Reports from China :

Before and After The Cultural Revolution

Frederick C. Teiwes

It comes as no surprise to current visitors to China that their hosts place

great emphasis on the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution. While
production increases and improvements in living conditions are repeatedly
cited, the basic change is spiritual - before the Cultural Revolution,
elitist and selfish attitudes were allegedly widespread; since the Revolu-
tion, a new commitment to the common good by cadres and masses alike
has purportedly enriched Chinese life. This preoccupation with the Cul-
tural Revolution stems from more than a need to justify past upheavals,
it reflects an ongoing debate over the realization of goals sanctified by
that movement. The twin efforts of rebuilding the system and institu-
tionalizing Cultural Revolution reforms have apparently caused deep
misgivings on the part of some leaders who see a thinly disguised effort
to "restore the old." Thus the question of how China has changed since
1965 is of current policy relevance as well as intrinsic scholarly interest.
A three-week tour of China, comprising visits to two factories, two
communes, the Shanghai docks, four universities, a teachers' college, an
urban residential area, a May 7 Cadre School and a children's palace,
as well as discussions with county cadres in Linhsien and municipal
cadres in Sian,1 provides a slender basis for confident generalizations,
especially as this was my first visit to China and pre-Cultural Revolution
comparisons for specific institutions are dependent on the recollections
of my hosts. Nevertheless, I gathered a considerable amount of informa-
tion which allows some tentative judgments on several key areas - leader-
ship and personnel, Party and administrative organization, administrative
centralization/decentralization, and remuneration policies. I shall also

1. I visited China from 25 September to 16 October 1973, with a delegation

from the Research School of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University.
Our itinerary was Canton, Chengchow, Anyang, Linhsien, Sian, Peking and
Shanghai. The specific institutions visited were: The Chengchow Textile Machine
Building Factory (under the Ministry of Light Industry), the Shanghai Diesel
Engine Factory (under the First Ministry of Machine Building), Ma-ch'i-chai
People's Commune in suburban Sian, the Sino-Hungarian Friendship People's
Commune in suburban Peking, the No. 5 Loading Zone of Shanghai Harbour,
Northwest University in Sian, Peking University, Fu-tan University in Shanghai,
Chung-shan University in Canton, Peking Normal School, Feng-ch'eng street in
Yang-p'u district, Shanghai, the Ch'ung-wen district, Peking, May 7 Cadre School
in suburban Peking, and the Ching-an district, Shanghai, Children's Palace.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 333

examine three " new born things " which have been vigorously defended
in recent months - educational reform, the programme of sending educa-
ted youth to the countryside, and May 7 Cadre Schools - to see what
changes they represent from pre-Cultural Revolution policies.2

Leadership and Personnel

In all types of organizations visited - industrial, agricultural, and edu-
cational - the Cultural Revolution resulted in remarkably few permanent
dismissals of cadres or expulsions of Party members. In Ma-ch'i-chai
Commune in suburban Sian, where precise figures were given, only six
Party members from a pre-Cultural Revolution membership of about 300
were expelled,3 while none of over 4,000 cadres were dismissed in Peking's
Ch'ung-wen district. Such figures, however, obscure substantial changes
in leadership and status since 1965. Some changes were undoubtedly
routine responses to personnel requirements with no unique relationship
to the Cultural Revolution. Thus some cadres working in the Sino-
Hungarian Friendship Commune administration outside Peking in 1965
have been shifted to district and brigade posts according to work needs,
and the pre-Cultural Revolution Party secretary of Ch'ung-wen district
retired because of advancing years and poor health.
Other changes, however, were linked to the political struggles of 1966-
68. First, young Cultural Revolution activists have gained positions in
many organizations. This was graphically illustrated at the Shanghai
Diesel Engine Factory through an animated discussion of Cultural Revo-
lution factional strife dominated by a young cadre responsible for Youth
League work, a cadre who had been a member of the " rebel" faction.
Although members of the "conservative" faction were also given res-
ponsible posts in order to restore unity within the factory,* the Youth
League man cowed those with the wrong factional ties as the discussion
unfolded. While this cadre's position in the factory hierarchy is still
relatively modest, his status has clearly risen vis-a-vis others.5 Here,

2. Other "new born things" normally attributed to the Cultural Revolution

are the reform of public health and literary and art reform. However, I did not
have the opportunity to pursue the former subject while in China and limitations
of space prevent a discussion of the latter.
3. This purge rate of roughly 2% is double the less than 1% figure Chou En-lai
gave for the entire Party, but still extremely low for a tumultuous movement such
as the Cultural Revolution. See Edgar Snow, " Talks with Chou En-lai: The Open
Door," The New Republic, 27 March, 1971, p. 21.
4. Divisions within this factory had apparently been very sharp, with one death
and about 300 injuries resulting from factional conflict.
5. Similar changes of status resulted from previous political campaigns with
some activists given official posts and cultivated for further advancement and some
cadres subjected to disciplinary measures. The manner and degree in which the
Cultural Revolution experience differs from previous campaigns in this respect is
difficult to determine; impressionistically, it appears that the sense of "winners
and losers," at least in urban institutions, is more widespread and deeper than in
earlier movements.

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 334 The China Quarterly

as elsewhere, few cadres had been irrevocably dismissed but a significant

number were restored to lower ranking, less influential jobs. Moreover,
although the most important posts tend to be held by veteran cadres, it
is not unusual for these leaders to be post-Cultural Revolution transfers
to their units.6 For example, the recently appointed Party Secretary and
Revolutionary Committee Chairman for the No. 5 Loading Zone of
Shanghai Harbour led another loading zone before being ousted as a " cap-
italist roader" in 1967. This man, as well as his predecessor who was in
charge of the zone from the time its Revolutionary Committee was founded
in 1969, had been dispatched from the Shanghai Harbour Management
Bureau. By this method experienced cadres are utilized, but in areas where
they have not been embroiled in Cultural Revolution conflicts. In the
loading zone where the " capitalist roader " previously worked, however,
leadership is held by a former worker who became a rebel activist -
additional evidence of gains for revolutionary elements. While the re-
habilitation of cadres definitely restored aspects of the old system, last-
ing changes in the distribution of power are still apparent in various basic
level units.
Approaching the question of personnel patterns from a different angle,
it is possible to examine channels of mobility into desired cadre positions
by taking the China International Travel Service (CITS) as a case study.
The administrative personnel and interpreters of CITS fall into three
broad categories. The largest group consists of people who were already
with CITS or doing similar work with other units prior to the Cultural
Revolution. They had generally undertaken such work upon graduation
from university or foreign language institute; in most cases their careers
were interrupted by stints of up to one-and-a-half years in May 7 Cadre
Schools. A second group are clearly beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. These people had typically been workers before 1966 and were
recruited for CITS administrative roles or language training prior to
CITS appointments during the post-Cultural Revolution organizational
reconstruction. They therefore had impeccable credentials in terms of
labour experience when recruitment was undertaken. It is significant, how-
ever, that at least some of them had been middle school graduates who
wanted to go to university but couldn't quite make it. Thus, although on
the one hand they were less able than those who entered CITS before
the Cultural Revolution, in another sense they had the advantage of a
somewhat higher cultural level than other workers.7 In other words, some
of these " workers" had botih a background and past aspirations which
set them apart from the ordinary factory hand. The final type consists of
middle school graduates who directly entered CITS, often quite con-
sciously viewing it as their two years of "practical experience" - an
experience normally gained in factories, communes or military service -

6. This apparently occurred with some frequency in urban production units.

Unfortunately I have no information for communes on this point.
7. This is not to gainsay the role of political criteria in the selection process but
only to argue that, all other things being equal, they had an edge.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 335

prior to entering a university or foreign language institute. These young

people benefited from solid middle school training, in one case in a school
specializing in foreign languages. As with the first group they were ap-
parently selected with considerable attention to their linguistic capabilities.
In sum, while all three groups have ideological credentials whether via
May 7 Cadre Schools, factory labour or "practical experience," some
members of each appear to have a definite educational advantage. In this
regard, the Cultural Revolution has not solved the problems involved in
trying to break down elitism while simultaneously providing specialized
skills.

Party and Administrative Organization

One of the targets of the Cultural Revolution was an over-staffed,
overlapping bureaucracy. One major reform implemented during the
organizational reconstruction following the movement was unification.
This process meant discarding the pre-Cultural Revolution practice of
having dual Party and administrative bureaucracies; instead, Party and
administrative (now Revolutionary Committee) organs were " unified into
one." Although this policy is still much in evidence, a significant counter-
tendency has also appeared.
It seems that unified structures currently exist in low level units such
as communes, educational institutions and urban residential areas. These
units all reported dual structures before the Cultural Revolution although
the Party organization often consisted of only three or four sections.*
Thus while the principle has been realized at these levels it did not involve
the dismantling of a complex Party bureaucracy. At the intermediate
levels, however, a separate Party bureaucracy is reappearing. Cadres from
the Sian Municipal Revolutionary Committee revealed that a general
office, propaganda group and political work group are attached to the
city's Party Committee and hinted that additional units are in the works
by mentioning that reorganization was still going on. The most definitive
information obtained concerns Anyang special district where a general
office, organization department, propaganda department and united front
department are subordinate to the Party Committee alone. In Linhsien
county under Anyang special district, however, cadres insisted that no
separate Party bureaucracy exists. Generally speaking, there appears to
be considerable variation from place to place concerning the existence
of Party departments. In any case, the current Anyang Party structure

8. Doak Barnett's work on a pre-Cultural Revolution South China commune,

however, does not reveal dual structures and indeed paints a picture very close to
that recounted by commune cadres concerning present practices. See A. Doak
Barnett, with a contribution by Ezra Vogel, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political
Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.
339-62. While Barnett speaks of " two parallel hierarchies " (p. 343), the Party
structure be describes only consisted of the committee and its secretaries as is the
case in the communes I visited.

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 336 The China Quarterly

is far smaller than pre-Cultural Revolution Party bureaucracies at inter-

mediate levels.9

Administrative Centralization/Decentralization
In addition to unification, post-Cultural Revolution organizational re-
forms sought more flexible administration through decentralization. But
apart from planned measures, a degree of unplanned political decentra-
lization emerged from the chaotic days of 1966-68. The problem of
obtaining both central political direction and decentralized administration
has been a delicate one.
In general, it appears that while some matters have been turned over
to lower level units,10 the weight of the Centre is felt on key matters.
According to cadres from the Sian Revolutionary Committee, production
targets for different commodities are set by the Centre, province or city,
with the Centre retaining control over the most important. A non-inclusive
list of centrally determined targets embraces iron, steel, grain, cotton,
coal and transportation. For individual factories the pre-Cultural Revol-
ution system of dual leadership by a central ministry and the local Party
Committee is still in effect. In actual practice this results in vesting
primary authority for various aspects of an enterprise at different admini-
strative levels. For example, production planning for the Chengchow
Textile Machine Building Factory is basically the prerogative of the
Ministry of Light Industry " while Honan Province is mainly concerned
with securing materials and Chengchow municipality deals with manpower
problems. Factories naturally have more frequent contacts with the geo-
graphically proximate local branches of the responsible ministry than
with the ministry itself; thus the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory's con-
tacts with the First Ministry of Machine Building tend to take place at key
points in the annual and seasonal planning cycles while those with the
ministry's Shanghai office occur several times a week. A wide variety of
channels is used to keep central authorities abreast of local developments,
however. These include conferences in Peking, conferences convened by
the Centre in the localities, inspection visits by ministerial cadres to local

9. Bamett's county had ten Party departments. Barnett, Cadres, pp. 458-59.
Including the Revolutionary Committee apparatus, Anyang now has 26 major
organs - four departments (pu), three offices (pan-kung-shih), 15 bureaux (chii),
two commissions, a storehouse and a people's court - as well as numerous sub-
ordinate units. This compares to 41 major units in Barnett's county before the
Cultural Revolution. It does, however, reflect considerable expansion since initial
Cultural Revolution measures which slashed such structures to as few as four
sections.
10. For example, prior to the Cultural Revolution central authorities deter-
mined the curriculum, textbooks and length of study for primary and middle
schools; now these matters are under the control of the provincial level.
11. While local ministerial offices translate central targets and plans into more
detailed directives for factories, cadres view these offices as branches of the relevant
ministries rather than as organs of the localities.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 337

units, and telephone conferences as well as written reports. All these

methods were in use before the Cultural Revolution and cadres could see
no significant change in the mix and frequency with which they are
utilized although all measures are now assertedly " deeper" and " more
efficient."

Remuneration Policies
Material incentives were another primary target of the Cultural Revol-
ution. Remuneration policies emphasizing such incentives had allegedly
diverted people from lofty political and social concerns and turned them
into selfish economic animals. Yet current remuneration policies still
make extensive use of material incentives, although some changes are
apparent.
Income differentials remain significant in all areas. University salaries
range from Y56 per month for beginning teachers to Y340 for senior
professors although the full range does not exist in all higher educational
institutions. Within factories the highest paid employee makes about
five times more than the lowest. In the Chengchow Textile Machine Build-
ing Factory monthly wages range from Y33 to Y106 for workers and Y33
to Y170 for technicians and cadres; in the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory
the range is Y42 to Y129 for workers while the top technical personnel
make Y210. According to the pre-Cultural Revolution cadre ranking sys-
tem which is still in effect, a grade one cadre receives up to Y728 per
month while a grade 30 cadre starts with Y20.12 In communes, where in-
come levels are not set by the state but are based on a division of actual
production, differentials are less but still considerable. For example, the
average income from the collective sector of a full time farmworker in
the most prosperous production team of the Sino-Hungarian Friendship
Commune is Y500 per year compared to Y200 in the least prosperous.
Similar differentials occur within the same production brigades which
generally correspond to natural villages.
It is not entirely clear to what extent these differentials vary from the
pre-Cultural Revolution situation but changes do not appear to be great.
The wage range was described as " about the same " at the Shanghai
Diesel Engine Factory, while cadres at the Sino-Hungarian Friendship
Commune claimed that the pre-Cultural Revolution gap was greater but
were unable to offer statistical comparisons. But if wage differentials
have not changed significantly, they are recognized as a problem " left
over from the past." In dealing with this problem, however, no drastic
alteration of remuneration policies is envisaged. Where wages are set by

12. This system, which is detailed in 1956 Chung-yang ts'ai-cheng fa-kuei hui-
piert {1956 Compendium of Financial Laws and Regulations of the People's Repub-
lic of China) (Peking: Ts'ai-cheng ch'u-pan she, 1957), pp. 226-47, applies only to
" state cadres " whose salaries are fixed by administrative decision. Cadres in rural
production brigades and small collectively operated urban enterprises earn a share
of the collective income of their units.

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 338 The China Quarterly

the state the approach is not to slash higher wages but to bring up the
lower ones over a period of years. In agriculture the work point system
is not to be tampered with; instead the commune attempts to raise the
productivity of backward brigades by sending in experienced cadres,
providing increased loans, and allowing greater attention to lucrative
sideline production. The strategy, in short, does not threaten those
benefiting from existing wage policies.
The principles underlying remuneration differ in industry and agri-
culture. In industry two very direct forms of material incentives - piece-
work wages and bonuses - do not exist. While the abolition of bonuses
appears to be largely a result of the Cultural Revolution, piecework - at
least in the Shanghai docks and Diesel Engine Factory - had already
been eliminated before the Cultural Revolution.13 It is noteworthy that
the reasons for abolishing bonuses and piecework were similar although
separated in time by the Cultural Revolution; in both cases the problem
of determining who got what resulted in conflict among the workers.14
In agriculture, however, piecework rates are used. Workpoints, as before
the Cultural Revolution, are determined according to the amount of work
done and measurement by piecework is used where it can be readily
applied. There have apparently been some changes in the assessment of
workpoints since 1965, however, with greater attention than before assert-
edly being given to "political consciousness" and "work attitude."
Moreover, such practices as giving higher workpoints during crash periods
to increase labour enthusiasm have been discarded, thus toning down
reliance on material incentives. But the central fact of remuneration
according to a measurable amount of work remains. Finally, while bonuses
do not exist in the countryside, in a sense continued cultivation of private
plots at pre-Cultural Revolution levels (roughly 7 to 8 per cent of a com-
mune's sown area) provides a functional equivalent.15 Here the peasant
can gain extra material rewards in return for additional labour and in-
genuity. Overall, changes in the remuneration system in the countryside
since 1965 appear marginal.

Educational Reform
Nowhere has the impact of the Cultural Revolution been more marked
than in higher education, and nowhere is the future more uncertain. Even
13. Barry M. Richman, who visited 38 industrial enterprises during a two-month
visit in 1966 before the Cultural Revolution, found that while about 80% of the
factories he saw had bonus systems, no individual piecework systems and few
collective piecework systems were in effect. Richman, Industrial Society in Com-
munist China (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 811.
14. On the Shanghai docks conflict was also generated by the fact that if an
accident occurred the entire work group was denied bonuses even though the fault
may have been that of one individual.
15. At Ma-ch'i-chai Commune 2,000 of 26,800 mou (7-5%) were private plots.
According to the 1962 " Revised draft regulations for work on rural People's
Communes ", Article 40, 5 to 7 % of cultivated land should be private plots.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 339

though the first post-Cultural Revolution graduations took place in late

1973, universities still operate far short of capacity.16 The experimental
nature of university reforms is repeatedly emphasized. Even where uni-
versities follow the same practice - as in adopting a basic three year course
- this reportedly reflects only the opinion of the individual institutions and
is not permanently fixed.17 Moreover, despite central authority over uni-
versity texts, the actual revision of teaching materials is largely carried
out at the various universities or in conjunction with other local educa-
tional institutions.18 Finally, university leaders reported that educational
reforms are still the subject of vigorous debate within their institutions,
although efforts to determine the precise nature of conflicting viewpoints
were unrewarding.
Reform of the content of tertiary education emphasizes the importance
of making it more attuned to the needs of society and more conducive to
creative thinking. While pre-Cultural Revolution higher education asser-
tedly drew the student into a specialized bookish world divorced from
society,19 enormous stress is now placed on developing links between the
universities and the rest of the community. Under the slogan " open door
teaching " several measures have been adopted to increase student contact
with the outside world, one of them being the establishment of university-
run factories and workshops. Moreover, regular access to factories outside
the university - 68 in the case of Pei-ta - has been expanded. The basic
guideline is that students should spend one-third of their time outside the
university in factories, rural communes or other relevant units.
With regard to intellectual creativity, it is clear that the arts and social
sciences face severe restrictions on grounds of current orthodoxy despite
such measures as open book examinations and self study.20 This was
brought home in a discussion with staff members of the International

16. Both Northwest and Fu-tan Universities are operating at less than half
capacity; Northwest has 1,400 students compared to a projected capacity of 3,000
while Fu-tan's students number 2,700 compared to 6,000 before the Cultural
Revolution. Peking University's enrolment of 6,000 was described as " not full."
One effect of a small student body is that many teachers are not involved in teach-
ing; at Fu-tan University only one-third actually teach while the remainder com-
pile educational materials, engage in research, or carry out " investigation and
study."
17. Possible erosion of the three-year principle is suggested by the allowance
of a fourth year for students at Peking University " if needed."
18. For example, Fu-tan University and Shanghai Normal School exchange
newly compiled texts.
19. There is evidence, however, that efforts to prevent this were undertaken in
the years immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution, especially via intensified
manual labour programmes for students. See Donald J. Munro, " Dissent in Com-
munist China: the current anti-intellectual campaign in perspective," Current Scene,
1 June 1966, p. 13ff.
20. Self-study consists of students pursuing individual topics and consulting with
teachers as the need arises. At Chung-shan University students can choose from a
variety of topics during the first two years and propose topics of their own during
the third year.

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 340 The China Quarterly

Relations Department of Peking University. It is noteworthy that the main

difference in teaching materials currently used by this department com-
pared to 1965 is a greater emphasis on criticism of the Soviet Union. The
reformed materials consist of Marxist-Leninist classics and Mao's works,
CCP commentaries on Party history, the international Communist move-
ment and national liberation movements, and auxiliary materials drawn
from foreign sources such as Kissinger's policy statements since 1969 -
but not his earlier scholarly writings.21 This limited fare becomes more
understandable with the knowledge that Peking University trains only
teachers of international relations; diplomats, whose craft presumably
requires a more varied and subtle education, are trained elsewhere.22
While the emphasis on creativity undoubtedly finds expression in applying
scientific principles to concrete technical problems, in areas such as inter-
national relations the core of education is mastering the formulae of the
political line.
Major changes have taken place in the enrolment of university students.
Before the Cultural Revolution, enrolment was primarily by examina-
tion 23 and all new students were higher middle school graduates. Now the
well publicized method of "voluntary application, recommendation by the
masses, approval by the leadership and re-examination by the colleges
concerned " is followed. Under this system a youth must have at least two
years of " practical experience " before applying for admission, gain the
backing of workers in his or her unit and the approval of the Party Com-
mittee, and finally face an examination administered by the university.
Although this examination emphasizes the ability to analyse problems
rather than formal knowledge, knowledge is also tested and the fact that
there may be two to five times as many candidates as places suggests a
significant weeding out of the least prepared. Nevertheless, in terms of
established educational norms, the new system enrols students substan-
tially less able than their pre-Cultural Revolution counterparts. New
students are now generally described as having middle school educational
levels; some did not graduate from higher middle school, others only

21. The reform of teaching materials focuses on political purification - eliminat-

ing " feudal, imperialist and revisionist influences " - and simplification - rewriting
" overly comprehensive and complicated" texts. For students with intellectual
curiosity, however, university libraries provide an opportunity to go beyond the
limited horizons of these materials. While these libraries have apparently been
subjected to some Cultural Revolution cleansing, they still contain such thought
provoking items as traditional novels, back runs of provincial newspapers, revolu-
tionary histories published in the 1950s, and pamphlets by Lin Piao. In general,
library stacks seem accessible to students.
22. China's only other known department of international relations at Fu-tan
University also does not produce diplomats; they apparently are trained at the
Institute of Foreign Affairs. The Peking and Fu-tan departments were established
shortly before the Cultural Revolution and thus lack a long tradition.
23. There was room for the application of other criteria in cases where examina-
tion scores were identical or very close; then the applicant with the better class
background was chosen. See also note 35, below.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 341

attended lower middle school, and the background of still others combines
primary school and spare time training. The problems these students face
in adjusting to university life are recognized and efforts are made to ease
the transition through a period of remedial study after matriculation.
Although the new enrolment system has a definite levelling bias, there
are exceptions which create favoured groups. In fields where the develop-
ment of skills from a young age is considered essential, as in fine arts and
physical culture, the requirement of two years' practical experience is
sometimes waived and students enter universities directly upon gradua-
tion from middle school. The elasticity inherent in the " at least two
years " requirement also results in discrimination; thus language students
are apparently snapped up as soon as their " practical experience " (some-
times in such organizations as CITS) reaches two years while applicants
for other fields may have a much longer wait. Another form of favouritism
benefits PLA men; once soldiers make their applications the entire
process of admission can take as little as a month while rusticated youths
may have to wait years before they are accepted.24
In terms of class origins (ch'u shen) the new enrolment system has
produced some important but less striking changes than current rhetoric
would suggest. This is illustrated by the following summary in Table 1 of
class origins of recently enrolled students at Northwest University
together with a class breakdown of Pei-tcfs student body before and
after the Cultural Revolution.

Table 1.
Class Origins of University Students

I. Recent enrolment at Northwest University

Workers 560+ (c.42%)
Peasants 460+ (e.35%)
Revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals 300+ (c.23%)
II. Peking University student body
Befcwe the Cultural Revolutu?n 1973
Workers and peasants 70% 80-90%
(half workers,
half peasants)
Revolutionary cadres and
revolutionary intellectuals " a great number " 10% +
Exploiting classes 10-20% 1-2%

While there has been an increase in the proportion of students from

worker and peasant homes, it is notable that these elements had achieved

24. This observation is based on conversations between D. A. Low of the ANU

delegation and students at Fu-tan University. PLA men are also favoured in that
they retain their army salaries which may be three times the stipend for ordinary
students.

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 342 The China Quarterly

predominance before the Cultural Revolution.25 The relative position of

the offspring of " revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals "
has probably slipped slightly, although not a great deal.26 The most drastic
change is the cutback of children from the " exploiting classes," i.e. the
bourgeoisie, rich peasants, landlords and " counter-revolutionaries."
Finally, the new enrolment system does not fully come to grips with a
critical target of the Cultural Revolution - narrowing the differential
between city and countryside. In a country which is still more than 80 per
cent rural, urban workers are greatly over-represented among the current
crop of university students.
While the new enrolment policy tries to provide greater equality in
admissions, changes concerning the assignment of graduates attempt to
prevent the emergence of a university trained elite. Before the Cultural
Revolution, all university graduates received job assignments from the
state. While some assignments were better than others, all graduates were
immediately recruited into the special world of cadre and professional
careers. Now the stated policy is that " most" graduates will return to
the production units from which they came but some will receive job
assignments from the state. Since no classes had graduated at the time of
my visit, no figures were available concerning the proportions which
receive state jobs or return to their units. The criteria used in determining
who gets the choice state jobs is also unclear.27 Particularly in view of the
preference for urban assignments28 - something admitted by a number
of students under questioning - it is likely that while the new policy will
provide a flow of university graduates to the countryside it will also
generate tension among those competing for desirable positions.
In sum, although far-reaching changes have taken place in higher

25. There is evidence of a conscious policy to increase the production of worker

and peasant students in some institutions in the period immediately preceding the
Cultural Revolution - a time when educational policy was under the personal
leadership of l i u Shao-ch'i. See Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness
Account of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 114.
26. Information given to a Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars delegation
at Wuhan University in March 1972 suggests an even stronger position for this
group. The figures for 1970-71 students were: workers - 446, peasants - 57, PLA
- 71, intellectual youth - 422, others (including barefoot doctors and children of
cadres) - 249. Note also the relevance of the low number of peasant students to the
following discussion. I am indebted to D. Gordon White for making available his
notes of the CCAS tour.
27. In a perhaps comparable situation, students who began their course at Chung-
shan University before the Cultural Revolution graduated in 1970. Of 200 grad-
uates of the foreign languages department, 20 were retained for positions at the
university. According to one student who stayed on, no single criterion was em-
ployed and many with better linguistic abilities than he were sent to teach in the
countryside. Besides academic achievement, political behaviour and the location
of the student's family were also taken into account.
28. In this respect students recruited from urban factories have an inherent
advantage over those from the countryside since even if they do not receive state
assignments and return to their units they wind up in the cities.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 343

education since the Cultural Revolution the new system contains impor-
tant contradictions inhibiting the achievement of Mao's goals. The desire
to stimulate creativity runs head on into a stifling political orthodoxy;
only in technically oriented fields is the problem largely avoided. Perhaps
more troublesome are the seeds of elitism. Some types of applicants are
favoured by the admissions policy and some graduates are tapped for a
higher calling. Universities apparently remain an important channel of
upward mobility, if only for some of their students.

Sending Educated Youth to the Countryside

The policy of sending educated youth to the countryside pre-dates the
Cultural Revolution although it has been implemented in a much more
thorough-going manner since 1968.39 Now far fewer individuals or groups
are excluded and there is greater emphasis on permanent residence in the
rural areas. But the objectives are unchanged, including clearing the cities
of unemployed youth, providing skills for agricultural development, and
reducing the gap between urban and rural areas. Moreover, as before the
policy is a source of considerable social tension.
Although the more thorough implementation of the programme has
resulted in greater equity, the process is still selective. In Shanghai as
elsewhere some of the educated youth are sent to distant border areas,
some go to areas as close as the municipality's suburbs, while others are
assigned jobs within the city itself. The proportions of each are unclear:
cadres at both the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory and the Feng-ch'eng
Street Revolutionary Committee claimed to have no knowledge on this
score although both institutions are involved in the implementation of the
policy. What is clear is that both middle school students approaching
graduation and their parents have a marked preference for local assign-
ments.
A number of urban alternatives are open for educated youth. Two
major categories are apparent. The first has elitist overtones as it involves
young people with special skills. Several examples have already been
mentioned - fine arts and physical culture students admitted directly into
university upon middle school graduation and language students assigned
to jobs with organizations like CITS. Another channel is the recruitment
of talented youngsters by professional drama troupes, orchestras, etc. - a
process which starts at an early age. For example, representatives of pro-
fessional troupes come to the Children's Palace of Shanghai's Ching-an
district, a remarkable institution which provides special courses in music

29. For a discussion covering both pre- and post-Cultural Revolution periods,
see D. Gordon White's forthcoming China Quarterly article, " The politics of social
change in modern China: the case of Hsia-hsiang Youth." The pre-Cultural Revo-
lution administration of the policy in Shanghai, where most of my information was
gathered, is dealt with in Lynn T. White III, "Shanghai's polity in Cultural
Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), The City in Communist China (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 335-38.

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 344 The China Quarterly

and the arts as well as in scientific subjects for children from ages seven
to thirteen,30 and select some of the most promising youngsters for further
training. The second category - employment by local industry - undoubt-
edly involves a more significant portion of educated youth. In this regard
the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory has two methods of recruiting middle
school graduates. One is directly into the factory for a three-year appren-
ticeship " ; the other is via enrolment in a two-year course at the factory's
technical school prior to assignment as a regular worker. According to
factory cadres the children of workers employed by the enterprise receive
no special consideration; however, " some preference " is given to middle
school graduates living nearby and it is a principle of urban planning that
workers' houses should be built as close to their factories as possible.
The selection process to determine who will be sent to the countryside
and who will remain in the city involves a number of participants and
considerations. In Shanghai's Feng-ch'eng street area the critical decision
is made by a " four in one " combination of urban district authorities,
school leaders, students and their families. The district authorities seem
to implement decisions made at the municipal level concerning the num-
bers and types of young people required for urban jobs. The various
industrial bureaux, reflecting the requests of factories under their jurisdic-
tion, determine the manpower requirements for local industry in conjunc-
tion with the municipal Labour Bureau. Each district presumably is
responsible for selecting a share of this work force, as well as mobilizing
youths not needed in urban jobs to " go down " to rural areas. The school
purportedly plays an important role although none of the cadres
questioned on this point were able to define it. The school's possession of
information on each student's aptitudes and behaviour, however, suggests
a hand in matching individuals with whatever assignment criteria is
determined by higher authority.
While the role of students is also unclear, families - and more generally
public opinion - are a key factor in the equation. The " needs and diffi-
culties " of families is one of the factors taken into account; it can involve
such concerns as the health of parents or the financial situation of the
household. Moreover, there appears to be a rule that at least one child
from a family will be kept in the city or a nearby suburb. But even with
an apparently firm policy of not sending all the children from one family
to remote areas there is plenty of room for pushing and shoving over the
selection of youth for rural assignments. The actual work of selecting and
30. The Ching-an Children's Palace, one of 11 in Shanghai, serves more than
50,000 children in this age group. The great bulk of these children come once a
month for general activities such as watching plays or going through an obstacle
course representing the Long March. In addition, 1,400 to 1,500 carefully selected
children come once or twice a week for six month courses in chorus, violin, draw-
ing, etc. These children are expected to become activists in their schools and spread
the skills they learn at the palace.
31. Apprentices are paid a monthly wage of Y18 in the first year, Y20 in the
second, and Y22 in the third, or roughly one-third the average workers' wage in
this factory.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 345

mobilizing individuals is carried out by " to the mountains and villages

groups " (shang-shan hsia-hsiang tsu) at the neighbourhood (li-nung) level.
These groups engage in a great deal of bargaining and persuasion. They
must convince public opinion in the neighbourhood that their choices
are reasonable and do not unfairly damage the interests of any family. If
decisions seem arbitrary aggrieved families can enlist the support of their
friends to bring social pressure to bear on the neighbourhood cadres for
reconsideration. Thus despite the greater equity of the youth to the
countryside movement since the Cultural Revolution, the human anxieties
and problems of implementation remain much the same.

May 7 Cadre Schools

The May 7 Cadre School is an innovation of the Cultural Revolution
although its objectives - political indoctrination, participation in manual
labour, and development of contacts between town and city cadres and
the peasantry - are long-standing CCP goals. These schools vary in size,
location and student body. Cadre schools for central organizations are
apparently based on functional categories. For example, CITS personnel
attend a May 7 school in rural Honan together with personnel from other
units dealing with foreigners such as the various Friendship Associations.
For Peking municipality roughly 30 schools cover every bureau, urban
district and county.32 The PLA maintains its own May 7 schools separate
from their civilian counterparts.
The May 7 Cadre School for Peking's Ch'ung-wen district, a " middle
to small " school with a current enrolment of 400, re-educates leading and
ordinary cadres from administrative offices at the district level as well as
some street level officials, factory, school and shop cadres, and primary
and middle school teachers. It operates under the leadership of the district
Revolutionary Committee and is staffed by early graduates who demon-
strated an aptitude for political education. Although considerable empha-
sis is placed on the role students played in using " their own hands " to
build the school rather than wait for aid from higher levels, the school has
received considerable material support from the district government.
Altogether, including both a substantial initial investment and annual
upkeep, the district has spent about Y300.000 in the five years of the
school's existence. Above that the salaries of cadres studying at the school
continue to be paid out of district funds. The location of the school in the
Peking suburbs also tends to make for intimate ties with the district. In
this regard the situation is quite different from geographically removed
schools such as that attended by CITS personnel. Cadres at the Ch'ung-
wen district school can return home for two days every two weeks and

32. Each of Peking's eight urban districts and nine counties apparently has its
own school. This indicates that some municipal level bureaux are combined, prob-
ably on a functional basis, for purposes of May 7 training since a city of Peking's
size certainly has more than a dozen or so bureaux.

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 346 The China Quarterly

thus maintain much closer contact with family, friends and co-workers
than those sent a substantial distance.
The education at the May 7 schools can be divided into two categories:
(1) mastering theory and policy; (2) cultivating proper attitudes via labour
and contact with the masses. Time is apportioned equally between the
two overall although there is seasonal variation. One gains the definite
impression, however, that the study of documents is considered the more
important task. In this study great emphasis is placed on basic theory;
students read Marxist-Leninist classics and Mao's writings rather than
condensed summaries.33 In addition, documents on the current domestic
and international situation are studied - with emphasis on criticism of
modern revisionism, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao. As in the universities,
stress is placed on self study by individuals. With regard to manual
labour, the Ch'ung-wen school has a small factory but the main form is
participation in agricultural production.34 Contact with the poor and
lower-middle peasant masses is achieved by inviting peasants into the
school to lecture on the bitter past and current agricultural policies and
by sending students to nearby communes for brief periods of working,
studying, eating and living with the villagers.
As cadres readily acknowledge, none of the features of the May 7
experience is new. Before the Cultural Revolution regular programmes
of cadre labour existed, political study was carried out in both bureau-
cratic units and special Party schools, and office workers were sent to the
countryside for what was often a longer and closer association with the
peasantry than the May 7 schools provide. What then is different? The
answer given by a cadre attending the Ch'ung-wen school is that the
May 7 experiment provides a better opportunity to integrate the various
aspects of re-education. For example, he claimed that while the pre-
Cultural Revolution Party schools conducted intensive study, they had no
programme of manual labour. But now a cadre can engage in factory and
field labour, study theory and policy and link up with the peasant masses,
all in one concentrated period. Yet it is noteworthy that the leaders of the
school said that one of its major shortcomings was inadequate knowledge
of how to combine all these activities - especially theoretical study and
manual work. Moreover, some of the schools' practices do not appear
designed to achieve maximum integration of diverse experiences. Not only
are entire schools organized functionally but the organization within the
geographically defined Ch'ung-wen school is similarly based. Thus one
company, the intermediate level within May 7 schools, consisted entirely
of school teachers while its subordinate squads were set up according to
the street areas where they taught. This was defended on the grounds that
people with similar backgrounds and personal familiarity can learn better

33. The number of classics studied does not appear to be extensive, however.
At the Ch'ung-wen school theoretical study seemed limited to The Civil War in
France.
34. This also has a serious economic aspect with the school's produce marketed
to the state.

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 Before and After the Cultural Revolution 347

from each other. But it does not maximize the opportunity for educational
workers and cadres responsible for agriculture or industry to learn from
one another; in short, it does not meet the underlying rationale of Mao's
May 7 directive that each individual should have knowledge of as many
aspects of life as possible.33 It is also possible that the procedure simply
transfers the attitudes, problems and social pressures of the original units
to a new setting without producing desired changes. Finally, it must be
asked whether one concentrated period combining study, labour and mass
contacts - a period which must suffice for several years - ultimately
provides greater " integration " than the sum of the various pre-Cultural
Revolution programmes.
One last point concerns the process of regularizing May 7 schools since
their establishment in 1968. In some respects this has resulted in a more
effective pursuit of their objectives. For example, when the schools were
initially set up students did not establish contacts with the peasants; only
subsequently were systems for peasant visits to the schools and student
participation in village life developed. But perhaps more significant is the
likelihood that regularization has meant routinization. At first great
uncertainty surrounded the schools and cadres did not know what to
expect. The term of study varied widely from as little as three months to
two years or more. Cadres were called back to work irregularly,
apparently largely in response to personnel needs created by the revitaliza-
tion of administrative units. But the fact that " some got more and some
less " from study also played a part in reassignments. By 1972, however,
the schools were operating under a system where in principle everyone
attended a six-month course by rotation. The schedule of who goes to
the schools is known well in advance and the great majority of cadres
return to their original posts afterwards. Under this system an individual
attends a May 7 school every five to six years under predictable condi-
tions.36 In short, the anxiety-producing features of the schools have been
eliminated. While this may make life easier for cadres, it may also dilute
the impact of the experience. Much as the effectiveness of pre-Cultural
Revolution rectification measures was eroded by repeated use,37 the May
7 Cadre Schools are in danger of becoming another familiar feature of the
political landscape which knowing cadres can easily manipulate.

Conclusion
Although important changes have taken place in Chinese politics and
society since the launching of the Cultural Revolution, in many respects
35. Mao's directive is translated in Jerome Ch'en (ed.), Mao Papers: Anthology
and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 103-105.
36. The five- to six-year interval was given as what a CITS cadre can expect; it is
also consistent with the rate of turnover at the Ch'ung-wen district school. At
some May 7 schools cadres have reportedly begun their second time round.
37. See Frederick C. Teiwes, " A case study of rectification: the 1958 Cheng-
feng Cheng-kai campaign in Hui-tung County," Papers on Far Eastern History,
March 1973, pp. 71-99, passim.

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 348 The China Quarterly

the situation in 1973 appears different from 1965 only in degree. Where
there are innovations, as the May 7 Cadre Schools, it is often unclear how
much actual difference they make from pre-Cultural Revolution practices.
And in some fields, e.g. remuneration in the agricultural sector, conti-
nuities with 1965 overwhelm whatever change has occurred. Overall, there
is considerable variation from area to area with changes in education the
most profound, those in agriculture the least significant, and those con-
cerning the arts, factories, the bureaucracy and various social policies
occupying the intermediate ground.
It is worth asking whether the results of the Cultural Revolution mani-
fest in 1973 could have been achieved at less cost by a combination of
traditional rectification methods and administrative measures. Leaving
aside questions of power politics, in many areas this appears true. It did
not require a Cultural Revolution to eliminate industrial bonuses or set
up May 7 Cadre Schools. But if there has been a pendular swing away
from the full extent of Cultural Revolution reforms, the drastic nature of
the movement has significantly limited the reaction. Thus the re-emer-
gence of a separate Party bureaucracy has, five years after the Cultural
Revolution, reached only a nascent stage. And in some areas - most
notably education - changes have been so far reaching that only the clean
sweep of the Cultural Revolution broom made them possible. The cor-
ollary question, suggested at the outset of this report and discussed with
regard to May 7 schools, is whether the institutionalization of Cultural
Revolution reforms is robbing them of their vitality and leading to a
restoration of discredited practices. This question lies behind current talk
of more Cultural Revolutions.

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