In general.

and orders of the revolutionary government were the

Definition. The set of prescriptions setting forth the
fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing
limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the
enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve
the ideals of liberty, equality and security “against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles” [quoted in PBM Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189]. Generally,
any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void.
These provisions are also generally self-executing.
supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights at the time. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Due Process of Law. fSec. 1. Art. Ill: “No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law x xx “.]

Civil Rights. Those rights that belong to every citizen of Origin. By the 39th chapter of the Magna Carta wrung by
the barons from
the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or administration of
King John, the despot promised that “no man shall be taken or
government. They include the rights to property, marriage, equal
imprisoned or disseized or outlawed, or in any manner destroyed;
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.. They are rights
nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land [per legem terraef.
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. '

Definition. “A law which hears before it condemns, which

Political Rights. They refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government [Simon v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994]. 2
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial”
[Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518], “Responsiveness to
the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice”
[Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila,
20 SCRA 849]. “The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play”
[Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33].

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768,

July 21, 2003, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of
Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from
the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution
until the adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional
(Freedom) Constitution. During this period, the directives
 Who are protected. Universal in application to all persons,
without regard to any difference in race, color or nationality.
Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as
their property is concerned [Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.
163], The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of
livelihood [Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275].
Meaning of life, liberty and property.
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its
completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of
God-given faculties which make life enjoyable [Justice Malcolm,
Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200.
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare, and public morals [JMM Promotion and
Management v. Court of Appeals, supra.].
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory
provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere
privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder.
Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the
public interest [Republic v. Rosemoor Mining & Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004]. Mere privileges,
such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights
and are revocable at will [Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil
123].

The license to carry a firearm is neither a property

Liberty includes “the right to exist and the right to be nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit
free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, x x x (It) includes to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any
the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as
ways x x x” [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660], absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power [Chavez
v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534],
Property is anything that can come under the right of
ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than The mandatory suspension from office of a public
the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and official pending criminal prosecution for violation of RA 3019
dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197].
cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of
law [Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163].
Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted
from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the
de jure officer’s right to office [Nunez v. Averia, 57 SCRA 726],
Indeed, the Court while public office is not property to which one
may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right [Bince
v. Commission on Electiions, 218 SCRA 782]. One’s employment,
profession or trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Thus, an order of
suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights
[Crespo v. Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66]. But its proper regulation
has been upheld as a legitimate subject of the police power of the
State, particularly when its conduct affects either the execution of
 Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles underlying a
democracy.—In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of
faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve
the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with general principles." The purpose of
the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the
right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we
abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to
protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the
liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are
not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life,
to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he
can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the Bill of
Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred
position.—In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than property
rights disclosed.—The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose—that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs.
Ferrer. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec,like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that
the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials
or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest
test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by
Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration
against police abuses did not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.—Tested
against the foregoing principles, the conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations
that the petitioners by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm. Said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression
in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect employees
against police abuses.—As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm
to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the defense
of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a violation of
collective bargaining agreement.—As heretofore stated, the primacy of human
rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances—over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this
basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—
becomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer,
as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts
a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression,
of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been enjoined by
any court.—The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be
trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears
to be an illegal picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those belonging to
a particular shift may join demonstration.—The respondent firm claims that there
was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.
should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This
stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially
by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum persuasive
force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the validity of their cause
but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies
with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is
one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-
third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. ... At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request...
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join demonstration
against police abuse guilty of unfair labor practice.—Because the refusal on the part
of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in
Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-
1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx
The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means not such
loss was sustained.—While the respondent Court found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the said
court did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm.
This significant circumstance can only means that the firm did not sustain any loss
or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of
leaders of demonstration against police abuses constitutes denial of social justice.
— Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of
the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx". Respondent
Court as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate
that said court failed to implement this policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders
become null and void.—Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the
Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot Republic of the Philippines
prevail over basic constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the motion for SUPREME COURT
reconsideration was filed two days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees Manila
for their reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited
cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only EN BANC
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution
is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence  
to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right
over the aforesaid court procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme
Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of
the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge. In ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO
the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which MUNSOD, petitioners, 
impinges on such human rights. vs.
Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an accepted PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
principle that the Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under this authority, this Court is petitioners.
enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural
niceties that do not square with the need to do justice..." If we can disregard our own
rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
the suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and
shielded with resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic
law.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The
suspension of the application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the
case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms." composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a

mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in
the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8
A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the
following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of
March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the
Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon,
Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For
the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino
Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente,
(5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration
and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano.
In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the
2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not
follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss;
De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers
of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their
plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration
will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
 EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in
the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section
15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge
was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo
de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding
complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor
Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C",
pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that
they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against
the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted
by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated
September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as
directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969,
the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969,
on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as
asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant
to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p.
63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners
received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17
(should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until
September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration
was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion
for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their
motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc  dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from
the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall
be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent
court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on
the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-
89, rec.).
I only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of
the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the
criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not
its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of
one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies
for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy
of human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished
by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored
by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law
is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec  and reiterated by
the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added
that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as
well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised
in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the
improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that
by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of
work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion
cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent
firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of
their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly
and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights
for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members
fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform
more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself
at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local
police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police
who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its
lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality —
abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis  the
local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can
be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty,
if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who
toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial
Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe
regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses
during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind
and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at
bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a
strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although
there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediately action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the
local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by
that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration
is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be
apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-
third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified
the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration
and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or
prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of
its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated
in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work
for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian
as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all
its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace
Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the
right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection";
while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was
for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses,
denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on
the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration,
under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in
the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the
employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining
be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the
furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the
company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such
threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the
mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised
against the local police, were more important to them because they
had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such
threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose
a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to
forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would
bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their
right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for
redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary
to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses
inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint
and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent
the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can
only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did
not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure
to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that
day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by
the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated
for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason
of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5
of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the
State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at
all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the
case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this
policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison
d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties,
may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after
the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to
obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already
served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the
instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the
courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural
rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a
purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by
Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human
rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The
right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,
the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he
cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-
a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules
of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they
could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with
a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of
the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered
by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence
to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement
or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but
instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority
granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the
ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56,
Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969
was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the
Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by
the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73,
rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such
supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28,
1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being  pro forma  since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for
by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision
subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But
in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on
appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional
issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the
case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the
Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise
yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even
before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to
deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent
power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr.
Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove
with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need
to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time,
provided that the right of the parties to a full day in
court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court
may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In
other words, when all the material facts are spread in
the records before Us, and all the parties have been
duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court
 a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then
and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within
the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is
perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of
discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its
authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a
certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a
quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction.  If there can be any doubt, which I do
not entertain, on whether or not the errors this
Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal
grounds should it choose to reverse said decision
here and now even if such errors can be considered
as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower court
for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course
of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of
their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage
has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience
to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the
application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor
union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-
stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970
case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al.,  30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules
of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that
such criterion is not binding upon the Court of
Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to
a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties
and power under this Act, the Court shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By
this provision the industrial court is disengaged from
the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific
relief demanded by the parties but may issue such
orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for
the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any
doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang
Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940;
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil.
124.) For these reasons, We believe that this
provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
 meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46
Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one
day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when
they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which
such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on
this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court
in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor  (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register
of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949];
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958]
and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p,
322.) To that norm, this Court has remained
committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v.
Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind.
For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural
laws are no other than technicalities" view them in
their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts
have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the
law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical
language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated
technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to
the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-
15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the
latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan
v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.)
Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation
of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but
are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule
were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same
Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of
Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed
and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were
specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge
filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent
firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in
the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen
(13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice
charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not
all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4,
1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation
that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should
have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their
vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the
Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a
lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not
from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill —
good men who allow their proper concerns to blind
them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable.
What we must remember, however, is
thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw.
The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees
of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment
makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of
us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to
a group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play
for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,
but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income
or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers.
This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities
and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness,
if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the
Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru
Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this
admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted activity,
in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...)
This is the view of some members of this Court. For,
as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
 The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in might have realized from other sources during their separation from
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be the service.
sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to Inc.
discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313
U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in

unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify

labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president
no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable
and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners,

with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service
 Local Governments; Constitutional Law; An ordinance of Quezon City
requiring memorial park operators to set aside at least six percent (6%) of their
cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise of police
power, and one that constitute taking of property without just compensation.—There
is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Same; Same; Same.—The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise
in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to homeowners.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG
PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
City Fiscal for petitioners.
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and
void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL
GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated
shall immediately be developed and should be open
for operation not later than six months from the date
of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of
the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following
resolution:
 RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to
request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified
respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely
legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore,
rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-
64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City
Government and City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a
valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to
make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends
that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not
available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this
case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not
taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in
order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case
of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the
spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of
the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the
lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the
questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in
question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep.
Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the City. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee,
and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the
City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs.
Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39
N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
The ordinance in question not only confiscates but
also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery, because under Section 13 of said
ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is
punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and
that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a
memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance
in question be justified under sub- section "t",
Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the
City Council to-
'prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of population of
the city and provide for their burial
in such proper place and in such
manner as the council may
determine, subject to the provisions
of the general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries and
governing funerals and disposal of
the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep.
Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which
authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed
by the respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section
9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of
police power. The police power of Quezon City is
defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537
which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance
and regulations not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this act and
such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote, the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort and convenience of
the city and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or
penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain
basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill
of rights is the provision which states that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers
of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary
attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in
Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It
is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is
deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote
the general welfare. In police power, the owner does
not recover from the government for injury sustained
in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been
said that police power is the most essential of
government powers, at times the most insistent, and
always one of the least limitable of the powers of
government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This
power embraces the whole system of public
regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The
Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-
reaching in scope that it has almost become
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the state itself, it
does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and
survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential insistent
and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society
and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions. The field and scope of police power have
become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police
power by which and through which the state seeks
to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the
government and the due process clause being the
broadest station on governmental power, the conflict
between this power of government and the due
process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes
inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that
police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
does not involve the taking or confiscation of
property with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not
unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges
the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As
early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL
250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity
and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance
was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court
speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision
is the a of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The
presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action
of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular ... municipality and with all the facts
and lances which surround the subject and
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice
that the regulations are essential to the well-being of
the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918],
39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of
the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance
as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in
Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier
stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
 ... Under the provisions of municipal charters which
are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by
virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to
the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and
highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-
ordered and society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. An
property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to
such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations, established by
law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution,
may think necessary and expedient. The state,
under the police power, is possessed with plenary
power to deal with all matters relating to the general
health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it
does not contravene any positive inhibition of the
organic law and providing that such power is not
exercised in such a manner as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong
and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare
clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any
express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power.
The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but
we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the
questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the
cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly
acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the
permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova,
JJ., concur.
 Election Law; Commission on Elections; A written communication officially
directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a
government agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally
authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so
addressed.—That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten
publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or
other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec’s original intention
was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers.
A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free
print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed
by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to
produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not
be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other
sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional
difficulties inhering in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such
sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional
objection.
Same; Same; To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space”
of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, amounts to
“taking” of private personal property for public use or purposes.—To compel print
media companies to donate “Comelec space” of the dimensions specified in Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the
intended frequency of such compulsory “donation:” only once during the period
from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a
week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory “donation,” measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.
Same; Same; The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec.—The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private
property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that
the members of PPI are unwilling to sellprint space at their normal rates to Comelec
for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested,
let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
Same; Same; The taking of private property for public use is authorized by
the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation.”—The taking of
private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to “donate” free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation,
or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest.
Same; Same; Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.—There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to
Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present,
to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.—Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a
national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and
without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or
magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real
and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Same; Same; Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.—Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
 G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139
members, represented by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and
its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,  Commission for dissemination of vital election
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
 
FELICIANO, J.:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court
assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by
respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its
corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a
Petition for Certiorari  and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock,
non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which
reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall
procure free  print space of not less than one half
(1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general
circulation in every province or city for use as
"Comelec Space"  from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995
until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said
newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from
any magazine or periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec
Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free
of charge, among all candidates  within the area in
which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public issues and
their platforms and programs of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the
information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. — (a) "Comelec
Space" shall also be available to
all candidates during the periods stated in Section
2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial
among all candidates for the same office. All
candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of
the allocation of "Comelec Space" for their
information, guidance and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of
"Comelec Space" from newspapers or publications
based in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit
an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee
on Mass Media of the Commission. Any candidate
desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" in
newspapers or publications based in the provinces
shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to
the Provincial Election Supervisor concerned.
Applications for availment of "Comelec Space" maybe
filed at any time from the date of effectivity of this
Resolution.
(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial
Election Supervisors shall allocate
available  "Comelec Space" among the
candidates  concerned by lottery  of which said
candidates shall be notified in advance, in writing, to
be present personally or by representative to witness
the lottery at the date, time and place specified in
the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the
lottery may appeal to the Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the
Committee on Mass Media or the Provincial Election
Supervisor, as the case maybe, sufficiently in
 advance and in writing of the date of issue and the
newspaper or publication allocated to him, and the
time within which he must submit the written
material for publication in the "Comelec Space".
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political
Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or
publication shall allow to be printed or published in
the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the
newspaper or publication accounts or comments
which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or
including therein said candidate or political party.
However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the
newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters, dated
22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like
the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya  and
the Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI. These letters read
as follows:
This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No.
2772 of the Commission on Elections, you
are directed to provide free print space  of not less
than one half (1/2) page for use as "Comelec
Space" or similar to the print support which you
have extended during the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for
each political party fielding senatorial candidates,
from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public issues and
their platforms and programs of government.
We shall be informing the political parties and
candidates to submit directly to you their  pictures,
biographical data, stand on key public
issues and platforms of government  either as raw
data or in the form of positives or camera-ready
materials.
Please be reminded that the political
parties/candidates may be accommodated in your
publication any day upon receipt of their materials
until May 6, 1995 which is the last day for
campaigning.
We trust you to extend your full support and
cooperation in this regard. (Emphasis supplied)
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner
also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same
time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of
Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues
that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression.1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to
various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court
also required the respondent to file a Comment on the Petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of
respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772
does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers as it does not  provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution.
According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the
procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of
allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or
requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space"
procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues
that even if  the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter
directives are viewed as  mandatory, the same would nevertheless be
valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
Comelec over the communication and information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election. 2
At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent
Comelec through its Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo, in response to
inquiries from the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court,
stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and
the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched to various members of
petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to supply
Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo represented to the
Court that Resolution and the related letter-directives were merely
designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space
which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the
election period relating to the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed, the
Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet
and adopt an appropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a
certified true copy of which would forthwith be filed with the Court.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor
General a manifestation which attached a copy of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of
this Resolution follows:
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested
in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other
election laws, the Commission on Elections
RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No.
2772 as follows:
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be
construed to mean as requiring publishers of
the different mass media print publications to
provide print space under pain of prosecution,
whether administrative, civil or criminal, there
being no sanction or penalty for violation of
said Section provided for either in said
Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, on the grant of
"Comelec space."
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be
construed to mean as constituting prior
restraint on the part of publishers with respect
to the printing or publication of materials in
the news, opinion, features or other sections of
their respective publications or other accounts
or comments, it being clear from the last
sentence of said Section 8 that the
Commission shall, "unless the facts and
circumstances clearly indicate
otherwise  . . . respect the determination by the
publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or
publications that the accounts or views
published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest."
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval.
(Emphasis in the original)
While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as having become moot and
academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first
constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue
to rest and prevent its resurrection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in
expression. Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A did not try to redraft
Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 persists in
its original form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded,
and in particular as interpreted and applied by the Comelec itself in
its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that
petitioner PPI has given it. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in
express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its
implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction,
does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention
was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space
from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print
media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a
government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member
of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound
to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That
the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the
imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such
directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties inhearing in
the present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions
by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious
constitutional objection.
To compel print media companies to donate  "Comelec-space" of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less
than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property
for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the
intended frequency  of such compulsory "donation:"
only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995)
until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as
Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking
or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimistemporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation,"
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is
the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown
by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members
of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. 3 Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested
by petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution
No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing the public about
the identities, qualifications and programs of government of
candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital
election information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations,
notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a
matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the
ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations,
circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the
attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized
by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation"
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of
authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print
space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an
appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving
free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not,
however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers,
against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to
provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely
in line with the theory of democratic representative government. The
economic costs of informing the general public about the
qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most
appropriately distributed as widely as possible throughout our
society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by
taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e.,
print media enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened
level of information on and the awareness of the electoral process are
commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be
allocated on the same basis.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to
"donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too
casually to require prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there
was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec)
to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation —
has been constitutionally delegated to respondent
Commission.4 Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly
taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there
was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the
requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument
that purports, without a showing of existence of a national
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and
without regard to the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to
take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No
attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent
necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and
that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of
the State.
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be
quoted in full again:
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political
Parties in Newspapers. —  No newspaper or
publication shall allow to be printed or published in
the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the
newspaper or publication accounts or comments
which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or
including therein said candidate or political party.
However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the
newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest.
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in
Resolution No. 2772. In any case, Section 8 should be viewed in the
context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections. 6 There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section
11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for
campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing
so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political
advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11
(b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion  by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators
or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and
which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press:
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section
11 (b)  shows that it  purports to apply only to the
purchase and sale,  including purchase and sale
disguised as a donation, of print space and air
time for campaign or other political purposes. Section
11 (b) does not purport in any way to
restrict the reporting by
newspapers  or radio  or television  stations of news
or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcaster or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at
least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not
in fact advertisements for particular candidates
covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be
 read as reaching any report or commentary or other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for
by candidates for political office. We read Section 11
(b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of
Section 11 (b) — that it does not restrict either the
reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or
comment upon the qualifications and programs and
activities of any and all candidates for office —
constitutes the critical distinction which must be
made between the instant case and that of Sanidad
v. Commission on Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of
the Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation of the above-
quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an effort not
blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A
while possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid
political advertisements on the one hand and news reports,
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters,
broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be
given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a
case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege
any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to
enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of
its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of
Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court
considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be
raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes
a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX,
Section 4 of the Constitution to
therefore, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful
and credible elections —
is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of
Section 8.
Summarizing our conclusions:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,
purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print
space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of
an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22
March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the
Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The
Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. 

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of

all franchise or permits for the operation of — media
of communication or information — [for the purpose
of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and
the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates
Statutory Construction; Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at
interpretation.—Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at
interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its
IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not regulate the
collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article
1158 of the New Civil Code, which states: Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law
are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws
are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes
them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
National Building Code; The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cannot
rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section
803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR), so as to include the regulation of parking fees.—The OSG cannot rely on
Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of
the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking
fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code declaring the policy of the State “to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision,
which reads, “and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all
buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of
materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.” While the first part of
Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the
second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code.
Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of
regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of
life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory
power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for
all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied
with.
Administrative Agencies; The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.—The OSG
cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces
for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the
enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The
rule-making power of administrative agencies must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must
always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
National Building Code; Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of
such parking fees, the action of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.—It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the
power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and
structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control,
partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly, the fees
within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable
power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that
govern the relations not only as between individuals but also as between private
parties and the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to
impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the
same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the
imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees
upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting
the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.   
  
 Same; The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum
specifications and requirements for the same.—The Court is unconvinced. The
National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications
and requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic congestion in
areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say that the National
Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic congestion
around the buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate
lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has
apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the malls is due to the
fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners
to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged by
respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully
occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only because
there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred
by the parking fees charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may
even have the opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more people may be
encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of taking public
transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking facilities would become full sooner,
leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in the malls and parked in the streets
instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Police Power; The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall
parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. —
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Same; Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting
the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.—Police power is the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the
owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit.
A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police
power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of
a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms.
Taking; A police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use
business property for business purposes amounts to taking of private property, and
the owner may recover therefor.—The power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.
It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is
essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner
that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives
any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him
to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation
to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Same; Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking
facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection
of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount
to a taking or confiscation of their properties.—Although in the present case, title to
and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition
against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities,
is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as
parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or
even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of
the required parking facilities.
Same; Expropriation; The total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no
basis in the National Building Code or its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).—The total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees
from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE   G.R. No. 177056
SOLICITOR GENERAL,  
Petitioner, Present:
   
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  VELASCO, JR.,
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, NACHURA, and
 ROBINSONS LAND PERALTA, JJ.
CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA  
PLAZA CORPORATION and SM  
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Promulgated:
Respondents.  
 
September 18, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
 
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
[1]
 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Decision[2] dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint
Decision[3] dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-
1210; and (2) the Resolution [4] dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate
court in the same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land
Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons),
Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings,
Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in
their malls to their patrons and the general public.
 
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and
maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro
Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out
commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM
City, Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North
Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Pias.
 
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents
have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of
parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings
and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking
spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent
for the construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent
Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and
building specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed
for the lessors account.
 
Respondents expend for the maintenance and
administration of their respective parking facilities. They provide
security personnel to protect the vehicles parked in their parking
facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the
following parking fees from the persons making use of their parking
facilities, regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not:
 
Responden Parking Fees
t
 
Ayala Land On weekdays, P25.00 for the first four hours
and P10.00 for every succeeding hour; on weekends,
flat rate of P25.00 per day
 
Robinsons P20.00 for the first three hours and P10.00 for every
succeeding hour
 
Shangri-la Flat rate of P30.00 per day
SM Prime P10.00 to P20.00 (depending on whether the parking
space is outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours
and 59 minutes, and P10.00 for every succeeding
hour or fraction thereof
 
The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners
contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be responsible for
any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in respondents parking
facilities.
Shangri-la  
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce
and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation for
the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent
practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2)
assuming arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally
authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking
rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of
the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft,
robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of
the parking tickets. Said Senate Committees invited the top
executives of respondents, who operate the major malls in the
country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and other local government
officials; and the Philippine Motorists Association (PMA) as
representative of the consumers group.
 
After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3
November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-mentioned Senate
Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report No. 225 [5] on 2
May 2000, in which they concluded:
 
In view of the foregoing, the Committees find
that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls
is contrary to the National Building Code and is
therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code
merely requires malls to provide parking spaces,
without specifying whether it is free or not, both
Committees believe that the reasonable and logical
interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces
are for free. This interpretation is not only
reasonable and logical but finds support in the
actual practice in other countries like the United
States of America where parking spaces owned and
operated by mall owners are free of charge.
Figuratively speaking, the Code has
expropriated the land for parking something similar
to the subdivision law which require developers to
devote so much of the land area for parks.
 
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734
(Consumer Act of the Philippines) provides that it is
the policy of the State to protect the interest of the
consumers, promote the general welfare and
establish standards of conduct for business and
industry. Obviously, a contrary interpretation (i.e.,
justifying the collection of parking fees) would be
going against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.
 
Section 201 of the National Building Code
gives the responsibility for the administration and
enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including
the imposition of penalties for administrative
violations thereof to the Secretary of Public
Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out
in reality.
 
In the position paper submitted by the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately
pointed out that the Secretary of the DPWH is
responsible for the implementation/enforcement of
the National Building Code. After the enactment of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the local
government units (LGUs) were tasked to discharge
the regulatory powers of the DPWH.Hence, in the
local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/
regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to all
building plans, specifications and designs including
parking space requirements. There is, however, no
single national department or agency directly tasked
to supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the
Code on parking, notwithstanding the national
character of the law.[6]
 
 
Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, contained the
following recommendations:
In light of the foregoing, the Committees on
Trade and Commerce and Justice and Human
Rights hereby recommend the following:
 
1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute
the necessary action to enjoin the collection
of parking fees as well as to enforce the
penal sanction provisions of the National
Building Code. The Office of the Solicitor
General should likewise study how refund
can be exacted from mall owners who
continue to collect parking fees.
 
2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant
to the provisions of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise
known as the Consumer Act of
the Philippines should enforce the
provisions of the Code relative to
parking. Towards this end, the DTI should
 formulate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations on parking in shopping
malls, with prior consultations with the local
government units where these are
located. Furthermore, the DTI, in
coordination with the DPWH, should be
empowered to regulate and supervise the
construction and maintenance of parking
establishments.
 
3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to expressly prohibit
shopping malls from collecting parking fees
by at the same time, prohibit them from
invoking the waiver of liability.[7]
 
 
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that,
pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary
and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias
intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin
respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting
parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal
sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as
the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building
Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the
threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October
2000, a Petition for Declaratory Relief [8] under Rule 63 of the Revised
Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias. Said Petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and assigned to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr.
(Judge Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime prayed for
judgment:
a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code
as ultra vires, hence, unconstitutional and void;
 
b) Declaring [herein respondent SM Prime]s
clear legal right to lease parking spaces appurtenant
to its department stores, malls, shopping centers
and other commercial establishments; and
c) Declaring the National Building Code of
the Philippines Implementing Rules and Regulations
as ineffective, not having been published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation, as prescribed by Section 211
of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
 
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for
such other reliefs as may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises.[9]
 
 
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) [10] against
respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1210
and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by
Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the RTC:
 
1. After summary hearing, a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued restraining respondents from collecting
parking fees from their customers; and
 
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered
declaring that the practice of respondents in charging
parking fees is violative of the National Building Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and is
therefore invalid, and making permanent any
injunctive writ issued in this case.
 
Other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises are likewise prayed for. [11]
 
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 135, issued an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210
with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of
Makati, Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning
of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order [12] of even date
which limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208
and No. 00-1210 to the following:
 1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil
Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present
proceedings and relative thereto whether the
controversy in the collection of parking fees by mall
owners is a matter of public welfare.
2.                  Whether declaratory relief is
proper.
  pronounced that:
3.                  Whether
respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and
SM Prime are obligated to provide parking spaces in
their malls for the use of their patrons or the public
in general, free of charge.
 
4.                   Entitlement of the parties of
[sic] award of damages.[13]
 
On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210.
 
The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled
that the OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential
Decree No. 478 and the Administrative Code of 1987. [14] It also found
that all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were
present, to wit:
 
The requisites for an action for declaratory
relief are: (a) there is a justiciable controversy; (b)
the controversy is between persons whose interests
are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue
involved is ripe for judicial determination.
 
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-
1208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to be
affected directly by the position taken by the
government officials sued namely the Secretary of
Public Highways and the Building Officials of the
local government units where it operates shopping
malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter
of public interest and has taken a position adverse
to that of the mall owners whom it sued. The
construction of new and bigger malls has been
announced, a matter which the Court can take
judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether
mall operators should provide parking facilities, free
of charge needs to be resolved.[15]
 
As to the third and most contentious issue, the RTC
 
The Building Code, which is the enabling
law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations do
not impose that parking spaces shall be provided by
the mall owners free of charge. Absent such
directive[,] AyalaLand, Robinsons, Shangri-la and
SM [Prime] are under no obligation to provide them
for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:
Obligations derived from
law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or
in special laws are demandable and
shall be regulated by the precepts of
the law which establishes them; and
as to what has not been foreseen, by
the provisions of this Book (1090).[]
 
xxxx
 
The provision on ratios of parking slots to
several variables, like shopping floor area or
customer area found in Rule XIX of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be
construed as a directive to provide free parking
spaces, because the enabling law, the Building Code
does not so provide. x x x.
 
To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-
La and SM [Prime] to provide parking spaces for free
can be considered as an unlawful taking of property
right without just compensation.
 
Parking spaces in shopping malls are
privately owned and for their use, the mall operators
 collect fees. The legal relationship could be either
lease or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners
have the right to collect money which translates into
income. Should parking spaces be made free, this
right of mall owners shall be gone. This, without just
compensation. Further, loss of effective control over
their property will ensue which is frowned upon by
law.
The presence of parking spaces can be
viewed in another light. They can be looked at as
necessary facilities to entice the public to increase
patronage of their malls because without parking
spaces, going to their malls will be
inconvenient. These are[,] however[,] business
considerations which mall operators will have to
decide for themselves. They are not sufficient to
justify a legal conclusion, as the OSG would like the
Court to adopt that it is the obligation of the mall
owners to provide parking spaces for free. [16]
 
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to
justify any award for damages.
 
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil
Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court
declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land
Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM
Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide
parking spaces in their malls for the use of their
patrons or public in general, free of charge.
All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210
are dismissed.
 
No pronouncement as to costs.[17]
CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the
OSG[18] and respondent SM Prime[19] filed with the Court of
Appeals. The sole assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellants
Brief was:
 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND
MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF
CHARGE[;][20]
 
while the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its
Appellants Brief were:
 
I
 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES,
HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
 
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING RULES
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED
AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
 
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS
THE OSGS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
AND INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
 
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DECLARE THAT THE OSG HAS NO LEGAL
CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.
[21]
 
Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG
on the ground that the lone issue raised therein involved a pure
question of law, not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
 
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
76298 on 25 January 2007. The appellate court agreed with
respondent Robinsons that the appeal of the OSG should suffer the
fate of dismissal, since the issue on whether or not the National
Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall
operators to provide parking facilities to the public for free was
evidently a question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298
also included the appeal of respondent SM Prime, which raised
issues worthy of consideration, and in order to satisfy the demands
of substantial justice, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on the
merits of the case.
 
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG
to initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the RTC as the legal
representative of the government, [22] and as the one deputized by the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines through Senate Committee
Report No. 225.
 
The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of respondent
SM Prime that the OSG failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. The appellate court explained that an administrative
review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity
of the IRR of the National Building Code, as such issue was not
among those the parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC during
the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-
1210. Issues cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the controversy
could be settled on other grounds, without touching on the issue of
the validity of the IRR. It referred to the settled rule that courts
should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law or
implementing rules, because of the principle that bars judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question, unless the resolution thereof
is indispensable to the determination of the case.
 
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the
National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and
needed no further construction. Said provisions were only intended
to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and structures. In
the absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents
could not be obliged and expected to provide parking slots free of
charge.
 
The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[23]
 
 
In its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the
grounds relied upon by the latter had already been carefully
considered, evaluated, and passed upon by the appellate court, and
there was no strong and cogent reason to modify much less reverse
the assailed judgment.
 
The OSG now comes before this Court, via the instant
Petition for Review, with a single assignment of error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT OBLIGED
TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING SPACES TO THEIR
CUSTOMERS OR THE PUBLIC.[24]
 
The OSG argues that respondents are mandated to provide
free parking by Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule
XIX of the IRR.
 
According to Section 803 of the National Building Code:
 
SECTION 803. Percentage of Site
Occupancy
 
(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be
governed by the use, type of construction, and
height of the building and the use, area, nature, and
location of the site; and subject to the provisions of
the local zoning requirements and in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by the 1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1
Secretary. slot/100 sq. m. of shopping
  floor area
   
In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old IRR,[25] provides:  
  The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be
RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE read together with Section 102 of the National Building Code, which
REQUIREMENTS declares:
   
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site  
occupancy, the following provisions on parking and It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
loading space requirements shall be observed: State to safeguard life, health, property, and public
  welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
1. The parking space ratings listed below are environmental management and control; and to this
minimum off-street requirements for end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for
specific uses/occupancies for all buildings and structures, a framework of
buildings/structures: minimum standards and requirements to regulate
1.1 The size of an average and control their location, site, design, quality of
automobile parking slot shall materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
be computed as 2.4 meters maintenance.
by 5.00 meters for  
perpendicular or diagonal  
parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly
meters for parallel contributes to the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and
parking. A truck or bus public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
parking/loading slot shall be management and control. Adequate parking spaces would contribute
computed at a minimum of greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick
3.60 meters by 12.00 and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking. Moreover,
meters. The parking slot the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and
shall be drawn to scale and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to
the total number of which impose fees and, conversely, to control -- partially or, as in this case,
shall be indicated on the absolutely -- the imposition of such fees.
plans and specified whether  
or not parking The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
accommodations, are  
attendant-managed. (See The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and
Section 2 for computation of regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that
parking requirements). respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers,
  should provide parking and loading spaces, in accordance with the
xxxx minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor
  area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-
collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term parking
fees cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code
and its IRR.
 
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
any attempt at interpretation.[26] Since Section 803 of the National
Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees,
then simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the
same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article
1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
 
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are
not presumed. Only those expressly determined in
this Code or in special laws are demandable, and
shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which
establishes them; and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (Emphasis
ours.)
 
 
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within
the ambit of the National Building Code and its IRR, the OSG had to
resort to specious and feeble argumentation, in which the Court
cannot concur.
 
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building
Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and
Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking
fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the
National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard
life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control; but
totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, and to
this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings
and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design,
quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance. While the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the
Code.Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials in the name of life, health, property, and
public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said
officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements
for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building
Code, are complied with.
 
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to
fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings,
Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered
by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative
agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always
be resolved in favor of the basic law.[27]
 
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly
referred to Republic v. Gonzales[28] and City of Ozamis v.
Lumapas[29] to support its position that the State has the power to
regulate parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and welfare of
the public; and it is by virtue of said power that respondents may be
required to provide free parking facilities. The OSG, though, failed to
consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal
backgrounds of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
 
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the
occupants of two parcels of land of the public domain to give way to
a road-widening project. It was in this context that the Court
pronounced:
 
Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla
Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was
prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of
traffic in the surrounding area to the great
discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use
the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to
the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the
people and it can only be substantially relieved by
widening streets and providing adequate parking
areas.
 
 
 The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had
been clothed with full power to control and regulate its streets for the
purpose of promoting public health, safety and welfare. The City can
regulate the time, place, and manner of parking in the streets and
public places; and charge minimal fees for the street parking to cover
the expenses for supervision, inspection and control, to ensure the
smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and for
the safety and convenience of the public.
 
Republic and City of  Ozamis involved parking in the local
streets; in contrast, the present case deals with privately owned
parking facilities available for use by the general
public. In Republicand City of Ozamis, the concerned local
governments regulated parking pursuant to their power to control
and regulate their streets; in the instant case, the DPWH Secretary
and local building officials regulate parking pursuant to their
authority to ensure compliance with the minimum standards and
requirements under the National Building Code and its IRR. With the
difference in subject matters and the bases for the regulatory powers
being invoked, Republic and City of Ozamis do not constitute
precedents for this case.
 
Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain
pronouncements that weaken the position of the OSG in the case at
bar. In Republic, the Court, instead of placing the burden on private
persons to provide parking facilities to the general public, mentioned
the trend in other jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments
themselves took the initiative to make more parking spaces available
so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
 
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, parking in designated areas along public
streets or highways is allowed which clearly
indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a
useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is
at least as voluminous as here, the provision by
municipal governments of parking space is not
limited to parking along public streets or highways.
There has been a marked trend to build off-street
parking facilities with the view to removing parked
cars from the streets. While the provision of off-
street parking facilities or carparks has been
commonly undertaken by private enterprise,
municipal governments have been constrained to
put up carparks in response to public necessity
where private enterprise had failed to keep up with
the growing public demand. American courts have
upheld the right of municipal governments to
construct off-street parking facilities as clearly
redounding to the public benefit.[30]
 
 
In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the collection by the
City of minimal fees for the parking of vehicles along the streets: so
why then should the Court now preclude respondents from collecting
from the public a fee for the use of the mall parking
facilities? Undoubtedly, respondents also incur expenses in the
maintenance and operation of the mall parking facilities, such as
electric consumption, compensation for parking attendants and
security, and upkeep of the physical structures.
 
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees
and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely,
the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been
settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property
carries with it the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations
not only as between individuals but also as between private parties
and the political society.[31] True, if the regulatory agencies have the
power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the
power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary
and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents; but
the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use
the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory
powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately
owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection
arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the
collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness
and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.[32]
 
 Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness
and propriety of measures or means, the Court notes that Section
803 of the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light
and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to regulate
site occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation
in every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the IRR requires that
a building, depending on its specific use and/or floor area, should
provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, however,
fails to see the connection between regulating site occupancy to
ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis--
vis regulating the collection by building owners of fees for the use of
their parking spaces. Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the
former does not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally
escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation conditions at the
malls could be affected by the fact that parking facilities thereat are
free or paid for.
 
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing
that:
 
Under Section 803 of the National Building
Code, complimentary parking spaces are required to
enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic
congestion in areas surrounding the building, which
certainly affects the ventilation within the building
itself, which otherwise, the annexed parking spaces
would have served. Free-of-charge parking avoids
traffic congestion by ensuring quick and easy access
of legitimate shoppers to off-street parking spaces
annexed to the malls, and thereby removing the
vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy
streets near the commercial establishments. [33]
 
 
The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code
regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications and
requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic
congestion in areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch
to say that the National Building Code and its IRR also intend to
solve the problem of traffic congestion around the buildings so as to
ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate lighting and
ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG
has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the
malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their parking
facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The
Court notes that despite the fees charged by respondents, vehicle
owners still use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully
occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets
only because there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and
not because they are deterred by the parking fees charged by
respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may even have the
opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more people may be
encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of
taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking
facilities would become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without
parking spaces in the malls and parked in the streets instead,
causing even more traffic congestion.
 
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually
invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned
parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof.  The
Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking
facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.
 
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does
not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.  [34]
 
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for
public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but
another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent
domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. [35]
 
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner
of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. [36] It is a
settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of
value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains
with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine
whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts
to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of
the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles
him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to
permit the regulation to be justified under the police power.
Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to
use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of
private property, and the owner may recover therefor. [37]
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of
the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition
against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of
said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of
their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces,
but is also mandating that they give the public access to said
parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into
the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived
of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are
further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the
required parking facilities.
 
The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v.
Judge Ericta[38] is edifying. Therein, the City Government of Quezon
City passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries within its
jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their total area for
charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to
the Court, the ordinance in question was null and void, for it
authorized the taking of private property without just compensation:
There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of'
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of'
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
 
'The expropriation without compensation of a
portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and to provide for
their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q)
that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the
burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law,
and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different
from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience
are very clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to homeowners.
 
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The
State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents property without payment of just compensation.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the
issue persistently raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the
unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said issue
was not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial conference
for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for
resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the
constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will
not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it
has been, settled on other grounds.[39]
 
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January
2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29
May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in
Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED.No
costs.
 
SO ORDERED.