available options,
sometimes from unreliable foreign suppliers, even at the expense of overall industrial base health .
A cohesive industrial
policy that has buy-in from all the major offices in the Department of Defense will go a
long way in restoring needed capabilities within the defense supply chain, with the
potential to actually lower costs in the long run by using the overall purchasing power
of the U.S. military to create economies of scale.
Secondly , the report encourages the use of direct funding to target and support
critical sectors of the supply chain. Though the programs available to carry out this important mission
— the Defense Production Act Title III, Manufacturing Technology, and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment — already
exist, they need additional resources to make significant changes in the industrial
base. Congress, to its credit, has provided the Title III program with $20 to $30 million in additional funds annually, but this has
been insignificant compared to the efforts made by China and other nations to strip industrial capacity away from the United States.
If the recommendations in the report are to be executed, more Title III funds will be required.
The report also calls for additional efforts in education and with allied nations to address workforce shortages and joint industrial
challenges. Finally , though not specifically addressed in the formal Blueprint, the report
acknowledges that the Pentagon’s own acquisition processes continue to pose
challenges for innovative manufacturers , with red tape and uncertain funding
driving many potential suppliers away.
Supporters of a strong defense industrial base should view this report as a significant
step forward for the U.S. military. After years of being overlooked, the sub-tiers of the defense industrial base, in
particular, are now being monitored, evaluated, and supported. The Department of Defense and the White House have started an
important conversation by doing the research to bring these problems to the foreground, and it will be up to Congress next year to
provide the resources and legislation necessary to cure them.
Link
Generic
1NC
Ending foreign arms sales decks US defense manufacturing
Gholz 19 (Eugene Gholz; associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, US Department of
Defense Exceptional Public Service Medal, senior advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is coauthor
of two books and author of multiple articles and book chapters; Spring 2019; “Conventional Arms Transfers and US
Economic Security”; https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-13_Issue-1/Gholz.pdf; DS)
*note: CAT = conventional arms transfers
Arms exports still sometimes contribute directly to innovation in a way that should be considered in arms
transfer decisions. Specifically, foreign buyers sometimes purchase upgraded equipment compared to
what the US DOD has purchased in the past, and foreign buyers then pay the R&D cost
of producing those upgrades. In some instances, as with Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the
US has not purchased any of the upgraded product—meaning that the particular innovations created for
export sales to the United Arab Emirates and others have not contributed directly to US national security. In those cases, perhaps
CAT decision makers should have considered the option value that creating those upgraded F-16s offered to the US Air Force. On
other occasions, the US has directly benefited from export-supported technology upgrades —
as on Patriot, Aegis, and other missile defense systems—where DOD has continued to purchase post-upgrade weapons from US
contractors after export sales funded technology investments. Considering this pathway to innovation in an assessment of the
economic effects of a potential arms sale requires detailed knowledge of the likely trajectory of future US defense procurement
spending. In general, the more recently the exported system has joined the US weapons inventory, the more likely that this pathway
could contribute some economic security (innovation) benefit to the United States through approval of an arms transfer. This is
because it would be more likely that the US military would still be building its inventory of the newly upgraded system.
CATs have a clearer, direct effect on economic security via their effect on US defense
manufacturing . Because weapon systems tend to stay in the US military inventory for so
long, they often require spare parts for maintenance years after the initial production run is complete.
DOD needs to pay the overhead cost of maintaining the production capacity for those
spare parts, even when the production rate for spares is much slower than the initial production rate during original
manufacture of the defense system. That slower rate tends to drive the unit cost of spare parts dramatically upward. In some cases,
demand for spare parts drops below the minimum technical sustaining rate, meaning that the workers lose the ability to maintain
quality standards even when the buyer is willing to pay very high unit costs. In other cases, the government does not realize how
much the cost of production has risen over time and does not invest enough to keep the supplier interested or able to produce the
part profitably, so production drops below the minimum economic sustaining rate. These
situations create
potentially very costly Diminishing Manufacturing Sources or Material Shortage
(DMSMS) problems.20 Arms exports and the expanded demand for future spare parts
business that they create can help reduce the unit cost of spares production by
keeping up production rates, maintaining workers’ skills , and ameliorating the risk
of DMSMS by bolstering revenue for critical and fragile niches in the supply chain. These effects have
been observed in recent years in export sales of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, among others.
Assessing these manufacturing effects of arms sales requires detailed knowledge of the defense supply chain, including the technical
characteristics of the components that suppliers make, the financial status of each of those suppliers, and the business strategy of
the executives at each supplier—knowledge that is not often available to the government or defense industry prime contractors.
Finally, CATs
can contribute economic benefits to the United States through the
economies of scale that are often available in defense systems production. If foreign
sales are figured into the cost estimates from the start of a project, and foreign buyers
contribute to development and capital investment spending, the cost of a project to
the US defense budget will be proportionately reduced, benefiting US economic
security . For example, the F-35 program claims to have benefited from this dynamic, although the higher overhead cost of
managing a multinational development program and the redundancies of building extra final assembly and sustainment facilities
overseas cut against the economies of scale benefits.21 In some European multinational aircraft development programs,
governments have presumed that programs would gain very large benefits from economies of scale that have not materialized. This
is due to technical and management challenges in the programs or the countries’ failure to follow through on their initial purchase
commitments. The result in those cases was that including projected economy of scale benefits of foreign sales in a program’s
management baseline added to rather than reduced program instability and hurt economic security.22 Estimating the net economic
effect of expected economies of scale as part of a CAT decision would require sophisticated, reliable understanding of program
dynamics that might be beyond what the US government should reasonably count on in its decision making.
* Specific Links *
Drones
1NC
Foreign military drone sales are key to US manufacturing growth
Harrison 13 (Glennon J. Harrison; B.A. in economics and Latin American studies from Tulane University, research
manager at the Congressional Research Service; “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Manufacturing Trends”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42938.pdf; DS)
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) represent a bright spot for the technology-intensive
aerospace manufacturing sector , but military and civil government agencies will likely
be the predominant customers for an extended period while such systems are
integrated into the U.S. National Airspace System (“national airspace”). Airspace access by commercial UAS users is
projected to be much slower than for governmental entities.
U.S. export control policies pose an issue for manufacturers that seek to export UAS.
Some UAS are classified as weapons under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and require an
export license approved by the U.S. State Department. UAS are also covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a
voluntary arrangement among 34 member countries to restrict the proliferation of missiles or UAS capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction. Under MTCR guidelines, export of UAS carries a “strong presumption of denial” of an export license. The
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) has stated that advances in UAS technologies have resulted in the development of some
systems that are not suited to weapons-ofmass-destruction (WMD) delivery. The association says the regulations will allow
nonmember countries (such as Israel or China) to sell UAS with advanced capabilities.
The U.S. Department of Defense ( DOD ), the major user of such systems, has
demonstrated the effectiveness of UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan , but continued development of
new systems and capabilities depends on access to the national airspace. UAS spending has been driven
primarily by military needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries where terrorist
groups were or are active. Numerous forecasts project that U.S. and global UAS markets will
experience strong growth during the next 10 years. A forecast of global UAS demand by the Teal Group
shows worldwide annual spending on research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement rising from $6.6 billion in 2013 to $ 11 .4 billion in 2022. Total spending for the
decade is projected to amount to $ 89 .1 billion .
U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturing firms have a significant lead in military
UAS, but Israel is also a strong competitor. Europe, China, and Japan are also expected to press ahead with
significant UAS development programs—an area of aerospace deemed critical in terms of defense and industrial capabilities.
European manufacturers in particular appear to be focused on potential sales to nonmilitary government and commercial
customers.
2NC
DoD drone production is crucial to US manufacturing
Harrison 13 (Glennon J. Harrison; B.A. in economics and Latin American studies from Tulane University, research
manager at the Congressional Research Service; “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Manufacturing Trends”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42938.pdf; DS)
*note: UAS = unamnned aircraft systems
The D epartment o f D efense Remains the Key Driver of UAS 7 Sales of UAS equipment
have been driven primarily by military needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries where
terrorist groups were or are active. The scheduled withdrawal of most troops from Afghanistan by 2014 has
reportedly led to an intensification of UAS use to protect remaining forces.8 In April 2012, DOD reported that it had
more than 7,100 UAS in its inventory.9 In its Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, DOD
outlined its efforts to consolidate and streamline the UAS fleets it had acquired
quickly as wartime needs rose. The report emphasized that in a highly constrained fiscal environment, “unmanned systems
[must] be affordable at the outset and not experience significant cost growth in their development and production evolution.”10
The President’s FY2013 budget requested $3.8 billion for UAS acquisition , down from $4.8
billion in FY2012.11 A June 2011 analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined DOD UAS acquisition
costs based on DOD’s FY2012 budget request, and reported procurement costs for the
2011-2020 period would amount to nearly $ 37 billion .12
The plan destroys US tech advantages in manufacturing

Divis 18 (Dee Ann Divis; editor at Inside Unmanned Systems, Journalism Fellow at MIT, Bachelor’s degree in
Business; “Military UAV Market To Top $83B”; http://insideunmannedsystems.com/military-uav-market-to-top-83b/;
DS)
Export Fight Brewing
All of those numbers could shift, at least for U.S. manufacturers , if the Trump administration
follows through on reported plans to ease export restrictions.
“The State Department especially has been very obstructive in the sale of larger UAVs, ones that are capable of being armed, into
the export market—I mean to the extent that it’s actually gotten ridiculous,” Zaloga said. “If you look at, for example, the long time it
took the U.S. government to allow Italy to arm the Predators that they bought. They were one of the earliest European adoptees of
Predators but they were the original unarmed predators. So then the Italian government came and said: ‘Well, we’d like to arm
them with Hellfires (Hellfire missiles) just like the U.S. ones are.’ It took years and years and years.”
“A change in U.S. policy on the export of large (i.e. MTCR Category I) UAS will greatly enhance America’s ability to provide much
needed UAS technology to its closest partners and allies,” said Remy Nathan, vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace
Industries Association, in a written statement. “Current
restrictions on exports have allowed foreign
competitors, like the Chinese, to provide their UAS technology to some of our most
strategic partners and allies. This hurts U.S. industry and jobs and degrades our
technological edge , while funding Chinese R&D to further refine their systems and
ability to support global operations—an advantage the U.S. currently maintains .”
The restrictions have left the market open to competitors, Zaloga agreed. Though the Israelis
are currently the largest exporters, he said, the Chinese have recognized and are working
on seizing the opportunity—a development with potentially wide ramifications.
“China now has ambitions to compete in the big market—to directly compete against the United States and the Europeans and the
Russians with high tech products,” Zaloga said. “So they’re trying to do that in the aircraft field but they’ve got to get a foot in the
door. They’ve got to convince customers that their products are equivalent in quality to the other big players’. And
so you
can see that they’re putting a lot of effort in this field of endurance UAVs that can be
armed and they are doing it because the U.S. manufacturers basically have an arm
tied behind their back because of the State Department restrictions .”
The plan decks US aerospace manufacturing growth

Soshkin 16 (Maksim Soshkin; Research and Analysis Specialist: Aerospace, Aviation, Travel & Tourism at World
Economic Forum, BBA in Finance, Investments, and Political Science from CUNY Baruch College; 2016; “The US
Aerospace Industry: A Manufacturing Powerhouse”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s11369-016-0008-y;
DS)
4. Military Aircraft and Related Products The manufacturing of military aircraft and related
components accounts for about a fourth of total aerospace manufacturing revenue
[IBISWorld Staff 2016a]. The vast majority of military aircraft are sold to the U.S. military , though
the export market (discussed below) is becoming increasingly important. For the most part, contractors rely on the
massive U.S. defense market to generate demand. Recently, military aircraft manufacturers have had to
deal with falling demand after years of growth.
Following post-Cold War defense spending cuts in the 1990s, the US military spending surged, driven by antiterrorist operations and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Figure 5 shows, defense outlays drastically increased in the 10 years to 2010, with outlays for
aircraft procurement rising at a 4.3 percent rate to reach $37.0 billion (Figure 6). In particular, combat operation needs
resulted in increased spending on platforms such as helicopters and UAVs . The heavy use of
fighter jets and transport aircraft also increased demand for new planes and components. However, the boom in demand fizzled
out. In 2011, the U.S. ended the Iraq War while in the process of winding down combat operations in Afghanistan, causing military
spending to decline. Moreover, faced with large deficits, the government has attempted to rein in overall spending. The
Budget Control Act of 2011 eventually led to sequestration, which imposed funding
caps through 2021 [Khimm 2012]. As a result of these measures, in the 5 years to
2015, defense outlays fell at a 4.7 percent rate to $597.9 billion .
The cuts in defense spending hit a number of aircraft programs, with Department of
Defense (DoD) aircraft procurement outlays falling by 15.8 percent between 2012 and
2015. In particular, the most of the fall was on spending on combat-related procurement. The Army experienced the largest
percentage decline in spending. Army aircraft spending mostly goes toward helicopters, which are extensively used alongside ground
operations. Therefore, once combat operations were reduced, demand for helicopters plunged, with Army outlays falling by nearly a
third from 2012 to 2015. The federal government also cut its Navy and Air Force aircraft budgets over these years, with the largest
dollar decline coming from the Air Force.
Aerospace manufacturing is crucial to overall US manufacturing growth
Soshkin 16 (Maksim Soshkin; Research and Analysis Specialist: Aerospace, Aviation, Travel & Tourism at World
Economic Forum, BBA in Finance, Investments, and Political Science from CUNY Baruch College; 2016; “The US
Aerospace Industry: A Manufacturing Powerhouse”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s11369-016-0008-y;
DS)
9. Conclusion
The aerospace manufacturing industry is a vital component of the US

manufacturing sector, providing a key source of exports, jobs, and innovation . While a
large portion of the US manufacturing has withered away, aerospace
manufacturing has continued to
expand, representing one of the few industrial sectors in which the United States still
has an overwhelming competitive advantage. For instance, over the 5-year period to 2015, the
industry’s revenue has grown four times faster than that of the overall
manufacturing sector. While manufacturing’s share of the private economy’s GDP (as measured by industry value added)
has continued to decline over the last decade, the aerospace industry’s share is expected to rise by nearly a third [IBISWorld 2016].
Many of the industry’s products are essential to global transportati on. When the global economy
expands, demand for air travels rises, boosting the demand for aircraft. As a result, the industry’s performance can be indicative of
the state of the global economy, including the health of emerging markets and the rate of globalization. T he industry’s
defense segment highlights trends in government fiscal policy and how government spending can
impact the US industrial base. Over the next 5 years, the industry will face numerous
challenges such as growing international and technological competition , the chance of a
greater global economic slowdown, and budget constraints. Nonetheless, IBISWorld estimates that in the 5-year period to 2020,
industry revenue will rise at a rate of 4.1 percent to reach $317.0 billion [IBISWorld Staff 2016a, b].
Egypt
1NC
Egyptian arms sales are crucial to US defense manufacturing growth
Sharp 19 (Jeremy M. Sharp; Specialist in Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, Master’s
Degree in Middle East History from Princeton University and was named a Presidential Management Fellow by the
federal government's Office of Personnel Management; 3/12/19; “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf; DS)
Between 1946 and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $78.3 billion in bilateral foreign
aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation).78 The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt
ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two
separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its
letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to “endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military
and economic assistance requirements of Israel.” In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the
following: In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded
security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of
those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required. 79
All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any foreign recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty
itself does not include any U.S. aid obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potentially
construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancillary documents or other communications and were—by their terms—
subject to congressional approval (see above). However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has
traditionally provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security cooperation with both
countries.
In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) with a foreign country pledging a
specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the
United States has signed foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan. Currently, there is no U.S.-Egyptian MOU specifying a
specific amount of total U.S. aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period.80 Congress typically specifies a precise allocation of
most foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill. Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from
three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and
Training (IMET).81 The United States offers IMET training to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation
over the long term.
Military Aid and Arms Sales
Overview
Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large
amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to
Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and
sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Egypt has used U.S. military aid
through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems , such as the
F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack
helicopter.
Realigning Military Aid from Conventional to Counterterrorism Equipment For decades, FMF grants have supported Egypt’s
purchases of large-scale conventional military equipment from U.S. suppliers. However, as mentioned above, the Obama
Administration announced that future FMF grants may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for “counterterrorism,
border security, Sinai security, and maritime security” (and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt’s arsenal).83
It is not yet clear how the Trump Administration will determine which U.S.-supplied military equipment would help the Egyptian
military counter terrorism and secure its land and maritime borders. Overall, some defense experts continue to view the Egyptian
military as inadequately prepared, both doctrinally and tactically, to face the threat posed by terrorist/insurgent groups such as Sinai
Province. According to a former U.S. National Security Council official, “they [the Egyptian military] understand they have got a
problem in Sinai, but they have been unprepared to invest in the capabilities to deal with it.”
84 To reorient the military toward unconventional warfare, the Egyptian military needs, according to one assessment, “heavy
investment into rapid reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication gear ... backed by
enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. In order to transport them, Egypt would also need numerous
modern aviation assets.” 85
Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt
In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been
available to only a few other countries. For example  Early Disbursal and Interest-Bearing Account: Between FY2001 and FY2011,
Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an
interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.86 Interest accrued from the rapid disbursement of aid has
allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the
obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions hadbeen met before releasing FMF funds, thereby
eliminating their automatic early disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds
already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
 The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—
assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. The
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of
outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated
“major non-NATO ally,” Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the
Arms Export Control Act.
[Footnote 80] 80 In
July 2007, the George W. Bush Administration had announced, as a part
of a larger arms package to the region, that it would begin discussions with Egypt on a
proposed $ 13 billion military aid agreement over a 10-year period. Since Egypt was
already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement
represented no major change in U.S. aid policy toward Egypt. Since then, no such bilateral MOU on U.S. military aid to Egypt has
been reached by the Bush, Obama, or Trump Administrations with the Egyptian government
[Footnote 83] 83 According to a 2015 GAO report on U.S.

assistance to Egypt, DSCA “led a review of
Egypt’s FMF program to align current purchases with shared security interests and to
make recommendations on whether to continue to support specific systems through FMF. As part of this review, DSCA
identified some systems that did not directly align with shared security interests. These included some older, outdated, or third-
party produced systems, such as Chinese-built submarines and Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, as well as U.S.-manufactured
Gulfstream VIP aircraft and M1A1 tank kits. DSCA
recommended continuing support for 18 of these
systems totaling $6.5 billion , but identified 15 of these systems totaling $777 million
that should be transitioned from FMF funds to Egyptian government funds or ended .”
See GAO-15-259, “EGYPT U.S. Government Should Examine Options for Using Unobligated Funds and Evaluating Security Assistance
Programs,” February 2015.
Iran
1NC
Iran’s purchase of arms sales is key to US manufacturing
Wezeman and Kuimova 19 (Pieter D. Wezeman; Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and
Military Expenditure Programme; Alexandra Kuimova; research assistant with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure
Programme; 5/29/19; “Military Spending And Arms Imports By Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, And The UAE”;
https://lobelog.com/military-spending-and-arms-imports-by-iran-saudi-arabia-qatar-and-the-uae/; DS)
Iran Iran’s
military spending in the period 1994–2018 peaked in 2006, after which it fell by 30
per cent between 2006 and 2014 (see figure 1). The fall was steepest in 2012–13, after the European
Union imposed economic and financial sanctions on Iran. These sanctions and some of those imposed by the United
States were lifted in 2015, which benefited the Iranian economy. Iran’s military spending
subsequently increased by 25 per cent between 2015 and 2017. However, in 2018 military
spending decreased again, by 9.5 per cent, to $13.2 billion, as the Iranian economy went into recession and inflation
increased from 10 per cent in 2017 to 30 per cent in 2018. In 2018 military spending was 2.7 per cent
of GDP, the 25th highest in the world.
The level of Iran’s arms imports decreased significantly between 1994 and 2018 (see figures 2 and 3). The volume of
Iran’s arms imports in this period was relatively small compared with the volumes imported by many other states in
the Middle East. For example, the total value of Iran’s arms imports in 2009–18 was equivalent to just 3.5 per cent of
Saudi Arabian arms imports in the same period. This can partly be explained by the limits on funding linked to Iran’s
economic problems. In addition, since 2010, United Nations Security Council resolutions have restricted the transfer
of major arms to Iran. These restrictions are scheduled to remain in force until the end of 2020. The sanctions allow
exemptions on exports of certain arms. The
delivery of four S-300 air defence systems by Russia
in 2016 was Iran’s first significant import of major arms since 2007 . Whereas other states in
the Gulf region procure arms from a wide variety of states, 96 per cent of Iran’s imports in 2014–18 came from Russia
and the rest from China.
Iran has the capability to develop and produce certain types of major arms , including
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles . This has to some extent offset
the restrictions on its arms imports. However, the level of performance of these arms as well as other arms produced
or upgraded by Iran has been questioned.
Israel
1NC
Israeli arms sales are key to US defense manufacturing
Sharp 18 (Jeremy M. Sharp; Specialist in Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, Master’s
Degree in Middle East History from Princeton University and was named a Presidential Management Fellow by the
federal government's Office of Personnel Management; 4/10/18; “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf; DS)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. Foreign
Military Financing. For FY2019, the President’s request for Israel would encompass
approximately 61% of total requested FMF funding worldwide. Annual FMF grants to Israel
represent approximately 19% of the overall Israeli defense budget .24 Israel’s defense
expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (5.8% in 2016) is one of the highest in the world.25
Cash Flow Financing26 Section

23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §276351) authorizes the
President to finance the “procurement of defense articles , defense services, and design and
construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may
determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations
have used this
authority to permit Israel27 to finance multiyear purchases through installment
payments, rather than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up front. Known as “cash flow
financing,” this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S.
defense suppliers with payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.28
Early Transfer and Interest Bearing Account Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress
has mandated that Israel
receive its FMF aid in a lump sum during the first month of the fiscal year .29 The FY2017
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31) states that “the funds appropriated under this heading for assistance for Israel shall be
disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s
military aid is transferred to an
interest bearing account with the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.30 Israel has used interest
collected on its military aid to pay down its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government
agencies, which, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, stood at $148.8 million as of December 2015. 31 Israel cannot
use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Israel

is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ,
the Department of Defense’s fifth-generation stealth aircraft considered to be the most
technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. In September 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal with a possible total value of $15.2 billion.32
Since then, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts (see table below) using FMF
grants. Israel is to install Israeli-made C4 (command, control, communications, computers) systems in the
F-35s it receives, and call these customized F-35s “Adirs.”
33 As part of the F-35 deal, the United States agreed to make reciprocal purchases of
equipment (known as “ offsets ”) from Israeli defense companies. If Israel elects to purchase all 75 F-35s, it is estimated
that its business offsets could be as high as $4 billion. As of 2017, Israeli firms had received more than one
billion dollars’ worth of business from Lockheed Martin in building components for the F-35.
34
Excess Defense Articles The
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides a means by which
the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through
provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. This program, managed by DSCA, enables the
United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either
reduced rates or no charge.35 As a designated “major non-NATO ally,”36 Israel
is eligible to receive EDA under
Section 516(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. According to DSCA,
from 2007 to 2017, Israel received $374.399 million in EDA deliveries (current value only).37
2NC
Israeli arm sales are crucial to US domestic manufacturing
Muhammad 18 (Jehron Muhammad; Free lance journalist for Africa Watch; 9/25/18; “The U.S. Industrial
Military Complex and Growing Weapons Industry”; https://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/US-
Industrial-Military-Complex.shtml; DS)
The report is titled “War Profiteers: The U.S. War Machine and the Arming of Repressive Regimes.” It says the
military-industrial complex fuels endless wars for corporate profits and includes five of the largest U.S.
weapons manufacturers and their arms deals with Saudi Arabia, Israel , and Egypt.
The military weapons manufacturers include Lockheed Martin , Boeing, Raytheon,
Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.
According to Madea Benjamin, co-founder of Codepink, and the human rights organization Global Exchange, who co-authored the
report, out of the three countries only Saudi Arabia actually purchases weapons from U.S. weapons contractors. Egypt and
Israel’s weapons are paid for by “our tax dollars.”
She told the Baltimore-based Real News Network, “It’s where our tax dollars are going to the weapons
industries, then being funneled into those countries to be used for repressive attacks against either their own people or
neighboring countries.”
A case in point:
On top of having extensive ties with Israel and being a major arms supplier to Saudi Arabia,
Raytheon was awarded a $ 9.9 million contract via the U.S. Department of Defense
to assist Egypt in researching and developing technology to “detect tunnels between
Sinai and Gaza. Raytheon called this their ‘Seismic and Acoustic Vibration Imaging program,’ ” which used lasers to detect
vibrations in the ground and reveal the location of tunnels.
Japan
1NC
Japanese spending on arms and defense is key to US manufacturing
Reuters 19 (Reuters; international news organization. It is a division of Thomson Reuters and has nearly 200
locations around the world; Japan is planning to spend billions on US military hardware, and defense companies are
showing off their wares”; https://www.businessinsider.com/r-arms-firms-show-off-wares-as-japan-eyes-more-f-35-
stealth-jets-2018-11; DS)
TOKYO — Globalarms firms showed off on Wednesday their wares in Japan as it prepared
a plan to buy billions of dollars of US military equipment , including at least 40
Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters worth about $ 4 billion , four sources said.
The Lockheed Martin Corp F-35s, which will replace 100 aging F-15 fighter jets, are in addition to an
earlier order for 42 of the aircraft.
The new procurement will leave Japan with about 100 stealth fighters, including some vertical-
takeoff B variants that could fly from helicopter carriers, in a bid to give it an edge over China in the contested East China Sea.
"It will be around 40 new aircraft," said one of the sources with knowledge of Japan's five-year plan. He described a Tuesday report
in the Nikkei business daily that Japan would buy as many as 100 new F-35s as "aspirational."
The procurement plan, which will be released in December with a paper outlining defense goals, is widely expected
to accelerate defense spending increases that are already pushing Japan beyond a self-imposed limit of 1% of
gross domestic product.
Despite having a pacifist constitution, even at 1%, Japan already ranks as one of the world's biggest military spenders.
Japan is bolstering defenses against North Korean ballistic missiles with two Lockheed Martin
Aegis Ashore air-defense batteries.
It also wants to build a military equipped with modern fighter jets, longer-range missiles and drones, as well as ships
and aircraft to ferry soldiers to project power along an island chain stretching almost to Taiwan.
For the year starting on April 1, the Ministry of Defense is seeking a 2.1% increase in spending to
5.3 trillion yen ($46.54 billion) for the seventh straight annual increase.
Those outlays have drawn foreign defense contractors to this week's Japan International Aerospace Exhibition in Tokyo.
'Longer operations'
Limited space at the show, which is being held early to avoid a clash with the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, means that 300 fewer domestic
companies are exhibiting compared with two years ago.
But the number of foreign companies has gone up to 294 from 195.
"We see opportunities for more F-35s," said Andy Latham, the head of business development for military aviation at BAE Systems,
which builds the fighter's rear fuselage.
The British company also wants to partner with Japan on a new, longer-range fighter. They are together studying the development
of beyond visual range air-launched missiles.
"That's indicative of the type of longer operations that Japan can become involved in," Latham said.
US contractors may be the biggest winners of Japan's increased spending because
purchases of their equipment will help Japan deflect criticism from President Donald
Trump over a trade surplus he says hurts US workers.
Trump, who has threatened to put tariffs on Japanese cars, wants to make the United States even more dominant in the global
weapons trade.
US overseas arms sales to foreign governments rose 13% to $192.3 billion in the year that ended September 30, the State
Department said this month.
Saudi Arabia
1NC
The plan causes Saudi Arabia and the GCC to abandon purchases of US arms
sales, destroying US defense manufacturing
Svet 16 (Oleg Svet; Senior Defense Analyst, PhD in War and Defense Studies from King’s College London, MA in
Strategic Studies and International Economics at The Johns Hopkins University, BA in International Relations from
Tufts University; 9/26/16; “Why Congress Supports Saudi Arms Sales”; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-
congress-supports-saudi-arms-sales-17840; DS)
When considering this particular sale it is important to keep in mind the big picture of U.S.
defense exports and their contribution to America's defense industry. Over the past six years, as U.S. defense spending has
faced considerable budgetary pressures, American defense companies have struggled to maintain employees and keep production
lines open. With tightening defense budgets, highly-skilled manufacturing jobs on the line, and the prospect of
production lines for advanced U.S. weapons being phased out, American exports of defense articles and
services have become and will continue to be ever more important .
Saudi Arabia has emerged as the dominant purchaser of American arms. In 2010 Riyadh
signed a record $60 billion deal to buy defense articles made by American companies .
Under the deal, it agreed to spend $30 billion up front on fighter jets, helicopters, and other systems. That purchase is
equivalent to a large chunk of the U.S. defense budget. In fact, the contribution is
much larger, relatively speaking, when one looks at how it benefits the smaller defense companies that service American and
foreig defense industrial base AND economy n defense customers. The 2010 deal with Saudi Arabia entailed purchasing American jet
fighters that will help manufacturers in forty-four states and aid in protecting seventy-seven thousand jobs.
Importantly, the 2010 Saudi deal included the purchase of eighty-four new F-15 fighters . The
prime contractor was Boeing, a hundred--year-old American multinational company that consistently ranks as one of the world's
most admired companies. Until recently, Boeing produced only one F-15 per month, and the production line for F-15s was on the
verge of being closed, that is, until the deal with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh's
purchase helped save thousands of
jobs for Americans working on Boeing's F-15 production line on the outskirts of Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport. Boeing also makes Apache helicopters, and the Saudi deal included the purchase of seventy Apaches. As
Fortune reported, "Production
lines for Boeing's F-15, Harpoon missile, and Apache helicopter are sustained by
exports, which support thousands of high-paying, highly skilled manufacturing jobs."
Saudi purchases help keep highly-skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States.
Maintaining a robust
security cooperation relationship with Saudi Arabia also helps
America's defense industry in the region as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the most important
member of the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ), which includes five other large
purchasers of American defense articles : Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These
countries are gradually creating a multinational, interoperable force that requires all of the countries to maintain similar weapons
systems. When Saudi Arabia purchases U.S. defense articles, other countries in the Gulf
follow suit. For example, a $7 billion deal to sell three dozen F-15 jets to Qatar and twenty-eight Boeing F/A-18E/F Super
Hornets to Kuwait is currently in the works. Furthermore, in the crucial period from 2011 to 2015 (when U.S. defense spending was
especially under strain), the UAE was the second-largest importer of U.S. defense articles, after Saudi Arabia. In
2015, the
United States sold $33 billion in defense articles and services to the GCC countries . For
large American defense companies, such exports are crucial. In recent years an estimated one-quarter of
Raytheon’s sales came from foreign purchases. A few years ago, the UAE's $3.3 billion order
enabled Raytheon to restart the Patriot production line and add new features . Such
purchases save highly-skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States, and, by adding advanced capabilities,
will help win new customers unless Congress blocks them from happening.
If Senators Paul and Murphy would have succeeded in their measure, Riyadh would almost certainly have gone to another large
military supplier, possibly Russia. Saudi and other GCC officials fear that Iran, which is not only ideologically and theologically
diametrically opposed to the Kingdom, but also has a population and territory several times the size of Saudi Arabia, poses an
existential threat. The uncomfortable truth is that Yemen is a proxy war in the Saudi-Iranian competition. Riyadh feels that it must
win in Yemen against the Houthi rebels (who the Saudis are convinced are sponsored by Iran), and the only way to win is through
military power. Saudi Arabia does not have an indigenous military industry to support the war; it has to find military suppliers to
sustain its war effort. Had the sale been blocked and Saudi Arabia shifted to Russia, China, or
other suppliers for military purchases, other Gulf States would have followed suit ,
putting in jeopardy an additional tens of billions of dollars in sales by American
multinational companies and thousands of highly-skilled manufacturing jobs. Going
forward, when considering whether to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia, therefore, Congress should
not only worry about the particular sale in question. It should also consider the wider negative implications
that a suspension would have on tens of thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs all across America,
tens of billions of dollars in revenues for U.S. companies, and the wider defense industry.
2NC – Saudi Arabia
Saudi weapons purchases are key to US manufacturing
Wezeman and Kuimova 19 (Pieter D. Wezeman; Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and
Military Expenditure Programme; Alexandra Kuimova; research assistant with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure
Programme; 5/29/19; “Military Spending And Arms Imports By Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, And The UAE”;
https://lobelog.com/military-spending-and-arms-imports-by-iran-saudi-arabia-qatar-and-the-uae/; DS)
Saudi Arabia
In 2018 Saudi Arabia’s military spending amounted to an estimated $ 67.6 billion . It was
the third-largest military spender globally and by far the largest military spender in
the Gulf region. There have been three periods in the past 25 years in which there were major increases in Saudi Arabia’s
military expenditure (see figure 1). Military expenditure increased by 57 per cent between 1996 and 1998, by 76 per
cent between 2003 and 2007 and by 63 per cent between 2011 and 2015. The fall in oil prices at the end of 2014 caused a decline in
government revenues, which are highly dependent on oil exports. Military spending fell by 28 per cent in 2016. There was then an
increase of 11 per cent in 2017 followed by another drop, of 6.5 per cent, in 2018.
A clear indication of the high priority that Saudi Arabia gives to military capability is the fact that Saudi Arabian military
spending was 8 .8 per cent of GDP in 2018. At its peak in 2015, military spending was 13 per cent of GDP. In
contrast, all other countries among the 15 largest military spenders in the world allocated
less than 4 per cent of GDP to the military in 2018. At $2014, Saudi Arabia’s per capita military spending in
2018 was higher than any other country in the world.
After a low point in 1999–2008, arms imports increased rapidly (see figure 4). They rose by 192 per
cent between 2009–13 and 2014–18, making Saudi Arabia the world’s largest arms importer in 2014–18. The USA and the United
Kingdom were by far the largest arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia in 2014–18 (see figure 4). A number of countries in Europe, most
notably Germany, have been critical of Saudi Arabia’s use of military force in Yemen and therefore restricted their arms exports to
Saudi Arabia in 2018. However, this is likely to have little effect on Saudi Arabia’s access to arms as the main, long-standing
arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia—the USA, the UK and France—have continued to supply arms.
In addition, China and Russia have made significant efforts to sell arms to Saudi Arabia in recent years.
Saudi Arabia’s substantial investment in its military means that it has the largest
inventory of advanced weapons among the states in the Gulf region. Imports included arms such as
combat and tanker aircraft, which have increased the reach and strike power of the Saudi Arabian Air Force. The USA
commenced delivery of 154 F-15SA combat aircraft in 2016, which will add to the delivery of
72 Typhoon combat aircraft by the UK in 2009–17. Both aircraft types are equipped with cruise missiles and other
guided weapons. The six tanker aircraft delivered from Spain between 2011 and 2015 increase the range of Saudi Arabia’s combat
aircraft.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is improving its capability to defend against air and missile attacks. In
2014–18 it received 23 Patriot PAC-3 air and missile defence systems from the USA . In 2018 it ordered seven highly
advanced THAAD missile defence systems from the USA .
Saudi Arabia’s land and naval forces have been and continue to be modernized and
expanded. In the period 2014–18, a total of over 4000 armoured vehicles were delivered from Austria, Canada, France, Georgia,
South Africa and Turkey, and 338 tanks were delivered from the USA. Saudi Arabia ordered three large patrol boats from France in
2015, four frigates from the USA in 2017 and five frigates from Spain in 2018.
Saudi arms sales are the backbone of US manufacturing strength
Hartung 15 (William D. Hartung; director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy,
Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program; 10/19/15; “U.S. Arms Transfers
to the Middle East: Promoting Stability or Fueling Conflict?”; https://securityassistance.org/blog/us-arms-transfers-
middle-east-promoting-stability-or-fueling-conflict; DS)
The recent surge in U.S. arms transfers to the Middle East is part of an unprecedented
boom in major U.S. arms sales that has been presided over by the Obama administration. In President Obama’s first
six years in office, new agreements under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales ( FMS )
program – the largest channel for U.S. weapons exports – totaled over $ 195 billion .[1] Overall, the Obama
administration has approved more major weapons deals than any U.S. administration since World War II.
The majority of the Obama administration’s major arms sales – over 56 per cent – have gone to
the Middle East and Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia topping the list with over $49 billion
in new agreements.[2] This is particularly troubling given the complex array of conflicts raging throughout the region, and
given the Saudi regime’s use of U.S.-supplied weaponry in its military intervention in Yemen.
The increase in arms sales under the Obama administration is rooted in two factors, one political and one economic. The political
factor is grounded in President Obama’s pledge to avoid getting into any new, large-scale “boots on the ground” conflicts like Iraq or
Afghanistan.[3] His alternative has been to rely on tactics designed to limit U.S. casualties, from drone strikes to arming and training
allies to carry out fighting that might otherwise have been done by U.S. troops. This aspect of the Obama policy mirrors the
approach taken by Richard Nixon in the wake of the Vietnam War, when he armed regional surrogates like Iran under the Shah to
fight on behalf of U.S. interests in key regions.[4]
On the economic front, the Obama administration has been a major promoter of exports in
general and arms exports in particular. In doing so, it has been responding to pressure
from weapons manufacturers like Boeing, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics
who are seeking to increase export sales to counterbalance a leveling off of Pentagon
procurement spending.
The extent of the Obama administration’s commitment to promoting weapons sales was underscored at a
March 2013 hearing on arms export control policy when Tom Kelly, who was principal deputy assistant secretary of the State
Department’s bureau of political-military affairs, said that “it is an issue that has the attention of every top-level official who’s
working on foreign policy throughout the government . . . in advocating on behalf of our companies and doing everything we can to
make sure these sales go through.”[5]\
In addition to setting higher goals for arms exports in general, major weapons contractors have attempted
to use foreign sales to keep open key production lines for systems that are reaching the end of the
line in terms of Pentagon procurement. For example, earlier this year it was reported that Boeing had concluded a deal to sell 40
F-18s to Kuwait, which will extend the life of the program for another year or more beyond its current
projected end date of early 2017.[6] Similarly, the General Dynamics M-1 tank has been surviving on a
combination of Congressional add-ons and a deal for tanks and tank upgrades for Saudi Arabia. [7]
The majority of arms sales manufacturing comes from Saudi purchases
Frohlich 19 (Thomas C. Frohlich; managing editor for 24/7 Wall Street, BA in Philosophy, MA in Cultural Studies
from Dartmouth; 3/26/19; “Saudi Arabia buys the most weapons from the US government. See what other countries
top list.”; https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/03/26/us-arms-sales-these-countries-buy-most-weapons-
government/39208809/; DS)
The U.S. has been both the largest exporter of military supplies and the country with
the largest military expenditure since the SIPRI started its database in the early 1990s.
The U.S.’s outsized share of world arms exports has also increased over the past five years since the previous five-year period
through 2013, when 30 percent of world arms exports came from the United States.
This increase, however, is largely due to deliveries, mainly of F-35 combat jets, over
the past five years, said Aude Fleurant, director of the arms and military expenditure programme with SIPRI, in an email to
24/7 Wall St. While the United States will almost certainly remain the dominant exporter of weapons, the large increase
in arms exports was due primarily to the nature of cycles and transfers.
The United States supplies arms to at least 98 nations, and it is the largest supplier to 20 of the 40 largest arms importers in the world. These arms include ammunition such as missiles, various aircraft, submarines, surface ships, anti-submarine weaponry, tanks,
armoured vehicles, as well as electronics such as radar, sonar, and guiding systems. The United States selects its clients based on well-established partnerships, as well as for strategic reasons related to the leverage it could gain during conflicts. Of the 25 countries
buying the most weapons from the U.S., 10 are either NATO member nations or part of other alliances formed with the United States since the Cold War. “The US transfers to these countries are meant to ensure allies security, as arms transfers from the US brings
with it security guarantees, which basically entail diplomatic and military assistance in case of troubles,” said Fleurant. Methodology To identify the countries buying the most weapons from the U.S. government, 24/7 Wall St. reviewed the total value of arms exports
from the United States over the decade 2008 to 2018 delivered to the 183 countries available in SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database updated March 11 2019. The arms data cover actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. The first, second, and third largest
suppliers to each country came from SIPRI’s major arms export volumes report published March 11, 2019. These figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers. They should therefore not be directly compared with gross domestic product (GDP), military
expenditure, sales values or the financial value of export licenses in an attempt to measure the economic burden of arms imports or the economic benefits of exports. GDP per capita for each country was obtained from the World Bank. 25. Oman • Arms imports
from US, 2008-2018: $842 million, 26.5 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: Not available • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): UK, USA, Norway • GDP per capita: $37,961 24. Mexico • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $899 million,
51.2 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $18 million, 69.2 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, France, Netherlands • GDP per capita: $17,331 23. Germany • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $1 billion,
65.1 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $2 million, 14.3 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): Not available • GDP per capita: $45,229 22. Kuwait • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $1.36 billion, 79.6
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $55 million, 62.5 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Russia, Switzerland • GDP per capita: $65,531 21. Norway • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $1.38 billion,
40.8 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $346 million, 64.4 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, South Korea, Italy • GDP per capita: $64,800 20. Greece • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $1.40 billion,
35.4 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $59 million, 90.8 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): Germany, USA, France • GDP per capita: $24,574 19. Italy • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $1.81 billion, 55.5
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $241 million, 77.5 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Germany, Israel • GDP per capita: $35,220 18. Morocco • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.05 billion, 45.2
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $333 million, 86.0 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, France, Italy • GDP per capita: $7,485 17. Canada • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.26 billion, 76.2
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $121 million, 56.3 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Netherlands, Germany • GDP per capita: $44,018 16. Afghanistan • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.40
billion, 70.8 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $206 million, 85.8 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Russia, Brazil • GDP per capita: $1,796 15. Pakistan • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.51
billion, 21.6 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $12 million, 1.5 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): China, USA, Russia • GDP per capita: $5,035 14. Qatar • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.63 billion,
68.3 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $423 million, 51.8 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Germany, France • GDP per capita: $116,932 13. Egypt • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.84 billion,
27.9 percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $197 million, 13.3 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): France, Russia, USA • GDP per capita: $10,551 12. Israel • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $2.91 billion, 69.6
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $480 million, 96.4 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Germany, Italy • GDP per capita: $33,132 11. India • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $3.10 billion, 9.1
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $25 million, 1.6 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): Russia, Israel, USA • GDP per capita: $6,430 10. Taiwan • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $3.58 billion, 95.1 percent
of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $129 million, 100 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Germany, Italy • GDP per capita: $00 9. United Kingdom • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $3.60 billion, 70.1 percent
of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $194 million, 36.4 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, South Korea, Germany • GDP per capita: $39,753 8. Turkey • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $3.82 billion, 45.8
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $293 million, 42.8 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Spain, Italy • GDP per capita: $25,135 7. Singapore • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $3.97 billion, 49.8
percent of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $56 million, 11.0 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, France, Spain • GDP per capita: $85,535 6. Japan • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $4.31 billion, 93.4 percent
of arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $675 million, 97.0 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, UK, Sweden • GDP per capita: $39,002 5. Iraq • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $4.45 billion, 55.8 percent of arms
imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $40 million, 6.7 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Russia, South Korea • GDP per capita: $15,393 4. South Korea • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $7.40 billion, 66.7 percent of
arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $612 million, 46.5 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Germany, UK • GDP per capita: $35,938 3. UAE • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $7.60 billion, 63.7 percent of arms
imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $799 million, 72.6 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, France, Turkey • GDP per capita: $67,293 2. Australia • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $8.09 billion, 66.4 percent of arms
imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $918 million, 58.4 percent of arms imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, Spain, France • GDP per capita: $44,649
1. Saudi Arabia • Arms imports from US, 2008-2018: $13.72 billion, 59.6 percent of
arms imports • Arms imports from US, 2018: $3.35 billion, 88.0 percent of arms
imports • 1st, 2nd, and 3rd largest suppliers (2014-2018): USA, UK, France • GDP per capita: $48,986
Saudi foreign military sales are key to defense industry growth

Kane 19 (Alex Kane; New York-based journalist who focuses on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East; 5/20/19;
“Here’s Exactly Who’s Profiting from the War on Yemen”; https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-
war-arms-sales.html; DS)
Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s richest countries, has been bombing Yemen, the fifth-
poorest nation in the world, since 2015—with support from the United States. Their mission is to topple the Houthis, an armed
political movement that overthrew Yemen’s president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a Saudi ally, in February 2015. Saudi Arabia (a
Sunni monarchy with an oppressed Shiite minority) feared that the Houthi movement in Yemen (who are Zaydis, a Shiite sect) was
acting as an arm of its regional foe, Iran, in an effort to take power right across its southern border. While the Houthis have never
been controlled by Iran, Iran delivers arms to the movement.
Under President Barack Obama’s administration and, now, President Donald Trump’s,
the United States has put its military might behind the Saudi-led coalition , waging a war
without congressional authorization. That war has devastated Yemen’s infrastructure, destroyed or damaged more than half of
Yemen’s health facilities, killed more than 8,350 civilians, injured another 9,500 civilians, displaced 3.3 million people, and created a
humanitarian disaster that threatens the lives of millions as cholera and famine spread through the country.
U.S. arms merchants, however, have grown rich . Fragments of the bombs were documented by
journalists and HRW with help from Mastaba villagers. An HRW munitions expert determined the bombs were 2,000-
pound MK-84s, manufactured by General Dynamics. Based in Falls Church, Va., General Dynamics is the
world’s sixth most profitable arms manufacturer. One of the bombs used a satellite guidance kit from Chicago-based Boeing, the
world’s second-most profitable weapons company. The other bomb had a Paveway guidance system,
made by either Raytheon of Waltham, Mass., the third-largest arms company in the
world, or Lockheed Martin of Bethesda, Md., the world’s top weapons contractor. An In These
Times analysis found that in the past decade, the State Department has approved at least $ 30.1
billion in Saudi military contracts for these four companies.

The war in Yemen has been particularly lucrative for General Dynamics, Boeing and
Raytheon, which have received hundreds of millions of dollars in Saudi weapons deals.
All three corporations have highlighted business with Saudi Arabia in their reports to
shareholders. Since the war began in March 2015, General Dynamics’ stock price has
risen from about $135 to $169 per share, Raytheon’s from about $108 to more than $180, and Boeing’s from about $150 to $360.
Lockheed Martin declined to comment for this story. A spokesman for Boeing said the company follows “guidance from the
United States government,” while Raytheon replied, “You will need to contact the U.S. government.” General Dynamics did not
respond to inquiries. The State Department declined to comment on the record.
The weapons contractors are correct on one point: They’re working hand-in-glove with the State
Department. By law, the department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs must approve any arms sales by U.S. companies to
foreign governments. U.S. law also prohibits sales to countries that indiscriminately kill civilians, as the Saudi-led military coalition
bombing Yemen did in the Mastaba strike and many other documented cases. But ending sales to Saudi Arabia
would cost the U.S. arms industry its biggest global customer , and to do so, Congress must
cross an industry that pours millions into the campaigns of lawmakers of both parties.
2NC – GCC
GCC countries are the largest arms buyers
Vickers et al 18 (Joanna Vickers; Associate Director Communications at IHS Markit, MA in Middle Eastern Politics
and Arabic Language from SOAS University of London, MA in History from Cambridge University; Jane’s Defence
Budgets; unique methodology to deliver a macro-level analysis of national defence spending around the world.
Covering 105 countries accounting for 99% of global defence spend, it provides a 20-year view with 10 years of
historical analysis alongside 10 years of forecast; 9/6/18; “Gulf States’ Defence Spending to Hit Record High Amid
Ongoing Regional Conflict, Jane’s by IHS Markit Says”;
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180906005357/en/Gulf-States%E2%80%99-Defence-Spending-Hit-
Record-High; DS)
Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) member states are forecast to

LONDON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The
spend over USD100 billion on their defence capabilities for the first time next year, with
increasing budgets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) driving growth between
2018 and 2027.
Across the Gulf states comprising the

GCC (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman), defence budgets
are expected to reach record highs next year, with increases in spending primary
focused on modernising and expanding military force structure and improving readiness in
response to continuing regional instability.
“The6 percent growth in defence expenditure in the GCC that we’ve seen this year is
expected to slow, but growth rates of 3 to 4 percent a year are sustainable over the next decade –
meaning that defence spending is likely to hit a record USD100 billion next year,” said
Craig Caffrey, principal defence budgets analyst at Jane’s by IHS Markit. “If we see any significant increases in oil prices, we’ll
probably see further growth – or at the very least, more procurement activity.”
Jane’s Defence Budgets data says that despite

predicted fluctuations in the growth rate, defence spending
will continue to increase over the next five years, reaching around USD117 billion by 2023. In total, the
states of the GCC are expected to spend around USD86 billion on defence equipment over the next five years.
GCC defence budgets have risen as a percentage of GDP over recent years , but even more
significantly are also rising as a share of government spending; highlighting the importance placed on enhancing military capabilities.
A major driving factor in defence procurement plans has been the increase in operational activity by GCC
militaries in places such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Such actions have led to an increase in spending on the
development of expeditionary and intelligence gathering capabilities, as well as the bolstering of combat aircraft fleets.
Can the GCC escape North American export domination? Despite

accounting for just 5 percent of global
defence spending the GCC is responsible for almost a quarter of all imports of
defence equipment – importing assets worth approximately USD56 billion between 2014 and 2018.
North America and Europe provide about 95 percent of all equipment acquired by Gulf
states. The US alone has accounted for about half of all exports to the GCC in the last
five years. However, despite the prevalence of equipment from these sources, other suppliers – ranging from Australia to China
and Turkey – are increasing their market presence.
GCC military spending provides billions of dollars for US defense manufacturers
Cordseman 15 (Anthony H. Cordesman; Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, former adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University, and has twice
been a Wilson fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian; 4/28/15; “Military Spending and
Arms Sales in the Gulf”; https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-spending-and-arms-sales-gulf; DS)
There are many ways to measure the Gulf military balance, but one
key indicator is to look at the relative
size of Gulf military expenditures and the size and nature of Gulf arms imports and transfers of military
technology. The Burke Chair has prepared a detailed comparison of key estimates of both military spending and arms transfers,
drawing upon official sources as well as the work of key research centers like the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
This report is entitled Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf: How the Arab Gulf States Now Dominate the Changes in the
Military Balance, and is available on the CSIS web site here. It provides a wide range of tables and charts describing the patterns in
military spending and arms transfers both in comparative dollar terms and by major weapons system and transfer of military
technology.
Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage over Iran in both

The summary data show that the
the size of their recent military spending and the size and quality of their arms
transfers and imports of military tech nology.
What is most striking, however, is

the growing level of sophistication in Arab Gulf arms and
related weapons technology at a time when Iran is facing major constraints on its military modernization due to the
limits to its military spending and the impact of sanctions and other political constraints on its access to arms.
The full text provides the details of key arms transfers, and explains the following key trends in military
spending and arms transfers:
• The limits to Iran’s military expenditures have been a matter of necessity more than intent, and this necessity has resulted from
international pressure and sanctions as the limits imposed by Iran’s GDP and its need to support a large native population. Iran has
been subject to expanding and crippling sanctions, leading to a devalued currency, significant reductions in oil exports, trade
disruptions, higher inflation, and a shrinking economy; challenges that some GCC Gulf States are not facing.
• It is scarcely surprising that the GCC collectively spends more on their military
than Iran. Saudi Arabia, alone, spent nearly $56.5 billion on its military in 2012, compared to Iran’s
$10.6 billion. Collectively, the GCC spent nearly $ 98.5 billion on their militaries,
outspending Iran nearly 10:1. This spending superiority allows the GCC to invest in newer technology, weaponry and
defense acquisitions.
• IISS estimates of total military expenditures show that that the GCC, as a whole, spends far more than Iran on its military. Saudi
Arabia alone spent about 5.5 times more than Iran on its military and the United Arab
Emirates spent almost twice as much as Iran during this period. And, as a whole, the GCC combined
spent just over 9 times more than Iran on its military.
• SIPRI data show a similar Arab lead over Iran. Saudi Arabia spends some 4-5 times as much as Iran, and the UAE alone has
outspent Iran since 2007. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the two Arab Gulf states with the most modern Arab Gulf military forces are
combined – they have consistently spent more than six times as much as Iran.
• Data issued by the Congressional Research Service show that the GCC took $38.5 billion worth of new
arms transfers between 2004 and 2011: 35 times Iran’s deliveries of only $1.1 billion. The size of new orders
during 2004-2011 has been less favorable, but
the Gulf states still ordered $106.1 billion worth of
arms to Iran’s $9 billion – an uneven spending ratio of almost twelve-to-one (12:1).
• SIPRI data also indicate that the Arab Gulf states in the GCC have a massive lead over Iran in arms imports. The gap is so great in
given periods that the GCC states lead Iran by nearly 7:1 during 1997-2007, 10:1 in 2004-2008, 33:1 in 2009-2013, and 27.5:1 in
2007-2014.
• The Arab Gulf states had a clear advantage between 2004 and 2008 in terms of both total spending on arms imports and access to
modern US and European arms. Saudi Arabia’s expenditures alone were twice as large as Iran’s, and the UAE was more than seven
times larger.
• The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states widened sharply from 2009-2014, during which Saudi Arabia’s arms imports have
been more than 18 times larger than Iran’s. The UAE’s imports are 16 times larger.
The GCC advantage in importing weapons and military technology has been partially offset by the lack of standardized, and to some
extent interoperability in GCC and allied forces that come from each country buying a different mix of weapons and equipment from
different suppliers, as well as from the lack of standardization in doctrine, training, supply, and logistics.
At the same time, the

GCC states benefit from access to outside training facilities , military
experience, and access to advanced US Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities
and
Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and battle management capabilities
(C4I/BM). They also do not face technological risk since they can choose between proven
systems while any Iranian produced systems that are not exact copies of foreign
systems mean Iran must assume the risk of problems in performance , delivery delays, and cost
escalation.must assume the risk of problems in performance, delivery delays, and cost escalation.
Middle Eastern states account for nearly half of US arms exports

Wezeman et al 18 (Pieter D. Wezeman; Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military
Expenditure Programme; Alexandra Kuimova; research assistant with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure
Programme; Aude Fleurant; Nan Tian; Siemon T. Wezeman; March 2018; “TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS, 2017”; https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf; DS)
The United States
The USA was the top arms exporter in 2013–17 and 2008–12. Its share of total arms exports
rose from 30 per cent to 34 per cent between those periods . The USA’s exports of major arms grew
by 25 per cent between 2008–12 and 2013–17, further widening the gap between it and all other arms exporters (see figure 3). In
2013–17 US arms exports were 58 per cent higher than those of Russia—the second largest arms exporter for that period. In 2008–
12 its arms exports were 17 per cent higher than Russia’s. US arms exports in 2017 were the highest for a single year since 1998. It
should be noted that contracts for most of these deliveries were agreed up to 10 years ago.
States in the Middle East accounted for 49 per cent of US arms exports in 2013–17,
followed by states in Asia and Oceania (33 per cent), Europe (11 per cent), the Americas (4.8 per cent) and Africa (2.2 per cent ).
The USA delivered major weapons to at least 98 states in 2013–17, a significantly
higher number of export destinations than any other supplier . Of the world’s 50 largest arms
importers in 2013–17, only 7 did not receive or place orders for major arms from the USA during that period. By far the
largest recipient of US arms in 2013–17 was Saudi Arabia , accounting for 18 per
cent of US arms exports (see figure 4). The USA’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia increased
by 448 per cent between 2008–12 and 2013–17.
Arms transfers are often used as a US foreign policy tool to forge new strategic partnerships. As part of its efforts to offset China’s
growing influence in Asia and Oceania, for example, the USA has been strengthening its ties with India: its arms deliveries to India
rose by 557 per cent between 2008–12 and 2013–17. The USA has also started to increase its security cooperation with Viet Nam in
recent years. In 2017 it delivered one large patrol ship to Viet Nam—the first US transfer of major arms to that country. The
USA
exports a wide variety of major weapons, and combat and transport aircraft account
for a large proportion of these exports. The USA delivered 200 combat aircraft in 2013–17. These deliveries
included a total of 50 F-35 combat aircraft, of which 12 were delivered to the United Kingdom, 10 to Norway, 9 each to Israel and
Italy, 6 to Japan, and 2 each to Australia and the Netherlands. The USA also delivered 30 F-15SG combat
aircraft to Saudi Arabia and 16 to Singapore. By contrast, the volume of US exports of military ships is relatively modest.
In 2013–17, for example, the USA’s volume of exports of military ships was smaller than the volumes exported by Germany, Spain or
the Netherlands.
Taiwan
1NC
F-16 sales to Taiwan are necessary for domestic manufacturing growth
Kan 14 (Shirley A. Kan; Independent Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Retired Specialist in Asian Security Affairs for
Congress at CRS, Graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service (SFS) and University of Michigan’s
Rackham Graduate School; 8/29/14; “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf; DS)
Taiwan included $82 million for the F-16C/D program in the 2009 defense budget, for a
total cost estimated at $4.7 billion. In public remarks on April 22, 2009, President Ma Ying-jeou reiterated
his commitment to the Obama Administration that Taiwan still requested the F-16 C/Ds.
By mid2009, Taiwan quietly admitted difficulty in sustaining costly maintenance of the Mirage fighters, but Taiwan’s Air Force denied
in October 2010 earlier reports that it had to mothball the Mirages. Without a U.S. decision through 2009 on whether to consider
Taiwan’s request for F-16C/Ds (despite Taiwan’s funding in defense budgets), 26 of Taiwan’s
legislators, led by Shuai Hua-
ming, sent a letter to the Congress in early January 2010 to express their bipartisan
commitment to the request. On January 29, 2010, when President Obama first notified Congress of arms sales to
Taiwan, Administration officials noted that they were still assessing Taiwan’s need for fighters.
Lockheed Martin stressed the urgency of a new sale of F-16 fighters to

In 2010,
Taiwan, because it would help keep the production line open as the F-16 program
was drawing to an end. The manufacturing process would need contracts three years
before the production line closes, in part to sustain sub-contracts for supplies . By 2020,
Taiwan’s fighters would drop in number by 70% without new F-16s and by 50% with 66 new F-
16s. Lockheed Martin also commissioned a study released in June 2011 that estimated a program of F-16s for
Taiwan with direct spending of about $ 4.6 billion with 23,407 direct jobs in 44 states
and the District of Columbia (while generating about $8.7 billion in total output and 87,664 in total jobs when
including indirect employment).139 Still, Taiwan was not the only interested buyer of F-16s. Aside from commercial considerations,
a concern for policymakers would be the dim chance of an alternative if the F-16 is no longer available. Moreover, years after Taiwan
first asked for F-16C/Ds, the issue evolved to the U.S. response to deterioration in Taiwan’s whole air force, beyond whether to sell
more planes. In an address to the United States on May 12, 2011, President Ma reiterated Taiwan’s need to buy F16C/D
fighters and submarines, primarily for leverage in political negotiations with Beijing. Ma was
running for reelection in January 2012, and his campaign manager, King Pu-tsung, visited Washington where on September 11, he
called U.S. arms “bargaining chips” with the PRC. Meanwhile, visiting Deputy Minister of Defense Andrew Yang said in Richmond on
September 18 that Taiwan also looks to procure the more advanced F-35 fighters. He
called the F-16C/Ds and
submarines the most urgent systems for Taiwan to acquire (not the F-16A/B upgrade).
2NC
New military deals are crucial for US domestic manufacturing
Lu 18 (Zhenhua Lu; covers US-China bilateral diplomacy and defense for the Post. He was previously a Beijing and
Brussels correspondent for the 21st Century Business Herald; 11/26/18; “US$330 million arms sale to Taiwan will go
ahead, says US Congress”; https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2170262/us330-million-arms-sale-
taiwan-clears-congressional-review-may; DS)
A planned US$330 million arms sale to Taiwan has won de facto Congressional
approval, clearing the way for the US State State Department to complete the
agreement – and potentially upsetting Beijing.
The sale passed through a 30-day review process that expired at midnight on Wednesday night
without triggering any Congressional disapproval. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs
Committee had joint authority to halt the sale.
The deal marks the second US arms sale to Taiwan in less than 18 months under US President
Donald Trump. The administration approved an initial US$ 1.4 billion deal in June 2017, in a
show of support and deepening defence ties between Washington and Taipei.
The new sale covers spare parts for “F-16, C-130, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all
other aircraft systems and subsystems, an other related elements of logistics and program support”,
according to the Pentagon’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency.
The approval came days after two US warships sailed through the Taiwan Strait and also ahead
of a US-Taiwan defence industry conference . Scheduled to begin on Monday in Annapolis, Maryland,
the conference is expected to include Taiwan’s deputy defence minister Chang Guan-chung as well as US government
representatives.
Future arms sales to Taiwan are key to US manufacturing revenue

McBride 19 (Courtney McBride; reporter of the State Department, foreign policy, and national security for the
Wall Street Journal, undergraduate degree from UPenn; 6/6/19; “U.S. Plans More Than $2 Billion in Weapons Sales to
Taiwan, Angering Beijing”; https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-plans-more-than-2-billion-in-weapons-sales-to-taiwan-
angering-beijing-11559870443; DS)
WASHINGTON—The U.S. is planning a new effort to help the Taiwanese government

upgrade its military by allowing Taipei to buy billions of dollars’ worth of weapons
systems, possibly including more than 100 tanks —a move that has already drawn
criticism from Beijing.
Washington is legally obliged under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 to help the self-
ruled island access defensive weapons, but such transactions are bitterly opposed by Beijing, which considers
Taiwan a breakaway province. A new round of weapons sales to Taipei would also risk further inflaming tensions between the U.S.
and China as the two countries remain locked in a trade fight.
Multiple people familiar with the weapons-sales plan told The Wall Street Journal that members of
Congress have been informally notified of the possible arms sale . Ultimately, the Taiwanese
government would have the option to buy some or all of the items included in the proposal, these people said.
Reuters earlier reported the potential sale, which

includes Abrams tanks, antitank missiles, medium-
range tactical missiles and portable Stinger air-defense missiles. The value could be in
excess of $2 billion .
A State Department official, citing U.S. government policy on potential or pending arms sales, declined to comment on or confirm
the terms before formal congressional notification. A representative of the Taiwanese government declined to comment beyond a
Ministry of National Defense statement confirming its request for the weapon systems, in accordance with U.S. procedures for
foreign military sales.
In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said “China firmly, consistently and unequivocally opposes U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan.” He said he urged Washington to recognize the sensitive nature of the matter, honor the One China policy and halt
any U.S. arms sales to or military relations with Taiwan.
China and Taiwan have been governed separately since 1949, when China’s Nationalist government retreated to the island after it
was ousted from the mainland by Communist Party forces.
The U.S. officially adheres to the One China policy, meaning Washington won’t establish formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, but
the U.S. and Taiwan view the sales as crucial for stability in the region. President Trump approved a $1.42
billion arms sale in 2017, and the Obama administration approved a similar transfer
in 2015.
Arms sales to Taiwan are key to US defense manufacturing growth

DID 19 (Defense Industry Daily; government and industry professionals dedicated to tracking and analyzing military
contracts, awards and programs; last updated 7/5/19; “Taiwan’s Force Modernization: The American Side”;
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/taiwans-unstalled-force-modernization-04250/; DS)
The USA is also selling Taiwan the newest version of its attack helicopter, the AH-64E
Apache Guardian. Its Longbow radar mast allows it to use radar guided, fire and forget missiles, and it also carries Stinger
missiles for defense against enemy aircraft. Engine and communications upgrades, including the ability to control UAVs remotely,
round out that package. The 30 Apaches would serve alongside Taiwan’s 60+ AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, as a rapid reaction
force able to counterattack beachheads and exploit the hilly island’s natural chokepoints.
Sea Control
At sea, the situation is simultaneously less overtly perilous, and less hopeful. China’s navy is certainly growing, but is not yet
overwhelming. The problem is that without air superiority as cover, no Taiwanese surface navy can expect to survive, in order to
maintain control of the seas around Taiwan. Britain faced the same equation in World War 2, and prevailed by winning in the air.
If that isn’t possible, a good submarine force is the classic military solution. Submarines are capable of either destroying efforts to
cross the strait, or strangling Chinese trade as it moves through Southeast Asia’s key choke points. Modern missiles give them vastly
longer offensive reach, and modern submarines are very difficult to find and target once they put to sea. For a nation like Taiwan,
they’re the ultimate conventional deterrent against invasion.
Taiwan’s comprehensive failure to field this trump card stems even more directly from Chinese pressure. The USA approved a sale
request in 2001, but they haven’t produced conventionally-powered subs for many decades, and don’t want to be the supplier.
Without that option on tap, Chinese diplomacy has utterly strangled Taiwan’s efforts to find a party who is (a) able to make diesel-
electric subs; and (b) is willing to sell them to Taiwan. The Republic of China currently relies on 2 submarines that are too old for
anything but training missions, and 2 Hai Lung (Sea Dragon) class submarines. The Hai Lungs were ordered from the Dutch firm
Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM) in 1981, as a derivative of their Zwaardvis (Swordfish) class external link. A follow-on
order for 4 more submarines was blocked by the Dutch government in 1992 thanks to Chinese pressure, and RDM went out of
business a few years later.
Since then, Taiwan has explored a number of alternatives to obtain diesel-electric submarines, without success. They are even
reportedly considering building their own boats from foreign designs. Australia’s experience suggests that this course may be
fraught with peril, and Taiwan has a number of technology gaps to address: ship design technology, torpedoes, sonar, propulsion
systems, combat systems, and submarine periscope lenses. On the other hand, if the alternative is no submarines at all, and
submarines are one of your most critical national defense needs, the perils of caution may outweigh the risks of inexperience.
Taiwan seems determined to face the peril, and a report is expected by June 2014.
Land Defense
Land defense improvements currently center on portable missiles, mobility, and massed counterattack against amphibious or
paradropped beach-heads. The missiles provide dispersed, hard-to-target defenses against enemy aircraft and armored vehicles.
Helicopter mobility allows rapid response to enemy airdrops or pre-positioned guerrilla units. Massed counterattack means the
heavy armor of tanks, which remain the most important and element for crushing enemy beach-heads.
Taiwan’s situation with respect to tanks isn’t very good. The Republic of China Army currently fields about 480 M60A3 tanks
acquired in the 1990s, but the M60 first entered US service in 1960, and the A3 version entered US service in the late 1970s. They’re
joined by 450 much older CM11s (modified M48H 105mm turrets with improved fire control, mated to M60 hulls), and 300 of the
M-48 medium tanks whose base design dates back to the 1950s: 50 M48A3s, and 250 CM12s (modified CM11 turrets mated to
M48A3 hulls).
Contracts & Key Events
This article focuses on foreign imports, and the vast majority come from the USA . The US DSCA
references to “the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States” are diplo-speak for “Taiwan” or
“Republic of China”. DID uses the conventional term instead. Note that DSCA requests are not contracts; those are separate
announcements, and sometimes years pass between the two events. Having said this, a DSCA request does open the door to
contracts as permitted weapons exports through the Foreign Military Sales process, unless Congress moves to block the proposed
sale within 30 days.
Note that upgrades to the ROCAF’s locally-designed and built F-CK-1 fighters are covered in a separate article, as an Indigenous
Taiwanese program that sits outside this article’s scope.
July 5/19: F-16 Deal Reviewed Lara Seligman from Foreign Policy Magazine reported external link that Taiwan’s request to buy F-16V
jets was expected to move forward this month, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday said that the request is still only being
reviewed by the US. According to the article, although the deal for 66 F-16 Block 70 jets has been stalled, it is expected to move
forward before the US Congress begins its traditional recess next month. The negotiations over price and configuration of the
aircraft had led to the deal taking longer than expected, Seligman wrote. However, Taiwan’s request must still be converted into a
formal proposal by the US Department of Defense and Department of State, and then Congress officially notified, after which
lawmakers would have 30 days to block the sale if they want.
May 27/19: Peace Phoenix Rising Program FMS F-16 The Air Force awarded external link Lockheed
Martin a $ 16 .4 million contract modification to support the Taiwan F-16 Peace
Phoenix Rising program. Taiwan kicked off its modernization program at the beginning of the year and called for 144
Lockheed Martin F-16 A/B Fighting Falcon’s to be upgraded under the Taiwan F-16 Peace Phoenix Rising program. The F-16
Fighting Falcon is a single-engine, multi-role fighter jet that is primarily used for air-to-
air and air-to-surface missions. The modification provides for miscellaneous support work identified during
performance of the in-country aircraft modification program, use and maintenance of product support aircraft, and additional
support necessary for the successful completion of modification installs. Lockheed will perform work in Fort Worth, Texas and
Taiwan and expects completion by the end of May, 2023.
May 10/19: F-16 Pilots are moving The training ground for the Taiwanese F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona will be
relocated external link to Tucson International Airport within the next two years. The relocation will cost Taiwan approximately $8
million. Taiwan’s pilots have trained at Luke Air Force Base for more than 20 years since the country purchased the first batch of F-
16 fighter jets from the US. The transfer of the 21st Fighter Squadron, where Taiwanese pilots are trained to fly F-16 jets, will begin
in 2020, to provide space for new F-35 fighters.
November 3/18: Viper instead of F-35? Taiwan’s external link air force is hoping that the US approves its requested purchase for new
F-16V fighter jets. The air force sees the F-16V as a platform that would increase the country’s air defense capabilities, while also
being a cheaper alternative to the costly F-35. Defense Minister Yan Defa minded that the service must evaluate the platform based
on its combat strength and supplement capability to the other three aircraft types in service, he also reassured that any proposed
platform that meets the operational requirements will be taken into consideration. Taiwan’s main fighter platforms are the F-16,
AIDC F-CK-1 known as Indigenous Defense Fighter and the Mirage 2000, all of which are about 20 years old. Past requests for the
purchase of 66 F-16C/D fighters were rejected by the US government. As an alternative the US proposed the delivery of F-16Vs
which have a comparable performance to the C/D variants. Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping told external
link the South China Morning Post that ‘the US had considered selling the production lines of its discontinued F-16 and F-18 fighter
jets to India, and it was possible it may also sell the F-16 production line to Taiwan’.
October 5/18: Viper incoming The Taiwanese Air Force will soon external link be able to fly the first batch of upgraded F-16s. The
first four planes to be delivered are currently undergoing ground-testing at Taiwan’s state-owned Aerospace Industrial Development
Corp. Taiwan is currently in the process of upgrading its fleet of 144 F-16 A/B jets to the Viper configuration. The $3.64 billion
program is considered the most important modernization program ever undertaken by the Air Force and significantly enhances its
war fighting capabilities. Upgrades in the V-variant include new mission computers, navigation equipment, large color multifunction
displays, Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) transponders, updated electronic warfare suite, and the Link-16 tactical data
link, as well as an AN/APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR).
September 26/18: Package The

US Defense Security Cooperation Agency is green lighting a
military sales package external link to Taiwan. The approved sale is valued at $ 330
million and provides for the delivery of spare and replenishment parts needed to
keep Taiwan’s F-16s, C-130s and F-5s operational. This package is part of a US contribution to Taiwan’s Force
Modernization program, aimed at breaking the country’s defense equipment logjam. Taiwan expects to retire its F-5 and Mirage
2000v5 fighters by 2020. To mitigate this decrease in fighter numbers, Taiwan is modernizing its fleet of F-16s, this is however a
medium term solution, not a long term one, and does nothing to address the growing numeric imbalance across the strait.
September 10/18: ROCAF budget increase The Taiwanese government plans to significantly boost its F-16 budget. The Ministry of
National Defense will need external link about $4.6 billion to maintain parity between the upgraded F-16s and the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Air Force’s tactical fighters. A large chunk of the budget will be spend on a variety of air-to-air missiles and
automated ground collision avoidance systems. The ROCAF has a total of 115 F-16s, of which 24 are out of service for upgrades at
any point and 16 are in the USA for training at Luke AFB. By 2023 Taiwan will have an updated fleet of F-16Vs external link. The latest
variant of the fighter jet integrates advanced capabilities as part of an upgrade package to better interoperate with fifth-generation
fighters, including the F-35 and the F-22. The Viper can be deployed in suppression of enemy air defense missions, air-to-ground and
air-to-air combat, and deep interdiction and maritime interdiction missions.
July 18/18: US FMS The

government of Taiwan is set to receive support for its fleet of F-16
fighter aircraft as part of a US foreign military sale. URS Federal Services will provide a
maintenance and supply support to meet all of the 21st Fighter Squadron mission
objectives under this firm-fixed task order external link valued at $7.3 million . Taiwan is
currently in the middle of a modernization program that seeks to improve the island’s ability to control the sea and deny enemies to
take that control. The ultimate issue for Taiwan is one of numbers. In the air, quantity has a quality all its own. The
current
fighter jet availability is quite low with just 74 out of 146 F-16s considered to be
operational. This task order provides safe, efficient and effective maintenance for sortie production of Taiwan’s 14 Block 20 F-
16 aircraft for the Taiwan Air Force. Work will be performed at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, and is expected to be completed by end
of July, 2019.
Turkey
1NC
Arms sales to Turkey are key to US manufacturing growth
Thomas 17 (Clayton Thomas; Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, MA in
Middle East Studies at George Washington University, BA in History and Political Science at UNC Chapel Hill;
10/11/17; “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy”;
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf; DS)
Turkey has historically been one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms , owing to its
status as a NATO ally, its large and politically powerful military, and its strategic
position. Although Turkey straddles a number of disparate geographic regions, since the end of the Cold War its security focus
has increasingly been to its south and east (the Middle East)—hence its inclusion in this report.
Roughly coinciding with the phase-out of U.S. FMF to Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s, and perhaps
influenced to a degree by periodic delays or cancellations of proposed U.S.-Turkey arms deals due to
congressional concerns, 53 Turkey began reformulating its procurement strategy to include both new suppliers and
increased domestic production. 54 Yet, Turkey maintains key links with U.S. manufacturers , most
importantly as a partner in the production of the F-35, of which Turkey ordered 100; the first
delivery is expected in 2018. Turkey’s approach rests on building up its domestic defense industry
(including through technology-sharing and co-production arrangements with other countries) as much as
possible, while minimizing “off-the-shelf” arms purchases from the United States and other countries.
Recent Turkish actions regarding the procurement of air and missile defense systems
are perhaps the most prominent examples of Turkey’s willingness to range outside of its traditional security
partnerships with the United States and other NATO countries to develop indigenous defense industrial capabilities. In 2013, Turkey
announced a state-owned Chinese company as the preferred bidder for a missile defense system contract, over American (Patriot
missile defense), European (SAMP/T), and Russian (S-400) competitors, spa rking
concern from Members of
Congress and other observers regarding Turkey’s commitment to NATO . Turkish officials,
however, emphasized the lower cost of the Chinese system (known as the HQ-9) and greater willingness by the Chinese to transfer
technology than was reflected in the U.S. or European offers.55 The tender was officially canceled in November 2015, but in March
2017, Turkish officials expressed a new interest in the Russian S-400 anti-air missile system.
Ukraine
1NC
Ukrainian arms sales are key to the US manufacturing sector
Semchuk 19 (Liana Semchuk; PhD candidate in politics at the University of Oxford, MPhil Comparative
Government at the University of Oxford; 3/27/19; “U.S. arms sales to Ukraine keeping the conflict alive”;
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2019/03/27/US-arms-sales-to-Ukraine-keeping-the-conflict-
alive/3381553687739/; DS)
Despite attempts by Volker and Scaparrotti to market the proposition as a way to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia, the
immediate benefits seem clearer to America's weapons manufacturing sector than to

Ukrainian civilians, who will undoubtedly get caught in the cross-fire.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that the United States
is home to five of the world's 10 largest defense contractors. Lockheed Martin , by far the largest in the field, in
2017 had an estimated $44.9 billion in arms contracts globally .
The company was also contracted (with Raytheon) in 2018 to provide Ukraine with
Javelin anti-tank missiles.
The U.S. Pentagon said: "The Javelin system will help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and
territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements."
But Lockheed Martin likely profited handsomely from the deal. Meanwhile, the company's
financial reports showed fourth quarter 2018 net sales of $14.4 billion , compared to $13.8
billion in the fourth quarter of 2017. This year, the company is expecting sales to grow by as much as 6 percent.
This is unlikely to be the case if the number of conflicts around the world declines .
It's clear why Washington wants to sell more weapons to Ukraine. But whether Ukraine remains
receptive and willing to continue buying them may hinge on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election, which is scheduled
for Sunday.
Impacts/Internals
Economy Scenario
1NC – Econ
Maintaining domestic manufacturing is key to economic growth, jobs, and
innovation
Ettlinger and Gordon 11 (Michael Ettlinger, Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for American
Progress, Kate Gordon, Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress, April 2011, “The
Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing”, https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf)
Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the

strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the machines and the men and women who
worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come.
Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what happens behind the
factory gates. The
strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries implications
for the entire economy, our national security, and the well-being of all Americans.
Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the private-sector
workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing
is only a part of the picture.
First, jobs in the manufacturing

sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of Americans. Those jobs
serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard-working, middle-skill
workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens and strengthens the middle class
to the benefit of the entire economy.
What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that are quite
different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill service jobs that include the
accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad
range of other jobs including basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and
design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.
Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership . The
problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher-
skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to
other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more
direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of these service jobs will
follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the
manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing operation—a critical element in
the innovative process—is eventually broken. To maintain that feedback loop,
companies need to move higher-skill jobs to where they do their manufacturing .
And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation .
This is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in
the United States matters. The “industrial commons” that comes from the
crossfertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and
government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.
Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience of
the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009
along with the rest of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as
construction, still languish. Diversity
in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly
important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected by broader economic
events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer goods as well as industrial
goods, serving both domestic and external markets— gives it great potential
resiliency .
Finally, supplying
our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector
protects us from international economic and political disruptions . This is most obviously
important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the
risk of a weak manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance
on imports and substantial
manufacturing trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to
everything from exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural
disasters .
Economic decline triggers nuclear conflict and terrorism

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and
international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator
and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and
vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security
@ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-
2014.pdf)
The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic

considerations within states can figure
prominently into the calculus for future conflicts . The findings also suggest that security
issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants
of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts
toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic
uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will
present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new
asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in
the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate
future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with
economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect
allied confidence in America’s security guarantees . The study shows that this outcome
could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-
pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state
groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar
international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD , resulting
from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan,
Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons
vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by
contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent
vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations
and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with
opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status . A more
ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to
the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.
2NC – Manufacturing K2 Econ
Strong manufacturing key to sustained growth – 6 reasons
RYNN 11 – author of the book Manufacturing Green Prosperity: The power to rebuild the American middle class, available
from Praeger Press. He holds a Ph.D. in political science and is a Visiting Scholar at the CUNY Institute for Urban Systems [Jon, Six
Reasons Manufacturing is Central to the Economy , Roosevelt Institute,
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/six-reasons-manufacturing-central-economy/, DKP]
Paul Krugman recently argued that “manufacturing is one of the bright spots of a generally disappointing recovery, and there are
signs — preliminary, but hopeful, nonetheless — that a sustained comeback may be under way.” He points out that the gap
between what we sell and what we buy has been improving. This must be set against a background of a manufacturing decline in the
United States of historic dimensions; even without adjusting for inflation, the trade deficit in goods for the United States between
2000 and 2010 was 7 trillion dollars. A turnaround in the attention of more perceptive economists and a turnaround in
manufacturing may be in the works. But before that, the crucial question is: Why is manufacturing so important?
1. Manufacturing has been the path to development
It has been the strategic achievement of rich nations over the last several hundred years to create
a high-quality manufacturing sector in order to develop national wealth and power , as
Erik Reinert shows in his book “How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor.” From the rise of England in
the 19th century, to the rise of the US, Germany, Japan and the USSR in the 20th, to the newly industrializing
countries like Korea, Taiwan, and now China, manufacturing has been the key to prosperity.
2. Manufacturing is the foundation of global “Great Power”

The most powerful nations in the world — the “Great Powers” — are those that control the
bulk of the global production of manufacturing technology. That is, it isn’t enough simply to have
factories and produce more goods, you have to know how to make the machinery that makes the goods. The key to power,
then, is to make the “means of production.”
As the machinery industries go, so goes Great Power. My own research shows that about 80% of the world’s production of factory
machinery has been controlled by what we would consider the “Great Powers.” Until the 1950s, the US had produced about 50%;
we now produce less than China’s 16%.
3. Manufacturing is the most important cause of economic growth
The growth of manufacturing machinery output, and technological improvements in that
machinery, are the main drivers of economic growth . No machinery industries, no
sustained, long-term economic growth. Just consider the explosion of the Internet ,
iPhones, and the like — all made possible by a small subset of production machinery called
semiconductor-making equipment (SME), which itself is dependent on other forms of production machinery, such
as the machine tools that grind the lenses they use or the alloys of metal the metal-making industries output. These
technologies reproduce themselves, as when an SME makes the semiconductors that then go to make more
SMEs, or when a machine tool makes the metal components that not only go into other pieces of machinery, such as cars, but are
used to produce yet more machine tools. The
technological and productive potential of machine
tools and SMEs affect each other as well, leading to the explosive economic growth of
the last two hundred years.
4. Global trade is based on goods, not services
A country can’t trade services for most of its goods. According to the WTO, 80% of world trade
among regions is merchandise trade — that is, only 20% of world trade is in services. This closely matches the
trade percentages that even the US, allegedly becoming “post-industrial,” achieves. If in the extreme case an
economy was composed only of services, then it would be very poor, because it
couldn’t trade for goods; its currency would be worth very little. The dollar is also
vulnerable in the long-term. A “post-industrial” economy is really a pre-industrial economy — that is, poor.
5. Services are dependent on manufactured goods
Services are mostly the act of using manufactured goods. You can’t export the
experience of using something . Retail and wholesale, which make up about 11% of the economy, are the act of
buying and selling manufactured goods. The same goes for real estate, another 13%, which is the act of buying and selling a “real” or
physical asset, a building. Even health, which makes up about 8% of the economy, is the act of using medical equipment and drugs
(all figures from 2010, value-added).
Finance involves the redirection of surplus resources that the nonfinancial sector of
the economy produces, which means that indirectly, even finance is dependent on
manufacturing. The cycle of rise and decline usually runs like this: some clever society figures out how
to take advantage of the current technologies of production , thus generating huge surpluses,
which either the financial forces, the very wealthy, or the military then appropriate for
their own wealth and power; they kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs. To sum up: the
health of the economy is critically dependent on the health of the manufacturing
sector.
6. Manufacturing creates jobs
Most jobs, directly or indirectly, depend on manufacturing — and reviving the sector could provide
tens of millions of new jobs, eradicating the Great Recession. In 2005, the Japanese manufacturing sector was 20.2% of its economy,
in Germany it was 23.2%, and in the US manufacturing accounted for 13.4%, according to the the OECD. Using 2005 figures, if
the
US had the same percentage as Japan, we would have 7 million more high-quality,
long-term, well paying jobs. If we were equal with Germany, we would have 10 million
more. And according to the Economic Policy Institute, each manufacturing job supports almost three
other jobs in the economy. That makes sense, considering the other five reasons that manufacturing is central to the
economy.
Thus, there are six solid reasons that we need to rebuild the manufacturing sector of the
United States. It’s time for the United States to wake up before it’s too late and rebuild the foundation of a strong, prosperous,
middle class economy.
Manufacturing is the cornerstone to the entire economy – consumers have

been weakening and can no longer keep it afloat
DUGUAY 18 – [Andrew, Opinion: U.S. manufacturing is now the key to economic growth, 5/24/2018,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-manufacturing-is-now-the-key-to-economic-growth-2018-05-24, DKP]
The new tax

reform will not reverse or undo any negative economic trends impacting the American
consumer. Rather,
it makes the U.S. significantly reliant on the industry long rumored to be dead … U.S.
manufacturing.
In the decade since the 2008 financial crisis, the consumer has been largely
responsible for carrying the U.S. economy. During 2015 and most of 2016 industrial production was so weak,
that questions arose as to whether the U.S. manufacturing could ever show signs of life again.
But in 2017,
continued strong growth throughout the year made it clear that
manufacturing could recover. While at the same time, the U.S. consumer has been
weakening due to rising inflation, tepid wage growth despite nearly full employment,
and the softening U.S. dollar. Additionally, the Fed continues to hike interest rates, making consumer credit more
expensive; in fact, total debt in 2017 surpassed the 2008 peak, according to the New York Federal Reserve.
As the consumer continues to weaken, it’s now up to the manufacturing sector to
keep the economy afloat by growing its exports and reinvesting the revenue growth
from overseas back into the U.S. economy.
In the short term, there have already been examples of the tax reform leading to reinvestments in the economy, For instance, the
first-quarter earnings season kicked off with Johnson & Johnson’s JNJ, +0.28% plan to invest more than $30 billion in capital projects
and research and development in the U.S.
At the same time, many companies that were holding dollars offshore must now repatriate them, meaning more money to invest
domestically. The
latest corporate tax reform has also unlocked new opportunities for
manufacturers to further invest in the domestic economy.
But, domestic sales alone will not be enough to keep the U.S. economy afloat. While it can be appealing to focus on the initial boon
of the tax reform, the aforementioned consumer indicators cannot be ignored and the Congressional Budget Office projects an
unprecedented growth of debt.
There is no reason to believe that acceleration in domestic gross domestic product will match these indicators.
To continue positive momentum, the U.S. will be heavily reliant on the manufacturing
industry to grow its exports. Fortunately, economies in Europe, North America and Asia are all accelerating
concurrently for the first time in a decade. This economic growth, particularly in China, is opening up more
opportunities for U.S. manufacturers to export, in some ways unexpectedly.
Manufacturing is the most important part of sustained growth – prospects are

strong but still shaky
MOUTRAY 16 – chief economist at the National Association of Manufacturers [Chad, A Strong Manufacturing
Sector Fuels Economic Growth, 11/21/2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/11/21/a-strong-
manufacturing-sector-fuels-economic-growth/#66294dc47f3e, DKP]
Manufacturing continues to be one of the most important bellwethers regarding the

health of the U.S. economy. The broader U.S. economy will not be able to grow
robustly without a rebound in manufacturing. Faster real GDP growth is possible, but
not until we get manufacturing humming along strongly once again.
Some analysts have posited that recent improvements show manufacturing is less important to
economic growth than it once was. In this thinking, strengths elsewhere more than outweigh weaknesses in the manufacturing
sector. After all, they suggest, manufacturing accounts for almost 12% of GDP today, down sharply from 31% 50 years ago, and
employment in the sector is a smaller share of the total pie.
Yet, such flawed analysis undersells how important manufacturing is for overall
economic growth. Manufacturers contributed nearly $2.2 trillion to the U.S. economy
in the most recent data, demonstrating how intertwined manufacturing firms are with the rest of the economy. Indeed ,
business leaders often tell me about the hundreds or—for larger firms—thousands of suppliers
they interact with every single day.
Manufacturing has the highest multiplier effect of any major sector . For every
dollar spent in manufacturing, another $1.81 is added to the economy, and for every
manufacturing worker, there are another four employees hired elsewhere. Indeed, shifts in
manufacturing can affect the larger economy significantly. More importantly, millions of Americans rely on
manufacturing as a path to the middle class. There are 12.3 million manufacturing workers, with average
compensation of $81,289 in 2015, including pay and benefits.
With that said, a number of factors have hampered manufacturing growth over the past two years, including a strong U.S. dollar,
slow economic growth abroad, low commodity prices and economic and political uncertainties. As a result, manufacturing growth
has often lagged behind stronger activity in other segments of the economy, particularly in the service sector. Along those lines,
manufacturing production saw no growth on a year-over-year basis in September, and business leaders in the sector are cautious in
their economic outlook.
Moving beyond the current challenges, the prospects for manufacturing are bright.
The United States is seen increasingly as a viable location for global manufacturers, with
foreign direct investment in the sector exceeding $1.2 trillion in 2015, an all-time high. In
addition, new technologies have the ability to alter radically the way manufacturers
innovate, produce and sell their products moving forward, improving efficiency and
competitiveness. In fact, manufacturing today is more globally competitive, and I
continue to be quite bullish about its long-term prospects in the United States.
Still, it is not a coincidence that sluggish economic growth has coincided with softness
in manufacturing demand and production. That’s why we need pro-growth
manufacturing policies that will fuel the sector and drive economic growth.
That might seem like a no-brainer to many of us who work in the manufacturing sector, but it bears repeating: Pro-growth
policies will ensure that manufacturing’s best days are ahead of us, lifting economic
prospects for everyone.
2NC – Competitiveness
DIB vital to national security and economic competitiveness – decline crushes
relative power
O’HANLON 11 – Senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in
U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy, PhD, MA, MSE, BA @ Princeton [Michael, 21st
CENTURY DEFENSE INITIATIVE POLICY PAPER, Brookings, The National Security Industrial Base: A Crucial Asset of the United States,
Whose Future May Be in Jeopardy, February 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/02_defense_ohanlon.pdf, DKP]
The significance of this runs counter to how issues in security are often framed. We
are accustomed in the American
public debate to praising men and women in uniform and yet we often ignore or even pillory
those who equip and support them—the scientists, engineers, industrialists, investors,
and workers who make the equipment that has allowed the United States to dominate
most forms of warfare for the last few decades. To be sure, there have been abuses in the defense corporate sector, as
well as an absence of adequate regulation for many of the overseas operations of contractors. But the fact remains that
American troops have been successful in the field wielding the weapons of war
manufactured for them primarily by U.S. firms. And an additional reality looms—many of these firms, and
thus many technology areas of excellence for the nation, could soon be in serious trouble.
High defense budgets are good for the defense industry and defense investors at one
level. They are dangerous, however, at another level. The stock market does not treat firms well when their
sector of the economy is expected to go into significant decline in the coming years, as is the case with defense—even if current
spending is reasonably robust. Companies do not enjoy laying off workers and shutting down facilities in communities that have
been loyal to them. The workers and communities obviously enjoy the process even less. And in a free-market system, beyond these
painful realities of the bust-and-boom cycle of industries that are vulnerable to such roller-coaster dynamics, there is also the
concern that cutbacks will be uncoordinated and unpredictable in effect. The
national asset represented by
research, development, and production capabilities at not just the prime contractors,
but also their many subcontractors could be jeopardized. Capabilities could be lost ,
and once lost, could be difficult, costly, and slow to replace if and when they are needed again.
The future taxpayer could suffer. Even more to the point, the nation’s future security
could be jeopardized , especially in an environment where rising powers and
entrepreneurial adversaries will be constantly attentive to any American
weaknesses.
industry also is a key engine in the American
We must also remember that the defense
economy , most specifically as an engine of trade and innovation. To use just one example, if
it was not for the defense industry’s role in everything from Global Positioning System (GPS)
to the Internet to the jet engine, we would not have global trading networks or the
“Just In Time” strategy that has raised so many organizations' returns on investment, quality,
and efficiency. Indeed, each of the major firms in this sector spin out literally
thousands of copyrights and inventions.
Competitiveness prevents great power nuclear war.

Khalilzad 11 [Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the
presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, “ The Economy and
National Security”, 2-8-11, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024]
We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries
such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are
growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These
trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and
other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international
order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify
geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to
play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond
to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In
modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of
U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their
competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great
powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.
American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American
security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against
emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races,
miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to
accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical
posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to
make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as
a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic
military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite
capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even
as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and
actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian
states. Still, the
United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and
aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and
fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional
powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the
world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from
all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are
healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of
higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify.
Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of
crisis that we face today.
2NC – Econ Decline Causes War
Economic decline devastates international security – causes widespread global
conflict, terrorism, organized crime, rising nationalism, protectionism, and
rampant poverty.
Muhumed 16 – Muhumed Mohamed Muhumed, Graduate Student in Pursuit of an M.A. in Political Science and
International Relations from Instanbul Aydin University, Former Teacher in the Cambridge International School in
Hargeisa, M.A. in International Economics from North South University, B.A. in Economics from the University of
Hargesa, 2016 (“The Effect of Financial Crisis on International Security,” Research Gate, December, Available Online
at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311867747_The_Effect_of_Financial_Crisis_on_International_Security
Financial crisis and international security
As we have mentioned earlier, security in the twenty-first century is not only dealing
with military issues and states are no longer the main sources of threat. Threats are
originating from diverse sources whereby international organizations and non-state
actors could be a vital reason of international security to deteriorate . The principal threats to
international security in twenty-first century include but not limited to financial crisis and economic mismanagement,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, refugees, poverty and hanger, ethnic polarization, criminal gangs, epidemics,
over-population, climate change, water crisis, and globalization per se. Crisis
are natural feature of
globalization. Due to globalization, different economies and markets are
interconnected . Certain markets hence react to changes taking place in other foreign
markets or international markets. Net capital flows to emerging markets, for instance,
are positively correlated to US economic fluctuations . This correlation results
emerging economies to be susceptible to financial, economic and all other external
factors. These external factors affect their financial markets, domestic production as
well as trade and capital flows between them and other countries including US .
Composition of capital inflows and maturity structure of external debt, according to
empirical evidences, lead emerging economies to be highly vulnerable to risks of
financial crisis (Prasad et. al. 2003).
Financial crisis cause substantial fall of economic growth . During the 2008 financial
crisis, Asian emerging economies experienced decrease in private investment which
contributed to the growth negatively. As a result, foreign trade and net exports
declined, followed by lower levels of consumption. In addition, majority of East Asian
economies faced extensive currency depreciation against US Dollars (Goldstein and Xie
2009).
Financial crisis leads to increasing security threats both nationally and

internationally. The reason is that budgets for defense and law enforcement
institutions are regularly falling as well as applying strict saving measures. As a
result of financial crisis, numerous countries suffered from lower or negative economic
growth, higher levels of unemployment, budget deficits, deteriorating balance of
payments and other negative effects. In order to survive from these drawbacks and lessen the
consequences of crisis, many countries should apply not only monetary and fiscal but also legislative and political
measures. Paying
more attention to improving economic conditions may cause the
government to be too weak to protect the society from potential threats (Ivancik 2011).
Crumley and Karon (2009) argue that financial
crisis and economic recession cause three
principal security threats. Firstly, long-lasting economic recession accompanied with
lower levels of production, investment, consumption, government spending as well as
higher levels of unemployment and possibly inflation will lead to regime collapse .
That vacuum and state failure will therefore give chance to terrorists , pirates and
other violent groups. Secondly, crisis is associated with rising nationalism . This can
be either rising anti-immigrant movements in developed countries, or promoting
protectionism policies in developing countries. This disintegration between
economies undermines the possibility of collaboration and economic recovery.
Thirdly, due to increasing unemployment, both activities and power of organized
criminal groups rises that deteriorates the security in national and international
levels.
Rogers (2008) also have very close argument. Because of the absence of international-level collective response,
financial or economic crisis will remain the biggest threat to international security. The reason is that these crises
leave millions and hundreds of millions of people in poverty . Consequently,
violent and radical movements will spread among societies , facing strong force
from the government. The result will be widespread conflict.
Economic decline causes war—strong statistical support.

Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil.
Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem
of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben
Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict . Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic
decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered
at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.
First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory,
finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-
eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As
such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power
(see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a
permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999).
Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the
likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections
between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of
trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that
interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future
trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page
213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states
will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4
Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write,
The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and
mutually reinforcing . Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour . Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the
extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg
& Hess, 2002. p. 89)
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism
(Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead
to external tensions .
Furthermore, crises generally reduce

the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory"
suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments
have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally

around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find
supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997),
Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater
for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to
being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that
periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity,
are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency
of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external
conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels .5 This implied connection between integration,
crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic
interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the
first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of
global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by
economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
Empirical studies confirm: growth reduces conflict.

Kim and Conceição 10 — Namsuk Kim, Policy Specialist at the United Nations Development Programme, holds
a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Maryland, and Pedro Conceição, Director of the Office of Development
Studies at the United Nations Development Programme, holds a Ph. D. in Public Policy from the LBJ School of Public
Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, 2010 (“The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development,”
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer, Available Online at
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf, p. 32)
2. From Low Human Development to Conflict
While there are a number of factors that could cause conflict, empirical studies find
that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict .
Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a). Growth
rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing countries. If the
growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point from the mean,
the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent (Collier et al., 2009). Kang
and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the five years prior to
conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent compared
to 2 percent in the countries that remained peaceful .
Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly
related . The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a new conflict.
Collier et al. (2009) finds that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study’s
sample mean was 4.6 percent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk would be
increased to 5.3 percent.
2NC – Economy: Asia War
Turns Asia war
Auslin 9 (Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Weekly Standard, 2/6/09,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp?pg=2)
AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget
that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on
earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension ,
nationalist outbursts , growing distrust , and ultimately, military miscalculation . The result would be disaster on top of an
already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has
helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,
China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has
gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic
systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general
conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic
shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China
has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-
wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the
1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-
rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of
democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will
overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest ? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a
Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong
enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning
the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point , as well. First of all, we have alliance
responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our
part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in
good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but
nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if
the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it
clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and
treasure for lands across the ocean.
2NC – Economy: Turns Democracy
Turns democracy
Halperin 5 – Morton Haperin, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open
Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 90
This chapter has made the case that economic stagnation is a threat to democratization . Over 70 percent of democratic
backtrackers experienced economic stagnation in the years preceding their political contraction . Moreover,
democratizers with more prolonged recessions had a greater tendency to revert to authoritarianism .
2NC – Economy: Turns Diseases
Turns disease
Fidler 8
(David P., Professor of Law, Indiana University, University Center on American and Global Security, “After the
Revolution: Global Health Politics in a Time of Economic Crisis and Threatening Future Trends,” Global Health
Governance, Fall 2008/Spring 2009, Volume 2, Number 2)
Further, the global economic crisis is absorbing ever larger amounts of capital to keep governments, financial
institutions, and corporations afloat, which drastically reduces the availability of resources for addressing the growing
costs of providing adequate public health and health care for populations around the world. Even before the global
economic crisis hit, experts argued that the unprecedented increases in national spending and development
assistance for health were inadequate and, even worse, that many developed donor countries had not fulfilled
existing aid pledges. 56 Thus, maintaining existing levels of domestic spending and development assistance on health
would not be sufficient, but increased expenditures seem unlikely for years while the global economy recovers. The
more likely scenario is reductions in health spending within national budgets and in foreign aid programs. Such
reductions, even if shortlived, will have a severe impact on global health activities already desperately in need of
more financial resources. Perhaps the cruelest irony of the global economic crisis is its emergence in the year WHO
and global health stakeholders renewed the push for achieving primary health care for all. The report of the
Commission on Social Determinants of Health advocated for primary health care in 2008.57 The World Health Report
2008 focused on primary health care, 58 and the WHO Director-General connected the new emphasis on primary
health care to the Declaration of AlmaAta, which first launched the “health for all” strategy based on universal
primary health care in 1978.59 However, 30 years ago, the Alma-Ata strategy was derailed by developments in the
energy and economic sectors that sound ominously familiar, as the WHO Director-General recognized in September
2008: Nor could the visionary thinkers in 1978 have foreseen world events: an oil crisis [that began in 1979], a global
recession [in the early 1980s], and the introduction [in the 1980s], by development banks, of structural adjustment
programmes that shifted national budgets away from the social services, including health. As resources for health
diminished, selective approaches using packages of interventions gained favour over the intended aim of
fundamentally reshaping health care. The emergence of HIV/AIDS, the associated resurgence of tuberculosis, and an
increase in malaria cases moved the focus of international public health away from broad-based programmes and
towards the urgent management of highmortality emergencies.60 The effort to rejuvenate the primary health care
movement in a year in which global food, energy, and economic crises emerged proved ill-timed, and the worsening
nightmare of the global economic crisis threatens even more damage to the political, economic, and social conditions
needed to achieve progress on universal primary health care. Put another way, political, economic, and intellectual
capital for advancing the primary health care agenda will, for the foreseeable future, be in short supply. Instead, as
with the energy and food crises, global health finds itself scrambling to address an emergency with potentially
devastating consequences for the health of individuals and populations, health services and systems, and the social
determinants of health.
2NC – Economy: Turns Environment
Turns the environment

Sagoff 97 (Mark, Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park,
Atlantic Monthly, June, v279, n6, p. 80-96, www.chem.brown.edu/chem12/readings/atlantic/consume.html)
Many have argued that economic activity, affluence, and growth automatically lead to resource depletion,
environmental deterioration, and ecological collapse. Yet greater productivity and prosperity—which is what
economists mean by growth—have become prerequisites for controlling urban pollution and protecting sensitive
ecological systems such as rain forests. Otherwise, destitute people who are unable to acquire food and fuel will
create pollution and destroy forests. Without economic growth, which also correlates with lower fertility, the
environmental and population problems of the South will only get worse. For impoverished countries facing
environmental disaster, economic growth may be the one thing that is sustainable.
2NC – Economy: Turns Heg
Causes a U.S. military drawdown
Harris and Burrows 9 – (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the
Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of
intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than
ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that
period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and
1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason
to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in
which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that
terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s
appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those
terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the
world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long
established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to
conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,
particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most
dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the
Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers , acquire additional weapons, and
consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed
between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low
intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader
conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals
combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce
inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more
focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world
continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort
to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future
access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured
access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime.
Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a
rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If
the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military . Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves ,
but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming
scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly
difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
2NC – Economy: Turns ME War
Turns Mideast war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025,
**member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”,
Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of
intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for
unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever.
While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period
include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s)
and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think
that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the
potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as
they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will
decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that
remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most
dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established
groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct
sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,
particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous
casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East .
Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the
region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing
their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers
for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and
terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear
red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals
combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will
produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of
strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian
intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises . Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows
and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take
actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government
leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of
their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are
providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval
capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves ,
but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in
Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within
and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
2NC – Economy: Turns Terrorism
Turns terrorism
Bremmer 9 (Ian, - President of the Eurasia Group, sr. fellow @ World Policy Institute, 3/4/09, Foreign Policy,
http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/04/the_global_recession_heightens_terrorist_risks)
But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive in places
where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places. No matter how cohesive
and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in which to flourish. That means a
location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the support (or at least acceptance) of the local
population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a
direct result of an increased willingness of local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants
operating there. In part, that's because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash
and weaponry) for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the
locals. The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite
phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much
interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either
protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have
yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances. The slowdown threatens to slow
the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places
like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for
prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes
easier for local militants to find volunteers. This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-
trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless
regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a
cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism
threatens to spill across borders.
2NC – Economy: Turns Trade
Turns trade
UzReport 8 – UzReport 4/18 (Uzbek news organization, WTO: developing, transition economies cushion trade
slowdown, Lexis)
The adverse consequences of turmoil on financial markets will not only affect US demand growth but also lead to further downward
revisions in economic growth for Japan and Western Europe. As world trade responds strongly to variations in global
economic activity a stronger than projected deceleration in world economic growth could cut trade growth much more
sharply, to significantly less than the 4.5% predicted above. (Income elasticity how much trade responds to changes in income
has been between 1.5 and 2 over the last decade, indicating that trade reacts significantly .) REAL MERCHANDISE TRADE
AND OUTPUT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2007 The slowdown in economic activity in developed countries was the major factor in
the reduced expansion of global trade in 2007. Real merchandise export growth is provisionally estimated at 5.5% in 2007,
nearly 3 percentage points less than in 2006 but still close to the average rate of trade expansion over the last decade (1997-2007).
The expansion of real trade exceeded global output growth by 2 percentage points.
2NC – Economy: Turns Warming
Tanks alternative energy

Tokic 12 – PhD, Professor @ ECS Rennes
Damir, December 2012, “The economic and financial dimensions of degrowth” Ecological Economics Volume 84
Science Direct
In a broader sense, it is unlikely that even ecological concerns can be addressed by degrowth as illustrated in Fig. 1.
First, the environmental issues would be less important during the economic implosion, which could delay the
development of sustainable alternative energy. Second, while the environmental picture could temporarily improve
during the economic implosion, the carrying capacity will eventually be exceeded yet again as the economic growth
resumes, as we illustrate in Fig. 2. Third, given that crude oil is an investable asset, it is likely that the price of crude oil
would correct during the implosion due to deleveraging, deflation, and the decrease in demand for energy, which are
likely to be only temporarily positive for ecological concerns. However, the temporary lower crude oil prices would
also put climate change issues on the backburner , and thus, limit the interest in development of alternative energy
projects. Thus, in the long run, the economic implosion would be a net negative for ecological concerns. As soon as
the economy rebounds, energy consumption growth would resume and eventually exceed the carrying capacity, this
time perhaps even more damaging for the environment due to the significantly delayed development of effective
alternative energy sources.
Spikes emissions
Parry 11
Wynne, Live Science Writer, 12-4-11, “Fiscal Crisis Failed to Curb Global Warming Emissions”
http://www.livescience.com/17296-embargoed-fiscal-crisis-failed-curb-global-warming-emissions.html
While a decline in economic activity means fewer greenhouse gas emissions, the most recent crisis seems to have
created only a dip in the road to a warmer planet, the analysis indicates.¶ In fact, after the predictable downturn,
emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide from two prominent sources climbed to a record high , the
researchers found. ¶ "The (global financial crisis) was an opportunity to move the global economy away from a high
emissions trajectory," write the researchers, led by Glenn Peters of the Center for International Climate and
Environmental Research in Norway, today in the journal Nature Climate Change. "Our results provide no indication of
this happening, and further, indicate that the global financial crisis has been quite different from previous global
crises." ¶ The rebound in emissions makes the goal of limiting global warming to 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees
Celsius) more difficult to achieve. Negotiators, gathered in Durban, South Africa, are attempting to figure out a
solution. [How 2 Degrees Will Change Earth]¶ Economic crises mean fewer things are sold or built and less fossil fuel is
burned as individuals and corporations keep tighter grips on their pocketbooks. This research relied on two crucial
sources of carbon dioxide — the burning of fossil fuels, such as gasoline in cars, and cement production, which
accounts for 5 percent of human carbon dioxide emissions. ¶ Global carbon dioxide emissions from these sources
have dropped in years past; one example was the oil crisis of 1979. And in 2009, during the financial crisis, global
emissions dropped by 1.4 percent. ¶ But last year, emissions of carbon dioxide increased by 5.9 percent, reaching a
record high and swallowing up any reduction that occurred during the crisis, according to preliminary estimates.¶ The
rapid rise may have been the result of easing energy prices, government investment intended to speed economic
recovery and high economic growth in the developing world, the researchers write.
2NC – Economy: A2: No War
There’s robust empirical support for our impact

Howell 13 (Patrick, B.A. from Emory University. “Economic Crises and the Initiation of Militarized Disputes,” A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Master of Arts, 2013, https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/howell_patrick_d_201305_ma.pdf)
The findings are clear: economic crises are an important trigger for shifts in a state’s rate of dispute initiation . By using
a large sample of states over a period of 185 years, this conclusion then can also be taken as generalizable to the entire
population of states in the international system. In addition to providing support for issue crossover and the influence economic troubles
can play on foreign policy decisions, the findings here also support the methodological rationale for using economic crises as
explicit, observable events , instead of as trends in other variables (e.g. GDP growth). Of course, this is not to say that all work on
this topic is final. There exist a number of areas where this research agenda can be improved upon and/or extended to in order to provide a more
holistic account of where and how economic crises exactly apply political pressure on leaders. First, the study of diversionary
war exists in both
quantitative tests and in more fine toothed examinations of actual cases (Levy and Vakili 1992; Fravel 2010). Exploring the internal
processes within states in such a fashion can also produce a deeper understanding of the exact causal mechanisms through which prospect theory
operates. Aggregation and levels of analysis become a basic concern with applying prospect theory outside of the laboratory and to states and
governments. After all, “prospect theory is developed as a theory of individual decision making, the question is whether it is applicable to collective
decision making” (Vis 2011, 337). Here a unitary actor assumption is made from the outset, but it is also possible that the
observed effect is
driven instead by individual decision-makers themselves (for example, Fuhrmann and Early 2008, who keep the level of analysis only on
President Bush). A deeper case study of a few select cases with an eye towards process might reveal whether the increase in conflict initiation is due to
a single policy entrepreneur or leader, or if it is the result of collective behavior (as perhaps even aides, legislators, and bureaucrats seek to compensate
for the detrimental effects that accompany an economic crisis separately or in concert). Examination of specific cases might also provide a more
accurate picture for policymakers of the strategy that can accompany an economic crisis and inducement of diversionary tendencies in another state.
Smith (Smith 1998) hypothesizes diversionary actions as a strategic game, and finds that potential target states should then adopt a policy of
strategic avoidance – disengaging from any scenario that might make them a target from a diversionary conflict initiated by an opposing state in
dire straits. This question of strategic avoidance occurs most often in the study of the U nited S tates (Fordham 2005; Meernik 2005), with
evidence that other states avoid and/or initiate fewer disputes with the United States when the American economy is performing poorly. The empirical
test here using a proportionbased dependent variable might already be capturing some degree of a strategic avoidance effect, in that some of the
variation in the proportion of initiation could be because the rate of other states initiating disputes on the crisis-stricken state is decreasing. If
strategic avoidance is occurring, it actually increases the strength of aspects of the diversionary war literature (in
that other states are actually behaving according to expectations of diversionary actions ), but much more work and nuance
would be needed to separate where then the logic in strategic avoiders is originating. The final implication of the findings to be discussed
here is the role of institutions in this analysis. As stated above, the institutional controls that were included in the estimation
demonstrated null effects on the overall rate of militarized dispute initiation. This finding is interesting considering the
enshrined role that institutions and regime types tend to play within scholarly work on diversionary war. Similar to the mixed results of GDP indicators,
mixed and contradictory results can be found throughout the body of work on diversionary war: some find that the diversionary
effects
exist mainly in democratic settings (Gelpi 1997; Davies 2002; Brul´e and Williams 2009), while others find that diversionary effects
occur in autocratic settings (Miller 1999; Lai and Slater 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2010). One method of reconciling the
conflicting conclusions of whether democratic or autocratic leaders are more likely to engage in diversionary behavior
is in direct tests comparing the two regime types. Typically, these comparisons have either found the two regime types differ in the
targets that are selected by each (Bueno De Mesquita and Siverson 1995), or have found some fault with the way that the regime types themselves are
defined, due to differing incentives for differing subtypes of regimes (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). In order to examine the difference between
democracies and autocracies, I split the sample from Model 2 into either of the regime types, using a score of 6 in the Polity2 measure as a cut-point.
Splitting the sample has the effect of interacting regime type with all independent variables, giving regime specific
effects not only for economic crises, but also all control variables .1 The results of this regime split can be found in Table 2. As can be
seen here, the effect of economic crises is positive and significant in both institutional settings . Comparing the coefficients for
economic crisis in Table 2 with those of the original Model 2, the likely explanation for why the institutional variables in the original model did not have
an impact on crisis initiation is because all
democracies and autocracies possess relatively similar incentives for increasing crisis
initiation following economic crises, so any variation across institutions was only averaged out. However, the results
presented in Table 2 also provide support for a difference existing in the process of how diversionary conflict might occur in either regime type, due to
the differences in control variable significance. This lends some credence to the separation of democracies and autocracies for study of diversionary
war, but provides no evidence that the effect should only exist in one or the other. The similarity in the main independent variable of
economic crises, though, furthers the assertion that the effect of economic crises increasing dispute initiation can be
viewed as a general behavior of all states in the international system. Conclusions Altogether, there can be said to be a
robust, positive relationship between the occurrence of economic crises and the rate of dispute initiation by states .
This effect is especially strong and demonstrable when time ordering is preserved by examining how crises in the
previous year affect states in their current year . These findings can also be said to have a relatively high degree of substantive import as
well. As Figure 1 showed, the occurrence of each subsequent economic crisis increases the chances of a state initiating disputes by almost 3%. The
nearly 20 percentage point increase in dispute initiation across the range of the lagged economic crisis variable also
represents a substantial impact, especially considering the rare event nature of militarized disputes to begin with.
This generalizable finding can have far-reaching impact to both the study of diversionary war in academia, as well as directly for policymakers. In
academe settings, there is good
evidence to support the use of acute economic crises over those variables based on the
slowershifting trends of GDP or public opinion measurements. Economic crises act as an explicit trigger that can
mark a leader’s shift into a losses frame and engage in riskier behavior consistent with both prospect theory and
diversionary war hypotheses. Meanwhile, applying this observed effect to the real world would seem to indicate that if a state goes through an
economic crisis, other states should have increased wariness in their dealings with the crisis-stricken state and/or be more prepared for the possibility
of a new dispute emerging in the wake of such an event.
Best studies
Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration,
Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political
Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict . Political science literature has contributed a
moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at
systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on
leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms
in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power
and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises
could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic
cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections
between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that
'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of
states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases ,
as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources . Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased
trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link
between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a s trong
correlat ion between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn . They write:
The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns
the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts
self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood
of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the
popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary
theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline,
sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the
flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least
indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the
tendency towards diversionary tactics are
greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to
lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the U nited S tates, and thus
weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively
correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline
with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Collapse causes nationalism and wrecks multilat---goes nuclear

Merlini 11 – Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and
chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”,
Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the
risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One
or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states,
perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global
economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second
Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger,
the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would
self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, empty ing, perhaps entirely, the half-
full glass of multilateralism , including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as
between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as
those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be
exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic
absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism .
2NC – AT: Drezner
Drezner’s only talking about the ’08 crisis and says no war because multilateral
governance worked---this one would be far worse because of magnitude---and
he concludes Neg---resiliency will collapse
Drezner 14 – Daniel Drezner, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great
Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164
IX. Conclusion
When the subprime mortgage crisis began, there were rampant fears that global economic governance was too
dysfunctional and unprepared to cope with a severe crisis. The Great Recession then exacerbated those fears. A
review of policy outcomes, outputs, and processes shows a different picture. Global trade and investment levels have
recovered from the plunge that occurred in late 2008. A mélange of international coordination mechanisms facilitated
the provision of key policy outputs from 2008 onward. Existing global governance structures, particularly in finance,
have been revamped to accommodate shifts in the distribution of power. The evidence suggests that multilateral
institutions adapted and responded to the 2008 financial crisis in a robust fashion. They passed the stress test—global
economic governance has been good enough. The picture presented here is at odds with prevailing conventional
wisdom on this subject.
This does not guarantee that global economic governance will continue to function effectively going forward . It is
worth remembering that there were genuine efforts to provide global public goods in 1929 as well, but they
eventually fizzled . The failure of the major economies to assist the Austrian government after the CreditAnstalt bank
failed in 1931 led to a cascade of bank failures across Europe and the United States. The collapse of the 1933 London
conference guaranteed an ongoing absence of policy coordination for the next several years. The start of the Great
Depression was bad, but international policy coordination failures made it worse. Such a scenario could play out
again .
2NC – Economy: US Key
Other countries can’t fill in
Irwin 16 – Neil Irwin, Senior Economic Correspondent at The New York Times, Formerly a Washington Post Columnist
and the Economics Editor of Wonkblog, “Foreign Crises Test America's Resilience”, International New York Times, 1-6,
Lexis
Seven days in, 2016 is shaping up to be a chaotic year in global economics and geopolitics, with profound challenges nearly everywhere. Except, for now at least, in the world's
largest economy. The American economy is acting as a steadying force in a volatile world.
A giant question for 2016 - not just for Americans but for people across the globe who benefit from having one of the world's
major economic engines revving while others sputter - is how resilient the U nited S tates will prove to be.
On one hand, in
an interconnected global economy , troubles in one place can spread easily , whether through financial
markets, the banking system or trade linkages. Just Thursday the World Bank downgraded its forecast of 2016 global growth, which implies less demand for
American products around the world - and fewer jobs for American workers.
On the other hand, in the past, the United States has shown an uncanny tendency to benefit economically from tumult abroad.
''The United States may not have incredibly robust economic growth and has plenty of problems you can point to,'' said Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, a
geopolitical consultancy. ''But from a stability perspective, when things are more unstable, the United States in some ways gets stronger,'' as both people and investment dollars
gravitate to the nation's relative stability.
The truth is, not one of the problems that have flared across financial news tickers so far in 2016 is completely new or surprising. Rather, they are continuations of trends that
were well established in 2015.
And as disturbing as it may be to see tensions rise, conflict in the Middle East is not exactly new. Usually the way those tensions ripple through the global economy is by driving
the cost of oil up; instead, the opposite is happening.
Oil prices fell to $37 a barrel from around $53 a barrel over the course of last year and are now under $34. The Shanghai composite index fell sharply, starting in June of last
year, and even after steep declines in the opening days of 2016 is above its late-August level (though it is anybody's guess how much it would have fallen, absent a string of
government interventions to try to stanch the declines).
Economic growth has been slowing not just in China but across many emerging markets , including Brazil and Nigeria, for two years
now. Europe and Japan are growing only barely , and even formerly hot advanced economies like Canada are suffering from the commodity glut.
Against that gloomy backdrop, the consensus economic forecasts for the U nited S tates - the International Monetary Fund forecasts 2.8
percent growth in 2016 - look
pretty terrific . The American stock market indexes, despite the global sell-off and major hits to oil companies' earnings,
remain above their September levels.
But there are two basic questions about the notion that the U nited S tates can serve as an island of economic and political stability in a
messy world.
Innovation Impact
1NC – Innovation Impact
Innovation – all levels of manufacturing and R&D are interconnected – the
collapse of US manufacturing base destroys advanced manufacturing and R&D
Lind 12 (Michael, Policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New
America Foundation, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing
Future,” http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and
%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20-%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf )
Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of
manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of
the manufacturing sector in R&D. The expansion in the global market for high-value-
added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade
surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D,
engineering, software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is
R&D. The United States has long led the world in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic
expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country
in the world. And the U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States
spent more than 400 billion dollars. European countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about
150 billion dollars. 14 In the United States, private sector manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself
accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S. manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP
R&D
in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S. 15 And
and innovation are inextricably connected: a National Science Foundation survey
found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the
same percentage introduced process innovations in the period 2006-2008, while only
8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind . 16 Even as the
manufacturing industry in the United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D
spending continued to follow a general upward growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed
directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S.
engineers. 17 This means thatmanufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S.
innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who
might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America
Needs the Industrial Commons Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs
growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries . An “industrial commons” is
a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number of firms. The term “commons” comes from
communally-shared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector
includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American
manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials,
component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and
Willy Shih point out, these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms. 18
Examples of industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from
Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York. 19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic
Manufacturers and researchers alike have long
agglomeration effects and co-location synergies. 20
noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are
located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the
researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and
to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in
industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic
linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem. If
an advanced
manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the
manufacturing industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the industrial
commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing
share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the
United States.
US rate of innovation, technological development and R&D have to keep pace

to develop technology to solve collapse of the biosphere
Barker 2k [Brent BARKER, electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the Electric Power
Research Institute and former industrial economist and staff author at SRI International and as a commercial research
analyst at USX Corporation, 2K “Technology and the Quest for Sustainability,” EPRI Journal, Summer 2000, Vol. 25, p.
8-17]
From a social standpoint, accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is
necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability , to support an aging population in the
industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations . The second area of opportunity for
technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-
first century, possibly as early as 2075. The key is economics. Global communications , from television to
movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed world
into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality
of life, either through economic development in their own country or through emigration to other countries. If we in the
developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity--infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and
affordable, recent history suggests that the cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered , relatively quickly
and without coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and
communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very
countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest,
we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the
fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A third, related
opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and , more broadly, decoupling economic
growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use efficiency, and industrial ecology . Decoupling
population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were
needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5
hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per
additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with Europe and North America experiencing the fastest decreases.
Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades, meaning that no additional land is needed to support
additional children and that land requirements will continue to decrease in the future. One can postulate that the pattern
of returning land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the
current onslaught on the great rain forests.
Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved from being laid
bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for
those now trapped in subsistence and frontier farming . In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous.
Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the
world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon
basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other
parts of the economy Certainly with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use around the
world can be greatly altered, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will,
in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They
will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources
much more efficiently and productively. Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials
intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to
offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in
other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is
the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and
paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial
goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth
century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As
Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50%
of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in
honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more
than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in." Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from
population and economic growth . Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a
triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the
increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas' themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology
stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for
policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little
value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it
was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal
on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and
put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible,
and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch
methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making.
Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s,
triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and
use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals
that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by
the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of
farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East
pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new
sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration of electricity
with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an
order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered. Technology has
also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for
example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and
our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light. But global
sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future,
there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are
disturbing indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that openly
foster an ever-faster pace of change. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the
economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as
both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen. We solved the
manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-
electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the
pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. Breaking limits "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling
book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better
than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly,
human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability
has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world. Today's perceived limits, however, look and
feel different. They are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion
people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water.
AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases are more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves,
expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful
preservation efforts, the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as
it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and other vertebrates in North
America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived limits require innovation of
a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment . The list of real-world problems
that could thwart global sustainability is long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and
religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental
degradation. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental
impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not
catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology,
which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close. We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more
than 5 billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and
irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources .
Manufacturing Scenario
1NC – Manufacturing Impact
Strong manufacturing sectors deter nuclear escalation in global hotspots
Eaglen et al 12 (Mackenzie Eaglen; resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, M.A. from the Edmund
A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a B.A. from Mercer University, served as a staff
member on the National Defense Strategy Commission, a congressionally mandated bipartisan review group; Rebecca
Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W.
Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments; January 2012; “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense
Industrial Policy”; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon.pdf; DS)
Yet there are severe challenges that could result to the nation’s security interests even
with 10 percent cutbacks. Despite the likely potential of lesser resources, the demand side of the equation does not seem
likely to grow easier. The international security environment is challenging and complex.
China ’s economic, political and now military rise continues. Its direction is uncertain, but it has
already raised tension, especially in the South China Sea. Iran ’s ambitions and machinations remain
foreboding, with its nuclear plans entering a new phase of both capability but also
crisis. North Korea is all the more uncertain with a leadership transition, but has a
history of brinkmanship and indeed even the occasional use of force against the South, not to mention
nuclear weapons related activities that raise deep concern. And the hopeful series of
revolutions in the broader Arab world in 2011, while inspiring at many levels, also seem likely to raise
uncertainty in the broader Middle East . Revolutions are inherently unpredictable and
often messy geostrategic events. On top of these remain commitments in Afghanistan and beyond and the frequent
U.S. military role in humanitarian disaster relief. Thus, there are broad challenges for American defense
planners as they try to address this challenging world with fewer available resources.
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S.
defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too
often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional
districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security
resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has
become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only
for winning wars but for deterring them . That requires world-class scientific and
manufacturing capabilities —which in turn can also generate civilian and military
export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.
2NC – DoD K2 Manufacturing
DoD production is key to US manufacturing growth
ITF 18 (Interagency Task Force; created a set of recommendations aligned to four levers: investment, policy,
regulation, and legislation surrounding defense manufacturing in the United States for the executive branch;
“Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the
United States”; https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-
THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF; DS)
The DomesticManufacturing and Defense Industrial Base For the purposes of this assessment, the
domestic industrial base includes two categories of producers of goods and services –
the private sector and the organic industrial base. The private sector (also known as the commercial sector) includes prime system
integrators, major subsystem suppliers, component suppliers, and service providers, from small to large companies. Across
multiple tiers of the supply chain, private sector companies produce defense-specific
products exclusively for use by DoD and approved foreign buyers , including platforms,
weapons systems, and components hardened for defense uses. Private sector companies
may also produce products specially designated as “dual-use,” which have both
military and nonmilitary applications and may be subject to export control, as well as
commercial items without an explicit defense use. 7
The organic defense industrial base (also known as the organic base, or the government or public sector)
includes government-owned, government operated and government-owned ,
contractor operated facilities that provide specific goods and services for DoD . The
organic base is composed of resource providers, acquisition and sustainment planners,
and manufacturing and maintenance performers at depots, manufacturing arsenals, and ammunition
plants. By law, some production and maintenance activities must be executed by organic base components.
Military Scenario
1NC – Military Impact
A strong defense industrial base is key to US military strength and tech
innovation
Conclusion The U.S. military’s ability to defeat its opponents in battle depends largely ,
though not exclusively, on the equipment , weapons, and supporting capabilities that it
possesses. In turn, these depend on an industrial base that is viable and healthy
enough to produce them and the relative effectiveness of new capabilities that spring from
competition in design. All of this implies some level of competitive redundancy among
manufacturers that can come only from a defense funding stream that is large enough
and consistent enough to keep companies that produce the wherewithal of America’s
military power in business. To be clear: This is not some form of corporate welfare. It is an investment in the nation’s
fundamental security.
Modernization requires the ability of the military to keep place with the tech nological
evolution of the battlefield. A force able to modernize in turn requires an industrial
base healthy and diverse enough to develop and apply emerging technologies that are relevant
to war. Failure in either area—a weak, moribund defense industrial base or obsolete forces— means
failure in war and the fatal compromise of the nation’s security. Conversely, a healthy and
effective force, made possible by a healthy and relevant industrial base, means a secure and prosperous
country.
US military dominance prevents global nuclear war

Ochmanek et al 17 (David Ochmanek; senior international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, M.P.A.
in international relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; B.S. in
international affairs and political science, United States Air Force Academy; Peter A. Wilson; Brenna Allen; John Speed
Meyers; Carter C. Price; 2017; “U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World”;
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1782-1.html; DS)
The Challenge Facing U.S. Forces and Their Capability to Respond Presidents Obama and Bush
(like many of their predecessors) were both correct in their observations that the United States fields the most capable armed forces
in the world. And both have made good on their promise to keep U.S. forces number one. But lest such assertions create an
unwarranted sense of complacency, we should be clear that many parts of the force are under
considerable stress from a prolonged high tempo of deployments; readiness levels generally fall
well below historical standards; and modernization in some key capability areas is lagging . More to
the point, for the United States, having the finest force in the world does not, in and of
itself, guarantee that those forces will be able to meet all of the demands being placed
on them. Since the United States’ entry into World War II, this nation has espoused and largely practiced a uniquely ambitious
strategy calls on U.S. military forces to, among other things, deter
national security strategy. Today, that
aggression and coercion by adversary states in several parts of Eurasi a; if deterrence fails, to
defeat such aggression; to carry out a long-term campaign aimed at containing and,
ultimately, defeating Salafist-jihadi groups abroad; and to protect the U.S. homeland . In
light of these requirements, having the world’s most capable armed forces can be thought of as
a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition for enabling the United States to play the international role it has
defined for itself. Consider the following realities—some enduring and some new—that bear on the question of the adequacy of U.S.
forces today:
• The United States rarely has the luxury of fighting adversaries on the ground of its choosing. Indeed, the reality is quite the
opposite: Whether the adversary is a nation-state or a non-state actor, U.S. forces nearly always find themselves fighting far from
home and on or close to the adversary’s “home turf,” with all of the associated logistical and cultural disadvantages that entails.
• The United States has interests and allies worth fighting for in multiple parts of the world, and multiple adversaries that pose
challenges to those interests. Therefore, U.S. force planners cannot count on being able to fight only one war at a time. Indeed, U.S.
forces were conducting two large-scale expeditionary operations from 2003 until very recently. And U.S. forces must plan on having
to provide a sizable deterrent presence in key regions, even when conducting a large-scale operation elsewhere.
• As technologies and systems relating to remote sensing, data processing and transmission, precision guidance, autonomy, and a
host of other functions proliferate, U.S. forces are finding themselves confronted by adversaries
that are gaining mastery over military capabilities analogous to those that enabled U.S. forces to win swift
and lopsided victories in the 1990s and early 2000s. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons adds to
this trend.
• With China ’s emergence as a major international player and Russia ’s recently demonstrated ability and
will to use military might in pursuit of a revisionist policy agenda, the United States
now faces the challenge of dealing with two great power adversaries . In short,
providing the military power called for by the United States’ ambitious national
security strategy, which has never been easy, has recently become considerably more challenging. The
coincidence of this new reality with a period of constrained defense budgets has led to a situation in
which it is now far from clear that our military forces are adequate for the tasks being placed before them. The significance of this
reaches well beyond issues of military planning. This nation’s approach to safeguarding and advancing its security and well-being
internationally centers on maintaining strong ties of influence and partnership with its treaty allies. The United States’
unique ability to project large-scale military power into the Eurasian periphery in the
defense of common interests provides the foundation for these relationships . It follows
that if adversaries perceive U.S. military capabilities as inadequate to the task of deterring and
defeating coercion or aggression, the viability of this nation’s entire national security strategy and, indeed, the rules-based
liberal order that it has promoted for more than 70 years, will be called into question.
2NC – Arms K2 Military
Arms sales are key to military power – defense industrial base, military
flexibility, coalitions
THOMPSON 18 – MA in National Security and Strategic Studies @ the National Defense University, MS in counseling and
organizational behavior @ Long Island University, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security [Andrea, US
undersecretary of state for arms control: Creating a flexible, effective foreign policy tool, 12/10/2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/us-undersecretary-of-state-for-arms-control-creating-a-flexible-effective-
foreign-policy-tool/, DKP]
Arms transfers are a central pillar of America’s international security cooperation,

and they are also an important part of the American economy. This dual role as a tool of
both foreign policy and economic security — combined with the unique nature of the goods and services
involved — makes arms transfer policy uniquely complex.
Recognizing these factors, the U.S. government oversees and manages our defense trade unlike any other sector of the export
economy. At the heart of this process is the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, supported by the Department of
Defense. The bureau vets each potential sale against legal, regulatory and policy standards through the rubric of the president’s
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.
The new Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, which President Donald Trump approved in April 2018, lays out a comprehensive set of
considerations that must be taken into account in reviewing every potential arms transfer. While the policy is designed as a practical
framework for such decisions, it can also be read as an explanation of the potential benefits of these transfers for our national
security and global security.
Well-considered arms transfers can bolster the security of the United States and our allies and
partners. Examples include defending against external coercion and providing
capabilities in support of shared security objectives, such as countering terrorism,
trafficking and transnational organized crime. They can forge and strengthen long-
term relationships and enhance military interoperability. Arms transfers can help
maintain the U.S. military’s technological advantages and lower its own procurement
costs, strengthen America’s manufacturing and defense-industrial base , and even
facilitate ally and partner efforts to reduce the risk of military operations causing civilian
harm.
Arms sales are key to sustaining the DIB and military strength more broadly
EAGLEN and SAYERS 9 – *resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on
defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness, M.A., Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University, ** Adjunct Senior Fellow for the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS), M.Sc. in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore and an
M.A. and B.A. in Political Science from The University of Western Ontario [Mackenzie, Eric, Maintaining the
Superiority of America's Defense Industrial Base, 5/22/2009, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/maintaining-
the-superiority-americas-defense-industrial-base, DKP]
America's military strength remains vital to preserving the nation's interests and
sustaining international stability. While much of this strength is derived from the professionalism and skills of
America's armed forces, the technologically superior military platforms that the U.S. has
developed and fielded since World War II are also vital to ensuring a superior fighting force.
In both peace and war, America's defense manufacturing industrial base has allowed
the United States to design and build an advanced array of weapons systems and
platforms to meet the full spectrum of potential missions the military may be called
upon to fulfill. Securing America's military dominance for the decades ahead will
require:
An industrial base that can retain a highly skilled workforce with critical skill sets and
Sustained investment in platforms that offer future commanders and civilian leaders a
vital set of core military capabilities and equipment to respond to any threat.
America's military may also benefit from a more open international defense market. A
2005 Heritage Foundation study examined the effect of globalization on the defense market and concluded that access to
foreign suppliers would play a significant and positive role in helping the Pentagon to
access a broader industrial base and meet immediate defense needs more efficiently.[1] These findings still hold
true today. While remaining focused on the critical technologies, industries, and skills that are not readily available in the global
Congress should also support increased foreign military sales to help
market,
complement America's domestic defense industrial base.

Following the sweeping procurement changes proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in President Barack Obama's fiscal
year (FY) 2010 defense budget, the decisions awaiting congressional review will directly affect America's defense industrial base for
years to come. These funding decisions about what the military will and will not buy are a primary factor in determining whether
America will retain its military primacy a decade from now.
The critical workforce ingredients in sustaining an industrial base capable of building
next-generation systems are specialized design, engineering, and manufacturing skills.
The consolidation of the defense industry during the 1990s has placed an increased burden on a small collection of defense
companies, and the consolidation of major defense contractors has led to a general reduction in the number of available workers.
Already at a turning point, the potential closure of major defense manufacturing lines
in the next five years with no additional scheduled production could shrink this national asset even further.
While the manufacturing workforce alone should not dictate congressional defense acquisition decisions , the potential
defense "brain drain" must be considered when Congress determines whether or not
to permanently shut down major production lines --particularly shipbuilding and aerospace. More often
than not, once these highly skilled workers exit the federal workforce, they are difficult to
recruit back and more expensive to retrain with significant project gaps.
The Foundation of American Military Strength
Since World War II, the United States has benefited from the skills of a robust defense
industrial and manufacturing workforce. Over six decades, various U.S. defense strategies
have emphasized the benefits of a technologically superior military to help deter and
win wars. This " technical overmatch" has been pursued by the U.S. military for decades
in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the U.S. in conflict and to
reduce risk and the loss of life on the battlefield.
The ability to maintain America's military technological edge reflects the superior
efficiency of America's defense industry. America's capital-intensive Air Force and
Navy operate the world's best fighter aircraft, long-range bombers, aircraft carriers,
destroyers, cruisers, and submarines . Similarly, the Army is building a host of next-
generation platforms, including tanks and attack helicopters, that will allow it to complete its missions. This is also the
case in platform systems and areas such as low-observable and very-low-observable technologies, submarine quieting, acoustic
detection, digital-signal processing for a range of applications, active electronically scanned arrays, near-real-time sensor-to-shooter
targeting connectivity, and all-weather guided munitions.[2]
the defense industry has nevertheless been a
technology alone has not assured American military superiority,
potent enabler of American military might. The base of this power can be found in
a series of core capabilities that the U.S. has been able to maintain and continue to
modernize over recent decades. These include, among others, air dominance, strategic lift, the
ability to project power throughout and beyond the world's oceans, counterinsurgency
proficiency, and the ability to seize and control land. Maintaining these capabilities has enabled the soldier,
sailor, airman, and Marine to remain adequately prepared for a full spectrum of potential operations.
2NC – DIB Internals
Strong DIB key to hegemony and economic strength
HENDRIX and O’BRIEN 17 – * retired U.S. Navy captain and award-winning naval historian-strategist, is a
naval expert at the Center for a New American Security, **a partner at Larson O’Brien LLP, served as a national
security advisor to Scott Walker, Mitt Romney, and Ted Cruz during their presidential campaigns [Jerry, Robert, Trump
Acts To Revitalize America’s Defense Industrial Base, 7/26/2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/trump-acts-
to-revitalize-americas-defense-industrial-base/, DKP]
President Donald Trump has identified a fact few of his recent predecessors have understood: t he Defense Industrial Base of the
United States (DIB)
is a critical component of our national security. The DIB is more
important than any individual weapons program – be it an aircraft carrier, long range bomber, or high-tech
tank. But for too long, the DIB has been ignored, mismanaged or even attacked.
With his signing of an executive order to review and revitalize America’s industrial base,
the president has taken the first step to rebuilding the nation’s defense infrastructure.
This will also encourage the restoration of redundancies in our industrial capability
that are crucial both in peace time and in times of war. Like Ronald Reagan, President Trump also
understands that DIB jobs are high-paying and give skilled workers in regions that have
suffered from economic neglect a chance to get back to work in our factories and shipyards.
That he chose to sign the executive order on the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier Friday carries real symbolism. Only America
has the capacity to build a super carrier. The Russians want such ships but cannot construct them and even the
Chinese, with all of their recently-acquired shipbuilding prowess, are years away from replicating the Ford-class carriers that will
soon enter America’s fleet. But
this technological and manufacturing edge can no longer be
taken for granted as the nation’s DIB becomes increasingly fragile.
With his focus on the DIB, Trump now follows in the footsteps of both Roosevelt’s, Theodore and Franklin. Each President Roosevelt
served as the assistant secretary of the Navy, managing the rapid expansion of the US Navy prior to the Spanish-American War
(Theodore) and World War I (Franklin). These experiences dramatically informed their understanding of the DIB during their
presidencies. For Theodore Roosevelt, it was the “up-building” of the Great White Fleet that heralded the United States’ emergence
as a world power at the dawn of the twentieth century. His cousin, Franklin, was required to shift the entire American economy to
war footing, altering Detroit assembly lines from automobiles to bombers while building warships on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers.
That incredible output turned the tide of the war and defeated the Axis.
As the Cold War moved into full-swing, five star general-turned-president Dwight Eisenhower’s launched the Solarium project. The
wise men of Solarium reviewed the entire breadth and depth of the American economy, identifying the areas to be strengthen if the
United States was to win its competition with the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, much of the focus of the project was on America’s
DIB. The Trump White House’s National trade Council its Industrial policy shop has come to the same conclusion today that the
Solarium scholars did in the 1950s.
Like the Roosevelts, Eisenhower and Reagan before him, President Trump has inherited a world in crisis. A resurgent and aggressive
Russia, a rising and assertive China, an Iran intent on establishing a Middle East hegemony and a nuclear-crazed rogue-state North
Korea all are undermining the free market and rules-based international order that America has encouraged and protected for
decades. In light of these challenges, a vibrant United States DIB is an imperative today just as it has
been in past eras.
Trump’s executive order is necessary to address a generation of neglect of the DIB that followed the West’s victory in the Cold War.
Dramatic contractions in defense spending, especially the Obama Administration’s sequestration program that it exacted from
Congress in exchange for reopening the government, waves of industrial mergers and defense contractor consolidations and naïve
strategic assumptions regarding the “end of history” have left the America’s DIB fragile and lacking in redundant capability. Trump’s
executive order requires the government undertake a thorough inventory of the breadth and depth of the nation’s DIB so the
administration can identify where it is thin and requires strengthening.
Unfortunately, many policy makers’s understanding of the DIB begins and ends with seeing ships, planes and tanks rolling off the
factory assembly line. While impressive,
the port, tarmac or tank parking lot give a very limited view
of the DIB. What is not seen are the thousands of individual part and component
manufacturers who supply the nation’s big defense factories. A missile assembly line in St. Louis
may employ 500 people, but there are likely to be over a 1,000 workers, spread across the country, manufacturing the various parts
that combine to produce just one of the missiles that ultimately rolls of the line.
Often, there are many suppliers of ubiquitous nuts, bolts and screws that go into a
weapon, which is how it should be. In other cases, however, there is merely one supplier in the entire country of a key widget or
component upon which an important weapon’s platform depends. It is well-known, for example in defense circles that critical items
such as five-axis tooling machines or circuit boards, are in very short supply. Consequently, the DIB, like the nation’s overall
economy, has come to depend on foreign manufacturers, including some that are China-based, for important defense components.
Few questions are being asked in Washington how the nation might gain access to these foreign components in a time of war.
The narrowing of the country’s DIB is not just limited to subcontractors and suppliers. It has affected America’s great companies as
well, many of which no longer exist. In the past, the United States boasted 10 major military aircraft manufacturers. Today we have
four. During World War II, we had over 50 shipyard dry docks capable of producing warships over 400 feet in length, some of them
on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Today we have 12. Even among the dozen, several are under economic strain. America is down to
one tank factory and it only produces a handful of tanks per year and exists only at the insistence of Congress, which has fought to
keep it open.
The DIB is not just the sum of components, platforms, contractors and factories. It is
also composed of the hundreds of thousands of welders, electricians, pipefitters,
metal workers, heating and air conditioning specialists, tool makers, composite
material molders, engineers, scientists, logistics specialists, test pilots and managers
who actually invent and build our weapons systems. All of these jobs, and many more, skilled
blue collar and while collar positions alike, are critical to the our country. They are solid, stable
occupations that enhance our nation’s defense while also providing comfortable
middle and upper income livings for the men and women engaged in them. Yet these jobs have disappeared at an
alarming rate as the DIB has shrunk. Once the critical skills they embody are lost, it is very difficult to reconstitute them within the
workforce. Thus, America’s current and future skilled defense industry work force should also benefit from the President’s executive
order.
DIB is k2 military dominance

DAMON 18 – [Andre, Pentagon report points to US preparations for total war, 10/11/2018,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2018/10/11/tota-o11.html, DKP]
“America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base,” observes the report, creates the
“platform and systems” upon which “our Warfighter depends.” This complex
encompasses not just the government, but the private sector, as well as “R&D organizations” and “academic institutions.” In
other words, the entire economy and society.
It warns that “The erosion of American manufacturing over the last two decades… threatens to
undermine the ability of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements.
Today, we rely on single domestic sources for some products and foreign supply chains for others, and we face the possibility of not
being able to produce specialized components for the military at home.”
Correcting this strategic deficiency , the report concludes, means that “support for a vibrant
domestic manufacturing sector, a solid defense industrial base, and resilient supply
chains is a national priority.”
The report squarely targets China, declaring, “China’s economic strategies , combined with the adverse impacts of
other nations’ industrial policies, pose significant threats to the U.S. industrial base and thereby pose a
growing risk to U.S. national security.”
US manufacturing dominance , in other words, is vital for promoting military
The promotion of
dominance.
DIB is the “arsenal of democracy” – key to lasting American peace and military
supremacy
O’HANLON 11 – Senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in
The defense and broader aerospace and national security industrial base is often thought of as the
“arsenal of democracy” going back to the term first coined by FDR during World War II. And in this role, it has
certainly played its part in defending America, from the astounding 324,000 aircraft and 88,000 tanks
manufactured by the U.S. firms during World War II (amazing numbers to think about given today’s D.C. debates over whether to
buy 172 F-22s or 500 EFVs or not) to the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and Reaper drones that our servicemen
and women use today in Afghanistan.
Historically, the vitality of the base has been wrapped up within the state of American
military excellence. This may not have been true in Revolutionary War times, when the colonists helped create a form of
guerrilla warfare and depended far more on classic insurgent methods than on military might of the classic sort. But it has been
largely true ever since, culminating
in the victories of the world wars as well as the nonviolent
triumph over the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War that was due largely to the nation’s
strong economy and high technology prowess in defense as well as nondefense
realms.
Defense industrial base is key to US military superiority and power projection

WATTS 8 – Senior Fellow, is an expert on a range of topics, including air power, Air Force transformation, net assessment, and
the military use of space. He headed the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Defense of Department during 2001–2002.
Following retirement from the Air Force in 1986, Watts worked for, and later directed, the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. His
recent publications include US Fighter Modernization Plans (with Steve Kosiak), Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle
Networks, and Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and Options. He holds a Bachelor of Science in mathematics from the US Air
Force Academy and a Master of Arts in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. [Barry, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, The US Defense Industrial Base Past, Present and Future, September 2008,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a490689.pdf, DKP]
Since World War II, the

United States’ military strategy has emphasized exploiting technological
superiority to deter war, win conflicts, and shape the behavior of other nations, allies as well as
adversaries, during peacetime. Against this criterion, the defense industry has to be given high
marks for its contributions to national defense. Of course, the United States had the resources
to pursue a strategy that sought, as much as possible, to substitute technology and
equipment for the blood of its warriors. Since the 1940s, the United States has outspent all
other nations with the exception of the Soviet Union from 1970 until the early 1980s. Since the
Cold War ended, the US military has been able to outspend all actual or prospective
rivals by even wider margins, although this fact must be balanced against its greater commitments. Significant
portions of the US military have been engaged in combat operations more or less continuously since 1991.
Granting these caveats, the
United States has nonetheless outdone other nations in the development
of superior systems in most important arenas of military competition. Today, US nuclear
submarines, surface combatants, tactical combat aircraft, bombers, main battle tanks,
reconnaissance satellites and navigation satellites are the leaders in their respective
classes. In underlying areas such as low-observables technologies, submarine quieting, acoustic detection, digital
signal processing for a range of applications, active electronically scanned arrays, near-real-time sensor-toshooter targeting
connectivity, and all-weather guided munitions, the
defense industry has given the US military
substantial leads, many of which have been sustained over periods of decades.
2NC – Military Impact
US industrial base superiority resolves great power conflict
Challenges to U.S. Military
Modernization in the 21st Century Today, U.S. national security may be under greater stress than at
any time since the early days of the Cold War. The number of geostrategic threats to U.S. global
interests and allies has increased, and the ways and means of modern warfare are evolving with
remarkable speed. Competitors are engaged in an intensive and broad-based arms race intended, first, to deny the
United States its hard-won military advantages and, second, to establish their own military superiority.
Advanced military and dual-use technologies are proliferating widely. The defense industrial base has shrunk
to the point that there are numerous instances of single suppliers of critical items. The national security innovation
base is under stress from within and attack from without.
Senior defense officials and military leaders have identified five evolving strategic
challenges to U.S. security: Russia , China , North Korea , Iran , and terrorism . The first two are
engaged in major military modernization programs, investing in capabilities designed to counter long-held U.S.
military-technological advantages. According to Army Major General Eric Wesley, “some analysts have said of 10 major capabilities
that we use for warfighting that by the year 2030, Russia will have exceeded our capability in six, will have parity in three, and the
United States will dominate in one.”17
In a number of ways, Russia has made the greatest strides in the shortest period of time. Compare Russia’s problematic campaign
against Georgia in 2008 with the much better-planned and better-executed operations in Crimea and Ukraine a short six years later.
Moscow’s operations in Ukraine allowed the world to observe the gains Russian ground forces have made in both technologies and
combat techniques. Russian forces have demonstrated advances in armored combat vehicles; electronic warfare (EW); long-range
massed fires coupled with drone-provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); mobile, high-performance air
defenses; and air assault.18 A respected expert on this new generation of Russian military capabilities has described one
engagement:
In a 3-minute period…a Russian fire strike wiped out two mechanized battalions [with] a combination of top-attack munitions and
thermobaric warheads…. If you have not experienced or seen the effects of thermobaric warheads, start taking a hard look. They
might soon be coming to a theater near you.19
The impact of Russian investments in a new generation of ground combat capabilities has been amply demonstrated by operations
over the past several years in Ukraine and Syria. The combination of drone-based ISR, communications jamming, and the application
of long-range firepower with advanced warheads has proved to be especially lethal.
Russian advances in EW have been particularly noteworthy and have resulted in the deployment of systems that can challenge one
of the central features of modern U.S. military capabilities: the ability to link sensors to shooters in a manner that provides a near
real-time ability to conduct long-range and multidomain fires. Ukrainian separatist forces equipped with Russian EW systems have
demonstrated a highly sophisticated ability to jam communications systems, deny access to GPS, and interfere with the operation of
sensor platforms. Recently, it has been reported that U.S.-made tactical drones operated by Ukrainian security forces were being
jammed and hacked by the Ukrainian rebels.20 Russian forces in Syria were reported to have jammed U.S. intelligence/psychological
operations aircraft operating in the western portion of that country.21
“Given [the Russian military’s] modernization, the pace that it’s on ,” Army General Curtis M.
Scaparrotti, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has warned, “we have to maintain our modernization…so that we can remain
dominant in the areas that we are dominant today.” Otherwise, “I
think that their pace would put us
certainly challenged in a military domain in almost every perspective by, say, 2025 .”22
China is equally intent on developing military capabilities that pose a direct challenge
to the United States and its allies. According to Defense Department’s 2017 Annual Report to Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: China’s leaders remain focused on developing the capabilities
to deter or defeat adversary power projection and counter third-party intervention—including by the United States—during a crisis
or conflict…. China’s military modernization is targeting capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. military-technological
advantages. To support this modernization, China
uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign
military and dual-use technologies, including cyber theft, targeted foreign direct investment, and exploitation of
the access of private Chinese nationals to such technologies….23
In its 2017 report to Congress, the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission identified a number of specific capabilities
that the People’s Liberation Army is developing for the purposes of targeting U.S. military forces and countering advanced U.S.
capabilities:
The weapons and systems under development and those that are being fielded by
China’s military—such as intermediate-range ballistic missiles , bombers with long-range precision
strike capabilities, and guided missile nuclear attack submarines —are intended to provide
China the capability to strike targets further from shore, such as Guam, and potentially complicate U.S.
responses to crises involving China in the Indo-Pacific…. China’s increasingly accurate and advanced missile forces are intended to
erode the ability of the United States to operate freely in the region in the event of a conflict and are capable of holding U.S. forces
in the region at risk. China’s continued focus on developing counter space capabilities indicates Beijing seeks to hold U.S.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites at risk in the event of conflict.24
More and more, the strategic

competition with Russia and China will be in the exploitation of
advanced technologies with military applications. In her statement before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Lisa J. Porter, nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, observed that:
[N]ot only do we face a diversity of threats, we also face a diversity of technological approaches being employed against us, which
range from innovative uses of existing technologies in ways we have not always anticipated, to the employment of cutting edge
capabilities ranging from space systems to cyber attacks to machine learning to hypersonics to biotechnology.25
Outgoing Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Admiral Harry Harris has warned explicitly that the United States is in
danger of losing the next arms race with China:
I am also deeply concerned about China’s heavy investments into the next wave of
military technologies, including hypersonic missiles, advanced space and cyber
capabilities, and artificial intelligence —if the U.S. does not keep pace, USPACOM
will struggle to compete with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on future battlefields. China’s
ongoing military modernization is a core element of China’s stated strategy to supplant the U.S. as the security partner of choice for
countries in the Indo-Pacific.26
In addition, Russia and China are providing advanced conventional military hardware to a growing number of states. According to a
senior U.S. Army source, “If the Army goes into ground combat in the Middle East, we will face equipment from Russia, Iran and in
some cases China.”27 Russia is a major defense exporter . It sells advanced aircraft, air defense systems, radar, and
ships to China and India; recently began to deliver the S-300 air defense system to Iran; and has reentered the Egyptian market,
selling Egypt 50 Kamov Ka-52 Alligator combat helicopters.
Regional challengers like North Korea and Iran are investing in such asymmetric
military capabilities as ballistic missiles, advanced air defense systems, and even nuclear weapons .
Both nation-states and non-state terrorist groups are able to access advanced military
equipment provided not only by Russia and China, but by Western countries as well. Iran has received advanced air defense
systems from Russia and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles from China. Capabilities once viewed as restricted to peer competitors
are increasingly within the arsenals of local adversaries and terrorist groups.
A strong defense industrial base is an impact filter for global conflicts

O’Hanlon 11 (Michael O’Hanlon; senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign
policy issues; 2011; “The National Security Industrial Base: A Crucial Asset of the United States, Whose Future May Be
in Jeopardy”; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02_defense_ohanlon.pdf )
Good defense industrial policy is not just about potential assets, but also must include an assessment
of the nation’s security requirements as well as the threats faced by the United States. It is for this reason that the policy
process logically begins with a national security strategy, coordinated at the White House, to guide defense planning and budgeting. The same logic
should therefore apply to a consideration of the nation’s future national security industrial base requirements. There are numerous ways to assess
potential risks to American security and thus possible requirements for the nation’s armed forces that would be supplied by the defense industrial base.
As an example, the following are a range of scenarios that the U.S. military could be called upon to deal with in the coming years. The list is suggestive,
rather than complete; more important than its wide geographic scope is its functional variability, and coverage of many different types of possible
warfare:
Airstrikes against Iran or perhaps a naval blockade of the country, or at least the potential to threaten
21 „
the Iranian regime’s hold on power in order to deter major aggression
„War between India and Pakistan over Kashmir that then leads to a robust
international peace implementation force with strong U.S. participation
„ Another Korean war, perhaps involving weapons of mass destruction
A Taiwan contingency that could, if things went tragically wrong, pit the United States against
China in open conflict, including not only classic kinetic operations but (as with other scenarios here) cyberwarfare and perhaps
combat in space „
Chinese challenges to other disputed islands and associated sea and

Perhaps more plausibly,
seabed resources near its coasts „

ARussian attack on a former Soviet republic like Georgia or, worse yet given their NATO
membership, the Baltic states „
A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, perhaps even involving weapons of mass
destruction „
A collapsing Congo or Indonesia …or Mexico or Pakistan

Not all of these would necessitate American military intervention. Even if they did require a role for U.S. armed forces, any U.S. participation might
occur only as part of a multinational coalition and in the context of a negotiated ceasefire, UN Security Council resolution, or other international
blessing. But such a list underscores the range of possible operations that could prove necessary for a country like the United States that does not have
the luxury of defining its national security interests or activities narrowly, given its broad range of interests and alliances.22
any such list will evolve not only as a function of geopolitics but also
As one looks into the future,
of technology. Certainly the trends in computers have already been remarkable, and if "Moore's Law" continues to hold, there could
be another billion fold increase in computing power within roughly 25 years. There may be
somewhat analogous trends underway in areas such as microbiology and nanotechnology, even if the enthusiasts for a “revolution in military affairs” of
These trends are
the 1990s often overstated their cases and made their arguments about technological progress too sweeping and bold.23
providing the basis for the existing growth in systems like robotics to new ones like
directed energy or nanotechnology.
The implications of technological trends are that the domains in which conflict could
take place, and for which the military will be looking to find solutions, will extend into
new areas such as cyber, space, and the changed global environs as well .
This will connect to huge demographic trends to create what might be termed the urban hot zone. That is, just as 15 years ago the
U.S. military was not gearing up for a counterinsurgency fight in rural Afghanistan, it may be failing now to face up to a future fight
that is much different, and perhaps more urban. A strong majority of the world's future population will lie in major urban areas and
some 50 new megacities (with populations of 10 million or more) will be created around the world within a quarter century.
Violence and national security threats are likely to be found emanating from such places, where hundreds of millions of individuals,
many poorly educated and underemployed yet aware of all that the world offers that they cannot easily access, could represent
potential recruits for various militant movements.
All of these developments have major implications for not just the defense budget and weapons decisions, but also for the people
that DoD and industry must hire. Operating complex systems effectively, a traditional American strength, will require attracting
technology-literate people even more than in the past. Rosie the riveter might not have to become Gussie the group theorist, but
the trend is clear nonetheless. The United States armed forces also must think hard about how to attract and retain, and thus the
nation’s universities and industry must figure out how to supply, individuals with a "Google mindset" who expect access to
information as well as modern devices without all the bureaucratic encumbrances and hierarchical structures that traditionally afflict
military organizations.
the U.S. will have no monopoly on power and some of these

Another key aspect of this change is that
sophisticated technologies, meaning not just a diversity of new environments to

prepare for, but a deeper lethality within them. The future period holds a greater spread of access-denial
technology, cyberthreats and "GRAM" technologies (guided rockets, artillery, and mortars). Such a "democratization of destruction" will continue with
small states and non-state groups having greater access to lethal technologies.24
Even more, a “proliferated world” of WMD in the hands of a greater number of states
seems a strong possibility. Some argue for pursuit of a nuclear-free world, but even if that goal proves viable as a vision, in the
interim it is just as likely that the threat could become more complex and acute. Nuclear
campaign planning could become more important, as the likelihood that one or more nuclear weapons will
be used somewhere probably grows.25

Another key challenge, especially in such realms as cyberwarfare, is integration—not only within individual systems but across systems, and with
enough flexibility to allow for modernization, adaptation and innovation. This, though, stands in direct contrast to another key demand, which is to
This same growing DoD concern over cyber-

build resilient networks that can resist and recover from attacks.
assurance will likely grow on the hardware side, as more and more investment and
production moves away from traditional U.S. partners and suppliers .26
Not all is foreboding. Historically, the United States remains quite secure as a major power. In addition, with China the only plausible rising rival of
comparable power, we may not face major challenges anywhere except the Western Pacific—and some would debate the degree to which China,
however impressive as a rising power in many ways, is likely to pose a security threat to the United States or its allies. Moreover, for all of China’s
the United States still enjoys advantages of leadership in innovation.

strengths in manufacturing,
The ability to integrate across systems and technologies has been and will be a key
strength. We can use methods such as data mining to improve intelligence collection and the forecasting and tracking of threats. We have a
history in the “black world” of remarkable game-changing inventions.
** Aff **
UQ
2AC – NUQ
US arms sales are decreasing now
Hartung and Arabia 19 (William Hartung; director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy,
Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy; Christina Arabia; Director of the Security Assistance
Monitor (SAM) at at the Center for International Policy, Master's degree in International Affairs with a concentration in International
Conflict and Security from the New School in New York City and a Bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University; 4/4/19; “Trends in
Major U.S. Arms Sales in 2018: The Trump Record - Rhetoric Versus Reality”; https://securityassistance.org/publication/trends-
major-us-arms-sales-2018-trump-record-rhetoric-versus-reality; DS)
Summary
U.S. arms sales offers totaled $78.8 billion in 2018, a $ 3.4 billion drop from the figure
reached during President Trump’s first year in office. The figures include offers under the
Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales ( FMS ) program as well as Direct Commercial Sales ( DCS )
licensed by the State Department. While substantial, the level of exports reached under the Trump
administration so far lag significantly behind the $102 billion in offers made during the
peak year of the Obama administration in 2010. Measured by offers under the FMS program – the only measure for
which full statistics are available – arms offers in the first two years of the Trump administration
averaged $56.6 billion per year, about $ 2 billion less than the annual average for
the eight years of the Obama administration.1
Major findings of this report include:
• The number and value of licenses granted to manufacture U.S. weapons and weapons components overseas increased by over 50% from 2017 to
2018. In 2017 there were 19 manufacturing licenses granted, valued at $12.6 billion. In 2018 those figures jumped to 40 licenses granted, valued at
This development undermines President Trump’s claim

$19.8 billion, or 25% of all U.S. arms offers in 2018.
that U.S. arms sales are a major source of jobs in the United States.
• President Trump continued to exaggerate the number of jobs generated by U.S. arms
sales, both to Saudi Arabia and globally. By the most generous estimate, total U.S. arms sales-related jobs equal two-tenths of one per cent of the
U.S. labor force. And many of these jobs are located overseas as a result of offset and manufacturing agreements, as noted above.
2AC – AT: Navarro
Their Navarro evidence is neo-con propaganda – the DIB is repressive and
violent
LENDMAN 19 – [Stephen, America needs a stronger defense industry?, 3/21/2019,
http://www.intrepidreport.com/archives/26634, DKP]
Post-WW II, America’s only enemies were and remain invented ones.
No real ones existed since Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were defeated—none anywhere, clearly none today!
Yet the US consistently pours countless trillions of dollars down a black hole of endless
waste, fraud and abuse—global militarism and belligerence supported by the vast majority of
Republicans and undemocratic Dems, at the expense of world peace, equity and justice.
Trump regime director of trade and industrial policy Peter Navarro is a militant right-wing extremist.
He’s part of a sinister cabal in Washington, wanting US-controlled puppet rule replacing
sovereign independent governments in China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and elsewhere.
He favors whatever it takes for the US to achieve dominance over planet earth, its resources, and
populations. The NYT gave him feature op-ed space to promote greater military spending at a time it should be
slashed.
He lied claiming, “Investing in the [defense] sector means more jobs at home and improved
security abroad. He lied saying, “In terms of economic security, the Trump defense budget is helping to create good
manufacturing jobs at good wages.”
He lied claiming increased “arms sales [abroad] not only help create good jobs at good
wages in America…they also enhance America’s capacity to bolster and stabilize our regional
alliances, even as they may reduce the need to deploy more American soldiers overseas.”
He lied saying “our defense industrial base [is] the unshakable foundation of both
economic and national security.”
Dwight Eisenhower’s warning about military-industrial complex dangers went unheeded, saying: “The potential for the disastrous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”
He called it a “potential enemy of the national interest…a distorted use of the nation’s resources…fail[ing] to comprehend its grave
implication…[affecting our] livelihood [and] the very structure of our society,” adding, “Every gun that is made, every war ship
launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and
not clothed.”
In an article, titled “The War Business,” the late Chalmers Johnson said the following: “[M]unitions
and war
profiteering have [become] the most efficient means for well-connected capitalists to
engorge themselves at the public trough.”
“To call these companies ‘private,’ though, is mere ideology. [Weapons and]
munitions making in the United States today (and related industries profiting from them are) not really private
enterprise. It is state socialism,” adding, “When war becomes the most profitable course of
action, we can certainly expect more of it,” sacrificing a free society for private
interests reaping short-term gains.
George Washington warned about “overgrown military establishments,” calling them “inauspicious to liberty.”
Perpetual wars now rage for illusory peace, what ruling authorities in Washington abhor—along with
democratic governance they tolerate nowhere, especially at home.
US elections are farcical when held. With attribution to redoubtable activist Emma Goldman, if they changed anything, they’d be
outlawed.
Economist, activist writer opponent of the military, industrial, security complex, Seymour Melman wrote extensively on the topic,
dispelling state-sponsored/media promoted myths.
Discussing what he called “the Grip of a Permanent War Economy,” he explained the following: “[A]t the start of the twenty-first
century, every
major aspect of American life [has been] shaped by our Permanent War
Economy.” Its horrific toll includes:
a de-industrialized nation, the result of decades of shifting production abroad, leaving unions, US workers and communities
“decimated;”
government financing, promoting and pursuing “every kind of war industry and foreign investing by US firms”— war priorities taking
precedence over essential homeland needs;
America’s “permanent war economy…has endured since the end of World War II…Since then, the US has been at war—somewhere
—every year, in Korea, Nicaragua, Vietnam, the Balkans,—all this to the accompaniment of shorter military forays in Africa, Chile,
Grenada, Panama,” and endless aggression in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Palestine, Somalia, Yemen, Central Africa, and
increasingly against perceived homeland threats;
“How to make war” takes precedence over everything, leaving no “public space (for) improv[ing] the quality of our lives;”
“Shortages of housing have caused a swelling of the homeless population in every major city [because] state and city governments
across the country have become trained to bend to the needs of the military…;”
The nation’s deplorable state is characterized by growing millions of poor, disadvantaged, low income, uneducated, and
“disconnected [people] from society’s mainstream, restless and unhappy, frustrated, angry, and sad.”
“State Capitalism” characterizes America’s agenda —partnering with business, running a
permanent war economy for greater power and wealth, ill-served by pure evil leadership, at war on
humanity at home and abroad.
US rage for global dominance comes at the expense of a nation in decline, lost
industrialization, crumbling infrastructure, millions of lost jobs offshored to low-wage countries,
growing millions at home uncared for, unwanted, ignored, and forgotten to assure steady funding for bankers, war making, and
other corporate predation—at the expense of ordinary people everywhere.
Melman explained that investing in domestic needs, developing the nation and its people, achieves a far greater bang
for the buck than resources
spent for militarism and war making.
They’re parasitic, unjustifiable, illegal, immoral, and eventually self-destructive— why
the US has been in decline for decades while China, Russia, and other nations are growing and developing productively.
2AC – Manufacturing Weak Now
US manufacturing and defense industry has been hollowed out through
offshoring development and import dependence – critical industries are
hanging on by a thread
*edited
Clad, ’18 (James Clad, Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC and former deputy
assistant Secretary of Defense, “The Perilous State of America’s Defense Industry”, InsideSources, 11/26/2018,
https://www.insidesources.com/the-perilous-state-of-americas-defense-industry/, ZW)
Two grim words — ‘hollowed out’ — routinely surface when we speak about
America’s once formidable industrial and manufacturing prowess. Once inextricable to
growth and progress, our
industrial primacy was already slipping when a shortsighted notion
took root back in the 1980s and then spread like crabgrass.
It went like this: It doesn’t really matter if we are not actually making anything anymore. “Computer chips, potato chips: what’s the
difference so long as they’re monetized?’”
The “financialization” of everything proceeded apace in

the 1990s, accompanied by a facile belief
that globalized trade would impartially confer comparative advantages to all . Because of
economies of scale, the winners at the very least would outnumber the losers. In some models, there would be no losers at all.
Two or three decades into this mindset, the damage of what we could call this laissez expirer attitude helped propel the current
administration to power in 2016. Yet hand-wringing still stymies concerted action to right the ship, especially in a vital part of the
country’s capacity — defense manufacturing and broader trends in defense industrial enterprise.
The pace of recent domestic news plus midterm elections have pushed less pressing news aside. It’s no wonder therefore that a
ponderously titled Defense Department report (“Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and
Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States”) failed to make the summer blockbuster reading list, let alone Page One.
But if you care about maintaining our defense superiority — and you should — a passing familiarity with the report’s contents will
equip you with worrisome facts.
Let’s be clear: This isn’t bathtub reading. The dense report packs in a lot, including sector-by-sector risk analyses and various agency-
specific must-do’s for reducing defense supply chain risk. In just one section on the “Materials Sector,” the Defense report sees
enormous and growing vulnerability to sole suppliers, domestic and foreign.
Here’s the ‘BLUF’ — Pentagonese for “bottom line up front.” Put bluntly, U.S.
military manufacturing and the
military materials supply chain have succumbed to a crippling dependence on overseas
imports. There’s also too much acquiescence in supply chain choke points. Entire
critical industries either have disappeared or are hanging on by a thread.
As is often the case, the challenges faced by our defense industrial base and supply chain can largely be traced back to successive
missteps and omissions. For example, Washington gridlock routinely produces unpredictable federal budgeting. Lacking reliable
payments means perilous uncertainty for defense suppliers.
That’s just one example. Overall, the

erosion of industrial capability and capacity has led to a
ceding of place to foreign competitors, a slow-motion decline of domestic strength
mirroring the wider phenomenon of offshoring manufacturing.
Within the defense industrial subsector of our overall manufacturing base, foreign
competition has not elicited a domestic response sufficient to halt the erosion of U.S.
industrial capacity. While too often a one-size-fits-all excuse for failure, a combination of mercantilist
trade practices, dumping, and intellectual property theft (overwhelmingly from China)
has eroded our industrial primacy. Yet it has all happened under our noses, with our “eyes wide shut.”
Manufacturing is declining now – 12 vital signs disprove hopeful projections

Collins, ’18 (Michael Collins, author of The Rise of Inequality and the Decline of the Middle Class and former vice
president at Columbia Machine in Vancouver, Washington, “Hope Is Not a Plan: The Myth of American
Manufacturing”, Industry Week, 08/09/2018, https://www.industryweek.com/leadership/hope-not-plan-myth-
american-manufacturing, ZW)
Economists who believe that a service economy will provide the needed growth for
the American economy are simply relying on hope, not facts. The truth is if manufacturing
continues to decline, then America will decline. The assumption that a service
economy is adequate is a huge gamble which risks living standards, the economy, and
in fact, our position as the No. 1 economy in the world.
Assessing manufacturing growth requires looking at 12

vital signs of manufacturing and how they are trending.
Together, these signs make the case that American manufacturing is declining in terms of
market share and employment but can be saved by policy changes.
1. Manufacturing jobs – The following chart from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the long-term trend in
manufacturing jobs is negative. This chart suggests that we may have a brief rebound but will
continue to lose manufacturing jobs in the coming decades. Almost all of the other sectors in the
economy (including mining and construction) show growth in new jobs between 2016 and 2026. The Bureau of Labor Statistics data
show that manufacturing jobs will go from 12,348,000 jobs in 2016 to 11,611,000 in 2026
– a loss of 736,000 jobs.

2. Advanced training – Politicians are desperate for middle-class jobs that don’t require a college education, and they
always point to manufacturing as the answer. But the fact is that most manufacturers don’t want the people who have
been laid off. They want multiskilled employees (apprentice/journeyman) who will help them do more
with fewer workers.
A recent report called “The Skills Gap in U.S. Manufacturing 2015 and Beyond” projects that with retirements in the next
decade, 2 million manufacturing jobs will go unfilled.
This skilled workforce shortage problem is not new. The urgency of the problem was described as far back as 1990 by the National
Center on Education and the Economy, with its report "The American Workforce - America’s Choice: High Skills or Low Wages." Since
then, the problem has been well-documented, in five more reports: in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2015.
It has been at least 25 years since the alarm was sounded on skills shortages in manufacturing and the threat of retiring baby
boomers. So, the question is: Are the manufacturers investing in the apprentice/advanced training they say they need?
The proof that it is not happening is in the U.S. Department of Labor database of federally registered apprentices in the U.S. Of
533,607 registered apprentices across all industries in 2017, only 17,559 were in
manufacturing.
Training the new manufacturing workers to do advanced troubleshooting and have the multiskill ability to do many jobs, I believe,
will require an investment in long-term, comprehensive training programs. McKinsey estimates that a national apprenticeship
program could cost $40 billion annually.
But I suspect that the publicly held companies will continue to view training as an expense rather than an investment. This kind of
mindset is very suspicious of training programs that take years to complete, paying people for skills they attain, or issuing certificates
to people that make their skills transferable.
The federal government has also offered a solution for training people with advanced skills. They propose building 15 Advanced
Technology Centers around the country. It is amazing to me that both the federal and state governments always think that building
brick and mortar buildings and hiring staff is the answer to training problems.
We need apprentice programs and corporations don’t want to fund them, so wouldn’t the money be better spent funding the wages
of apprentices over the many years it takes to certify them as journeymen?
After his election, President Donald Trump promoted the idea of apprenticeship type training, but so far he has declined to commit
any significant funding to training.
3. Machine tools – Machine tools are the foundation of manufacturing. They are the master machines
that make other machines.
In 1965, U.S. machine tool builders were responsible for 28% of global production. By
1986, that share had declined to less than 10%.
According to the 2016 Gardner Market Research survey, our share of the global
machine tool market now stands at 5.8%.
4. Trade deficit – When imports and exports of a country are in balance, all trading countries benefit. Each country
specializes in what it does best—exchanging its most competitive products for products it could not produce as cheaply as the
trading country. Normally trade deficits are self-correcting, because as the deficit grows, the country’s currency is supposed to
decline in price in the world market. This makes exported goods less expensive and foreign goods more expensive, which brings
trade into balance.
But this is not happening because

we allow our trading partners to manipulate their currencies
to always keep the dollar high and force the U.S. to run trade deficits . We then have to
finance this deficit by borrowing from the same countries and issuing the government
securities as collateral so that we can buy more of their imports and increase our
deficit.
An article by the Economic Policy Institute makes a strong case that trade deficits are related to the loss of jobs. It asserts that
between 2000 and 2007, 3.6 million manufacturing jobs were lost. After the Great Recession, between 2007 and 2014, another 1.4
million manufacturing jobs were lost. Overall
manufacturing lost more than 5 million jobs since
year 2000, during a time of increasing trade deficits.
Up until the late ’90s, trade deficits were relatively small, “never exceeding $131 billion annually, and they never exceeded 1.7% of
GDP.” After 1998, trade deficits began rising sharply and peaked at $568 billion in 2017. The U.S. now owes $11.15 trillion to the
countries that loan us money to finance the deficit. This is not an accounting convention; we really are obligated to pay this money
back. Which begs the question: What if a loaning country decides they want their money back and want to cash in the government
securities we gave them?
Who are the losers? As I see it, the losers of the ongoing policy of financing trade deficits are American workers, manufacturing,
taxpayers, and the economy in general (because trade deficits are added to our federal deficit). Continuing to run trade deficits has
led to de-industrialization and the loss of millions of jobs.
Who are the winners? The obvious winners are the multinational corporations who have built plants in Asia and can ship their
products back to the U.S. Conservative pundits and lobbyists are always supportive of trade deficits. They make the case that trade
deficits are good for the economy, good for consumers, and create jobs.
As more American manufacturers move abroad, the flow of money out of the country will eventually exceed the benefits of cheap
imports. In the last five years, the trade deficit grew from $461 billion to $568 billion.
The trade deficit begs two questions. First, if we have to pay the money back, how will we do it with a growing federal deficit?
Second, how much can we continue to borrow? We now have a balance of $11.5 trillion. Is it okay to go to $20 trillion?
President Trump has sent out numerous tweets decrying trade deficits. But I haven’t heard of anybody in either political party
offering a real plan to begin reducing trade deficit growth or even admit it is not sustainable for the long term. Unless we can set a
goal to reduce the trade deficit, there is simply no chance of a manufacturing renaissance or big increases in manufacturing jobs.
And I am afraid that the continuous borrowing to finance deficits at some point will overwhelm us.
5. Federal research – Basic research by the federal government differs from private R&D in that federal basic research is
high-risk and seldom translates into commercial products in the short term. Private R&D, on the other hand, is driven by
shareholders for short-term profits.
Most people are unaware that federal

basic research was the initial research that led to the
development of many products seen today, including the Google search engine, the internet, GPS,
supercomputers, artificial intelligence, smart phone technology, shale gas, seismic imaging, LED technology, MRI, Human Genome
Project and advanced prosthetics, to name just a few.
What this demonstrates is that the best strategy for the future that America can employ is innovation, which comes from research—
and government-funded basic research is crucial.
In the early 1960s, federal research spending was more than half of the total R&D
spending; by 2012, it had fallen to 31% of total R&D. This decline is a very bad trend because this
research is the lifeblood of all R&D, and most experts believe that declining basic research will eventually lead to declining GDP
growth.
6. Manufacturing’s share of R&D – Manufacturing R&D is vital because it is 70% of all

business R&D. Any decline in manufacturing will result in a decline of R&D and our
strategy of innovation.
7. Advanced technology products – China has already swallowed the low-tech products we use to make. What they
want now is our advanced technology products and all of the new technologies that go with them. The U.S. government-
designated Advanced Industries sector includes 50 industries—35 manufacturing, three
energy, and 12 service. They are our best shot at maintaining competitive advantage and sustainable economic growth.
According to the Brookings Institution, Advanced Industries employ 80% of the nation’s engineers, perform 90% of private sector
R&D, generate 85% of U.S. patents, and account for 60% of U.S. exports. These industries employ more than 12 million workers and
another 27 million secondary workers for a total of 39 million jobs. America’s Advanced Technology Industries now produce 17% of
the U.S. gross product.
But as important as the Advanced Industries are, there are big problems emerging. Job creation in this category
has been stagnant for many years and as the following chart from the Peterson Foundation shows, we have
been running trade deficits since 2002. We need to protect the technology of these industries or we simply
won’t be able to lead in innovation.
8. Net exports of capital goods as a share of GDP – Trade in capital goods, such as
airplanes, medical equipment, semiconductors, etc., are a big part of our exports and
have long been a factor of our competitive strength . But as the chart below illustrates, this is no longer true.
Capital goods have changed from a surplus to a deficit.
9. Industries lost or in decline – It would seem that the simplest indicator of either growth or decline is the
government figures on industries, which are available from the Monthly Labor Review in their employment outlook: 2008 to 2018.
The industries that are essentially lost and probably never coming back include
textiles and apparel, semiconductors, coal, cellphones, robots, and luggage.
The industries that are in decline and may eventually die unless they get some
protection include furniture, steel, aluminum, autos, computer and peripheral
equipment, and motor vehicle parts.
As those industries decline, manufacturing’s share of GDP drops . From 1948 to 2003,
manufacturing output increased along with productivity. But from 2000 to 2010, the share of GDP growth
began to decline along with manufacturing jobs and overall GDP. In fact, in that decade,
manufacturing productivity increased by 66%, while manufacturing jobs declined by 33%. Manufacturing’s
percentage of GDP has been declining since 2014.
10. Exports – Manufacturing was a top priority of the Obama administration, which
strove to double exports during Obama’s second term. But Robert Scott of the Economic Policy
Institute said the U.S. economy fell well short of that goal , as exports only increased by 48.4%. Not only did
the U.S. fall short, but the rise in exports between 2009 and 2014 was actually smaller in percentage terms than it was in the five
years following the 2001 recession.
Most people do not know that U.S. manufacturing has contributed an average of 70% of
American export shipments every year since 2000. But, exports are not growing fast
enough to offset the trade deficit. In fact, we are beginning to lose our place as exporter to the world. China
has taken over the No. 1 position in world exports. The U.S. exports have fallen to No.
2 and Germany is third and likely to take over the No. 2 position. If increasing the ratio of exports
to imports is the only way we can reduce our trade deficit, then manufacturing exports are not only vital, they are
the solution to the trade deficit problem.
11. Our strategy of innovation – Just about everybody, liberal or conservative, believes that innovation is the primary
strategy America depends on to compete in the global economy. President Obama, in a State of the Union speech, summed up our
competitive challenge when he said, “The only durable strength we have—the only one that can withstand these gale winds—is
innovation.” But the
loss of our technologies through partnerships, unfair trade, technology
transfer and espionage has shown that we are fast losing our innovation edge to countries
like China. If we can’t stop this ongoing loss of technology or halt the decline of U.S. manufacturing, we will not be able to compete
with a strategy of innovation.
12. Manufacturing and national defense – Many industries, like aerospace, high tech,
software and others build the products that allow America to have the world’s most
powerful arsenal. Basic industries like the chemical, petroleum, mining, and
electronics industries are part of our strategic and defensive reserves. Maintaining
these industries and the suppliers and skilled workers in them is a matter of national security, yet we are
losing ground to foreign manufacturers who manipulate their currencies, have government subsidies, or don’t
have to pay the same tariffs they place on foreign imports. For most of the declining industries (despite increasing
productivity) it means continuous decline of employment, more imports and the eventual
loss of the industry to foreign competitors.
We have exported the manufacturing of many defense components and materials to
lower cost foreign producers which has seriously eroded the supply chain that made
them.
Manufacturing is declining now – recent ISM log documents enormous fall
caused by domestic economy, not exports
Simonet, ’19 (Joffrey Simonet, economist, “United States: ISM manufacturing index logs steepest month-on-
month decline since the last recession in December”, Focus Economis, 01/03/2019, https://www.focus-
economics.com/countries/united-states/news/pmi/ism-manufacturing-index-logs-steepest-month-on-month-decline-
since, ZW)
The U.S. manufacturing sector tumbled sharply in December after logging a robust performance in
November. The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing index fell from 59.3 in
November to 54.1 in December, reaching a 25-month low and well below analysts’
expectations of 57.9. The decline was furthermore the largest observed in a single month
since October 2008, during the Great Recession. Nevertheless, the index remained above the 50-point threshold that
separates expansion from contraction in the U.S. manufacturing sector, where it has been for 28 consecutive months.
The decline logged in December was broad-based, but was due primarily to a sharp fall in output
growth, and an even sharper decline in the new orders index , which lost a staggering 11 points in the
month and came close to the 50-point threshold. Interestingly, the new export orders index was one of the
two indicators to rise slightly in December, indicating that dramatically softer demand
conditions were exclusively caused by the domestic economy. Consequently, backlogs of orders—
which had been rising at a robust pace so far this year—were stable in December, while both employment and import growth
softened.
Looking at supply-side indicators, weaker demand in December also had an outsized impact on
manufacturers’ supply chains, with signs of strain abating significantly. Indeed, supplier delivery times lengthened at
a much softer pace in the month, while input cost inflation also declined markedly. Growth in input inventories meanwhile slowed,
while, conversely, customers’ inventories depleted at a marginally softer pace than in November.
As in previous months, manufacturers

continued to be mainly preoccupied with the state of
the ongoing trade feud with China, and their responses also reflected significantly less
optimistic sentiment than just a few months ago. One respondent for instance declared
that “the ongoing open issues with tariffs between U.S. and China are causing longer-
term concerns about costs and sourcing strategies for our manufacturing operations.
We were anticipating more clarity [regarding] tariffs at the end of 2018”.
According to James Knightley, chief international economist at ING, “the plunge in the
ISM manufacturing index adds to the sense of unease about the prospects for the
global economy and will reinforce financial market gloom", strongly suggesting that the Fed will
abstain from raising interest rates again at least until the end of Q1.
Manufacturing’s declining now – specifically where Trump promised to

revitalize the industry
Tackett, ’19 (Michael Tackett, staff writer for the New York Times, “Trump Promised a Manufacturing
Renaissance. What Happens in 2020 in Places That Lost Those Jobs?”, The New York Times, 06/24/2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/trump-manufacturing-jobs-2020.html, ZW)
But nothinghas reversed the decline of the county’s manufacturing base. From January
2017 to December 2018, it lost nearly 9 percent of its manufacturing jobs , and 17 other
counties in Michigan that Mr. Trump carried have experienced similar losses, according to a
newly updated analysis of employment data by the Brookings Institution.
“To the extent that economic realities have the power to alter voting behavior, the trends are pointing in one direction in Michigan
in a lot of these counties,” said Mark Muro, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who directed the analysis.
And that makes it most likely that Michigan, which the president won by only 10,704 votes, could be a place where his expansive
promises will come back to haunt him in 2020.
More troubling for Mr. Trump, some of the same forces are at work in the two other states that
were critical to his Electoral College victory — Wisconsin, where 10 counties that he won in 2016 lost
manufacturing jobs, and Pennsylvania, where eight counties that he carried faced
manufacturing job losses.
All three states experienced an overall growth in manufacturing jobs during the period
surveyed by Brookings, but the rates have begun to slow, especially in Michigan.
“Michigan is likely a forerunner,” Mr. Muro said. “I could imagine Pennsylvania and Wisconsin turning negative or losing growth
momentum the rest of the year.” While
Michigan’s economy is more dependent on the big
automakers, all three states have economies with roots in factory work, particularly in
smaller towns and rural areas that have been steadily losing ground because of
automation and globalization.
North of Dimondale, Clinton
County offers another example. Mr. Trump won the county, but it has experienced a
loss of more than a quarter of its manufacturing jobs.
In Pennsylvania, the losses were not as steep but two counties that Mr. Trump won easily, Wyoming and Warren,
had the highest percentage declines in the state. The same was true for Trempealeau
and Rusk Counties in Wisconsin, where a Democrat, Tony Evers, ousted the incumbent Republican governor, Scott
Walker, a strong supporter of the president, in 2018.
2AC – Manuf Weak: LL
US manufacturing is weak now – demos, education, immigration and
infrastructure thump the link
O’Hanlon 11 – Senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in
The United States faces other problems too. Despite the strength of certain cutting-edge technology sectors in this
country, most classic manufacturing industries are in relatively weak shape , and overall
manufacturing output as a percent of GDP declined from 21.2 percent in 1979 to just 11.5 percent three
decades later.14 Aerospace remains a bright spot in this picture, with total sales exceeding $200 billion a year and
an export trade balance exceeding $50 billion annually even in recent economically difficult times.15 Yet like other aspects of the
national security industrial base, it is at some risk.
A core underlying trend is the issue of human capital—the young men and women who will staff the
defense industry firms and invent the key military technologies of the future. In many ways, they are more the base
than the plants and facilities themselves. Unfortunately a great deal of defense
industry work cannot be globalized, and this once rich pipeline is under significant
stress, with long-term consequence for the firms that must recruit from this pool (as
a great deal of defense industry work cannot be globalized).
Science and technology education levels among the country’s public school students are mediocre by
global standards—ranking typically in the 20s among 40 nations participating in recent surveys, and 36th among all
countries in “health and primary education” according to the World Economic Forum.16 Although elite universities remain strong,
including in the sciences, more and more of the country’s science and engineering graduate
students are foreigners who often return home after obtaining their degrees. As a percent of U.S. degrees
earned, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) degrees have fallen from around 25
percent a quarter century ago to only about 16 percent in recent years. This contrasts with levels ranging from 25 to 33 percent
in most western nations and 38 percent in Korea.17 These trends are simply not consistent with the
country’s long-term need to maintain domestic advantages in cutting-edge technology
sectors.
In his new book Brain Gain, Darrell West argues that, while education reform to deal with problems in science and engineering
capability is certainly necessary, the
United States must also rethink its immigration policies . Current
immigration policy has not been strategic and the political debate on it has become deeply
disappointing. Since 2005, only 6.5 percent of U.S. visas have gone towards highly skilled workers; comparatively, Canada set
aside 58 percent, using its visas as part of a drive to fill needed skills gaps and aid long-term economic growth and competitiveness.
Reorienting policy towards greater efforts to attract workers with needed skills should be prioritized. In
addition to
matters such as H-1B visas, the United States presently makes a massive investment in many
foreign PhDs (approximately $300,000 per graduate) that is usually lost when a student must return
to their native country after receiving their degree.18
The infrastructure that the base also depends on is also weakening , all the more
concerning as newer powers outdistance the United States in everything from high-speed rail
to major ports to broadband internet capacity. Current annual spending on infrastructure is perhaps
$20 billion too low simply to maintain existing services , and about $80 billion too low relative to what would
be optimal.19 This is happening at a time when the finances of cities are in greater peril than at any time
over the last quarter century. Even if some of the problem is due to the short-term effects of the great recession ,
the decline
in the property values that provide the base for urban services will probably be
longer-lasting. State budgets are similarly strained; for example, Maryland has $33 billion in unfunded
future pension and health-care obligations to state employees, and another seven states are in similarly bad straits (with yet another
dozen also in some trouble).20 California, the nation’s largest state, is
in the most worrisome shape of all.
Such localities will not be in a position to provide the type of support or even tax
credits they once offered in competitions to entice major new defense industrial
facilities to be built in their areas.
The above trends all pose threats, either direct or indirect, to America’s future power. They
could weaken what the defense industry needs to produce world-class equipment for America’s men and
women in uniform. They could impede the government from sustaining adequate defense
budgets. They could erode the will of the American people to continue to support an enlightened
foreign policy focused more on heading off threats, sustaining the global commons and maintaining global order than on waiting for
threats to develop and trying to respond only then. They are all of concern.
1AR – Manuf Weak: Job Trends Prove
Job trends prove manufacturing decline is inevitable
Zarrolli 16 (Jim Zarolli; NPR correspondent based in New York, graduated from Pennsylvania State University;
“Bringing Back Manufacturing Jobs Would Be Harder Than It Sounds”;
https://www.npr.org/2016/08/18/490192497/bringing-back-manufacturing-jobs-would-be-harder-than-it-sounds;
DS)
It's a line that draws thunderous applause at Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump's campaign rallies, one that can
sometimes even bring the crowd to its feet: Let's bring back America's lost manufacturing jobs.
And is there any question why? The United States has lost nearly 5 million
manufacturing jobs since 2000 alone, hollowing out factory towns all over the country and leaving countless
working-class Americans struggling.
Getting those jobs back is a goal that politicians of all stripes eagerly line up behind. But
the plain truth is that,
legally speaking, there's not a lot that Trump or any other president could do to bring
those jobs back, without an act of Congress.
Link
2AC – Funding/Exports Solve
The Pentagon budget and other weapons exports overwhelm the link
Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program; 6/24/19; “Do U.S. Defense
Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?”; https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-
u-s-defense-firms-really-need-arms-exports/#7120816563eb; DS)
But thetruth of the matter is that U.S. firms could do without sales to Saudi Arabia and
other repressive regimes, and they’d still be doing just fine financially. The current
Pentagon budget is at one of the highest levels since World War II, and it provides
ample funding for procurement and R&D, much of which lands in the coffers of major defense firms that are
the leading weapons exporters. This is particularly true when one considers that the most likely outcome would not be a total ban
on sales to Saudi Arabia, but a prohibition on weapons most relevant to the Yemen war – precision-guided munitions in particular.
Other deals, like a lucrative $15 billion sale of the Lockheed Martin THAAD missile
defense system to Riyadh, would likely remain untouched . Arms sales in general
are important to key firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which got roughly one-quarter to one-third of their
revenues, respectively, from foreign sales in 2018. But the biggest export earners were missile
defense systems and combat aircraft exported to allies in Europe and Asia, not
bombs being used in war zones.
2AC – No Link: Drones
Domestic military drone production and R&D disprove the link
Divis 18 (Dee Ann Divis; editor at Inside Unmanned Systems, Journalism Fellow at MIT, Bachelor’s degree in
Business; “Military UAV Market To Top $83B”; http://insideunmannedsystems.com/military-uav-market-to-top-83b/;
DS)
U.S. Keeps Its Lead
Though the military UAV sector is expected to become increasingly international the
U nited S tates will continue to dominate, Teal predicted. The United States will account for 57 percent
of the unclassified research and development ( R&D ) spending on UAV technology over
the next decade and about 32 percent of the procurement. Add in Teal’s estimates of classified U.S.
spending and that jumps to 76 percent of R&D and 49 percent of procurement.
A comparison of production value of the unmanned aircraft (that is the value of the UAVs themselves not including things like
sensors, modifications, ground control systems and other procurement costs) shows the
U.S. growing from an
estimated production of 1,179 UAVs worth $1.8 billion in 2017 to 2,530 drones in 2026
worth $4.4 billion. The Asia-Pacific is the next most active market by region as measured by both the number of air vehicles
produced and by the value of those air vehicles, according to Teal, followed by Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas (see
Table 1 for the numbers). The study estimated that UAV production would increase from current worldwide UAV production of $4.2
billion annually in 2017 to $10.3 billion in 2026—that is $80.5 billion in total spending on just the unmanned aircraft over the next 10
years (Note: this is slightly different from the FY18 to FY27 time frame mentioned earlier. The value of each unit is standardized
using cost ranges to enable practical forecasts. Those ranges reflect a portion of system costs. See Table 2).
Though micro UAVs didn’t make the cut, there is real activity in the next level up—the mini UAVs, which Teal categorizes as costing
$50,000-$65,000. There were some 2,530 of these produced in the U.S. in 2017 with a value of about $189 million. That is expected
to rise to 4,439 units with a value of $363 million by 2026.
Teal forecast that the biggest

slice of the UAV market, at $27.2 billion, would be centered on
the development of new Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles or UCAVs—unmanned
aircraft that could perform at least some of the roles of combat aircraft . Zaloga believes the
Air Force already has a classified version of such a program in the works as a
replacement for the now-retired F-117 Nighthawk stealth attack plane —a UAV that could slip
past sensors to take out air defenses without risking a pilot.
“My belief is that the Air Force is either flying that right now or on the verge of flying it—or certainly has a requirement,” Zaloga
said.
Those working on UCAVs as true combat aircraft, however, have some real challenges ahead, he said. “I think that one is a lot
further down the road because it’s much more difficult to replace the human as the main sensor on the aircraft,” Zaloga said. “The
human is much more versatile than most electro-optical or mixed electro-optical/radar sensors that we have right now.”
Zaloga expects the second largest segment of the market to be the Medium Altitude/Long
Endurance (MALE) UAVs like the Predator and Heron. With an endurance of about 24 hours and long-
range capability these are generally used for operational reconnaissance. Teal forecast a total production value
over 10 years at $ 22.2 billion (see Chart 4).

2AC – No Link: Saudi Arabia
The plan has a minuscule impact on US manufacturing revenue
Caverley 18 (Jonathan D. Caverley; Associate Professor of Strategy in the Strategic & Operational Research
Department of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies and a research scientist in political science at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 10/12/18; “Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply”;
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html; DS)
President Trump, however, is skeptical. “I don’t like stopping massive amounts of money that’s being poured into our
country,” he said on Thursday. “They are spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs for this
country.” This figure is vastly inflated, but there’s a reason Mr. Trump is inclined to
believe it. While the amount of new deals approved under President Trump is closer to $20 billion, the Saudi government has
visibly linked itself as the foremost client of the administration’s export push.
Peter Navarro , the White House’s director of trade and industrial policy, has argued that increased arms
sales “will be an important catalyst for strengthening American industry ; the stewardship of
our national security; and the strengthening of our international partnerships.” But the truth is that in the case of
Saudi Arabia, the benefits on all three fronts are slight .
arms orders remain a manageably small part of the United

Despite recent increases, Saudi
States’ exports. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in 2017, a near-record year for annual
purchases, the United States delivered $5.5 billion worth of arms, 20 percent of all foreign
military sales. That may sound like a lot, but the United States exports only 25 to 30
percent of its defense industry production, so exports to Saudi Arabia clearly remain a
relatively small slice of the enormous defense industrial pie .
And contrary
to President Trump’s statement, exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively
few American jobs . Based on Commerce Department figures, releasing the billion dollars of
munitions currently on hold in the Senate would “create or sustain” fewer than 4, 000
jobs. Here’s a more specific example: Publicizing a recent $6 billion helicopter deal with Saudi Arabia,
Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 450 American jobs.
2AC – No Link: Saudi Arabia (GCC)
The GCC is already moving away from US arms imports
Gaub 17 (Florence Gaub; Deputy Director of the EUISS, where she is in charge of coordinating research activities,
Senior Analyst at the EUISS, as well as at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the German Parliament. She
completed her PhD at the Humboldt University, Berlin and also has qualifications from the University of Munich,
Sciences Po Paris, and the Sorbonne; 2017; “DEFENCE INDUSTRIES IN ARAB STATES: PLAYERS AND STRATEGIES”;
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_141_Arab_Defence.pdf; DS)
One of the more curious developments has been the rise of eastern European
countries and other unexpected partners entering into cooperation agreements with
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This, however, demonstrates recognition that dependence on the
West is no longer guaranteed. Whereas arms imports trends show a tendency on the part of Gulf countries to go
after the most sophisticated ‘glamour weapons’, the arms industry trends point more towards
mastering the basics. With the exception of certain Saudi programmes , such as the recent foray
into full aircraft production, emphasis on COTS solutions and partnerships with non-traditional partners with more middle-ground
capabilities is perceived as a necessary interim step towards operability and, eventually, autarky.
Tracking new defence industrial partnerships in Gulf countries also indicates who
future suppliers will be. As can already be seen with regard to arms imports in the
Middle East, partnerships with second-tier, non-Western producers, namely South Africa , also
demonstrate how the emergence of nascent defence industries may weaken Western
dominance. If Arab DTIBs become more capable, this could have a ripple effect on other markets
that may favour GCC cooperation and regionally sourced solutions. The implication
for traditional suppliers from the US and Europe is a new trade-off of less foreign
policy leverage relative to increasingly capable allies in the region.
Internals
2AC – Econ: Jobs Internal Link
Arms sales jobs are a tiny fraction of the US economy
Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program; 6/24/19; “Do U.S. Defense
Firms Really Need To Export Arms To Saudi Arabia?”; https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2019/06/24/do-
u-s-defense-firms-really-need-arms-exports/#7120816563eb; DS)
President Trump
is far from the most consistent commander-in-chief we’ve ever had, but
he’s convinced of at least one thing – arms exports are good for American jobs and
American companies, and all other considerations be damned .
The president was at it again this weekend when he told NBC’s Chuck Todd that initiating an FBI investigation of the role of Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman over the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi might jeopardize lucrative
U.S. arms deals with the kingdom. This is just the latest example of his love affair with weapons exports, beginning with his much-
touted and greatly exaggerated $110 billion arms sales package to Saudi Arabia that he announced during his May 2017 visit to
Riyadh.
Building on the Saudi mega-deal – which independent analysts have determined may be as little as 10% as large as the $110 billion
figure the president claims – Trump has thrown out incredible estimates of the U.S jobs generated by the Saudi sales, from 40,000 to
An estimate I did for a report
500,000 and up to one million if one counts related deals outside the military sphere.
by the Center for International Policy indicates that the real number of jobs generated
by the roughly $ 2.5 billion a year in arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia over the past
decade is likely 20,000 to 40,000 jobs , a tiny fraction of the more than 150 million
jobs in the U.S. economy.
2AC – Econ: Internal Link Turn
Defense manufacturing hurts the economy – they free ride on civilian
innovation and require large government spending
Holden et al. 16 (Paul Holde, a historian and researcher, et al. Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global
Arms Trade: Myth 4: The Defense Industry is key to the National Economy, Zed Books, 2016, WC)
one of the key justifications for military spending is the impact it has on the
As we've seen in Myth 2,
economy. This argument is trotted out whenever there is even the vaguest threat of
cuts in defense spending, which usually draws a widespread gnashing of teeth and dire
predictions of massive unemployment leading to national calamity . For politicians who want to put their own
fingers into the pork barrel and appear strong on defense, plumping up the vital role that defense plays in the economy of arms producers is a no-brainer.
Just one problem: there is very little evidence that military spending does benefit
the econo my, and indeed rather more evidence that its effect is actually harmful . Far
national arms industries typically rely on massive welfare and subsidies

from driving the economy,
from their parent governments to stay afloat. The arms business does create jobs—
but, because of the massive subsidies involved, far fewer jobs and at greater expense
than alternative investments. Rather than driving innovation, the arms business
mostly free-rides on civilian innovation , taking existing technologies and cobbling
them together. And since it competes for talent and resources with other industries, in
some ways the business actually slows down civilian scientific and technological
advancement .
Size Matters
Despite the triumphalist advertising of the defense industry, it is relatively small as a share of total industry or manufacturing outside of the United States. In the UK, which has the second largest defense industry
in the world, the total sales of manufactured military products was E13.1bn in 2013.1 This may seem like a large number, but it is nothing compared to the food and drink sector, for example, which added E21.5bn
to the UK economy and has a turnover of E81.8bn.2 Indeed, the total value of sales of products manufactured in the UK in the same year was E354.5bn.3 Sales from defense manufacturing thus only constitutes
3.8% of total manufacturing sales in the country. And compared to total GDP—El.8trn in 2013—it is absolutely miniscule. And all this despite the Ministry of Defense receiving roughly 6% of all 4 UK government
spending over the last few years.
In Europe as a whole, the amount contributed by defense is even more marginal. According to the European Aeronautics and Defense Association, the total turnover for defense companies in 2012 was €95bn in
twenty European countries (seventeen European Union members, including the UK, as well as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey).5 This is remarkably small compared against the €6.4trn in turnover recorded for
manufacturing in the European Union in the same year.6 Exact figures for Chinese defense manufacturing are hard to come by, but, based on China's considerably smaller defense spend and much smaller defense
export market compared to other members of the UN Security Council, is likely to be only a tiny fraction of China's $1.6trn manufacturing output.
. But given the size of the

There is, of course, one exception: the United States. The US is different because its expenditures on defense and the value of its weapons exports are far higher than for any other nation
US economy, it remains the case that arms production and trade account for a
relatively small share of total economic activity . In 2010, when total Pentagon
spending (both its base budget and the separate account for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan) topped $700bn and reached its highest levels since World War Il, it was
still only about 4.5% of USGDP. And in 2011, when US arms trade agreements were 7
estimated at a record $66.3bn by the Congressional Research Service,8 they paled in

comparison to the $1.49trn in goods and $627bn in services exported in the same year (for a total
of $2.12trn); indeed, defense exports only constituted 4% of total US exports.

Unsurprisingly, it is the US that boasts the largest defense companies in the world. As Figure 4.1 shows, only one non-US company (BAE Systems, which in any event has extensive US operations which usually
account for over 40% of its revenues) is in the top five global arms sellers.
And this is why size matters: it makes the economics of the international defense industry incredibly strange. If the arms trade worked like any other industry—making fridges, say—there simply would not be any
non-US manufacturers. This is because the US local demand gives it huge advantages in economies of scale: if you're already producing 1,000 tanks for your own military, it's much easier and cheaper, per unit, to
add an extra 200 to sell to your allies than it is to design a tank from scratch if your military only needs 200 for itself. Other defense manufacturers—the largest of which are all in Europe—have to find other means
by which to sell their products, as their lack of economies of scale means that they struggle to compete purely on product and price. They tend to seek economies of scale in either pooling resources into single
products (the Eurofighter) or by engaging in extensive exports. But if they can't compete on price and product, they have to start thinking more creatively, offering more than just weapons.
This is why the European defense industry has become expert at offering two sorts of inducements: economic offsets (discussed briefly in Myth 2 and in more detail later) and bribes. Indeed, as we will consider in
the following chapter, it is the non-US defense industry that is most often involved in corruption, without which it arguably could not compete. That is not to say that there aren't major problems with US defense
companies exerting influence on policy via lobbyists and Washington politicians in what has been described as 'systemic legal bribery', but it is clear that the most outrageous outright bribery tends to be
undertaken by players outside of the US. In a dysfunctional industry, dysfunctional behavior becomes the norm.
when the defense industry starts to speak darkly about national economic collapse
Thus,
at the threat of defense cuts, we need to bear two things in mind. First , it simply is not
true that the defense industry is central to the global economy and that cuts,
therefore, lead to economic Armageddon . Second, perhaps it may not be the best idea to pour money into a dysfunctional industry that is not
very economically efficient and is structured in such a way as to almost demand widespread corruption.
Kills growth – their studies are cherry picked or outdated; academic consensus
goes aff
Holden et al. 16 (Paul Holde, a historian and researcher, et al. Indefensible: Seven Myths That Sustain the Global
Arms Trade: Myth 4: The Defense Industry is key to the National Economy, Zed Books, 2016, WC)
If defenders of the industry cannot convince you that defense spending staves off
industrial catastrophe, they can always argue that, regardless of size, defense
spending nevertheless positively contributes to national economies by driving
economic growth it is an argument that has very little data to support it. Over
. Again,
the last thirty years, defense economists have tracked the correlation between
defense spending and economic growth in multiple countries . While the details are still hotly debated in the pages of academic journals,
the overall results show that instead of feeding growth, defense spending has been
shown to have an insignificant or negative impact on growth . In countries where there is a marked negative impact on
growth, they are said to be laboring under what is known as a 'defense burden'. Analysts of defense expenditure and
economic growth have looked into numerous channels through which defense expenditure can have an impact on economic performance.10 Among the key factors considered are:
Labor: how military spending can both lead to the training of advancement of military recruits, but may
suck up educated and technically proficient employees from the civilian sector .
Capital: how military investment can create industrial output, but can also 'crowd
out' investment in the civilian industries, hampering growth.
Technology: how arms production and imports can increase the technological base of an
economy, but may create an advanced technological sector delinked from the rest of
the economy and reliant on government support.

Socio-political: how military spending can have positive spin-offs by introducing a modernizing influence and reducing internal conflict, but may end up
supporting dictatorial and corrupt regimes that, as a whole, stifle growth.
Debt: how military spending in especially developing economies is funded by large public debt, which can constrain the raising of capital for civilian
industries or limit state spending 11 on other more productive areas of the economy.
In one vital 2013 study by the defense economists Professors John Paul Dunne and
Nan Tian, the entirety of the existing literature (close to 170 papers) was reviewed. The
They found that, in the majority of cases, the
literature covered a wide range of countries, from developed to developing economies.
studies undertaken had suggested an overwhelming ambiguous or negative

impact on growth , as Figure 4.2 shows.
cases where there was a positive result, the analysts had used a
These data, too, need to be put into context. In almost all
simple 'supply-side' equation, in which they looked at the amounts of money going into the economy and the economic activity associated with it. This,
Dunne argues, is unsurprising as these models are 'inherently structured to find such a
result'. When studies include a 'demand-side' calculation, such as the impact of
military spending on crowding out other investments in the economy, the results are
almost always negative or ambiguous.
New studies that focus on
Dunne and Tan make one additional point: the studies that were conducted using Cold War data were more likely to produce positive results.
post-Cold War economics tend to show more markedly negative results . In simpler terms, since
the end of the Cold War in particular, the data has shown that military spending has a
downward impact on the economy. This is clear from the second figure of data included in Dunne and Tan's survey (Figure 4.3), which shows that studies
undertaken since 2007, using more post-Cold War data, have produced clearer negative results.
The more recent

Reviewing their results, Dunne and Tan were emphatic: 'What does seem increasingly clear is that military expenditure does in general come at an economic cost ...
literature is moving towards a commonly accepted, if not consensus, view :
Military expenditure has a negative effect on economic growth. '13

Impact
2AC – Econ Defense
Economic decline doesn’t cause war – empirics
Clary 15 (Christopher Clary – Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for
International Studies, Brown University, "Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International
Rivalries”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)
Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns

encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that
economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For
states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate
the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct
rival dyads since 1950 , 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were
approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were
during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative
explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession,
capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other
possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that
economic downturns are associated with diversionary war , and instead argues that in
certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.
No war – Their ev can’t explain the 2008 recession

Drezner 14 (Daniel, Professor of International Relations (Tufts), Nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, former
international economist at the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of International Banking and Securities Markets,
“The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, B.A. in political economy (Williams
College), M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science (Stanford), World Politics, 66.1, January)
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked : the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict
and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of
force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an
increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great
power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled
impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and
Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate
violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other
studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict , as Lotta Themner and Peter
Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in
violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date
generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43
2AC – Econ: Resiliency
Econ’s resilient – shocks don’t spill over
Posen, 16 – Adam S. Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and external voting
member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting Monetary Policy Committee, “Chapter 1: Why We Need a Reality
Check”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-
3, March 2016
A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our economic
resilience , diminished the systemic spillovers between economies , and even created some room for additional
stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk
averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked
to the center’s growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade
imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also
smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now so committed to stabilization that they are attacked for being
too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying
loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets are far more solid in the US and
some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of
balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.
Economy resilient – dollar heg, influence on multilateral organizations, sheer

size, no challengers, and isolation from external downturns
Stratfor 16 ---- “The Decline of the Dollar Is Not the Decline of the United States,” 5/2,
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/decline-dollar-not-decline-united-states
There is no doubt that the U nited S tates' dominant role in the global financial system gives
it outsized influence . The dollar's status as the global reserve currency, U.S. influence on
multilateral financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and New
York's position as the financial capital of the world gives Washington strong
leverage that it uses to influence the actions of other nations. As in the case of the recently lifted sanctions
that isolatedIran, even if other countries do not align with U.S. positions, they would likely
capitulate to U.S. wishes so as not to lose access to U.S. financial markets. The United States still needed support from Europe for
those sanctions to have a significant effect, but even without that support, the sheer size of U.S. financial markets would have
given unilateral sanctions significant weight . While ETM Analytics has taken the view that the U.S. role in the global
financial system is supported largely by the hegemony of the dollar, Stratfor sees the dominant dollar is just one
component of a much larger mosaic supporting the long-term stability and
health of the U.S. economy . A gradual decline in the dollar's role as a global reserve currency does
not undermine the rest of the U nited S tates' economic strengths. Those give the U nited S tates more
flexibility in dealing with any economic challenge , and that is likely to continue
underwriting the stability of the U.S. economy . While the U.S. economy, like every other,
certainly remains subject to periodic downturns that will no doubt be painful at times, the U nited S tates has the
ability to weather them more easily than any other large country . One point that the ETM series
drives home is that regardless of its intent, the Fed's actions matter on a global scale, meaning it poses a risk to the rest of world. But to Stratfor, it is
not a question of whether the dollar's role in international finance is an exorbitant privilege that other nations are driven to "abhor," but rather how
well the Fed walks the thin line of balancing its own monetary policy requirements with the requirements of the global economy. The Fed's mandate is to
safeguard the health of the U.S. economy. However, the U nited S tates remains isolated from other global economic
problems, particularly in trade. This means that the potential of the Fed's monetary policy to disrupt the global economy is diluted by natural
economic buffers in the United States against external shocks. This question lies at the heart of the monetary tightening cycle that the United States began late last year.
2AC – AT: “Competitiveness”
“Competitiveness” is the wrong focus – it’s a bankrupt metaphor
Krugman 11 — Paul Krugman, Columnist for the New York Times, Professor of Economics and International Affairs
at Princeton University, and Recipient of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics, 2011 (“The Competition Myth,” New
York Times, January 23rd, Available Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html)
Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President
Obama has telegraphed his main theme: competitiveness. The President’s Economic Recovery
Advisory Board has been renamed the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. And in his Saturday radio
address, the president declared that “We can out-compete any other nation on Earth.”
This may be smart politics. Arguably, Mr. Obama has enlisted an old cliché on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell
a much-needed increase in public investment to a public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government
spending is a bad thing.
But let’s not kid ourselves: talking about “competitiveness” as a goal is fundamentally
misleading . At best, it’s a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to
policies based on the false idea that what’s good for corporations is good for America .
About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of
competitiveness?
It’s true that we’d have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the
same is true of Europe and Japan , which also have depressed economies. And we
can’t all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to .
Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus — but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing,
he should say that plainly.
America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was

Furthermore, while
before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller still. But ultimately,
we’re in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies
have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals.
But isn’t
it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc.,
competing in the global marketplace? No .
Krugman is right — “competitiveness” is economically bankrupt.

Schrage 94 — Michael Schrage, writer, consultant and research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1994 (“The Myth of a 'Competitive' Economic Policy,” Los Angeles Times, March 10th, Available Online at
http://articles.latimes.com/print/1994-03-10/business/fi-32358_1_economic-policy)
An American economy that cares a great deal about boosting domestic productivity
requires policy-makers who care very little about global competitiveness.
A Zen koan for the nationalistic '90s? The sound of one Keynesian clapping? A lyric for aspiring autarkists?
None on the above. It's
the startling pronouncement of MIT's Paul Krugman, one of the
country's most brilliant young economists , a nonpartisan academic with a
reputation for intellectual honesty and a cruel tongue.
You might recall that Krugman was widely quoted criticizing industrial-policy economist Laura D'Andrea Tyson's
research when President Clinton named her chairwoman of his Council of Economic Advisers.
Alternating between statistical scalpels and macroeconomic machetes, Krugman

bloodily eviscerates "competitiveness" as a policy doctrine without any kind of
economic validity.
What supply-side "economics" was to Reaganomics, Krugman asserts, competitiveness has become to Clintonomics: a
sort of psuedo-rational pastiche that Nobel Prize-winning chemist Irving Langmuir once described as "pathological
science"--that is to say, no science at all.
"To make a harsh but not entirely unjustified analogy," he says in his essay "Competitiveness: A Dangerous
Obsession" in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, "a government
wedded to the ideology of
competitiveness is as unlikely to make good economic policy as a government
committed to creationism is to make good science policy, even in areas that have no
direct relationship to the theory of evolution."
"Gee, we must be making progress," smiles Dan Burton, president of the Council of (sigh) Competitiveness, which was
formed by frustrated high-tech executives in the wake of the Ronald Reagan Administration's rejection of its own
presidential commission on the topic. "In 1987, competitiveness was dismissed as a buzzword. Today, it's graduated
to being a dangerous obsession."
Might Krugman be the one with the dangerous obsession? Not after you see the numbers. His
arguments
would command respect even without his impeccable credentials . They're
important because he takes the global competitiveness champions like Tyson, U.S. Trade
on their
Representative Mickey Kantor, Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich and health care guru Ira Magaziner
own terms , impatiently redoes their arithmetic for them and makes a strong case
that competitiveness issues amount to little more than a rounding error in the $6-
trillion U.S. economy.
2AC – Innovation Defense
Warming’s inevitable
McPherson ’16 (Guy McPherson – professor emeritus of natural resources, ecology, and evolutionary biology @
the University of Arizona, “Climate-Change Summary and Update,” 2 August 2016,
http://guymcpherson.com/climate-chaos/climate-change-summary-and-update/)
According to Colin Goldblatt, author of a paper published online in the 28 July 2013 issue of Nature Geoscience, " The
runaway greenhouse may be much easier to initiate than previously thought ."
Furthermore, as pointed out in the 1 August 2013 issue of Science, in the near term Earth's climate
will change orders of magnitude faster than at any time during the last 65 million
years. Tack on, without the large and growing number of self-reinforcing feedback
loops we've triggered recently, the 5 C rise in global-average temperature 55
million years ago during a span of 13 years (subsequently strongly supported by this paper in the 15
December 2014 online issue of Nature Geoscience and then questioned in this paper from January 2015), and it
looks like trouble ahead for the wise ape. This conclusion ignores the long-lasting,
incredibly powerful greenhouse gas discovered 9 December 2013 by University of
Toronto researchers: Perfluorotributylamine ( PFTBA ) is 7,100 times more powerful
than carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, and it persists hundreds
of years in the atmosphere. It also ignores the irreversible nature of climate
change : Earth's atmosphere will harbor, at minimum, the current warming potential
of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration for at least the next 1,000 years , as
indicated in the 28 January 2009 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. The marine situation is similarly catastrophic: The Guardian's headline from 16 July 2015
screams: "Warming of oceans due to climate change is unstoppable , say US scientists" in
response to the annual State of the Climate in 2014 report. According to a paper published in the 3 August 2015 issue
of Nature Climate Change: "Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere has been proposed as a measure for
mitigating global warming and ocean acidification. ... Focusing on pH, temperature and dissolved
oxygen , we find that even after several centuries of CDR deployment , past CO2
emissions would leave a substantial legacy in the marine environment ." In other
words, removal of atmospheric carbon dioxide, even if it were possible , would be
insufficient to overcome the damage experienced by the ocean . Finally, far too late, the
New Yorker posits a relevant question on 5 November 2013: Is It Too Late to Prepare for Climate Change? Joining the
too-little, too-late gang, the Geological Society of London points out on 10 December 2013 that Earth's climate
could be twice as sensitive to atmospheric carbon as previously believed. New Scientist
piles on in March 2014, pointing out that planetary warming is far more sensitive to
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration than indicated by past reports . As usual and
expected, carbon dioxide emissions set a record again in 2013, the 5th-hottest year on
record (since 1850). Ditto for 2014 and 2015, the new hottest years on record . The previous
top three hottest years (2010, 2005, and 2007) were influenced by El Niño events, which cause short-term warming of
the Earth's atmosphere.
Bio-d’s past the tipping point – tons of alt causes

Gaworecki 16 (Mike, New York-based journalist who writes about energy, climate, and forest issues, ““Ecological recession”:
Researchers say biodiversity loss has hit critical threshold across the globe,” Mongabay, July 25, 2016,
https://news.mongabay.com/2016/07/ecological-recession-researchers-ring-the-alarm-as-biodiversity-loss-hits-critical-threshold-across-the-
globe/) [SA]
An international team of researchers has concluded that biodiversity loss has become
so severe and widespread that it could affect Earth’s ability to sustain human
life . The researchers examined 2.38 million records of 39,123 terrestrial species
collected at 18,659 sites around the world to model the impacts on biodiversity of
land use and other pressures from human activities that cause habitat loss . They then
estimated down to about the one-square-kilometer level the extent to which those
pressures have caused changes in local biodiversity , as well as the spatial patterns of those changes. They
found that, across nearly 60 percent of Earth’s land surface, biodiversity has declined
beyond “safe” levels as defined by the planetary boundaries concept, which seeks
to quantify the environmental limits within which human society can be considered
sustainable. “We estimate that land use and related pressures have already reduced
local biodiversity intactness — the average proportion of natural biodiversity remaining in local ecosystems — beyond its
recently proposed planetary boundary across 58.1% of the world’s land surface, where 71.4% of
the human population live ,” the researchers write in an article published this month
in the journal Science. In other words, more than 70 percent of the global population lives in
areas where the level of biodiversity loss has been so substantial that the ability of
ecosystems to support humanity is now in question. Biodiversity intactness has
already sunk below the safe planetary boundary in most biomes , but grasslands ,
savannas , and shrublands were found to have been hit the hardest, with biodiversity hotspots such
as forests and woodlands following close behind . Levels of biodiversity loss are so high ,
the researchers said, that they could even undermine plans to continue developing the world’s
economies without destroying precious natural resources . “Such widespread transgression of safe limits
suggests that biodiversity loss, if unchecked, will undermine efforts toward long-term sustainable development,” the authors of the Science
article added. “It’s worrying that land use has already pushed biodiversity below the level
proposed as a safe limit,” Andy Purvis, a professor in the Department of Life Sciences at
Imperial College London and a co-author of the study, said in a statement. “Decision-makers worry a lot about economic recessions, but an
ecological recession could have even worse consequences — and the biodiversity damage we’ve had means we’re at risk of that happening.
Until and unless we can bring biodiversity back up, we’re playing ecological roulette.”
Purvis and team said that it is possible proactive conservation could prevent future losses. They’ve made the maps from their paper and all of
the underlying data publicly available in the hope that their results will be used to inform conservation policy at the national and
international level. “The greatest changes have happened in those places where most people live, which might affect physical and
To
psychological wellbeing,” Dr. Tim Newbold of the University College London, the lead author of the study, said in a statement. “
address this, we would have to preserve the remaining areas of natural vegetation
and restore human-used lands .”
Warming doesn’t promote disease spread – empirics
Goklany ’15 (Indur M. Goklany, PhD @ Michigan State, is a science and technology policy analyst for the US Department of the
Interior, where he holds the position of Assistant Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy. Has represented the US at the IPCC.
“CARBON DIOXIDE: The good news,” The Global Warming Policy Foundation Report 18, 2015,
http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2015/10/benefits1.pdf)
Disease Claims that vector-borne diseases such as malaria will increase are also not
borne out by the facts . The global mortality rate for malaria has declined : from 194 per
100,000 in 1900 to 9 per 100,000 in 2012, a reduction of 95.4%.136,137 Equally important, it is less prevalent
and substantially less endemic in its reduced range.138
Warming doesn’t cause war

Kozacek 16 – Circle of Blue (Cody, “Climate Change Effects On Conflict Are Complex, Tenuous, And Misunderstood”, 3/30/16,
http://www.circleofblue.org/2016/water-climate/stress-conflict-migration/climate-change-effects-conflict-complex-tenuous-
misunderstood/)
Expert evaluation of climate change as a factor in initiating conflict has, by no means, reached a consensus . Global
security experts say it is completely possible for climate change to have indirect effects on conflict in the future, but acknowledge that
the relationships are extremely complex and can be difficult to tease out on a country-by-country basis. These
factors include a country’s governance, infrastructure, and levels of corruption , which can interact with environmental
pressures. For example, Africa’s Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East are already relatively unstable
politically. They are also expected to see hotter and drier temperatures under future climate change scenarios. But because the risk of
conflict is already high due to poor governance issues, climate change is unlikely to shift current military or
humanitarian strategies in these regions. Instead, the long-term effects of climate change could become more of a problem—in
security terms—in the emerging economies of Latin America and Asia. “ The bottom line is climate change can’t be seen as an
either necessary or sufficient driver of conflict ,” said Jeffrey Mazo , consulting member of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, a London-based research organization focusing on global relations and security policy. “Nothing else is. There are
a dozen other factors , and I think this is an area of consensus among studies, that are drivers of conflict.” “The most serious strategic
implications are in these more nebulous areas where climate change could contribute to the destabilization of relatively stable areas,” added
Mazo. The idea that climate change will undermine international security has been circulating for at least the past decade. The thesis gained
traction in the public sphere in 2007 at the height of the conflict in Darfur, a region of Sudan, and again last year in light of Syria’s civil war.
The ignition points for both conflicts were linked to droughts. Both also were seen by some climate scientists, economists and diplomatic
authorities as evidence that climate change could cause more wars and conflicts in the future. “Sudan’s tragedy is not just the tragedy of one
country in Africa, it is a window to a wider world underlining how issues such as uncontrolled depletion of natural resources like soils and
forests allied to impacts like climate change can destabilize communities, even entire nations,” Achim Steiner, the executive director of the
United Nations Environment Programme, said in a statement accompanying a 2007 report about the Darfur conflict. Steiner’s words, like
those used in many of the reports and studies warning of a link between climate and conflict, describe climate change as a force capable of
multiplying the threat from other risk factors—such as poor governance or inadequate infrastructure. In many cases,there is no
quantifiable data available to prove or disprove a definitive link between a climate event, like a drought, and
climate change, much less between a drought and human conflict . The relationships are so complex that they are
more akin to a butterfly effect than a falling set of dominoes . But to consider only the potential for a drought to create a war,
even with caveats and detours along the way, is to put the phenomena into an equation where climate change is a purely environmental
input and violent conflict is the only outcome. Instead, climate change is shaking up each facet of modern life—economic, political, and
social. Major international banks and investment institutions have withdrawn their support for the coal sector in the past year as
governments and climate activists urge companies to divest from fossil fuels, and renewable energy alternatives become cheaper. This
month, Peabody Coal, the world’s largest private-sector coal company, indicated that it may file for bankruptcy. In the political realm,
development plans like India’s Himalayan hydropower scheme have been literally swept away by a climate-related flood in 2013. Or, in the
case of South Africa’s pursuit of coal-fired energy, rendered untenable by that nation’s changing hydrological cycles and steadily declining
reserves of fresh water. Severe droughts in Australia and California have sparked fundamental shifts in the way farm
products are produced, freshwater is transported, and how residents view, value, conserve, and use water.
Disturbances on such a large scale possess an inherent tension. Whether they result in violent conflict is impossible
to know . In fact, scientific studies about conflict show that competition over scarce resources like water is much
more likely to be resolved through cooperation than violence . What is clear is that climate change will force countries
to reassess the way they govern resources, the way they build infrastructure, and the way they fuel their
economies. A Different Way To View Climate and Conflict One of the greatest areas of uncertainty and stress will be the global economy,
according to Jan Selby of the Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research. Instead of more severe droughts, floods, and sea level rise
driving destabilization, it is much more likely that the economic implications of climate change and adaptation will cause discord. Responses
to climate change are already beginning to shake the foundations of the planet’s largest industrial sectors—energy production, agriculture,
and mining. Even in cases where arguments have been made that drought contributes to conflict — the Syrian civil war, for example — the
subsequent social disruptions were primarily the result of economic reverberations. In 2009, during the third consecutive year of drought, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) said that most farmers in Syria who depended on rain to water their crops had
suffered complete or near-total losses, while livestock herders were only able to maintain 3 to 10 percent of their animals. The report found
that the income of severely affected groups had dropped 90 percent since 2006. The farmers’ ability to withstand the drought had been
largely eroded by larger economic policies pursued by the Assad government. Between 2007 and 2008, prices for diesel in Syria nearly tripled
as the government cut back subsidies, according to the Middle East Research and Information Project. This increased costs for farmers, who
use diesel fuel to power their irrigation pumps. The government had also encouraged the expansion of wheat production and other crops by
promoting irrigation. As a result, groundwater reserves in many agricultural areas were depleted as irrigated areas doubled between 1984
and 2000. All of this added up to a significant migration of families from drought-hit areas to cities in 2009, though the number of migrants is
disputed. “Droughts probably shouldn’t be thought of as environmental phenomena in this respect. They should be thought of as economic
phenomena, meaning phenomena that exacerbate economic problems and especially people’s adaptive and coping capacity,” said Selby. “A
lot of the moving that took place needs to be understood in the context that the Northeast was the poorest and most marginalized area of
Syria, where they had high levels of raw debt, where the Syrian government didn’t make any credit available to farmers and herders, and
where, yes, if a drought happens, people’s earnings go down from farming and a lot of livestock would have been sold or sent to slaughter
early, so people decimated their own stocks and the ability to replenish them. But the economic context is a huge reason why drought has
such an effect.” Other Factors Matter Destabilization or pressure on natural resources , however, does not always equal
conflict . Regions with well-functioning and responsive governments, like Australia and California, have shown
great capacity to resolve conflicts over water before they escalate to violence , even amid unprecedented droughts.
Moreover, the majority of scientific studies actually show that people are more likely to cooperate in times of
resource stress than fight, especially when it comes to water . These outcomes should not be discounted when
discussing the potential links between climate change and conflict , according to Elizabeth Hartmann, professor emerita of
development studies at Hampshire College in Massachusetts. “ To blame poor people or think that poor people are going to
immediately engage in violent conflict when resources are scarce, it kind of relies on—and I don’t think people are being
intentionally racist—but it relies on old colonial narratives about inferior races and barbarism ,” said Hartmann. “Especially in
the case of Africa, where a lot of this discourse is focused, it really bolsters the view of poor Africans as savages and barbarians. I’m not
saying people are intentionally doing this, but they are not interrogating their own stereotypes of people and where they
come from historically.”
No ocean acidification impact---their evidence assumes far higher CO2 levels

than we’ll ever reach, adaptation solves, and research is systemically biased
toward alarmism
Howard I. Browman 16 , Institute of Marine Research, Marine Ecosystem Acoustics Disciplinary Group, Austevoll Research Station,
Norway, “Applying organized scepticism to ocean acidification research,” ICES Journal of Marine Science, Volume 73, Number 3,
February/March 2016, pp. 529-536
[OA = Ocean Acidification]
The first articles on OA were descriptions of the process itself (CO2-driven changes in the biogeochemistry of seawater and
sediments) and its implications. This was followed by an explosion of work (mainly laboratory-based) on the possible effects of OA on various
marine organisms, at first mainly calcifiers or the calcified hard parts of organisms without calcarious shells. These were mostly restricted to
part of one generation (a limited number of life history stages), or at most a single complete life cycle, with one or a small number of
In early work, treatment exposure levels often greatly

biological endpoints measured as effect indicators.
exceeded those predicted to occur hundreds of years into the future even without
any reduction in CO2 emissions. The majority of these early works reported significant
negative effects of high CO2, from which it was inferred that there would be a detrimental
effect of OA over the coming decades–centuries. Thereafter, longer-term effect studies began to appear,
which first included single-generation carry-overs and then multiple generations. By necessity, these have been on organisms with short
More studies that
generation times. As the approach to CO2 exposures matured, very high treatment levels became less common.
showed no effect of high CO2 (predicted for the next century)—and even beneficial effects (e.g. for
some phytoplankton and macrophytes)—appeared. Upwelling and vent systems were used as in situ case studies of
natural future OA-like conditions. Some in situ work mimics such systems by injecting CO2 and following the response of
organisms/communities locally. Results of experiments that included multiple stressors in addition
to CO2 were published. The most common of these has been temperature, but salinity, oxygen, and a variety of others have
also been included (in a global climate change context). Such studies typically report that the additional
driver(s) has a stronger effect than CO2 , although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the individual variables.
The reality thatthe functional response curve of each driver will likely differ , as will the organism's
ability to adapt to them, further complicates interpretations of multiple driver experiments. Studies on the effect of CO2 on trophic
interactions (indirect effects) are sparse—such experiments are logistically complex and difficult to interpret. A small number of recent
studies integrate the results of the preceding body of work into risk assessments and scenario modelling, typically on economically important
species of fish and shellfish; most conclude that the prognosis is dire, although in the context of what follows, that conclusion might be
premature.¶ The preceding describes how OA research has matured. The following describes how it still has a way to go.¶ Applying
organized scepticism to research on the effects of OA¶ Scientific or academic scepticism calls for critical scrutiny of research outputs before
they are accepted as new knowledge (Merton, 1973). Duarte et al. (2014) stated that “…there is a perception that scientific skepticism has
been abandoned or relaxed in many areas…” of marine science. They argue that OA is one such area, and conclude that there is, at
best , weak evidence to support an OA-driven decline of calcifiers. Below, I raise some of the
aspects of OA research to which I contend an insufficient level of organized scepticism has been applied (in some cases, also to the articles in
this theme issue). I arrived at that conclusion after reading hundreds of articles on OA
(including, to be fair, some that also raise these issues) and overseeing the peer-review process for the very large number of submissions to
this themed issue. Importantly, and as Duarte et al. (2014) make clear, a retrospective application of scientific scepticism such as the one that
follows could—and should—be applied to any piece of/body of research.¶ Exposure levels, water chemistry, and limits to making inferences
early studies on OA applied treatment
about the effect of a long-term driver from a short-term experiment¶ Many
levels that greatly exceeded even worst-case climate change scenarios and did not
report water chemistry in sufficient detail to determine if the treatment mimicked
future OA-driven seawater conditions. Although most recent work has improved with respect to treatment levels,
mimicking future water chemistry remains tricky.¶ A rationale commonly used to justify high CO2/low pH treatments is the need to identify
at what levels organisms are affected. However, the limits to making inferences about how an organism or ecosystem will respond to a
climate-change scale variable (i.e. one that changes over decades–centuries) from their response during a short-term challenge experiment
(i.e. hours–days–weeks) has not been adequately addressed—or even mentioned—in most studies. This is reflected in a confusion of terms
common in OA studies—when describing the outcome of a short-term CO2 challenge, authors often make the inferential leap and use “OA”
when discussing their results, without any caveats. Oddly, incorporation of the extensive toxicology literature is almost entirely missing from
OA studies, either when it comes to adopting established exposure protocols or to framing the inferences that can/cannot be drawn from
missing from most studies is anything more than a superficial
short-term experiments. Also
statement about the possibility for acclimation , adaptation , or evolution , something that
is necessary to extend the outcome of a short-term challenge experiment into an inference
about the effect of a long-term driver (see below).¶ Spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH¶ Biogeochemists are well aware of
the spatio-temporal variability in CO2 and pH—daily (high productivity areas), seasonal (blooms), interannual (higher temperatures),
horizontal (coastal upwelling areas, high turbidity zones), and vertical (deep vs. surface waters) ranges in these can be extensive (e.g.
Wootton et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2011; Waldbusser and Salisbury, 2014; Kapsenberg et al., 2015). Biologists have struggled to
incorporate this variability into experiments designed to test the effects of OA, and into their interpretations of the outcomes (Eriander et al.,
2016). Some researchers have pointed out that organisms that are exposed to large ranges in CO2 and pH during their daily lives (e.g. vertical
migrators), life cycles (e.g. organisms that reside offshore as larvae but move to the coast as juveniles or adults), or somewhere in their
distributional ranges, should be more tolerant of OA (e.g. Lewis et al., 2013).¶ Imbalanced focus on individuals that are affected and
insufficient focus on inter-individual variability and within-experiment selection bias interpretations of ecological impacts¶ Almost all CO2
challenge experiments produce a range of responses in the test organism—some individuals
are badly affected, others less, and some not at all. There are several issues associated with all such experiments that it is important to be
cognizant of and account for: (i) analyses and interpretations should not ignore or minimize individuals that are little affected or unaffected
(after all, these are the ones whose genes will be passed on to the next generation); (ii) inter-individual variability should be highlighted; (iii)
the longer that the experiment runs the more likely it is that an internal selection process for the tolerant individuals has occurred. All of
these are important in the context of the next section.¶ Acclimation, generational carry-over effects, adaptation, epigenetics, and evolution¶
Almost all experiments conducted to assess OA are short-term toxicity challenges .

Therefore, using them as the basis from which to make inferences about a process that
will occur slowly over the next decades –centuries must be made with appropriate
caution. That is, the experiments and the interpretations made from them must consider how populations might
acclimatize, adapt, and evolve to climate change, including OA (e.g. Donelson et al., 2011; Hoffmann and Sgrò,
2011; Sunday et al., 2013; Harvey et al., 2014). Recent studies indicate that even the effects of OA that are considered most worrisome—
various behavioural impairments resulting from short-term exposure to high CO2 (see Nagelkerken and Munday, 2016)—might be reduced or
overcome through adaptation and evolution (Regan et al., 2016). More knowledge of the mechanisms of direct action of OA-related drivers—
higher concentrations of CO2, hydrogen ions (=lower pH), and/or carbonate chemistry (less carbonate ions)—and of indirect drivers such as
be duly
the effects of OA on food quality, are essential to understand what degree of adaption is possible. Readers should
sceptical of studies that completely ignore the possibility of adaptation when

presenting their inferences about OA, particularly scenario modelling of socio-economic impacts.¶ We must also do
better to incorporate analogous work in other fields, for example, rapid evolution of tolerance to envirotoxins (e.g. Whitehead et al., 2012)
and environmental change (e.g. Collins et al., 2014; Stoks et al., 2015; Thibodeau et al., 2015) via a combination of genetic and epigenetic
mechanisms (Yona et al., 2015).¶ Publication bias¶ Negative results—those that do not support a research hypothesis (e.g. OA will
have detrimental effects on marine organisms)— can provide more balance for a subject area for which
most published research reports positive results. Negative results can indicate that a subject area is not mature
or clearly enough defined, or that our current methods and approaches are insufficient to
produce a definitive result . Gould (1993) asserted that positive results tell more interesting
stories than negative results and are, therefore, easier to write about and more interesting to read.
He calls this a privileging of the positive. This privileging leads to a bias that acts against the
propagation of negative results in the scholarly literature (see also Browman, 1999). Further, it is also
important to recognize that studies showing no effect of OA are less equivocal than those that do, for all of the reasons noted above.
Following from this, it is essential that authors writing about possible effects of OA present and discuss research that is inconsistent with their
results and/or their interpretations—openly, honestly, and rigorously. Readers should be duly sceptical of articles that do not do this.
2AC – Manufacturing Defense
Historical manufacturing decline disproves their impact
Davis 15 (M. Thomas Davis; former corporate vice president with General Dynamics Corporation and a past
assistant professor of economics at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy; 6/16/15; “The Incredible Shrinking
Defense Industrial Base”; https://www.afcea.org/content/Blog-incredible-shrinking-defense-industrial-base; DS)
The long-term decline has snuck up on the nation, and it must be reversed.
A few weeks ago, current DRS CEO and former Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn gave a presentation at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled “Globalization vs. the Culture of National Security.” The major point of his address
was that with an increasingly globalized economy—Lynn’s company DRS is owned by Italian defense manufacturer Finmeccanica—
many issues and restrictions regarding technology, intellectual property and supply chains increasingly are “quaint.”
It was an important observation. But many in the audience were surprised when Lynn made the smaller, passing point that Apple
could buy nearly half the current top tier defense companies with the cash balance
currently reflected on its balance sheet. This point nicely reinforces one I frequently
make: that currently the current annual revenue of the five top tier defense
companies is less than half that of Walmart .
But, let us put that comment into some additional perspective. Two weeks ago, the business magazine Fortune released the latest
compilation of its annual Fortune 500—the top 500 companies in the United States. Just as it was in 2014, Walmart was number one
with annual revenue of a staggering $485 billion—nearly the size of a sequester-constrained defense budget—with profits of $16
billion. Exxon Mobil was number two with revenues of $382 billion and profits of $32 billion. For its part, Apple was number five with
revenues of $183 billion and profits of nearly $40 billion, showing information technology remains much more profitable than either
retail sales or petroleum.
But, what about the defense industry? When

Fortune compiled the 500 listing in 1961, the year of
President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous warning about the “military industrial
complex,” 15 defense companies were in the top 100 of the Fortune 500. The highest
ranked among them was General Dynamics at number 15. The 2015 listing of the top
100 contains only four aerospace and defense companies; and General Dynamics
barely made the list, being ranked number 100. The three other companies on the 2015 list are Boeing at
number 27, and two-thirds of Boeing’s revenue comes from its commercial aircraft; United Technologies at number 45—the
company currently is indicating it may sell its Sikorsky Helicopter Division because of decreasing sales and low margins; and
Lockheed Martin at number 64. Of the four defense companies making the top 100, only two—Lockheed Martin and General
Dynamics—are primarily defense enterprises.
In 1961, the defense companies in the Fortune 100 accounted for nearly 30 percent of the group’s total revenue. Today,
as
reflected in the 2015 ranking, that number is less than 7 percent—much of it actually
coming from commercial activities. For the companies that are primarily defense—
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics—the number is less than 2.4 percent, and
some of that is commercial. This means that over the past 54 years, defense has been
displaced as a major presence on the national economic scene and replaced in the top
100 by healthcare, 17 companies; financials and insurance, 16 companies; petroleum
and chemicals, 15 companies; and information technologies, 14 companies.
This dramatic change in the size and scope of the defense industrial base largely is
unrecognized by the public and even the government itself. Senior defense leaders want more
competition in the defense marketplace along with the cost control that flows from it, and they want more innovation, which comes
from intellectual and technological competition. However, these leaders seem unwilling to embrace the reality that many
government policies and procedures discourage firms from entering the defense market, and other policies—such as limiting profit
margins—encourage many to leave.
Since 1961,
the Fortune 100 companies, in constant dollars, have seen annual revenues
and earnings increase about seven times. During the same period, defense companies’
revenue and earnings barely have doubled. This illustrates that defense is not
keeping pace with overall economic performance measured in numerous ways. At
a moment of great strategic instability and challenge, one in which the United States
will need to rely increasingly on technology to substitute for manpower, these are worrisome trends that need to be
addressed. The first step toward developing a solution always comes with recognizing there is a problem, and this problem needs
much wider recognition.
2AC – Military Defense
No U.S. Leadership Impact – benefits are empirically disproven
White 16 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence
Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence,
2016 (“What’s So Great About American World Leadership?,” The Atlantic, November 23rd, Available Online at
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-world-order-foreign-policy/508547/)
So it appears the American electorate no longer accepts the American role in the world that policymakers have long
taken for granted. And what if the electorate is right? Maybe the foreign-policy assumptions of the past few decades
do need to be overhauled. The record, after all, is not very impressive. So
far this century, America has
failed to achieve most of the key national-security objectives it has set for itself .
Does that sound harsh? Hereis a list, in no particular order, of some key goals both the Bush and
Obama administrations set for themselves in foreign policy: Prevent North Korea
getting nuclear weapons; prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons and contain its
growing influence in the Middle East; transform Iraq and Afghanistan into stable ,
progressive, pro-Western states, or at least leave them as minimally functioning countries; contain and
eventually crush jihadist extremism; harness the Arab Spring to enhance U.S. influence in
the Arab world; reconcile Russia to the U.S.-led order and resist its efforts to rebuild a
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; resist China’s challenge to the U.S.-led order in
Asia; broker a durable settlement between Israel and the Palestinians; and prevent
another 9/11 on U.S. soil.
Of all these, the only clear success is the avoidance of another direct major attack on
America itself. The nuclear deal with Iran may prove a partial success, but even there the best we can hope is that
an Iranian nuclear capability has been deferred. All the rest have been total failures . And yet these
are exactly the kind of goals that America should have been able to achieve if it was to
fulfill the orthodox vision of its global leadership. That vision is, or has been, that America
can and should create and uphold in every region of the world an international order
which is based on American values and which supports America’s interests. And it
should be able to do that without incurring the immense costs and risks it bore in the
conflicts of the last century. It is a noble vision, and the world would be a better place
if it was realized. But the record suggests it does not correspond ed to reality . We’d
better ask why.
1AR – Military Defense
No leadership impact – the U.S. is not indispensable.
Zenko 14 — Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign
Relations, former Research Assistant at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University, former Researcher at the Brookings Institution, 2014 (“The Myth of the
Indispensable Nation,” Foreign Policy, November 6th, Available Online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-
myth-of-the-indispensable-nation/)
Indispensables also hold an unrealistic faith in the latent power of leadership that flows
from suppose it indispensable-ness. During a House hearing in September, Gerald Feierstein, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, declared: "When the United States stands up and demonstrates
resolve and demonstrates a direction, the international community generally supports and falls into place behind."
Really? This hypothesis would surprise anyone who tracks multilateral fora where U.S.
officials state their
policy positions and then repeatedly fail to compel other leaders to get in line — see,
for example, the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, and the WTO trade
talks since the Doha Round opened in 2001.
And if Feierstein is referring only to warfare, then why do so few countries with deployable military assets participate
in U.S.-led campaigns in a meaningful way? The United States provided the majority of the actual combat forces and
airpower in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and is doing so again in the air campaign to counter the Islamic State (IS).
Most countries that could participate have either declined to do so, or are taking part by providing such limited and
constrained capabilities that they are not significantly enhancing the coalition’s capabilities. In each of these military
interventions, the United States decried unilateralism, attempted to form a large coalition, and then found itself
paying most of the costs, dropping most of the bombs, sacrificing the most soldiers, and losing most of his credibility.
Whether it is multilateral talks or military operations, other governments do not do

as Washington demands because, quite simply, it is not in their national interests to do
so. Moreover, the United States refuses to employ the political will or coercive leverage to force them to. The point
being is that few, if any, substantive and enduring foreign-policy activities can be done
unilaterally, and asserting one’s indispensability does nothing to alter others’
interests. It is often stated that countries in the Middle East or East Asia are looking
for America "to lead," but they actually want U.S. leadership on their terms , and in
support of their own narrow objectives. The moment that leadership conflicts with
the visions and objectives those countries hold, they cease or severely limit their
partnerships with the United States.
Finally, the
Indispensables belief that America’s role in the world is "absolutely
necessary" in all areas is simply arrogant . It discounts the tremendous and essential
contributions from non-U.S. countries, international non-governmental organizations,
and civil society. This includes the 128 countries contributing 104,184 troops and police forces currently
deployed in support of sixteen U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. The United States provides only 113 troops
to U.N. peacekeeping operations, but, importantly, foots 27 percent of the bill and provides logistics support. Or,
consider the billions of dollars from the Gates Foundation, Norwegian Refugee Council, Mercy Corps, International
Red Cross and Red Crescent, and countless others, which improve the lives of the poorest and most in need. Each of
these public health, humanitarian, and development organizations offer the deep pockets and political neutrality that
allows them access to areas where the United States simply cannot or will not go.
The reason that the United States is not the indispensable nation is simple: the human
and financial costs, the tremendous risks, and degree of political commitment
required to do so are thankfully lacking in Washington. Moreover, the structure and
dynamics of the international system would reject or resist it, as it does in so many
ways that frustrate the United States from achieving its foreign policy objectives. The United
States can be truly indispensable in a few discrete domains, such as for military operations, which as pointed out
above has proven disastrous recently. But overall there is no indispensable nation now , nor
has there been in modern history . Indispensables may feel compelled to repeat this
feel-good myth, but nobody should believe them.
U.S. military power isn’t key to global stability

Preble 14 — Christopher A. Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,
holds a Ph.D. in History from Temple University, 2014 (“The Truth about Military Spending,” Cato at Liberty—the Cato
Institute’s blog, June 25th, Available Online at https://www.cato.org/blog/truth-about-military-spending)
Some could argue that the United States can ill afford to cut its military spending given the
current state of the world. Such cuts would only serve to embolden our adversaries like China and Russia, and
exacerbate the turmoil in the Middle East, North Africa, and southwest Asia.
But, if anything, many of the current security issues in the world have resulted from
America being too involved militarily . The U.S.-led war in Iraq, for example, certainly
contributed to the current chaos in the Middle East. The war also undermined American
influence by revealing the limits of America’s military power. The operation in Libya
destabilized a country in which the United States had no vital interest, and showed Iran
and others what happens when you negotiate away your nuclear program. And
arming Syrian rebels has prolonged a civil war in which ISIS gained the strength,
experience, and gear needed to launch a successful offensive into Iraq. It turns out
that having an unrivaled military only gets you so far .
Americans can and should spend less on the military , because the U.S. military
can and should do less , even in the face of what is happening in the Middle East,
Eastern Europe, and Asia. And others, especially our wealthy allies in Europe and Asia, can, and probably
should, spend more, as illustrated by another Cato infographic.
Other countries fill-in — retrenchment doesn’t cause war

Preble and Friedman 10 — Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, served
as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, holds a Ph.D. in History from Temple University, and Benjamin H.
Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. Candidate in
Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010 (“A U.S. Defense Budget Worthy of Its Name,”
The Globalist, November 18th, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12582)
Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military primacy underlies
global stability. According to this theory, our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between
potential rivals, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade.
This logic liberates defense planning from old-fashioned considerations like enemies and the balance of power. It sees
the requirements of global policing as the basis for the size of the U.S. military. That is no standard at all, which is why
hawks embrace it. Boundless objectives justify limitless costs.
That argument overestimates both the American military's contribution to

international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. U.S.
force deployments in Europe and Asia now contribute little to peace , at best making
already low odds of war among states slightly lower . Inertia, rather than our security
requirements, explains the perseverance of U.S. military alliances.
During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to
defend themselves. We should let them do so. These alliances heighten our force
requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.
Without our forces there, our allies would pay the cost of balancing local
adversaries .

Manufacturing DA - UTNIF 2019

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The uniqueness CP is included if students are facing difficulty winning the

* Terms you should know

Our allies and partners want

Trump administration announced Thursday two landmark

Mr. Trump’s new CAT

Ending foreign arms sales decks US defense manufacturing

A strong defense industrial base is key to US military strength and tech

Navarro’s work is supported by a consensus of literature and praised among

Praise for Peter Navarro’s previous book,

United States have fundamental conflicts of business, economic and strategic

—Stuart L. Hart, S.C. Johnson Chair of Sustainable Global Enterprise, Cornell

“This is a well researched and illuminating book, and is a necessary counter to a

Trump guarantees a boom in foreign arms sales

Our allies and partners want

Trump administration announced Thursday two landmark

Mr. Trump’s new CAT

On the economic front, a

55.66 billion in foreign military sales, an uptick of 33

increase from FY17’s $128.1 billion .

WASHINGTON ― Underneaththe rosy picture of a strong U.S. defense industry lies a

Defense industrial base vulnerable now

Defense industry in shambles – ideological underpinnings and budgeting

Defense industrial base weak – decades of decline, reliance on China

*note: UAS = unamnned aircraft systems

The plan destroys US tech advantages in manufacturing

Export Fight Brewing

The plan decks US aerospace manufacturing growth

The aerospace manufacturing industry is a vital component of the US

Military Aid and Arms Sales

Special Military Assistance Benefits for Egypt

[Footnote 83] 83 According to a 2015 GAO report on U.S.

Cash Flow Financing26 Section

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Israel

services have become and will continue to be ever more important .

advanced THAAD missile defence systems from the USA .

Saudi foreign military sales are key to defense industry growth

billion in Saudi military contracts for these four companies.

Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) member states are forecast to

Across the Gulf states comprising the

Jane’s Defence Budgets data says that despite

Can the GCC escape North American export domination? Despite

Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage over Iran in both

What is most striking, however, is

At the same time, the

Middle Eastern states account for nearly half of US arms exports

The United States

Lockheed Martin stressed the urgency of a new sale of F-16 fighters to

Future arms sales to Taiwan are key to US manufacturing revenue

WASHINGTON—The U.S. is planning a new effort to help the Taiwanese government

Reuters earlier reported the potential sale, which

Arms sales to Taiwan are key to US defense manufacturing growth

Contracts & Key Events

September 26/18: Package The

July 18/18: US FMS The

immediate benefits seem clearer to America's weapons manufacturing sector than to

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the

First, jobs in the manufacturing

Economic decline triggers nuclear conflict and terrorism

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic

2. Manufacturing is the foundation of global “Great Power”

Manufacturing is the cornerstone to the entire economy – consumers have

The new tax