, Behov. Thu. & Exp Pyhror. Vol. 23. No. 4. pp. 257-26X. 192. oca-7’) Ihi’) f5.M + o.

ca
Pnnted in Great Bntain. Pcrgamon Prey5 Ltd

ON COGNITIVE THEORIES AND CAUSATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR

CHRISTINA LEE
The University of Newcastle. Australia

Summary - Modern theories of social behavior are based on the largely unquestioned
assumption that human activity is determined by cognitive variables. Physiology. environ-
ment, and behavior are seen as peripheral to the understanding of cognition, seen as central
to the understanding of human nature. This paper argues that these approaches to psychology
arc essentially metaphorical models of behavior. inadequate as explanatory theories, because
they rely on untestable assumptions concerning the centrality to human behavior of
hypothetical and unmeasurable cognitive variables. Their lack of precision does not allow for
the testing of specific predictions. This paper argues that contemporary cognitive-behavioral
and cognitive-social theories cannot be salvaged as explanatory models.

Most modern theories of social behavior rely in an explicitly imaginary sense. Directions for
on assumptions about the nature of cognition possible development of such models are out-
and its relationship to behavior. These assump- lined. It may be that existing models are so
tions, and the theories themselves, have been intrinsically vague that no progress can be
criticised on the grounds that they fail to made, but this issue may at least be open to
produce adequate scientific explanations of empirical examination.
human action (Skinner, 1977, 1987), that they
rely on vaguely described unobservables as Cognitive Psychologies and Cognitive
causal elements (Eysenck, 1978; Ledwidge, Therapies
1978; Lee, 1989), and that they are unfalsifi-
able (Lee, 1987). These criticisms notwith- That psychology has undergone a “cognitive
standing, cognitive models of human behavior revolution” is not at issue (Bootzin, 1985).
are central to modern applied psychology. Clinical psychology, social psychology, and
Cognition-based models of human social most other fields of applied psychology have
behavior may be viewed in two ways: as become firmly cognitive in outlook. Cognitive
veridical explanations of behavior, or, less approaches to the subject matter of psychology
grandly, as heuristically useful but explicitly are widely accepted as a compromise between
fictional descriptions of behavior, descriptions the hard-nosed, soulless science of the radical
which serve a practical function in applied behaviorists on the one hand, and the enter-
psychology but do not pretend to identify the taining but fictional models of the
underlying causes of behavior. I argue in this psychoanalysts on the other.
paper that contemporary cognitive-social mod- Cognition-oriented psychology is appearing
els are inadequate at both of these levels. The in traditionally non-cognitive fields; for exam-
problems at the formal explanatory level are ple, a survey of members of the Association for
argued to be insurmountable; however. there Advancement of Behavior Therapy (Craig-
may be potential for the development of head, 1990a) found that 71% of members
practically useful models which use cognition described their theoretical orientation as cogni-

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Christina Lee. Department of Psychology, University of Newcastle, NSW
2308. Australia.

257
 2% CHRISTINA LEE

tive or cognitive-behavioral. Hehuvior Ther- pletely unobservable to anyone. are enormous

apy, one of the most cited journals in the social but will not be considered in this paper, which
sciences (Awad, 1990). has recently removed restricts itself to the definition of cognition as
the words “behavior therapy and behavior reportable but unverifiable “internal events”.
modification” from its by-line and replaced There does not appear to be a clear consensus
them with “behavioral and cognitive sciences” concerning the status of these events; some
on the grounds that this more accurately cognitive psychologists (e.g., Bandura, lYX6)
retlects the zeitgeist (Craighead, 19YOb). On argue that cognitions arc real entities which are
the wider scene, Baer. Wolf and Risley (IYX7) the veridical causes of behavior, while others
estimated that behaviorists constitute 2% of hold the view that “cognitions” are no more
American psychologists. In applied and clinical than verbal reports, which may have heuristic
psychology. cognitive models have become the value but are not necessarily reflections of any
norm and non-cognitive theorists are a minor- underlying reality.
ity with whom the mainstream have little in Currently popular theories (e.g.. Bandura.
common. 19X6) assume that behavior is largely driven by
Historically, much of the present emphasis conscious thought, or at least by cognitive
on cognition developed from the application of events which are accessible to consciousness
behavioral principles. Eysenck’s influential when the behaver is asked to describe them.
paper which summarised evidence that tradi- They assume further that problems are largely
tional psychotherapy was ineffective (Eysenck, caused by illogical, irrational, or otherwise
lYS2) provided an impetus for the develop- “faulty” cognitions. Therefore, it is argued,
ment of behavioral strategies in clinical emotional disorders and behavioral problems
psychology. However, clinical developments are best treated by altering cognitions (Holt &
moved in a different direction with the publi- Lee, 1989).
cation of texts in cognitive behaviorism (Maho- Social psychology frequently applies the
ney, lY74: Meichenbaum. lY77). These au- same types of argument to understanding
thors argued that a radically behavioral normal social behavior. Influential theories
approach was inadequate as an explanation of such as attribution theory (e.g., Heider, 1944)
the complexity of human experience. Experi- and dissonance theory (e.g., Brehm & Cohen.
mental results and clinical techniques were lY62; Festinger, 1957) have for decades had
appearing which were not readily explicable by their basis in the assumption that social be-
basic conditioning principles. Cognitive havior is proximally determined by attitudes
mediational explanations were proposed in- and beliefs, themselves the result of cognitive
stead, and it was argued that theoretical interpretation of experience. The cnviron-
eclecticism was the most effective route for ment, contingencies of reinforcement, and
applied psychology to take. previous behaviors are relevant only periphe-
For the purposes of this discussion, and rally, as the raw material from which the
within the context of applied social-cognitive individual constructs a world of experience
and cognitive-behavioral psychology, “cogni- (Bruner, 1986). Therefore, efforts to under-
tions” may best be defined as verbal indica- stand social behavior should focus not on the
tions of internal states. self-reportable but environment. but on cognitive interpretation.
unobservable and unverifiable. “Cognition” Concepts from social and cognitive psychology
may be used to refer to any inferred internal are being taken up in models of abnormal
event, whether conscious or not (e.g.. Brewin, behavior (e.g., Bower, 197X; Guidano & Liot-
IYSY; Guidano & Liotti, 1983). The problems ti. 1987; Segal. 1988), so that social and clinical
inherent in the invocation of unconscious psychology are increasingly strongly linked by
cognitions, events which are in principle com- similar underlying assumptions.
 Cognitive -’1 neorles --“I
L.)Y

These approaches to the subject matter of which it is important to maintain (Lee, 1989).
psychology suffer from major flaws at two Kimble (1989) criticises the tendency of
levels. This paper argues firstly that cognitive “intervening-variable” psychologists to confuse
theories are not, and cannot become, adequate concept formation with explanation. and
scientific explanations of behavior, and makes the point that disputes about such
secondly that their value as metaphorical mod- intervening variables are arguments about de-
els is poor but may possibly be improved finitions, not facts. A great deal of research
through the application of greater rigor in with a cognitive orientation seems to be no
methodology and clarity in definition. more than the correlation of self-reports of
hypothetical constructs with self-reports of
other hypothetical constructs. In the words of
Formal Theoretical Weaknesses in Cognitive Skinner (1977, p. l), “cognitive psychologists
Models (. . .) invent internal surrogates, which become
the subject matter of their science”.
Many currently popular theories are based
on the untestable assumption that, within
general environmental constraints, behavior is Cognitive Theories As Descriptive Metaphors
determined by cognitive factors such as attitu-
des, attributions, self-efficacy, and locus of While the theories are intrinsically unable to
control. It is argued that, although factors such explain behavior, it may be argued that they
as physiology, biochemistry, and behavior are have a limited role as descriptive frameworks.
relevant, in the final analysis human nature can A number of theorists (e.g., Eysenck, 1978)
only be understood when cognitions, the proxi- hold that cognitions have no existence in any
mal causes of behavior, are understood (e.g., real sense but are metaphorical labels for
Campbell, 1970). highly complex physiological and neurochemi-
However, cognition-based models are not cal processes which we are yet to understand.
scientific accounts of human behavior which Cognitive models, it is argued, do not pretend
translate into scientifically based therapeutic to explain anything at a basic scientific level,
techniques (Lee, 1989), because they rely for but exist only as loose descriptions of processes
their apparent explanatory power on ill- which we do not understand.
defined and unobservable cognitive variables. Thus, cognitions are argued to be
The most fundamental point to be considered metaphors, but useful and necessary
when discussing these theories as explanations metaphors, because our limited understanding
of behavior is the underlying and fundamental- of neurochemistry and other basic processes
ly untestable assumption that conscious prevents us from describing human behavior in
thought, as manifested in reported attitudes, more precise terms. However. this level of
beliefs, and intentions, plays an important role explanation may be better than none at all.
in directing behavior. It appears, of course, Kimble (1989), for example, holds that a
immediately obvious that thinking controls radical science of behavior may satisfy the
action, but obviousness is not necessarily re- positivists, but must inevitably leave out
lated to truth or to utility (Skinner, 1990). “everything of interest and importance”
Aspects of human action which seem immedi- (P.493) while Munro (1992) argues that
ately obvious to the people performing those models at different levels of analysis or expla-
actions are not necessarily accurate reflections nation have equal value.
of reality. Theoretical eclecticism is argued to be an
The distinction between post-hoc descrip- appropriate and pragmatic strategy (Meichen-
tions and actual explanations of behavior is one baum, 1974), given the lack of anything
260 CHRISTINA LEE

resembling a Grand Unifying Theory of Many currently popular theories invoke

psychology. However. on this point. Hallam variations on a basic three-step process in
(1987) has pointed out that eclecticism is a order to describe behavior. At the first step.
strategy which maximises short-term gains at cognitive variables are hypothesized to arise
the expense of long-term development. In a from direct and vicarious experiences. At the
similar vein. Wolpe (1989) argues that eclectic second step. these cognitive variables interact
approaches may appear useful for dealing with in order to produce some cognitive outcome.
issues in the short term. but will inevitably fail, At the third step, this cognitive outcome
as they lack a scientific basis and thus have no determines actual behavior. The following
value in the development of a coherent section examines a number of contemporary
science. models in order to demonstrate that their
The drift in therapy towards “boxes of surface plausibility does not reflect any under-
tricks” and technology rather than understand- lying power to describe or predict behavior
ing has been criticised (e.g., Branch. 1987; (Staddon, 1984).
Hayes. Rincover. & Solnick. 1980). It is Different theories (e.g.. Bandura. 19X6;
argued that a firm theoretical stance permits Fishbein & Ajzen, 1076; Triandis, 1980) pro-
the scientific development of techniques pose different models, of varying complexity,
together with an understanding of how they involving different cognitive variables. All the
may operate, while eclecticism “resembles models hold that external variables give rise to
having one’s feet firmly planted in midair” cognitions, and that it is these cognitions. not
(Branch, 19X7. p. 79). If using a single inade- objective reality, which should be the subject
quate theory causes problems, then mixing of psychological research. But the question of
several inadequate theories merely compounds which sources of experience or information will
the problem. influence the hypothetical cognitive variables,
Models which deal entirely with hypothetical and the nature and extent of that influence, is
constructs complicate rather than simplify our not addressed in any coherent fashion. Self-
view of the world. Because of the lack of clarity efficacy theory (e.g.. Bandura. 1977) and its
in defining unobservable variables. there is development in social cognitive theory (Ban-
little to prevent a proliferation of theories dura, 19X6), for example, hypothesize that
postulating subtly different cognitions with personal and vicarious experiences, verbal
different relationships between them. Cum- learning, and physiological state influence cog-
mings, Becker, and Maile (1980) identified 14 nitions, but make no attempt at all to address
different models which related cognitive vari- the next necessary step of the argument, in
ables to health-related behaviors. involving I09 which the nature, extent. and possible interac-
cognitive and demographic variables. and sta- tions of these influences are specified. There is
ted that “many investigators have long felt that no conceptual or methodological discussion of
the actual number of truly distinct concepts the actual relationships between observable
(. . .) is considerably lower (p. 123)“. variables and hypothesized cognitive variables,
so that there is no way to predict the effect that
any specific combination of experiences might
Definitional and Methodological Problems have on self-efficacy.
The second step, in which the cognitive
Putting to one side the inability of these variables are asserted to combine to produce a
models to explain behavior, the following single cognitive outcome. is equally problema-
sections of this paper consider the problems tic. The details of this cognitive outcome vary
which arise in attempting to use existing between theories. Bandura (1986) argues that
models as descriptions of behavior. self-efficacy is the cognitive outcome, resulting
 _ 261
LOgnltlVe Theories

from the combination of information from a cognitive variable and behavior, is also prob-
variety of sources in some undefined fashion; lematic. Self-efficacy theory (e.g., Bandura,
both the Fishbein model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1986) holds that efficacy expectations are the
1976) and the more complex but ill-defined proximal determinant of behavior. Other mod-
model of Triandis (1980) argue that several els are more circumspect about the relationship
distinct cognitive variables combine to produce between the composite variable and behavior.
a behavioral intention; protection motivation Fishbein and Ajzen (1976), for example, argue
theory (Rogers, 1983), related specifically to that the behavioral intention is an immediate
health actions, argues for a “protection motiva- precursor of behavior, but that numerous other
tion” as the final common pathway by which variables may influence the relationship be-
cognitions affect health-related behavior. The tween a measured behavioral intention and the
argument is basically the same in each case. A behavior. They argue that the relationship is
variety of component variables arise from a dependent on measurement issues such as the
variety of classes of previous experiences and degree of specificity of the questions asked and
combine in some way to produce a single the time between measurement of behavioral
variable which in turn produces behavior. intention and observation of behavior, as well
The development and testing of precise as on psychological issues such as the degree to
predictions concerning these composite cogni- which the behavior is under volitional control
tive variables is, however, impossible. The and the stability of the intention. Triandis
relationships between the cognitive compo- (1980) argues that habit strength must be
nents and the composite outcome are not included in this model.
specified at all in social learning theory (Ban- These propositions, like the theories them-
dura, 1977), protection motivation theory (Ro- selves, sound reasonable, and may give the
gers, 1983), and the Health Belief Model (Janz illusion that the questions have been adequate-
& Becker, 1984), while other models (e.g.. ly dealt with. However, in both cases, all they
Triandis, 1980) provide only a vague indication really do is introduce more unmeasurable
of the possible direction of influence. Thus, the constructs. Rather than explaining mismatches
models are too imprecise for any but the between cognitive predictor and behavior, the
vaguest of predictions to be made about the effect is rather to “explain away” any failures
composite outcome variable on the basis of to predict behavior by the invocation of yet
information about component cognitive vari- more vaguely described hypothetical variables,
ables. Not only is it impossible to predict the without providing any suggestions of how these
effect that external influences may have on any might be assessed or what effects they might
component variable, it is also impossible to have on behavior.
predict the effects that these undefinable In summary, the social-cognitive theories
changes may have on the composite cognitive which are currently popular have the following
variable. flaws: they postulate the existence of cognitive
The Fishbein model (Fishbein & Ajzen, variables but are unclear as to how they arise
1976) does have a reasonably clear hypothe- from external experiences and events; they
sized relationship and a method for developing postulate that cognitive variables interact to
specific predictions for particular behaviors produce a composite cognition but are unclear
and subject populations. However. the evi- as to how; and they suggest that this resulting
dence supporting the model is highly variable, composite cognition would, under perfect cir-
suggesting that factors other than the postula- cumstances, predict behavior but again are
ted cognitions play an important role. unclear as to the effects of other variables on
The third stage in these theories, that con- this relationship.
cerning the relationship between the composite Thus, it is impossible to make precise predic-
762 C‘ttKISTINA LEE

tions as to (a) what cognitions will arise in a dological imprecision is not important, as long
particular person from a particular set of as techniques derived from the theories help in
events (b) how these cognitions will interact predicting behavior and alleviating distress.
with each other and (c) what behavior will However, the body of research which examines
occur as a result. Although such models have the predictions of cognition-based models sug-
the appearance of taking the complexity of gests that the success of these models is highly
human decision-making into account, they are variable. For example. a meta-analytic review
of no actual use in explaining or predicting of self-efficacy research cln academic perform-
behavior. ance (Multon, Brown, & Lent. 1YYl) found a
A further implication of this imprecision mean standardised effect size of 0.38. The
arises if one attempts to conduct research results, however, were highly heterogeneous
examining the efficacy of these models in the (Q = 276.7, p < .OOl). and significant levels of
prediction or description of behavior. Because within-class heterogeneity remained when the
of the lack of definition of all the crucial projects were classified according to research
variables, it is extremely difficult to develop designs. populations, and specific assessment
research questionnaires which accurately rc- techniques. This suggests that other. unspeci-
fleet the concepts. Differences between the fied. factors had a major impact on these
constructs specified by various models may be results.
clear enough to researchers, but may be totally There are many demonstrations that correla-
opaque to the subjects with whom research is tions between self-efficacy and behavior are
conducted. When the constructs are converted high if self-efficacy has been measured immedi-
into specific questions comprehensible to re- ately prior to a straightforward task (e.g..
search subjects, the differences can become Biran & Wilson. lY81; Katz, Stout. Taylor.
very hard to see. For example, Mullen, Horne. & Agras. 1083; Weinberg. Gould.
Hersey. and lverson (1987), comparing three Yukelson, & Jackson. 1981). However, over
social-psychological models. commented that the longer term the relationships are lower
numerous respondents objected to the (e.g.. Condiotte 81 Lichtenstein, IYXI: DiCle-
apparent similarity of belief strength and belief mente, lY81) and other, theoretically irrele-
importance questions. “They said “but I vant, variables such as the opinions of others
already answered that”, when asked about the (Lee, lY82). previous behavior (Feltz Kc Mug-
importance of each belief they had rated no, 1Y83; Let. 1Y8.1) and the sex of the
earlier. This perception that the questions were respondent (Bctz & Hackett, 1Y81) have been
the same seemed to carry over into the found to be better predictors.
answers” (p. 97X). Of course. some research projects using
This experience is one I have shared, for some of these models have produced good
example, in research assessing efficacy and results. For example, DeVries and Ajzcn
outcome expectations (Lee, IYX4a, b). These (lY71) found component variables to predict
studies found very high correlations between 87% of the variance in behavioral intention
efficacy and outcome expectations, despite when students answered questions about
theoretical arguments (e.g., Bandura. lYX2) cheating in examinations. Ajzen and Fishbein
that they should be largely independent of each (1970) found behavioral intentions to account
other. Subtle differences between variables for Y2% of the variance in actual behavior
may be clear in the abstract, but can be when the topic was about having an abortion.
completely lost when the variables arc con- On the other hand. Grube. Morgan. and
verted into straightforward questions about McGee (lY86) found component variables to
specific actions and opinions. account for 21% of the variance in behavioral
It may be argued that theoretical and metho- intentions concerned with smoking, while War-
 Cognitive Theories 26.3

shaw, Calantone, and Joyce (1986) found productive way to proceed, given that the aim
intentions regarding blood donation to account of therapy is to assist a person with a problem,
for only 9% of the variance in behavior. rather than answer a theoretical question. But
Why do some research projects find the theoretical questions are not purely of esoteric
hypothesized relationships while others do academic interest. They are important practi-
not? This is an area which is in need of cally (Lee. 1989). The inadequacy of defini-
systematic research if the usefulness of these, tions and lack of real distinction between
and similar, models as metaphorical descrip- constructs reduce the theories’ value, even as
tions of behavior is to be increased. An under- descriptive metaphors. It means that if a
standing of the circumstances in which they change occurs, it is difficult even to hypothe-
accord with observations and those in which size about what happened, and it means that
they do not may result in a more detailed and improvements in therapeutic techniques can
practical, although still heuristic rather than only happen in an ad hoc fashion, rather than
explanatory, model of behavior. through enhanced understanding.
Evidence on the effectiveness of therapies
based on cognitive models suggests that ther-
apeutic applications are of limited value, either Promoting Change Within Cognitive-
on their own or as adjuncts to more behavioral Behavioral Psychology
interventions. This literature has been re-
viewed thoroughly before, and a full-scale Scientific objections to the direction of mod-
review would be well beyond the scope of this ern psychology have been put for decades, but
paper. Wolpe (1989) reviews recent evidence cognitive psychologists have not been per-
on the effectiveness of non-behavioral suaded to give up their models of human
psychotherapy which suggests that effective- nature. It may be that the application of
ness is no better than it was when Eysenck scientific principles to human behavior has
(1952) questioned the value of these techni- little reinforcement value for most psycholo-
ques. Beidel and Turner (1986) concluded on gists (Baer, Wolf, bi Risley, 1987). Skinner
the basis of a wide-ranging review that there (1990) pointed out that behaviorists have re-
was no evidence for the superiority of “pure” sponded to an unsympathetic mainstream by
cognitive strategies over other non-behavioral developing their own separate professional
methods. A review by Latimer and Sweet organisations. journals, and terms of refer-
(19X4) concluded that the effectiveness of ence.
cognitive procedures alone, not in combination An alternative to this, however, is to argue
with behavioral components, has not been for the need for research which would begin to
demonstrated with clinical populations. Com- achieve consistency and accuracy at the de-
parisons of cognitive-behavioral and strictly scriptive level. If theories relating hypothetical
behavioral therapies generally find their ther- cognitive entities to behaviors were refined so
apeutic effects to be roughly equal (Dush, that they did make precise predictions. and if
Hirt. & Schroeder, 1983; Miller & Berman, definitions of these hypothetical entities were
1983; Sweet & Loizeaux, 1991). suggesting that refined so that it was possible to develop
cognitive components do not add to the effec- assessment strategies which had at least a
tiveness of behavioral therapy. degree of face validity, it might then be
It could, however, be argued that clients possible to debate the usefulness of the cogni-
may feel more comfortable with a cognitive tive metaphor from an empirical standpoint. It
model than with a behavioral one. An might be possible to identify the circumstances
approach that is congruent with the client’s in which the assessment of particular hypothe-
point of view on the problem may be the most tical variables was useful in predicting behavior
26-1 CHRISTINA LEE

and those in which it was not. Thus, without will affect levels of self-efficacy in a new
denying the basic problems inherent in models situation (e.g., Bandura, 19X6) or that habit
which require non-material events to cause strength will have an effect on the probability
events in the material world (Eysenck, 1978), it of a behavior occurring (e.g. Triandis, 19X0)
might be possible to find a more limited but does not provide information that allows one
useful role for these theories. to make any predictions beyond those dictated
In the following sections I consider a number by common sense.
of ways in which cognitive theories might be There is a need for models which specify
refined and their limits explored. If headway how previous experiences (to take a single
could be made on these points. then arguments example) might impinge upon the hypothe-
for the utility of models of this type, at least as sized cognitions, and there is a need to develop
descriptive frameworks in the short term. a method for assessing previous experiences
would be strengthened. On the other hand, if (or whichever variable is being considered) in a
the questions discussed do not appear amen- way that reflects their relationship with the
able to empirical investigation, then this would cognition being studied.
suggest that problems with cognitive theories For example, it is quite likely that the effects
may be intrinsic to theories of this type. of previous experiences on current cognitions
rather than being specific to currently popular would be influenced by those experiences.
models. their type, their frequency. and how recently
they occurred, as well as by the distribution of
various sub-types of related experiences and
the occurrence of contradictory experiences.
Improving the Cognitive Models
There is to my knowledge no research which
Describiq the Influences OH Cognitions attempts to systematize the assessment of
experience so that it would provide a specific
Cognitively-based theories hold that cogni- measure or measures of apparently relevant
tions arise from a wide variety of sources. experiences, nor is there any work investigat-
Bandura (1986) lists previous actual experi- ing how any particular experience might influ-
ence, previous observational experience. sym- ence a particular behavior or cognition.
bolic learning derived from verbal input, and Of course, this is equally a problem for
physiological states of the organism as the raw behavioral models, which rely on constructs
material for the derivation of cognitions. Cog- such as past reinforcement history to explain
nitions are also hypothesized to be influenced behavior; it is possible that research of this
by biological variables, both long-term and type would allow one to develop a model which
stable, such as genetic make-up (e.g., Plomin could quantify or summarize experiences of
& Daniels, 1986), and temporary, such as state different types. investigate relationships be-
of health, hunger and thirst. Experiences are tween experience and behavior, and assess
also assumed to be filtered and interpreted on whether the hypothesizing of cognitive vari-
the basis of generalised schemata, consisting of ables adds anything to strictly behavioral ex-
broad sets of cultural values and central be- planations.
liefs, themselves derived from earlier experi- Retrospective self-reports, despite their ob-
ences (e.g., Guidano & Liotti, 1983). vious limitations. are one method of collecting
As already discussed, the central weakness information about experience and assessing the
of these ideas is that they lack any precision, relevance of cognitive variables. For example,
and are thus unable to predict the effects of any Wolpe, Lande, McNally, and Schotte (1985)
particular set of variables on cognition. For evaluated the use of retrospective self-reports
example, suggesting that vicarious experiences to determine the origins of neurotic fears and
 Cognitive Theories 265

thus to make recommendations concerning Fishbein & Ajzen, 1976) are quite specific
appropriate treatment modalities. concerning methods for establishing the pre-
Other methods would require more elabo- cise relationships, at least for closely-defined
rate designs but might be more accurate. These behaviors in specific groups. There is a need to
might include longitudinal studies, for example extend research of this kind, again in order to
with people learning a new skill. Even inter- develop models which would allow specific
vention studies in which subjects are exposed predictions to be made. The Health Belief
to a range of novel experiences, and the effects Model, for example, specifies a number of
of various combinations on target variables cognitive variables, but not how they might
assessed, are possible. Whatever method was interact. Thus, for example, if a person be-
use.d, it might be possible to develop more lieved a particular disease to be extremely
specific models of how particular classes of serious but saw him- or herself to be only
variable might predict later behavior, and moderately susceptible, and perceived some
whether self-reports were at all useful. quite strong barriers to taking action, while on
the other hand scoring highly on health motiva-
tion, there is no way that any prediction could
Examining Relationships Among the Influences
be made about that person’s behavior. The
on Cognition.5
model is so vague that any outcome could be
explained after the fact, but none could be
A logical extension of the points made above
predicted with any degree of certainty.
is needed to provide more precise models of
It seems probable that research aimed at
how the different hypothesized influences on
developing models of the specific interactions
target cognitions might interact. For example,
among these variables would be extremely
if a person has had a single negative experi-
complex, even if the problems of assessment
ence, and observed others in a range of
could be overcome. It has been argued (Corri-
positive experiences, with a particular activity,
gan, 1990) that we simply need to continue
what might be the overall effect on self-
research using the traditional statistical strate-
efficacy? How many vicarious positive experi-
gies of multiple regression, discriminant analy-
ences, of what nature, might counteract the
sis, and path analysis in order to clarify these
single negative experience? Such questions
theories. However, it may be that these
cannot be answered by existing models. Firstly,
approaches, with their underlying assumptions
they require a clear-cut method for assessing
of lineal causation, will not be adequate to
influences of individual variables on cognition.
produce accurate descriptions o,f human be-
Following this, research examining combina-
havior (Lee, 1990). It may be necessary to
tions of these measures might enable models to
move beyond these traditional tools and make
be developed which might predict more pre-
use of modelling strategies now being develo-
cisely how a particular set of experiences,
ped in other fields (Schuster, 1989).
.observations, verbal inputs, and other influ-
Further, frameworks which are optimal for a
ences might affect reported cognitions.
particular behavior may be inappropriate for
others; it is also probable that there will be
Defining the Interactions Among Cognitions differences among demographic and cultural
groups. However, attempts to understand
Many of the theories discussed in this paper these issues in all their complexity need to be
argue that external sources give rise to number made if cognitive-behavioral models of be-
of different types of cognition which then havior are ever to reach a level at which they
combine to form a cognitive outcome, which can make predictions of behavior which are
itself influences behavior. Some models (e.g., more than trivial.
266 CHRISTINA LEE

Defining the Range of Behaviors, and matter of psychology. It is possible, however,

Populations, For Each Model that attempts to develop these models will
make them more useful in the short term. As
Speculation on the complexities which might temporary descriptive frameworks which have
appear in research of the type outlined above heuristic value, they may serve a purpose. But
suggests that more rigorous models might also there is a need for development and refine-
be much less general in their application. ment before they will be adequate as descrip-
Models which would provide predictions for tions of human behavior.
some behavioral targets, some environments, In conclusion, though, it would appear that
or some population groups might be quite their failure to produce workable descriptions
inappropriate in others. of human activity, together with their lack of a
Greater specificity, and a narrowed range of scientific basis, are in the long run arguments
applicability, does not reduce the value of any for rejecting cognitive theories in favor of a
particular framework. Rather, the ability to stronger development of materialistic models
define the limits of a model’s applicability is an of human behavior (e.g., Ledwidge, 1978; Lee.
indicator of its strength. If cognitive- 1990; Skinner. 1977. 1990). This is not to say
behavioral models can be developed which can that behavioral models. in their present form,
provide accurate descriptions of behavior, are without their own problems: the concept of
even if they apply only in circumscribed situa- reinforcement, for example, suffers from prob-
tions and with a limited range of behaviors, lems of circularity, and assessment of reinfor-
and if one can state in advance the limits of cement history may be almost as problematic
their applicability, they will at least demons- as assessment of hypothetical variables.
trate that it is possible to develop cognitively However, behavioral theories do have a firm
based descriptions of behavior which have basis in the observable, which must strengthen
empirical support. On the other hand, if it is their ability to develop testable models of
not possible, even within quite narrow con- human behavior.
straints, to develop an accurate model, this will
tend to support the idea that the assessment of Acknowledgemenrs -The author gratefully acknowledges
hypothetical and unobservable variables is less the comments of Felicity Allen, Justin Renardy. and
Neville Owen on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
central to the understanding of behavioral
choices than is currently thought to be the case.
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