You are on page 1of 62

JUDGMENT DATABASE

I. Section 200, Indian Penal Code, 1860

Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false.—Whoever corruptly uses or


attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any
material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Nitin Jairam Gadkari vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr.
b. Citation - 2004 (4) MhLj 419
c. Date of Judgment – 29th November 2003.
d. Bench Name – D.D. Sinha, J.
e. Summary

During the night between 15-12-1998 and 16-12-1998, three persons were killed by the gun
shots fired from the pistol of one Prakash Dwarkadas Kalyani. According to the said Mr. Prakash
Kalyani, these three persons had entered the premises of his Chemist Shop called "Shyam
Medical Stores" adjacent to the Mayo Hospital, Nagpur, and they were armed with deadly
weapons like two country-made revolvers, two daggers etc., around midnight on 15th December,
1998 with an intent to commit robbery and dacoity and one of them opened fire after threatening
the servant of Prakash Kalyani, namely Satish Kanhaiyalal Dwivedi. The assailants demanded
money and started abusing the owner of the shop and also extended threats. Three persons, who
were present in the Chemist Shop at the relevant time, were Prakash Kalyani, his servant Satish
Dwivedi and brother of Prakash Kalyani, Rajendra Kalyani. Two of the assailants were having a
country-made handgun and a revolver each and the third one had a dagger in his hand.

The learned counsel for the applicants contended that in the instant case, the process is issued by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate against the present applicants in respect of the offences punishable
under Sections 200 and 201, read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, for using as true such
declaration knowing it to be false as well as causing disappearance of evidence of offence as well
as giving false information to screen offender.

In the instant case, this Court has neither adjudicated upon the other grounds raised by the
applicants in their respective criminal applications and criminal revision application, nor any
opinion is expressed thereon, except on point which is argued before me.
On the backdrop of the above referred facts and circumstances, the impugned order, dated 10th
February, 2000, is unsustainable in law. The same is quashed and set aside and the complaint
dated 24-12-1998, filed by the complainant in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate is dismissed
so far as it relates to the applicants.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Rev. Dr. Busi Suneel Bhanu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh,
rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh & Another.
b. Citation - Criminal Petition No. 1785 of 2011
c. Date of Judgment – 14th November 2017.
d. Bench Name – Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry.
e. Summary

The allegations are that in the elections held in the month of May 2009 for the purpose of
President of AEL Church, the accused was elected as President and he wanted removal of the
complainant from his post by hook or crook. As a loyal servant of the Church, the complainant
never intended to bring the offences committed by the accused. The accused issued a legal order,
restraining the complainant from discharging his duties as bursar of ALT Seminary. On receipt
of the said order, the complainant approached the Principal District Court, Rajahmundry and also
the Principal of ALT Seminary and temporary injunction was granted, which was made absolute
subsequently. The complainant filed Ex.P22 a bunch of property tax demand notices issued by
the Municipal Corporation, Rajahmundry to a tune of Rs.28,00,000/-. The accused knowing fully
well that the Church is bound to pay the tax, failed to pay the amount and it is categorically
mentioned in the counter that “…it is false to allege that the previous Bursars and Principals did
not pay tax to the Municipal Corporation of Rajahmundry for the past several years amounting to
several lakh of rupees …”

It is this submission of the petitioner made in the counter that is tried to be projected as an
offence under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code. The alleged statement made by the
petitioner does not by any stretch of understanding constitute an offence under Sections 199 and
200 IPC.
The complaint also supports the said contention and except the said grievance, there cannot be
any reason for the complainant to file this complaint, which does not make out any offence
against the petitioner. There cannot be any personal grievance for the complainant for non
payment of taxes. It only suggests that the complainant wanted some pretext to harass the
petitioner and hence, filed this complaint. The continuance of the proceeding would only result
in abuse of process of law.

With the above observation, the criminal petition is allowed and the further proceedings in
CC.No.14 of 2011 on the file of the III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry
are hereby quashed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – K. Ramakrishnan vs M.M. Rajendran


b. Citation - 1995 CriLJ 3959
c. Date of Judgment – 7th September 1994.
d. Bench Name – S A Mohamed
e. Summary

In 1994, a complaint came to be filed against the appellant by the respondent under Section 200
IPC alleging that because of some press statements made by the appellant, which appeared in the
press in June 1990, he (the respondent) suffered reduction in the sale of SPIC products, thereby
incurring losses. The appellant approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras through a
petition under Section 482 CrPC praying for quashing of the complaint pending in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, Aruppukottai. A learned Single Judge of the High Court on 1-3-1996, while
dismissing the petition filed by the appellant made the following order.

“The petitioner is seeking for quashing the complaint registered for the offence under Section
200 IPC namely, using a statement knowing it to be false. The circumstance under which he used
the statement knowing it to be false, is a question of fact to be determined during trial. Having
regard to the quantum of punishment contemplated for such an offence, it is triable by warrant
procedure and he can raise all the contentions at the appropriate stage before the court below. I
see no ground to quash the complaint. The petition is dismissed.”

We have examined the application filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the complaint filed by the respondent and the other record. In our opinion
arguable questions had been raised in the petition filed by the appellant but the same have not
been dealt with at all by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition. The impugned
order is wholly cryptic. There is no discussion let alone a finding, whether the facts stated in the
complaint even prima facie disclose the commission of an offence under Section 200 IPC.

We accordingly accept this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We remit the petition under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Crl. OP No. 3075 of 1994) to the High Court for
a fresh disposal in accordance with law. The High Court shall expeditiously dispose of the matter
without treating anything said herein by us as any expression of opinion on the merits of the
case. Till the petition is disposed of by the High Court, the proceedings in the complaint in the
trial court shall remain stayed. It shall be open to the appellant to seek exemption from personal
appearance in the trial court from the High Court.

4. Fourth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Riju Samanta v. State of Assam & Others


b. Citation - 2013 (5) GLT 700
c. Date of Judgment – 9th November 2012.
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.A. Ansari.
e. Summary

On 08. 04. 2004, accused No. 4, i. e. , the present accused-petitioner, representing accused No. 1,
2 and 3, approached the complainant with mala fide intention to induce the complainant to
become the Consigning and Forwarding (in short, Candf) agent of accused No. 1. In this regard,
accused No. 4 (i. e. , the petitioner herein) promised to appoint the complainant as Candf agent
of accused No. 4, for the entire North-Eastern Region, for a period of two years on depositing a
sum of Rupees five lakhs as the security deposit and also promised to send stocks and products
of accused No. 1 to the complainant on the complainant's appointment as Candf agent and
continue maintaining uninterrupted flow of supply of its products in the market. Believing in the
representations, so made by the accused-petitioner, the complainant deposited a sum of Rupees
five lakhs by way of bank draft in the name of the accused No. 1, which is a company, at its
Chandigarh branch. On receiving the security deposit of Rupees five lakhs, though the accused-
company appointed the complainant as their Candf agent for the entire North-Eastern Region and
executed, in this regard, an agreement, on 20. 04. 2004, the accused No. 1 sent consignment on
two occasions and, thereafter, no consignment of goods was sent by the accused-company to the
complainant despite repeated demands placed by the complainant with the accused-company.

Having examined the complainant and complainant's witnesses, under Section 200 IPC, the
learned Magistrate, as indicated above, took cognizance of offences under Sections 406 and 420
read with Section 34 IPC and directed issuance of summons to all the accused named in the
complaint including the present petitioner.

In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision succeeds. The impugned order,
dated 01. 12. 2004, is hereby set aside to the extent that the same relates to taking of cognizance
of offence under Section 200 read with Section 34 IPC and issuance of process, as against the
accused-petitioner, under Section 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The impugned order, dated 01.
12. 2004, is also hereby set aside to the extent that the same directs issuance of process, as
against the accused-petitioner, for the offence allegedly committed by him under Section 406
read with Section 34 IPC. The complaint shall, therefore, proceed under Section 406 read with
Section 34 IPC against accused No. 1 and its remaining functionaries, namely, accused No. 2 and
3, until directed otherwise.
5. Fourth Judgment

f. Name of the Judgment – Riju Samanta v. State of Assam & Others


g. Citation - Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2135 of 2012
h. Date of Judgment – 22nd July 2013
i. Bench Name – Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia J..
j. Summary

The petitioner had contested the election of office of Chairman. Municipal Corporation,
Chirawa. At the time of filing of nomination papers the petitioner had submitted affidavit,
declaration recording his assets and liabilities. A grievance was made by respondent No.2 that
the affidavit accompanied by declaration and undertaking as per Section 12-K Rajasthan
Municipal Act, 1959 read with Article 243-T of Constitution of India were false.
Respondent No.2 filed a criminal complaint for prosecution of the petitioner for the offences
under Sections 193 and 200 IPC.

The Court of the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 199 and 200 IPC and
summoned the petitioner to stand trial.

Aggrieved against the same, the petitioner filed a revision petition. The Revisional Court below
upheld the order of cognizance and had dismissed the same. Hence, the present petition has been
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. During the course of the arguments, it is not denied that for
prosecution of offence under Sections 193 and 200 IPC there is a specific bar under Section 195
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As per Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
prosecution of the petitioner for offences under Sections 199 and 200 IPC complaint in writing is
to be filed by the public servant or the Court quo whom offence has been committed. Admittedly
in the present case, no complaint has been filed by the Returning Officer. In view of the bar
under Section 195 Cr.P.C., the petitioner could not be prosecuted by the respondent. The lawful
remedy for the respondent was to approach Returning Officer and make a prayer that complaint
be filed to prosecute the petitioner. It is stated that such a prayer, was made to the Returning
Officer and Returning Officer had not accepted the prayer. It is the prerogative of the Returning
Officer to launch prosecution for the offences under Sections 199 and 200 IPC when he come to
the conclusion that such prosecution is necessary and in his opinion it is expedient in the interest
of justice.

The platform of the Court cannot be used to settle personal score or to take revenge. In view of
the specific bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. which is attracted in the facts of this case, the Court
below could not entertain the complaint and act thereupon. Consequently, the present petition is
accepted. The impugned complaint along with all subsequent proceedings is quashed.
II. Section 201, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,
causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any infor-
mation respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false; if a capital offence.
—shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable
with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment
for life.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Sharwan Kumar son of Birduram v. The State of Rajasthan
b. Citation - 2017 (3) RLW 2112 (Raj.)
c. Date of Judgment – 9th September 2016.
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vijay Kumar Vyas
e. Summary

Facts of the case in nutshell are that appellants were charged that Sushila, Bhabhi of Mishri and
Sharwan Kumar and daughter-in-law of Phooli, was married with Babulal on 5.2.1984, and since
then she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry and she died of an unnatural death by
felling in a way within 7 years of matrimonial alliance. The appellants disposed of the dead body
prior to reaching of her parental sides. The appellants were tried by the trial court for offences
punishable under Section 498 A, 304 B, 306 and 201 IPC. After due trial, the appellants were
acquitted, extending benefit of doubt, from charges of 498 A, 304 B and 306 IPC. However, they
were convicted for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. Section 201 IPC reads as under:-

"201.Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen


offender.--Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,
causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of
screening the offender from legal punishment, of with the intention gives any information
respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false;

Hon’ble Supreme court has observed in Suleman Rahiman Mulani’s Case :

“The conviction of the appellant No.2 under Section 201 IPC depends on the sustainability of the
conviction of appellant No.1 under Section 304-A IPC. If appellant No.1 was rightly convicted
under that provision, the conviction of appellant No.2 under Section 201 IPC on the facts found
cannot be challenged. But on the other hand, if the conviction of appellant No. 1 under Section
304-A IPC cannot be sustained, then, the second appellant's conviction under Section 201 IPC
will have to be set aside, because to establish the charge under Section 201, the prosecution must
first prove that an offence had been committed not merely a suspicion that it might have been
committed and that the accused knowing or having reason to believe that such an offence had
been committed, and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, had caused
the evidence thereof to disappear. The proof of the commission of the offence is an essential
requisite for bringing home the offence under Section 201 IPC.”

The Apex Court has reiterated in Ghusabhai’s case (supra) that once it is held that the accused
appellants are not guilty of offence under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC, conviction under Section
201 IPC is also not sustainable.

In the instant matter, facts are similar. Here also appellants have been acquitted of the charges u/s
304-B, 498-A and 306 IPC. Therefore, they cannot be convicted for charge of disappearance of
evidence of offence i.e. under Section 201 IPC.

Thus, appeal succeeds. Judgment dated 4.8.1993 with regard to the conviction and sentence for
offence u/s 201 IPC, passed by learned trial court, is set aside. Appellants are acquitted of the
charges of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Premjeet Singh v. State of M.P


b. Citation - Criminal Appeal No. 981 Of 1997
c. Date of Judgment – 15th January 2004.
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Doraiswamy Raju & Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha
e. Summary

The above appeal has been filed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur dated 5.3.1997 in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1992, whereunder
on an appeal filed by the State against the verdict of acquittal returned by the learned Sessions
Judge, the High Court while partly allowing the appeal, though sustained the order of acquittal of
the appellant before us under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC'), yet
found him guilty under Section 201 IPC for causing disappearance of the evidence and after
hearing the appellant on the sentence has imposed rigorous imprisonment of five years.

We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court to substantiate the grievance
strongly projected for the appellant that not only there was total absence of evidence to find him
guilty under Section 201 IPC but there has been no consideration and findings recorded as to the
satisfaction or otherwise even of the necessary ingredients to bring home the guilt of the
appellant under Section 201 IPC. The learned counsel for the respondent-State despite attempts
made to justify the judgment of the High Court in this regard could not successfully answer the
grievance made on behalf of the appellant.

On going through the relevant portions of the judgment wherein the High Court has chosen to
convict the appellant under Section 201 IPC we find not only conspicuous absence of any
concrete materials for indicting the appellant under Section 201 IPC but the necessary
ingredients to warrant conviction of the appellant under that provision have not been found to
really exist on any objective consideration. On this only ground we set aside the judgment of the
High Court holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 201 IPC.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Lokinder Ratika v. CBI


b. Citation – MANU/HP/1618/2014
c. Date of Judgment – 9th July 2014
d. Bench Name – Dharam Chand Chaudhary J.
e. Summary

Accused Lokinder Raitka is in appeal before this Court against his conviction and sentence for
the commission of offence punishable under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code passed by
learned Special Judge CBI, Shimla in Sessions Trial No. 27-S/7 of 2009 on 29.1.2012. He was
tried for the commission of offence, punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 201 of
the Indian Penal Code alongwith his co-accused V.K. Sharma (since deceased). The accused is a
contractor by profession. He was awarded the construction work for up-gradation of Khadrala-
Nakestely road under "Pardhan Manatri Gram Sarak Yojna" by the office of Chief Engineer,
HPPWD (South), Shimla. He had to furnish bank guarantees, i.e. performance security to the
tune of Rs. 14,69,021/- and another additional security for unbalanced bid of Rs. 25,000/-, to
claim the payment in advance. His co-accused deceased V.K. Sharma, was the Manager of
Rohroo branch of UCO Bank. The accused approached said V.K. Sharma for issuance of bank
guarantees. They both hatched criminal conspiracy and in furtherance of such conspiracy
deceased accused V.K. Sharma issued the bank guarantees without processing the matter as per
the prescribed procedure and charging commission etc. Thus, both of them cheated the bank and
thereby caused loss to the bank and obtained wrongful gain to themselves. The convict produced
the alleged forged bank guarantees in the office of Executive Engineer, HPPWD, Rohroo, a pre-
requisite to the award of the work.

The plain reading of Section 201 IPC makes it crystal clear that to constitute an offence under
this Section it must be proved that it was known to the accused that an offence has been
committed and he caused to disappear the evidence relevant for the purpose of the commission
of the offence intentionally to screen the offender from legal punishment or gave any information
with respect to the offence knowing fully well that the same was false.

As discussed above, in view of there being no legal and acceptable evidence, suggesting the
involvement of the accused for the commission of offence, punishable under Section 201 IPC, he
has been erroneously convicted. Hence, the findings of his conviction and sentence being not
supported by the evidence available on record deserve to be quashed and set aside.
In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the present appeal succeeds and the same is
accordingly allowed. Consequently, the findings of conviction and sentence under Section 201
IPC recorded against the accused are quashed and set aside and he is acquitted of the said
charge. The amount of fine deposited in the trial court be refunded to the said accused as per
procedure prescribed therefor.
4. Fourth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Pradeep Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh


b. Citation – (2015) 3 RCR (CRIMINAL) 157
c. Date of Judgment – 3th Feb. 2015
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice fakir Mahhmed Ibrahim Kalifulla & – Hon’ble Mr.
Justice Ajay Mohan Sapre
e. Summary

On 10.9.2006, Puranchand (PW-1) and his brother Gopichand (PW-2) lodged a complaint in
Police Station Chirgaon. As per the complaint, Puranchand's daughter - Reeta Kumari who was
married to Deep Ram (one of the accused) about 5 years back and had a minor daughter of one
year born out of the wed lock was missing. It was stated that Deep Ram was living with his
family with his sister Suban Dei in village-Shounter and visited Puranchand's house on
05.09.2006. Puranchand inquired as to why he came alone and did not bring Reetakumari. On
this, Deep Ram said that he had gone to attend some fair and from there he came alone. After
Deep Ram left, Puranchand not being satisfied with his answer asked his wife Gianpati to go to
the house of Deep Ram to find out the well being of their daughter. Gianpati accordingly went to
Deep Ram's house and came to know that her daughter (Reeta kumari) was missing from
04.09.2006 from the house. Puranchand then started doubting and made frantic efforts to search
for his daughter but all were in vain. He then suspected that Deep Ram must have killed her
daughter.

On 10.09.2006, police received a message from one Sunil Kumar Pradhan Gram Panchayat -
Sari (Gaonsari) that one dead body was lying in Gaonsari Kufshala - Thach. On receiving the
message, the police reached the spot and found a verification that the dead body was of Reeta
Kumari.

This led to further investigation resulting in apprehending Deep Ram - husband of Reeta Kumari
(deceased), Pradeep Kumar (appellant) - real brother of Deep Ram and Neeraj Kumar (another
accused) - servant of Deep Ram for commission of offence of murder of Reeta Kumari. After
completing all the formalities such as custodial interrogation of the accused, recording of
statement of several witnesses, seizing of articles from the spot and the places disclosed by the
accused/witnesses in their disclosure statements, post-mortem of the dead body, and preparation
of spot map etc., the police submitted a charge-sheet against the aforementioned 3 accused
persons for commission of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 201 and 34
of IPC. The case was then committed to the Sessions Court for trial.

Coming now to the question of sentence, we have given our anxious consideration to this
question. In our considered view, having regard to relevant facts and circumstances appearing in
the case, as brought out by the learned counsel for the appellant in his submission and further
taking into consideration the appellant's age and family background, we consider it appropriate to
modify the sentence awarded by the courts below and accordingly reduce it to 2 years RI instead
of 5 years RI. The interference is called for only to this extent.

In the light of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed in part. The sentence
awarded to the appellant is modified to the extent indicated above. So far as the fine amount
awarded by the Courts below is concerned, it is upheld.

5. Fifth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Om Prakash v. State of Haryana


b. Citation – AIR 2019 SC 2852
c. Date of Judgment – 29th March 2019
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nageshwara Rao & – Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
e. Summary

FIR was registered on the basis of a statement of Nain Singh (PW-1) against the Appellants
under Sections 498 A, 304 B, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the IPC’). According to the FIR, Kamla was married to Shyam Sunder, son of Jodh Raj
(Appellant No.2) on 19th April, 1992. She was consistently being harassed by Shyam Sunder for
insufficient dowry. As Kamla was resisting the demand, she was beaten by Shyam Sunder at the
instigation of the Appellants. Appellant No.1 is the brother of Shyam Sunder. The family
members of deceased made attempts to speak to Shyam Sunder and the Appellants not to trouble
Kamla for dowry, all in vain. Information was received on 13.03.1997 that Kamla died on the
night of 12.03.1997. Immediately, they rushed to the village Ramgarh where the Appellants and
the deceased were living. They came to know that Kamla died in the intervening night of
11/12.03.1997. It was stated in the FIR that the informant believed that the Appellants and
Shyam Sunder had burnt the dead body of Kamla after causing her death and had thrown the
ashes into Jamuna river.

After completion of investigation, the Appellants and Shyam Sunder were charged under
Sections 304 B and 201 IPC. Shyam Sunder was convicted under Section 304 B IPC and
sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The Appellants were convicted under Section
201 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and a fine of
Rs.1,000/-. The High Court dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the Appellants and Shyam
Sunder affirming the conviction and sentences imposed on them by the Trial Court. While
issuing notice in the SLP filed by the Appellants, this Court dismissed the SLP filed by Shyam
Sunder. In this appeal, we are concerned with the conviction and sentence of the Appellants
under Section 201, IPC.

The Appellants were convicted under Section 201 IPC on the basis of the oral testimonies of
Nain Singh (PW3 1) and Attar Singh (PW-2). The High Court affirmed the convictions of the
Appellants under Section 201 IPC by observing that the dead body of Kamla could not have been
cremated without the active connivance of the Appellants.
III. Section 202, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform.—
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,
intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally
bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Manji Prasad v. State


b. Citation – 1996 (20)ACR567
c. Date of Judgment – 27th February 1996
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.S. Sidhu
e. Summary

This will dispose of two appeals Nos. 1776 and 1836 both of 1980 filed by Manji Prasad and his
mother Saraswati Devi respectively before this Court against their convictions under Section
202, IPC recorded on 7-8-1980 by Sessions Judge, Ballia and the sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for six months awarded to each of them while at the same time acquitting then of
the charge under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC.

The prosecution case in nut-shell was that in furtherance of their common intention both of them
had murdered Kamlawati none other than the wife of the former and daughter-in-law of the latter
and thereafter had intentionally omitted to give information respecting the offence.

This appeal must succeeds on the short ground that before they can be convicted under Section
202, IPC it has to be proved that an offence was committed. The Apex Court in the case of
Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 354 in a somewhat similar situation had
held that before there can be conviction under Section 201, IPC it must first be proved that an
offence had been committed. As the accused in that case appellants before me had been acquitted
under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC by the Sessions Judge it has to be held that
their convictions and sentence under Section 202, IPC are untenable.

A That being so, both the appeals are hereby accepted on this short ground and the convictions
and sentence of the appellants are set aside. They are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged.

Appeals allowed.
2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Haryana & Another.


b. Citation – (2007) 1 RCR Criminal 808
c. Date of Judgment – 29th November 2006
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjit Singh
e. Summary

Urvashi wife of Dharambir Singh died an unnatural death on 22.7.2004. The complainant, who is
brother of deceased Usha Rani @ Urvashi, lodged a complaint against her husband and his
relations under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 328, 406 and 34 IPC. On 22.7.2004, Usha Rani was got
admitted in Government Hospital, Sardoolgarh and was attended to by Dr. Sohan Lal posted
there as Medical Officer. The said doctor, after giving some treatment to the deceased, advised
the family to shift her to Patiala Nursing Home at Sirsa where she was admitted at 10.00 p.m.
She was declared brought dead. Allegation is that she had been poisoned or was forced to take
poison on account of harassment by the accused and his family members. Dr. Sohan Lal was
accused of not intentionally referring her to some specialised institutions for better treatment and
thus failing to perform his duties. On the basis of these allegations made against the family of the
accused as well as against the Medical Officer, the challan was presented. It is urged that Dr.
Sohan Lal was duty bound to refer the deceased to some specialised institution for better
treatment and to inform the police regarding the commission of offence and he failed to do so
and hence was responsible for the offence alleged against him. Dr. Sohan Lal being doctor
working at Government Hospital as a public servant and as such he could have been ordered to
be prosecuted only after obtaining requisite sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The prosecution
had not obtained any sanction in this regard. Accordingly, a prayer was made for discharging
accused Dr. Sohan Lal. After making reference to few judgments, the court found that the
sanction was essential in this case and accordingly the doctor was ordered to be discharged. This
is under challenge in the present revision.

The only submission made before me is that sanction was not needed in this case as the
circumstances in this case indicated intention on the part of the doctor not to report the matter to
police or otherwise failing to refer the deceased for specialised treatment, which may make him
liable under Section 202 IPC.

There is even no material placed on record to show that the deceased needed any specialised
treatment or that the respondent doctor had intentionally omitted to give information of offence
or that he was bound to give any such information to attract the culpable provisions of Section
202 IPC. Rather the learned counsel conceded that in the case Dr. (Smt.) K.K. Patnayak and
others v. State of M.P., 1999 Cri.L.J. 4911, it was held that failure to give information (6 days in
this case) regarding admission of patient would not itself amount to offence under Section 201
IPC and such failure does not amount to offence under Section 202 IPC unless it is shown that
doctor was under duty bound to give such information.

I do not find any infirmity in order discharging the accused Dr. Sohan Lal. No case for
interference is made out. The present revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Vinay Kumar v. State of Uttrakhand


b. Citation – (2018) 3 NCC 370
c. Date of Judgment – 7th August 2018
d. Bench Name – Lok Pal Singh J.
e. Summary

Present petition, under section 482 Cr.P.C., has been filed for quashing of the charge sheet dated
24.05.2010, as also summoning order dated 08.06.2010 passed by the Judicial Magistrate,
Roorkee District Haridwar in criminal case no. 2568 of 2010 State vs. Furkan and others for the
offences punishable under sections 304B and 202 IPC.

Second respondent-complainant lodged the first information report against Furkan (husband of
the deceased), Kurban (brother in law/JETH), Akhtari mother in law and Mehraj (sister-in-
law/JETHANI) with the averments that marriage of his sister (Parveen) was solemnized with
Furkan on 11.12.2009 as per the Muslim Rites. At the time of marriage, his father gave sufficient
dowry but the in-laws were unhappy with the dowry and on account of non fulfillment of
demand of dowry, were regularly harassing the sister of the complainant. On 28.02.2010, he
received information on mobile that the aforesaid persons have killed his sister.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that petitioner is a Doctor by profession and
runs a nursing home in the name and style of Vinay Nursing Home, when the deceased was
brought to the petitioner’s nursing home, petitioner was not there at that point of time. The
condition of the complainant’s sister was critical and as a matter of routine, a receipt of Rs. 250/-
has been issued in the name of the deceased by the staff but she was not admitted in the hospital
and during general checkup it was found that Parveen (sister of the complainant) was brought
dead.

During investigation, the Investigating Officer visited to the Hospital and inquired about the
death of the deceased. After completion of investigation, charge sheet under section 202 IPC has
been submitted against the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the only allegation against the petitioner is
that he has not informed the police about the incident. It is further submitted that since there is no
evidence available on record to convict the petitioner, therefore continuation of criminal
proceedings against the petitioner would be a futile exercise. It is also submitted that petitioner is
a reputed Doctor and is not involved in the crime. Further it is submitted that prosecution
witnesses, namely, Faiya, Mumtiyaz and Parvez have not made any allegation against the present
petitioner.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, considering the facts and circumstances and also
considering the fact that continuation of proceedings under section 202 IPC against the reputed
Doctor would be a futile exercise, this Court is of the view that the criminal proceedings liable to
be quashed.
Accordingly, the petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. Charge sheet dated 24.05.2010,
as also summoning order dated 08.06.2010 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee District
Haridwar are hereby quashed qua the petitioner. However, it is made clear that criminal
proceedings against the other accused persons shall continue. Let a copy of this order be sent to
the Magistrate concerned.

4. Fourth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – U.C. Parikh v. State of Uttarpradesh


b. Citation – (2017) 98 ACrC 760
c. Date of Judgment – 27th October 2016
d. Bench Name – Shamsher Bahadur Singh J.
e. Summary

Necessary facts leading to prosecution of applicant for aforesaid offence are that on 31.05.1999
at about 10.30 A.M., the informant Ramakant Yadav found his real brother Jaipal Yadav in a pit
situated within premises of U.I.C. Paper Mill, Nishat Ganj, P.S. Mahanagar, District Lucknow,
who was crying for help. Jaipal Yadav was rescued and then he stated before the witnesses
namely Roop Narayan, N.B. Singh, Ramakant Yadav (informant), Machalooram Yadav,
Jaichandra Yadav, Dr. Dayanand Giri and Baba Ramdeen (Sahajanand Giri Baba) that another
Guard Sanjay Singh assaulted him with stone and threw him in the pit. He was rushed to Medical
College on the same day. The informant Ramakant Yadav contacted the applicant, Managing
Director of U.I.C. Paper Mill at his residence situated within the premise of Paper Mill and
narrated the incident. He asked for money for treatment of Jaipal Yadav as Security Office was
found closed. The applicant gave him Rs. 1600/on humanitarian ground. On 01.06.1999, Jaipal
Yadav died and the inquest was conducted at Medical College Mortuary in the presence of the
witnesses namely Ramakant Yadav (informant), Ram Dulare Yadav, Sunil Kumar Yadav, Ram
Naresh Yadav, Vimalesh Yadav. All the Panchs stated that death was caused due to fall in the pit
and none was blame for death. After inquest, the dead body was sent for autopsy, which was
conducted on 01.06.1999 at 2 P.M. and post mortem report was prepared. Following ante
mortem injuries were found on the person of the deceased:
The post mortem report reached Mahanagar Police Station through Senior Superintendent of
Police, Superintendent of Police (Trans Gomti) and Circle Officer, Mahanagar and then Station
House Officer, P.S.Mahanagar, directed S.I., R.P.S. Kushwaha on 03.06.199 to take action after
the inquiry.

On behalf of the State, it has been vehemently argued that certainly there is no evidence against
the applicant to make out a case of any offence punishable under Sections 304, 201, 191, 192,
418, 464, 468/120 B IPC but there was a legal obligation on part of applicant to give information
of offence to the police concerned and for this reason, the present application cannot be allowed
as prima face a case for offence punishable under Section 202 IPC is made out against the
applicant. To appreciate the argument advanced by Shivnath Tilhari and Sri Digvijay Singh,
learned AGA for the State, it appears necessary to reproduce the penal section 202 IPC.
In view of above discussion from the entire statement of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
available on record and as admitted by learned AGA, maximum an offence punishable under
Section 202 I.P.C.

In the result, the present application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The proceedings of
Criminal Case No.2218 of 2002 arising out of Case Crime No.377 of 1999, under Sections 304,
201, 191, 192, 418, 464, 468 and 120B IPC, P.S. Mahanagar, District Lucknow, against the
applicant, are hereby quashed.
IV. Section 203, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, gives
any information respecting that offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Smt. Yogita Pravinkumar Gosalia v. S.B. Morey & Another
b. Citation – LQ 2010 HC 1332
c. Date of Judgment – 12th October 2010
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.A. Britto
e. Summary

The case of the complainant is that a notice was served on petitioner Pravinkumar Gosalia to
reach Mumbai to open the Bank locker at Hongkong Bank on 24/12/1988, but the said
Pravinkumar Gosalia expressed his inability and sought an adjournment and, as such, the
opening of bank locker and completion of search proceedings was posted on 7/01/1999 and
8/01/1999. It is the case of the complainant that the statement of the accused was also adjourned
for being recorded upon opening of a locker no.2399 in Hongkong Bank and when the said
locker was opened the locker was found empty. The said lockers at Union Bank and Dena Bank
were opened by the accused or at their instance on 8/01/1999 and this was admitted by the
petitioners-accused in their further statement recorded on 9/02/1999. The entire case of the
complainant is that the accused made a false statement on 16/12/1998 inspite being made aware
of the nature of the statement and, therefore, the petitioners-accused by making false statements
about the existence of the lockers at the Union Bank of India and Dena Bank at Napean Sea
Road, Mumbai and thereafter having proceeded to empty the contents thereof have committed
offence punishable under Section 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r/w Section 181, 201 & 204
of Indian Penal Code. The complainant also stated that the offence of giving false evidence was
committed by the accused at Margao on 16/12/1998. Complainant has made no mention of
Section 193 IPC and no charge has been framed under the said Section.

One of the main ingredients of Section 203 IPC is that false information should be given in
respect of an offence committed. Sections 201 and 203 both contemplate giving information
respecting an offence which the accused person knows or believes to be false. As already seen,
one of the requirements of Section 201 is that the accused caused evidence of the offence to
disappear.
For reasons stated herein above, the petitions are partly allowed. The petitioners-accused shall
stand discharged under Section 201 and 204 IPC. Trial against petitioner-accused shall proceed
under Section 181 IPC. No order as to costs. Parties to appear before the learned JMFC, Margao
on 30/10/2010 at 10.00 a.m.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Jayarama Reddiar v. Station House Officer, Gingee,


Villupuram District
b. Citation – LQ 2011 HC 17856
c. Date of Judgment – 4th January 2011
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.N. Basha
e. Summary

Mr. N. Suresh, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, would vehemently contend that there
is no material available on record to make out a prima facie case against the accused in order to
attract the ingredients of the offence under Sections 201, 203 read with 302 IPC. It is contended
that the petitioner has nothing to do with the alleged offence and he is only a lessee of the lodge
in which, the victim as well as the accused stayed together. It is further contended that soon after
knowing the unnatural death of the deceased, the revision petitioner has preferred a complaint on
29.6.2007 narrating the sequence of events, namely, the allotment of a room in the said lodge to
one male and a female, the room was found locked till 29.6.2007 and on that ground, the said
room was opened with a duplicate key and found that the deceased lying dead in the bath room
and the bloodstains were found in the said room.

If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave suspicion, the Trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he
is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused ” clearly show that Judge is not a mere Post
Office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to
fact of case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by prosecution. In
assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the prosand cons of the matter or
into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the
Court, after the trial starts.

In view of the aforesaid reasons, this revision is allowed and the order passed by the learned trial
Judge, namely, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. I, Tindivanam,
dated 12.10.2010 in Crl. M.P. No. 197 of 2009 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 is hereby set aside and
the revision petitioner has been discharged from the charges for the offence under Section 203
IPC and under Sections 201 read with 302 IPC.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – State of Haryana v. Marvin & Others


b. Citation – (2019) 4 LawHerald 2911
c. Date of Judgment – 12th July 2019
d. Bench Name – Ajay TewariHarnaresh Singh Gill JJ.
e. Summary

Special Investigating Team conducted the investigation. Deputy Superintendent of Police-


Suresh Kaushik, also conducted the investigation with regard to the report of the chemical
examiner about the cause of the death. On 02.06.2016, the interrogation of accused-Marvin and
Monu (Ashwani) was conducted and Marvin had suffered a disclosure statement admitting his
involvement in the crime and stated that the iron pipe used in the commission of the offence had
been sold to one rag picker, who was not known to him. On further investigation, accused-
Marvin had suffered another disclosure statement , partly retracting from his previous disclosure
statement and the iron pipe was got recovered from the terrace of his house. Another accused,
namely, Pratibha, had suffered a disclosure statement (Ex.P-32), admitting her involvement in
the commission of the crime.
Accordingly charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 203 IPC were framed
against the accused Marvin and Ashwani, whereas, accused Pratibha @ Sorbhi was charge
sheeted under Section 202 IPC on 27.02.2017 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

The Sessions Judge, Ambala has taken a possible view after considering the evidence available
on record and as such no case for interference with the judgment of acquittal, passed by the
Sessions Judge, Ambala is made out especially when, the prosecution has failed to prove that the
death of Nitin can be attributed by the respondents. 20. Consequently, the application seeking
leave to appeal is dismissed. Leave to appeal is declined.

4. Fourth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – V. Singaravelan & The State of others


b. Citation – LQ 2012 HC 5083
c. Date of Judgment – 1st Feb. 2012
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.R. SHIVAKUMAR
e. Summary

The de-facto complainant in Crime No.887 of 2008, which was registered on the file of the
Kottai Police Station, Tiruchirappalli is the present revision petitioner. He had preferred a private
complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruchirappalli on 11.08.2008 alleging
that his paternal aunt Mariammal was murdered by the respondents 2 to 5 herein on 21.12.2002.
The learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruchirappalli, perhaps considering the position that
investigation could not be ordered if Private Complaint Procedure would be adopted, rightly
chose to refer the said complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C to the police for investigation.
Accordingly, a case was registered on the file of Kottai Police Station, Tiruchirappalli District, in
Crime No.887 of 2008 on 29.09.2008 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 302 r/w
Section 34 and 203 IPC. The Inspector of Police of the said Police Station, after completing the
investigation, came to the conclusion that there was no material to show the death of Mariammal
to be homicidal. The Investigating Officer had also found that the death was natural and the same
was sought to be projected as a homicidal death. Accordingly, the Inspector of Police, Kottai
Police Station submitted a final report for dropping the case as 'mistake of fact'.

In this case, the petitioner herein/de-facto complaint has alleged commission of offences
punishable under Sections 302 IPC and Section 203 IPC. The story propounded by the revision
petitioner is that his paternal aunt Mariammal had executed a 'will' on 08.04.2002, bequeathing
her properties in favour of the revision petitioner and three other persons, namely respondents
2,3 and 4 herein; that after execution of the said 'will', the deceased Mariammal met with an
accident in December 2002 and was admitted in the hospital.

Upon such consideration, the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruchirappalli formed an opinion
that there was no material to show that the death was either homicidal or any offence was
committed relating to the death of Mariyammal. As mandated under Section 203 Cr.P.C, the
learned Judicial Magistrate has also briefly stated the reasons for arriving at such a conclusion
that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the respondents 2 to 5.

Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.


V. Section 204, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever secretes or destroys any 1[document or electronic record] which he may be
lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a Court of Justice, or in any proceeding
lawfully held before a public servant, as such, or obliterates or renders illegible the
whole or any part of such 1[document or electronic record] with the intention of
preventing the same from being produced or used as evidence before such Court or
public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully summoned or required
to produce the same for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – B.S. Naryanan v. State of Andhra Pradesh


b. Citation – 1987 Supp SCC 172
c. Date of Judgment – 23rd January 1987
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE G. L. OZA
e. Summary

This appeal by special leave has been filed by the appellant against his conviction under Section
204 read with Section 34 and Section 353 IPC. Initially at the trial there were seven accused
persons out of them accused 2 to 4 were convicted for an offence under Section 204 IPC whereas
this appellant and the rest were convicted for an offence under Section 204 read with Section 34
IPC. All the accused persons also were convicted under Section 353 IPC. After appeal and
revision to the High Court all others have been acquitted and the only person who remained was
the present appellant who was convicted under Section 204 read with Section 34 IPC and Section
353 IPC and was sentenced to underage imprisonment for one year and six months respectively
for the two offences.

The only question before us which was raised is that the accused who were convicted for the
substantive offence under Section 204 IPC having been acquitted the conviction of the appellant
with the aid of Section 34 IPC could not be sustained. Even on facts as they emerged from
evidence the only part in respect of an offence under Section 204 which was attributed to the
appellant was that he was present on the scene of occurrence. Apart from it, admittedly accused 2
to 4 who were convicted for their acts constituting an offence under Section 204 have been
acquitted as the learned courts came to the conclusion that it is doubtful as to whether they
committed any act which constitute an offence under Section 204 IPC and therefore as they have
been acquitted of the substantive offence it will not be possible for this Court to sustain the
conviction of the appellant under Section 204 read with Section 34 IPC.

As regards his conviction under Section 353 IPC he was awarded a sentence of six months and
the learned counsel informs that he may have remained in custody for about two months during
this period. The incident is of 1975 and the appellant is a bus conductor who may lose his job as
well. Looking at all the circumstances in our opinion it is a fit case for giving him the benefit of
Probation of Offenders Act on his furnishing a bond of good behaviour for one year with one
surety to the satisfaction of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chennur.

Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed, conviction of the appellant under Section 204/34 IPC
is set aside, his conviction under Section 353 IPC is maintained but he is released on his
furnishing a bond of good behaviour for one year with one surety to the satisfaction of the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chennur under Probation of Offenders Act.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Smt. Yogita Pravinkumar Gosalia v. S.B. Morey & Another
b. Citation – LQ 2010 HC 1332
c. Date of Judgment – 12th October 2010.
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.A. BRITTO
e. Summary

The case of the complainant is that a notice was served on petitioner Pravinkumar Gosalia to
reach Mumbai to open the Bank locker at Hongkong Bank on 24/12/1988, but the said
Pravinkumar Gosalia expressed his inability and sought an adjournment and, as such, the
opening of bank locker and completion of search proceedings was posted on 7/01/1999 and
8/01/1999. It is the case of the complainant that the statement of the accused was also adjourned
for being recorded upon opening of a locker no.2399 in Hongkong Bank and when the said
locker was opened the locker was found empty. The said lockers at Union Bank and Dena Bank
were opened by the accused or at their instance on 8/01/1999 and this was admitted by the
petitioners-accused in their further statement recorded on 9/02/1999. The entire case of the
complainant is that the accused made a false statement on 16/12/1998 inspite being made aware
of the nature of the statement and, therefore, the petitioners-accused by making false statements
about the existence of the lockers at the Union Bank of India and Dena Bank at Napean Sea
Road, Mumbai and thereafter having proceeded to empty the contents thereof have committed
offence punishable under Section 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r/w Section 181, 201 & 204
of Indian Penal Code. Section 204 IPC deals with destruction of document or electronic record
to prevent its production as evidence.

For reasons stated herein above, the petitions are partly allowed. The petitioners-accused shall
stand discharged under Section 201 and 204 IPC. Trial against petitioner-accused shall proceed
under Section 181 IPC. No order as to costs. Parties to appear before the learned JMFC.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Hemaben Sanjeev Kumar Kanodiya v. Dr. D.N. Nanavati &
Another
b. Citation – 2013 (2) GLR 1317
c. Date of Judgment – 31st January 2013
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.D. KOTHARI
e. Summary

The complainant, who was pregnant, had delivered a child on 14.5.1999. It was cesarean
operation. The operation was carried out at Anand Hospital, Ankleshwar, which is said to be run
by Doctor Family Dr. Mahendrabhai Panchal.

Thereafter, she had said to have developed pain in her abdominal area. After consultation with
the doctor, complainant’s sonography was carried out on 23.6.1999. X-ray was also carried out
by Dr. Nanavati (A/3). It is the say of the complainant that in sonography report though scissor
was found by Dr. Nanavati, the same was not immediately disclosed to the complainant. It is
alleged that there was connivance between all the accused. Then at the instance of the sister of
the complainant’s husband (Nanand), who appears to reside at Bombay, the complainant was
referred to Bhakti Vedanta Hospital at Bombay. There X-ray/sonography was undergone by the
complainant. She was operated there and a scissor was alleged to have been found from her
body. Then on 27.3.2000, a private complaint came to be lodged by the complainant before the
learned J.M.F.C. Ankleshwar against Dr.Mahendra G.Panchal, Dr.Rekha M.Panchal of Anand
Hospital and Dr. D.N.Nanavati of X-ray & Urological Clinic, Ankleshwar, alleging that the
accused have committed offences punishable under Sections 196, 197, 198, 406, 420, 337, 338
r.w. section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. A criminal complaint was lodged, process was issued
for the offence under section 338 – as in this case – and for offence under section 204 IPC. The
patient had also filed complaint before Consumer Forum. The High Court was pleased to quash
the order of issuance of process.

The doctor would be in difficulty when the case of culpability on his part is possible to infer
from the material on record. Greed – new age mantra or crass professionalism are much common
human trait in present time. So if doctor, infected by such germs, treats or operates innocent
patient and patient suffers thereby, or his relative, in case of fatal error – then as a natural
consequence the doctor may lend in dock. In view of the above discussion, Criminal Misc.
Application Nos. 12500/2005 and 12490/2005 fail and are hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.
Criminal Misc. Application NO. 828/2006 is hereby allowed. Rule is made absolute.

4. Fourth Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Mewa Ram v. State


b. Citation – 2014 IIIAD (DEL) 385
c. Date of Judgment – 5th February 2014
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
e. Summary

The facts of the case are that a FIR under Section 191/193/205/417/420/468/471 IPC was
registered against the petitioner with the allegations that the petitioner impersonated as one Om
Prakash and gave surety for one accused in FIR No.530/99 under Section 379/411 IPC, P.S.
Kotwali. The said accused absconded and on notice to the surety i.e. the petitioner (who had
impersonated as Om Parkash) a report was received that the address given by the surety in the
surety bond was not correct. On the suspicion, the learned M.M. had sent the FDR for
verification to Dena Bank from where report was received that the FDR was forged. Even the
copy of ration card furnished was bogus. Accordingly, a complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C.
was preferred and pursuant thereto the aforesaid FIR was registered against the petitioner. The
petitioner was arrested and his disclosure statement was recorded. The necessary documents
were seized during the investigation. The specimen signatures, hand writing and thumb
impression of petitioners were obtained and the original documents containing his signatures and
handwriting were sent to CFSL along with specimen handwriting and a report was obtained.
Thereupon charge-sheet was filed in the concerned court. During the trial, evidence of various
witnesses were recorded.

On consideration of the grounds of the appeal, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order
of Ld.trial court. It is evident that judgment of the trial court is not merely based on the expert
opinion and the court had also taken into consideration the testimony of police officials as well
as the complaint of metropolitan magistrate and basis thereof. The accused was also arrested in
similar case and therefore his record was available with the office of DCP north and hence no
question of doubt arises about the identity of the accused. The ground taken by the appellant that
forged FDR of Dena Bank does not prove that it was the accused who fabricated the FDR, has no
relevance since no conviction was recorded u/s 468 IPC. So far as other offences are concerned,
they stand clearly proved. With respect to the alleged infringement of the right of the accused on
the ground that he was not represented by any counsel during the evidence, I also find no merit
or substance since record of order sheets of the trial court reveal that accused was enlarged on
bail and he was represented by the counsel. Presence of counsel M. Mohan stands recorded in the
ordersheet dt.6.4.2010 as well as the presence of counsel for the accused was recorded on
1.5.2010.”

In the present case both the courts below have relied upon cogent and convincing evidence and
convicted the petitioner. The petitioner has been found guilty by both the courts below. There is
overwhelming evidence on record to prove the guilt of the petitioner for the offences punishable
u/s 193/204/419/471 IPC. There is no illegality in the impugned order of conviction. The
petitioner has already undergone the sentence.

The revision petition stands dismissed.


VI. Section 205, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever falsely personates another, and in such assumed character makes any
admission or statement, or confesses judgment, or causes any process to be issued or
becomes bail or security, or does any other act in any suit or criminal prosecution, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Rajendra Kumar v. State of Haryana


b. Citation – (2012) 3 AICLR 664
c. Date of Judgment – 14th December 2011
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAKESH KUMAR JAIN
e. Summary

The aforesaid FIR was registered on the complaint of the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri. The brief background of the case is that one FIR No. 50 dated
26.02.2008, under Sections 279, 336, 427, 307, 109 IPC, 4-B/8 of the Punjab Prohibition of
Cows Slaughter Act, 1955 and Section 11 of The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960
was registered against Murtaza son of Anis and Shehzad son of Budhan at Police Station Sadar,
Yamuna Nagar. On 18.06.2008, both the accused were produced before the Duty/Chief Judicial
Magistrate. They were remanded to judicial custody with a direction to be produced on
02.07.2008.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to various provisions of the law to contend that
though the FIR was registered on the complaint of the Court, yet the cognizance has been taken
on the police report for the offence under Section 205 IPC and the related offences which are
alleged to have been committed by the petitioner in the same transaction.

It is pertinent to mention that Section 441-A Cr.P.C. is inserted by Act 25 of 2005 w.e.f.
23.06.2006 and Rule 9A of Chapter 10, Volume 3 of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court [for short "Rules & Orders] is added by correction slip dated 11.09.2007.
Section 441-A Cr.P.C. was aimed to curb the tendency of a person standing surety for more than
one accused, whereas Rule 9A of the Rules & Orders is aimed at to curb the menace of bogus
surety.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid provisions, a direction is given to all the Subordinate Court(s) in
the States of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh to comply with the aforesaid provisions in letter
and spirit while taking surety/sureties.

Registry is directed to circulate copy of this order to all the Subordinate Court(s) in the States of
Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh for compliance, after obtaining necessary orders from Hon'ble
the Chief Justice.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Dr. Tom Kurein v. State of Kerala


b. Citation – Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2132 Of 2008
c. Date of Judgment – 3th April 2013
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE A. HARIPRASAD J
e. Summary

Hariprasad, J.—Petitioners are accused 4 and 5 in Crime No. 123 of 2006 of Vanchiyoor Police
Station. Allegation in the first information report dated 27.05.2006, stated shortly, is the
following: A person by name Dr. M.K. Mansoor was made an accused in C.C. No. 543 of 2001
on the file of the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram. The case was posted
on 07.06.2005. At that time, Dr. M.K. Mansoor was in London. But, on the posting date of the
case, somebody impersonated him and attended the court on his behalf. Allegation in the first
information report is to the effect that this was a cheating by personation punishable u/s 419 of
the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC"). Therefore, a case was registered against Dr. M.K.
Mansoor and another person, whose name was not mentioned in the first information report. On
subsequent investigation, it was found that the petitioner along, with other accused, abetted in
impersonation and also hatched a conspiracy with other accused to commit the offence.
Therefore, a report was filed by the Investigating Officer before the court on 21.12.2007 adding
Sections 109 and 120B of IPC also in the case. Aggrieved by that, accused 4 and 5 have come up
before this Court in this proceedings u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short,
"Cr.P.C."). It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the 1st petitioner
is a Gastroenterologist by profession and working as Senior Lecturer in the Medical College
Hospital, Kottayam. The 2nd petitioner is a Neuro Surgeon and is presently working as Assistant
Professor in the Department of Neuro Surgery, Sree Chitra Thirunal Institute of Medical
Sciences, Thiruvananthapuram. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, they
are in no way connected with the alleged offence. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor.

It is argued for the petitioners that there was no dishonest inducement or deception committed on
the court by the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that at the most
the allegations will constitute an offence falling within Chapter XI of IPC, dealing with false
evidence and offences against public justice. Section 205 of IPC is pertaining to false
personation in a suit or prosecution.

In the result, petition is allowed. First information report, in so far as the petitioners are
concerned, is set aside. It is made clear that the trial court is free to take appropriate action, if it is
brought to its notice that an offence relating to administration of justice was done in this matter
and then it shall proceed in accordance with law.

All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Biju M.V. v. State of Kerala and Others


b. Citation – Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2512 Of 2011
c. Date of Judgment – 10th December 2014
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE C.T. RAVI KUMAR J.
e. Summary

In the case of the petitioner is that the second respondent herein while being booked for the
offences under sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act and at the time of his arrest in
connection with the said offence misguided the police by impersonating himself as the petitioner.
It is the further allegation that subsequently he managed to obtain the summons and thereafter
appeared before the court and participated in the trial personating himself as the person by name
Biju (the petitioner herein) and pleaded not guilty and thereafter during the examination under
section 313, Cr.P.C. pleaded guilty. The fact that the second respondent pleaded guilty was not
within the knowledge of the petitioner at that time of filing Annexure II and at the time his
complaint the position in S.T. No. 2689/2004 was that by impersonation and the subsequent
abscondence after pleading guilty the second respondent caused issuance of a warrant against the
petitioner herein. It was that incident which was sought to be enquired into by the petitioner by
filing Annexure II application. Going by Rule 66 of the Criminal Rules of Practice every
application under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be registered as a
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. As stated earlier, the learned magistrate forwarded the
application for enquiry under section 156(3) Cr.P.C and thereafter Crime No. 1392/2007 was
registered at Muvattupuzha police station. After investigation Annexure III final report was laid
charging the petitioner for the offence under section 205, IPC.

A perusal of section 195, Cr.P.C would reveal that in respect of offences included thereunder the
Court concerned or such officer of that Court authorised in writing in that behalf alone could file
a complaint and cognizance could be taken by the competent court only on such a complaint. A
perusal of the aforesaid section would reveal that section 205, IPC is an offence included
thereunder.

Though, the petitioner had not specifically alleged in Annexure II that the second respondent
herein has committed an offence under section 205, IPC his allegation is one of commission of
that offence and that fact is very much discernible.

In the circumstances expatiated above and in view of the bar under section 195(1)(b)(i) the
Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Muvattupuzha is not competent to take cognizance under
section 205, IPC based on Annexure III final report. However, in view of the discussion made
above it is made clear that the court below is not debarred from looking into the FIR and the
other materials collected during the investigation in Crime No. 1392/2007 while considering
Annexure II complaint. In view of the discussion this criminal miscellaneous case is disposed of
with a direction to the learned magistrate to conduct enquiry as contemplated under section 340,
Cr.P.C. on Annexure II filed by the petitioner to ascertain whether expedient in the interest of
justice to file a complaint and that regard it will be open to the court below to look into the FIR
and the other materials] collected during the investigation in Crime No. 1392/2007 of
Muvattupuzha Police Station, after complying with the procedures thereunder and subject to its
outcome of decision on that question appropriate orders shall be passed or appropriate action
shall be taken, in accordance with law.
VII. Section 206, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers or delivers to any person any
property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest
therein from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence
which has been pronounced, or which he knows to be likely to be pronounced, by a Court
of Justice or other competent authority, or from being taken in execution of a decree or
order which has been made, or which he knows to be likely to be made by a Court of
Justice in a civil suit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – P.B. Sakthivel v. P.B. Subramaniam & Others.


b. Citation – LQ 2011 HC 5329
c. Date of Judgment – 17th August 2011
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. PALANIVELU
e. Summary

Mr.G.R.Swaminathan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that
inasmuch as the conduct of the respondents would attract the ingredients contained in the
provision under Section 206 IPC, there is no legal embargo for the Court below to take
cognizance under Section 206 IPC, that the terms available under Section 206 of IPC,
themselves would indicate that if any result is likely to be obtained in a civil suit in favour of the
complainant, wherein in case the respondents fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers or
delivers to any person any property, then the wrong doer could be held liable under Section 206
of IPC. It is his further contention that since this is a partition suit among the brothers, the
petitioner has got every chance in getting his share divisioned and since the first respondent has
alienated a portion of the joint property.

The Court has to ascertain whether the relief prayed for in the civil suit or any proceedings
would come under the two categories as set out in the section, which are, the interest in the
property is likely to be forfeited in the said proceedings or "in satisfaction of fine" under a
sentence which has been pronounced. By no stretch of imagination, it could be stated that the
relief prayed for in the partition suit would come under the above two categories even if the
relief of partition is granted in favour of the petitioner in the partition suit. Directing division of
property, certainly, the relief is not in the form of the interest being taken as a forfeiture or in
satisfaction of a fine under a sentence. Only if the relief claimed in the proceedings comes under
any of the above two categories, definitely, Section 206 of IPC comes to play.

Even though the Court below has not drafted the order in consonance with the terms employed in
Section 206 IPC, still this Court is of the considered view that there is no prima facie materials
available in the case of the petitioner and there is no infirmity either legally or factually is seen in
the order challenged before this Court.

The next limb of the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the case
was given Calendar Case number and the Court cannot dismiss the same under Section 203
Cr.P.C. A careful perusal of the records would show that the office of the Judicial Magistrate has
wrongly given Calendar Case number instead of giving Criminal M.P. number. Only after taking
cognizance of the offences, question of assigning Calendar Case number will arise. But,
admittedly, in this case, this is a pre-cognizance stage and the Calendar Case number was given
wrongly by the staff of the Court which is not a legal flaw. It is only an irregularity that can be
cured. The learned Judicial Magistrate has dismissed the petition under Section 203 Cr.P.C.
properly and there is no ground made out to interfere with the order challenged before this Court.

In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Kuldip Singh v. Gurmail Singh and others


b. Citation – 2009 (30) CRIMINALCC 834
c. Date of Judgment – 16th April 2009
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia
e. Summary

The petition has been filed by Kuldip Singh. He is aggrieved that in the complaint filed by him,
the trial Court had only issued summons against Karnail Singh and Bhag Singh.

Aggrieved against the same, petitioner had filed a revision petition. The same was dismissed by
the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala on 26th February, 2007. Petitioner filed Criminal
Misc. No. 15853-M of 2007 in this Court and assailed the order of summoning and the order
passed by the revisional Court. In the petition so filed, the matter was remanded back to the
Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala to decide the revision petition afresh on merits.
Revision petition was decided on 8th September, 2008. The revisional Court, along with two
accused already summoned, also ordered summoning of accused Karnail Singh son of Kartar
Singh and Sawinder Singh son of Uttam Singh.

Mr. Parminder Singh appearing for the petitioner has stated that in the present case, offence will
be made out under Section 206 IPC. If it is accepted that offence is made out under Section 206
IPC, then there is a bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance of the offence. Since the
property was attached by the Court, it is that Court only, which can take any action. Therefore,
petitioner has to file an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Counsel for the petitioner has
submitted that he has been agitating his grievance in the wrong forum, therefore, the FIR lodged
and the cancellation report submitted and also the complaint filed are to be treated as an
application by the concerned Court for initiating proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Counsel for the respondents has submitted that this has not been brought to the notice of this
Court that earlier a contempt petition was filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the present petition
is not maintainable.

Commission of a penal offence and contempt of Court are entirely in different domain. Initiation
of proceedings under the provisions of Contempt of Courts will not oust the petitioner from
taking the offenders to task under the penal provisions.

It has further been submitted by counsel for the respondents that order of attachment was not
noticed in the revenue record and in the jamabandi obtained by the respondents. Therefore,
respondents were not aware of any attachment order.

To controvert this, Mr. Parminder Singh has submitted that the respondents had the knowledge
of the attachment of the property. Whether respondents were aware regarding the order of
attachment or not, is a question of fact, which can not be examined in a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. Consequently, taking the larger interest in view, it is ordered that the complaint filed
and the cancellation report submitted in the FIR, shall be treated as an application under Section
340 Cr.P.C. They shall be placed before the Court, which had ordered attachment, for
consideration. The Court shall hold an inquiry as envisaged under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and if the
Court comes to the conclusion that any offence has been committed, which falls within any of
the provisions, which have been specified under Section 195 Cr.P.C., the Court shall proceed in
accordance with provisions of law.

Accordingly, summoning order and the order passed by the revisional Court are set aside. In case
concerned Court comes to the conclusion that any other offence is made out, which has not been
specified under Section 195 Cr.P.C., the Court may take cognizance of the offence. However, as
a matter of abundant caution, it is also ordered that in case Court comes to the conclusion that no
offence is made out, then also the Court may proceed in accordance with provisions of law.
Parties shall appear before the concerned Court on 15th May, 2009.

With these observations, present petition is disposed off.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Surinder Kumar v. Union of India (UOI) and others
b. Citation – 57 (1995) DLT 519
c. Date of Judgment – 8th October 2018
d. Bench Name – Jog Singh (J)Sudhakar Mishra (A) Members
e. Summary

The applicant was posted as D.C.P. Zone-Ill, Mumbai, between November, 1995 and January,
1997, an unfortunate incident took place when one of the Inspectors, namely, late Shri M.G.
Jadhav, committed suicide in Police Station on 5.1.1997. The applicant was supervising officer
of six Police Stations, including the Kala Chowki Police Station, where Shri Jadhav committed
suicide. Late Shri Jadhav had made complaint against four officers, including ACP Shri
Mirokhe, Sr. Police Inspector, Shri Sanap and Police Inspectors Shri Anil Nalawade, and Shri
Subhash More. The applicant, being D.C.P., had earlier sought version against the said allegation
from late Shri Jadhav. However, the name of the applicant in the note left by late Shri Jadhav is
not to be seen. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for applicant that the applicant had actually
commended the work of said late Shri Jadhav and had given him ''Outstanding'' C.R. in the
preceding year 1996. Therefore, the applicant had no personal grudge against him and the charge
contained in the charge sheet relating to abatement of the crime and connected issues of
attempting to destroy the evidence are bogus and not maintainable, particularly after a lapse of
more than 10% years.

It is material to consider whether destruction to 16 pages in the diary was by DPC Surinder
Kumar. PSI Thopate has stated that the personal diary of P.I. Jadhav was carried by DPC
Surinder Kumar into Sr. P.P.''s Room. Even if on the evidence it is established that it was DCP
Surinder Kumar who destroyed 16 pages of the personal diary of P.I. Jadhav, to attract Section
206, IPC it would have to be established that he knew he would be under an obligation to
produce it as evidence. Since the main offence is not established, the applicability of Section 204
is doubtful.
In addition to the above the highest authority has already taken a decision to drop the charges,
which is the admitted position. Recently, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjeet
Singh v. State of Haryana Civil Appeal No. 1491 of 2006 dated 30.6.2008, has reiterated that a
delay of about 9 years in issuing the charge sheet in itself is fatal and vitiates the whole
disciplinary proceedings by causing grave prejudice to the officer concerned.

In view of the above said discussion of law and fact, the charge sheet in question is hereby
quashed and the O.A. stands allowed in terms of prayer 8(a) and 8(b) of the O.A. No costs.
VIII. Section 207, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever fraudulently accepts, receives or claims any property or any interest therein,
knowing that he has no right or rightful claim to such property or interest, or practices
any deception touching any right to any property or any interest therein, intending
thereby to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken as a forfeiture or in
satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence which has been pronounced, or which he knows to
be likely to be pronounced by a Court of Justice or other competent authority, or from
being taken in execution of a decree or order which has been made, or which he knows to
be likely to be made by a Court of Justice in a civil suit, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Tulsidas v. State of Rajasthan


b. Citation – 2007 CriLJ 1343, RLW 2007 (3) Raj 1956
c. Date of Judgment – 7th February 2013
d. Bench Name – Hon’ble Sandeep Mehta J.
e. Summary

The facts necessary for the disposal of this revision petition are that the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent No.2 and the Sarpanch of the concerned village namely Sampat
Raj Modi for the offences under Sections 198, 420 read with Section 34 IPC in the court of the
learned Judicial Magistrate, Sojat. The complaint was sent to the Police under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. The police after investigation filed a negative final report in the matter. The complainant
filed a protest petition. The statements of the complainant and his witnesses were recorded under
Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., where after, cognizance for the offences under Sections 467 and
467/120B IPC was taken against the respondent No.2 Parasmal and the Sarpanch Sampat Raj
Modi. At the stage of framing of charge, the learned Magistrate discharged the accused from the
offences under Sections 467 and 467/120B IPC but framed charge for the offence under Section
207 IPC against them.

Learned counsel Shri Deepesh Singh Beniwal appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2
Parasmal has placed on record the order-sheets dated 28.5.2011 in relation to the suits filed by
the petitioner in the court of the learned Addl. District Judge, Sojat. As per the order-sheets, the
execution proceedings filed by the petitioner Tulsidas in the said court have been decided by way
of a compromise. Learned counsel has also filed along with the said document a compromise
deed executed by Tulsidas on 28th May, 2011, wherein, the respondent No.2 is also a signatory.
In the said agreement, it has been mentioned that all the proceedings pending in relation to the
said litigation in all the courts shall be withdrawn and the responsibility thereof will be of
Tulsidas. The execution proceedings have been decided in terms of the compromise.
In the opinion of this Court, the only grievance of the complainant was that the execution of the
decree was attempted to be shifted by the accused by execution of a fraudulent ownership
certificate. On merits also, the said allegation does not appear to be justified because the patta
was issued in the name of the father of the respondent No.2 in the year 1976. The issuance of the
ownership certificate was just a necessary consequence of the said event. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the respondent No.2 has committed any offence under Section 207 IPC by having the
ownership certificate issued in his name.

Resultantly, this revision petition being bereft of any force is hereby dismissed. Record be sent
back forthwith.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Lalchharmawia v. State of Mizoram


b. Citation – 2013 (1) GLD 401 (Gau )
c. Date of Judgment – 31st July 2012
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. SEN
e. Summary

The brief fact of the prosecution in nutshell is that on 25.12.2010 an FIR was received from Mr.
Saihnuna to the effect that in between 1st December to 23rd December, 2010, 6 nos. of wooden
planks, 3 nos. of window frame were removed from his house by the convict. Accordingly, the
case was registered as Kolasib PS Case No. 98 of 2010 on 25.12.2010 under sections 380 and
427, IPC. After investigation found a prima facie case and charge sheeted. A case was registered
to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kolasib as Crl. Tr. No. 928/2010. From record it
appears that thereafter, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kolasib passed the impugned judgment and
order on 9.2.2011 and further appears that against the said impugned judgment a revision was
moved before the Addl. District & Sessions Judge-2, Aizawl and by a judgment and order dated
26.8.2011 Addl. District & Sessions Judge upheld the judgment passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kolasib.
It is a settled law in criminal case that the case is based on the charge and in the civil case the
case is based on issues. These are basic knowledge of law. Procedure for trial of warrant cases by
a Magistrate has been described under Chapter XIX of the Cr.PC which commence from section
238 and ends with 250. In warrant triable cases (in GR cases), it is the duty of the Magistrate to
furnish the copies to the accused as required under section 207, IPC and section 239 describes
when the accused shall be discharged, in that stage court to consider whether there are sufficient
materials available on record to frame charge against the accused.

But, in this instant case I am sorry to say that none of the above provision laid down in the Cr.PC
has been followed. Rather, I find the learned court below has framed its own Cr.PC which is
unacceptable, undesirable. Therefore, I find the entire trial is vextious and without any sanction
of law. Hence, this court set aside both the impugned judgment and orders dated 9.2.2011 as well
as 26.8.2011 and direct the Superintendent, District Jail to release the convict forthwith in case if
he is not required in other case or cases.

3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Vijayan v. The State Rep. by The Inspector of Police
b. Citation – LQ 2009 HC 15424
c. Date of Judgment – 16th June 2009
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.R. SHIVAKUMAR
e. Summary

In a case registered as Cr.No.2530/2000 on the file of PEW, Avinashi Unit, Avinashi, one
Thiru.N.Sampathkumar, Inspector of Police of the said PEW Unit submitted a final report after
completion of investigation on 28.03.2001 alleging that the appellant herein/accused had
committed the following offences: i) an offence punishable under Section 4(1)(i) of Tamil Nadu
Prohibition Act; ii) an offence punishable under Section 4(1)(a) of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act;
and iii) an offence punishable under Section 4(1-A) of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. The same
was taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Avinashi (in-charge) as PRC No.35/2001.
After furnishing the copies of the records relied on by the prosecution
under Section 207 IPC, the learned Judicial Magistrate committed the said case for trial under
Section 209(a) to the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore Sessions Division, Coimbatore as
one of the offences, namely an offence punishable under Section 4(1-A) of the Tamil Nadu
Prohibition Act was exclusively triable by a court of session. The learned Principal Sessions
Judge, Coimbatore Sessions Deivision, took it on file as S.C.No.94/2002 and made it over to the
Assistant Sessions Judge (Sub Judge, Tiruppur) for disposal according to law. Subsequently,
after constitution of Fast Track courts in the State of Tamil Nadu and one at Tiruppur, the case
was transferred to the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No.5),
Coimbatore Sessions Division, Tiruppur by the order of the learned Principal Sessions Judge,
Coimbatore dated 30.04.2002 made in his proceedings No.673/2001.

The court comes to the conclusion that the conviction of the appellant herein/accused by the
court below for offences punishable under Sections 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) of Tamil Nadu
Prohibition Act and the sentence awarded therefore are infirm and defective warranting
interference by this court in this appeal and that the conviction recorded and the sentence
awarded by the court below have to be set aside as they cannot be sustained in law.

In the result the appeal succeeds and the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant
herein/accused for an offence punishable under Sections 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) of Tamil Nadu
Prohibition Act and the sentence imposed by the court below are set aside and the appellant
herein/accused is acquitted of all the offences with which he stood charged.
IX. Section 208, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be passed against him at the
suit of any person for a sum not due or for a larger sum than is due to such person or for
any property or interest in property to which such person is not entitled, or fraudulently
causes or suffers a decree or order to be executed against him after it has been satisfied,
or for anything in respect of which it has been satisfied, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Bal Krishna Gaur v. State of U.P.


b. Citation – 1985 ACR 528
c. Date of Judgment – 23rd April 1985
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. WAHAJUDDIN
e. Summary

The undisputed facts are that a partiton suit was filed interne between the landlord and his
brothers. The complainant, who lodged the report and claims to be the tenant, was not a party to
that suit. The suit for separating the petitioner's share from other co-owners and for delivery of
possession was decreed and the execution Parwana was issued.

Under the relevant provisions of CPC if any other person is in possession as tenant, only
symbolical possession is permissible and not the actual physical possession. The landlord
concerned through the Commissioner, who proceeded to execute the decree, secured actual
physical possession of the premises after removing the belongings of the complainant opposite-
party, who was in occupation as tenant. A first information report was lodged by the tenant
concerned alleging that the commissioner and the landlord acted hands in gloves and colluded
and committed trespass over the premises in occupation of the tenant and also committed
mischief by removing the properties and belongings of the tenant and causing damage to it. The
investigation followed. Chargesheet was submitted by the police under Section 427 and 448,
IPC. The Magistrate holding that the proceeding is barred by the provisions of Section 195,
CrPC discharged the accused. The tenant-complainant filed a revision. The revisional court
quashed the order of the Magistrate and directed that the case should proceed against the
petitioner under Sections 427 and 448, IPC.

It was urged that the offences under sections 208, IPC and 210, IPC have been committed and
these offences are included under Section 195, CrPC. By no stretch of imagination Section 208
IPC is attracted. As regards Section 210, IPC, I may at the very out-set observe that the section
operates, if the decree etc. is obtained against any person in respect of the matters mentioned
under that section. In the present case, neither the complainant, who lodged the report, was a
party to the civil suit in question, nor a decree was obtained against him. Section 210, IPC would
again not be attracted by any stretch of imagination.

It was further argued that in any case amy offence under Section 448, IPC would not be made
out in absence of any notice, as has been held in the case of Captain N. Basu v. Rais Ahmad,
1982 ACrR 462. Of course, this would be a matter to be looked into by the Magistrate whether
any notice, its required under Section 441, IPC has been given or not. Even if for want of notice
offence under Section 448, IPC would not be made out, atleast there is a prima facie case under
Section 427, IPC and this Court would not interfere in exercise of its inherent pewers at this
stage and this application is summarily rejected. Application rejected.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Sadhan Chandra Bar v. Nepal Kulsi


b. Citation – (2001) 1 CAL LT 78
c. Date of Judgment – 18th August 2000
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN KUMAR MAZUMDER
e. Summary

The case of the accused-petitioner was in brief that O.P. No. 1 Nepal Kulsi filed a petition of
complain the before the learned SDJM, Ghatal on 9.6.94 alleging inter alia that on the previous
night some criminals entered his house by breaking open the window of the house and after
committing theft of various articles including golden ornaments they fled away. It was only on
the following morning that O.P. No.1 came to know of the same and lodged the complaint.
According to O.P. No.1, accused No.1 Bablu Patra and accused No. 2 Bimal Singh committed
the said theft from his house and accused No. 3 being the present petitioner and accused No.4
Tarit Singh received some of the said stolen goods from accused Nos.1 and 2. Although the O.P.
No.1 lodged a complaint in 1994 with Chandrakona P.S. in the matter but with no result.
Accordingly O.P. No.1 lodged a second complaint with Chandrakona P.S. on the selfsame
incident but again without success. Thereafter O.P. No.1 filed another complaint on the selfsame
incident with Chandrakona P.S. and this time Chandrakona P.S. Case No. 48/99 dated 26.6.99
under sections 448/457/380/208 IPC was started. Ultimtely this case rise to G.R. Case No.
208/99 now pending before the learned SDJM, Ghatal. According to the petitioner there could
not be any second or third complaint on the selfsame incident between the selfsame parties and
accordingly the third case which was now pending before the learned SDJM, Ghatal being G.R.
Case No. 208/99 as arose out of Chandrakona P.S. Case No. 48/99 dated 26.6.99 was liable to be
quashed.

A look on the petition of complaint lodged by O.P. No.1 against the petitioner and others which
gave rise to Chandrakona P.S. Case No. 48/99 dated 26.6.99 (G.R. Case No. 208/99) clearly
indicated prima facie that there were ingredients of the offences of house trespass, lurking house
trespass, theft from dwelling house and offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property as
punishable under sections 448/457/380/208 IPC respectively were there in the petition of
complaint. In other words, it appears that the O.P. No.1 has been able to make out a prima facie
case against the petitioner and others in respect of various offences as punishable under sections
208/457/380/411 IPC.

The law is well settled that when the petition of complaint and its annexed documents made out a
prima facie case, the High Court could not enter into a debatable question as to which of the two
versions of the parties was true. It is again well settled that the inherent power of the High Court
to quash a Criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases
to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In my
view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no justification whatsoever for
quashing the instant Criminal proceeding being G.R. Case No. 208/99 arising out of
Chandrakona P.S. Case No. 48/99 dated 26.6.99. The prayer of the petitioner for quashing the
instant Criminal proceeding against him is, therefore, dismissed. Learned Court below is directed
to go ahead with G.R. Case No. 208/99 in accordance with law at an early date. There will be no
order as to costs. Petition dismissed
3. Third Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Kulwant Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr.
b. Citation – (2010) 2 RCR (Criminal) 564
c. Date of Judgment – 11 December 2009.
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE Nirmaljit Kaur J.
e. Summary

The facts, in short, are that the petitioner No. 1-Kulwant Singh son of Sh. Gurbachan Singh was
the Science Teacher of Dashmesh Khalsa High School, Heran. He remained Member Panchayat
from the year 1998 to January 2003. Harbans Singh is the headmaster of that school. An FIR was
registered against the petitioners on the ground that petitioner No. 1 held the post of Panch in
spite of his being a teacher in a Government Aided School. He had received salary of Rs.
6,09,884/- from June 1998 upto 1st January 2003. He was holding an Office of profit during his
tenure as Panch, which he could not do. He should have resigned before being elected as Panch.
The same was stated to be in the knowledge of petitioner No. 2 who knowingly allowed the
petitioner No. 1 to continue to draw the salary. Thus, an FIR No. 30 dated 18.11.2008 under
Sections 420, 120B IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, 1988, was
registered against the petitioners.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners, while seeking quashing of the said FIR, submitted that the
petitioners were not Government Servants and had not incurred any disqualification under
Article 243-F of the Constitution of India or under Section 208 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act,
1994 or under Section 11 of the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994. The petitioners
have never held an office of profit under the State or Panchayat and have not been convicted by
any court of law under any offence and as such, have never earned any disqualification.

The petition is allowed and the FIR No. 30 dated 18.11.2008 registered at Police Station
Vigilance Bureau, Ludhiana under Sections 420, 120B IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC. Act, 1988 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby,
quashed.
X. Section 209, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Whoever frauduently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any person, makes
in a Court of Justice any claim which he knows to be false, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall
also be liable to fine.


1. First Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Rajinder Kumar v. Wazir Singh


b. Citation – PLR (2003) 134 339
c. Date of Judgment – 23rd January 2003
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE JUSTICE Adarsh Kumar Goel J.
e. Summary

The respondnt landlord filed an application for eviction of the petitioner tenant on the ground of
non-payment of rent.

The Rent Controler ordered the eviction. The tenant filed an application under Section 340
Cr.P.C. alleging that the landlord had committed an offence under Section 209 IPC by taking a
stand the rent had not been paid, which had already been paid. The landlord admitted the excess
payment of rent and he stated that the same was on account of inadvertent mistake and he had no
objection to the adjustment of excess payment of rent. The Rent Controller held that the
statement of the landlord that rent for two months had not been paid was deliberately false and
therefore, granted sanction under the provisions of the Rent Act to the tenant to file prosecution
against the landlord. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred which was dismissed as
time barred. Hence this revision petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that instead of granting sanction for prosecution, the
Rent Controller ought to have itself filed a complaint. Reliance is placed on Sheo Narain v. Smt.
Megh Mala Jain (1977)79 P.L.R. 157 (F.B.); Smt. Malan Devi v. Piara Lal and Anr. 1978(1) All
R C J 283 and Smt. Vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lal Prem Kumar 1971 C L J 141.

In Sheo Narain''s case (supra), it was observed that violation of provisions of the Rent Act makes
a person liable for prosecution under Section 19 of the Act. There is no dispute with this
proposition. In Malan Devis''s case (supra), it was held that the Rent Controller is a Court within
the meaning of Section 195 Cr.P.C. There is no dispute wit(tm) this proposition also, but it does
not mean that in every case, the Court must file complaint.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any ground for
interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.The petition is dismissed.

2. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Narendra Kukreja v. State & another


b. Citation – 2013 IIAD (DEL) 181
c. Date of Judgment – 8th January 2013
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. BHASIN
e. Summary

This petition has been filed by the petitioner-accused under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 for quashing of the order dated 15th July, 2010 passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate in a criminal complaint (being C.C.No. 34/1/10) filed by respondent No.
2 whereby he has been summoned as an accused for the commission of the offence punishable
under Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioner is the tenant under the complainant-respondent No. 2 in a part of property No. K-
146, Krishna Park Extension, New Delhi. The respondent No. 2 filed a petition in the Court of
Rent Controller for the eviction of the petitioner under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act,1958. On receipt of the notice of that eviction petition the petitioner sought leave to
defend the same by filing an application and his affidavit stating therein the facts which
according to him entitled him leave to defend the eviction petition. The respondent No. 2 filed
his reply to the petitioner’s application for leave to defend and refuted the averments made
therein. However, before the learned Rent Controller could take any decision on the petitioner’s
leave to defend application the respondent No. 2 filed a criminal complaint under Section 200 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 against the petitioner and one other person to whom the
rented premises had been allegedly sub let by the petitioner. In the complaint commission of the
offences punishable under Sections 193/199/209/34, IPC by the petitioner was alleged because
of his having sought leave to defend the eviction petition on false pleas.
The learned Magistrate after recording the pre-summoning statements of the
complainant(respondent No. 2 herein) and his son passed the impugned order summoning the
petitioner herein only as an accused for the commission of the offence under Section 209, IPC.
Feeling aggrieved by that order the present petition was filed by the petitioner.

This petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order of the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate is set aside. It is, however, made clear that quashing of the criminal complaint against
the petitioner at this stage would not be considered by the Rent Controller at the time of disposal
of his leave to defend application, if it is still pending, or at any subsequent stage also if leave
has already been granted as any expression of opinion on the merits of the petitioner’s pleas in
the eviction proceedings and the Rent Controller shall take a decision in accordance with law.

3. Second Judgment

a. Name of the Judgment – Veena Sharna v. Raman Monga & Another


b. Citation – (2018) 249 DLT 237
c. Date of Judgment – 31st January 2018.
d. Bench Name – HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
e. Summary

The Appellant/Smt. Veena Sharma was the Plaintiff in the suit (hereinafter 'Plaintiff')
Respondent No. 1/Mr. Raman Monga was Defendant No. 1 in the suit (hereinafter `D1') and
Respondent No. 2/Sh. Horam Singh was Defendant No. 2 in the suit (hereinafter 'D2').

The Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell and purchase dated 28th October, 2003 with the
Defendants for the purchase of the second floor of property bearing No. 29/39, West Patel Nagar,
New Delhi, admeasuring 100 square yards. The total sale consideration was Rs.13 lakhs. The
Plaintiff has made a total payment of Rs.12 lakhs.
D2, however, takes a completely contrary stand and alleges that the agreement to sell dated 28th
October, 2003 is a document which is tampered with. Though the signature of D2 on the second
page of the agreement is not disputed, the contents of the first page of the agreement are
disputed. It is further submitted that what was agreed to be sold to the Plaintiff was the first floor
of the property and not the second floor. D2 alleges collusion between D1 and the Plaintiff. He
further submits that he has not received the amounts paid by the Plaintiff and that all the amounts
have been received by D1, except the initial sum of Rs.2 Lakhs. D2 further submits that the suit
as framed is not maintainable as it seeks specific performance qua the second floor of the
property which has already been sold to one Mr. Vikas Sharma on 8th April, 2004.

The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the second floor had already been sold to Sh. Vikas
Sharma and hence, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted. The Court further held
that the conduct of the Plaintiff was not upright and fair as she has sought for specific
performance of the second floor, when the agreement appears to have been only for the first
floor. The Trial Court also concluded that the inter se disputes between the Defendants are not
the subject matter of the suit and hence, when the Defendants jointly and severally admitted to
have received Rs.12 Lakhs, the said amount is liable to be refunded to the Plaintiff.

Unless lawlessness which is all pervasive in the society is not put an end with an iron hand, the
very existence of a civilized society is at peril if the people of this nature are not shown their
place. Further if the litigants making false claims are allowed to go scot free, every law breaker
would violate the law with immunity. Hence, deterrent action is required to uphold the majesty
of law. The Court would be failing in its duties, if false claims are not dealt with in a manner
proper and effective for maintenance of majesty of Courts as otherwise the Courts would lose its
efficacy to the litigant public."

However, before coming to a final conclusion on the above aspect, D2 is given notice to show
cause as to why action under Section 209 should not be taken.\

In the facts and circumstances of this case, the Plaintiff would be entitled to costs of
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) payable by the Defendants within one week.

You might also like