WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE

HEFT 78

DAVID HIGGINS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF

CLASSICAL RDZOGS CHEN IN TIBET
Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (,sems)
and Primordial Knowing (ye shes)

ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCH E UND BUD DHISTISCHE STUDIEN U N IVERSITÄT W IEN

W IEN 2013
 W IE N E R ST U D IE N
Z U R TIBETO LO G IE U N D B U D D H ISM U SK U N D E

GEGRÜNDET VON
ERNST STEINKELLNER

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
BIRGIT KELLNER, HELMUT KRASSER,
HELMUT TAUSCHER

HEFT 78

WIEN 2013
 DAVID HIGGINS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF

CLASSICAL RDZOGS CHEN IN TIBET
Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (sems)
and Primordial Knowing (ye shes)

WIEN 2013
The printing of this book was supported by the
Chair of Buddhist Studies of the University of Lausanne
with means from the Fonds Elisabeth de Boer

Copyright © 2013 by
Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien / David Higgins
ISB N : 978-3-902501-16-5

IM P R E S S U M
Verleger: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien
Universitätscampus AAKH, Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien
Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich:
Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser, Helmut Tauscher
alle: Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien
Druck: Ferdinand Berger und Söhne GmbH, Wiener Straße 80, 3580 Horn
 CONTENTS

Contents 5

Prologue 8

Section One: Understanding the rDzogs chen D istinctions 17

Part I Background 18
1 I Introduction: the Distinctions as a Window on Classical rDzogs chen 18
1. Two Principal Distinctions: Sems/Ye shes and Kun gzhi/Chos sku 18
2. The Place of the Distinctions in Classical rNying ma Soteriology 24
3. The Disclosive Paradigm 27
4. On the Obscure Origins of the sNying thig System 3Q
5. The Lives and Works of Four Major rDzogs chen Figures 35
5.1 Vimalamitra 35
5.2 gNyags Jñānakumāra 37
5.3 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes 40
5.4 Klong chen rab ’byams 43
6. Previous Studies and Scope of Present Work 53

Part II The Problem of Knowledge: The Sems/Ye shes Distinction 57

2 I The Nature and Scope of the M ind/Primordial Knowing Distinction 57
1. The Scope of the Distinction 57
2. The rDzogs chen sNying thig Analysis of Mind (sems) 66
2.1 Dualism 67
2.2 Ignorance 69
2.3 Reification 74
3. The rDzogs chen sNying thig Analysis of Ye shes and Related Concepts 78
3.1 rDzogs chen Intepretations of Sems nyid 79
3.2 rDzogs chen Interpretation of Rig pa and Rang rig 86
3.3 rDzogs chen Interpretation of Ye shes 99
4. Concluding Remarks: Reframing the Two Truths 111
 3 I Classical Justifications of the M ind/Primordial Knowing Distinction 120
1. Why the Distinction? 12Q
2. Some Consequences of Not Distinguishing Mind and Primordial Knowing 123
3. Criticisms of the Cessation of Jñāna Doctrine 127
4. Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments 133

PartIII The Problem of the Ground: The Kun gzhi/Chos sku Distinction 140
4 | The Ground in Early rDzogs chen (8th to 11th c.) 140
1. Background 140
2. Two Dimensions of the Ground Problem 142
3. The Yogācāra Model: Scope and Limitations 147
4. Toward a Primordially Unaffected Ground of Consciousnesss 15Q
* Ye shes sde’s Eighth Century Synthesis of Yogācāra and Tathägatagarbha Views 16Q
5. Conceptual History of the Ground in Early rDzogs chen 163
5.1 Soteriological Context of the Ground 163
5.2 A Typology of the Ground in early rDzogs chen 163
(a) Ground as the Nature of Mind (sems nyid, ye shes, rig pa) 168
(b) Ground as the Nature of Reality (de bzhin nyid, de kho na nyid, chos nyid) 170
(c) Ground as Buddha Nature (bde gshegs snying po, byang chub snying po) 173

5 | Distinguishing the sNying thig Ground of Freedom (grol gzhi) 183

1. Stages of Differentiating the Sütric and rDzogs chen Grounds 183
1.1 Identity: Ground as Common Source of Samsära and Nirväna 185
1.2 Divergence: Conflicting Interpretations of Kun Gzhi 189
1.3 Difference: Clearly Distinguishing the Grounds 192
2. A Central Problem: Does Errancy Exist in The Ground? 198
2.1 The Response of gNyags Jñānakumāra (8th Century) 199
2.2 The Response of Rog Bande Shes rab ’od (12th Century) 2Q1
2.3 The Response of Klong chen rab ’byams pa (14th Century) 2Q3
3. The sNying thig Primordial Ground and its Critics 2Q6
3.1 The Abiding versus Metaphysical Grounds 207
3.2 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Critique and rNying ma Responses 213
4. Concluding Remarks: The rDzogs chen Idea of Freedom 217

Part IV The Problem of the Path: Implications of the Sems/Ye shes Distinction 222

6 | rNying ma Path Hermeneutics and the Problem of Reconciliation 222

1. Overview: Bridging the Vehicles 226
2. The Problem of Gradualism in rNying ma Perspective 229
3. Nature and Scope of the Reconciliation Problem 231
 3.1 The Exegetical Dimension: Doctrinal Synthesis and Narrative Unity 251
* Comparison with gSar ma Path Summaries of Atiśa, sGam po pa, Tsong kha pa 257
3.2 The Hermeneutical Dimension: Intemalizing the Path 245
4. rNying ma Soteriological Schemes: From Soteriology to Aletheiology 249
4.1 The Path as Emancipation Process and Clearing Process 249
4.2 Yon tan rgya mtsho on Disciplines (sdom) as Stages of Refinement 255

7 I rDzogs chen Transformations of the Path 255

1. The rDzogs chen Path Without Progression (bgrod du med pa 7 lam) 255
2. Where the Ladder Ends: A Path Beyond Its Representations 264

Section Two: Tibetan Texts and Translations 267

1. Klong chen pa’s Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan 268
1.1 Introductory Remarks 268
1.2 Translation: A Reply to Questions Conceming Mind and Primordial Knowing 269
1.3 Sources and Conventions Used in Preparing Critial Edition 289
1.3 A Critical Edition of Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan 290

2. Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod (excerpts) 5QQ

2.1 Introductory Remarks 500
2.2 Translation: Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (excerpts) 5Q1
2.3 Sources and Conventions Used in Preparing Edited Text 515
2.4 Edited Text of Theg mchog mdzod XIV (excerpts) 516

3. ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 with Yon tan rgya mtsho’s Commentary 527
3.1 Introductory Remarks 527
3.2 Translation: Treasury of Qualities XII.9-23 with Commentary (excerpts) 527
3.3 Sources and Conventions Used in Preparing Edited Text 555
3.4 Edited Text of Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 and Commentary 555

Bibliography and Abbreviations 541

Index 56Q
 I Prologue

“The distinction between mind and primordial knowing

{ Should be understood by those who are wise.”

Pearl Garland Tantra

(Mu tig phreng ba)

Although the past three decades have witnessed a surge of interest, both populär and
academic, in the syncretistic Tibetan tradition known as rDzogs chen (“Great Perfection”),
there has been little to date in the way of critical study of its philosophical foundations or
key doctrinal developments.1 A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic
appraisal of rNying ma (“Ancient Ones”) views on the nature of mind that traces their
evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamātra, Madhyamaka, Pramānavāda,
and Vajrayāna views. rNying ma contributions to the understanding of human consciousness
merit attention not only because of their intrinsic interest and relevance to contemporary
philosophies of mind but also because they provide an indispensable key to understanding
this tradition’s complex Systems of thought and practice. As a tentative Step toward at least
defining the parameters of this crucial but neglected field of inquiry, the following work
investigates the nature and significance of the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and
primordial knowing (ye shes), and the related distinction between the all-ground (kun gzhi)
and dharmakäya (chos sku), as these two are presented and defended within Tibetan rDzogs

1 The current lack o f critical engagement with the subject matter o f rDzogs chen - of a kind and calibre one has
come to expect in contemporary Buddhist epistemology for example - can, and often does, give the impression that
philosophical rigour, clarity and systematicity are simply lacking in, or have been avoided by, rNying ma thinkers. I
can think o f three reasons for this misconception: 1) the relatively recent development o f rNying ma studies; 2) the
enduring stereotype (among Western and Tibetan scholars) of rNying ma (Ancient) as an antinomian tradition
pursued by wild-eyed shaman-mystics averse to scholarship, rational discourse and textual analysis in contrast to the
more sober-minded rationally inclined gSar ma (New) scholar-clerics (on which see Dalton 2002: 12); 3) the
challenging nature (both to understanding and praxis) of rNying ma views o f mind vis-à-vis the prevailing Anglo-
American representationalist epistemology that underlies much o f the recent work on Buddhist theories of
knowledge. The third consideration is o f particular relevance here as I will argue that rNying ma attempts to
articulate the conditions for the possibility o f nondual primordial knowing (ye shes) led them, in interesting ways,
to abandon subject/object epistemologies, realist as well as anti-realist, in a manner comparable to attempts by
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein to overcome mediational epistemologies in Western philosophy.
chen traditions between the 8th and 14th centuries. In taking a synoptic vicw of thcse
philosophical developments, my aim has been to trace the conceptual genealogies of the
distinctions and examine how they were shaped by, and reciprocally shaped, the scholastic
and contemplative milieux in which they emerged. From their origins as spiritual
instructions (man ngag) transmitted by early, mostly Indian masters of the Royal Dynastie
Period (610-910)2, through their defence and articulation.within wider contexts of Buddhist
doctrine and soteriology by scholar-adepts of the Period of Monastic Hegemony (1249-
1705), the distinctions emerge as formative elements of rDzogs chen theory and praxis.

As a work of philosopical interpretation and reconstruction, my investigation has

been guided by a number of pertinent questions: Why did rDzogs chen writers from the 12th
Century onward consider the sems/ye shes and kun gzhi/chos sku distinctions so crucial for
understanding the rDzogs chen path and Buddhist soteriology in general? What antecedent
Buddhist doctrines contributed to the distinctions and how were they in tum (re)interpreted
in light of them? Wherein lay the power and attraction of the underlying constellation of
guiding ideas/ideals - ye shes, rig pa, chos sku, byang chub kyi sems, gzhi - that so inspired
scholar/practitioners? What was the relationship between these idées forces and the
contemplative practices and experiences with which they were inextricably connected?3 In
addressing such questions, my objective has been not only to elucidate some of the ideas
that were central to the classical sNying thig System but also to bring into sharper focus the

z The three periods referred to in this study are the Royal Dynastie Period (610-910), The Period o f Fragmentation
(910-1249), and the Period o f Monastic Hegemony (1249-1705). This is a pared down version of the periodization
scheme proposed by Cuevas 2006.1 sometimes use “classical” with reference to the Period of Monastic Hegemony.
3 Determining a genetic relationship between Buddhist ideas and practices is far from unproblematic, as recent
debates on this issue suggest. For a defence of the view that all central Buddhist metaphysical views derive from
meditative praxis, see Schmithausen 1973, an abridged version o f which was published as “On the Problem of the
Relation o f Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism,” Schmithausen 1976. For a recent criticism of
this view, see Franco 2009. Against theories presupposing an isomorphic relationship between metaphysics and
meditation, Franco (2009: 96 f.) advocates an inquiry standpoint that acknowledges the complexity and
heterogeneity o f this relationship, arguing that “its varieties cannot be reduced to a single homogeneous model.” On
balance, it seems prudent not only to acknowledge the central place that the reciprocal relationship between views
and meditation occupies in Buddhist soteriological Systems - as reflected in the ‘emic’ categories used to schematize
teachings such as the four successive disciplines (yoga : m al ’byor) of view (Ita ba), meditation (sgom pa), conduct
{spyod pa) and fruition ( ’bras bü), or the three insights (prajñã : shes rab) bom of studying (thos pa), thinking
(bsam pa) and meditation (sgom pa) - but also to take into consideration (as far as is possible) the constellation of
linguistic, historical, doctrinal-systematic, sectarian, imaginative and didactic factors that typically condition
traditonal presentations.
motivating interests, concems and questions that led its adherents to investigate and
formulate the distinctions in the ways that they did. This type of genealogical inquiry is less
speculative than one might suppose. Fortunately, rDzogs chen is a tradition that has left us
many guideposts in the form of questions posed, problems defined, and intentions explicitly
stated (these latter are typically found in “statements of intent” at the beginnings of works or
in colophons). These have served as points of departure and orientation for the present
investigation which attempts to probe beneath the doxographical surface of rDzogs chen
exegesis to get at the philosophical and soteriological issues involved. Indeed, the history of
rDzogs chen attempts to articulate and justify the principal distinctions can fruitfully be read
as a series of ongoing responses to certain general problem areas that had long claimed the
attention of rDzogs chen scholar-practitioners. It is here important to stress that the aim and
significance of the rDzogs chen distinctions are only understandable when situated within
context of living praxis the evolving repetoire of spiritual exercises from which they
developed and toward which they were oriented.4
The main section of this book is organized around three soteriological problem areas
(with two chapters devoted to each) that I have staked out for the purpose investigating the
distinctions. Taken in sequence, these encompass problems conceming the nature of
liberating knowledge (gnoseology), the grounds of human reality (ontology), and the

4 Pierre Hadot has made a similar claim with regard to premodem Greco-Roman and Christian philosophies. Based
on his meticulous translations and interpretations o f the Greek and Latin sources, Hadot argues that these
philosophies were inextricably bound up with certain exercitia spiritualia (a term adopted by Ignatius of Loyola
based on the original sense o f the Greco-Christian term aksesis) that were concemed less with abstract theorizing
and doctrinal exegesis than with the formation and transformation of the individual. Therefore, the sense and
significance o f these works only becomes intelligible when they are considered in light of this context of ‘living
praxis’. According to Hadot, the work of ancient philosophy, “even if it is apparently theoretical and systematic, is
written not so much to inform the reader o f a doctrinal content but to form him, to make him traverse a certain
itinerary in the course o f which he will make spiritual progress.” (Hadot 1995: 64) “Philo^ophy then appears in its
original aspect: not as a theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world in a
new way. It is an attempt to transform mankind. Contemporary historians o f philosophy are today scarcely inclined
to pay attention to this aspect, although it is an essential one. The reason for this is that, in conformity with a
tradition inherited from the Middle Ages and from the modern era, they consider philosophy to be a purely abstract-
theoretical activity.” (Ibid.: 106). In the rDzogs chen context, mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum (1158-1213) has drawn a
similar contrast between adherents of philosophical Systems {grub pa 7 mtha 7 rjes su ’dzin pa) who deal with a
ground that is an intellectual object {shes bya 7 gzhi) and adherents o f the path {lam du rjes su ’dzin pa) who deal
with a ground that is ascertained as their abiding condition {gzhi kyi gnas lugs). See his rDzogs pa chen po Tshig
don bcu geig pa: 16.9 f. and Klong chen pa’s Tshig don mdzod: 778.5 f.. These differing views on the ground (viz.,
one’s fundamental soteriological frame of reference) are investigated in chapter 5.
Buddhist path (soteriology). This main section is preceded by an introductory chapter (part
one) that introduces the distinctions as comerstones of rDzogs chen sNying thig doctrine
and sheds light on their historical and sociocultural background. The problem of knowledge
investigated in part two concems the ancient Buddhist question of what conditions are
necessary for a person to become enlightened (bodhi). Posed another way, what are the
conditions of possibility of the unconditioned nondual mode of awareness deemed
constitutive of being a buddha or ‘awakened one’ (<buddhajñãna)? Chapter two sets out, in
light of this question, to investigate the scope and nature of the distinction between mind and
primordial knowing. It examines the characteristics associated with each, and then briefly
considers how the distinction laid the foundations for classical rDzogs chen and shaped its
often Creative (re)interpretations of Buddhist doctrine. Chapter three examines some key
philosophical arguments that were adumbrated during the classical period to justify and
defend the distinction, with special focus on the use of transcendental arguments of the
general form ‘for y to be possible, x must be the case’.

The problem of the ground that forms part three of this work concems the ultimate
‘grounds’ of freedom and error, where the term gzhi (‘ground’) refers both to what is
considered fundamental and to sources of legitimation (in a manner similar to the dual
senses of the English ‘ground’ and German ‘Grund’). Chapter four takes up rDzogs chen
investigations into the conditions of possibility of the mode of being of a buddha, variously
termed the ground (gzhi), the ground of all (kun gzhi), dharmakäya (chos sku), the abiding
condition (gnas lugs). It surveys the early development of rDzogs chen “ground” and “all-
ground” conceptions as they developed in relation to three constellations of core
soteriological ideas: nature of mind (sems nyid, ye shes), nature of reality (chos nyid, de
bzhin nyid) and buddha nature (byang chub snying po, de bzhin gshegs p a fi snying po).
Chapter five addresses the question of why classical sNying thig sources increasingly
emphasized a distinction between grounds of freedom (grol gzhi) and error ( ’khrul gzhi)
when earlier rDzogs chen sources tended to stress their unity rather than difference. In doing
so, it investigates how classical rNying ma exegetes sought to reconcile their own early
rDzogs chen ground conceptions (gzhi, kun gzhi) with Yogācāra speculations on the
ālaya[vijñāna] (kun gzhi [mam par shes pa]) and with Tathägatagarbha discourses on innate
buddahood. The focus then shifts to the sNying thig conception of the primordial ground to
determine how and why it was distinguished both from the all-ground (kun gzhi) in its
multiple aspects as well as the various so-called intellectual grounds (shes bya’i gzhi) that
were criticized as foundationalist abstractions. The final part of the chapter looks at how the
rDzogs chen ground problem involved a radical reinterpretation of the ancient Indian idea of
freedom (moksa), seeing it as a fundamental mode of being of the subject rather than a
teleocratic aim (“freedom from samsära”) as it had often been viewed in the Indian tradition.

The problem of the path investigated in part four of this book brings into focus some
important soteriological implications of the distinction between mind and primordial
knowing that became central to rNying ma path hermeneutics in the classical period.
Chapter six takes up the problem of how the authors of classical rNying ma path summaries
sought to reconcile progressivist sötric and non-progressivist tantric models of the Buddhist
path on the basis of this distinction. The rNying ma authors faced two main problems of
reconciliation: an exegetical or content-focused problem of combining in a single narrative
structure the quite different models of the path delineated in the sütras and tantras, and a
hermeneutical or context-focused problem of how an individual can make sense of and make
an experience of (nyams su len) these divergent paths through his or her own application. In
contrast to the authors of Lam rim (Stages o f the Path) scriptures of other Tibetan schools
who largely confined their path summaries to non-tantric Mahāyāna content, relegating the
study and practice of tantra to separate works and disciplines, rNying ma exegetes sought to
accommodate the heterogeneous subject matter of the vehicles within a disclosive
Mantrayāna-Tathāgatagarbha-based path structure and to thematize the problems of
reconciliation in terms of the mind/primordial knowing structure of consciousness. Chapter
seven tums to the question of how one follows a path where there is, quite literally, none to
follow. A disclosive view of awakening leaves little room for ideas of linear progression and
teleological deliberation. “The path of spiritual awakening has nothing to do with
progression,” says a work ascribed to Padmasambhava, “it is the very essence of the
awakened mind.” Thus the problem of reconciling sötric and tantric paths comes down to to
the problem of accommodating a path espousing purposive progression (rtsol bcas) to an
effortless (rtsol med) rDzogs chen path that spontaneously unfolds precisely when the
willful deliberations of dualistic mind have ceased. For Klong chen pa, (1308-1364) this
vital tension between voluntary (sems-based) and involuntary (ye shes-based) aspects of
soteriology captures the dialectical nature of the path itself - the progressive familiarization
with primordial knowing as the turbidity of mind and mental factors cease. In this sense,
primordial knowing is both a vision of things as they are undisorted by reifications and a
mode of being and living that is commensurate with this vision.

The second section of the book comprises a short selection of translated materials on
the principal distinctions together with edited texts preceded by introductions that elucidate
their historical and doctrinal contexts. My principle of selection has been to focus on
writings that provide original developments and important clarifications of the principal
distinctions. Translations and critical editions are based on different rescensions of the texts
and are accompanied by annotations reflecting variant readings. This has proved especially
important in handling quotations from the Seventeen Tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) which can
vary significantly among the different rescensions. The first entry is Klong chen pa’s Sems
dang ye shes kyi dris lan (Reply to Questions Conceming Mind and Primordial Knowing), a
succinct, eloquent treatise from the author's Miscellaneous Writings (gSung thor bu) that
was composed at the behest of his Student and biographer Chos grags bzang po. The text
clarifies how the mind/primordial knowing distinction is implicit in tathägatagarbha
doctrines of the final promulgation (the so-called “third tuming”) of buddhadharma in India
and provides a solid basis for understanding the import of Buddhist view and meditation.
The next entry consists in two selections from the fourteenth chapter of Klong chen pa’s
monumental Treasury o f the Supreme Vehicle (Theg mchog mdzod) that introduce his most
lengthy and philosophically rigorous treatments of the key distinctions on the basis of the
Seventeen Tantras of the Heart Essence (snying thig) tradition. The final entry is a section
from ’Jigs med gling pa’s (1729-1798) 18th Century Klong chen sNying thig synthesis
Treasury o f Qualities (Yon tan mdzod) with commentary by Yon tan rgya mtsho (b. 19th c.)
that covers the first three of ten distinctions outlined in the twelfth chapter of this sweeping
summary of the Buddhist path (combining subject matter from Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid
ngal gso ’grel, Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel and sNying thig writings among much eise). These first
three distinctions tum on the basic sems/ye shes distinction and reflect the strong accent on
direct personal guidance ( man ngag) as the proper context for their realization that has been
hallmark of this 18th Century renaissance of the sNying thig tradition, a renaissance that is

still very much alive today.

My interest in the two principal rDzogs chen distinctions goes back to my first
encounter with Tibetan Buddhism in India in 1980. During five months spent travelling
throughout northem India I was greatly impressed with the many leamed Tibetans I met but
at the same time somewhat daunted by the labyrinthine complexity of their cultural heritage.
It was therefore a delight to come across practical summaries of the Buddhist path -
specifically, Herbert Guenther’s translations of sGam po pa’s Lam rim thar rgyan and Klong
chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso - that had been composed during the so-called later diffusion
(phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet with the express purpose of systematizing the principal
ideas and practices of their respective traditions for the benefit of aspiring scholars and
practioners. In my initial reading and comparison of these “Stages of the Path” (lam rim)
works, it became clear that the distinction between mind (sems) and Mind itself (sems nyid)
or primordial knowing (ye shes) loomed large in Klong chen pa’s approach to Buddhist
soteriology. On retuming from India, I began a long period of intensive study with the late
Dr. Herbert Guenther with a primary focus on Tibetan path literature. My studies of rNying
ma path summaries such as the Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso and Yid bzhin mdzod,
’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod, and their commentaries, confirmed the central place the
sems/ye shes distinction occupies in classical rNying ma exegesis. What distinguished these
path summaries from those of the other Tibetan schools I was studying was their attempt to
systematize the heterogeneous doctrines and practices of the different idealized vehicles of
Buddhism Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, and rDzogs chen itself within a
fundamentally Mantrayāna-Tathāgatagarbha model of the path. This was a model that
presented the path not as a developmental process of accumulating merits and knowledge
that serve as causes and conditions leading to goal-realization, but as a disclosive process of
directly recognizing and then becoming increasingly familiar with primordial knowing as
the mind’s reifications and their obscuring effects subside. At the time, the momentous
soteriological ramifications of this disclosive perspective did not entirely escape my notice.
But it was only when I began studying the sNying thig system proper, and began receiving
guidance from some of its most leamed Contemporary teachers, that I came to view the
distinctions as central pillars of the classical rDzogs chen sNying thig doctrinal System and
as indispensable keys to understanding its extraordinarily rieh and varied repetoire of
liberative practices.

A work of this nature is very much a collaborative effort. Although I alone am

responsible for the final product, its creation would not have been possible without the
generous assistance, expertise and companionship of many exceptional people. My first debt
of gratitude is to Tom Tillemans who directed this work (in its thesis stages) with great
kindness, patience and interest, while upholding the highest Standards of philological
accuracy and philosophical rigour. The many conversations we had over earlier drafts - in
cafes, on rivers, across continents, and even on university campuses greatly enriched my
understanding of the philosophical issues at the heart of this work and the doctrinal contexts
in which they arose. I am also deeply indebted to the late Herbert Guenther who generously
shared with me his encyclopedic knowledge of all things rNying ma and bKa’ brgyud
during the many years I was fortunate enough to study with him. His inexaustable passion
for leaming and wide-ranging interests have remained a constant example and reminder of
how much is possible and how much is at stäke in trying to understand what texts have to
say. I would like also to extend my profound gratitude to all the Buddhist teachers who
have, over many years, deepened both my understanding of the subject of this work and my
appreciation of the traditions in which it developed. Above all, I am thankful to Chökyi
Nyima Rinpoche, Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche, Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche and Chögyal Namkai
Norbu for all they have taught me.

A special word of thanks is due to my thesis committee members Klaus-Dieter

Mathes and Jacob Dalton whose thought-provoking discussions and helpful suggestions
made for a stronger work. This work also benefited from correspondence and conversations
with many friends and colleagues along the way including Johannes Bronkhorst, Martin
Adam, Thomas Doctor, James Gentry, Erik Schmidt, Dorji Wangchuk, Oma Almogi, Ilse
Guenther, Jeanette Lavigne, and Kent Johnson, to name only a few. During the research and
writing of this work, financial support was gratefully received from the Fonds Elisabet de
Boer of the University of Lausanne.

Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my parents, my children and, above all, my wife,

Naseem, whose constant support, patience, and companionship sustained me throughout this
project.
 Section One

Understanding the rDzogs chen Distinctions

Part I : Background

1 I Introduction: the Distinctions as a Window on Classical rDzogs chen

The darkness of mind and mental factors does not allow the sun of primordial
knowing to be seen. But when the Skylight of primordial knowing opens
revealing open awareness in all its nakedness, the darkness of mind and
mental factors dissipates and the basic nature of primordial knowing in its
original purity envelops all.

Klong chen pa,

Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel5

§ 1. The Two Principal Distinctions: Sems/Ye shes and Kun gzhi/Chos sku

Between the 8th and 14th centuries, a succession of rNying ma scholar-practitioners

articulated and defended certain philosophical distinctions that were considered
indispensable for understanding Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) view and practice. Among
these, two principal distinctions - between mind and primordial knowing (sems/ye shes) and
between the all-ground and dharmakäya (kun gzhi/chos sku) - are introduced in the
seventeen Atiyoga tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) that make up the Heart Essence (snying thig)
subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Genre (man ngag sde) of rDzogs chen teachings.6 rNying

5 Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel: 580.4 f.: sems dang sems byung gi mun pas ye shes kyi nyi ma mthong du mi ster la\
Irig pa ye shes kyi mthongs phye ste rjen la bud dus\ \sems sems byung gi mun pa sangs te\ \ka dag ye shes kyi chos
nyid gtibs pa ’o\ \
6 The principal distinctions are traditionally associated with the hearing lineages (snyan brgyud) o f Vimalamitra and
other early rDzogs chen masters. They receive their first systematic treatment in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras, their
commentaries (six o f which are extant) and supporting materials in the Bi ma snying thig and canonical collections.
Among the Seventeen Tantras, the most extensive and influential accounts o f the distinctions occur in the sGra
thal’gyur chen po (Tb vol. 12, 12.1-173.3; Ati vol. 1, 1-205), Rig pa rang shar (Tb vol. 11: 323.1-699.1; Ati vol. 1:
389-855), Mu tig phreng ba (Tb vol. 12: 304.7-393.6; Ati vol. 2: 417-537), Kun tu bzangpo klong drug (Tb vol. 12:
394.1-467.3; Ati vol. 2: 111-214), and Kun tu bzang po thugs kyi me long (Tb vol. 12: 245.5-280.1; Ati vol. 1: 233-
80). On issues conceming the nature, canonization and possible 12th Century Tibetan provenance of this collection,
see Germano 2005. Other important and influential canonical sources for the detailed sNying thig analysis of
sems/ye shes include the Dur khrod phung po ’bar ba man ngag gi rgyud ascribed to Vimalamitra and contained in
the NyG as well as the Bg (Tk vol. 7: 595.6 f.; Bg vol. 8: 204.7 f.), the Thig le kun gsal c h en p o ’i rgyud{Tb vol. 13:
ma historical and biographical works trace these two principal distinctions to the teachings
of early rDzogs chen masters, in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi ma
snyan brgyud), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the many
esoteric instructions (man ngag) on the two distinctions found scattered among rNying ma
collections such as the Bi ma snying thig1, Bai ro rgyud ’bum, rNying ma rgyud fbum and
dGongs pa zang thal. The close connection between the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra
and the Seventeen Tantras which he is said to have co-translated and composed
commentaries on8 has been frequently attested in rDzogs chen sNying thig exegesis from
the 12th Century onward. A relatively early example is the Tshig don bcu geig pa (The Eleven
Topics) by mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum (1158-1213) that summarizes the essentials of sNying
thig doctrine and practice on the basis of the Seventeen Tantras which are quoted alongside
excerpts from oral teachings of Vimalamitra.9
A survey of these sources confirms that the sharply drawn and meticulously detailed
accounts of the principal distinctions presented in the Seventeen Tantras represent the
culmination of a conspicuous gnoseological trend in early rDzogs chen exegesis of the

296.6-492.5 f.) which is assigned to the Secret Cycle (gSang skor) subclass of Man ngag sde tantras, and the Spros
bral don gsal chen p o ’i rgyud (Tb: vol. 13: 2.1-288.6 f.) which is classified in the Ultra Pith Cycle ( Yang t i ’i skor).
This latter text appears to be expanded Version of the Thig le kun gsal with interpolations o f supplementary material,
though it is equally plausible that the latter is in fact an abridgement o f the longer (earlier) tantra given that it in
many instances appears to correct or clarify passages from the longer work. The colophon o f the Thig le kun gsal
notes that it was transmitted by dGa’ rab rdo rje to Mañjuśjrīmitra and subsequently translated by Srisimha and
Vairocana. The Spros bral don gsal is included in a group o f nine Padmasambhava-based texts associated with Nya
Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer (1124/36-1204) and is said to have been revealed by his reincamate successor Gu ru chos
kyi dbang phyug (1212-1270). See Germano 2005: 22 f.. The mTshams brag edition o f the rNying ma rgyud ’bum
additionally includes a chapter summary o f the latter text entitled Spros bral don gsal chen po 7 rgyud kyi le don
bsdus pa (Tb: vol. 13: 288.7-296.6). The key distinctions also occupy an important place in the dGongs pa zang thal
gTer ma collection o f Rig ’dzin rGod kyi Idem ’phru can (1337-1409). rGod Idem traces precepts on distinguishing
sems and ye shes to the oral transmissions of dGa’ rab rdo ije (dga ’ rab rdo rje ’i snyan brgyud) and Vairocana (bai
ro tsa n a ’i snyan brgyud) and precepts on distinguishing kun gzhi and chos sku to the oral transmissions of
Vairocana, but also takes up the distinctions in the context o f discussing the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi
ma la 7 snyan brgyud). See dGongs pa zang thal vol. 2: 472,488.3 f. and vol. 4: 183 f..
On the chronology o f the Bi ma snying thig and Seventeen Tantras, see Prats 1984: 197-209 and Achard 1999: 78-
83.

8 On the six commentaries extant in the recently discovered 120 volume bKa ’ ma shin tu rgyas pa (hereafter NyKs),
the most extensive and important extant collection of exegetical and commentarial literature in the rNying ma
tradition, see individual entries in Bibliography.
This text, the -Dzogs pa chen po Tshig don bcu geig p a , presents a philosophical synopsis of the Seventeen Tantras
structured according to eleven key ‘topics’ (tshig don : padärtha) or adamantine topics (rdo rje ’i gnas) o f the
sNying thig system. This work may have served as a prototype for Klong chen pa’s similarily structured but more
extensive Tshig don rin po che ’i mdzod (Precious Treasury o f Topics).
 Royal Dynastie Period (610-910) marked by a persistent and pervasive interest in
articulating a primordial nondual mode of knowing and establishing it as the conditio sine
qua non of Buddhist theory and praxis. This trend is reflected in the widespread use, from
the earliest stratum of rDzogs chen literature onward, of terms describing an unconditioned
and naturally luminous mode of awareness that include (in varying combinations)
primordial knowing (ye shes), open awareness (rig pa ), self-awareness (rang rig), awakened
mind (byang chub kyi sems), and Mind itself (sems nyid). The main lines of the rDzogs chen
gnoseological trend can be traced to the *Guhyagarbhatantra and other works belonging to
the Mãyãjãla cycle (sGyu 'phrul dra ba skor) and affiliated Mahäyoga tantric corpus, and
through a variety of texts assigned to the Mind and Space Genres (sems sde and klong sde)
of Atiyoga that are ascribed to a group of early (8th - 9th c.) figures that includes dGa’ rab rdo
rje, Mañjuśrimitra, Śrisimha, Vimalamitra, and their Tibetan colleagues, Vairocana being
the most important. This same circle of early masters are traditionally identified as the
earliest human proponents of the rDzogs chen sNying thig (Great Perfection Heart Essence)
system which (re)emerges as a relatively minor Central Tibetan religious tradition in the
eleventh Century but steadily eclipses other rDzogs chen traditions in the centuries to follow.
Within this System, the persistent rDzogs chen emphasis on the primacy of a primordial,
nondual mode of being (variously termed gzhi, chos sku, gnas lugs) and awareness (ye shes,
rig pa, byang chub kyi sems) is set in sharp contrast to those diremptive and obscurational
modes of being (kun gzhi, ykhrul lugs) and awareness (ma rig pa, sems, yid, mam shes) that
are seen as deriving and deviating from it.10

The varying ways of characterizing the relationship between primary and derivative
modes of being and awareness revolve around the basic difference between the worlds of a

10 An cursory survey of the relevant rNying ma rgyud ’bum and Bai ro rgyud ’bum literature attests the centrality o f
the mind/primordial knowing distinction in works associated with the sNying thig lineage holders (whether as
authors, translators or rediscoverers) and reveals nascent attempts to distinguish an impure karma-based kun gzhi,
classified in various ways, from a pure primordial knowing-oriented kun gzhi or, in some cases, from the ground
(gzhi), ground o f all (kun gyi gzhi) or primordial ground (gdod ma ’i gzhi). Also worth noting is the importance given
to the sems/ye shes distinction in 14th Century rNying ma gTer ma collections dGongs pa zang thal (as noted above)
and the Bla ma dgongs ’dus whose rediscoverers, rGod kyi Idem ’phru can (1337-1408) and Sangs rgyas gling pa
(1340-1396) respectively, were contemporaries o f Klong chen pa. rGod Idem traces the mind/primordial knowing
distinction to the hearing lineage transmitted in Tibet by Vairocana (bai ro snyan brgyud) that goes back to Śrisimha
and dGa’ rab rdo ije. The sems/ye shes distinction is also considered important the Bon rDzogs chen tradition and is
attested in many works from the Zhang zhung snyan brgyud.
buddha and sentient being. This distinction itself was of course nothing new. But its clear
formulation enabled rDzogs chen thinkers to accentuate in original ways a living tension, as
old as Buddhism itself, between conditioned and unconditioned ways of being, between
what we might call karmic and gnostic modalities of human experience. Their dimensional
account of consciousness, suggesting as it did an ever-elusive but nonetheless personally
accessible prerepresentational stream of experiencing ‘beneath’ the concurrent flow of
reflective representational thought, had far-reaching doctrinal and soteriological
repercussions. At the heart of their instructions and expositions was the issue of how to
recover an invariant nondual condition of experience from the reifying appropriations of
dualistic mentation. It is in their illuminating and often radical responses to this problem and
the subsequent elaborations and explanations of their insights by successive generations of
rNying ma scholars that we find the defining elements of the emerging doctrinal and
contemplative Systems of classical rDzogs chen.
From the fourteenth Century onward, the two principal distinctions are systematically
elucidated, with a level of phenomenological rigor perhaps unparalleled in the history of
Buddhist thought, by luminaries such as Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308-1364), rTse le
sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608), ’Jigs med gling pa (1730-98), Yon tan rgya mtsho (19th
Century) and more recently by ’Jigs med bsTan pa’i nyi ma (1865-1926) and Tshul khrims
bzang po (1884-1957). Above all, it is Klong chen pa’s articulations of these distinctions as
comerstones of sNying thig doctrine and contemplation and his Creative appropriation of the
sems/ye shes distinction in formulating an inclusivist schematization of the Buddhist path in
terms of the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing a Clearing process (sbyong
byed) that seamlessly integrates elements of Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna and rDzogs chen - that
laid the doctrinal and hermeneutical foundation for all the subsequent rNying ma treatments.
An assessment of Klong chen pa’s extant corpus11 reveals the mind/primordial knowing
distinction to be a central and unifying theme in the author’s rDzogs chen writings, one that
he would retum to again and again during his lifetime and that he repeatedly characterized
as “extremely important” (shin tu gal po che) but also as “very difficult to understand” (rab

In 2009, the author’s extant writings were for the first time organized and published as a gSung ’bum in 26
volumes. See Bibliography Klong chen gsung ’bum.
tu rtogs dka’). It is no exaggeration to claim that the mind/primordial knowing distinction is
as important to understanding Klong chen pa’s rDzogs chen exegesis as the two truths
distinction is to understanding Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka exegesis. The scholar must
nonetheless be alert to the quite different contexts within which Klong chen pa framed this
distinction. Following the Klong chen pa’s own Classification of his works12, it is possible
to broadly distinguish two textual-doctrinal contexts within which the distinction is
described and explained13:

(1) Exoteric: elucidations of the sems/ye shes distinction in the early Sems nyid ngal
gso ’grel and Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan (hereafter Sems ye dris Um) draw on a
wide ränge of Mahāyāna sūtras with emphasis on texts ascribed to the third tuming
(dharmacakra) such as the Ratnagotravibhäga, Madhyamaka works such as the
Madhyamakävatara and epistemological (pramãnavãda) treatises such as the
Pramãnaviniścaya. Although Klong chen pa, in these early works, cites a number of
Indian Buddhist tantras in support of the distinction, the only rNying ma tantras he
cites are the *Guhyagarbhatantra and other tantras from the Mãyãjãla cycle and
certain tantras of the Mind Genre (sems sde), most importantly the Kun byed rgyal po.
What interests us in the author's early ‘bridging’ works14 is his systematic reading and
reframing of traditional Mahāyāna doctrine in light of a sharply drawn distinction
between unconditioned and conditioned modes of consciousness. In so doing, he not
only illuminates a distinction which he considered implicit, though often to the point
of ambiguity, within the broad ränge of Mahāyāna and Vajrayäna sources he draws
upon. He also adumbrates a series of related arguments for the indispensability of the

12 This catalogue o f works containing 270 titles with additional songs and prayers is appended to a biography of
Klong chen pa by Chos grags bzang po entitled Kun mkhyen dri med ’od zer gyi rnam thar mthong ba don Idan
(included in Kun mkhyen klong chen rab ’byams kyi rnam thar, Chengdu 1994: 208-226; See also Bi ma snying thig
vol. 4: 499-589). A slightly different rescension o f the work known as the dKar chag rin po c h e’i mdzod khang,
which is ascribed by tradition to the author himself, is translated in sMyo shul mkhan po’s Chos ’byung (See Barron
2005: 132 f.) For preliminary attempts to reconstruct a relative chronology o f Klong chen pa’s writings see
Arguillères 2007: 140 f. and Wangchuk 2008.
13 The difference between these two textual-doctrinal contexts is not mirrored by a corresponding chronological
sequence in the author’s corpus. The relative chronology o f Klong chen pa’s works so far suggests that the author
not only continued periodically writing texts from a more general Buddhist doctrinal standpoint after being
introduced to the sNying thig System but consecrated considerable attention to clarifying how rDzogs chen marks
the culmination o f and supercedes antecedent developments in the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist soteriological Systems.
14 What I am calling “bridging works’7 are those (viz. Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel, Grub mtha ’
mdzod and Sems ye dris lan) which attempt to situate rNying ma thought and praxis within the wider context of
Buddhist (and in some cases non-Buddhist) discourses and which seek to clarify the essential unity and continuity
between Mahāyāna, Vajrayäna and rDzogs chen discourses within an inclusivist framework.
 mind/primordial knowing distinction for the proper understanding and application of
Buddhist doctrine.

(2) Esoteric: the scope of Klong chen pa’s handling of the sems/ye shes distinction
broadens dramatically from the time of his introduction by his root guru Ku mā rä
dza/tsa (Skt. Kumārarāja, Tib. gZhon nu rgyal po, 1266-1343)15, who he met in his
twenty-seventh year (i.e. 1334), to the teachings of the Heart Essence (snying thig) or
Esoteric Guidance Genre (man ngag gi sde) of rDzogs chen teachings, particularly as
systematized in the Seventeen Tantras. Henceforth, the author’s rigorous elucidation
of the distinction in a great variety of systematic treatises16, poetic works and
commentaries will centre around the very detailed elaborations of the sems/ye shes and
kun gzhi/chos sku distinctions presented in these and a number of related tantras. The
mind/primordial knowing distinction in particular forms the doctrinal nucleus of a
wide ränge of distinctive rDzogs chen teachings that include: (1) onto-cosmogenic
theories conceming the ground of being (gzhi) and its phenomenal manifestation (gzhi
snang); (2) contemplative practices aimed at direct recognition of Mind’s nature,
particularly as presented in the Breakthrough (khregs chod) teachings17; (3) theories
and practices concemed with the elicitation of “embodied ye sh es” viz. ye shes as
residing within and animating the subtle structure of gnostic lamps (sgron ma), energy
channels, currents, and potencies (rtsa, rlung, thig le) that make up the adamantine
body (rdo rje’i lus) and which figure importantly in the Thod rgal teachings; (4) death

15 rNying ma sources generally refer this to influential rDzogs chen master (referred to hereafter as Kumārāja) by the
Tibetanized Sanskrit epithet Ku mā rä dza or its variants Ku ma rā dza/Ku mā rä tsa, all based on the Sanskrit
Kumārarāja. Occasionally, he is referred to using the Tibetan translation o f Kumārarãja, gZhon nu rgyal po. The
Tibetan shortening o f the Sanskrit kumära to ku mär probably reflects the tendency in Indian vemaculars to drop the
final a, as evident in the Contemporary Indian use o f Kumar rather than Kumära as a proper name. See comments by
Arguillères 2007: 88 n. 187. Wangchuk 2008 sees it as a possible instance o f the more general linguistic
phenomenon of haplology, i.e., the elimination o f a syllable when two consecutive identical or similar syllables
occur. As well as being the root teacher o f Klong chen pa, Kumārāja was also a teacher o f the third Karmapa Rang
byung rdo ije (1284-1339). Kumārāja is credited in the Chos ’byung of Dudjom Rinpoche with establishing a
philosophical language to communicate the rDzogs chen sNying thig teachings. See below n. 36. In this regard,
mention should again be made o f the recently discovered rDzogs pa chen po Tshig don bcu geig pa of mKhas pa
Nyi ma ’bum (1158-1213), a philosophical synopsis of the Seventeen Tantras.
16 In particular, see Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1037.2 f. and Tshig don mdzod: 1038.1 f..
17 This is one o f the two main contemplative teachings of the rDzogs chen sNying thig system, the other being the
Leap-over (thod rgal) teachings. Khregs chod teachings share many similarities with non-gradual Mahāmudrā
teachings and similarily aim at directly introducing the practitioner to the abiding, empty nature o f mind or
primordial knowing. The Leap-over teachings employ a highly sophisticated repetoire o f distinctive tantric-
physiological practices to draw forth embodied primordial knowing and encounter it directly in four luminous
visions {snang ba bzhi). In short, Breakthrough teachings are said to introduce practitioners to open awareness in its
empty, originally pure essence {ngo bo ka dag stong pa), whereas Leap-over teachings enable them to elicit open
awareness in its luminous, spontaneously present nature {rang bzhin Ihun grub gsal ba). The most detailed available
treatments o f these Systems are found in Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod and Tshig don mdzod.
 and dying traditions concemed with realizing primordial knowing in the intermediate
state (bar do)\ and (5) non-gradual conceptions of the path and goal-realization.

Klong chen pa lived during a period of unprecedented doctrinal synthesis, a time

when emerging Tibetan schools sought to define themselves by consolidating their
distinctive ideas and practices, composing systematic and practical doctrinal summaries, and
legitimizing their traditional identities by establishing continuous lines of transmission back
to Indian texts and teachers. Against this background, the mind/primordial knowing
distinction provided Klong chen pa with an interpretive framework for (a) understanding
and articulating the conditions for the possibility of nondual awareness, regarded as the
indispensable basis and goal of rNying ma soteriology and for (b) schematizing the
relationship between the exoteric and esoteric vehicles of Indian Buddhism within a unified
path conception that was at once theoretically comprehensive and practically viable.18 In this
way the distinction helped him define the guiding ideas, ideals and practices of classical
rDzogs chen while disclosing their continuity with antecedent Buddhist doctrines;
specifically, tathägatagarbha theories, certain Yogācāra-Cittamātra models of mind (viz. the
ãlayavijñãna and trisvbhäva doctrines), *Prāsańgika Madhyamaka views on the “cessation
of mind,” and Mantrayäna doctrines conceming the transformation of perceptual
consciousness (vijñāna) into primordial knowing (jñãna).19 Throughout his writings, and in
keeping with his ongoing hermeneutic of reconciliation, Klong chen pa continues to situate
his exegesis and interpretation of the principal rDzogs chen distinctions within the broader
currents of Buddhist doctrine and praxis.

§2. The Place of the Distinctions in Classical rNying ma Soteriology

Post-eleventh Century expositions of the two principal distinctions open a window on

a crucial period of rDzogs chen intellectual and religious history. This period of rDzogs
chen scholarship marks an unprecedented, yet still poorly understood, phase of doctrinal
synthesis and innovation inspired, in part, by the growing demand for the assimlation of a

18 This was the principal exegetical and hermeneutical challenge confronting Tibetan Lam rim authors of the 10th to
14th centuries. I examine the rNying ma response to this challenge and the soteriological implications of the sems/ye
shes distinction in chapter 6.
19 These topics are treated in the course o f this study. The reader is referred to the Index for page references.
complex diversity of early rDzogs chen traditions under the new rubric rNying ma or
“Ancient Ones”. The self-definition and institutionalization of the rNying ma school and its
amalgamation of rDzogs chen traditions under a single sectarian identity must be seen as
part of the broader pattem of monastic hegemony that defines this most fruitful period of
Tibetan cultural and religious history. If the formation and ascendancy of new Tibetan
schools gave a powerful impetus to codify and further develop traditional doctrines and
practices, it also brought to light growing intersectarian pressures as certain bKa’ brgyud
and rNying ma traditions deemed to be of questionable provenance were called upon to
verify the authenticity of their texts, teachings and practices by verifying their Indian
Buddhist pedigree.

Not only did the principal rDzogs chen distinctions play an important part in the
twofold task of highlighting central insights of rDzogs chen teachings while disclosing their
continuity with earlier Buddhist doctrines, they were also seen as the culmination of a
number of central Buddhist soteriological trends including certain theories of cessation and
transformation that will be treated below. In the spirit of inclusivism20, antecedent doctrines
were encompassed as lower stages leading toward a more fundamental and encompassing
vision. This is mirrored in the doxography of nine vehicles that is found already in early
rDzogs chen works such as the dGongs 'dus p a i mdo and Man ngag phreng ba. To this
nine-fold scheme, the rDzogs chen sNying thig tradition introduces a further
subclassification of the final vehicle Atiyoga into a Mind Genre (sems sde), Space Genre
{klong sdé) and Esoteric Guidance Genre {man ngag gi sde), with further subdivisions
amongst these. Thus, the ascending doxography of vehicles is considered to find its
culmination in the Esoteric Guidance Genre {man ngag gi sde) or Heart Quintessence
(sNying thig) rDzogs chen teachings that claim to offer a path distinct from its predecessors,
an effortless {rtsol med), spontaneous (Ihun grub) path grounded in primordial knowing in
contrast to the deliberative and toilsome paths grounded in dualistic mind. According to
sNying thig doxography, all vehicles from Śrāvakayāna up to and including the Mind and

On inclusivism, see Schmithausen 1981: 223 f.. The term, coined by Paul Hacker, is defined by Schmithausen as
the method by which “competing doctrines, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate
Position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the
other doctrine or its propounders” (ibid.: 223).
Space Genres (sems sde and klong sde) of Atiyoga are described as paths of dualtic mind
(sems kyi lam) that vacillates between constructs of acceptance and rejection (blang spang).
How are we to assess such a claim? It would be remiss to regard the rDzogs chen
hierarchy of spiritual vehicles and their numerous doxographical subclasses as a grand
intellectual synthesis, an overarching summa philosophica. We must reconcile the obvious
trend toward doctrinal inclusivism in rDzogs chen with the tradition’s equally conspicuous
critique of the Buddhist proclivity for intellectual system-building which was seen as
symptomatic of the intransigent ego-mind and its dualistic fixations.21 One recurrent
element in rDzogs chen explanations of the key distinctions is their critique of Claims that
one can realize buddhahood by way of mentation, that one can in effect reason one’s way to
enlightenment. This downgrading of reason-guided gradualism is justified on the basis of
the distinctions themselves, presupposing as they do a structural asymmetry and even
radical discontinuity between Mind itself (sems nyid) and the representational activities of
dualistic mind (sems). This is a point on which much more will be said later. What bears
emphasizing here is that at the basis of Claims that rDzogs chen marks the culmination of all
paths was a conviction that all spiritual pursuits (even the so-called lower rDzogs chen
pursuits) remain bound up with dualistic (subjectivizing and objectifying) mind until
primordial knowing is fully disclosed.22 It is noteworthy that the prominent thirteenth
Century critic of rDzogs chen, Sa skya Paņdita argued that rDzogs chen should not be
considered a vehicle (yäna.) at all as it simply refers to the goal, primordial knowing, and not
the steps leading to it. Sa paņ’s penetrating observation touches on a delicate problem that
concems the very foundations of rDzogs chen soteriology and therefore warrants close
attention. His argument and rNying ma responses to it are examined in chapter seven below.

21 As a typical instance, consider stanza 23 from Klong chen pa’s dPe don nges don rdo rje ’i mgur, Klong chen
gsung ’bum vol. 24: 223.1 f.: “Philosophical Systems are like the spittle o f silk worms [by which] one hems in one’s
own being. From now on it would be good if there were no clinging to philosophical positions, the true nature of
phenomena being free of limitations.” grub mtha ’ srin gyi kha chu ’dra\ \rang rgyud rang gis ’ching ba la\ \da res
mtha ’ bral chos nyid don\ \khas len ’dzin pa med na legs\ \
22 See, for example, Klong chen pa’s Chos dbyings mdzod 'grel'. 229.2 f.: “Although within the natural condition of
open awareness there are no spiritual vehicles whatsoever, they have manifested individually simply as avenues to
its realization...” de 'ang rig pa ’i rang ngo la theg pa gang du ’ang med kyang\ \de rtogs par byedpa i sgo tsam du
so sor shar...
§3. The Disclosive Paradigm

The importance and far-reaching implications of the rDzogs chen disclosive

paradigm of goal-realization cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is typically invoked to
distinguish the rDzogs chen way from Hīnayāna stratagems of renouncing or eliminating
(spong ba) the cognitive and affective obscurations, Mahāyāna stratagems of counteracting
(gnyen po) them, and Yogācāra and Vajrayäna stratagems of transforming (bsgyur ba) them.
The critique of transformation that is developed in classical rDzogs chen can be traced to the
tradition’s earliest sources.23 In the Khyung chen Iding ba (Flight o f the Garuda), for
instance, we read that “since [self-occurring primordial knowing] is unchanging and

23 This early broad-based critique of transformation is honed, during the classical sNying thig phase of rDzogs chen
exegesis, to target certain Buddhist models of fundamental transformation, literally “transformation of basis” (gnas
’g yur : ãśraya-parãvrtti, °-parivrtti), that assumed goal-realization to consist in an altered state o f cognition. For
discussions o f a broad spectrum of transformation models in light o f their historical and doctrinal backgrounds, see
Davidson 1985, Sakuma 1990, Schmithausen 1969, and Mathes 2008. Some models relevant to the present study
will be examined in chapter four. Although the basic idea that goal-realization depends on a radical transformation,
metamorphsis, or puriñcation o f the fundamental structures of human reality was developed most fully by the
Yogācāra philosophers in line with their complex psychological and ontological theories, it is found already in
Vaibhä§ika and Sauträntika sources (on which see Davidson 1985: 160-171 and Sakuma 1990: 45 f.) and was later
adopted by virtually all Buddhist schools and adapted to their specific viewpoints regarding the nature o f mind,
reality and the path. It should here be emphasized that rDzogs chen thinkers did not reject all models of
transformation. Classical thinkers like Klong chen pa, Mi pham and’Jigs med gling pa were in fact partisans o f late
hybridized Yogācāra-Tathāgatagargha models of transformation (such as those elaborated in the Ratnagotravibhäga,
Mahāyānasamgraha) that were based on a disclosive view o f awakening and that defined primordial knowing (ye
shes) or suchness (de bzhin nyid) as the basis (āśraya : gnas) and goal o f the transformation process as well as the
means by which it occurs. In other words, ‘transformation’ (parävrtti : gyur) in these sources is interpreted as the
complete purification or elimination o f the ãlayavijñãna which obscures the fundamental basis (variously identified
as buddha nature, suchness, thatness, primordial knowing), rather than as the replacement o f an old basis afTlicted by
badness/hindrance (dau$tulya) by a new basis pervaded by ease (praśrabdhi), as the transformation was interpreted
in earlier Yogācāra. On these contrasting models as elaborated in the Bodhisattvabhümi and Srāvakabhūmi
respectively, see Schmithausen 1969: 96 f. and Sakuma 1990: 104-108, 125-135. The late Yogācāra ‘elimination’/
‘purification’ model o f transformation, as will be shown in chapters 4 and 6, neatly coincided with the rDzogs chen
disclosive soteriological paradigm. As an example of this transformation-cwm-disclosure model, consider the
following passage ffom Klong chen pa’s Sems n y id n g a lg so ’g rel (vol. 1: 219.5 f.) where dualistic mind (sems) and
its mistaken appearances are said to be “fundamentally transformed or purified away” (gnas gyurpa'am dag) upon
realizing luminous Mind itself (sems nyid) which is identified as the unchanging aspect o f the absolute ( ’gyur ba
m e d p a ’iyongs grub) as presented in the Yogācāra trisvabhāva doctrine: ‘T o summarize, once we have fathomed
the unchanging reality as it is, luminous Mind itself, and realized all phenomena as empty to the extent that they are
merely imagined, and if we proceed to cultivate the path so that the impure mistaken appearances together with the
mind that hypostatizes them are fundamentally transformed or purified away, we have then reached the primordial
state, thereby gaining complete mastery over the pure buddha realms of the inexhaustible omament-wheel of
authentic body, speech and mind. [This] description is a synthesis of the authentic doctrines.” mdor bsdu na\ \sems
nyid od gsal ’gyur ba med p a ’i de kho na nyid khong du chud cing\ \chos thams cad kun brtags pa tsam du stong par
rtogs nas\ \lam bsgom na ma dag p a ’i ’khrul snang kun brtags pa ’i blo dang bcas pa gnas gyur p a ’am dag nas\
Igdod ma ’i ngang du phyin te sku gsung thugs mi zad pa rgyan gyi ’khor lo ’i zhing khams dag pa la mnga ’ dbang
rdzogs par ’g yur pa ni bstan pa dam pa ’i chos rnams geig tu dril ba yin\ \
changeless, it is without any basis for evolution (chags p a ) ”2A A commentary on this text
from the bKa ma shin tu rgyas pa reads this line as a negative response to the question of
whether a human being can be said to ‘change into’ a buddha.25 This model is rejected on
the grounds that buddhahood is not properly understood to be something that has matured
(smin zin pa): since in it there is no succession of moments, buddhahood is not claimed to be
the production of an essence. “Since there is therefore no fundamental transformation (gnas
gyur pa med pa), the quintessence [of buddhahood] is devoid of waxing or waning. Since it
defies expectation and is not found as some self-existent foundation of goal-realization,
primordial knowing is nothing that can be grasped as an individuating principle (bdag).”26
This early repudiation of soteriological models based on development (smin, skyed) and
transformation ( ’gyur, gnas gyur) feeds into the growing emphasis on disclosure as the
paradigm that best accounts for how spiritual awakening (bodhi) occurs. It makes little
sense, as Klong chen pa argues at length in his Theg mchog mdzod21, to say that afflictive
States (e.g. nyon mongs) are transformed into enlightened ones (e.g. ye shes), especially
given the adventitious and obscuring character of the former and abiding, unfabricated
character of the latter. It is more accurate to say that afflictive States must be eliminated to
allow enlightened ones to manifest.

In view of such a critique, it can be seen that the distinction between ordinary and
originary knowing (mam shes/ye shes) as it is developed in certain sütras such as the

24 Tk vol. 1: 420.1 f.: mi ’g yur ’g yur ba m edpas chags pa ’i gnas med de\ | While the term chags pa can mean either
‘attachment’ or ‘evolution/development’, the commentary leaves no doubt that the latter sense is intended here.
25 Khyung chen Idingspa'i ’g relp a , NyKs vol. 103: 24.6: ’o na sems can mi las sangs rgyas su \gyur ro zhe na\
26 Ibid. 24.4 f.: smin zin pa bshad pa Ita bu'i phyir dang\ \skad cig ma'i rgyun med pas ngo bo'i skyed mi ’dod pa'i
phyir\ Ignas gyur pa med pas snying po ’p hel ’g rib med de \ \re ba dang bral bas 'bras bu 7 rten gzhi rang rgyud par
ma grub pas ye shes la bdag tu ’dzin pa med do\|
27 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 1604.3 f.: nyon mongs las nges par ’byin p a ’i lam rgyal a ti rdo rje snying po ’dir\
Inyon mongs ma spangs gnas su dag pas\ \nyan rang Itar spong ba dang\ \sems dpa ’ Itar spong ba\ \sngags ’og ma
bskyed rim Itar b sg y u f ba dang\ \rdzogs rim Itar rang zhir gtong ba dang\ | theg pa thun mongs spyi Itar gnyen pos
gdul ba dang\ \sems sde Itar rang lugs su ’jo g pa dang\ \klong sde Itar de nyid chos nyid du byed pas dag pa Ita bu
ma yin no\ | ci ’i phyir zhe na\ \nyon mongs pa de y i j i bzhin y o d ma myong du ma shes na\ \spangs pas mi spong ste\
Inyon mongs de sems kyis spong na\ |spang bya spong byed gnyis rdzas geig pas dag par mi rung la\ \ye shes kyis
spong na sems kyis ye shes ma mthong\ |ye shes kyis sems ma mthong bas Ihan cig mi gnas pa ’i dngos ’g al la spang
bya spong byed kyi tha snyad mi rung la\ |snga ma phyi mas spangs pa med de ’das ma ’ongs rdzas ’g al bas\ \geig
yod dus geig ’g ags la\ | dus mnyam na phan tshun ’chol bas spang bya gnyen por thal la\ \gnyen po spang byar thal
teI Isems rgyun geig la dus mnyam pa ’i phyir ro\ | atext: bskyur
Mahāyānasūtrãlamkãra as well as Yoganiruttara tantras such as the Kälacakra, is only
typologically similar to the rDzogs chen sems/ye shes distinction. Closer analysis reveals
that the two distinctions reflect quite different interpetations that are based on different
textual sources, different models of consciousness and different accounts of how awakening
actually occurs. The idea that goal-realization comes about due to a fundamental
transformation of ordinary consciousness into primordial knowing is central to the Yogācāra
model of consciousness and is developed in the higher Yoga Tantras. This model exerted a
powerful influence on the Tibetan bKa’ brgyud traditions. The sixth chapter of Rang byung
rdo rje’s Zab mo nang gi don, a detailed exposition on body, mind and cosmos according to
the Yoganiruttara tantras (bla na m ed p a ’i mal ’byor gyi rgyud), is devoted to clarifying the
complex relationship between mam shes and ye shes and the transition between them.28 The
distinction is further clarified in his above-mentioned treatise rNam shes ye shes ’byed p a ’i
bstan bcos (which elaborates the distinction as presented in Mahãyānasūtrālamkãra IX).29

rDzogs chen sources at times specify transformation as a doctrine having only

provisional meaning (drang don, i.e. in need of further interpretation), one that is employed
with the implicit intention (Idem dgongs) of guiding beings in accordance with their varying
interests and degrees of understanding. The Nam mkha’ klong yangs kyi rgyud puts it this
way: “While transformation is taught as a doctrine with regard to gradations in the intellect
of individuals due to the differing interests of sentient beings, it is [here] shown to be merely
of provisional meaning with the implicit intention [indicated].”30 This tantra later

28 See Rang byung rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 7: 355 f..
29 Ibid. vol. 7: 269 f..
° Tk vol. 7: 140.3 f. (Bg vol. 8: 22.6 f.): sems can mos pa tha dad pas\ |gang zag blo’i rim pa la\ \gnas ’g yur chos
su bstan pa yang\ \bkri drang Idem dgongs tsam du bstan\ | See also the rDzogs pa chen po ’khor ba rtsod nas gcod
pa Chos sku skye med pa ’i pa ’i rgyud,Tk vol. 7: 395.3 f.: de phyir mam shes tshogs brgyad dag\ \yang dag ma yin
khor b a ’i chos\ \gnas ’g yur chos su bstan pa yang\ \dkri dang ldema dgongs bstan pa zad\ \de phyir kun gzhis gzhi
byas te\ |gnyen po bzhiyis ’jigs pa dang\ \bag chags chags p a ’i rten byedpa\ \yang dag ma yin ’khor ba ’byung\\
“text: Idim. This text reflects the sNying thig position that the all-ground with its eightfold cognitive ensemble is
one’s own mind and not dharmakäya (Ibid. 395.3 f.: kun gzh i’i rnam shes tshogs brgyad kyang\ \rang sems yin te
chos sku min/). Since the eightfold ensemble is an indeterminate cognition that gives way to dualistic constructs on
account o f conditions o f error associated with ignorance, it is oblivious to self-occurring awareness (rang ’byung rig
pa) like a blind person. In this way, these conditioned modes of consciousness preserve the belief in the constructs
and categories o f reifying mentation and thereby solidify the latent tendencies leading to samsära (Ibid.: 395.7 f.:
rto$f pa bye brag ’dzin skyongs bzhin\ | ’khor b a ’i bag chags rtas par byed\atext: rtogs). On the history and
significance o f the sNying thig distinction between kun gzhi and chos sku, see chapters 4 and 5 below.
distinguishes the so-called transformed modes of primordial knowing (i.e. the five jñãná)
from self-occurring primordial knowing (rang byung ye shes): because the former involve
modification due to conditions (rkyen ’gyur), they cannot be considered self-occurring. To
do so would be like taking brass for gold.31 The Nam mkha’ mnyam p a ’i rgyud similarily
proclaims that “the primordial knowing that is not self-occurring refers to the five modes of
primordial knowing that are fundamental transformations of the eightfold ensemble [of
cognitions]. Because they arise due to conditions of production, they are not the self-
occurring [primordial knowing] that abides primordially.”32 In characterizing the recovery
of primordial awareness, rDzogs chen sources typically opt for a language of disclosure
rather than transformation. By doing so, they reject the psychologistic claim that awakening
consists merely in the modification of mind (x) from one state (jc1) into another (jc2). In the
disclosive paradigm, realization cannot be simply an altered state of consciousness because
it depends on the dissolution of mind and all its associated factors into their abiding source.

§4. On the Obscure Origins of the sNying thig System

Because a good deal of the present work is taken up with the exposition and
philosophical interpretation of rDzogs chen sNying thig exegesis on the principal
distinctions, it is a good idea to briefly review our current state of knowledge about the
historical roots of this tradition and point out some areas requiring further investigation.
Despite our still dim and fragmentary knowledge of its history and major figures, it is likely
that the (re)emergence of this tradition owes much to the efforts of lCe btsun Seng ge dbang
phyug33 ( I I th c.) who is credited with ‘reorganizing’ the sNying thig teachings of
Vimalamitra that are said to have been discovered by his teacher IDang ma lhun rgyal in the

31 Tk vol. 7: 151.7 f.; Bg vol. 8: 34.4 f.: rang byung min p a ’i ye shes de | |gnas ’gyur ye shes Ingar ’dod pa\ \rkyen
’g yur phyir yang rang byung min\ | ra gan gser du ’dzin pa ’dra\ \ye shes rang byung ma yin pa\ | a Bg ra gan\ Tk ra
gnas
32 Tk vol. 8: 287.1 f.: rang byung min pa ’i ye shes de\ \tshogs brgyadgnas g yurye shes lnga\ \bskyedpa ’i rkyen las
byung ba ’iphyir\ |ye nas gnas pa ’i rang byung min\ | See also Nam mkha ’ klongyangs kyi rgyud, Tk vol. 7: 151.7 f.:
rang byung min p a ’i ye shes de\ \gnas ’g yur ye shes Ingar ’dodpa\ | rkyen ’g yur phyir yang rang byung min\\
33 On lCe btsun Seng ge dbang phyug, See Dudjom 2002: 557 f., sMyo shul mkhan po’s Chos ’byung, translated in
Barron 2005: 85 f., ’Gos lo tsâ ba’s Deb thersngon po, in Roerich 1976: 192 f. and Karmay 1988: 210 f..
Temple of the Hat (zhwa’i Iha khang)34 in dBu ru35. Over the next two centuries, the
tradition gained a prominent place within the emerging Tibetan rNying ma order in Central
Tibet as successive generations of scholar-adepts further codified and explained these
teachings while keeping the flame of oral transmission alive. If few writings survive from
this period, mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s aforementioned 12th Century summary of the sNying
system entitled Tshig don bcu geig pa serves as an isolated example of what was in all
likelihood a broader trend. Klong chen pa’s own root guru Kumārãdza, who is said to have
developed rDzogs chen as a philosophical system employing a specific technical language
and not mixing it with the rDzogs rim system36, must have also played a critical role, though
unfortunately little of his work survives.37 It is in any case with the prodigious systematizing
efforts of Klong chen pa that the sNying thig emerges from relative obscurity in the 14th
Century to become the most important and influential tradition of the rNying ma school.

34 The Zhwa’i 1ha khang is a small temple located about 80 km north-east of Lhasa “in a sheltered valley near the
mouth o f a stream that flows into the sKyid chu from the direction of Nu ma ri in the east.” Richardson 1985: 43.
The temple entrance is flanked by two tall stone pillars bearing inscriptions that record certain Privileges granted
Myang by the emperor Khri lde’u srong btsan (b. 776). Myang is said to have been instrumental in establishing Khri
sde’u srong btsan on the throne. Tradition relates that Myang Ting nge ’dzin hid the Seventeen Tantras in a pillar in
this temple in the early 9th Century after receiving the complete sNying thig transmission and texts (the tantras and Bi
ma snying thig) from his teacher Vimalamitra but not before teaching them to ’Brom Rin chen ’bar ba, thus ensuring
the continuity o f oral transmission. The texts are said to have been found in the 11lh Century by IDang ma lhun rgyal
who was caretaker of this temple and later passed on to Seng ge dbang phyug. These events are summarized in the
colophon o f the Rig pa rang shar, Ati vol. 1: 852-55; a more detailed account is found in the rDzogs pa chen po
snying tig gi lo rgyus chen mo, in Klong chen pa’s Bi ma snying tig part 3, sNyig thig ya bzhi vol. 9: 163-9. Later
critics o f the rNying ma tradition have denied the veracity o f this account, on which see below note 51. Further
information on this temple is found in H. E. Richardson, ‘Tibetan inscriptions at Zhwa’i Lha Khang,” JRAS, 1952:
133-54 and 1953: 1-12; Karmay 1988: 210 f.. Klong chen pa is said to have restored Zhwa’i lha khang in the 14th
Century and he composed two works about the temple that are contained in his Miscellaneous Writings (gSung thor
bu): Zhwa padma dbang chen gyi bstod pa rol mo 7 sprin phung and Zhwa padma dbang chen gyi dkar chag gtsigs
kyi yi ge zhib mo, in Klong chen gsung bum vol. 24: 20-29 and 38-63 respectively. The former work includes inter
alia the geomantic layout o f the temple, its importance as a kind of symbolic bulwark {chu rags) against the
flooding o f lHa sa and bSam yas (which would foretoken the ruin of Tibet), its national importance as an Imperial
Period temple, as well as its artistic inventory and major renovations. See Sørensen and Hazod 2007: 457 n. 101.
dBu ru was the Westemmost part o f the two parts into which Central Tibet (dBus) was traditionally divided, the
other being g.Yon ru. See Ferrari 1958: 46 and 117 n. 160.
According to Dudjom 2002: 571-2: “Kumārāja was able to explain the instructions o f the Innermost Spirituality
[sNying thig] without mixing them with other Systems o f the stage of perfection [rDzogs rim]; and thus he created a
philosophical system in the technical language [of the Great Perfection itself.]” This interesting remark which goes
back to ’Gos lo tsä ba’s Deb ther sngon po (44b. 1 f.) bears further investigation.
I am aware only o f the bKa ’ brgyad kyi bskyed rim gyi man ngag gnad bsdus that is listed in a collection o f texts
recovered from the Potala (it is listed as Potala Collection number 01221-1 on the TBRC website) but is so far not in
circulation.
 None of these details about the I I th to 14th Century ascendancy of the sNying thig
tradition rule out the possibility that its historical origins lie in the Royal Dynastie Period, as
indeed the tradition maintains, or that it continued through the ensuing Period of
Fragmentation, mostly in the form of closely guarded oral teachings, at times as ‘treasures’
(gter ma) concealed for future generations, finally re-emerging as a major Central Tibetan
rDzogs chen movement in the classical period.38 If there is as yet no conclusive evidence for
this hypothesis there are a number of intriguing indications. These include: (1) the existence
of an extensive body of sNying thig tantras, commentaries, treatises and instructions that are
ascribed to Vimalamitra (the figure most closely associated with sNying thig transmissions)
and found scattered amongs the Bai ro rgyud 'bum, Bi ma snying thig, gSang ba snying
thig39, and bKa’ ma and rNying rgyud collections; (2) a reference in the Mun p a ’i go cha by
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes (late 9th - early 10th c.) to certain esoteric instructions (man
ngag) that he attributes to a prominent person (rab gang zag) of his day emphasizing the
need to have perceptions (dmigs) in Atiyoga practice, an imperative the author criticizes as
counter-productive to his more quietistic Chan and Sems sde influenced Atiyoga System of
contemplating the mind based on principles of non-interference (byar med) and spontaneity
(Ihun grub)40; (3) Rog Bande shes rab ’od’s (1166-1244) identification of Esoteric Guidance
Atiyoga (man ngag a ti yo ga) as the summit of spiritual vehicles and his use of terms such
as rtsal in ways reminiscent of usages specific to the sNying thig System41; (4) unbroken

38 Unfortunately, the proliferation of rediscovered treasures (gter ma) attributed to early rDzogs chen masters from
the fourteenth Century onwards has served more to conceal than reveal the existence o f genuine works that may have
survived ffom the Royal Dynastie Period. See Germano 2005.
39 On the dates o f this cycle and its rediscovery, see Achard 1999: 81 f.. The cycle consisted o f the Seventeen
Tantras (rgyud bcu bduri) and a collection o f precepts related to these (bi ma snying thig).
40 Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 1, NyKs vol. 93: 513.4 f.: “One prominent person today is [considered to be] the foundation
o f the Dharma. But this person thinks that in Atiyoga there is a need to [have] perceptions. He Claims one is
liberated by way o f these esoteric instructions (man ngag) based on stratagems involving perceptions. It is clear that
he has not found confidence in the meaning o f thatness [i.e., rDzogs chen]. That blindman is like one who wants to
open the lock to a treasury by means of a yak-hom key.” dus deng sang gi gang zag rab geig de ni chos kyi gzhi yin
no\ Igang zag gi bsam pas a ti yo ga la dmigs dgos pas\ | thabs dmigs pa can gyi man ngag gis ’g rol zhes smra ba ni\
Ide nyid kyi don gyi gding ma rnyedpar gsal te\ \mdongspa de ni dper na dong rwa ’i Ide ’u mig gis bang mdzod tha
rama ’byedpar ’d odpa dang ’d ra ’o\\ atha ram is an archaic Tibetan term that appears to have the sense of ‘lock’ in
certain Bon passages but is also preserved in Darma language as tarum meaning ‘key’. See Dan Martin’s entry s.v.
tha ram in the THDL online Tibetan dictionary. Another possibility is tha rams meaning ‘full’ or ‘filled up’ (gang
ba, gtengs pa). The above comment concludes a lengthy passage on Atiyoga, on which see Dalton 2002: 314.
41 I examine some o f Rog’s rDzogs chen views in Chapter Four.
lines of oral transmission (an important source of legitimacy of Tibetan traditions) of
masters associated with the sNying thig tradition found in two Bai ro rgyud 'bum texts, the
Pan sgrub mams kyi thugs bcud snying gi nyi ma42 and ’Dra ’bag chen mo43; (5) Accounts
widely attributed to a now lost history of Buddhism in Tibet by Rong zom pa (1 Ith c.)44 that
credit Vimalamitra not only with initiating the last of seven transmissions (babs bdun) of
tantric teachings from India to Tibet bit also with instigating a later wave of translation
activity in Tibet known as the “cycle of complete perfection” (yongs su rdzogs pa 7 skor) or
“cycle of complete exfoliation” (yongs su rgyas p a ’i skor)45; (6) Later syncretistic Sems sde
texts such as the Kun byed rgyal po (a text not yet mentioned by gNubs chen and only
separate chapters of which are to be found in the Bai ro rgyud 'bum) that closely resemble
the sNying thig Khregs chod teachings in style and content; (7) Finally, we can mention the
Northern Treasure (byang gter) teachings revealed by Rig ’dzin rGod kyi Idem 'phru can
(1337-1409), a Contemporary of Klong chen pa, and contained in the dGongs pa zang thal
which not only quote extensively from the seventeen Atiyoga tantras46, but also present
many of the doctrines of the sNying thig tradition as deriving from rDzogs chen masters of
the Royal Dynastie Period by way of oral transmission lineages. Of particular interest in
rGod Idem’s collection are teachings on (a) distinguishing sems and ye shes that are alleged
to derive from oral transmissions of dGa’ rab rdo rje (dga’ rab rdo rje'i snyan brgyud)41 and
Vairocana48, (b) distinguishing kun gzhi and chos sku said to derive from Vairocana (bai ro

42 On this work, see Kapstein 2008. Most o f these figures are mentioned by gNubs chen in his bSam gtan mig sgron.
43 On this work, see Karmay 1988: 19 f..
The famous account of seven transmissions (babs bdun) and four processes (tshul bzhi) is traditionally attnbuted
to a lost Chos byung o f Rong zom pa. Germano (2002: 226 f.) mentions that this work survives only as cited in
certain rNying ma histories such as the IDe u chos ’byung of mKhas pa lde’u (13th c.), the Klong chen chos byung
of rGyal sras Thugs mchog rtsal (14th c.), the Nor bu ’i phreng ba o f Mkhyen rab rgya mtsho (16th c.) and the Pad ma
dkarpo ’i rdzing bu o f Zhe chen rgyal tshab pad ma mam rgyal (20th c.).
45 See Germano 2002: 227.
See in particular the author’s Bi ma la ’i snyan brgyud grel tig chen mo vol. 4: 183-401 in which the Seventeen
Tantras are extensively quoted and commented upon.
See for example dGongs pa zang thal vol. 2: 472 f..
See dGongs pa zang thal vol. 4: 183 f..
tsa n a yi snyan brgyud)49 and (c) the seven grounds (gzhi bduń) said to derive from
Vimalamitra (bi ma la i snyan brgyud).50
Despite these intriguing suggestions of unbroken continuity of the sNying thig
tradition from the Royal Dynastie Period onward, it is evident that a good deal of what one
encounters in the classical presentations is unprecedented and suggest at least a reworking
of older materials. Many of the characteristic terms and concepts are not found in the works
of important earlier figures such as gNubs chen (b. 844) and Rong zom pa (b. I I th c.),
though both quote and eite the influence of many of the well-known Royal Dynastie rDzogs
chen figures and texts. Whatever their provenance, the Man ngag sde tantras and supporting
exegesis appear to come to light in the 12th Century as a set of interlocking texts (replete with
intertextual references) presenting a coherent, thematically integrated system of doctrine
and practice. It is a system that presupposes earlier rDzogs chen developments (especially
Sems sde tantras such as the Kun byed rgyal po) as well as the broader currents of Indian
Buddhist Yogācāra, Madhyamaka and tantrism but Claims (following an intepretive strategy
common to Indo-Tibetan Buddhist doxographic works) to transcend them and mark their
culimination. The result is a fundamentally sNying thig framework of teachings based on
the primacy of open awareness (rig pa) or self-occurring primordial knowing (rang byung
ye shes) into which antecedent teachings are assimilated within the lower eight vehicles and
presented as partial perspectives based on dualistic mind (sems).
If later critics of the rNying ma tradition raised suspicions that these tantras and
supporting literature were of Tibetan not Indian origin and posed legitimate questions about
their authorship51, this should only reinforce the imperative to evalute them on their own
terms, as original works reflecting a distinctively Tibetan penchant for both synthesizing
and reframing inherited doctrines and ideas. It is here, perhaps, that modern Western
approaches to literature which are inclined to valueoriginality overconfirmation and

49 See dGongspa zang thal vol. 2: 488.3 f..

50 See dGongs pa zang thal vol. 4: 183 f..
51 One such critic, ’Bri gung dPal ’dzin (b. 14th c) in a circular letter (circa1400) criticizing the rNying ma tradition
claimed that the Bi ma snying thig and related Seventeen Tantras were composed by Senge dbang phyug rather than
reorganized by him as the rNying ma histories maintain. dPal ’dzin’s allegation is recorded in Sog bzlog pa gsung
’bum vol. 1, sNgags rnying m a ’i rtsod spong ’Bri khung dpal ’dzin gyi brtsod lan: 280.1: lee btsun seng ge dbang
phyug gis\ Ibi ma la ’i snying thig dang\ \d e y i rgyud chen bcu bdun byas\\ See Karmay 1988: 210 f..
individual expression over received wisdom may offer a new basis for appreciating works
that did not easily find a place in a sectarian, Indocentric intellectual climate that was
generally averse to innovation (rang bzo). Judged on their own merits, the sNying thig
tantras and the commentarial and exigetical works associated with them collectively
represent an enormous contribution to the development of Buddhist philosophy and
soteriology, one that we have only begun to explore.

§5. The Lives and W orks of Four M ajor rDzogs chen Figures

Before embarking on a detailed investigation of the principal rDzogs chen

distinctions, it may be useful to briefly survey the lives and works of some of the more
important figures whose work will be taken up in the course of this study : Vimalamitra (8th-
9th c.), gNyags Jñānakumāra (8th - 9th c.), gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes (9th - 10th c.) and Klong
chen pa (14th c.). Of these, Vimalamitra and Klong chen pa are traditionally regarded as the
two most influential proponents of the sNying thig tradition while gNyags and gNubs are
portrayed as leading advocates of the early Mind Genre (sems sde or sems phyogs as it was
sometimes called52) teachings associated with Vairocana and g.Yu sgra snying po.

5.1 Vimalamitra

Through the lens of rNying ma historical and hagiographical literature,

Vimalamitra’s larger than life role in promulgating rDzogs chen teachings in Tibet seems
inversely proportionate to the availability of reliable information conceming his life.53 He is
portrayed as a famous Indian scholar-yogin who at a ripe old age (200 according to bDud
joms rin po che) is invited to Tibet by king Khri srong lde’u btsan whereupon he proceeds
“to induce faith in the sceptical Tibetans by his amazing miraculous powers.”54 In a

See Kapstein 2008: 283. The author notes that this Classification of the three "genres’ (sde) of rDzogs chen is not
attested before the 12th Century (283. n. 25): “The threefold Classification o f the sde-gsum—sems-sde, klong-sde,
mang~ngag-gi sde—appears to originate in the tantras o f the latter category and is unknown to the other Systems of
Rdzogs-chen. A single reference to the threefold Classification in the rnam-thar o f Khyung-po m al-’byor (wntten c.
1140) may be the earliest reference outside the tantras themselves, and perhaps reflects later editorial intervention.
Information regarding Vimalamitra’s life and works is based on ’Gos lo tsâ ba’s Deb ther sngon po, in Roerich
1976: 191 f., bDud ’joms rin po che’s rNying m a ’i chos ’byung, in Dudjom 1991: 555 f., Karmay 1988: 24 f. and
Germano 2002: 241 f..
54 Dudjom 1991: 555.
somewhat less fabulous vein, Vimalamitra is credited with establishing the Esoteric
Guidance Genre (man ngag gi sde) of rDzogs chen in Tibet during the reign of Khri srong
lde’u btsan (late 8th Century) and also with instigating a second wave of Mind Genre (sems
sde) teachings there during the reign of Rai pa can (early 9th Century). This dual role has led
certain Tibetan historians including ’Gos lo tsä ba gZhon nu dpal to propose that there were
in fact two Vimalamitras, an earlier sNying thig yogi and a later monk.55 Other Tibetan
historians have been content to accept two historically distinct waves of propogation by the
esteemed master, as we have seen in Rong zom pa’s account of Vimalamitra’s earlier and
later transmissions.56 It is interesting that gNubs chen, writing closer to the master’s lifetime
(late 9th to early 10th Century), identifies Vimalamitra, along with Padmasambhava and
Buddhagupta, as an adept of the Mahäyoga System, though elsewhere in his bSam gtan mig
sgron (Lamp fo r Eyes o f Contemplation) he also names him as an exponent of one of the
nine principal rDzogs chen views, i.e. “the view that is free from any frame of reference”
(gza’ gtad bral ba'i Ita ba).57 It would appear that Vimalamitra was, like many of the early
Indian figures associated with the rise of rDzogs chen, a proponent of both Mahäyoga and
Sems sde teachings. In any case, Vimalamitra’s role in the diffusion of Sems sde lineages is
attributed to his collaboration with Vairocana and his subsequent translation of thirteen texts
(phyi 'gyur bcu gsum) belonging to the corpus of eighteen Sems sde works, the earlier five
translations (snga *gyur Inga) having been made by Vairocana himself.58

Like Padmasambhava, Vimalamitra’s widespread popularity in Tibet derives in part

from his alleged role in establishing the sNying thig tradition and in part from the large
volume of sNying thig writings and translations ascribed to him. None of these attributions
can be verified at present and one is led to suspect, for reasons indicated above, a strong
indigenous element at work in the formation of the sNying thig System. At any event, it was
Vimalamitra’s main disciple, a well-attested Tibetan monk from the powerful Myang clan
known as Myang Ting nge ’dzin bzang po (760-815), who reportedly preserved the

55 Roerich 1976,1: 191.

56 See above 33 and Germano 2002: 226 f..
57 See Karmay 1988: 61.
58 Karmay 1988: 24.
Seventeen Tantras for posterity by concealing them in the Temple of the Hat (zhw ai Iha
khang)59, after first teaching them to ’Brom Rin chen ’bar. Myang appears to have been
unpopulär with King Khri srong lde’u btsan and his brother, perhaps on account of his and
Vimala’s alleged sympathies with the Chinese Chan system of Heshang Mohoyen at the
time of the so-called bSam yas debate60 which likely occurred in Central Tibet during the
reign of Khri srong lde’u btsan (reign: 755-97). He nonetheless served as a tutor or guardian
to the prince Khri lde’u srong btsan (b. 776).61 It was reportedly on account of Myang’s
affectionate and loyal Service that the prince, when he later acceded to the throne, made his
tutor a minister and granted him the land on which the Temple of the Hat was established.
Questions of provenance and authorial identifications notwithstanding, the corpus of sNying
thig texts attributed to Vimalamitra in particular the Seventeen Tantras and supporting
commentaries and instructions is remarkable for its consistency, erudition, philosophical
acuity, clarity of expression and originality.

5.2 gNyags Jñānakumāra

gNyags Jñānakumāra (Tib gnyags dznyā na ku niä rä) is said to have been bom in the
Yar klungs (Yarlung) valley early in the eighth Century.62 Tradition relates that he was
ordained by Śāntaraksita and received rDzogs chen oral transmissions from
Padmasambhava, Vimalamitra, Vairocana and g.Yu sgra snying po. According to ’Gos lo
tsä ba gZhon nu dpal, gNyags studied the Sems sde teachings under Vairocana and g.Yu

On this temple, see above note 34.

Sources on the debate and its participants include Demiéville 1952, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 192 f., Jackson 1994a,
van der Kuijp 1984, Broido 1987, and Gomez 1987: 96 f.. A succinct account o f the bSam yas debate according to
the early sBa bzhed is given by Faber 1986. Relevant materials on the debate from the later (Zhabs btags ma)
version are found in Houston 1980. On the probable chronologies o f the earlier and later versions, see Seyfort Ruegg
1989: 67 f..

As a prominent aristocrat in the powerful Myang clan, Myang ting nge ’dzin is said to have played a decisive role
in having dBa’ Ye shes dbang po (d. around 797), first abbot o f bSam yas, removed from his ofifice and replaced by
gNyan dPal dbyangs. On these figures see Karmay 1988. Two factors may have influenced this decision. One was
Myang s perception that Ye shes dbang po had over-extended his reach by according the office of abbot of bSam
yas, and therefore the religious community itself, more power than the ministers and aristocracy. The other was
Myang s alleged affiliation with Chinese Chan proponents who were coming under increasing pressure from pro-
Indian factions led by Ye shes dbang po, as both sides vied for imperial patronage. See Tucci 1980: 5 f..
Information regarding gNyag’s life and works is based on ’Gos lo tsä ba’s Deb ther sngon p o , in Roerich 1976:
170 f., bDud ’joms rin po che’s rNying ma ’i chos ’byung, in Dudjom 1991: 601 f. and Garson 2004: 204 f..
sgra and the later Sems sde translations under Vimalamitra. This last association, if true,
would suggest that gNyag’s life straddled the 8th and 9th centuries. In transmitting the Sems
sde teachings, gNyags played a vital part in the consolidation and widespread dissemination
of the different Sems sde lineages in Tibet. Considered one of Vimilamitra’s two major
disciples, he also said to have collaborated in the earliest extant translation of the
*Guhyagarbhatantra. He is also credited with assisting in the translation and transmission of
a number of esoteric teachings belonging to Mahäyoga, rDzogs chen Atiyoga (i.e. Sems
sde), and Vajrakīla. ’Gos lo lists a number of gNyag’s disciples. Among these, rDza dPal
sprul rin po che (1808-1887) singles out Khu Byang chub 'od and Sog po (Sogdian/Manchu-
Mongolian) dPal gyi ye shes as gNyag’s two main successors. It is through Sog po that the
rDzogs chen teachings passed down to gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes.

The only works of gNyags that are extant are three commentaries that are included in
the recently discovered 120 volume bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa, namely, the ’Phrul gyi me
long dgu skor gyi 'grel pa (Commentary on the Nine-fold Cycle: Mirror o f Manifestation),
Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’grel pa (Commentary on the General Mantra Scripture), and
gSang ba bde ba ’i 'grel pa (Commentary on the Secret Bliss).63 Nothing is known about the
texts on which these commentaries are based though they clearly merit study for their lucid
and succinct distillations of early rDzogs chen thought. As for gNyag’s commentaries, the
last two are included in a corpus of Mind Genre commentaries (sems sde’i dgongs ’grel
skor). In these works, the author clarifies many of the distinctive, and at times contrarian,
themes introduced by this tradition such as the path that is spontaneously present (Ihun grub
pa ’i lam) and therefore devoid of progression (bgrod du med pa ’i lam)M, effortless mastery
(brtsol du med pa), the supreme sphere of being (thig le chen po)65, the rDzogs chen
unconditioned all-ground (kun gzhi)66, self-occurring primordial knowing (rang byung gi ye

63 These are in NyKs vol. 82: 963 f. and vol. 103: 439 f. and 355 f. respectively.
64 gSang ba bde ba ’i ’g rel pa: 355.3; Spyi gsang sngags lunggi ’g rel pa: 440.4.
65 gSang ba bde ba ’i ’g rel pa: 356.3; Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’g rel pa: 471.2.
66 Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’g rel pa: 441.1.
shes)67, and the way of Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) itself which is said to be beyond
acceptance and rejection.68

gNyag’s commentary on the Mirror o f Manifestation, which is incorporated in a

collection of sixty instructions on Mãyãjāla scriptures (sgyu ’phrul rgya gzhung man ngag
phra mo drug bcu’i skor), is of considerable philosophical interest as a defence of early
Mahäyoga and rDzogs chen principles. It also reveals a side of gNyags Jñānakumara quite
different from his rather fantastic portrayal in later hagiographical accounts as a wild
shaman-like Vajrakīlaya practitioner who, under the spiritual guidance of Vimalamitra,
Sublimates his impulse to wreak vengeance on various parties who wronged him, including
his own brother.69 The Mirror instead shows gNyags to be an astute Buddhist philosopher
well-versed in the Tibetan Buddhist philosophical schools prevalent in 8th Century Tibet and
capable of critically appraising and clarifying leading Mahäyoga/rDzogs chen ideas such as
spontaneity (Ihun gyis grub pa), primordial buddhahood (ye sangs rgyas), the ground (gzhi)
and errancy ( ’khrul pa) using an impressive repetoire of traditional tools of analysis and
argumentation, with a particular predilection for the reductio ad absurdum (prasańga : thal
’gyur).

Of particular interest within this commentary is the author’s doxography of the broad
ränge of views available to Tibetans during his lifetime. These views are classified as (1)
very unwise, (2) unwise, (3) wise and (4) very wise. (1) The ‘very unwise’ (shin tu mi mkhas
pa) rubric includes non-Buddhist heretics (mu stegs pa : tīrthika) as well as commoners
(skye bo dag) who hold extreme views. (2) The designation ‘unwise’ (mi mkhas pa) is
specified later in the text as characterizing three modes of thought of Buddhist philosophers
who are deemed unwise in perspective (Itos p a i mi mkhas pa dag): (A) Pramānavādins who
dispute about the existence of instruments (tshul) of valid cognition, (B) Cittamätra
followers who dispute about the existence or non-existence of sense-data [i.e., Nikāravādins/
Allkākāravādins and Sākāravādins/Satyākāravādins], and (C) Mädhyamikas who dispute

gSang ba bde ba ’i ’g rel pa: 356.4; Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’g rel pa: 480.3.
gSang ba bde ba ’i ’g rel pa: 356.6; Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’g rel pa: 451.5.
See Dudjom 1991: 601-6 .
about the existence or non-existence of appearances (snang ba). Since they all intentional ly
negate epistemological objects that are [deemed] ‘irrational’ and actively affirm
epistemological objects that are [deemed] ‘rational’, they develop mental attachments to
objects of affirmation and antipathy toward objects of refutation. Because they consequently
fail to see that which is without acceptance or rejection, they are considered ‘unwise.70 (3)
The moniker ‘wise’ (mkhas pa) is used with reference to Mädhyamikas and followers of
Cittamätra who pursue the Mahāyāna path but remain confused in their view of the Mantra
[approach] and consequently remain cut off from the path that does not err due to the
influence of object-oriented and subject-oriented deliberations. Because they entertain ideas
that definitively postulate factors that they intentionally deny or affirm, they are cut off from
the Mantra view. (4) The highest category, the very wise, consists of Mantra[yäna] (i.e.,
Mahäyoga) followers who directly realize the self-manifesting self-awareness (rang rig rang
snang) in which all phenomena bound up with acceptance and rejection are transcended.71

5.3 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes

gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes emerged as a brilliant rDzogs chen scholar and
systematizer of the dominant currents of Buddhist thought and praxis that existed in Tibet
during the so-called Period of Fragmentation (910-1249) following the collapse of the
central empire.72 As few works of other Tibetan scholars survived this tumultuous period,
the tradition is probably right to honour gNubs chen with preserving existing rNying ma
traditions for posterity through this difficult time of transition and with initiating a second
wave of bKa’ ma exegesis. gNubs chen’s works likely had limited circulation during his
lifetime and feil into relative obscurity thereafter. Fortunately, the recent global distribution

70 ’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor kyi ’g rel pa, NyKs vol. 82: 986.2 f.: Itos pa ’i mi mkhas pa dag ni\ \tshad ma tshul yod
la rtsod\ \sems tsam pa rnam pa yod med la rtsod\ \dbu ma snang ba yod med la rtsodpa byedpa cing\ \rigs pa ma
yin pa ’i shes pa ’i yul ched du 'gegs\ \rigs pa ’i shes pa 7 yul sgrub par byed pa de ni\ \sgrub p a ’i don la blo chags\
Idgag bya la zhe sdang bskyedpas\ | blang dor med pa ’i don ma mthong ba ’i phyir mi mkhas pa ’o\\
71 As gNyag states, “Since all phenomena o f denying and affirming, existing or non-existing, are simply this self-
awareness, one shouldn’t take some specially singled out reality which is devoid o f denial and afifirmation as an
intentional object.” Ibid.: 987.5 f.: ...dgag sgrub y o d med kyi chos thams cad rang rig p a y in pas\ \dgag sgrub med
pa ’i don ched du dmigs pa yul du mi byed do\ |
72 Information regarding gNub chen’s life and works is based on ’Gos lo tsä ba’s Deb ther sngon po, in Roerich
1976: 104 f., bDud ’joms rin po che’s rNying ma ’i chos ’byung, in Dudjom Rinpoche 1991: 607 f., Karmay 1988: 99
f. and Germano 2002: 252 f..
of once rare Tibetan texts73 has made it possible for the first time to give this remarkable
figure the attention he deserves.

There is considerable confusion about when gNubs chen lived. According to bDud
’joms rin po che, he was bom in the uplands of Grwa (Dra) in Central Tibet in 832 where he
lived to the age of l l l . 74 Some traditional sources claim he was bom in 772 in order to
make him a direct disciple of Padmasambhava, while others place his birth date in the late
10th Century.75 It is now widely accepted, on the basis of early records of family and
religious lineages as well as historical references in his bSam gtan mig sgron, that gNubs
chen lived sometime between the mid-ninth and mid-tenth centuries.76 Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od
zer (1136-1204) portrays gNubs chen as a figure in whom all transmissions of the nine
disciples of gNyags Jñānakumāra converged.77 His principal teacher is generally identified
as Sog po (Sogdian) dPal gyi ye shes, one of gNyag’s two main disciples. gNubs chen
Claims in the colophon of his bSam gtan mig sgron to have studied in the presence of various
scholars in India and Nepal and to have also studied with the translator (lo tsä ba) Che btsan
skyes of Bru sha (Gilgit-Baltistan region of Northern Pakistan).78 According to the mKhas
pa lde’u, these trans-Himalayan joumeys were motivated by gNubs chen’s dissatisfaction
with the lineages existing in Tibet during this period of turmoil.79 Karmay has noted that the
translation colophon of the dGongs ’dus p a ’i mdo names Che btsan skyes as translator of the
work from the language of Bru sha (a language today known as Burushaski80 which is used

Contemporary scholars who work with Tibetan primary sources are much indebted to Gene Smith (1936-2010)
and his team at the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Centre for their tireless efforts in collecting, codifying and preserving
a vast number and variety o f Tibetan texts and making them available in digital format.
74 Dudjom 1991: 607, 614.
75 Karmay 1988: 100.
76 Germano 2002: 253.
77 See Germano 2002: 253.
78 See Karmay 1988: 99. See also Dalton 2002: 278 f. for an account o f the teachers gNubs chen is said to have
studied with during his cross-Himalayan joumeys.
79 Germano 2002: 254.
80
Burushaski (also known as Brugaski, Kanjut, Verchikwär, Boorishki, and Brushas) is a language isolate (having
no proven genetic relationship with any language o f the world) which is today spoken by some 87,000 Burusho
People (as o f 2000) residing mostly in the Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, and Ishkoman valleys, and some parts of the Gilgit
valley in the Gilgit-Baltistan region o f Northern Pakistan. Despite the introduction of many loan words from
neighbouring languages, the grammar and vocabulary o f the language remain largely intact. On the Burushaski
in Gilgit and the Hunza valley).81 This tantra is the subject of gNubs chen’s most extensive
extant work, the Mun p a ’i go cha (Armour Against Darkness), a massive commentary that
fills two volumes of the recently discovered bKa ma shin tu rgyas pa.S2 The dGongs ’dus is
also the source most frequently cited in the author’s bSam gtan mig sgron where it goes by
the title rNal ’byor grub p a ’i lung ,83 Possibly on account of its unusual provenance and
distinctive character, the tantra was eventually classified as one of the so-called five (or later
four) tantras of the Anuyoga corpus (though nowhere does gNubs chen himself make such
an identification). It is more specifically identified as the explanatory tantra (bshad rgyud)
to the root tantra (rtsa rgyud) entitled Kun ’dus rig pa ’i mdoM, another of the four so-called
Anuyoga tantras that is also very often quoted by gNubs chen.85 According to ’Gos lo tsä ba,
gNubs chen received and propagated teachings on the Mãyãjāla (sGyu 'phrul drwa ba) that
came down to him in an unbroken lineage fromVimalamitra to gNyags Jñānakumāra and
thence to gNub’s own teacher Sog po dPal gyi ye shes.

In addition to consolidating and disseminating Māyãjãla, Anuyoga and Sems sde

transmissions, gNubs chen has gained renown amongst Contemporary scholars of Tibetan
Buddhism for his synoptic and critical assessment of the major religio-philosophical
traditions prevalent in Tibet during his lifetime. These included Indian Mahāyāna and
Mahäyoga Systems, Chinese and Tibetan Chan-based traditions and rDzogs chen itself. Such

language, see Hermann Berger, Die Burushaski-Sprache von Hunza und Nager, vol. 13 o f Neuindische Studien (ed.
by Hermann Berger, Heidrun Brückner and Lothar Lutze), Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1998.
81 Karmay 1988: 99 f..
82 NyKs vols. 93 and 94.
83 See Karmay 1988: 100.
84 See Roerich 1976: 158.
85 In the 1I th Century, the authenticity o f both these works, along with the other Anuyoga texts (which are included
in the bsTan ’gyur as well as in rNying ma collections), were called into question by mGos khug pa 1ha btsas (b. 1 Ith
c.). Interestingly, he Claims that “the dGongs ’dus and Kun ’dus and the five imperial dharmas (rgyal po ’i chos
Inga) are corrupt because they were written by Dar rje dPal gyi grags pa.” See Dalton 2002: 288. This Dar ije is
identified by ’Gos lo tsä ba (Roerich 1976: 108) as a famous 9 Century teacher o f the Māyājāla-*Guhyagarbha
system who taught both in Central and Eastem Tibet and whose followers were thus divided into the two schools of
dBu (dbu lugs pa) and Khams (khams lugs pa). As Germano (2002: 254) has noted, Dar rje dPal gyi grags pa is
identified by Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer as a teacher of gNubs chen, raising the possibility that gNubs chen’s joumey
to Bru sha (Gilgit-Baltistan region) to receive the dGongs ’dus was an elaborate fiction devised to legitimize
inauthentic tantras, in which case gNubs chen’s Mun p a ’i go cha would have served as a vehicle for promoting his
guru’s own teachings. However, among the evidence supporting the veracity o f gNubs chen’s joumey to Bru sha,
Dalton mentions the existence of passages in the dGongs ’dus o f untranslated Burushaski (bru sha skad).
was the scope of his masterpiece the bSam gtan mig sgron (Lamp fo r the Eyes o f
Contemplation), which remains a singulär source for understanding the vibrant religious and
intellectual lanscape of Tibet during this so-called ‘dark period’ of Tibetan religious history.
Among gNubs chen’s other extant works is the above-mentioned Mun p a ’i go cha which
contains among much eise detailed investigations of a number of central rDzogs chen
themes such as self-occurring primordial knowing (rang •byung gi ye shes), rDzogs chen
versus sötric all-grounds (kun gzhi), and preclassical buddha nature (*bodhigarbha) theories.
Also noteworthy is the author’s commentary on the rTse mo byung rgyal, one of the thirteen
later Sems sde translations, which contains further elucidations of these and other salient
themes.86

5.4 Klong chen rab ’byam s pa

Tuming to the main author discussed in this work, Kun mkhyen (“All knowing”)
Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308-1364) is regarded not only as the principal systematizer of
the rNying ma tradition but as its greatest scholar, philosopher and poet.87 He was bom in
the Grwa (Dra) valley in g.Yo[n] ru (Yoru), the eastem part of Central Tibet.88 This region
was the site of two famous monasteries that would figure importantly in Klong chen pa’s
academic and spiritual career. One was bSam yas, Tibet’s first monastery and spiritual
home of the rNying ma tradition, having been consecrated by Padmasambhava in the 8th
Century. The other was gSang phu Ne’u thog89, a bKa’ gdams monastery established in 1073

NyKs vol. 103: 179-230.1 discovered this work while researching commentaries on the Sems sde corpus.
Information regarding Klong chen pa’s life and works is based on ’Gos lo tsä ba’s Deb ther sngon po, in Roerich
1976, I: 200 f., bDud ’joms rin po che’s rNying m a ’i chos ’byung, in Dudjom Rinpoche 1991: 575 f., sMyo shul
mkhan po’s rDzogs pa chen p o ’i chos ’byung, in Barron 2005: 98 f., Chos grags bzang po’s Kun mkhyen dri med
od ze rg y i mam thar mthong ba don Idan, Klong chen pa’s Byang chub lam bzang, in Klong chen pa gsung ’bum,
vol. 21: 481 f., Arguillères 2007: 9 f., Guenther 1975: Introduction, Karmay 1988: 211 f. and Germano and Hillis
2005.

rDzogs pa chen p o ’i chos ’byung, vol. 1: 74a.4. The rNam thar mthong ba don Idan of Klong chen pa’s Student
Chos grags bzang po gives the name o f his birthplace as sTod grong (Tödrong) which simply means upper village.
On g.Yon ru, the eastemmost o f the two parts into which Central Tibet (dBus) was traditionally divided, the other
teing dBu ru, see Ferrari 1958: 46 and 117 n. 160.
gSang phu was the most important and influential o f six seminaries (chos grva chen po drug) established between
t o l l and 13th centuries in the dBus province, the others being sKyor mo lung, Zul phu, dGa ba gdong, bDe ba
can and Gung thang (i.e. Chos ’khor gling). gSang phu was under the authority o f the rNgog clan and started
operations with 500 students. Sørensen and Hazod (2007: 685) note that the six leaming centres played a vital role
m the establishment o f the major dGe lugs pa key monasteries in the 15th Century, being incorporated into their
by rNgog Legs pa’i shes rab (1 Ith c.), a disciple of the renowned Bengali master Atiśa alias
Dīpamkaraśrijñāna (982-1054) who founded the bKa’ gdams order. gSang phu remained a
vital centre for all areas of Tibetan scholasticism, particularly epistemology and logic, well
into the fourteenth Century. Klong chen pa received ordination at bSam yas in 1319 at which
time he was given the monastic name Tshul khrims blo gros. His affiliation with this
monastery can be traced to his patemal ancestor rGyal ba mchog dbyangs who belonged to
Padmasambhava’s original circle of disciples ordained there in the eighth Century. Despite
Klong chen pa’s frequent poetic lamentations about the climate of moral turpitude that had
befallen this once illustrious seat of leaming90, he would maintain a lifelong association with
bSam yas, as Student and teacher (of poetics among other subjects), and later as a hermit-
practioner in the nearby grottoes of mChims phu, long frequented by rDzogs chen pilgrims
and retreatants. Klong chen pa’s studies at bSam yas were wide ranging, reflecting the still
vibrant ecumenical spirit of the early fourteenth Century. Among teachings received were
the Lam ’bras (Path and Goal) teachings of the Sa skya tradition, rGod tshang pa’s path
teachings of the Upper ’Brug (stod ’brug) tradition, the Zhi byed and gCod Systems, and a
number of gSar ma tantras such as the Kälacakra. The young scholar also frequented
academies (bshad grwa) in the region to further his knowledge in all areas of scripture and

network. On formative developments in Buddhist epistemolgy at gSang phu, see Van der Kuijp 1983: chapters 1 and
2. On the traditions of debate and logic at gSang phu, see Onoda 1992: chapter 2. On abbatial succession at gSang
phu, see Van der Kuijp 1987, Onoda 1988, and Sørensen and Hazod 2007: 686 f..
90 This is movingly expressed in a number of poems o f renunciation that are found in the author’s Miscellaneous
Writings. The Po ta la kun tu dga ’ ba ’i gtam (Joyful Tale o f Potala) in Klong chen gsung ’bum, vol. 24: 146-180,
teils o f a spiritual joumey in which the protagonist, the gander king (personifying Klong chen pa himself), leaves the
spiritual ly bankrupt atmosphere of the once illustrious bSam yas in search o f Mount Potala, a mythical haven of
peace and liberation. This theme o f leaving bSam yas for more spiritually uplifting regions is repeated in the Ngang
p a ’i dris lan sprin gyi snying po (Quintessence o f Clouds: The Gander’s Questions and Answers), ibid.: 370-387.
The deplorable Situation that prompted these poetic flights o f fancy was apparently even worse at gSang phu.
Biographical sources relate that the partisan behaviour and misconduct of some Khampa scholars who took up
residence at gSang phu - one group o f whom evicted Klong chen pa ffom his room seven times - drove him into a
life o f solitary practice. The incident also inspired some fine poetry. sMyo shul mkhan po notes that “Klong chen pa
wrote enough tracts on the faults o f these eastem Tibetans to fill a basket.” Three poems are specifically devoted to
the source of his discontent: the rGyu la khams ’dus pa me tog gi phreng Idan (Garland o f Flowers: Disheartened
by Causes), ibid.: 312-315; the acrostic rKyen la khams ’dus pa ka kha sum cu (Thirty Letters o f the Alphabet:
Disheartened by Circumstances), ibid.: 316-18; and the no longer extant gNyis ka la khams ’dus pa dran p a ’i me
long (Mirror o f Memory: Disheartened by Both [Causes and Conditions]). These titles contain a double entendre
where the expression khams ’dus pa means both “disheartened” and “a throng o f Khams pas”.
reasoning. The breadth of his leaming is reflected in one of his many noms de plume9]
“bSam yas Lung mang pa”, “recipient of extensive scriptural transmissions from bSam yas”.
At age nineteen, Klong chen pa took up residence at gSang phu monastery where he
spent the next seven years expanding his studies in virtual ly all areas of Buddhist
scholasticism available at the time. His teachers during this period included such luminaries
as the third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339), from whom he received teachings on
the Six Doctrines of Näropa and many New Tantra (gsar ma rgyud) instructions, and the
renowned Sa skya master Bla ma dam pa bSod nams rgyal mtshan (1312-1375)92 with
whom he studied both bKa’ gdams and Sa skya doctrines. In the fertile intellectual climate
of gSang phu, Klong chen pa’s studies ranged from Mahāyāna to Vajrayäna and rDzogs
chen. In his Byang chub lam bzang (The Auspicious Path to Awakening), Klong chen pa
outlines the nature and subject matter of these three categories of teachings and his principal
teachers in each: (1) The Mahāyāna doctrines he received are characterized as outer (phyi)
preliminary (thog ma) instructions belonging to the Cause-oriented Vehicle of
Characteristics (rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa) that constitute an ordinary basis93. Foremost
among his Mahāyāna teachers was Bla brang pa Chos dpal rgyal mtshan94, an abbot of

Klong chen rab ’byams pa employed an unusual variety o f epithets in his wntings which reflected important
milestones in his life and also corresponded to the subject matter of the works to which they were appended.
Karmay 1988: 212 n. 27 mentions eleven names apart from Klong chen [rab ’byams] pa: Klong gsal dri med, rDo
ije gzi bijid, rDo ije sems dpa’, Dri med ’od zer, Bio gros mchog ldan, Tshul khrims blo gros, Ngag gi dbang po,
Padma las grol, sNa tshogs rang grol, and bSam yas pa. Arguillères (2007: 9) adds to these the epithets Padma las
brel rtsal and Byar med klong yangs and also mentions additional titles such as “All-knowing” (kun mkhyen), a title
generally reserved for the most leamed figure in a Tibetan Buddhist tradition, and “yogi of the supreme vehicle”
{thegpa mchog gi rnal ’byorpa), an epithet frequently used in the author’s sNying thig works.
On this important Sa skya hierarch who assumed offrce as 14th chief abbot o f Sa skya from 1343/44 until 1347,
see Petech 1990: 100 and 144, and Sørensen 1994 (especially biographical sketch on 29). The latter work provides a
translation o f Bla ma dam pa’s famous chronicle o f Tibet entitled rGyal rabs gsal ba 7 me long. In addition to his
Status as the greatest Sa skya scholar of the 14th Century, Bla ma dam pa was also teacher to some o f the most
Prominent figures o f his day including Klong chen pa, Tsong kha pa and Ta’i situ Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302-
1364). In fact, it was through this last-noted connection that Bla ma dam pa was able to secure peace between his
Order and the Phag mo gru subsect of the bKa’ brgyud order that was at this time usurping power from the Sa skya
m the struggle over Central Tibet under Ta’i situ’s ambitious aggenda of expansion and political control. See
Sørensen 1994: 31 f..
9, ßyanS chub lam bzang, in Klong chen pa gsung 'bum, vol. 21: 481.7: phyi thun mong gi gzhi rgyu mtshan nyid kyi
theg pa thog mar dge ba 7 khrid\
94
Ch°s dpal rgyal mtshan was the 1 Ith throne-holder o f Gling stod (“Upper Monastery”), one the two principal
hneage seats (the other being Gling sman or “Lower Monastery”) into which gSang phu divided early in the
Century. Gling stod came to be associated with rNogs Legs pa’i shes rab and the Sa skya tradition, whereas
gSang phu, who introduced him to the tradition of gradual training in Buddhist doctrine
(bstan pa la rim gyis bslab pa) as passed down from the Indian scholars Śāntideva,
Dharmakīrti and Atiśa through a lineage of Tibetan scholars among which are counted two
bKa’ gdams pa masters at gSang phu, the renowned translator and Sanskritist rNgog Lo tsā
ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109)95 and the influential epistemologist Phya pa Chos kyi seng
ge (1109-1169).% Klong chen pa would later adopt the thematic structure of these bKa’
gdams Stages of the Path (lam rim) and Stages of the Doctrine (bstan rirri) teachings as
paradigms for his own path summaries (Sems nyid ngal gso and Yid bzhin mdzod) but
broaden their primarily Mahāyāna scope to encompass Vajrayāna and rDzogs chen subject
matter. From Bla brang pa and two other teachers who served as abbots at gSang phu97,
bTsan dgon pa gZhon nu bsam gtan and Chos grags pa gnyis pa (“Second Dharmakīrti”)
gZhon nu rin chen, Klong chen pa received teachings on experiencing the contemplations
(samädhi) of the paths and levels as delineated in the works of Maitreya-Asanga and
Vasubandhu. From gZhon nu rdo rje (1207-1263)98, Klong chen pa received teachings on
the profound view that reveals one’s authentic abiding condition, the nature of things (chos
nyid don gyi gnas lugs) as passed down through Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Atiśa and Gro lung
pa Blo gros ’byung gnas (bom I I th c.), a disciple of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab whose bsTan
rim chen mo99 strongly influenced classical Tibetan Stages o f the Path (lam rim) literature,
the most famous example being Tsong kha pa’s Lam rim chen mo. Klong chen pa was
among a growing number of Tibetan scholars in the Period of Monastic Hegemony to

Gling sman came to be associated with Phya pa Chos kyi senge ge and the bKa’ gdams tradition. See Onoda 1989:
211 f. and Sørensen and Hazod 2007: 686 f.. See also Roerich 1976: 201 f.and 330 f..
95 On rNogs Blo ldan shes rab’s life and works, see Jackson 1994b.
96 On Phya pa’s life and works, see Van der Kuijp 1979: 1983, chapter 2, and Hugon 2008: 35-52.
97 ’Gos lo tsâ ba notes that bTsan dgon pa was abbot for twenty years, Chos dpal rgyal mtshan for six years and
gZhon nu rin chen for twelve years. See Roerich 1976 I: 330 and Sørensen and Hazod 2007: 686. Arguillères (2007:
33) proposes as approximate dates o f their tenures 1302-1314 (note twelve not twenty years), 1314-1320, and 1320-
1332 respectively on the basis o f information given in biographies of Klong chen pa.
98 Little is known about this teacher. gZhon nu rdo ije’s own teacher, referred to as Byang chub grub in the Byang
chub lam bzang, is probably the same as Byang chub dngos grub, a disciple of sGam po pa who studied
Prajñāpāramita doctrine passed down from Atiśa through Gro lung pa. See Roerich 1976: 470. This corresponds
nicely with the line of transmission given in the Byang chub lam bzang which includes Nāgāijuna, Candrakīrti,
Atiśa, and Gro lung pa.
99 On its content and importance, see Jackson 1996.
recognize the so-called *Prāsańgika-Madhyamaka tradition of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as
the highest expression of Indian Buddhist philosophy. In his estimation, the *Prāsańgika
approach with its uncompromising stance of global antirealism was the only such
philosophy to dispense with every trace of reification (realist as well as idealist) and thereby
provide the necessary preparation for an undistortive understanding of one’s abiding
condition (gnas lugs), the principal focus of the Vajrayäna and rDzogs chen Systems.

(2) The Vajrayäna teachings Klong chen pa received are characterized as inner
(nang) intermediate (bar du) instructions belonging to the Goal-oriented Guhyamantra-
Vajrayäna that constitute a special approach.100 His principal Vajrayäna teacher was gZhon
nu don grub101 of Dan ’bag monastery102 with whom Klong chen pa Claims to have studied
works belonging to all four classes of New Tantras: Kriyä, Caryä, Yoga and Yoganiruttara.
’Gos lo tsä ba specifies that the teachings Klong chen pa received from this teacher at Dan
’bag included the mDo (i.e. the dGongs ’dus p a ’i mdo), the Mãyã(jāla], the Sems sde corpus,
as well as a *Guhyagarbha commentarial tradition of Rog Bande Shes rab ’od which Klong
chen pa allegedly considered less satisfactory than that of Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po.103
sMyo shul mkhan po relates that Klong chen pa also studied rNying ma works with this
teacher including tantras from the rNying ma rgyud ’bum. Most important among these was
the *Guhyagarbhatantra on which Klong chen pa composed three commentaries. It was
Klong chen pa’s studies at gSang phu that gave him the mastery of the content, styles and
methods of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism as well as the conventions of Tibetan poetics and
prosody that would together become hallmarks of his literary corpus.

(3) The rDzogs chen teachings Klong chen pa received are described as arcane
(gsang ba) final (tha ma) instructions belonging to the Unsurpassed rDzogs chen Vehicle

Byang chub lam bzang, in Klong chen pa gsung ’bum, vol. 21: 481.8: nang khyadpar gyi bras bu gsang sngags
rdo rje ’i thegpa bar du dge ba 7 khrid\ \
Little information is available about this teacher apart from what is said about him in connection with Klong chen
pa s studies at Dan ’bag, on which see Arguillères 2007: 43.
Text: dan bag which is a variant of dan ’bag (occasionally dar ’bag or dan phag bag). This is a famous locale of
great antiquity on the Western outskirts o f Lha sa along the sKyid chu river where ’Bras spungs and gNas chung
monasteries are located. The monastery referred to may be Dan ’bag gling stod, on which see Sørensen and Hazod
2007: 217 n. 574.

03 See Roerich 1976: 202 and 157.

and representing the quintessential goal that is of definitive meaning.104 Klong chen pa’s
principal teacher in this tradition was of course his root guru Kumārarāja who he first
encountered after leaving gSang phu and from whom he received instructions in all three
genres of rDzogs chen (sems sde, klong sde, man ngag sde), the most important being the
Man ngag gi sde or sNying thig teachings said to originate with Vimalamitra.

By the time Klong chen pa met his root teacher Kumārarāja, he had become
increasingly devoted to a life of solitary practice fueled in part by an acute sense of
disenchantment with the corruption and hypocrisy he witnessed in the monasteries he had
frequented. This period of renunciation, reflected in the sombre tone and renunciate content
of various poetic works composed during his twenties, coincided with an increasing interest
and immersion in rDzogs chen teachings. Though Klong chen pa seems to have lived much
of his life in voluntary poverty, and typically refused to accept money in retum for his
teachings, he did not hesitate to use what little resources he had in founding or restoring
monasteries and hermitages, especially those associated with the rDzogs chen tradition.
These included Lha ring brag, the O rgyan rdzong grotto at Gangs ri thod dkar (“White
Capped Mountain”) where Klong chen pa spent many of his adult years in retreat, and
Zhwa’i lha khang where, we may recall, the Seventeen Tantras and other sNying thig
teachings of Vimalamitra are said to have been concealed by the latter’s Student Myang
Ting nge ’dzin and later rediscovered by IDan ma lhun rgyal in the eleventh Century.

It was at the age of twenty-nine, after spending eight months meditating in the dark
recesses of a cave, that Klong chen pa first met Kumārarāja. Five months into this dark
retreat, he had a vision in which a lovely young woman foretold his meeting with
Kumārarāja. Soon after the retreat, Klong chen pa joumeyed to meet the master, who
immediately recognized the younger yogi as his principal successor in the sNying thig
lineage based on his own prophetic dream of the preceding night. Klong chen pa joined the
itinerant teacher’s ever-mobile community which is said to have moved camp nine times
during spring and summer, resettling in one uninhabited valley after another. This constant
relocation is portrayed in rNying ma histories as a deliberate stratagem on the part of the

104 Byang chub lam bzang, in Klong chen pa gsung 'bum, vol. 21: 481.9 f.: gsang ba nges don snying po 7 ’bras bu
rdzogs pa chen po bla na med pa ’i theg pa tha mar dge ba 7 khrid... \
teacher to instill an acute sense of impermanence and desire for renunciation in his disciples.
This was indeed a time of extreme privation and dejection for Klong chen pa and he was on
the verge of leaving the community out of shame at having no tribute to offer in retum for
Kumārarāja’s teachings when the teacher appealed for him to remain. The following year,
the two of them joumeyed to Shampo Glacier where Kumārarāja bestowed on his Student
the complete sNying thig empowerments and instructions including the Bi ma snying thig,
the Seventeen Tantras, and sädhana cycles.

Some time shortly after his stay with Kumārarāja, Klong chen pa experienced a
vision of Padmasambhava and his consort Ye shes mtsho rgyal who together conferred upon
him the epithets Dri med ’od zer and rDo rje gzi brjid respectively. This vision instilled in
him a special connection with the mKha' 'gro snying tig teachings associated with
Padmasambhava which he later elaborated on in his mKha’ gro yang tig.105 In the
meantime, the sNying thig teachings passed down from Vimalamitra that Klong chen pa had
received from his root guru were collected in the Bi ma snying thig and further developed in
the author’s own Bla ma yang tig. The principal doctrines of the mKha ’ ’gro yang tig and
Bla ma yang tig were later synthesized in his Zab mo yang tig which also draws extensively
on two important explanatory tantras (bshad rgyud) from the Yang ti dass of rDzogs chen,
the Spros bral don gsal and its daughter tantra the Thig le kun gsal. All these texts were
assembled in the sNying thig ya bzhi which not only synthesized the rDzogs chen
transmissions of Vimalamitra and Padmasambhava but provided a comprehensive and
systematic framework for their understanding and practice.

Whether by choice or circumstance, Klong chen pa was continually on the move for
much of his adult life. This peripatetic lifestyle, long espoused by scholar-yogins of India
and Tibet, seems to have enhanced rather than hindered Klong chen pa’s altruistic activities,
and much of his time in ever-changing habitations was spent teaching, giving
empowerments, performing rituals, founding or restoring monastic settlements, and

KJong chen pa came to be recognized as an authority o f this system when a disciple, while channeling a series of
emale dākinī, recognized him to be the reincamation of the mKha ’ ’g ro snying thig's discoverer, Tshui khnms rdo
Ue (1291-1315/17) who also went by the name Padma las ’brel rtsal. See Germano and Gyatso 2000.
composing a large quantity of poems, commentaries and treatises on an impressive range of
subjects.

What has survived of Klong chen pa’s corpus reflects a prolific writer with wide-
ranging sympathies and a prodigious talent for synthesizing and systematizing diverse
currents of Buddhist thought, exoteric and esoteric, in works of striking originality and
stylistic beauty. His most famous and influential works, which number some two hundred
and seventy titles in the author’s catalogue (many of which are no longer extant), are
gathered into several collections. Foremost among these are the Seven Treasuries (mdzod
bduń) which elucidate the essentials of rDzogs chen theory and practice as these relate to
other Systems of Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) soteriology.106 Of these, the Yid bzhin mdzod
(The Wish-Fulfilling Treasury) and auto-commentary provide a comprehensive treatise on
Mahāyāna Buddhism which begins with the origins of the universe (cosmology) and human
existence (ontology) and then delineates the stages of the path, sūtric and tantric, that lead
the aspirant from worldly existence to spiritual awakening (soteriology). The Man ngag
mdzod (Treasury o f Esoteric Guidance) consists in a structured compendium of six-fold
precepts encompassing all aspects of Buddhist doctrine and praxis, Mahāyāna through
rDzogs chen. The Grub mtha' mdzod (Treasury o f Philosophical Systems) contains the
author’s most extensive summary of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical Systems
(siddhänta) culminating in the adamantine quintessence of luminosity ( ’od gsal rdo rje
snying po), i.e. the rDzogs chen sNying thig System. Two treatises are specifically dedicated
to systematic exegesis and interpretation of this System: the encyclopedic Theg mchog
mdzod (Treasury ofthe Supreme Vehicle) which covers every conceivable aspect of sNying
thig theory and practice in twenty-five chapters, and the Tshig don mdzod (Treasury o f
Topics), a more succinct presentation that focuses on the traditicnal eleven adamantine
topics (rdo rje’i gnas) of this system. Last but not least are two poetic masterpieces, the
Chos dbyings mdzod (Treasury o f the Expanse o f Phenomena) and gNas lugs mdzod
(Treasury o f the Abiding Condition) and their auto-commentaries, which represent the
author’s most mature reflections on rDzogs chen and are widely regarded as two of his most

106 See Guenther 1975: xvi f. for a concise overview of their subject matter.
profound and inspiring works. The former provides a seamless integration of all the key
points for understanding and practicing the three genres of rDzogs chen Atiyoga, the Mind
Genre (sems sde), Space Genre (klong sde) and Esoteric Guidance genre (man ngag gi sde)
with special attention to the Seventeen Tantras. The latter work provides a similar synthesis
but is structured according to the four sNying thig vows (dam tshig): non-being (med pa),
intensity (phyal pa), spontaneity (Ihun grub), and uniqueness (geig pu).101

Many of the author’s other collections were styled as trilogies (skor gsum) that
synthesized central elements of the rNying ma tradition. The Ngal gso skor gsum (Trilogy
of Resting in Ease) consists in a systematic and practical path summary entitled Sems nyid
ngal gso (Resting in Mind itself) and covers the essentials of Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna and
rDzogs chen, a practical guide to meditation (bSam gtan ngal gso), and a practical guide to
contemplating the illusory character of phenomenal existence (sGyu ma ngal gso). Each of
these poetic root texts is accompanied by an extensive auto-commentary and summary of
essential points. This cycle is complemented by the author’s Rang grol skor gsum (Triology
of Natural Freedom), a condensation of the Mind Genre of rDzogs chen consisting in the
Sems nyid rang grol (Natural Freedom o f the Nature o f Mind), the Chos nyid rang grol
(Natural Freedom o f the Nature o f Reality) and mNyam nyid rang grol (Natural Freedom of
Basic Equality). These works are again accompanied by autocommentaries. The Mun sei

These four vows (dam tshig : samaya), which articulate the existential foundations of rDzogs chen ethics, are
widely discussed in rDzogs chen scripture and are frequently contrasted with the more prescriptive samayas o f the
Mahāyāna and Vajrayäna Systems. See, for example, Klong chen pa’s Dam tshig gsum bkod, in Zab moyang tig part
1• 161.2 f. where the he discusses 25 ordinary samayas (thun mong gi dam tshig) pertaining to Mahāyāna (161.3 f.):
27 special samayas (khyadpargyi dam tshig) pertaining to Vajrayäna (162.3 f.) and the 4 unsurpassed commitments
{bla na med p a ’i dam tshig chen po) that are specific to the rDzogs chen sNying thig system (179.2 f.). In the Zab
don gnad kyi me long, Zab mo yang tig part 2: 355.2 f., he summarizes the four as they relate to the four yogas of
Vision, meditation, conduct and goal-realization: ‘T he four great [vows] are non-being, openness, spontaneity and
uniqueness. Since self-occurring primordial knowing is not established as anything at all, it it is surpassing like
space. [1] Since it transcends the parochialism o f ethical constraints, it is a view (Ita ba) o f great unrestricted no-
ingness (dngos med). [2] As its effulgent nature is unrestricted openness, it is pure meditation (sgom pa) as wide-
ranßlng auto-illumination. [3] As whatever manifests is self-liberated in self-occurring primordial knowing, it is
pure conduct (spyod pa) in this unique state. [4] As self-awareness is luminous and spontaneous, it is pure goal-
realization o f naturally reposing in dharmakâya. One should abide by the vows that do not transgress realizing
[ ings in this way].” chen po bzhi ni\ \med pa phyal pa geig pu Ihun grub ste\ \rang byung gi ye shes la gang
ang ma grub pas nam mkha ’ la ’da ’ mnyam\ \bsrungs mtshams kyi ris las ’das pas dngos med zang thal chen
Po i ta ba\ \ngang gdangs phyal pa bar med\ \rang gsal rgya yan dag pa ’i sgom pa dang\ \gang shar rang byung ye
os rang grol geig pur dag pa ’i spyod pa dang\ \rang rig ’od gsal Ihun grub chos sku rang mal dag pa i bras bur
n °gs Pa losI Imi ’d a ’ b a ’i dam tshig gnas par bya’o\\ The gNas lugs mdzod presents a lengthy philosophical and
P°etic elaboration of the four unsurpassed vows in its four successive chapters.
skor gsum (Trilogy which Dispels Darkness) consists in a cycle of commentaries on the
*Guhyagarbhatantra. The Yang tig skor gsum (Trilogy o f the Ultra Pith) comprises the
author’s above-mentioned Bla ma yang tig, mKha’ ’gro yang tig and Zab mo yang tig
collections. The majority of the Klong chen p a’s writings were either composed or redacted
at Gangs ri thod dkar (“White Capped Mountain”), setting of the cave hermitage O rgyan
rdzong (on the mountainside above Shugs seb monastery overlooking the sKyid chu river
valley near Lha sa) where the author spent extended periods in solitary retreat.

In 1359, Klong chen pa was forced into exile in Bhutan due to an alleged affiliation
with opponents of the ascendant ruling power. Klong chen pa was regarded as a master of
the ’Bri gung sect which had become a political rival of Ta’i si tu (Chinese da[i\situ =
“Grand [Instructor]”) Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302-1364), head of the Phag mo gru sect
(phag gru khri dpon) that was then rising to dominance in Central Tibet, having usurped
power from the Sa skya.108 When a ’Bri gung revolt broke out, Klong chen pa’s attempt to
mediate the hostile factions led Byang chub rgyal mtshan to surmise that the rNying ma
master had sided with the enemy. So convinced was he of Klong chen pa’s complicity that
he reportedly ordered his execution. The biographies recount Klong chen pa’s narrow and
miraculous escape from a throng of murderous solidiers sent from Yarlung by the ruler
when they surrounded his compound in Lhasa.

During his period of exile in the hinterland of Bhutan, Klong chen pa taught the
sNying thig System to thousands of students and established a number of hermitages known
as the “eight centres” (gling brgyad), the most important of which was Thar pa gling in Bum
thang where he resided during his sojoum.109 These activities established a solid footing for
the rNying ma tradition to flourish in Bhutan, as it still does today. Klong chen pa’s
laudatory poem extolling the beauty of Bum thang entitled Bum thang Iha’i sbas yul gyi
bkod pa la bsngags pa me tog skyed tshal (A Flower Grove: A Tribute to the Layout o f
Bumthangy Valley o f the Gods) depicts a mountainous landscape and climate comparable to

108 On the history of Phag mo gru pa sect and Byang chub rgyal mtshan’s role in its ascendency, see Petech 1990:
chapter 5. Details of Byang chub rgyal mtshan’s life are discussed in Van der Kuiip 1991 and 1994. See also
Sørensen and Hazod 2007: 680 n. 33.
109 Penjore 2005 has drawn attention to the rieh oral traditions conceming Klong chen pa’s activities during his exile
in the Bumthang region that continue down to the present day.
Central Tibet but with a political climate much more temperate than his divided homeland
and therefore more conducive to solitary practice. Klong chen pa was eventually reconciled
with Ta’i si tu Byang chub rgyal mtshan thanks to the mediation of Sangs rgyas dpal rin, a
disciple and friend of the ruler, and he retumed to Tibet in about 1360.1,0 The history of
sMyo shul mkhan po adds that the ruler henceforth became an ardent disciple and patron of
Klong chen pa and received numerous rDzogs chen teachings from him.111 According to a
biography of the master (dated 1725) by Lha lung Kun bzang ’gyur med mchog grub, it was
from Ta’i si tu that the rNying ma master received the epithet Klong chen rab ’byams pa112,
the title rab 'byams pa (“Exceedingly Vast”) being reserved for one who has attained
mastery in all available fields of leaming.113

In 1363, at the age of fifty-six, Klong chen pa feil ill and began to prepare for his
death by giving final empowerments and teachings at important centres such as Zhwa lha’i
khang and bSam yas. During this final year of his life, he also composed a remarkable final
trilogy of elegaic poems (zhal chems gsum)u4 of increasing depth and subtlety in which the
author celebrated a life well lived (“My greatest achievement is the joy I feel in dying”) and
offered heartfelt advice to his students and successors to make the most of their own lives in
accordance with Buddhist and rDzogs chen principles. Klong chen pa died later that year at
mChims phu.

§6. Previous Studies and Scope of Present Work

Given the magnitude of the key distinctions for understanding rDzogs chen, it is
somewhat suprising how little notice they have received in Contemporary rNying ma
scholarship. Much recent work in the field has been devoted to the difficult task of historical

MOxs
Karmay 1988:213.
111 See Barron 2005: 117.

See Van der Kuijp 2003: 394. As the author notes, however, a later biography by Glag bla Bsod nams chos grub
°ß (1862-1944) composed in 1938 maintains that Klong chen pa received the epithet ffom his root guru
umārarāja (1266-1343) during his studies with him.
113 ,
ra byams pa is defined as “a wise person who has reached the highest degree of leaming with regard to the
Cn ire sPectrum of doctrinal Systems” (gzhung lugs mtha ’ dag la sbyangs pa mthar son pa i mkhas pa).
These works entitled Zhal chems dri ma med pa ’i ’od, Zhal chems gnad kyi me long, and Zhal chems mthar thug
geig ma are contained in the mKha' ’g ro yang tig part 3, sNying thig ya bzhi vol. 9: 266-285.
reconstruction of rDzogs chen traditions based on relative chronologies of the texts and their
doxographical classes and revisionist accounts of historical events and leading figures.
Samten Karmay 1988 has contributed much to our understanding of the earlier, pre-12th
Century, historical development of rDzogs chen in Tibet.115 More recent research on
Dunhuang rDzogs chen documents by Dalton 2005 and Van Schaik 2004 have also shed
light on the development of early rDzogs chen doxographical Systems. Germano has made
significant progress in the much-needed task of reconstructing the developmental history of
rDzogs chen Tantras and their doxographical classes from eighth to fourteenth centuries116
and has advanced our knowledge of some of the tradition’s leading figures.117 Arguillère
2007 has provided the first detailed study of the life and writings of Klong chen rab ’byams
pa. Achard 1999 contains a discussion and translation of rDzogs chen sNying thig materials.
Among other noteable contributions to the understanding of rDzogs chen literature, history
and doctrine, mention must be made of the works of Matthew Kapstein (2000, 2008 and
2010), Franz-Karl Erhard (1990 and 1992), and Dorji Wangchuk (2005 and 2008). Klaus-
Dieter Mathes has examined Klong chen pa’s view on buddha nature according to the Grub
mtha’ mdzod and shown its relationship with other Tathagatagarbha trends in Tibet.118

Thus, while the historical and biographical contexts of the distinctions are now
somewhat clearer than they were two decades ago, our understanding of their intellectual
background - the principal doctrinal developments in the pre-classical period that we must
understand in order to make sense of the distinctions has progressed little since Samten
Karmay7s pioneering work published in 1988.119 Two exceptions are the works of
Guenther120 (1975 and 1989) and Germano 1992 which provide translations and

116 See Germano 2005.

117 See particularly Germano 2002.
1,8 See Mathes 2007: 98-113. See also Arguillère 2008,195-492.
119 A few exceptions are Wangchuk 2005, a paper on rNying ma tathägatagarbha views, and Wangchuk 2007 on the
concept of bodhicitta which includes a good deal o f rNying ma material, Germano’s above-mentioned PhD thesis,
and Achard 1999 which contains some discussion and translation o f rDzogs chen sNying thig materials.
120 See in particular Guenther 1975-77 and 1989.
interpretations of some important materials on the principal rDzogs chen distinctions. We
are much indebted to the pioneering efforts of Guenther in interpreting some of the principal
doctrinal innovations of rDzogs chen as they relate to Indo-Tibetan Buddhism in general.
Germano’s doctoral dissertation (1992) presents an annotated translation of the first five
chapters of Klong chen pa’s Tshig don mdzod (Treasury o f Topics), the fourth chapter of
which contains a discussion of the two key distinctions.121 Apart from these references and
brief treatments in works by Tulku Thondup122 and the late Dudjom Rinpoche123, the
development and significance of the distinctions remain a terrra incognita to modern
Buddhist scholarship that the present work sets out to explore in some detail.

In contrast to the paucity of published secondary sources dealing with the two
principal rDzogs chen distinctions and their doctrinal contexts, there is a wealth of primary
sources on this subject. I have thus been faced with the happy predicament of having an
exceedingly wide ränge of relevant materials to choose from. In view of this veritable sea of
discourse, it has been necessary to confine my research primarily to rNying ma rDzogs chen
texts of the 8th to 14th centuries that deal specifically with the distinctions and that are
distinguished by their originality, clarity and influence. I have drawn extensively on
supporting materials but only where these helped clarify the conceptual histories of the
rDzogs chen distinctions. Observing these constraints has meant leaving aside or giving
only passing notice to important and interesting treatments of the distinctions found in the
Bon tradition and in rNying ma gTer ma collections. I have also not addressed post-14th
Century rNying ma treatments in any detail, largely due to my impression that these were
strongly indebted to antecedent works, especially the summaries of Klong chen pa. This in
no way diminishes the importance of these later works as vital expressions of the traditional
themes. The magnificent songs, poems, treatises and commentaries of scholar-yogins like
rTse le sNa tshogs rang grol (b. 1608), Zhabs dkar pa sNa tshogs rang grol (1781-1851),
’Jigs med gling pa (1729-1798) and dPal sprul O rgyan ’Jigs med chos kyi dbang po (1808-
1887) all testify to the profound Stimulus the classical treatments continued to exert on
12ll
Germano 1992.
122 Thondup 1989.
Dudjom Rinpoche 1 9 9 1 .
successive generations of rNying ma scholars and practitioners after the fourteeth Century.
The many areas I have neglected, as well as the more detailed and esoteric treatments of the
distinctions in the sNying thig sources themselves, remain desiderata for future research.
Part II The Problem o f Knowledge: The Sems/Ye shes Distinction

2 I The Nature and Scope o f the Mind/Primordial Knowing Distinction

§1. The Scope o f the Distinction

Now, since all phenomena of samsära depend upon [dualistic] mind, when the
workings of mind124 are purified away, then samsära is purified away. Since the
phenomena of transcendence [nirväna] depend upon primordial knowing of open
awareness (rig p a fi ye shes), they remain just as they are in open awareness. Thus all
the essential points for naturally emergent buddhahood are subsumed under these
two [categories of mind and primordial knowing]. Here, I shall explain a little about
the difference between these two.

Mind in essence125 is ignorance. Open awareness in essence is primordial knowing.

Mind in essence is based on karma and latent tendencies. Open awareness in essence
is not based on karma and latent tendencies. Mind in essence is of the nature of the
error [of believing in the reality of] subjects and objects. Open awareness in essence
is of the nature of non-error since it is free from subject and object. Mind in essence
is subject to the extremes of discursive thought. Open awareness in essence is free
from all discursive elaborations. Mind in essence is the all-ground and the eightfold
ensemble [of cognitions]. Open awareness in essence transcends the all-ground and
its eightfold ensemble. Mind in essence is samsära with its dualism. Open awareness
in essence is nirväna without duality. Mind in essence is the outward effulgence of
open awareness riding on the [karmic] energy currents126. Open awareness in essence
is self-lucency without [karmic] energy currents ([las] rlung). Mind in essence is
constructed and conditioned. Open awareness in essence is unconstructed and free
from conditions.

Mind in essence depends on open awareness. Open awareness in essence does not
depend on mind. Mind in essence is what seems to arise and cease. Open awareness
in essence is without transition and transformation. Mind in essence consists in
obscurations to be eliminated. Open awareness in essence consists in primordial

sems kyi nS° bo. See following note.

In this passage I have not translated sems kyi ngo bo as the “essence o f mind” because this would wrongly imply
* at it is the essence o f mind and not mind that is the subject of predication. What Klong chen pa intends to
emphasize is that mind is essentially ignorance, and so forth.To avoid this confusion, I have instead adopted the
ren ering in essence” throughout the passage with the exception of the first instance where I use the expression
workings o f mind” to convey the intended meaning.
126 A *
,, n lnterlinear note specifies that rlung is here to be understood as las rlung (karmaväyu) (as distinct from ye shes
w n rlung (jñãnavāyü)).
 knowing to be attained. Mind in essence is adventitious erroneous conceptualizing.
Open awareness in essence is primordially present dharmakäya. These are mere
indications. Although an extensive [explanation] would be limitless, they should be
understood in terms of the following six [categories]: their (1) loci, (2) pathways, (3)
gateways (4) expressive capacities, (5) process of uniting127, and (6) process of
separating128.129

This passage occurs in a structured presentation of rDzogs chen ‘Breakthrough’

(khregs chod) teachings130 from Klong chen rab ’byams pa’s dNgos gzhi 'od gsal snying p o ’i
don khrid (Essential Guidance on the Main Practice: Quintessential Luminosity), an
integrated series of twelve texts summarizing the essentials of the sNying thig contemplative
system based on the oral teachings of Vimalamitra and other early rDzogs chen masters. At
several points in this collection, Klong chen pa draws attention to the indispensability of the
sems/rig pa or sems/ye shes distinction for understanding these teachings and making them a
way of life. A case in point is a passage a few lines after the above one where the author
concludes his discussion with these remarks:

It is crucial to distinguish between mind and primordial knowing for the following
reasons. It is implicit in all types of meditation. It is implicit in all the ways of
purifying präna-based cognition (rlung rig). And finally, when one is liberated, [1]
the open awareness in which obscurations have been purified due to mind having
been purified away and [2] the enlightened intent (<dgongs pa) which is present as the
käyas and jñãnas, and all the [other] essential points, come down to this [very
distinction].

127 This ‘uniting’ is explained in Bla m ayang tig vol. 1: 440.4 f. which is summarized on Table A.
128 This ‘separating’ is explained in Bla m ayang tig vol. 1: 441.1 f. which is summarized on Table A.
129 Bla m ayang tig vol. 1: 414.4 f.: de ’ang ’khor ba ’i chos thams cad ni\ \sems la brten pas sems kyi ngo bo dag dus
’khor ba dag pa ’o\ \ ’das pa ’i chos rnams rig pa ’i ye shes la brten pas rig pa yin thog tu bzhag pas sangs rgyas rang
chas su ’char ba ’i gnad tham cad de gnyis su ’dus pa yin no\ \ ’dir de gnyis kyi khyadpar cung zad bshad na\ \sems
kyi ngo bo ni ma rigpa\ \rig pa ’i ngo bo n iy e shes\ |sems kyi ngo bo ni las dang bag chags kyi rten can\ \rig p a ’i
ngo bo ni las dang bag chags gyi rten ma yin pa\ |sems kyi ngo bo ni gzung ’dzin ’khrul pa ’i rang bzhin\ | rig pa ’i
ngo bo ni gzung ’dzin dang bral bas ma ’khrul p a ’i rang bzhin\ \sems kyi ngo bo ni spros p a ’i m tha’dang bcas pa\
Irig pa ’i ngo bo ni spros pa thams cad dang bral ba\ |sems kyi ngo bo ni kun gzhi dang tshogs brgyad\ | rig pa ’i ngo
bo ni kun gzhi tshogs brgyad las ’das pa\ \sems kyi ngo bo ni gnyis ’dzin ’khor ba\ |rig pa ’i ngo bo ni gnyis med
myang ’das\ | sems kyi ngo bo ni rlunga zhon rig dgangs\ \rig pa ’i ngo bo ni rlung med rang gsal\ \sems kyi ngo bo ni
’dus byas rkyen dbang| | rig pa ’i ngo bo ni ’dus ma byas rkyen bral\ | sems kyi ngo bo ni rig pa la Itos pa\ \rig pa ’i
ngo bo ni sems la mi Itospa\ \sems kyi ngo bo ni skye ’g ags Itar snang ba\ |rig p a ’i ngo bo ni ’p ho ’g yur medpa\
Isems kyi ngo bo spang bya ’i sgrib pa\ | rig pa ’i ngo bo thob bya ’i ye shes\ \sems kyi ngo bo glo bur ’khrul rtog\ | rig
pa ’i ngo bo ye gnas chos sku ’o\ | ’di dag kyang mtshon pa tsam ste| |rgyas p ar mtha ’ yas kyang\ \gnas dang\ \lam
dang\ Isgo dang\ \rtsal dang\ | ’p hrad tshul dang\ \rgyab gyes tshul dang\ \drug gis shes par bya ste|| a Interlinear
note glosss rlung as las rlung (karmaväyu).
130 The title is Khregs chod kyi rgyab yig nam mkha ’ dri med. It is found in the author’s Bla ma yang tig vol. 1:
371.1 -421.5.
 Since these two are not clearly distinguished in the ordinary vehicles, spiritual
awakening is not attained [by means of these vehicles] for aeons or life-times.
According to the extra-ordinary [vehicles], however, inconceivable dharmakäya is
directly recognized in a single instant, and thus the präna-based cognition is purified
away in this very lifetime. This, then, is the key point of awakening to buddhahood.
This secret vital point - not known by fools who boast about their erudition or the
benighted who cast about in the darkness of delusion constitutes the profound
distinctive teaching that has reached the summit of Vajrayäna. It is therefore the
official seal131 for [access to] the sublime treasury. One should intemalize this [vital
point] by striving to simply relax in this state.132

Klong chen pa here commends the distinction not only as a unique hermeneutical key for
unlocking the import of Buddhist scripture but also, and more fundamentally, as a crucial
point of entry into understanding the complex and heterogeneous structure of consciousness,
one that best accounts for the ränge of phenomena involved in realizing the Buddhist goal of
spiritual awakening (bodhi).

The opening passage (as I will refer to it henceforth) highlights the wide-ranging
scope of the distinction as it pertains to several important dimensions of Buddhist
soteriology. It therefore makes an ideal entry point for our own investigation. As it is my
philosophical aim in this chapter to investigate the nature and scope of the mind/primordial
knowing distinction in classical rNying ma soteriology, it may be useful at the outset to
schematize Klong chen pa’s points of contrast between the two in the following table:

TH
f hL Sense term a tham is not clear, though the context would suggest a key. The term may be a derivation
Ot bka ■tham which refers to an official seal.
132 R I
ola ma yang tig vol. 1: 416.5 f.: de Itar na sems dang ye shes phyedpa gal che ste| |de Itar sgom pa thams cad
*yangdeyinla\ \rlung rig gi dag tshul thams cad kyang de yin la\ \ t h a m a g r o l dus kyang sems dag pas sgrib pa dag
pa i rig pa\ \sku dang ye shes su gnas pa ’i dgongs pa dang\ \gnad thams cad der thug pa 7' phyir ro\ \thegpa thun
^o/ig las de gnyis ma phyed pas byang chub bskal pa ’am tshe rabs su mi thob pa dang\ \thun mong ma yin pas yid
ÜS ™ Pa 1 chos sku skad cig gis rang ngo shes pas tshe geig gis rlung rig dag nas sangs rgya ba i gnad kyang de
yin noI Iblun po mkhas pa ’i nga rgyal can rnams dang\ \rmongs pa gti mug gi mun rdo phen pa mams kyis mi shes
Pj*1gnad gsang ba ni\ \rdo rje theg pa ’i rtse mor phyin pa ’i khyad par gyi chos zab mo yin pas\ \yang mdzod du a
am mo\ \de Ita bu ’i ngang du bzhag pa la brtson pas nyams su blang ngo\\
 Table A: Summary of Characteristics of Mind and Primordial Knowing According to
Klong chen pa’s dNgos gzhi od gsal snying po’i don khrid

Characteristics Associated Characteristics Associated with

with Dualistic Mind (sems) Primordial Knowing (ye shes)
1. phenomena of samsära ( 'khor ba ’i chos) phenomena of nirväna ( ’das pa ’i chos)
2. ignorance (ma rig pa) open awareness (rig pa)

3. karma (las) and väsanas (bag chags)
4. error ( ’khrul pa) and dualism (gzung ’dzin)
5. discursive elaborations (spros bcas)
6. all-ground and its eighfold ensemble [of cognitions]
(kun gzhi tshogs brgyad)
1. karmic energy currents [linked with movement of
breath] (karmaväyu : las kyi rlung)
8. constructed and conditioned
( 'du byas rkyen dbang)
9. dependent on open awareness
(rig pa la Itos pa)
10. what seems to arise and cease
(skye ’gags Itar snang ba)
11. obscurations to be eliminated
(spang bya ’i sgrib pa)
absence of karma and väsanas
absence of error and dualism
absence of discursive elaborations (spros brat)
absence of all-ground and eightfold ensemble
absence of karmic energy currents [and presence of
gnostic energy currents (jñānavāyu : ye shes kyi rlung)]
unconstructed and free from conditions
( ’du ma byas rkyen brat)
not dependent on dualistic mind
(sems la mi Itos pa)
without transition or transformation
( ’pho ’gyur med pa)
primordial knowing to be attained
(thob bya ’i ye shes)

12. adventitious mistaken concepts primordially abiding dharmakäya

(glo bur ’khrul rtog) (ye gnas chos sku)

13. locus (gnas): lungs; energy channel connecting heart locus: centre of heart
and lungs; conduit of mind energy current
14. pathway (lam): life energy channels from lungs, pathway: tubulär crystalline Kati energy channel
conduit of vital currents that carry thoughts running from the heart to the eyes

15. gateways (sgo): mouth and nose (for breathing) gateways: eyes (portals o f primordial knowing)
16. expressive energy (rtsal): divisive thoughts such as expressive energy: ye shes abiding as mandala of
acceptance and rejection based on subject and object wrathful [deities] in cranium (skull mansion)

17. process o f meeting: mind unites with awareness (a) outwardly by way of the intermediary energy channel when
the efflugence of awareness from the heart mingles with energy currents at the time of thoaght proliferations, and
(b) inwardly when the awareness effulgence aspect of mind dissolves back into the heart at the time when one is
free from discursive elaborations.
18. process o fparting : mind diverges from awareness (a) conditionally in preconceptual States when the flickering
of the präna-awareness known as ‘m ind’ naturally subsides at time of being free from elaborations through yogic
gazes etc. so that effulgence dissolves into awareness and currents come to rest; this is synonymous with “mind
directly encountering awareness” (b) finally if the dawning of non-discursive luminosity occurs at time of death
when the energy currents dissipate; this occurs when the effulgence of awareness dissolves in itself.
 The table encapsulates many of the salient points of divergence between mind and
open awareness or primordial knowing that will be taken up in the course of this work. The
first thing to note about this analysis is that it combines two quite different treatments of the
distinctions: (A) an exoteric account that largely follows traditional Buddhist views on the
respective characteristics of mind and primordial knowing (1-6, 8-12) and (B) an esoteric,
specifically sNying thig account (7, 13-17) emphasizing embodied and embedded
dimensions of mind and primordial knowing that draws on complex tantric physiological
models presented in the Seventeen Tantras and supporting literature. The fifth Dalai Lama
Ngag dbang Bio bzang rgya mtsho (1617-82) noted that this esoteric sNying thig treatment
of the distinction which is based on “directly seeing mind and open awareness without
confusing them” was a special quality (khyad chos) of rDzogs chen doctrine absent in the
Middle Way traditions of Other Emptiness (gzhan stong) and Own Emptiness (rang stong),
in the Mahāmudrā of the Abiding Condition (gnas lugs phyag chen)m or in any other
Tibetan Systems. He does add, however, that these essential points do not differ from the
implicit intent of the gSar ma Mantra System if one understands the latter’s true import.134
While the bulk of this complex and minutely detailed subject matter does not fall within the
purview of the present work, it is sufficiently integral to the rDzogs chen understanding of
the distinction to warrant a brief overview. To this end, I will simply clarify the relevant
points alluded to in the opening passage with particular attention to how the genesis and
interaction of mind and open awareness have been explained.

The locations (gnas) of dualistic mind are the lungs and specifically the narrow
tubulär channel (likened to a hollow grass stalk) connecting the lungs and heart. This serves
as the conduit through which the effulgence (gdangs) or expressive energy (rtsal) of open
awareness issuing from the heart mixes with the energy currents (of breathing originating

gNas lugs phyag chen is a technical term for ground mahãmudrã and also refers to a distinctively Tibetan non-
gradual Mahāmudrā teaching introduced in the so-called Upper ’Brug pa bKa’ brgyud tradition by rGyal ba Yang
dgon pa mGon po rdo ije (1213-58) and made famous by the 17th Century ’Brug pa master Padma dkar po. At
several points in his celebrated Ri chos skor gsum, Yang dgon pa draws a distinction between Mahāmudrā in its
mode o f abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) and Mahāmudrā in the mode o f errancy ( ’khrul lugs phyag chen).
134 f
ruzogs pa chen po 7 'khrid yig Rigs 'dzin zhal lung, in Thams cad mkhyen pa rgyal ba Inga pa chen po Ngag
dbang blo bzang rgya m tsho’i gsung ’bum vol. 24: 94.1 f.: rang stong gzhan stong gi dbu ma pa dang gnas lugs
phyag rgya pa sogs la ma grags p a ’i khyad chos sems rig ma ’dres par cer mthong du dbye ba’i gsang tshig ’di ni
rdzogs chen pa rnams kyi zab gnad yin la\ \zab gnad du ma zad sngags gsar ma ’i dgongs pa ’ang dbyis byin pa rtogs
na ’di las gzhan du med de \\
from the lungs), producing a profusion of fleeting thoughts.135 The pathway (lam) of Mind
refers to the so-called vitality channel (srog rtsa)m through which discursive mentation is
bome along on the vitality energy current (from the lungs).137 The gateways (sgo) of mind
are the mouth and nose because these are the portals through which the energy currents are
expelled (as breath).138 The expressive energy (rtsal) of mind refers to the divisive thoughts
such as acceptance and rejection based on subject and object, the grasping of objects and

135 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 434.1 f.: gnas ni glo ba na rtsa gro sog gi sbu gu tsam rlung gis gang ba las\ \dbugs
thams cad mchedpa 'i rten byedpa snying ga dang ’brel ba gnas te| ... ngo bo ni snying ga 'i rig gdangs rlung dang
’dres pas rnam par rtog p a ’o\\ ln clarifying the locus o f mind in his Theg mchog mdzod (vol. 1: 1066.1 f.), Klong
chen pa provides a cogent summary of how conceptual mind originates when the expressive energy of open
awareness mixes with the energy currents: “Conceming the locus [of mind], it is located where the effulgent glow o f
open awareness rides on the ‘wind-horse’ [energy current] via the narrow interior of the tubulär channel connecting
the heart and lungs. The energy current is similar to a blind horse with legs whereas the effulgence of open
awareness is like a cripple with eyesight. When these two do not mix together, wildly proliferating thoughts do not
arise. Since this open awareness in its effulgence resides naturally in oneself, although objects appear, they are not
conceptualized therein. Hence one can differentiate between the clear and dissipative [aspects] of cognition. Such is
the reason, therefore, why we distinguish between energy currents and open awareness by way of the key points
conceming these energy currents. When these two are mixed, then the resulting movement aspect ( ’g yu cha) which
consists in the veritable profusion of fleeting thoughts is the energy currents, whereas the awareness aspect (rig cha)
is the effulgence o f open awareness. Moreover, the fundamental open awareness within one’s heart is analogous to
water whereas the mind which mixes with the energy currents because the effulgent expressive energy [which
derives] ffom that [open awareness] has passed into the tubulär channel, is analogous to bubbles in water. Mind is in
this sense the effulgence or expressive energy o f open awareness. ln this regard, mind conforms to the existence or
non-existence of open awareness whereas open awareness does not have positive and negative concomitance [with
the respective existence and non-existence] o f mind. So in essence, open awareness is not under the power o f mind
whereas mind insofar as it is the expressive energy [of awareness] is under the power o f open awareness. Conceptual
mind is not possible when awareness does not stir in the same way that the arising of waves is not possible when
water does not stir.” gnas ni snying nas glo bar ’brel pa ’i bar na rtsa sog ma ’i sbu gu tsam nas rlung gi rta la rig
pa ’i gdangs zhon nas gnas te\ \rlung ni rta long ba rkang can ’dra la\ \rig gdangs ni mi ’p hye bo mig can ’dra ’o\ \de
gnyis geig tu ma ’dres na mi ’gyu dgu ’gyu ’i rtog pa mi ’byung bar\ \gdangs rig pa rang la rang chas su gnas pas
yul snang yang de la mi rtog par shes pa dangs sangs phyed pa ’byung bas\ \rlung gnad yis\ \rlung dang rig pa
’byed pa ’i rgyu mtshan de yin no\ \de gnyis ’dres pas rtog pa mi bkra dgu bkrar byung ba 7| | ’g yu cha rlung yin la\
Irig cha rig gdangs yin no\ | de ’ang snying nang gi rig pa dngos chu dang ’dra la\ \de las rtsal gdangs rtsa spubs su
song bas rlung dang ’dres pa ’i sems de chu ’i sbu ba dang ’dra ste\ \sems de rig pa ’i rtsal lam gdangs yin no\
Ide ’ang sems ni rig pa y o d med kyi rjes su byed la\ \rig p a ni sems yo d med kyi rjes su ’g ro Idog mi byed pas\ \ngo
bo la sems kyi dbang du rig pa ma gyur la\ | rtsal yin pas rig pa ’i dbang du sems gyur pa yin te\\rig pa mi g.yo na
sems rtog mi srid de\ \chu mi g.yo rba rlabs ’byung mi sridpa bzhin no\ \
136 Physiologically, this may correspond to the aorta. Germano (1996: 254 and notes) discusses this identification
but also points out some o f the problems in identifying (as the texts sometimes do) subtle energy body (rdo rje ’i lus)
Systems with physiological Systems.
137 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1067.3 f.: lam ni srog rtsa nas ’g yu ste| |de nas sems kyi rtsa srog rlung ’gyu b a ’i
phyir ro\\ See also Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 434.3 and especially 462.3 where the inner currents ffom the lungs are
said to pass (as breath) to the mouth and nose but also to the five sensory faculties. The main idea here is that
conceptual-perceptual activity is reciprocally related to breath movement; if one is erratic, so is the other.
138 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1067.4: kha sna gnyis te rlung de nas ’thon pa ’i sgo yin pa ’i phyir ro\\ See also Bla
ma yang tig vol. 1: 434.4 which adds that ‘gateways’ also refers to each o f the [five] sense gates as portals for
mental activity. This is corroborated by the account in Zab m oyang tig vol. 2: 287.6.
attachment to ‘I’ or ‘seif’.139 The locus of primordial knowing is the heart (snying ga). The
Theg mchog mdzod and Bla ma yang tig specify that “open awareness resides as mustard
seed-sized peaceful deities (sku) in the centre of a pentad of lights within the luster of the
light channels in the centre of the octagonal precious heart.” 140 The pathway of primordial
knowing is the “tubulär crystalline Kati energy channel (rtsa ka ti shel gyi sbu gu can)
running from the heart to the eyes.” 141 Its gateways are the two eyes since these are “the
portals through which primordial knowing shines.”142 The expressive energy of primordial
knowing refers to its presence as “the mandala of wrathful deities in the skull mansion (i.e.
cranium).” 143
The meeting and parting of mind and open awareness alluded to in the opening
passage are presented in the Bla ma yang tig as pith instructions pertaining to certain
soteriological implications of the embodied dimensions of mind and primordial knowing.
The meeting of mind and awareness is said to occur both (a) outwardly and (b) inwardly. (a)
The outward meeting occurs during the time of thought proliferations when the effulgence
of open awareness in the heart merges with with energy currents (from the lungs). When
these unite by way of the intermediary energy channel (connecting the heart and lungs), this
is called the “meeting of mind with open awareness.” (b) Inward meeting occurs at the time
when one is free from discursive thoughts. Since the awareness-effulgence (rig gdangs)
aspect of mind dissolves back into the heart, this is called the “mind directly meeting open
awareness inwardly.” 144 The Separation of mind and awareness occurs both (a) conditionally

139 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 434.5 f.: rtsal ni gzung ’dzin dgag sgrub la sog sp a 'i rnam rtog rnams so|| According to
Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1067.4 f.: rtsal ni yul la ’dzin zhing nga bdag tu zhen pa ’o\ \
140 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1098.1 f.: gnas ni snying rin po che zur brgyadpa ’i dbus ’od rtsa ’i dangs la ’od Inga ’i
dbus zhi ba ’i sku yungs ’bru tsam la rig pa gnas so| | See Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 434.6 f..
141 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 435.5 f.: lam ni snying nas mig tu ’brel b a ’i rtsa ka ti shel gyi sbu gu can\\ The Theg
mchog mdzod (vol. 1: 1098.2 f.) explains that the pathways are described with regard to movements through the
four channels, namely, the three traditional channels lalana (rkyang ma), räsana (ro ma), and avadhuti (kun ’dar
ma) plus the crystalline Kati channel. This follows Rig p a rangshar, Ati vol. 1: 537.1 f..
142 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1098.2 f.: sgo ni mig gnyis so| On the eyes as gates of primordial knowing, see Bla ma
yang tig vol. 1: 436.5 f.. The Zab mo yang tig identifies four gateways: the two eyes as conspicuous gateways
(mngon du gyur pa ’i sgo gnyis) and the two ears as hidden gateways (Ikog tu gyur ba ’i sgo gnyis).
143 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1 435.3: de ’i rtsal dung khang na khro bo ’i dkyil ’khor du gnas pa ni\... Like the peaceful
deities, these are specified as being the size o f mustard seeds.
144 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 440.4 f.: sems dang ye shes ’p hrad p a ’i dus ni gnyis te\ \phyi ’p hrad dang\ \nang ’p hrad
do\ \phyi ’p hrad ni\ \rnam rtog du mar ’p hro dus snying gi rig gdangs rlung dang ’dres pas\ \bar gyi rtsa lam nas
’brel ba ’i dus su sems la rig pa ’p hrad pa zhes bya ’o\ \nang ’p hrad ni\ \blo spros pa dang bral ba ’i tshe \ \sems kyi
63
and (b) ultimately. (a) Conditional Separation occurs when the flickering of the präna-
awareness known as ‘mind’ naturally subsides at time of being free from discursive
elaborations through implementing yogic gazes and the like. Since the effulgence thereby
dissolves into awareness and the energy currents come to rest, there is a Separation (or
lacuna) in which the next thought has not yet arisen. This is synonymous with “mind
directly encountering awareness” (b) The ultimate process of Separation may occur at the
time of dying when the effulgence of awareness has dissolved back into itself due to the
self-subsiding of the energy currents. Separation occurs if luminosity that is free from
discursive elaborations dawns.145
In view of the complexity of the exoteric and esoteric characteristics associated with
mind and primordial knowing presented in the opening passage, it is appropriate to give
some idea of the inquiry standpoint from which the distinction emerged and developed. The
treatments of the distinction one finds in classical sources can perhaps best be viewed in
light of certain motivating questions that were already posed in the earliest stratum of
rDzogs chen literature. How do people become enlightened? Stated otherwise, what are the
conditions necessary for a human being to become what is known as an ‘awakened one’
(buddha : sangs rgyas), a being in whom cognitive and affective obscurations have cleared
(sangs) so that inherent capacities for caring and knowing (mkhyen brtse nus Idan) are able
to fully unfold (rgyas)! Seen in this light, the problem can be viewed as an attempt to
discover and articulate the existential sources of ethics - what are the constitutive conditions
of human existence that enable human beings to live most appropriately with and for others?
The history of attempts to clarify the distinction can profitably be seen as an ongoing
response to these ancient Indian Buddhist questions. From these follow more specific
questions: What distinguishes the modes of being and awareness of a buddha from those of

cha ’i rig gdangs snying gar thim pas\ \nang rig thog tu sems 'phradpa zhes bya ’o\\ As a point o f clarification,
Klong chen pa adds that there are no actual meetings of mind with an awareness different from it, but they are so
described from the perspective o f the awareness-effiilgence mingling with energy currents outwardly and gathering
inwardly.
145 Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 441.1 f.: gyes tshul la gnyis las\ \gnas skabs Ita stangs la bzhag pas spros pa dang bral
dus sems zhes btags pa ’i rlung rig gi gya gyu de rang zhi ste\ \gdangs rig par thim nas rlung rang sor gnas pas\
\rnam rtog phyi ma ma lang gi bar la gyes 5o| |de nyid sems rig thog tu ’p hradpa dang don geig go\ \bu ma thog tu
grol bas ye shes dbyings su thim pa ’i ’od gsal lam bu 'dres pa zhes bshad 5o| | mthar thug gyes tshul ni\ \shi dus
rlung rang zhi la song bas rig gdangs rang thim la song ba ’i tshe\ \spros pa dang bral ba ’i ’od gsal shar ba na gyes
50 1 I ’di nyid da Itar gyes pa ngos zin pa de ka bar do ’i ’od gsal yin pas ngo shes pa gal che ’o\ | An abridgement of
this passage is given under point 18 on Table A.
an ordinary human being? How are primordial knowing (ye shes) and dualistic mind (sems)
co-present within the psychic and corporeal dimensions of lived experience and how is their
relationship best characterized? From a soteriological standpoint, how can a practitioner
reclaim unconditioned primordial knowing (ye shes) from the subjective appropriations and
reifications of conceptually and emotionally distorted mind (sems)?
Such questions preoccupied rDzogs chen scholar-adepts from as early as the 8th
Century and led them increasingly to differentiate between conditioned and unconditioned
modes of being and awareness. If earliest rDzogs chen sources tend to emphasize the
underlying unity of the ‘minds’ of buddhas and sentient beings, classical sNying thig
exegetes underscored the need to establish clear priority relations between them. Their aim
in doing so was to provide a framework for investigating consciousness that would allow
practitioners to directly recognize (ngo shes) and familiarize themselves with primordial
knowing (ye shes), the abiding condition of Mind, without confusing it with any of its
derivative and distortive by-products. To encounter primordial knowing in this way was
considered tantamount to realizing buddhahood itself, an abiding invariant condition devoid
of distorting reifications but replete with altruistic capabilities.
In short, by clarifying the mind/primordial knowing distinction, rDzogs chen sNying
thig scholars were in effect articulating the preconditions for the kind of knowing said to be
constitutive of being a buddha (buddhajñãna). At the same time they were delimiting the
entire ränge of factors that are considered obscurations and even obstacles to illumination.
These so-called factors to be abandoned (spang bya), culled largely from Abhidharma and
Yogācāra psychologies, were collectively termed ‘mind’ (sems). They are specified as what
must be stopped ('gags bya), removed (bral bya) or cleared away (sbyangs bya) in the
process known as spiritual awakening. The practical aim of drawing such a distinction, then,
was to clarify the mechanism of obscuration by shedding light on how mind’s self-reifying
activities lead us to overlook the simple taking place of presence open awareness or
primordial knowing - in favour of the myriad perceptual and epistemic objects that claim
our attention. Klong chen pa summarizes the matter in this way:

Mind is always a samsäric phenomenon: when open awareness is associated with this
flawed state (skyon) wherein the natures of karma and latent tendencies arise as
defilement, we use the term ‘minded being’ (sems can) and it is this mind which
 causes the six life forms to go astray each in its own way. When open awareness is
free from mind, we speak of “buddha[hood] which is free from adventitious
defilement”. Primordial knowing is always a nirvänic phenomenon: it is like a fire
because it bums away the karma and latent tendencies and it is of the nature of clear
and empty sky, being free from all discursive notions.146

From the foregoing, it is evident that the rDzogs chen sNying thig analysis of
consciousness reflects an innatist strain of Buddhist soteriology that draws on
Tathägatagarbha and tantric currents of thought, but introduces much that is original as well.
On this syncretistic account, the conditions for spiritual awakening and delusion are both
located within the heterogeneous structure of human experience itself. From the viewpoint
of classical rNying ma exegetes, the nature of mind (sems nyid, ye shes) which they
explicitly identify with buddha nature (tathägatagarbha, *sugatagarbha) refers to the
undifferentiated and invariant structure of the experiential continuum, whereas ‘mind’
(sems) serves as a cover term for the adventitious reflective and thematic differentiations
that arise within this continuum. Soteriology is seen as a task of recovery or retrieval, a
Clearing process (sbyong byed) that brings to light what is already present though
temporarily and adventitiously obscured. It is an approach that emphasizes, in the words of
Paul Ricoeur, “mind’s attempt to recover its power of thinking, acting and feeling - a power
that has, so to speak, been buried or lost - in the knowledge, practices, and feelings that
exteriorize it in relation to itself.” 147 In summarizing classical sNying thig views on the
nature of mind and primordial knowing and the difference between them, my philosophical
aim is to provide a framework for understanding this tradition’s distinctive approach to
Buddhist soteriology.

§2. The rDzogs chen sNying thig Analysis of Mind (sems)

It will be observed that the opening passage explicitly identifies mind (sems) with a
complex variety of phenomena that Buddhism has traditionally held to be causes of error,

146 Tshig don mdzod: 938.3 f.: sems gangyin ’khor ba ’i chos te las dang bag chags kyi rang bzhin dri mar skyes pa ’i
skyon de rig pa la Idan dus sems can zhes btags shing\ \sems des ’g ro drug so sor ’khrulpar byed la\ \rig pa de sems
dang bral dus glo bur dri bral gyi sangs rgyas zhes bya ’o\ |ye shes gangyin mya ngan las 3das pa ’i chos te las dang
bag chags bsregs pas me dang ’dra zhing kun tu rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba stong gsal nam mkha ’i rang bzhin
can te\ |
147 Ricoeur and Changeux 2000: 4. Ricoeur is here defining reflexive/reflective philosophy, a branch o f French
existential philosophy associated with Jean Nabert that is concemed with the subject’s attempt, through
interpretation, to recapture itself through the expressions of life (signs) that objectify it.
suffering and samsāra itself. ‘Mind’ is here associated with ignorance (ma rig pa), actions
(las) and their conditioning imprints (bag chags), error ( ’khrul pa), subject/object dualism
(gzung ’dzin), discursive elaborations (spros pa), adventitious mistaken concepts (glo bur
’khrul rtog), delusive perceptions, the Yogācāra substratum consciousness (ãlayavijñãna)
with its eightfold ensemble of cognitions, and the karmic energy currents (karmaväyu) and
their energetic pathways as these are detailed in rDzogs chen tantric physiology. In short,
mind comprises all that is constructed and conditioned ( ’dus byas rkyen dbang) and
constitutes the sum total of obscurations to be eliminated (spang bya ’i sgrib pa) as all these
were codified in the various Indian Buddhist doctrinal Systems. While a detailed analysis of
these points in light of their historical-doctrinal contexts would far exceed my abilities and
the scope of this study, it may be worthwhile to briefly summarize how rDzogs chen
scholars have defined and characterized mind in relation to some of the more important
aspects, before tuming our attention to the gnoseological current of thought that is more
distinctive of this tradition. Specifically I will consider how mind is viewed in relation to
three interrelated factors that Buddhist tradition has regarded as primary sources of
obscuration: dualism, ignorance and reifying conceptuality.

2.1 Dualism

According to Klong chen pa, “mind constitutes adventitious defilement. It functions

as the fundamental cause of samsära. It depends on latent tendencies of the three realms. As
it creates the conditions of worldly life, it is that from which we should be emancipated.” 148
These elements are all deemed to be consequences of the complex dual structure that is said
to be constitutive of mind. Basing himself on accounts of mind presented in the Seventeen
Tantras, Klong chen pa States:

[1] As for the essence [of mind]: it is any cognition arising as object and subject, the
apprehended and apprehending, such that ignorance is present as the pervader. [2] As
for its etymology, it is called ‘mind’ because it thinks (sems pa) in terms of object
(yul) and object-possessor (yul can) given that it arises as both the apprehended and
apprehending. Mind belonging to the two higher [realms] also consists in the
apprehending and apprehended [aspects] to which one is attached in the one-pointed

148 Zab don gnad kyi me long, in Zab mo yang tig vol. 2: 281.3 f.: sems ni glo bur gyi dri mar gyur ba\ \ ’khor ba ’i
rtsa ba ’i rgyu byedpa\ \khams gsum pa ’i bag chags brten pa\ \gson pa ’du byedpa bral bya yin pa ste11
 meditative absorptions. In the desire [realm, mind] consists of coarse conceptualiz-
ations.'49

This portrayal of mind is clearly indebted to the Cittamätra view that mind (citta), under the
influence of defiled ego-mind (klistamanas), has both intentional (object-intending) and
reflexive (‘I-intending’) operations that structure experience in terms of an ‘I’ (subject) and
’mine’ (object). Mind’s activities in the three realms are shot through with dualism, the only
difference being whether the reifications are coarse (as in the desires realm) or subtle (as in
the formless realm). Elsewhere, Klong chen pa characterizes mind as encompassing act,
object and agent in a manner reminiscent of Nāgārjuna’s analysis of mind in MMK 23.15.150
The author proceeds, however, to claim that the source of this tripartite intentional structure
is the efflugence of primordial knowing (ye shes kyi gdangs) as it is explained in sNying thig
tantric physiology: “The source of [dualistic] mind is the effulgence of primordial knowing:
the cognition of objects resulting from the stirring by the energy currents is the expressive
energy of primordial knowing, while the wild proliferation of thoughts is the aspect of the
energy currents. They [viz. the energy current and effulgence of primordial knowing] are
similar to a blind horse with legs and a crippled rider with eyesight [respectively].” 151 From
the foregoing, it is clear that the rDzogs chen understanding of dualistic mind is syncretistic,
combining analyses of its act-object structure that are known from traditional Cittamätra and

149 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1050.4 f.: ...ngo bo ni\ \yul yul can gzung ’dzin du skyes pa 7' shes pa gang zhig ma
rig pa khyab byed du yod pa\ | nges tshig ni\ \gzung ’dzin du skyes pas yul dang yul can du sems pas sems zhes
bya ’o\ \gong ma gnyis kyi sems kyang ting nge ’dzin rtse geig la chags pa ’i gzung ’dzin no\ \ ’dod pa na kun rtog
rags p a ’o\\ ln his Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel (495.3 f.), Klong chen pa specifies the role these two aspects o f mind
play in initiating and perpetuating the illusion o f dualism: “From object-oriented mind, apprehended objects, non­
existent but clearly apparent, manifest as the five aspects of forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactile sensations.
From subject-oriented mind, actions, their maturation, and afflictive emotions manifest in limitless ways. Samsära
which consists in grasping an object where there is no object and grasping a mind where there is no mind, appears
before sentient beings like a dream, having arisen from the manifesting of aspects of subject- and object-oriented
mind.” de ’ang gzung ba ’i sems las gzung yul med pa gsal snang gzugs sgra dri ro reg Ingar snang la\ \ ’dzin pa ’i
sems las las dang rnam smin nyon mongs pa dpag tu med par snang ste\ \yul med yul du ’dzin pa dang\ \sems med
sems su ’dzin pa 7 ’khor ba sems can la rmi lam Itar snang ba sems gzung ’dzin gyi m am par shar ba las byung
ba ’o\ I
150 Zab don snying po, in Zab mo yang tig vol. 1: 452.1 f.: “Conceming the reason for using the term [‘mind’]:
Because of the three factors of what is ‘minded’, by what means it is minded, and what does the minding, we speak
of ‘mind’.” sgra ’ju g pa ’i rgyu mtshan ni\ \gang la sems\ |gang gis sems\ \gang sems par byed pa gsum gyi phyir na
sems 5o| I This analysis resembles the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience in terms o f an intentional
act (noesis), intentional object (noemata) and what Merleau-Ponty called the intentional arc {l’arc intentionel).
151 Zab don snying po , in Zab mo yang tig vol. 1: 452.1 f.: de ’ang sems kyi rtsa ba ye shes kyi gdangs te\ \rlung gis
bskyodpa las yul rig pa ye shes kyi rtsal\ \mi ’g yu dgu ’g yu rlung gi cha ste| |rta long ba rkang can dang\ \mi ’p hye
bo mig can bzhin no\\
Madhyamaka sources with accounts of the psychophysical genesis of this dual structure that
are specific to sNying thig tantric physiology.

2.2 Ignorance

But these accounts leave unclear how and why dualistic mentation arises? The short
answer to this question is ‘ignorance’. Ignorance is understood in rDzogs chen thought to
be a precondition of dualistic experience. According to the mKha ’ ’gro yang tig: “Mind is
ignorance; it serves as the basis of the latent tendencies for bright and dark deeds (karman).
It it is therefore the cause or essence of samsära that is like a [spinning] wheel. Primordial
knowing transcends all [these] obscurations.” 152 Mind is elsewhere said to be closely
associated with fundamental ignorance and analogous to clouds that obscure the sun that is
primordial knowing.153 According to the commentary on the sGra thal ’gyur, ignorance is
what obscures authentic reality. It is called ‘ignorance’ because it does not recognize this
abiding mode of the actual ground as naturally occurring, naturally free and naturally
pure.” 154

If ignorance is construed as an event of fundamental obscuration that is identified as

the source of dualism, the starting point of samsära ( ’khor ba ’i thog ma) and the cause of
error ( ’khrulp a ’i rgyu)155, it remains to be explained precisely how this occurs. The rDzogs
chen sNying thig account of ignorance builds on the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist analysis of
avidyä (ma rig pa) as co-emergent ignorance (Ihan cig skyes p a ’i ma rig pa) and
conceptually elaborated ignorance (kun tu brtags p a ’i ma rig pa).156 Tibetan thinkers of the

152 m K ha' ’gro yang tig vol. 2: 233.2 f.: sems ni ma rig pa dkar nag gi las bag chags ki rten byed pas ’khor lo Itar
’khor ba ’i rgyu ’am ngo bo yin la\ \ye shes ni sgrib pa thams cad las ’das te11...
153 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1027.6 f.. See under “Texts and Translations”: 307.
154 sGra thal ’g yur 'grel pa vol. 2, in NyKs, vol. 111: 179.1 f.: ngo bo ni yang dag pa ’i don ni sgrib par byed pa ’o\
Inges tshig ni ma gzhi yin te\ \de Itar gzhi dngos pa ’i ’dug tshul de\ \rang byung rang grol\ \rang dag tu ma rig pas
ma rig pa zhes bya ’o\\
155 See mKhas pa nyi ’bum’s rDzogs pa chen po Tshig don bcu geig pa: 32.8 f.. Klong chen pa identifies a number
of synonyms o f this ignorance which include delusion (gti mug), not knowing (mi shes), not realizing (ma rtogs), not
seeing (ma mthong), error ( ’khrul pa) and erroneousness (phyin ci log). Zab mo yang tig vol. 2: 241.1: ming gi rnam
grangs ma rig\ \gti mug\ \mi shes\ \ma rtogs\ \ma mthong\ \ ’khrulpa\ \phyin ci log ces pa ste| ...
156 These two types o f ignorance may have developed ffom the two kinds o f personalistic false views (satkäyadr$(i/
°darśana) - viz. sahajasatkäyadr$fi and parikalpitasatkäyadrsti - or false views of seif {ãtmadrstil °-darśana) that
are distinguished in Yogācārabhūmi and Abhidharmakośabhãsya. See Eltschinger (2009: 67) where this typology is
discussed in the context o f examining DharmakTrti’s identification o f ignorance with personalistic false views. For
dGe lugs tradition view co-emergent ignorance as an innate or congenital tendency to reify
phenomena that is present in all sentient beings, whereas conceptually elaborated ignorance
is a language-dependent formulation of a realist view. Klong chen pa, however, interprets
this two-fold Schema as consisting in two kinds of misapprehension: Ihan cig skyes pa 'i ma
rig pa carries a sense of not seeing things as they are, whereas kun tu brtags pa ’i ma rig pa
connotes seeing things as other than they are. He explains that ignorance is classified as (a)
co-emergent ignorance on account of not recognizing the factor of open awareness to be
primordial knowing in and as oneself and (b) conceptually elaborated ignorance that grasps
what comes from oneself as ‘other7.157 In short, ignorance comprises not only an innate type
of non-recognition but also an acquired type of mis-recognition, viz., an active, distorted
intelligence (klistaprajñā) that reifies persons and entities, thus creating the conditions for
the arising of attachments, aversions and delusions that perpetuate cyclical existence.

rDzogs chen sNying thig sources introduce a third and more fundamental kind of
ignorance termed ‘ignorance of single identity that is the cause’ (rgyu bdag nyid geig p a yi
ma rig pa)m that is regarded as the foundation of all error.159 According to the 12th Century

Dharmakirti, ignorance is equated primarily with the innate personalistic false view, and not the reifying
personalistic false view which was used to characterize non-Buddhist (Brahmanical, Jain) doctrines of the seif.
157 Zab mo yang tig vol. 2: 240.5 f.: dbye na rig pa 7 cha la rang nyidye shes su mi shes pa 7 chas Ihan cig skyes pa
dang\ Irang las gzhan du ’dzin pa kun tu brtags pa ’i ma rig pa gnyis so| |
158 The locus classicus for the three types o f error is a cryptic passage in the sGra thal ’g yur, Ati vol. 1: 141.6 f.; Tk
vol. 10: 483.1 f.; Tb vol. 12: 118.4 f.: “Ignorance is o f three kinds: [Ignorance of] the single identity lays the
foundation for error. Co-emergent [ignorance] consists in dualistic concepts. Conceptually elaborated [ignorance]
engenders objects.” ma rig pa ni rnam pa gsum\ \bdag nyid geiga pas ’khrul rtsa byas\ \lhan cig skyes pas rtog pa
gnyis\ Ikun tu brtags pas yul du gyur\\ aAti,Tb geig; Tk cig bAti,Tb rtsa; Tk brtsa.
159 The three modes o f ignorance are sometimes presented as deviations within the three ye shes that are aspects of
the ground-manifestation (gzhi snang): essence, nature and responsiveness. See for example Thod rgal gyi rgyabyig
nyi zla gza ’ skar, in Bla ma yang tig vol. 1: 422.3 f.: “[Ignorance] serves as the first cause o f errancy: [ 1] Ignorance
of single identity [comes about] by failing to directly recognize the essence (ngo bo), i.e. the nonconceptual aspect
[of experience]. [2] Co-emergent ignorance [comes about] by failing to recognize the nature (rang bzhiri), i.e. its
own nature as the luminosity of the [five coloured] rays of light ( ’od du gsal ba). [3] Conceptually elaborated
ignorance comes about by not recognizing responsiveness (thugs rje) as one’s self-awareness.” ngo bo mi rtog pa ’i
cha ngo ma shes pas bdag nyid geig pa ’i ma rigj>a\ \rang bzhin ’od du gsal ba rang bzhin du ma shes pas Ihan cig
skyes pa ’i ma rig pa\ | thugs rje rang rig tu ma shes pas kun tu brtags pa ’i ma rig pas ’khrul pa ’i dang po ’i rgyu
byas\\ On the term gzhi gnas ma rig pa or ‘ground-based ignorance’, see Tk vol. 8: 203.1 f.. These three types of
ignorance are transcended in open awareness itself. In the gZhi snang ye shes sgron ma, Bla ma yang tig vol. 2
(158.1 f.), Klong chen pa States: de ’i tshe rang snang du rig pas rig par skyes pa ’i chas Ihan cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa
bcom\ Irig par shar bas ma rig pa med de bdag nyid geig pa ’i ma rig pa bcom\ \rang snang du rang rig pas gzhan
zhes gzung ’dzin med pas kun tu brtags pa ’i ma rig pa bcom nas dbyings nas phyir gsal du nyug tsam byung bas\
\gdod ma 'i ngang las cung zadphud tsam snang zhing g.yos kyang de ma thag tu rang rig pas rig mkhan nyid kyang
grol nas\ | ’dzin pa med pas gzung ’dzin gyi blo stong dus phyir snang ’od kyi snang ba sems po Itar snang ba rig pa
rDzogs chen sNying thig master mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum, this primary kind of ignorance
consists in not recognizing the single cause of both awareness and ignorance (ma rig rig
rgyu cig pa) as being in reality nondual (don gyis gnyis med), like two sides of the same
coin.160 This ‘single identity7 (bdag nyid geig pa) refers to the common ground (gzhi), i.e.
human reality in its most ontologically primitive condition, which, as open awareness,
antedates the distinction between error and non-error. Dualism and error develop from a
fundamental bifurcation between the ground itself (gzhi nyid) and the ground as
knowing/known (gzhi shes) that is the source and driving force of mind’s characteristic
subject-object dichotomy.161 This is another way of saying that ignorance has its inception in
nascent capacities within the process of auto-manifcstation (rang snang) or ground-
manifestation (gzhi snang), i.e. the most rudimentary taking place of self-experience, to both
reflect on itself and not recognize itself as it is (the ground simpliciter). In the words of
Klong chen pa:

How does the process [of errancy] arise? During the arising of the ground-
manifestation, the clear and knowing cognition as the expressive energy of
compassionate responsiveness (thugs rje) [i.e. the dynamic aspect of the ground]
manifests in close affiliation with the three kinds of ignorance because it fails to
directly recognize that it itself is what appears as able to discriminate amongst
objects. These three aspects are as follows: [A] ignorance of single identity as the
cause consists in not recognizing that all cognitions are of the same identical nature;
[B] co-emergent ignorance consists in the fact that this non-self-recognition (rang
ngo ma shes pa) and cognition (shes pa) arise together; and [C] conceptually
elaborated ignorance consists in discriminating self-manifestation as something other
[than oneself].162

ye shes kyi dgangs su shes te\ \rig pa dang rig gdangs shan phyed pa ’i skad cig la ma rig pa sangs nas rtag chad
sgro sdur dang bral te\ \gdod ma ’i ngang du grol ba nam m kha’ Ita bu ’o\ |
160 The Tshig don bcu geig pa (31.19) reads “like the front and back o f one’s hand”: lag pa ’i Ito rgyab Idog pa Ita
bur.
161 Tshig don bcu geig pa: 30.17 f.: rang snang ngo ma shes pas ’khrul te\ \ji Itar ’khrul na\ \gzhi dang gzhi shes kyi
khyadpar las ’khrul te\ \gzhi dang gzhi shes zhes bya ba khyab pa spyir stong pas gang du yang ma phye bas ’khrul
ma ’khrul gyi rtsis med shes pa ’i khyad par ’dod pa rang gzhung du bstan pas rig p a ’o\\...
162 Tshig don mdzod: 829.1 f.: tshul j i Itar shar na gzhi snang du shar dus thugs rje ’i rtsal shes pa gsal rig yul dpyod
nus su rang shar ba de rang ngo ma shes pa la Itos nas ma rig pa gsum dang mtshungs Idan du shar te\ \rgyu bdag
nyid geig pa ’i ma rig pa shes par skyes pa de nyid du ma shes pa dang\ \lhan cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa rang ngo ma
shes pa de dang shes pa de gnyis Ihan cig skyes pa dang\ \kun brtags pa ’i ma rig pa rang snang la gzhan du dpyod
pa ’i cha dang gsum mo\ | Klong chen explains these three in terms of the onset and development o f reifying
cognition in Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 743.4 f.: de yang dang po ’khrul pa ’i rgyu ma rig pa gsum ste\ \rang ngo ma
rig pa ’i cha tsam las\ \gzung ’dzin du ma skyes pas don gyis ma ’khrul zhes bya ba der ’khrul par song ste| \ming
med ming du song pa Ita bu ni rgyu bdag nyid geig pa ’i ma rig pa ’o\ | de nyid ngo ma shes tsam Idog de Ihan cig
Ignorance thus marks a critical juncture in the unfoldment of world-experience where an
experiencer first emerges as both the dative and genitive of manifestion. And it is to this
nascent level of reification wherein auto-manifestation gives way to hetero-manifestation
that the genesis of subject/object dualism can be traced.

For Klong chen pa, the three kinds of ignorance consitute progressive phases of
error: “these three types of ignorance are each named from the standpoint of non-self-
recognition (rang ma rig pa) as it occurs [1] in the phase of primordiality (ye Idań) of the
single identity ignorance, [2] in the phase of simultaneity (dus mnyam) of the co-emergent
ignorance, and [3] in the phase of posteriority (phyis 'byung) of the conceptually elaborated
ignorance.” 163

The rDzogs chen analysis of ignorance can be schematized as follows:

Table B: Three Kinds of Ignorance in Rdzog chen sNying thig System

Three kinds Ignorance of Single Identity Co-emergent ignorance Conceptual Ignorance

of ignorance bdag nyid geig pa'i m a rig pa Ihan cig skyes pa'i m a rig pa kun tu brtags pa'i m a rig pa

Definition Not recognizing single cause Coemergence of non-recogni- Auto-manifestation (mis)taken

o f awareness and ignorance tion and cogniton as subject-object ‘appearances’

Phases Primordiality Simultaneity Posteriority

(ye Idan) (dus mnyam) (phyis ’byung)

Implication Inception o f dualism ffom Development of subject/object Hypostatization and symbolic

nondual pre-errant condition dualism ascription of seif and world

Deviation Non-recognition of empty Non-recognition o f luminous Non-recognition o f dynamic

essence (ngo bo stong pa) nature (rang bzhin gsal ba) responsiveness (thugs rje)

It is worth pausing to consider how the rDzogs chen theory of ignorance both
develops and diverges from earlier Buddhist views. It can be seen that this account differs
from the influential Abhidharma analysis in a number of ways. First, the Abhidharma
account of ignorance interprets the privative a- in avidyä in the specific sense of an antonym
or opposite, akin to the opposites friend (mitra) and enemy (amitra).164 In the rDzogs chen

skyes pa 7 ma rig pa ste ’khor ’das gnyis kyi snang char byung ba ’o\ \de Itar yul ’od snang la blos gnyis snang tsam
du phye ba ’i cha nas ming don bdag tu rtog pa ’i char song bas kun brtags pa ’i ma rig pa zhes bya ’o\\
163 Bla ma yang tig vol. 2: 161.3 f.: ma rig pa gsum ni\ \bdag nyid geig pa ye Idan gyi tshul\ \lhan cig skyes pa dus
mnyam gyi tshul\ \kun tu brtags pa ’i phyis ’byung gi tshul du rang ma rig pa ’i cha las so sor btags so||
164 AK 3.28c-d (pp. 88-89). “The non-ffiend or enemy (amitra) is the opposite (vipaksa) o f a friend and not (1) the
not-friend, that is to say, anyone other than a friend, or (2) the absence of a friend.” In the same way, ignorance is
72
account, ma rig pa is a derivative quality of rig pa (rig pa ’i cha) that is characterized as the
non-recognition of rig pa that is one’s basic nature. This relation of structural asymmetry
expressed in the Statement “ma rig pa depends on rig pa but rig pa does not depend on ma
rig pa” in our opening passage precludes construing the relation as one of simple Opposition,
as is done in the Abhidharmakośa 3.28.

This asymmetrical entailment relation also sets the rDzogs chen view apart from
Buddhist Abhidharma and *Pramānavāda interpretations of ignorance as a mental factor
associated with the mind.!65 In rDzogs chen, ignorance is most certainly not a mental factor
alongside other mental factors (<caitta) but is the basic precondition of dualistic mind (<citta)
itself. Leaving aside the varying interpretations of what is meant by the relation of
‘association’ (samprayukta : mtshungs par Idan pa) between something primary (e.g. citta)
and concomitant (e.g. caittas)166, what deserves notice here is that the rDzogs chen account
reverses this priority relation, making mind subsidiary to ignorance (where ignorance is in
tum subordinate to rig pa).161 Mind is said to be associated with the fundamental ignorance
(sems ni rtsa ba ma rig pa dang mtshungs par Idan pa) in the sense of having it as a
condition of its possibility. This appears to be supported by rDzogs chen Statements to the
effect that mind entails fundamental ignorance: “Ignorance pervades mind”, says Klong
chen pa, “but it does not pervade open awareness.” 168 A number of justifications and
implications of this asymmetrical entailment relation are examined in the next chapter.

neither (1) non-knowledge (i.e. different from knowledge) nor (2) the absence of knowledge but rather “the opposite
o f clear knowledge (vidyä), a real, separate factor (dharmäntara).” It is further said to be “a cause or condition
(pratyaya) o f the samskäras, from which it follows that it is not a mere negation.” See Mejor 2002 for a study of the
seven interpretations o f the privative particle (nein) according to Vasubandhu’s Pratītyasamutpãdavyãkhyã.
165According to the Vibhã?ã 42, 17, there are 5 defiled permeating mental factors (akuśalamahābhūmika): (1)
ignorance (avidya), (2) lethargy (styäna), (3) excitedness (auddhatya), (4) shamelessness (ahrī), (5) disregard
(anapaträpyä).
166 See Eltschinger 2009: 66. See Tillemans 1990, vol. 2: 285 and n. 427
167 Klong chen pa was aware that this interpretation ran counter to the Abhidharmic analyis of ignorance as one of
the primary six kleśas (and therefore as one o f the concomitant caitta). In his Theg mchog mdzod, Klong chen pa
seeks to resolve this apparent discrepancy by arguing that ignorance is included on the Abhidharmic list o f six basic
emotions because it is “that which pervades the other five poisons” (dug Inga thams cad la khyab). It should
therefore be explained separately from the delusion (gti mug : moha) which is one of the five emotions.” Theg
mchog mdzod vol. 1: 831.1 f.: nyon mongs pa drug ni ma rig pa dang ’dod chags dang zhe sdang dang gti mug dang
nga rgyal dang phra dog go\ \de ’ang ma rig pa ni dug Inga thams cad la khyab la gti mug ni drug Inga ’i ya gyal yin
pas so sor bshad do\ | In other words, if ignorance is what gives rise to dualism, it cannot be reduced to a mental
factor that is counted among the many derivative expressions of this dualism.
168 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1042.2 f.. See under “Texts and Translations”: 310.
 The crucial difference between Abhidharmic and rDzogs chen conceptions of
ignorance comes down to their divergent views on the kind of knowledge that ignorance is
held to counteract or obstruct. In Buddhist epistemology and Abhidharma, it is correct
cognition or discemment (prajñā/vipaśyanā), a mode of cognition which affords the best
epistemic purchase on things. Ignorance is considered to be the opposite of this clear
knowledge (vidyä). The principal difference between vidyä and avidyä, then, is that they
grasp contradictory aspects: the former grasps the real aspects, the latter grasps erroneous
ones.169 They are thus distinguished on the basis of how well their respective representations
match up with objects. But on this account, both vidyä and avidyä belong to a
representational epistemology according to which knowledge typically consists in the
grasping of extemal objects by means of internal representations. From the rDzogs chen
perspective, it is this mediational inner/outer structure itself that needs to be abandoned,
both on the level of theory and contemplative praxis. This adventitious structure, in fact, is
what defines ignorance and mind, while its transcendence characterizes true knowledge
(vidyä). It seems to me that it is precisely this rejection of mediational epistemology that
underwrites the rDzogs chen sNying thig emphasis on overcoming subject-object dualism,
on ‘transcending mind’. The distinction provides an interpretive framework for overcoming
epistemology in theory and practice. Stated succinctly, what ignorance primarily obstructs
or overlooks is not better or truer representations but a primordial, nondual mode of
knowing that is prior to and a precondition of all representational thinking.

2.3 Reification

We can finally observe that in rDzogs chen thought, dualistic mind is closely linked
with the complex mechanisms of discursive superimposition (samäropa : sgro ’dogs) and
elaboration (prapañca : spros pa) that shape each agent’s specific world-interpretation (srid
pa). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that virtually all Indian philosophical schools in
one way or another accepted a basic distinction between nonconceptual (nirvikalpaka) and
conceptual (savikalpaka, vikalpa) modes of cognition.170 There was also widespread
agreement that conceptual cognition is based on language use, specifically the ascription of

169 See Etschinger 2009: 48.

170 See Bronkhorst 2010 and 2011.
names and universals to experience. The idea of nonconceptual cognition figures both in
epistemological and soteriological contexts of Indian philosophy, the first centering on the
ascertainment of valid epistemic instruments (pramäna), the second on the articulation of
conditions for liberating knowledge. It is the latter construal that is foregrounded in classical
rDzogs chen discussions of the nature and function of conceptualization. According to
Klong chen pa: “Since ‘mind’ involves conceptual and analytic factors of mental continua
belonging to the three realms, it is that which grasps erroneous superimposed aspects
together with the all-ground [comprising] the eightfold ensemble [of cognitions].” 171 The
sGra thal ’gyur tantra similarly equates mind with conceptual error and defines it as the
basis of all discursive reflections.172

All that said, it would be a mistake to conclude, as Sa skya Paņdita (1182-1251) and
a great many of his successors did, that rDzogs chen practitioners advocated the kind of
nonconceptual meditation that became associated in Tibet with the Chan system of Heshang
Mohoyen. A more complex picture emerges when we consider the four major approaches to
nonconceptuality that were current in Tibet at the time gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes
wrote his bSam gtan mig sgron (late 9th early 10th centuries).173 While all are considered by
gNubs chen to be viable paths to awakening, they are nontheless arranged in sequence from
lowest to highest, following a pattem already well-established in Indian, Chinese and
Tibetan doxographies by this time. According to gNubs chen, this hierarchical Classification
reflects the degree to which they represent ‘deviations’ (gol sä) in doctrine and praxis from
a higher Standard, in this case the rDzogs chen system.174 Thus, in successive chapters,
gNubs chen examines: (1) the step-by-step (rim gyis) Indian approach represented by
Kamalaslla which only comprehends the nonconceptuality of appearances (snang ba mi rtog
pa), (2) the ‘all at once’ (cig char) Chinese approach represented by Mohoyen emphasizing
the nonconceptuality of non-appearance (mi snang ba mi rtog pa), (3) the Indian Mahäyoga

171 Sems dangye shes kyi dris lan: 383.2 f.. See under “Texts and Translations”: 278.
172 Ati vol. 1: 129.3.
173 For a structural analysis of this work, see Meinert 2003. On the importance o f this work see Karrnay 1988: 86 f..
174 See for example bSam gtan mig sgron: 55.2 f.: stong pa 7 ngo bor snang la mi rtog pa ni\ \rnal ’byor spyodpa 7
yongs su grub pa bsgom pa ’o\ \dbu ma ’i lam sgom pa 7 shes pa Ihag mthong ste\ \de la gong gi mi dmigs pa tshang
ngo\ Ide las khyad du gnyis su med pa ’i mi rtog pa ma ha yo ga ’o\ \lhun gyis grub pa ’i mi rtog pa chen po a ti yo
ga ’o\de dag ni gol sa ngos bzung ba ’i phyir rim par bkodpa ’o\\
approach advocating nondual nonconceptuality (gnyis su m edp a ’i mi rtogpa) and finally (4)
the rDzogs chen approach of naturally and correctly recognizing spontaneously present
nonconceptuality (Ihun gyis grub p a ’i mi rtog po). According to gNubs chen, all four
approaches aim at realizing nonconceptual suchness but the first three remain bound up with
willful deliberation (ched du 'tshol) and striving ( ’bad rtsol) and therefore overlook
spontaneity175, a natural way of being and acting that confounds intellectual appropriation.176
For gNubs chen, spontaneity is ‘nonconceptual’ precisely because it occurs in the absence of
intentions and preconceived plans. For this reason, gNubs chen characterizes spontaneity as
a fundamental mode or dimension (ngang) of human existence.177 At its most basic level,
our experience of the world is natural, nonreflective and charged with meaning - we grasp
the world concretely and nonconceptually before we move on to the more sophisticated acts
of conception and belief. We all too easily lose touch with this originary dynamism and

175 In his bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen introduces spontaneity as one of the nine key principles of rDzogs chen.
See below Table E on p. 171. gNyag Jñānakumāra similarily takes up the question “What is spontaneity?” as the
second of nine queries conceming rDzogs chen in his ’Phrul gyi me long, in NyKs vol. 82: 964.2, 974.6 and 988.6.
Van Schaik 2008 has noted the importance of the concept of Ihun grub in Mahāyoga Māyājāla scriptures such as the
*Guhyagarbha. It also forms a central theme of an early Dunhuang Mahâyoga manuscript IOL J Tib. 454 in which
the idea o f spontaneity, or effortlessness, is used to characterize the basic nature of one’s own mind as nothing other
than perfect buddhahood replete with all capacities for altruistic activity by body, speech and mind. A commentary
on the ancient Rig pa ’i khu byug from the bKa ’ ma shin tu rgyas pa defines “spontaneity” in a section consisting in
instructions on the effortless conduct {spyod pa) of a rDzogs chen practitioner: “[In] the instruction on conduct,
absence of effort (brtsal ba med pa) is the very essence of conduct [characterized as] spontaneity, great compassion,
great skillful means, unpremeditated and unobstructed.”
176 For example, the main section (part two) of one o f the earliest available rDzogs chen texts, the sBas pa rgum
chung, opens with a criticism o f the tendency to take nonconceptuality as a thematic focus or as an experience: “To
what extent does the profound nonconceptual appear as an object o f the intellect? Because the experience o f
nonconceptuality is an experience, it is not that [nonconceptual suchness].” IOL 594, pt. II, vol. lb: line 2: j i tsam
rtog myed zab mo zhig\ \blo ’i yul du snang zhe na\ \myi rtog zab mo nyams myong ba\ |myong ba yin phyir de nyid
myin\ | Compare with ... j i Itar rtog med zab mo zhig\ \blo yi yul du snang zhe na\ | mi rtog zab mo nyams myong ba\
\myong ba yin phyir de nyid min\\ See Karmay 1988: 74. The text goes on to specify how suchness defies
representation and remains untouched by goal-directed soteriological activities. Ethical activities of accumulating
merits and knowledge as well as meditative activities such as contemplation (samädhi) and purifying latent
tendencies are all tethering pegs ( ’dzin pa ’i phur). gNubs chen clarifies the sense of ‘tethering peg’ in his bSam gtan
mig sgron: “To try to make improvements and efforts in body, speech and mind is a tethering peg and an
obscuration” and “to modify the unmodified is to [try to] tether it and pin it down conceptually.” bSam gtan mig
sgron 443.6: .. .sgo gsum ched du ’chos shing rtsol ba ni\ \ ’dzin p a ’i phur pa dang sgrib pa yin\\ and ibid. 444.2
... bcos su med pa la bcos pa nyid\ \rtog pa ’i ’dzin pa dang phur pa ’o\ \
177 On this great dimension of spontaneity {Ihun gyis grub pa ’i ngang chen po), the bSam gtan mig sgron (323.6 f.)
States: “Since this dimension of spontaneity that is great bliss is free from all spheres o f activity {spyodyul: gocara)
throughout the three times and no time, it is devoid o f any scrutinizing agent or object o f thought. Thus, it is also
great nonconceptuality [i.e. without premeditation]. It [nonetheless] responds to the aims o f all wayfarers and
trainees, satisfies their needs, and brings about their desired spiritual attainments according to their intentions.” bde
ba chen po Ihun gyis grub p a ’i ngang ni dus gsum dus med par spyod yul thams cad dang bral bas\ \brtag pa po
dang\ Irtog pa ’i yul m ed pas\ \mi rtog pa chen poayang yin\ \lam pa dang gdul bya ’i ril gyis don bya ba dang\ \dgos
pa ’i re ba yang skong\ \ji Itar bsam pa ’i dngos grub kyi ’dodpa yang byung\ | atext: pa
spontaneity in the drive to rationalize our every act and thought, to render reasons for what
is in reality mostly unpremediated.
What becomes abundantly clear in examining early rDzogs chen responses to the
debates over nonconceptuality is the tradition’s vehement rejection of nonconceptuality
pursued either as an end arrived at by conceptual means (Mahāyāna gradualism) or as a
means to its own end (Chan subitism). Nonconceptuality is instead taken as a fundamental
condition of being and awareness simpliciter, one that eludes the instrumental (means-end)
framework common to conceptual and nonconceptual deliberations. It is on the basis of such
a critique that gNubs chen Sangs rgyas employs the Tigurative expression’ (bla dwags)
‘great primordially present nonconceptuality’ (ye mi rtog pa chen po)m to distinguish the
rDzogs chen view of human reality as primordially nonconceptual and spontaneously
present from Chan traditions that seek to suppress thoughts and Mahāyāna traditions that
seek to instrumentalize them within a means-end framework. Rong zom pa went so far as to
declare that because both conceptuality and nonconceptuality are fundamentally equal by
nature, there is no need to try to improve things by means of deliberate effort.179

The critical point for gNubs chen and the Sems sde tantras he comments upon is not
whether the practitioner has concepts or not but whether his or her activity - and especially
mental activity which is considered the source of verbal and bodily activities - is contrived
or spontaneous, deliberate or unpremeditated. With this account, the soteriological focus has
shifted from how we know (conceptually or nonconceptually) to how we act (contrivedly or
uncontrivedly), where acting is seen to include thinking.

As gNubs chen sees it, action is primary and belief derivative. It is difficult to
overestimate the impact this reframing of the problem of nonconceptuality in terms of
spontaneity exerted on the development of rDzogs chen thinking and praxis. By shifting the

178 bSam gtan mig sgron 60.4 f.: “In this clear yet vibrant primordial lucidity that is one’s self-awareness - non
established, not moving, not vitiated and not dwelling - what is there to meditate on? What is there to reflect upon?
Nothing. There is only this state of absence. Who would ever concem themselves with that!? Within the great
primordial nonconceptua! state (ye mi rtog pa chen po), one does not supress appearances nor conceptualize them.
Even this ‘nonconceptuality’ is only a figurative expression.” rang rig pa ma bzhag ma g.yos ma bslad ma zhugs
par Ihan ne Ihang nge ye gsal bar ci zhig bsgom\ \ci zhig dran par byar yod de med\ \m edpa 7 don de nyid kho na
yod\ Ide dang du len pa su zhig ste\ \ye mi rtog pa chen po la\ \snang ba bkag pa yang med la\ |de la rtoga pa med
deI Imi rtog pa nyid kyang bla dwags so| | atext: rtogs
179 Theg pa chen po 7 tshul la ’ju g pa, in Rong zom bka ’ ’bum: 262.2: rnam par rtog pa dang rnam par mi rtog pa
gnyi ’ga ’ang rang bzhin gyis mnyam pa ’i phyir\ |rtsol bas bcos mi dgos pa ni\ | ...
soteriological focus from mediational epistemology - the view that we can only know things
and beings through our representations of them - to engaged agency, it restores primacy to
living praxis over theoretical reflection, and spontaneous activity over willful deliberation.
On this reading, the ‘through-structure’ that characterizes mediational epistemology is seen
to have a thoroughly derivative and adventitious character. It is from the more originative
order of life as it is prereflectively and spontaneously lived that all thinking, sense-making,
truth-making and planning originates.

For these and other reasons to be considered in sections to follow, rDzogs chen
authors were inclined to distance themselves from the debates over conceptuality and
nonconceptuality that had figured so prominently in the history of Buddhist thought. In an
illuminating passage from the Zab don gnad kyi me long (Mirror o f the Key Points o f
Profound Meaning) Klong chen pa considers it ambiguous if not misleading to characterize
the distinction between mind and primordial knowing merely in terms of their having or not
having concepts. It is, in his estimation, a way of thinking characteristic of the ordinary
vehicles that is inclined to overlook the enactive dimensions of these modes of experiencing:

When ordinary vehicles distinguish mind and primordial knowing merely on the
basis of the conceptual (savikalpa : rtog bcas) versus nonconceptual (nirvikalpa : rtog
med), [the distinction] is unclear. Here, however, we shall elucidate their difference.
Since primordial knowing has always been spontaneously present (ye nas Ihun grub),
it is unconditioned and nonconceptual. It has [therefore] been established as the
ground of arising of undefiled dharmakäya of the buddhas, as the condition of
suchness possessing defilement, as the nature of spiritual embodiment and primordial
knowing, and as the condition for the aspects of [both] the ground of emancipation
and the goal of emanciption.180

§3. The rDzogs chen Analysis of Ye shes and Related Concepts

If much of what one encounters in the sNying thig exposition of mind (sems) has
been drawn from traditional Abhidharma and Cittamätra psychology, the descriptions and
explications of ye shes and related gnoseological concepts reflect strongly indigenous
interpretations in which antecedent Mahāyāna and tantric formulations are assimilated to the

180 sNyan rgyudgyi rgyab chos chen mo Zab don gnad kyi me long, in Zab mo yang tig vol. 2: 280.5 f.: ...theg pa
thun mong pas rtog bcas rtog med la sems ye shes su phye ba tsam las gsal po med kyang\ | ’dir khyad par gsal bar
byed bstan te\ |ye shes ni ye nas Ihun grub kyis\ | ’dus ma byas\ \rnam par mi rtog pa\ \sangs rgyas ki chos sku dri
ma med p a ’i ’char gzhi\ \dri bcas de bzhin nyid kyi gnas skabs\ \sku dang ye shes kyi rang bzhin\ \bral gzhi bral
’bras kyi char gnas skabs kyi bzhagpa can yin te11...
 rDzogs chen disclosive paradigm. Technical terms referring to an implicit unconditioned
mode of awareness include inter alia Mind itself (sems nyid), open awareness (rig pä),
primordial knowing (ye shes), compassionate responsiveness (thugs rje), and the enlightened
intent/thinking [of a buddha] ([sangs rgyas kyi] dgongs pa). The first three terms are of
special importance in the present context as they are ubiquitous not only in rDzogs chen but
also in other Tibetan Buddhist contemplative Systems such as the non-gradual Mahāmudrā
teachings of the bKa’ brgyud traditions. A measure of their significance within the sNying
thig system is attested by their occurrence in the titles of three works (numbers 2, 8 and 9)
belonging to Vimalamitra’s Cycle o f Nine Lamps (sGron ma dgu skorm): the Sems nyid
bsdus pa 'i sgron ma, Ye shes bsdus pa ’i sgron ma and Rig pa bsdus pa ’i sgron m a.182 rDzogs
chen texts have consecrated considerable attention to clarifying the connotations and
implications of sems nyid, ye shes and rig pa within their own doctrinal system and to
showing how these relate to antecedent Buddhist conceptions. It may therefore be
worthwhile to briefly investigate how these concepts were understood in rDzogs chen and
how, in some cases, they were reinterpreted to fit in with its own distinctive views of goal-
realization.

3.1 rDzogs chen Interpretations of Sems nyid

This technical term is widespread in rDzogs chen works and forms the central theme
of several rDzogs chen expositions including Vimalamitra’s aforementioned Sems nyid
bsdus p a ’i sgron ma and Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso and Sems nyid rang grol. The
Tshig mdzod chen mo gives two definitions of sems nyid: (1) mind alone (sems kho na) and
(2) the basic nature of mind (sems kyi chos nyid); these roughly correspond to two related
functions of the particle nyid, viz. (1) to single something out (i.e. a restriction nges gzung :
avadhärana)m and (2) to indicate the quality or nature of something (corresponding to the

181 The full title is the gSang ba bla med sgron ma dgu skor gyi gdams pa. This cycle o f teachings is included in the
Bi ma snying thig vol. 2: 150.5-237.3.
182 These are lamps number 2, 8 and 9 respectively.
183 Tshig mdzod chen mo s.v. nyid: “[1] It has the sense o f ‘merely’ and ‘only’, that is, a word which restricts or a
word which excludes... [examples given] [2] It is the honorific o f ‘you’ as in ‘what You said is true.’” [1] tsam
dang kho na ’i don te nges gzung gi sgra ’am rnam gcod kyi sgra\ ... khyod nyid\ ... kho nyid\ ...d e nyid\ ... chos nyid\
... stong nyid\ ... rang bzhin nyid\ ... [2] khyod kyi zhe sa\ ... nyid kyis gsungs pa bden\ ...
Sanskrit secondary suffix -tva).m The most likely Sanskrit equivalent of sems nyid would
seem to be cittatä, a term found in the Mahävyutpatti, though only in the compound
samcittatä which is rendered as sems snyoms pa.m It is intriguing, then, that sems nyid in
the specific sense of nature of mind (sems kyi rang bzhin, sems kyi chos nyid) is so widely
distributed among the Tibetan translations of Indian Buddhist tantric songs dohäs,
caryāgīti or vajragīti - which were sung by mahäsiddhas to express their spiritual
realizations.186 It would be difficult to overestimate the impact that the Indian siddha
movement, and the styles and contents of its teachings, exerted on the emerging Buddhist
Orders during the second diffusion (phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet, especially given that all
of these schools (except the dGe lugs) traced their lineages to one or more of these Indian
siddhas. It is under its influence that a host of Tibetan technical terms describing the
fundamental nature of mind gain wide currency in Tibet both in translations and in a
steadily increasing volume of original Tibetan spiritual songs, commentaries and treatises
based on these. That said, it is doubtful that sems nyid owes its origin or popularity to any
Indian equivalent. For example, it is interesting to discover in the most frequently quoted
instance of sems nyid - the translation of Saraha’s Dohãkośagīti stanza 74 where this Mind
itself alone (sems nyid geig pu) is declared to be the seed of everything - that the original
Apabhramśa simply has citta instead of cittatä as one might expect.187 Moreover, the
addition of the nyid particle here cannot simply serve to single out sems since this is already
implied by geig pu (alone, single); rather it specifies that what is under consideration is the
nature of mind as distinct from mind. One can note similar insertions of the nyid particle in
the Tibetan titles of siddha songs such as Kanha’s Cittaratnadrsti which is rendered as Sems
nyid rin chen gyi Ita ba or Laksminkära’s Cittakalpaparihäradrsti which is rendered as Sems

184 The nyid particle renders a number of Sanskrit elements such as - tva, tä (‘...ness’) eva ( ‘only’).
185 See Mahävyutpatti nos. 189 and 190.
186 On this genre, see Roger Jackson, “ Poetry’ in Tibet: Glu, Mgur, sNyan ngag, and ‘Songs o f Experience’,” in
Cabezón and Jackson 1996: 373 f..
187 See Do ha mdzod kyi glu bzhugs so, in Nges don phyag rgya chen p o ’i khrid mdzod, vol. om: 289.5 where the
first two lines o f the Tibetan read sems nyid geig pu kun gyi sa bon te\ \gang la srid dang mya ngan ’das ’p hro ba\\
This corresponds to stanza 43ab in Shahidullah 1928 which reads: citteka saala bfam bhava-nivväna vi jam si
viphuranti\. Here citteka would be equivalent to sems geig pu/pa. The addition o f the element nyid allows for a
Tibetan reinterpretation of the original which, in the case o f rNying ma exegetes, supports the crucial distinction
between mind and Mind itself. See Guenther 1977: 164.
nyid kyi rtogs pa ’j oms pa ’i Ita b a .188 It is also noteworthy that the Cittacaitanyaśamanopãya
is rendered as Sems dang sems nyid ’dul ba’i thabs shes bya ba because here the term
caitanya (a term for consciousness or spirit associated with Hindu Vaisnavism and
Sämkhya) is translated as sems nyid.m One possible Indian Buddhist precedent for the
sems/sems nyid distinction that warrants investigation is the differentiation between dharma
and dharmatä (Tib. chos/chos nyid) that is widely attested in Indian sources, most notably in
the Dharmadharmatāvibhãga.190

Whatever its inception, it is clear that the concept of sems nyid already had an
important place in the earliest rDzogs chen and Mahäyoga and Sems sde teachings (circa 8th
c.), as reflected in the recurrent injunction that since Mind itself is already perfect
buddhahood, there is no need to search elsewhere for it.191 Sems nyid is used in early Sems
sde materials as a synonym of awakened mind (byang chub [kyi] sems : bodhicitta) and the
nature of mind (sems kyi rang bzhin) or the fundamental reality of mind (sems kyi de kho na
nyid)192. In the Kun byed rgyal po, sems nyid is equivalent to bodhicitta and hailed as the all-
creative Monarch (kun byed rgyal po) holding sway over all phenomena of samsära and

188 D nos. 3209 and 3211 respectively. See also the Cittatattvopadeśa of Kuddâli which is rendered as Sems nyid kyi
de nyid bcing ba, in D no. 3250.
189 D no. 3237.
190 See Mathes 1996. Although I have yet to find any mention of chos/chos nyid as a model for the sems/sems nyid
distinction among Tibetan Buddhist scholars, Klong chen pa did consider the two distinctions to be complementary,
a view reflected in the titles and contents o f the root texts o f his Triology o f Self-Liberation (rang grol skor gsum):
Sems nyid rang grol, Chos nyid rang grol, Mnyam nyid rang grol.
191 This passage occurs in a commentary on the rTse mo byung rgyal, in Bai ro rgyud ’bum vol. 1: 351.2. It is also
found in the *Guhyagarbha, Tb vol. 8: 191.4: sems nyid rdzogs pa ’i sangs rgyas te\ \sangs rgyas gzhan du ma tshol
cig\ I echoing the line sems la gzhan du sangs rgyas btsal myi dgos\ | that occurs in the Dunhuang manuscript lOL
Tib J 454, on which see Van Schaik 2008: 14. The same theme is found amongst the Six Lamps (sgron ma drug)
that are attributed to gNyan dpal dbyangs (8th c.) but appear to be a later redaction (see Karmay 1988: 66-69). The
Thabs shes sgron ma, for example, has rang gi sems nyid sangs rgyas yin shes na\ \gzhan nas bsgrub par bya ba ci
yang med\\ (D no. 4449: 769.2). The ITa bayang dag sgron ma has sems nyid ye nas chos nyid yin shes na\ \chos kyi
dbyings nyid gzhan du bsgom mi dgos\\ (D no. 4447: 767.4). This idea is not unknown in the Mahāyāna sötras. See
for example Atyayajñãnanãmamahãyãnasūtra ( ’Phags pa ’da ’ ka ye shes zhes bya ba theg pa chen po ’i mdo) D no.
122: 305.7: sems ni ye shes ’byung b a ’i rgyu\ \sangs rgyas gzhan du ma tshol cig\\ The idea that one’s own Mind
itself is already buddhahood and need not be sought elsewhere is the central theme of the Kun byed rgyal po. Klong
chen pa explains the meaning o f this dictum with supporting quotations ffom the *Guhyagarbha and Kun byed rgyal
po in his Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 1125.5 f.: rang byung gi ye shes rdzogs pa chen po nyid ye shes nas sangs rgyas kyi
che ba ’iyon tan Ihun grub tu yodpas\ \sku gsum rang chas su tshang ba ’i phyir logs nas btsal mi dgos pas\ \ ’di nyid
ma bcos j i bzhin pa ’i ngang nas ma g.yos pas ’g rub par bstan te11...
192 See for example the Pan sgrub rnams kyi thugs bcud snying kyi nyi ma, Bg vol. 1: 171.1 which equates sems nyid
with byang chub kyi sems, sems kyi de kho na nyid and j i bzhin pa in the context of elucidating the meaning of the
last two lines o f the six-line Rig pa ’i khu byug.
nirväna.193 This portrayal clearly draws on earlier Sems sde formulations such as the Nam
mkha’i rgyalpo where sems nyid is heralded as the ‘King of Space’ because it liberates the
spiritual quintessence from samsāra.194 The Kun ’dus rig pa'i mdo States that “this Mind
itself which is free from any foundation, abides primordially and is not created by anyone
[or anything]; It is the Mind of the perfect dharmadhätu that is invariant and spontaneously
present.” 195 In sNying thig works, sems nyid is regarded as a near synonym of primordial
knowing (ye shes) and both are understood to be the expressive energy (rtsal) of open
awareness. The Klong drug p a ’i rgyud variously describes Mind itself as (1) abiding equally
[in all phenomena] (mnyam par gnas pa ’i sems nyid), (2) devoid of mental signs (mtshan ma
med pa), (3) ineffable (brjod du med pa), (4) effortless (btsal du med pa), (5) undefiled (dri
ma med pa), (6) nonconceptual (rtog pa med pa), (7) devoid of representational thought
(bsam pa med pa), (8) without reflection (dran pa med pa), (9) devoid of conditioned
sensations (byung tshor med pa), and (10) devoid of objects (gzung ba med pa).196

In classical rNying ma exegesis, the difference between mind and Mind itself is taken
as a fundamental, if seldom explicated and frequently misunderstood, presupposition of
Buddhist soteriology. It is often emphasized by Klong chen pa and his successors to
highlight the continuity of rDzogs chen gnoseology with earlier mainstream sütric and

193 In his Kun byed rgyal po ’g rel (NyKs vol. 106: 357.6 f.), gZhan phan mtha’ yas ’od zer explains: “If you directly
widerstand this naturally occuring primordial knowing, Mind itself, the All-Creative Monarch, then you gain self-
mastery over the everlasting domain of Samantabhadra, the dharmakäya. If you do not directly widerstand it, it is
said that you do not find freedom no matter what efforts you make by way o f the paths of the lower vehicles.” kun
byed rgyal po sems nyid rang byung gi ye shes ’di nyid rang ngo shes na kun bzang chos sku ’i gtan srid la rang
dbang ’byor bar ’g yur la de nyid ngo ma shes na theg pa ’og ma 'i lam gyis ’bad rtsol j i tsam byas kyang mi grol bar
gsungs pa ’o\ \
194 Tk vol. 1: 407.7 f.: sems nyid nam mkha ’ chen po la\ |snying po ’khor ba las sgrol bas\ \nam mkha ’i rgyal po yin
par bya\ \
195 Tk vol. 1: 411.2 f.: rtsa ba bral ba ’i sems nyid de| |5ws kyang ma byas yc nas gnas\ \mi ’gyur Ihun gyis grub pa
yi\ Iyang dag chos nyid dbyings kyi blo\ |
196 See Ati vol. 2: 153.2 f. where each is explained: mnyam par gnas pa'i sems nyid la\ \khyab gdal chen po'i yul
snang bas\ \gnyis med snang ba ye ’brel zhes\ |kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \mtshan ma med pa'i sems nyid la\
\chos rnams grangs su snang ba ni\ \rang grol gnyis med ces bya'o\ | kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \brjod du med
pa'i sems nyid la\ \gling gzhi bral ba'i tshig snang ba\ \smra bsam yul las ’das pa zhes\ \kun tu bzang po nga yis
bstan\ Ibtsal du med pa'i sems nyid las\ \rang byung chen po rang snang ba\ \rang byung ye shes chen po zhes\ \kun
tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \dri ma med pa'i sems nyid la\ |yul rkyen bral ba'i snang ba ni\ \rang dag chen po'i
dgongs pa zhes\ |kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \rtog pa med pa'i sems nyid la\ | ma bzung ’gag med rang shar ba\
Irang rig gsal ba'i rang ngo shes\ | kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan bsam pa med pa'i sems nyid la\ \rang gnas Ihun
’byams snang ba ni\ |sgra bzhi rang log dgongs pa zhes\ \kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \dran pa med pa'i sems nyid
’di\ I ’g yu byed rang dag snang ba ni\ \ ’dzin pa rang grol bsam gtan zhes\ \kun tu bzang po nga yis bstan\ \byung
tshor med pa'i sems nyid la\ \ma bsams Ihag mthong snang ba ni\ \ ’gro ’ong zad pa'i dgongs pa zhes\ \kun tu bzang
po nga yis bstan\ \gzung ba med pa'i sems nyid la\ \ma ’g ags rig pa snang ba ni\ \rol pa chen po'i ting ’dzin zhes\\
tantric strains of Buddhist thought. Here again, we come across many a Creative attempt to
read this technical use of sems nyid back into Tibetan translations of Sanksrit passages
where no corresponding term occurs. A case in point is Astasãhasrikãprajñãpāramitã 5b. 1-2
which in the original reads tathā hi tac cittam acittam| prakrtiś cittasya prabhãsvarã |: “That
Mind is not [dualistic] mind. Mind’s nature is luminous.” 197 The original context clearly
spells out that the expression “that Mind” (tac cittam/sems de) refers to bodhicitta. Klong
chen pa and his successors frequently quote this pâssage as scriptural support for the
sems/sems nyid distinction. In his Sems ye dris lan, Klong chen pa quotes this passage after
identifying ‘Mind itself’ with luminous primordial knowing ('od gsal ba’i ye shes) and
tathägatagarbha and then declaring that “it is when mind ceases or no longer functions that
Mind itself, luminous primordial knowing, shines forth as personally realized self-
awareness.” 198

In his Theg mchog mdzod, Klong chen pa quotes the same passage after noting that
“even the exoteric texts make a distinction between mind and naturally pure Mind itself. In
these cases, ‘mind’ (sems) refers to samsäric phenomena that are conceptual fabrications.
‘Mind itself’ (sems nyid) refers to nirvänic phenomena that are free from discursive
elaborations.” 199 One is hard pressed to find in the original Sanskrit passage a distinction
that is so explicit or far-reaching in its soteriological ramifications. What we detect in these
rDzogs chen interpretations of a well-known passage from classical Buddhist scripture, and
in many others like it, is the persistent attempt by rNying ma exegetes to invoke scriptural
support for what was in all likelihood a uniquely rDzogs chen distinction between sems and
sems nyid. At any event, the technical use of sems nyid as juxtaposed to sems allowed
rNying ma scholars to bring various traditional sötric and tantric discourses on absolute

197 See Schmithausen 1977: 41 as lines E.b.1-2. This passage occurs in the following context: “How does one leam?
One should leam in such a way that one does not become superior-minded [conceited] even by this mind of
awakening. Query: On what account? Reply: In this way: ‘That mind is not [dualistic] mind. Mind’s nature is
luminous.’” ci Itar bslabs na ’di byang chub kyi sems des kyang rlom sems su mi bgyidpa de Itar bslabpar bgyi o\
Ide ci ’i slad du zhe na\ \ ’di Itar sems de ni sems ma mchis pa steI \sems kvi rang bzhin ni ’od gsal ba lags so\ | (D
no. 12: 5.3). In interpreting the relevant passage (underlined), Klong chen pa is at pains to unequivocally distinguish
the first use o f sems (sems de or the less accurate translation sems la in the version he was working with) from the
second, viz. to distinguish naturally luminous nondual sems nyid from dualistic sems.
198 Sems dangye shes kyi dris lan: 383.4 f.. See under “Texts and Translations”: 269.
199 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1043.2 f.. See under “Texts and Translations” : 309.
bodhicitta, tathãgatagarbha, citta[sya]prabhasvara[ta] (Mind’s luminous nature) and jñãna
into line with rDzogs chen gnoseology.

If the mind/Mind itself distinction was considered an indispensable presupposition of

Buddhist soteriology, it was also thought to be largely unarticulated, misunderstood and
underappreciated by earlier Buddhist traditions. In his gZhi snang ye shes sgron ma, Klong
chen pa indicates why this sems nyid should in no circumstances be confused with sems200:
“Here, by speaking of ‘Mind itself (sems nyid), we do not refer to mind (sems) but instead
to the very wellspring of open awareness (rig pa ’char gzhi) that is the vanishing point of
mind (sems kyi zad sä). Some deluded fools who fail to distinguish between mind and Mind
itself say they are one and the same. This is a cause for laughter.”201

Perhaps the most nuanced available treatment of this sems/sems nyid distinction
occurs in the author’s Theg mchog mdzod. In explicating the nature and Classification of
mind, Klong chen pa makes a crucial distinction between pure and impure mind. Under the
first rubric, he makes a further distinction between pure Mind itself (sems nyid dag pa) and
pure mind (sems dag pa). “‘Pure Mind itself refers to open awareness as it is personally
realized in onself (so so rang gi rig pa); it is the way things really are, the basic nature that
is empty of mind and mental factors and [their] grasping at entities as having defining
marks.”202 Pure mind, on the other hand, “refers to mind during the time of the path [which
includes] (a) factors such as meditative absorptions (samädhi) that are possible causes
(rgyur rung) of liberation unvitiated by concepts and (b) factors that are possible causes of
liberation such as conceptual forms of compassion and cultivating [bodhi]citta.”203 Here
again we can discem the characteristic sNying thig reluctance to identify the workings of
mind, even its most virtuous applications, with Mind itself. At best, these can bring one to
the threshold of unconditioned awareness, but not across it. Klong chen pa goes on to

200 More specific arguments are examined in chapter three below.

201 Bla ma yang tig vol. 2: 157.6 f.: dir sems nyid ces smos pas sems kyi zad sa rig pa ’char gzhi nyid la zer gyis\
Isems la mi zer ro\ \blun po rmongs pa ’gas\ \sems dang sems nyid kyang\ \ma phyedpar geig tu smra ba ni gzhad
bgad kyi gnas 5o| |
202 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1051.2 f.: sems nyid dag pa ni\ \sems sems byung dang dngos po mtshan mar ’dzin pas
stong pa ’i chos nyid de bzhin nyid so so rang gi rig pa ste11...
2mTheg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1051.4 f.: sems dag pa ni\ \lam dus kyi sems rtog pas ma bslad thar p a ’i rgyur rung
ting nge ’dzin pa dang\ \rtog bcas snying rje sems bskyed la sogs pa thar pa ’i rgyu rung rnams te11...
 explain that even in virtuous applications of mind conducive to liberation, "since one grasps
only a general idea [i.e. the object universal] (don spyi 'dzin pa) of the self-occurring
ultimate reality (rang byung gi don dam)2m and is consequently unable to perceive it as it
really is, they are subsumed under mind that is confined to the sphere of samsāra.” Finally,
under the rubric impure mind (sems ma dag pa) are subsumed the ego-mind (yid) and the
entire gamut of kleśas and other mental factors drawn from Abhidharma inventories but
here reframed and reclassified within a gnoseological context. In the rDzogs chen account,
the reader is repeatedly reminded that the entire spectrum of obscuring mental and affective
activities unfolds from dualistic mind which is in tum an expression of open awareness, the
expressive energy of the ground’s spontaneity.205
The foregoing analysis of mind may be schematized as follows:

204 Here the rang byung gi in rang byung gi don dam could either be taken as nominative, viz. “ultimate reality o f the
self-arisen [ones]” (as in the author’s supporting quotation fforn RGV), or as adjectival, viz. the self-arisen ultimate
reality”
205 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1052.5 f.: “Although the basic expanse is without any impurity, ffom the ground-
manifestation during its movement away ffom [this expanse], it unceasingly manifests as anything whatsoever.
[Dualistic] mind manifests ffom the play (rol pa) o f ignorance, ego-mind ffom the display (rgyan) of mind, and
afflictive emotions ffom ego-mind. In this context, ‘play’ (rol pa) does not refer to the inherent potential (nus pa) or
expressive energy (rtsal) but simply the effulgence emanating from it like the manifestation of a sprout ffom a seed,
or the image of one’s face reflected in a mirror. ‘Display’ (rgyan) refers to what develops from this, the simple
germinal factor as it individually manifests like flowers ffom a seed or the imprints ffom a seal. Thus as the Rig pa
rangshar [Ati vol. 1: 679.6] States: “Within the presence of authentic original purity, there is no ignorance, no mind,
and no ego-mind. Nonetheless, ffom the expressive energy (rtsal) o f spontaneity, ignorance comes about. From the
play (rol pa) o f ignorance comes mind. From the display (rgyan) of mind comes ego-mind. From the objects o f ego-
mind come the five emotional poisons. From the five emotional poisons come the sixteen afflictive emotions. From
these sixteen come the twenty-five. From these come the fifty-one. And ffom these come the eighty-four thousand.”
dbyings la ma dag pa med kyang\ \de las g.yos dus gzhi snang las go ma ’g ags par gang yang shar te| |ma rig pa ’i
rol pa las sems\ \sems kyi rgyan las yid\ |yid las nyon mongs su shar ba ’o\ \de yang rol pa ni nus pa ’am rtsal la ma
zer Itar de las byung ba ’i gdangs tsam ste\ \sa bon las myu gu dang\ \byad kyi rnam pa las de ’i gzugs brnyan me
long du shar ba bzhin no\ \rgyan ni de las smin sor shar ba ’bru ’i cha tsam ste sa bon las me tog dang rgya ’i ’bur
bzhin no\ \de Itar yang rang shar las\ \yang dag para ka dag gi snang ba la ma rig pa med\ \sems med\ \yid med
kyang1\ \lhun grub kyi rtsal lasc\ \ma rig pa byung\ |ma rig p a ’i rol pa las sems byung\ \sems kyi rgyan las y id
byung\ Iy id kyi yul las dug Inga byung\ \dug Inga las nyon mongs pa bcu drug byung\ \bcu drug las nyi shu lngad
byung\ \dc las Inga bcu rtsa geig byung\ \de las stong phrag brgyad cu rtsa b zh f byung ngo zhes sø|| ‘T b yang dag
pa ’i T b : yang dag pa ’i cAti, Tb la; Tk om. dAti, Tk nyi shu rtsa Inga; Tb nyi shu rtsa Ingar cAti, Tk, Tb om rtsa
bzhi but this adds up to a total of 80,000 kleśas instead o f the Standard 84,000.
 Table C: The rDzogs chen sNying thig Analysis of Mind from
Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog ńn po che'i mdzod

Typology Classification Major Characteristic Function

Pure Mind itself awareness as personally realized basic nature devoid of

(sems nyid dag pa) in oneself (so so rang rig pa) mind and its reifications
Pure mind mind during the path (lam kyi dus conceptual applications o f
(sems dag pa) Pure mind sems) - virtuous mind conducive mind (compassion etc.)
(sems dag pa) to freedom but unable to realize
self-occurring ultimate nonconceptual samädhis
truth/reality

Impure mind mind, ego-mind (yid), the play of ignorance (ma rig pa ’i basis of ego-mind (yid)
(sems ma dag pa) emotions (nyon mongs) rolpa) - ‘afflictive mind’ and myriad emotions

Central to this analysis of mind is the above-mentioned differentiation between pure

mind which comprises all applications of mind during the path, conceptual as well as
nonconceptual, and pure Mind itself, the realization of the basic nature, utterly devoid of
mind and mental factors with their reifying activities. It should be noted that ‘purity’ (dag
pa) is here used in two quite different senses: applied to mind (sems), it connotes a kind of
intentional attitude that is adopted as a motivational aim and ethical norm; applied to Mind
itself (sems nyid), however, it can only refer to that involuntary, original purity (ka dag) that
is held to characterize Mind’s abiding condition. In any case, the distinction has important
implications: while pure Mind itself is simply open awareness as it is personally realized,
mind in both its impure and impure modalities is an expression of ignorance that ultimately
has to be abandoned.

3.2 rDzogs chen Interpretations of Rig pa and Rang rig

Rig pa is widely used in rDzogs chen texts as a technical term referring to the special
knowledge of an awakened one, though it is also commonly employed as a verb to denote
knowing, understanding or cognizing, in both generic and more elevated senses.206 In the
earliest rDzogs chen sources, rig pa is sometimes used in conjunction with the all-important

206 The Mahävyutpatti lists a number of Sanskrit terms that correspond to rig pa including vidyä (knowledge),
vidvän (a knower, a leamed one), vid (knowing, a knower) v/7// (consciousness, understanding, intelligence) vijñã
(wise, knowing, clever), [sam]vedana (perception, Sensation, feeling). The Tshig mdzod chen mo gives several
meanings o f rig pa that include seeing (mthong ba), understanding or knowledge (rtogs p a ’am shes pa), intellect
(blo’am shes pa), intelligence (blo gros), sciences/fields of knowledge (bslab par bya b a ’i gzhi), and
‘consciousness’ as variously explained in Buddhist doctrinal Systems (chos lugs khaggis bshadpa’i rnam shes).
concept of bodhicitta (‘awakened mind’). Samten Karmay has noted the use of the
compound rig pa byang chub kyi sems or “awareness bodhicitta” in a Bon commentary on
the early Rig p a ’i khu byug2(n Sam Van Schaik has drawn attention to the occurrence of rig
pa byang chub kyi sems in various early Tibetan rDzogs chen and Mahäyoga works
including the Dunhuang Mahäyoga manuscript IOL Tib J 454 and has proposed that this
compound be considered as a source of the rDzogs chen term rig p a 2m This is not
conclusive, however, as one also finds other rDzogs chen gnoseological terms paired with
byang chub kyi sems in appositional compounds that include kun gzhi byang chub kyi sems
(‘awakened mind as ground of all’)209, rang rig byang chub kyi sems (‘awakened mind as
self-awareness’)210, rang byung gi ye shes byang chub kyi sems (‘awakened mind as self-
occurring primordial knowing’), and chos nyid byang chub kyi sems (‘awakened mind as
the nature of reality’)211. More than anything eise, such pairings testify to the centrality and
pervasiveness accorded to bodhicitta as a gnoseological concept in early rDzogs chen where
it is considered thefo n s et origo of all so-called enlightened cognitive and ethical qualities.
The central place of rig pa in rDzogs chen soteriology may have had more to do with its
superordinate Status in relation to ignorance. It may be recalled that sNying thig sources
view the relationship between the antonyms rig pa/ma rig pa not as one of simple Opposition
(as in the Abhidharma tradition) but as one of assymetrical entailment whereby ignorance
represents a confined mode of awareness that derives but deviates from open awareness. In
early sources, this asymmetry is already conspicuous in the recurrent juxtaposition between
verbal uses of rig pa and ma rig pa in the context of distinguishing between buddhas who
recognize and sentient beings who do not recognize (rig/ma rig) the ever-present ground
(gzhi) or abiding condition (gnas lugs). The use of rig pa as a verbal noun specifying the
‘state’ of such recognition can be seen to follow naturally from this verbal use.

207 Karmay 1988: 44-5. Note that the colophon to the Rig p a ’i khu byug often gives its title as Byang chub kyi sems
rig p a ’i khu byug. See Bg vol. 5: 306.3, Tk vol. 1: 419.3.
208 Van Schaik 2008: 15.
209 bSam gtan mig sgron: 2.2.
2,0 Byang chub sems rdo rje ’od ’p hro b a ’i rgyud, Tk vol. 4: 112.3 f.: 'di ni rang rig byang chub sems\ \ ’di zhes
bstan du med pa ’o\ | ci yang med las cir yang snang\ \rang byung snying po mchog gi don\|
211 Thig le kun gsal, Tb vol. 13: 434.3.
 In the sNying thig tradition, rig pa refers to ever-present awareness in its unrestricted
openness and undefiled purity. Its importance in this system is attested in an early and
influential text entitled Sangs rgyas kyi zhing du skad cig la grol bar byed p a ’i man ngag
attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra ( ’Jam dpal bshes gnyen) that elucidates dGa’ rab rdo rje’s three
adamantine precepts (rdo rje’i tshig gsum): (1) directly recognizing one’s nature, (2) clearly
ascertaining the single point, and (3) preserving the confidence of liberation. From its
opening invocation “Homage to the ' confidence bom of realizing self-awareness”,
Mañjuśrīmitra’s short commentary leaves no doubt that it is rig pa that one should directly
recognize, ascertain and preserve through these three precepts.212

Within the sNying thig context, the scope of open awareness is said to be all-
embracing. Even Mind itself (sems nyid) and primordial knowing (ye shes) are regarded as
pure self-expressions of this rig pa - “rig pa and ye shes are comparable to gold and its
golden [hue]”213 - while ignorance and mind are its distorted self-expressions. On the one
hand, rig pa is identified with primordial buddhahood, the original ground (thog m a’i gzhi),
and with undefiled dharmakäya which “in its primal purity, is like the clear expanse of the
ocean which has never known the existence of defilement.”214 On the other hand, it is
radically distinguished from ignorance (ma rig pa), dualistic mind (sems), and the all-ground
(kun gzhi) with its myriad cognitive and affective processes, even if these latter are deemed
to be distorted aspects of its own self-effulgence (rang gdangs).215 This open awareness is
compared to the awakened state one retums to when the sleep and dream States of ignorance
have ended.216 Thus, Klong chen pa maintains that “when open awareness is free from

2,2 This is confirmed in the introductory Statement, Bi ma snying tig vol. 1: 304.3: “[Conceming] this open
awareness o f which nothing can be truly predicated, since its self-manifestation is unceasing in whatever ways it
emerges, all that appears and exists dawns as the realm o f dharmakäya. In this way, this very dawning [of open
awarenessj is free in itself.” yin pa grub pa med p a ’i rig pa ’di\ \rang snang ’char tshul cir yang ma ’g ags pas\
Isnang srid kun kyang chos sku ’i zhing du shar\ \shar ba de nyid [interlinear note: rig pa nyid] rang gi thog tu grol\ \
213 Zab mo yang tig vol. 2: 215.3: rig pa dangye shes ni gser dang de ’i ser po bzhin no\ |
214 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1025.6. See under “Texts and Translations”: 305.
215 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1036.4.
2,6 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1026.6 f.: de ’ang rig pa dri ma med pa chos sku ’i ngo bo dus thams cad du Idog bya
ma yin zhing mthar thug grol gzhir yod la\ \kun gzhi gnyid Ita bu ’khrul snang gi rmi lam thams cad ’char ba ’i rten
du gyur pa las sangs par byed dgos pas khyad sh in tu che ’o\ \
dualistic mind, since it is also, by implication, free from mind’s distorted appearances, there
is no ‘place to go’ apart from the unique state of buddhahood.”217

If rDzogs chen texts generally portray rig pa as an ever-present mode of awareness

untouched by the ignorance that distorts ordinary perception and conception, the sNying
thig tradition sharpens this distinction and takes it as a key point in its esoteric precepts.
Indeed, the goal of both the Breakthrough (khregs chod) and Leap-over (thod rgal)
instructions is to directly recognize open awareness which is possible only when one
experiences the complete dissolution (yal ba) of dualistic mind, graphically compared to the
collapse of a play fort assembled by children or the breaking up of a ship at sea where none
of the floating debris can provide any support.218 As indicated previously, it is the aim of
Breakthrough teachings to introduce practitioners to open awareness in its empty, originally
pure essence (ngo bo ka dag stong pa), whereas the Leap-over teachings enable them to
elicit open awareness in its luminous, spontaneously present nature (rang bzhin Ihun grub
gsal ba). In this connection, it is important to remember that open awareness abides both as
the natural condition of mind (sems nyid) and as “embodied awareness” which makes its
presence feit through the “vital centres of one’s lived body” (lus kyi gnad), particularily the
heart, head, eyes and bioenergetic channels (rtsa).219

217 Chos dbyings mdzod ’g reh 494 f.. See below 132-3 and n. 217 for text and full passage.
218 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 1553.2 f.: “Where mind does not exist, there is also no foundation [that survives its]
destruction. For example, when a boat breaks up [at sea], there is no support structure to hold on to in the water. For
that reason, without understanding what the non-existence o f mind [really] means, one seeks vision, meditation and
conduct via [dualistic] mind but never discovers what has been shown to be liberation, sublime joy. It is like groping
in the water for a boat that has fallen to pieces. You are definitely deceived and fettered by this [tendency] to take
the non-existence o f mind as a foundation that exists.” sems med pa la gzhig pa ’i gnas med pa ni\dper na gru rdib
pa ’i tshe chu la ’dzin pa ’i gnas med pa dang ’dra ’o\de ’i phyir na sems med pa ’i don ma shes par\ \lta sgom spyod
pa sems la ’tshol ba ni\ \bde chen thar pa ’i bstan pa rnyed dus med de gru rdib pas chu la ’ju g pa ltar\ \sems med pa
la yod par rten bcas pa de nyid kyis slu zhing ’cing bar nges so| | On the related teachings on the collapse of the
playhouse mind (sems kyi khang bu gshigpa), see ibid.: 1552.2 f. and 1554.3 f..
2,9 Using language and imagery reminiscent o f third tuming sütras, the Seng ge rtsal rdzogs (Ati II: 308.5 f.) States:
“Within the bodies o f each and every sentient being, dwells the pure presence o f primordial knowing, [Though] it is
unable to shine forth to its full extent. For example, just as an [embryo ensconced] in the sheath of a womb or an egg
becomes obscured and does not directly manifest, but emerges once its inbom capacities are completely developed,
so also, as soon as one casts off this [ordinary] conceptualization and embodiment, one directly encounters the field
o f self-manifestation. One will then see the non-conceptual essence, primordially present self-awareness itself (rang
rig nyid). One will [also] see the pure presence of primordial knowing and the reality that is buddhahood.” sems can
kun gyi rang lus la\ \ye shes dag pa ’i snang ba gnas\ \rgya phye snang bar mi nus te\ \dper na mngal dang sgo nga i
rgyal jmngon du ma gyur sgrib ’g yur yang\ \rang rtsal rdzogs nas ’byung ba bzhin\ \rnam rtog lus di bor ma thag\
Irang snang yul dang ’p hrad par ’gyur\ |ye nas gnas pa ’i rang rig nyid\ \ngo bo rtog med mthong bar gyur \ \ye shes
dag pa ’i snang ba dang\ \sangs rgyas bden pa mthong bar ’gyur\\ In his Theg mchog mdzod (vol. 1: 1095.4 f.),
 The term rang [gi] rig [pa] (“self-awareness”) is also widely employed from the
earliest stratum of rDzogs chen literature onward with reference to naturally occurring
awareness.220 Rang rig is closely associated with various other gnoseological terms that
include rang byung ye shes (‘self-occurring primordial knowing’), rang byung rig pa (‘self-
occurring awareness’), so sor rang g/fs] rig pa (‘personally realized self-awareness’), so sor
rang [gi/s] rig p a ’i ye shes (‘primordial knowing as personally realized’) and mind’s
luminosity ( ’od gsal). Some of these associations call for closer attention. Rong zom pa
equates [rang byung] ye shes with rang rig pa on the grounds that whenever any
consciousness manifests as subjective and objective aspects, it is itself given as a mere self-
awareness that is devoid of duality. Thus, he concludes, this self-awareness is called
primordial knowing because it is unmistaken regarding [its] object.221 In some instances, this

Klong chen pa comments on this passage as follows: “In this context, [open awareness] manifests as spiritual
embodiments (sku) in the heart, as modes of primordial knowing (ye shes) in the conch mansion [cranium], as open
awareness (rig pa) in the eyes (bhri gu ta), and the spiritual lights ( ’od) and spheres of the manifest expanse
(dbyings snang) in the four energy channels (rtsa ba).” de yang snying na sku\ \dung khang na ye shes\ [bhri gu ta
na rig pa\ \rtsa bzhin dbyings snang gi ’od dang thig le ’char ba yin no\\
220 The gnoseological concept of rang rig is ubiquitous the rNying ma tantras. The following are but a few
examples: Ye shes gsang ba ’i rgyud, Tk. vol. 4: 79.3 f: kun ’dus ye shes dag pa ’i ’od\ \mthon dman rlom sems che
chung med[ \bdag gzhan gnyis med rang rig la\ \ ’dzin pa kun bral ’od gsal dag\ \dbyer med nam m kha’ Ita bur
khyab\\; ibid. vol. 4: 80.3: rang gsal ye nas ma bcos pa\ \don de shes pas ye shes yin\ | chos nyid ka dag ’od gsal
sems\ Idon de shes pas ye shes yin\ \ma bkad rang rig rgyu med gsal\ \rang byung ye shes ’g yur med sems\ | ; Byang
chub sems rdo rje ’od ’p hro ba ’i rgyud, Tk. vol. 4: 112.3 f.: ’di ni rang rig byang chub sems\ \ ’di zhes bstan du med
pa ’o\ Ici yang med las cir yang snang\ \rang byung snying po mchog gi don\ |; Thig le kun gsal chen po ’i rgyud, Tk
vol. 5: 138.4: rang gis rang rig pa las rig pa ’i ye shes ye shes so| |
In the Six Lamps (sgron ma drug) attributed to dPal dbyangs (8th c.), rang rig occurs nineteen times and is described
variously as being devoid o f object and thus devoid of apprehending subject (yul med de la ’dzin med), as totally
pure (rnam par dag), inexpressible by thought (bsam brjod med), aspectless (rnam pa med), conceptless (rtog med),
luminosity ( ’od gsal ba), free from limitations (m tha’ brat), as accomplishing all aspirations (smon pa kun rdzogs)
and, finally, as the Lord of all goals ( ’bras bu kun bdag) because there is in reality nothing to be attained. In short,
rang rig is an endogenous, naturally lucid mode o f awareness that is devoid of object and subject, unmodified by
reflection and thematization yet replete with all capacities for the spiritual fulfilment o f oneself and others.
221 Rang byung ye shes chen po ’bras bu rol p a ’i dkyil ’khor du blta ba ’i yi ge, in Rong zom bka ’bum: 559.3 f.: de
bas na shes pa gang la gzung ba dang ’dzin pa ’i rnam par snang ba de ’i tshe nyid na gr.yis pos stong pa ’i rang rig
pa tsam nyid yin par grub pa ’o\ | rang rig pa de nyid ye shes zhes bya ste | | don la phyin ci log pa med pa ’i phyir ro\ \
Elsewhere Rong zom pa establishes the equivalence of self-awareness and self-occurring primordial knowing on the
ground that that mind’s luminous, nondual character means in effect that it lacks not only any objective correlates
but any cognitive qualities (shes rig gyi chos) as well. See rGyud rgyal gSang ba snying po dkon cog ’g rel, in Rong
zom gsung ’bum, vol. 1: 174.14 f.: “Since mind and primordial knowing are both primordially devoid of
apprehended [object] and apprehending [subject], their characteristic feature is that they are independent o f other
[entities]. Even the mere self-awareness (rang rig tsam) is in itself devoid o f cognitive qualities (shes rig gi chos).
Given that it is thus primordially luminous, it is called ‘self-occurring primordial knowing’. sems dang ye shes
kyang gdod ma nas gzung ba dang ’dzin pas mtshan ma de yang gzhan la* bltos pa med la\ \rang rig pa tsam de nyid
kyang shes rig chos kyi stong pas gdod ma nas ’od gsal ba ’i phyir rang byung gi ye shes zhes bya ste| ... atext: las,
corrected on basis o f critical edition in Almogi 2009: 389.
 self-awareness is also identified with primordial buddhahood222 or buddha nature, as when
gNubs chen in his dGongs ’dus p a ’i mdo commentary equates rang rig [pa’i] byang chub
[kyi] sems (‘awakened mind as it is realized oneself’) with the early rDzogs chen term for
buddha nature byang chub snying po (*bodhigarbha)223, a term we will be looking at more
closely in chapter four.

The occurrence of rang rig within the compound so sor rang rig p a ’i ye shes has
been noted by Paul Williams224 and taken as evidence of a distinctive rDzogs chen
interpretation of rang rig. More specifically, Williams takes so sor rang rig p a ’i ye shes
tsam, as it occurs in a commentary on Bodhicaryāvatãra 9.35 by the rNying ma scholar Mi
pham ’Jam dbyangs mam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912), to be a rDzogs chen technical term
which he renders as “mere reflexive gnosis” (and for which he provides as the Sanskrit
equivalent the problematic compound pratisvasamvedanajñãnamãtrà). This reading prompts
Williams to draw connections between rDzogs chen and Yogācāra conceptions of self-
awareness. However, Matthew Kapstein has noted significant problems with this
interpretation.225 The first is that the technical term in question should not include tsam as an
element of the compound with the adjectival sense ‘mere’; rather tsam is used there as an
adverbial particle of limitation or exclusion (tsam gyis) that comes after the compound and
has the sense of ‘merely’. The more serious problem, however, is that so sor rang rig p a ’i ye
shes (Skt. pratisvasamvedanajñãna) is not a rDzogs chen term at all. Rather, as Kapstein
demonstrates with ample textual support, it is an expression that in its Indic equivalents has
been in currency from the time of the Päli Canon onwards226 and has been widely accepted
and employed by Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scholars of virtually all traditions ever since.

22 In his Chos dbying mdzod ’g rel (473.2), for example, Klong chen pa States that “the three käyas together with
their buddha-fields are shown to be the unique state of self-awareness.” sku gsum zhing khams dang bcas pa yang
fang rig geig pur bstan pa\
223 Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 2, ch. 55: 50.6.
224 Williams 1998: xi. See also Karmay 1988: 107 n. 4.
225 See Kapstein 2000.
See for example Kapstein 2000 (112 f.) where the following passage from Majjhimanikāya I 265 (PTS ed.) is
quoted: upanītā kho me tumhe bhikkhave iminä sanditthikena dhammena akälikena ehipassikena opanayikena
paccattam veditabbena viññūhi\ “Monks! You have been guided by me by means of this visibly true dhamma, that is
timeless, ostensible, conducive [to the goal], and to be personally realized by the w ise'’ (I have slightly altered
Kapstein’s translation for the sake of consistency). Here, paccattam veditabba is equivalent to the Sanskrit
pratyämaveditavya (°-vedamya) and to Tibetan so sor rang gis rig par bya ba.
The compound can be rendered as ‘primordial knowing as it is personally realized’ where
the so sor rang rig p a ’i-° (Skt. pratyätmavid-0) element of the compound is not intended
adjectivally or nominatively but rather as a adverb-verb combination that qualifies the
abstract noun ye shes. It expresses the rather old idea that the desired soteriological
condition (in this case, jñāna but elsewhere the paramärthasatya, the parinispanna227 etc.)
must be ‘personally experienced’ to be fully understood.228 In other words, primordial
knowing is a matter of direct acquaintance and not discoverable in any other fashion. Thus
when the vyākhyã on Ratnagotravibhäga 1.7 characterizes “self-awareness” using the term
so so rang gis rig par bya ba (pratyätmavedanīya), it is specifying a mode of awareness that
must be personally realized to be known.229

This brings us to the delicate question of how these rDzogs chen gnoseological
conceptions of rang rig relate to the Mahāyāna theories of self-awareness (sva-samvitti, °-
samvid, °-samvedanaf ätma-°) that were associated in particular with Yogācāra episemology
but widely discussed and debated amongst other Buddhist and non-Buddhist Systems as
well. Common to these theories is the idea that all conscious experience has a reflexive
nature; in its awareness of objects, consciousness is simultaneously aware of itself. When
one perceives something blue, one is at the same time aware one is perceiving something
blue. The idea of self-awareness is first introduced into Indian logico-epistemological
discourses by Dignāga (480-540)230 as a defining characteristic of all mental States.
According to his famous successor Dharmaklrti, mind and all epistemic and affective mental
factors accompanying it possess this self-awareness.231

227 It occurs a few times in Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvãlā, as for example its explanation of Madhyamakahrdayakārikã
V.5 where a Yogācāra Opponent takes the perfectly established nature (j)ańnispannasvabhāva) to be an object of
personal realization {pratyätmavid) in contrast to the imagined nature {parikalpitasvabhäva) which is an object of
worldly knowledge. See Hooemert 1999: 154.
228 We can consider, for example, Candrakīrti’s characterization o f ultimate truth as the nature o f things {svabhäva)
that is to be known by each individual personally: “The ultimate reality o f the buddhas is the nature o f things
{svabhäva) itself. Because it is, moreover, non-deceptive, it is the truth o f ultimate reality (paramärthasatya). It is to
be known by each one personally.” {don dam pa ’i bden pa). sangs rgyas rnams kyi don dam pa ni rang bzhin nyid
yin zhing \ \de yang bslu ba med pa nyid kyis don dam pa ’i bden pa yin la | |de ni de rnams kyi so sor rang gis rig
par bya ba yin no\\ MAvBh 108:16-19.
229 See Mathes 2008: 542 and n. 1838.
230 On Dignäga’s theory of self-awareness, see Kellner 2010.
231 Nyāyabindhutīka 1.10: sarvacittacaittānām ātmasamvedanam\ See Kellner 2010: 204. Dharmakīrti further States
that “if [cognition] were [itself] not perceived, the perception of [its] object would not be established.” PVin I k. 55:
 In The Reflexive Nature o f Awareness, Williams has shown that the idea of self-
awareness has been widespread in South Asian thought but also subject to varying
interpretations.232 Following a distinction made by the dGe lugs pa scholar Thub bstan chos
kyi grags pa (1823-1905) in his outline of the ninth chapter of Śāntideva’s (ca. 650-700)
Bodhicaryāvatāra, Williams distinguishes two basic kinds of self-awareness.233 These can
be broadly distinguished as transitive (taking an object) and intransitive (not object-
oriented): (1) The transitive type that Williams traces to Dignäga refers to a reflexivity or
self-awareness that is held to accompany any intentional cognitive act: perceiving and
knowing that one is perceiving always go together. This idea of self-awareness formed a
comerstone of Yogācāra epistemology wherein attempts were made to verify its existence
by means of memory arguments, e.g. I not only can remember an object because I
previously perceived it sensorily, but I can remember perceiving that object because the
earlier sensory perception was also self-aware. Self-awareness was also used to justify
idealism, when it was further maintained that awareness has access only to itself (i.e. is
confined to its own representations). To put things in the usual Yogācāra terms, self-
awareness consists in the mind’s subjective aspect (grãhakãkāra) being aware of the mind’s
own objective aspect (grāhyākāra). (2) The intransitive type of self-awareness, often
qualified as auto-illumination (rang rig rang gsal) and identified with mind’s luminosity
(cittaprabhãsvaratã), is taken to be the defining characteristic of all consciousness such that
its presence or absence is what distinguishes the sentient from the insentient (jada).234
Humans have this clear and knowing cognition, rocks and fumiture do not. This conception

dm igspa mngon sum m ayin na\ \dort mthong rab tu ’g rub mi ’gyur\\ See Skt. edition of Tattvasamgrahapañjikã by
E. Krishnamacharya p. 401, 4: apratyaksopalambhasya närthadrstih prasidhyati\ See Vetter 1966: 96, n. 2. For the
Buddhist philosopher, the reason why the perception of objects is deemed to depend on self-cognition is that
cognition that does not widerstand the qualifier (viśe?ana) cannot widerstand qualified things (yiśesya). In other
words, in the cognition o f an object, the object is the qualified thing and the state o f being cognized is the qualifier.
Now, if the state o f being cognized (the qualifier) were not known by cognition, then the object (the qualified thing)
could not be known either. Objects presuppose awareness. See Tarkabhā$ã of Mok§ākaragupta: 17, 8-11, as cited in
Keira 2004: 39 n. 75.
232 See Williams 1998.
233 Williams 1998: 4. Kellner (2010: 205) characterizes these as intentional and non-intentional respectively. On
these two types o f self-awareness, See also Yao 2005.
Śāntaraksita Madhyamakãlamkãra 16 ( - Tattvasamgraha k. 2000) in Ichigo 1985: 70 f.: vijñānam jadarūpebhyo
vyãvrttam upajāyate \iyam evātmasamvittir asyayã ’jadarūpatā | Tib. rnam shes bem po ’i rang bzhin las\ \bzlogpa
rab tu skye ba ste\ \bems min rang bzhin gangyin pa\ \de ’d i’i bdag nyid shes pa yin\\ “Consciousness arises as
something opposed to the nature o f insentient matter. That whose nature is non-material has this self-awareness.”
of svasamvedana appears to have been introduced into Buddhist philosophy by Śāntaraksita
who accepted it as a self-evident hallmark of consciousness and therefore as conventionally
existent. He characterizes it as a fundamental nondual, intransitive mode of consciousness -
i.e. devoid of the act-object structure of intentional awareness that makes the intentional
types of object-awareness and self-awareness possible. Because this self-awareness is the
mark of sentience and diametrically opposed to materiality, Śāntaraksita will further argue
(MAK 17) that cognition is able to know itself, given awareness and its self-knowledge are
of the same (immaterial) nature, but unable to know objects which are of a fundamentally
different nature. As a consequence, cognition is confined to its own representations (ākāra),
with no way of making contact with the extemal world. In this way, the intransitive type of
self-awareness is, like the transitive type, employed as a justification for a representational
form of subjective idealism, using arguments that presuppose a quasi-Cartesian dualism
between the nature of matter (held not to exist) and that of mind (which alone exists).235

The question at issue here is what, if anything, these two theories of self-awareness
have to do with the gnoseological ideas of self-awareness that are presented in rDzogs chen
texts from early on. Paul Williams has examined attempts by the late rNying ma scholar Mi
pham (1846-1912) to defend the conventional existence of the intransitive type of self-
awareness and to argue that this is implicitly endorsed by *Prāsańgika-Madhyamaka thinkers
like CandrakTrti and Śāntideva who had only explicitly argued for its ultimate non-existence.
(Of course, one could respond to this defence by simply pointing out that not arguing for the
conventional non-existence of intransitive self-awareness does not in itself imply an
endorsement of its conventional existence.) In any case, Mi pham takes as his main
opponents in this debate dGe lugs pa successors of Tsong kha pa who claimed to concur
with the *Prāsańgika in denying consciousness any reflexivity, either conventional or
ultimate. This debate has been discussed at some length in Williams 1998 and Garfield 2006
and need not be reprised here. What is important to stress here is that Mi pham’s attempt to
defend a Mahāyāna version of rang rig has no precedent in rNying ma philosophy from the
eighth to fourteenth centuries. In fact, Klong chen pa rejects Yogācāra theories of self-
awareness in toto in his treatments of philosophical Systems in the Grub mtha’ mdzod and

235 For an interesting critique of this proto-Cartesian representational from a dGe lugs pa *Prāsańgika-Madhyamaka
standpoint, see Garfield 2006.
 Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel. Looking at the former work, the author dismisses as incoherent the
claims held both by Sākāravādins/Satyākāravādins (who hold representions to be veridical)
and Nikāravādins/ Alīkākāravādins (who hold representations to be false) that the cognition
devoid of subject and object (gzung ’dzin gnyis su med p a ’i shes pá) ultimately exists as
something real. For Klong chen pa, the implied duality of cognizer and cognized in the view
that cognition takes itself as its own object fundamentally contradicts the supposition that
there is at one time one (non-dual) cognition. It is as impossible for cognition to know itself
by itself as it is for a sword to cut, or even touch, itself. 236 Klong chen pa here rejects what
in Contemporary philosophy of mind is known as a higher order theory of consciousness. On
this account, what makes a mental state (intransitively) conscious is the fact that it is taken
as an object by a higher order (transitive) state.237 According to Klong chen pa, this account
presupposes an immanent subject-object duality within what is alleged to be a nondual state
of awareness. The way is thus open to a vicious infinite regress whereby the cognition
cognizing itself requires yet another cognition to itself be conscious and so on ad infinitum.
The author also proceeds to reject alternative theories that hold self-awareness to consist in
a past cognition being known by a present one,238 or to consist in awareness simply knowing
itself.239 There is nothing particularly new in the theories he tables or his refutations of them
but I note them here simply as evidence of Klong chen pa’s blanket rejection of the
Yogācāra svasamvedana. Of course, the main target of his sweeping critique, as he makes
clear in his Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel, is the Yogācāra proclivity to treat consciousness as a real
entity with real characteristics and to presuppose it in justifications of idealism: “It is
eminently reasonable to claim that any objects that appear are unreal, but we refute the
Claim that mind is ultimately real.”240 Klong chen pa is also explicitly opposed to allowing
self-awareness any conventional existence such that it could then be used to buttress

236 Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 772.2 f.: de Itar rnam pa dang bcas pa dang\ \rnam pa med pa gnyis kas gzung ’dzin su med
pa ’i shes pa don dam par bden pa dang\ \rdzun par yod par khas blangs pa de yang rigs pa ma yin te ’di ltar\ | blo
rdzas geig dus geig la rig bya dang rig byed gnyis rdzas ’g al ba ’i phyir\ \rang gis rang rig pa ’ang mi srid de| |ral
gris rang gi rtse mo gcodpa ’am reg par mi nus pa bzhin no\\
237 Zahavi 2005: 17 f.. See also Kellner 2010.
238 Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 773.1: ’das pa ’i shes pa da Itar bas rig pa ’i phyir rang rig pa ’o\ \
239 Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 773.3: rang nyid rig par skyes pas rang rig pa yin no\ \
240 Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel: 1111.5 f.: don snang ci yang mi bden pa nyid shin tu ’thad mod kyis\ \sems don dam du
’dodpa dgag pa la...
representational epistemologies that assume we can only know extemal objects (if indeed
such are held to exist) through our internal representations of them. Interestingly, his
thoroughgoing rejection of Yogācāra epistemology and his wholehearted endorsement of the
*Prāsańgika stratagems for undermining any and all forms of realism (from substance
ontologies to subjective idealism) make his stance on svasamvedana appear, for all intents
and purposes, quite similar to the dGe lugs pa position that Mi pham was criticizing.

What, then, are we left with when it comes to the rDzogs chen self-awareness? It
must be acknowledged that the rDzogs chen conception of rang rig does concur with certain
elements of Śāntaraksita’s self-awareness, particularily its nondual and luminous character.
This we have already seen in Rong zom pa’s above-mentioned identification of intransitive
rang rig pa with the Sems sde conception of rang byung ye shes. We can also draw attention
to the following characterization of rang rig in a text attributed to Vimalamitra from the Bi
ma snying thig:

In essence, the term self-awareness (rang rig) means awareness of itself (rang gi rig
pa). Why is it termed ‘awareness’? ‘Awareness’ means alert wakefulness; it is
endowed with the acuity of cognition. Why the [reflexive particle] rangt The point is
that although this awareness that shows [itself] in the sky is vividly present, it lacks
any subjective or objective parts. In manifesting, it is self-manifesting, in arising, it is
self-arising, in abiding, it is self-abiding, in seeing it is self-seeing, in being free it is
free in its own [ontological] freedom. By moving it has acuity and subtlety and by
appearing it is aware. Since it is clear and knowing it is ‘awareness’.241

However, notwithstanding certain obvious affinities between this rDzogs chen rang rig and
the intransitive type of svasamvedana, Vimalamitra elsewhere maintains that the rDzogs
chen self-awareness transcends dualistic mind: “This term rang rig pa 'i ye shes refers to
what is free from mind (sems), ego-mind (yid) and representational thinking (bsam pa).”2*2
Although its essence is difficult to grasp, he continues, its nature is free-flowing (dal chags
pa). On this understanding, mind (citta) is not to be reified but transcended. Thus, the key to

241 Bi ma snying tig vol. 1: 420.1 f.: ngo bo rang rig pa ’o zhes bya ni rang gi rig pa o\ |rig pa zhes bya ba de rang
gang lags\ \rig pa ni shes pa ’i sgrin po* dang bcas pa ste rig ge seng nge ’o\ |de rang gang lags\ \don ni nam mkha ’
la bstan pa ’i rig pa de hrig hrig du ’dug kyang\ \gzung cha dang ’dzin cha med de snang bar rang snang\ \shar ba
rang shar\ \gnas p a rang gnas\ \mthong ba rang mthong\ \grol ba rang grol du grol ba yin no\ \ ’g yu bas sgrin pa
phra zhing snang bas rig pa ’o\ | rig cing gsal bas rig pa o|| ‘‘text: sgrib pa corrected on basis of Bi ma snying tig vol.
2: 224.4: shes pa sgrin po dang bcas pa rig ge sing nge ba gting nas hrig chags pa nyams sing bag dang bcas pa\ \
242 Bi ma snying tig vol. 2: 224.3 f.: ...rang rig p a ’i ye shes zhes bya ba ’di ni\ \sems dang y id bsam pa las grol ba\\
understanding the difference between the rDzogs chen and Yogācāra conceptions of rang
rig comes back to the imperative to properly distinguish between mind and primordial
knowing, so as to not confuse prereflective-nonthematic awareness from the reflections and
thematizations that derive from it.

If the provenance of the rDzogs chen rang rig and the extent and specifics of its
indebtedness to Yogācāra conceptions of self-cognition (svasamvedana) remain far from
transparent, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that rDzogs chen scholars were inclined
from early on to distinguish their own understanding of self-awareness from Yogācāra and
Mahäyoga interpretations.243 The Yogācāra idea of svasamvedana is explicitly criticized in a
Rig p a ’i khu byug commentary from the Bai ro rgyud ’bum as a fruitless state associated
with nonconceptual meditation. The commentary States that “Followers of Cittamätra
meditate on suchness consisting in the feit experience of luminous self-awareness
(,svasamvedana)”244 and proceeds to include this among the flaws of nonconceptual
meditation (along with those practiced by pratyekabuddhas and Mädhyamikas) that leave
their practitioners submerged in the darkness of ‘no thought’ wherein lucidity is blocked and
primordial knowing does not dawn.245

Classical rNying ma pas were even more resolute in denying any connection between
rDzogs chen and Yogācāra-Cittamātra conception of rang rig. Klong chen pa contends that
“although the open awareness that realizes the non-existence of subject and object is
conventionally designated as “self-occurring primordial knowing” (rang byung ye shes), it is
not held to be similar to the Yogācāra-Cittamātra conception of "self-luminous self-

243 A close analysis of rDzogs chen terms having apparent Yogãcāra/Cittamātra affiliations (gzhi, kun gzhi, rang rig,
gnas ’g yur) reveals an attempt to reinterpret them in line with the disclosive paradigm of rDzogs chen gnoseology. It
is important to recognize that terms such as rang rig and kun gzhi had already undergone significant
reconceptualization in the Mahäyoga assimilations o f Yogācāra psychology, and that such developments certainly
exerted a formative influence on early rDzogs chen. Thus a measure o f hermeneutical vigilance is required when
considering the same term in Shilling frameworks of Buddhist discourse: one must remain be alert to the role
immanent criticism and semantic transformation (and even inversion) may have played in reinterpreting its original
sense(s) and reframing its original context(s).
244 Khu byug gi Ita ba spyod pa ’i ’khor lo, Bg vol. 5: 349.2 f.: sems tsam rang rig pa gsal ba nyams su myong ba i ji
bzhin pa la bsgom\ \
245 Khu byug gi Ita ba spyod pa ’i ’khor lo, Bg vol. 5: 349.5 f.: rang rgyal sems tsam dbu ma gsum\ \mi rtog pa sgom
pas skyon yin te\ \mi rtog pa ’i mun thim pa dang\ \snang ba ’g eg pa dang\ \ye shes mi skye ba dang\ \skye ba i rgyu
’bras log pa ’o\ |
cognition” (rang rig rang gsal)”246 He goes on to point out that self-occurring primordial
knowing lacks most of the qualities associated with the Yogācāra svasamvedana - its
alleged reality, intemality, reflexivity, self-evidence, and accessibility to introspection - but
then cautions that “should one become attached to these [rDzogs chen gnoseological] terms
as denoting something real, you won’t find any difference from the Cittamätra conception of
svasamvedana, that is, the cognition which is devoid of subject-object duality and which is
simply auto-illumination.”247 In highlighting the many drawbacks of reifying the mental,
Klong chen pa rules out any basis for confusing the gnoseological and mentalist conceptions
of self-awareness: for the idealist, self-awareness is a real entity having real characteristics,
whereas for the rDzogs chen pa, it is simply a vivid auto-manifestation, a process lacking
any reality whatsoever.

Let us conclude this rather lengthy excursus on self-awareness by noting that gNubs
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes (b. 844) had already identified rang rig as a key concept in the
Mahäyoga tradition which maintained that all phenomena are simply this lucid self-
awareness.248 gNubs chen observes that suchness (de bzhin nyid) in the Mantra[yäna] is

246 Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: 321.1 f.: gang la gzung ba dang ’dzin pa med par rtogs pa ’i rig pa de ’i ngo bo la ni
rang byung gi ye shes su tha snyad btags kyang\ \rang rig rang gsal lo zhes rnal ’byor sems tsam pa Itar mi ’dod de\
247 The full passage from Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel (321.1 f.) reads: “Since it [rang byung ye shes] is devoid of
outer and inner, it is not found as some ‘inner mind’ (nang gi sems). Since it is devoid of seif and other, it is not
found as some exclusive ‘self-cognition’ (rang gi rig pa). Since it has never known the existence o f subject and
object, it is [also] not found as something separate from these. Since it is devoid of any object of feeling or
cognition, it is not found as some ‘nondual experience’ (myong ba gnyis med). Since it is devoid o f mind and mental
factors, it is not found as ‘one’s own mind' (rang gi sems). And since it is devoid of lucency and non-lucency, it is
not found as something ‘self-lucent’ (rang rig). That which is nothing that could be labeled as “consciousness only”
(rig pa tsam) since it transcends both awareness and ignorance (rig ma rig) is what we call the supreme complete
perfection that is free from limitations. Although we may describe [this mode of awareness] as “self-occurring
primordial knowing,” “awakened mind,” *'dharmakäya,” “great spontaneously present basic expanse,” and “naked
self-lucid open awareness” when using the convention of ostensive definitions, one should understand that apart
from merely designating it in order to facilitate a knowledge of [what the] terms [mean], it is in itself supremely
indescribable. Otherwise, should one become attached to these terms as denoting something real, you won’t find any
difference from the Cittamätra conception o f svasamvedana, that is, the cognition which ij devoid o f subject-object
duality and which is simply auto-illumination.” phyi nang med pas nang gi sems su ma grub pa dang\ | rang gzhan
med pas rang gi rig pa kho nar ma grub pa dang\ \gzung ’dzin yo d ma myong bas de nyid dang bral bar ma grub pa
dang\ Itshor rig gi yul na med pas myong ba gnyis med du ma grub pa dang\ |sems dang sems byung med pas rang
gi sems su ma grub pa dang\ \gsal mi gsal du med pas rang gsal du ma grub pa ’i phyir ro\ \rig ma rig las ’das pas
rig pa tsam du ’ang gdags su med pa ’di ni\ \mtha ’ bral yongs su rdzogs ap chen po zhes bya ste \ \mtshon tshig gi tha
snyad rang byung gi ye shes dang\ \byang chub kyi sems dang\ \chos sku dang\ \dbyings Ihun grub chen po dang\
Irig pa rang gsal rjen pa zhes brjod kyang\ \brda shes p a ’i phyir btags pa tsam las rang ngo brjod med chen por
rtogs par bya ’o\ | de Itar ma yin par ming la don du zhen na sems tsam pa ’i rang rig rang gsal gzung ’dzin gnyis
med kyi shes pa dang khyadpar mi rnyed do\ \
248 A still unidentified supporting quotation from a text cited simply as sGyu ’p hrul drwa ba (Mãyājāla) contains the
term gzung ’dzin bral b a ’i rang rig. A similar interpretation is is found in Maitrīpa's Tattvadaśaka, verse 5 where it
 characterized as the all-pervasive luminosity of nondual self-cognition (rang rig gnyis med
kun tu ’od gsal ba). This he contrasts with final or consummate suchness (de bzhin nyid
mthar thug) in rDzogs chen that is spontaneously perfected (Ihun rdzogs).249 This difference
aside, gNubs chen does not hesitate to adopt the concept of rang rig in the context of
introducing the meaning and scope of rDzogs chen. The goal (don) of spontaneous
perfection (Ihun rdzogs) that is considered the essence of rDzogs chen is said to be “directly
realized in one’s self-awareness (rang rig p a ’i mngon sum).” It is not, however, something
that can be intellectually posited and confounds all evaluation by introspective
discriminating insight (rang gi so sor rtog p a ’i shes rab). Why is this? “Because the entire
ränge of commonly accepted phenomena have since time immemorial been of the nature of
buddhahood within the immensity of the great sphere of self-occurring primordial knowing,
having never shed their coats or changed their colours.”250 Here gNubs chen advances a
rDzogs chen interpretation of rang rig, a technical term that he had just identified as a key
concept of the Mahäyoga tradition. All this goes to show how little is yet known about the
assimilation and transformation of Yogācāra ideas within Tibetan Mahäyoga and rDzogs
chen traditions.

3.3 rDzogs chen Interpretations of Ye shes

Of the three principle rDzogs chen gnoseological terms, ye shes is both the most
ubiquitous and semantically polyvalent. This is due in part to the long and complex
conceptual genealogies and classifications of the term jñãna (2-fold through 6-fold) that had
developed within the Indian Mahāyāna and Mantrayäna Systems to which Tibetans were
heir. But the pervasiveness and polysemy of ye shes in rDzogs chen also reflect the

is maintained that phenomena [are experienced as] being luminous through the samädhi o f realizing reality as it is
(yathãbhūtasamãdhi). Sahajavajra in his commentary explains that “luminous” here refers to “self-awareness” in
view o f its being naturally free from defilements. ’od gsal zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyisa dri ma spangs pas rang
rigpa ste| atext: gyi. See Mathes 2006: 210, 2 1 5 .1 thank the author for drawing my attention to this reference.
249 See bSam gtan mig sgron: 491.3.
250 I here paraphrase bSam gtan mig sgron 291.2 f.: de Ita bu ’i theg pa thams cad kyi yang mdzod spyi mes chen po
’di ’i ngo bo Ihun gyis gruba pa ’i ngang nyid kyi don\ \rang rig pa ’i mngon sum khong du chud nas blo bzhag par
bya yang med p a ’i don chen po rang gi rig pa la gsal bar bya ba yang\ \ji Itar shes par bya zhe na\ \shin tu m al
byor gyi theg pa ’di la\ |rgyud lung man ngag gi gzhung ltar\ \dang po gzhal bya’i chos geig la\ |rang gi so sor
rtogc pa ’i shes rab kyis gzhal bar byar yang med pa ste\ \de ci ’i phyir zhe na\ \chos so cog tu grags pa thams cad\
Iye gdod ma nyid nas spu ma brjea mdog ma bsgyur bar rang byung gi ye shes thig le chen po ’i klong du sangs
rgyas b a ’i rang bzhin la\\... “addit. btext: ba ctext: rtogs d text: brjes A similar but more extensive summary of
Atiyoga is given in the author’s Mun pa ’i go cha vol. 1 (NyKs vol. 93): 511.4.
profusion of autochthonous interpretations of this term that are one hallmark of this
tradition. The term ye shes itself has presented something of an enigma to Contemporary
scholars of Tibetan Buddhism since the prefix ye has no obvious equivalent in the Sanskrit
jñāna which it renders. In her meticulous research on the term ye shes and possible reasons
for use of the element ye in it, Oma Almogi has made a number of important observations of
which the following can be summarized here251: (1) The term jñãna has been rendered into
Tibetan as shes pa, mkhyen pa and ye shes according to context.252 Of these, shes pa is a
generic term for knowledge, while its honorific form mkhyen pa and the more technical
abstract noun ye shes are both used with reference to the special knowledge of a realized
being. (2) ye shes is traditionally explained as (A) primordially existing knowedge (ye nas
gnas p a ’i shes pa), i.e. the awareness of emptiness and radiance that is naturally present in
the mental continuum of all sentient beings, and (B) the knowledge possessed by Noble
Ones.253 Almogi here points out that the particle ye applies only to the first of these senses
and suggests that this interpretation may reflect the early influence of tathägatagarbha
and/or prabhäsvaracitta concepts in Tibet.254 (3) The particle ye generally means
‘primordial’, ‘enduring’ and ‘certain’, as its definitions in the Tshig mdzod chen mo suggest:
(A) beginning, origin, root, (B) constant, perpetual, and (C) certain, definite.255 (4) It is
nonetheless possible, Almogi suggests, that the element ye originally had a meaning other
than ‘primordial’ - for example one in line with other, and more archaic, senses of ye (<
yas) as ‘all’, ‘total’, ‘very’, or ‘definite’, senses which would correspond to the idea of
‘omniscience’ (sarvajñãna : thams cad mkhyen pa).256 (5) Almogi concludes (p. 162) that
“whatever the original meaning of the component ye in the word ye shes may have been, it

251 See Almogi 2009: 160.

252 See Tshig mdzod chen mo s.v. ye shes.
253 Tshig mdzod chen mo defines ye shes as follows; [1 ]y e nas gnas pa 7 shes pa ste sems can thams cad kyi rgyud
la rang bzhin gyis gnas pa ’i stong gsal gyi rig pa, [2] ’p hags pa 7 mkhyen pa.
254 Here it is necessary to qualify the view expressed by Almogi 2009, Wangchuk 2005 and Karmay 1988 that
tathägatagarbha theory played an insignificant role in early rNying ma literature. In chapter four, I demonstrate that
buddha nature concepts played an highly significant part in early rDzogs chen, albeit mostly in the form o f tantric
*bodhigarbha rather than sütric tathägatagarbha or *sugatagarbha concepts. It is also worth noting that the particle
ye is frequently used in combination with this distinct dass of buddha nature terms, as seen for example in terms ye
snying po byang chub pa, ye gzhi snying po, ye gzhi snying po byang chub kyi sems (on which see chapter four).
255 Tshig mdzod chen mo s.v. ye: [1] thog ma dang\ \gdod ma\ \rtsa ba\ ... [2] gtan dang\ \nam rgyun...[3] nges par
dang\ \mtha’gcig\...
256 See Almogi 2009: 161-2 and n. 63 for her detailed investigation o f the y e particle in the term ye shes.
seems that the tradition takes it to be ‘primordial’ - on the basis of speculative etymology
(though not necessarily by definition) or as a result of a semantic shift - or simply
disregards it altogether.” I would suggest here that the addition of the element ye in ye shes
(like the addition of nyid in sems nyid) reflects the Tibetan penchant for specifying technical
uses of the more generic Indic Originals (e.g. citta, jñāna, vidyā), terms that had through
semantic accretion taken on many diverse, and at times divergent, associations and
connotations in the course of their long and complex conceptual histories. In this regard, it is
interesting that the Karma bKa’ brgyud scholar gTsug lag phreng ba (1503/4-1566)
observed that the early Tibetan translators found it necessary to variously render jñãna as
shes pa (“cognition”) or mam shes (“consciousness”) when describing the cognition of a
sentient being, and as ye shes (“primordial knowing”) when describing the cognition of a
buddha, there being no such difference conspicuous in the original term.257

A survey of the ways ye shes has been variously employed in rDzogs chen sources
leaves little doubt that the element ye in ye shes has had these connotations of ‘primordial’
(ye nas) and ‘enduring’ (gtan) from the time of the tradition’s earliest available literature.
Used adjectivally, the element ye (‘primordial’) qualifies shes (‘knowing’ in a generic sense)
in order to specify a mode of knowledge that is considered genuine, abiding and originary in
contrast to normal cognition that is adventitious, transient and derivative. In this regard, it
should be noted that rDzogs chen texts distinguish rang byung ye shes (self-occurring
primordial knowing), synonymous with rig pa, from other modes of ye shes that are
considered manifestations or expressions of this rig pa (rig p a ’i rtsal). A text from the Bla
ma dgongs ’dus attributed to Padmasambhava declares that “the key point of all ye shes is
the rang byung ye shes (“self-occurring primordial knowing”). Other ye shes are transient
and impermanent.”258

Early rDzogs chen characterizations of primordial knowing reflect the innatist and
quietistic strains of thought that characterize the early Sems sde teachings. This is well-

257 Byang chub sems dpa ’i spyod pa la ’ju g pa ’i rnam par bshad pa Theg chen chos kyi rgya mtsho Zab rgyas mtha ’
yas pa 'i snying po: 764.5 f.: ...spyir dznya na ’i sgras sems can gyi shes pa brjod tshe shes pa am rnam shes dang
sangs rgyas kyi shes pa brjod tshe ye shes su bsgyur dgos par lo pan gyis bka ’ sa bcad pa yin gyi skad dod tha dad
med la\...
258 Zhal gdams dmar khrid don bsdus thugs kyi phreng ba in Bla ma dgongs ’dus vol. 5: 833.5 f.: ye shes thams cad
kyi gnad ni\ \rang byung gi ye shes yin\ \ye shes gzhan ni ’g yur zhing mi rtag pa ’o\...
 attested in the Khyung chen Iding ba, an important Sems sde source for understanding the
rDzogs chen conceptions of ye shes. It States that self-occurring primordial knowing abides
as pervasive suchness. Free from deliberate activity and not dwelling on objects, it is
nothing to be improved on using antidotes.259 Not attainable by applying concepts such as
error (bhränti) and path of awakening (bodhimärga), it transcends the limits of words (tshig
gi mtha* dang bral).260 It is nonetheless directly present as the nature of primordial
buddhahood (ye nas sangs rgyas).261 gNubs chen incorporates the early Sems sde
interpretations into his own presentation of rang byung ye shes as one of the nine principal
views of rDzogs chen.262 According to the viewpoint of this System, he says, all phenomena
are self-luminous in the state of great primordial knowing like light in the sky, having
always been the very essence of this self-occurring primorial knowing which remains
naturally free from causes and conditions.263
The systematization of Sems sde teachings in the I I th Century brought with it an
intensified focus on ye shes (and especially rang byung ye shes) as the sine qua non of
Buddhist doctrine and practice. A typical example of this trend is the following passage
from the Nam m khai mtha’ dang mnyam p a ’i rgyud in a chapter devoted to explicating ye
shes (ye shes bstan pa):

Luminous primordial knowing of open awareness, beyond effort,

Is not produced but has occurred primordially since the very beginning.
Since it comes from oneself, it does not come from elsewhere.
Since it is spontaneously present, it is impartial.
Self-luminous primordial knowing of open awareness
Is originally empty of cognition of anything other than it.
Since there are no possible positions with regard to its spontaneity.

259 Khyung chen Iding ba, Tk vol. 1: 419.5 f.; Bg vol. 5: 308.2 f.: rang byung ye shes mi rtog kun tu jT bzhin gnas\
Ibya bral yul la mi gnas gnyen pos bcos su med\ | aBg rang
260 Tk vol. 1: 420.4 f.; Bg vol. 5: 309.2 f.: 'khrul dang byang chub lam de* rtog pas thob pa med\ \rang byung ye shes
nyid kyang tshig gi mtha ’ dang bral\ | T k ste
261 Tk vol. 1: 420.4: Bg vol. 5: 309.2: ye nas sangs rgyas bdag nyid mngon sum gnas pa la\ \
262 See below Table E on p. 171. An interlinear note in the text attributes this view to dGe slong ma Kun dga’ mo
who has been identified as the 22nd on a lineage list of 23 early rDzogs chen masters (after Śrīsimha and before
Vimalamitra) presented in the rJe btsun thams cad mkhyen pa be ro tsa na 7 rnam thar ’Dra ’bag chen mo, on which
see Karmay 1988: 19-20. He is given as the 23rd on very similar list of 25 masters presented in the Paņ sgrub rnams
kyi thugs bcud snying gi nyi ma, on which see Kapstein 2008: 279-80.
263 The full passage in bSam gtan mig sgron (340.3 f.) reads: de la rang byung gi ye shes su Ita ba'i lugs ni skye ’jig
gis bsdud pa'i chos thams cad kyang gdod ma nas rang byung gi ye shes rgyu rkyen ngang gis bral ba'i ngo bor
sangs rgyas pa'i phyi nang med par nam mkha'i ’od bzhin ye shes chen por rang gsal lo\|
 It is free from opposing positions such as being luminous and not luminous.
As for being ‘self-occurringsince it is devoid of causality,
It has always been without producer and produced.264

Here, the various ways of characterizing rang byung ye shes serve to clarify each of the
components of the term: it is ‘primordial’ (ye) insofar as it has been spontaneously present -
luminous yet empty - since the beginning; it is ‘knowing’ (shes) in that it is a naturally lucid
condition of being aware that is devoid of seif and other; and it is ‘self-occurring’ (rang
byung) in that it occurs effortlessly, endogenously, and spontaneously without depending on
causal production, or on construction and contrivance.265 Similar presentations are adopted
in a large number of later Sems sde works, most notably in the Kun byed rgyal po, a late
(probably 1Ith - 12th Century) synthesis that comes to be regarded by classical doxographers
as the root tantra of this tradition.266 This tantra explicitly distinguishes self-occurring
primordial knowing (rang byung ye shes) from primordial knowing that conceptualizes
sense objects (yul la rtog p a ’i ye shes) which cannot be considered ‘self-occurring’ since its
occurrence depends on those objects (yul las byung).261

264 Nam mkha 7 mtha ’ dang mnyam pa 7 rgyud chen po, Bg vol. 1: 266.5 f.; Tk vol. 3: 514.6 f.: brtsal bral rig pa ye
shes gsal\ | ma bskyed1ye nas gdod nas byung\ \rang las byung bas gzhan byung min\ \lhun gyis grub pas phyogs ris
med\ Irang gsal rig pa ’i ye shes la\ \gzhan gyi rig pa gdod nas stong\ \lhun grub nyid la phyogs med pas\ \gsal dang
mi gsal phyogs dang bral\ \rang byung nyid la rgyu medpas\ \bskyed bya bskyed byed gdod nas med\ \ T k bskyed
265 This text later defines ye shes in terms of its elements ye and shes and indicates its relationship to open
awareness. Bg vol. 1: 267.5 f.; Tk vol. 3: 515.5 f.: “Since it knows primordially, it is primordial knowing. [And]
since it has primordially been great open awareness, it is great primordial knowing of open awareness. It is
primordial knowing by virtue o f ascertaining the reality o f open awareness just as is, uncontrived.” ye nas shes pas
ye shes yin\ ye nas shes rig chen po pas\ \rig pa ye shes chen po yin\ \ma bcos j i bzhin rig pa ’i don\ |gtan la phebs
pas ye shes yin\\
266 An illustrative passage ffom Kun byed rgyal po (Tb vol. 1: 15.5 f.; Tk vol. 1: 12.7 f.) reads: rang byung zhes ni
bya ba ni\ \rgyu rkyen med pa ’i snying po pas\ | rtsol sgrub* kun las ’das pa yin\ \ye shes zhes ni bya ba ni\ ’g ags pa
med cing ma bsgribs pas\ \chos kun ma lus stongpar byed\ \ ...[line omitted] ye nas bya b a ’i don ’di ni\ \thog ma
nyid nas gnas pa ’i don\ \ “Tk bsgrub This tantra is included in both rNying rgyud and the bKa ’ ’g yur canons.
267 Tb vol. 1: 168.4 f., Tk vol. 1: 145.1 f.: ye shes ye shes zhes bya ba\ \ye shes ye nas shes pa yin\ |rang byung ye
shes ye nas shes\ \yul la rtog pa ’i ye shes de\ |yul las byung bas rang byung min\ \ In his commentary on the Kun
byed rgyal po, gZhan phan mtha’ yas ’od zer (b. 1800) offers this cogent interpretation of ye shes: Kun byed rgyal
po ’g rel pt. 2 (NyKs vol. 106): 704.5: “Thus, the actual referent designated by the term ‘primordial knowing’ is the
vital factor o f self-knowing awareness that is free from knower and known, the very essence of ceaseless self-
radiance that has primordially not depended for its existence on objective frames of reference. Since it is
unconditioned luminosity, it is self-occurring primordial knowing that has also not depended on any causes and
conditions whatsoever. Although this is already known in and by itself as it really is, having primordially remained
unobscured by ignorance, it remains naturally free from concepts subject to transition and change, and therefore
naturally abides within as spontaneously present primordial knowing that has been present like the rays o f the sun,
shining in its own light at all times. Thus it is shown to be free from effort and achievement.” ’di Itar ye shes zhes
pa ’i ’dogyul dngos ni ye nas dmigs bya ’i yul la mi Itos par rang gsal ’g ags med kyi ngo bo shes bya shes byed dang
bral ba ’i rang shes rig pa ’i bdag nyid ’od gsal ’dus ma byas pa yin pas rgyu rkyen gang la yang ma Itos pa ’i rang
 The sNying thig tradition’s interpretations ye shes in many ways parallel its
interpretations of rig pa, building on earlier Sems sde and Mahäyoga formulations and
developing these along its own distinctive gnoseological, ontological and tantric-
physiological lines. There is a difference in scope, however, particularly in the classical
period as scholars sought to reveal the continuity of rDzogs chen descriptions of ye shes
with earlier Buddhist speculations on jñāna. This resulted in syncretistic articulations and
classifications of primordial knowing of extraordinary variety and complexity. In the face of
this profusion of discourse, my objective is to simply summarize a few key elements in the
sNying thig discourses on primordial knowing. One hallmark worth mentioning is their
emphasis on direct introduction (ngo sprod) as the primary method of realization. For
example, the Dur khrod phung po ’bar ba man ngag gi rgyud, an early sNying thig work268
attributed to Vimalamitra, States that primordial knowing is realized by a Student when its
abiding (though elusive) presence is pointed out by a qualified master.269 This principal
method of transmission is in keeping with the classical rDzogs chen view that the semslye
shes distinction has its inception in oral instructions (snyan brgyud).

Classical sNying thig texts elaborate on earlier characterizations of primordial

knowing as both empty (stong) and luminous (gsal), developing these aspects into distinct,
but mutually enhancing, Systems of doctrine and praxis. The emptiness aspect emphasizes
the abiding (gnas lugs), originally pure (ka dag), nonconceptual (mi rtog), and inexpressible
(brjod med) elements of primordial knowing that are the focus of the Khregs chod teachings.
The luminous aspect draws attention to its dynamic (shar lugs), spontaneous (Ihun grub),
expressive (rtsal) character that are the focus of the Thod rgal teachings. These
complementary ways of characterizing primordial knowing are developed fully in the
Seventeen Tantras.270 As we read in the sGra thal ’gyur.

byung gi ye shes te\ \de ni ye nas ma rig pas sgrib pa med par rang ngo rang gis shes zin pa yin kyang\ \ ’g yur ’p ho ’i
rtog pa dang ngang gis bral bas nang rang gnas Ihun grub kyi ye shes dus thams cad pa rang gsal nyi ma ’i ’od Itar
gnas pa yin pas rtsol sgrub dang bral bar bstan te\ \
268 It is included in the Bai ro rgyud ’bum and rNying ma rgyud ’bum.
269 Bg vol. 8: 205.6 f.; Tk vol. 4: 596.5 f.: nges tshig ye nas shes pas ye shes so\ glo bur med pas ye shes 5o| ye nas
yod p a ’i rig pa dea\ bla ma dam pas mtshon nas ni\ rang rig rtogs pas shes tsam na\ ye shes zhes ni de la bya\\ T k
ste
270 See the overview of this tantric corpus entitled Dung yig can rgyud kyi khong don bsdus a sgron ma snang byed
that is contained in Bi ma snying thig vol. 2: 263-421 and NyKs vol. 33: 595-714.
 ‘Primordial knowing as spontaneously present nature ’
Is unbom, unceasing, and does not think anything.
This is because it is pure of objects and is indeterminate.
[But] since its expressive energy and qualities are ceaseless
From its manifesting simply as a playing forth,
It constitutes the matrix for the complete manifold [world].
Because it is nothing, it appears, yet because it appears, it is empty.
It thus possesses these facets of accessing appearance and emptiness.271

Elaborating on the characterization of ye shes äs both empty and luminous, Klong

chen pa sees it both as the pristine source of all manifestation (like a crystal ball) in its
awareness aspect (rig chä) and the expressive display of conceptual elaborations (like
refracted light from a crystal ball) in its manifestation aspect (shar cha). If this appears to
confuse primordial awareness with discursive elaborations that derive from it, the author is
careful to point out that error has its roots not in manifestation itself but in the self-
identifications with and reifications of particular aspects thereof.272 There is, he continues,

Ati vol. 1: 152.6 f., Tb vol. 12: 127.6 f.: rang bzhin Ihun grub ye shes zhes\ \mi skye mi ’g ag cir mi dgongs\ \yul
dQg nges pa med phyir ro\ \rtsal dang yon tan ’g ags med pas\ \rol pa tsam du snang ba las\ \sna tshogs rdzogs pa ’i
gzhi ma ’o\ | med phyir snang la snang phyir stong\ |snang stong ’ju g pa ’i yan lag can\ | See also Ati vol. 1: 185.3, Tb
vol. 12: 155.6: mtshan nyid stong gsal rig pa la\ rang bzhin gang dang ma ’dres pa\ gzung dang ’dzin pa ’i mtha’
zad dang\ chos nyid rang ngo zact dag pa ’o\ | aAti om. zad The two aspects are characterized in the Rig pa rang
shar in terms o f the disclosive and spontaneous elements of primordial knowing. Ati vol. 1: 451.1: “The way of
explaining great primordial knowing is as follows: it consists [both] in buddhahood as direct realization and
buddhahood as spontaneously present nature. If one ‘knows’ this ‘primordial’ spontaneously present nature, then
realization will directly manifest. Such is the etymology o f ‘primordial knowing’.” ye shes chen po ’i bshad lugs ni\
Irtogs pa mngon gyur sangs rgyas dang\ \rang bzhin Ihun grub sangs rgyas 5o| |ye nas rang bzhin Ihun gyis grub\
\shes na rtogs pa mngon du gyur\ |ye shes nges tshig de bzhin no\ \
Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel: 241.2 f: “‘Self-occurring primordial knowing’ is open awareness that is empty yet
luminous, being free from discursive elaborations. Given that it occurs such that in essence it does not discriminate
sense objects, similar to a pure crystal globe, it abides as the factor o f being a ground for arising [of myriad
manifestations]; yet in its very essence there is neither manifesting nor non-manifesting. Thus it is that which is
vidvidly present in its own light, unimpeded in its emptiness and pristine in its original purity. Within its sphere, its
aspect o f manifesting as myriad things is the discursive elaboration of subject and object, whereas its aspect o f being
aware - the pristine nakedness that is the very essence o f this manifesting - abides as primordial knowing. Since it
therefore does not conceptualize sense objects, it is called “self-occurring primordial knowing.” In this context, all
those who have not encountered this through direct introduction [mistakenly] take the view to be a matter o f merely
going along with whatever [thoughts] crop up. They fail to widerstand the key point that “conceptualization itself is
error”. When things manifest, this pristine naked awareness in which there is no locus or agent of manifestion is
identified as that which is present as primordial knowing which is the unceasing mode o f arising of responsiveness
(thugs rje). It is therefore, by implication, identified [also] as that which is nakedly present in its own place as the
fundamental self-occurring primordial knowing (rtsa ba rang byung ye shes). And since there is no duality between
its essence (ngo bo) and its self-expressive energy (rang rtsal), it is called “nondual self-occurring primordial
knowing free from elaboration that is the unique sphere [of being]”.” rang byung gi ye shes ni rig pa stong gsal
spros pa dang bral ba shel gong dag pa Ita bu yul la mi dpyod pa ’i ngo bor skyes pa de yin la\ \ ’char gzhi ’i char
gnas kyang\ \rang ngo la shar dang ma shar med pas rang gsal du Ihag ge stong par zang ngo\ \ka dag tu sangs se
ba di yin no\ | de ’i ngang las sna tshogs su shar ba ’i cha de gzung ’dzin gyi spros pa ste\ \shar ba de ’i rang ngo rjen
sangs se ba de rig cha ye shes su gnas pas\ \yul la rtog pa ma yin pas rang byung gi ye shes zhes so| | ’dir ngo sprad
la ma ’p hrod pa kun shar thog der glod pa la Ita bar ngos ’dzin te\ | rtog pa nyid ’khrul zhes bya bas gnad ma go ba
no duality between the essence of primordial knowing and its self-expressive energy (rang
rtsal) stemming from its responsiveness (thugs rje); apparent duality is the result of
mistaken identifications incurred by reflection on and reification of this play (rol pa) of
expressive energy. It is possible, Klong chen pa suggests, to simply recognize this nondual
self-occurring primordial knowing in its pristine nakedness (rjen pa sang nge ba) - both as it
abides in its naked clarity and as it continuously manifests as myriad objects without
hypostatizing it.273 For so long as “one thinks of the abiding and manifesting òf cognition as
two different things and talks about [the experience of) ‘settling in the nonconceptual
essence’ [but also of] ‘preserving the expressive energy as being free in its arising’, one’s
practice goes off in two directions and one fails to understand the key point.”274

The sNying thig characterization of primordial knowing in terms of the indivisibility

of its pure empty essence (ngo bo ka dag stong pa) and luminous spontaneous nature (rang
bzhin Ihun grub gsal ba) has lent itself to complex typologies of ye shes which seek to
accommodate antecedent Buddhist interpretations and classifications of jñãna within a
specifically sNying thig framework. An example of the attempt to amalgamate rDzogs chen
and traditional Buddhist interpretations of jñāna/ye shes within a comprehensive typology is
the elaboration of ten modes of ye shes275 in the sPros bral don gsal and (abridged) Thig le
kun gsal tantras:

The classifications [of jñãna] include the following interpretations: [1] Since all of
samsära and nirväna manifest from the great unimpeded primordially pure and non-
entitative open awareness, it is called “ground-abiding primordial knowing”. [2]
Since this abides in its emptiness, it is called “primordial knowing of the basic
expanse” (dharmadhãtujñãna). [3] Since this emptiness is present as unceasing

yin no\ \shar dus nas shar sa shar mkhan med pa ’i rig pa rjen sangs seng de thugs rje ’char tshul ma ’gags pa ’i ye
shes su gnas pa de ngos bzung bas\ \rtsa ba rang byung ye shes su rang sa na rjen par gnas pa de zhar la ngos zin
nas\ \ngo bo dang rang rtsal gnyis su med pas gnyis med rang byung gi ye shes spros bral thig le nyag geig ces bya
ste II
273 See Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel: 246.2 ff.
274 The full passage in Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel (246.2 f.) reads de dag kyang rang ngo spros bral dang\ |de ’i rtsal
las shar dus phyir ma dpyad\ \nang du ma brtags\ \bar du ma bzhag pa ’i rig pa rjen pa sang nge ba ’dzin rtog med
pa nyid ngo zin pa tsam gyis\ \rang ngo spros bral de ka der rjen ne ba las gzhan med par rtogs pas\ \gnyis med
rang byung gi ye shes te\ \ngo bo dang\ \de ’i rtsal zhes brjod pas shes pa gnas pa dang\ \ ’char ba gnyis yin snyam
nas\ Ingo bo mi rtog par ’jog\ |rtsal shar grol du skyong zer nas\ \nyams len cha gnyis su song ba ni gnad ma go\ \
275 Compare with the five-fold typology given by gNyag Jñānakumāra in his 'Phrul gyi me long: 995.6 f.: ...de
bzhin nyid dang\ \chos kyi dbyings dang\ \mi gnas pa dang\ \rang byung dang\ \lhun gyis rdzogs p a ’i ye shes dang
Inga ’o\\
 awareness, it is called “mirror-like primordial knowing’7 (<ādarśajñāna). [4] Since
emptiness is itself aware and awareness is itself empty so that emptiness and
awareness are indivisibly united, it is called “primordial knowing of equality”
(samatãjñãna). [5] Since one knows [these two] individually within the nonduality of
emptiness and awareness, it is called “discriminating primordial knowing”
(pratyaveksanãjñāna). [6] Since primordial knowing that is a non-entitative open
awareness is devoid of material phenomena, it opens the gates of inbom qualities.
Since its therefore gives rise to temporally endless and spatially limitless expressive
energies, it is called “task-performing primordial knowing” (krtyãnustãnajñāna). [7]
While it has thus been indicated276 by way of uribiased terminology (tshig), since it
also does not manifest as having any partial meaning (don), it is called “non-static
primordial knowing” (mi gnas p a ’i ye shes). [8] Alas, son of a noble family! When it
comes to understanding it in this way, since it is known in and by277 oneself, it is
“primordial knowing as awareness” (rig pa 'i ye shes). [9] Since it has no creator, it is
called self-occurring primordial knowing (rang byung gi ye shes). [10] Since it does
not go beyond this reality, it is called primordial knowing of adamantine Mind
(thugs) that is difficult to pass beyond ( ’da ’ dka ’ thugs kyi ye shes27S).219

In this passage, we may observe that traditional Buddhist conceptions of jñãna such as the
five jñãnas (2 - 6), non-static jñāna (7), self-occurring jñāna (8), and jñãna that survives
mortality (10) are reinterpreted and assimilated within the distinctive rDzogs chen view of
ye shes as it is personally realized as the ground of being (1).

276 Tb here reads brtags “investigated” instead of bstan “indicated” in Tk.

277 Tb has the genetive rig gi; Tk has the ergative rig gis.
278 The term da ’ dka ’ thugs kyi ye shes likely derives from ’da ’ ka ye shes (Skt. atyayajñāna) which refers to jñãna
at the time o f abandoning corporeal existence. It is also the title of a short Mahāyāna sūtra in the bKa’ ’gyur, the
Atyayajñãnanāmamahãyãnasūtra ( 'Phags pa ’d a ’ ka ye shes zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo) D no. 122, on
which two Indian commentaries are found in the bsTan ’gyur. See Almogi 2009: 197 n. 27. ’D a ’ ka [ma] seems to
be akin to the term [nam] ‘chi kha [ma] which is employed in this short sütra, e.g. D K. vol. 54: 305.3 f.. The
Encyclopaedia o f Buddhism 1965 suggests that the title o f this work may be corrected to Mrtijñãna. The above
quotation Supports the sense ‘difficult to pass beyond’ suggested by the Tibetan ’d a ’ dka ’, which implies the
enduring quality o f a buddha’s mind (thugs) or awareness (jñāna). ’Jigs med gling pa discusses three ’d a ’ ka ma in
the context o f describing how the vase empowerment (bum p a ’i dbang : kalaśãbhi$eka) purifies obscurations of
corporeal existence that result in the attainment o f nirmānakāya. See his Yon tan mdzod ’g rel vol. 2: 210.2.
279 Tb vol. 13: 31.3 f. (and 312.2 f.); Tk vol. 5: 137.7 f.: dbye ba rnam grangs dang bcaspa ni\ \rigpa dngos medye
dag zang thal chen po de las\ \ ’khor ’das thams cad snang bas na\ \gzht gnas kyi ye shes so\ \de stong par gnas pas
na chos kyi dbyings kyi ye shes sø| J stong pa de rig pa ’g ag pa med par ’dug pas me longye shes so| |stong pa de
nyicf rigc pa yin la\ | rig pa de nyia stong pa yin tee| |stong rig dbyer mi phyed pas mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes 5of|
Istong pa dang rig pa gnyis su med par so sor mkhyen pas so sor rtog pa ’i ye shes sø| |rig pa dngos med kyi ye shes
gdos pa cang gyi chos mect pas yon tan gyi sgo yangs pa ste\ \rtsal phyogs med du gang la yang1thogspa med par
byung bas bya ba grub pa ’i ye shes so| | de Itar tshig phyogs med nas bstank kyang\ \don phyogs chaa dang bcas
par mi snang bas mi gnas pa ’i ye shes so| | kye ma ho rigs kyi bu de Itar shes pa ni\ \rang gim rig pas rig pa ’i ye shes
so| Ide la byed pa po med pas rang byung gi ye shes so| | de ’i don las mi ’da ’ bas ’da ’ dka thugs kyi ye shes sø| | *Tk
zhi *Tk stong nyid °Tb reg ^ k om. de eTk no r Tk mnyam pa nyid do 8Tk bcad hTk, Tb men ‘Tb om. JTb re Tb
brtags 'Tk che mgis
 In the sNying thig system, primordial knowing is classified into three basic types: (1)
ground-abiding (gzhi gnas kyi ye shes), (2) characteristic-beholding (mtshan nyid ’dzin p a ’i
ye shes), and (3) object-pervading (yul la khyab p a ’i ye shes)2*0 In scope, this scheme
parallels the three käyas in ranging from unmanifest to manifest modalities. While elements
of this three-fold typology are to be found amongst the oral instructions of Vimalamitra
preserved in the Bi ma snying thig281, its most detailed treatments occur in the Seventeen
Tantras and the commentaries and treatises based on these. We can see that this typology
combines distinctly rDzogs chen views of primordial knowing (1 and 3) with the classical
Mahāyāna-Vajrayäna Classification of five jñãnas (2) that are here viewed as expressions of
open awareness.282 The key to understanding this scheme goes back to the idea that
primordial knowing is empty in essence yet spontaneously present by nature, and expressive
as compassionate responsiveness. These three primordial modalities of awareness that
together constitute the so-called primordial knowing that abides as the ground of being (gzhi
gnas kyi ye shes) provide the framework for understanding all the others. Table D provides a
schematic overview based on accounts found in the Mu tig phreng ba, sGra thal gyur, the
bKa ma commentaries on these, the Ye shes bsdus p a ’i sgron ma, Thig le kun gsal and
Klong chen pa’s sNying thig summaries, particularly his Theg mchog mdzod. The table is
intended to provide an schematic overview of the sNying thig analysis of primordial
knowing, the baroque intricacies of which exceed the compass of this work.

The foregoing analysis of some key rDzogs chen gnoseological terminology has been
able to offer little more than tentative clues conceming the provenance and lines of

280 See for example Mu tig phreng ba: Ati vol. 2: 518.3 f.; Tk vol. 9: 569.4 f.; Tb vol. 12: 380.2 f.: “Primordial
knowing is as follows: Pure ground-abiding primordial knowing, characteristic-beholding, and object-pervading.” ye
shes nyid ni ’di Ita ste \ \gzhi gnasa dag pa ’i ye shes dang\ \mtshan nyid ’dzin dang yul khyab pa ’o\\ aAti, Tk, Tb have
nas; I base my reading on Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1072.1 and the Mu tig phreng ba ’g rel pa in NyKs vol. 112:
434.1 which both have gzhi gnas. For an analysis of these modes of ye shes under different rubrics see sGra thal
’g yur, Ati vol. 1: 150 f..
281 The first two are identified in the Ye shes bsdus pa ’i sgron ma, Bi ma snying thig vol. 2: 220.4 f.: ye shes kyi dbye
ba ni gnyis te\ \gzhi gnas pa ’i ye shes dang\ \mtshan ’dzin pa ’i ye shes so| |gzhi gnas la gsum ste\ \ngo bo ka dag gi
ye shes dang\ \rang bzhin Ihun grub kyi ye shes dang\ \thugs rje kun grol ba ’i ye shes so\ \de la rig pa nyid ’khrul ma
myong bas\ \ngo bo [ye nas] ka dag gi ye shes su bzhugs pas\ | ’khor ba la thog ma med pa [ 7' gnad] dang\ \rig pa la
rang bzhin des kun la khyab pas\ \rang bzhin Ihun grub kyi ye shes su bzhugs pas\ \gnad shes pa rnams sangs mi
rgya mi sridpa dang\ | rig pa de sna tshogs su shar bas\ \thugs rjes kun grol gyi ye shes su bzhugs pas ’bad rtsol bya
mi dgos par yongs su grol b a ’o\\ The five modes o f mtshan nyid ’dzin p a ’i ye shes are discussed at 221.3 f.. These
two correspond to the first two among the five-fold Classification of rig pa in Rig pa bsdus pa ’i sgron ma.
282 See in particular Thig le kun gsal, Tk vol. 5: 316.2 f..
transmission of terms such as sems nyid, rig pa, and ye shes. gNubs chen may be pointing us
in the right direction when he notes the importance of terms such as rang rig in the
Mahäyoga System. But this of course raises the question of how much Mahäyoga and other
early tantric traditions in Tibet were themselves indebted to other currents of Buddhist
thought such as Yogācāra. One thing that is clear is how far concepts adopted from the
Indian Buddhist milieux have been adapted to rDzogs chen Systems of doctrine and praxis
with their emphasis on the disclosure of primordial aWareness. In the history of Buddhist
thought, the assimilation and reinterpretation of ideas has always been a fluid process in
which the semantic boundaries of concepts shift, expand, and contract over time to
accommodate the variable ränge of phenomena they are called upon to articulate within
ever-changing doctrinal and soteriological contexts. More study of the literature of the early
rDzogs chen masters and their coreligionists will be needed to form a clearer picture of
these semantic genealogies and trace the possible lines of influence that have shaped them.
 Table D: The rDzogs chen sNying thig Analysis o f Ye shes in
A tiyoga tantras Mu tig phreng ba and sGra thal ’gyur

Modes and Functions Typoiogy Characteristics

Ground-abiding primordial
knowing
(gzhi gnas kyi ye shes)
• three expressions of the
primordial ground: empty,
luminous and all-pervading
1. Originally pure essence
(ngo bo ka dag gi ye shes)
2. Spontaneously present nature
(rang bzhin Ihun grub kyi ye shes)
3. All-pervading reponsiveness
(thugs rje kun khyab kyi ye shes)
..............................
Beyond limitations of existence and
non-existence, like sky
Primordially replete with buddha
qualities as expressive energy of
ground, like wish-granting jewel
Devoid of inherent nature yet serves
as source of spontaneous manifestati­
ons acting for welfare of sentient
beings

Characteristic-beholding 1. Primordial knowing of basic expanse Self-awareness from perspective of its

primordial knowing
(mtshan nyid 'dzin pa'i ye shes)
• comprises five modes of jñāna
each of which is further divided
into five (= 25)283
■its aspect as responsiveness
comprises ye shes subsumed under
(a) knowing (subtle quintessence in
all beings) and (b) knowable (i.e. 7/
Ita ba mkhyen pa'i ye shes and ji
snyed pa mkhyen pa'i ye shes)28*
(dharmadhätu : chos kyi dbyings kyi°)
2. Mirror-like primordial knowing
(ōdarśa°: me long Ita bu'i°)
3. Primordial knowing of equality
(sam atâ°: mnyam pa nyid kyi°)
4. Discriminating primordial knowing
(pratyavek$ana°: so sor rtog pa'i°)
5. Task-performing primordial knowing
(krtyānu$tāna° : bya ba [s]grub pa'i°)
emptiness without attributes
Self-awareness from perspective of its
luminosity as vivid cognition
Self-awareness from perspective of
indivisibility of luminosity-emptiness
Self-awareness from perspective of
unceasing insight due to recognizing it
Self-awareness from perspective of
having no achievement [and being
with premeditation]285

Object-pervading primordial
. . 286
knowing
(yul la khyab pa'i ye shes)
■rDzogs chen visions as outward
manifestations of inner luminosity
■apparent objects are self-
liberated in their manifesting
Primordial knowing of manifestations
(snang ba'i ye shes)
Primordial knowing of emptiness
(stong pa'i ye shes)
Primordial knowing of sense objects
(yul gyi ye shes)
Ye shes based on the five elements:
earth, water, wind, fire, space 287
Ye shes unestablished by introspection;
cuts through sensory attachments;
without essence or limitations;
nonconceptual and inexpressible
When five objects such as form are
naturally self-liberated, one's basic
nature is fully realized (chos nyid gong
'phel)288

283 These are presented in rD o rje sem s d p a ' snying gi m e long, Ati vol. 1: 375.4 f. and their meaning elaborated in
the Rig p a rang shar, Ati vol. 1: 454.2 f..
284 These last two com prise (A) knowing things in all their complexity, i.e. to know the nature o f all phenom ena in
accordance with the intentions o f those to be trained in order to help them fulfill their aims (gzhan don), and (B)
knowing things as they really are, i.e. in their fundamental abiding condition in order to dispel error and fulfill o n e’s
own aim (ra n g d o n ). S e e s G r a th a l ’g yur All vol. 1: 156.3 f. as explicated in Theg m chog m dzod vol. 1: 1078.2 f..
285 These descriptions o f the five jñ ā n a are based on Thig le kun g sa l, Tk vol. 5: 316.2 f.. More detailed treatm ent is
found in sG ra thal ’gyur, Ati vol. 1: 154.1 f.; Tk vol. 10, 492.2 f.; Tb vol. 12:128.6 f..

286 In the Chos dbyings m dzod ’g rel, it is this category which com prises the j i Ita ba mkhyen p a ’i y e shes and j i snyed
p a m khyen p a ’i y e shes.
287 These three are based elaborated in sG ra thal 'gyur, Ati vol. 1: 160.1 f.. and Theg m chog m dzod vol. 1: 1087.1 f..
288 This chos nyid gong 'phel constitutes the last o f the four visions (snang ba bzhi) o f the Khregs chod teachings.
See Theg m chog m dzod vol. 1: 1088.4 f..
§4. Concluding Remarks: Reframing the Two Truths

It has been a principal aim of this chapter to show that the distinction between mind
and primordial knowing not only forms a comerstone of classical rDzogs chen doctrine but
also provides a valuable key to understanding its complex soteriology. As a rule, classical
rNying ma scholars were inclined to reinterpret traditional Buddhist philosophical views in
line with this distinction and its underlying soteriological commitments. A striking instance
of this general tendency is their interpretation of the two truths (satyadvaya) of Indian
Buddhist philosophy as objects (visaya : yul) or spheres of activity (gocara : spyod yul) of
these modes of cognition.289 In concluding this chapter, I shall tum my attention to how this
(re)framing of the two truths in terms of these two cognitive styles allowed rDzogs chen
scholars to develop, by means of a Standard Buddhist doctrine, a number of distinctive, and
at times rather audacious, views on the nature and means of goal-realization.

This way of interpreting the two truths was hardly unprecedented. Indeed, in
correlating the two truths with the two relevant modes of awareness that make them
possible, classical rNying ma thinkers claimed allegiance to the *Prāsańgika Madhyamaka
tradition of Nāgārjuna and CandrakTrti. On this account, ultimate truth (paramärthasatya) is
the sphere of primordial knowing whereas conventional truth (samvrtisatyä) is the

289 The fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang Bio bzang rgya mtsho (1617-82) neatly summarizes this current o f thought in
his lucid summary of the sNying thig system, rDzogs pa chen po 7 ’khrid yig Rigs ’dzin zhal lung, in Ngag dbang
blo bzang rgya m tsho’i gsung ’bum vol. 24: 92.5 f.: “The Mu tig phreng ba States that ‘T he distinction between
mind and primordial knowing should be known by those who are wise.” According to this Statement, mind and open
awareness are totally different in their aspects. Thus, mind based on the all-ground (kun gzhi i sems) is the
adventitious conventional [reality] (glo bur gyi kun rdzob) insofar as it is subject to discursive elaborations of
apparent objects. It is conditioned [and constructed] insofar as it arises due to conditions [and] it is subject to
thoughts bound up with the clinging to [and belief in] duality. Its locus is the lungs and it is carried by the karmic
energy currents. When it emerges from the sensory gates, it indulges in the objects o f the eightfold ensemble [of
cognitions]. As for its fiinction, it comes to fruition as samsära due to the power of the error attendant upon dualistic
beliefs. Open awareness, the self-existent monarch (rig pa rang byung gi rgyal po), is the final ultimate [reality]
(mthar thug don dam pa), free from discursive elaborations o f subject and object. It is unconditioned insofar as it is
not produced by causes [and] it is beyond dualistic beliefs. As for its dwelling place, the Kun bzang thugs kyi me
long states: “In the Tsitta palace o f the heart, open awareness resides as the embodiments of peaceful [deities]
de ’ang mu tig phreng ba las\ \sems dang ye shes dbye ba ni\ \mkhas pa rnams kyis shes par bya\ \zhes gsungspa Itar
sems dang rig pa gnyis ni rnam pa kun tu tha dadpas kun gzhi'i sems ni glo bur gyi kun rdzob yul snang gi spros pa
can rkyen las byung ba'i ’dus byas gnyis ’dzin gyi rtog pa can de gnas sa glo bar gnas shing las rlung gis drangs te
dbang po'i sgo rnams las thon nas tshogs brgyad kyi yul la longs spyod\ \byed las bden ’dzin gyi khrul pa'i dbang
gis ’bras bu ’khor bar skye la\ \rig pa rang byung gi rgyal po ni mthar thug don dam pa yul yul can gyi spros dang
bral ba rgyus ma bskyedpa'i ’dus ma byas gnyis ’dzin las ’das pa de gnas sa yang\ \kun bzang thugs kyi me long\
Itsitta snying gi gzhal yas na\ \rig pa zhi'i sku ru bzhugs\ \
provenance of dualistic mind. Not only is this held to be consistent with the *Prāsańgika
approach; it is also said to have been endorsed by its leading thinkers such as Santideva and
Candraklrti in certain oft-repeated quotations affirming a transcendent mode of cognition.290

According to Klong chen pa’s summary of the *Prāsańgika System in the twelfth
chapter of his Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod, the essence of the two truths is that all
phenomena lack any intrinsic nature (svabhäva).291 This means in effect that both the
essence of the conventional, i.e. the objects of the intellect (blo) and senses, as well as the
essence of the ultimate, i.e. the object of primordial knowing as it is personally known by
each (50 sor rang gi rig p a ’i ye shes), are free from the limits of discursive elaborations
insofar as both these truths lack any instrinsic nature. He is quick to add, however, “should
one assume this personally realized self-awareness and intellect are the same, it is really due
to a terminological confusion: ‘intellect’ (blo) is used in the present context in the sense of
‘hypostatization’ (kun tu rtog pa).”292 As he proceeds to explain, “the hypostatized objects,
sensory capacities, and mental engagements constitute the conventional because they are
simply mistaken. ‘Personally realized self-awareness’, by contrast, refers to a non-deluded
primordial knowing that defies expression in thought and language.” 293

So for Klong chen pa, distinguishing conventional and ultimate objects on the basis
of their respective reflective-thematic and prereflective-nonthematic cognitive styles is not
only consistent with *Prāsańgika philosophy but explicitly advocated by its leading thinkers.
But why was he so concemed to align classical rDzogs chen gnoseology with this current of

290 What CandrakTrti’s widely quoted passage on Madhyamakāvatāra XI. 17 in fact States is that suchness (tathatâ) is
made manifest by the käyas due to the cessation o f mind. For Klong chen pa, who quotes this passage in at least 12
instances in his writings, suchness is virtually coextensive with primordial knowing. Mention should be made of
CandrakTrti’s own distinction in Prasannapadä (on MMK 25.16) between jñāna (ye shes) and vijñãna (mam shes)
which La Valleé Poussin, in his critical edition of MMK (533.8-17), glosses as ‘intuitif and ‘discursif respectively.
291 Jan Westerhoff has identified three meanings o f svabhäva in Nāgāijuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy: 1. essence
an essential property that an object can't lose without ceasing to be that very thing; 2. substance - something that
does not depend on anything eise; and 3. absolute - a property that is regarded as the true or final nature o f things.
See Westerhoff 2009: 12-13 and chapter 2. Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is the view that the first two
svabhäva do not exist but are conceptually superimposed on phenomena which lack them and are therefore empty.
292 Yid bzhin mdzod ’g rel: 1155.4 f.: so so rang rig dang blo geig yin mod snyam na\ \brda la rmongs pas re bden\
I ’on kyang blo ni kun rtog pa la skabs ’dir mdzad de\ \
293 Ibid. 1155.5 f.: kun rtog pa 7 yul dang dbang po dang y id la byed pa rnams kun rdzob pa yin te\ |so sor rang gi
rig pa ni\ | ma ’khrul pa ’i ye shes smra bsam brjodpa las ’das pa ste11
Indian Buddhist philosophy? We may recall that Klong chen pa was one of a growing
number of scholars in the classical period to regard *Prāsańgika Madhyamaka philosophy as
the summit of the Indian Buddhist philosophical Systems presented in Mahāyāna sūtras. He
begins his summary of this philosophy in the twelfth chapter of the Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel by
affirming the philosophy of Nāgārjuna as the pinnacle of Buddhist sötric philosophy and
Candraklrti as its most authoritative interpreter. He then Claims that this is the only sötric
philosophy to have clearly recognized the indivisibility of the two truths, of appearance and
emptiness (snang stong dbyer med), which facilitates the crucial transcendence of discursive
elaborations (spros pa: prapañca) and extremes (mtha’ : koti). He then summarizes the
meaning of Candraklrti’s classic texts: “The basic way things are is, in essence, not
established as any intrinsic nature whatsoever, yet all Claims involve an attachment to
truth/reality (bden zhèn). Thus the Claims made in the classical texts belonging to the
traditions of proponents of intrinsic nature (rang bzhin du smra ba : svabhāvavādiri) are
[mired in] internal contradictions. All that is discussed in the classical texts of those who
make Claims by appeal to the power of facts (dngos po ’i stobs zhugs : vastubälapravrtta) are
hence refuted. But following this negation, there ensues no certitude (niścaya) [about any
Position], as would be the case for the *Svätantrika.”294 To be specific, it is CandrakTrti’s
uncompromising critique of ontological and epistemic foundationalism that is held to offer
the best philosophical antidote to the mind’s inveterate propensities toward abstraction and
reification. This is how Klong chen pa characterizes *Prāsańgika in his Theg mchog mdzod:

That none of the philosophical postulates fashioned by the intellect actually exist is
asserted [by Nāgārjuna and CandrakTrti] in order to pacify discursive elaborations.
[The *Prāsańgikas] may apply categories of symbol-based cognition that are in
accord with whatever the worldly posit conceming what merely appears as various
things. However, because they make no Claims [of their own], and because
phenomenal presence goes beyond [constructions of] truth or falsity, these
[*Prāsańgikasj maintain that this [phenomenal presence] is from this very moment

Yid bzhin mdzod ’g rel: 1143.1 f.: gshis ngo bor gang yang rang bzhin ma grub pa dang\ \khas len pa thams cad
bden zhen dang bcas pas na rang bzhin du smra ba dag gi lugs rang gi gzhung khas blangs nang gal ba dang\
Idngos po stobs zhugs khas len pa po de ’i gzhung la grags tshod des ’g og pa yin la\ \bkag pa ’i rjes la rang rgyud pa
Itar nges pa ’i dam bca ’ med de| |gal te nges dam bca ’ ’g a ’yod[ \
 free from the limits of existence and non-existence. This constitutes the pinnacle
among the proponents of Buddhist philosophical Systems.295

Klong chen pa recognized that the skeptical quietism of *Prāsańgika anti-

metaphysics offers the Buddhist philosopher the surest prospect of escaping the wildemess
of his own superimpositions. It is important to recognize, however, that the study of
Buddhist sötric philosophy plays something of a propaedeutic role within the context of
rNying ma soteriology as a whole. In strictly doxographical terms, the place of
Madhyamaka Systems within the rNying ma 9-fold yäna scheme is the 3rd yäna up from the
bottom, i.e. the highest of the Bodhisattvayäna approaches, with outer and inner Mantrayäna
Systems Stretching up and beyond. According to the relevant doxographical categories,
*Prāsańgika is ranked highest of the “the cause-oriented vehicle of characteristics” (rgyu’i
mtshan nyid kyi theg pa). Thus, the remainder of the siddhänta chapter in Klong chen pa’s
Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel outlines the tantric philosophies of the “goal-oriented vehicles of
secret mantra” ('bras bu i gsang sngags kyi theg pa) after first explaining how they are
superior in theory and practice to the vehicles of characteristics.296 The understanding of
these categories within classical rNying ma doxography and the reasons for deeming
Mantrayäna superior are discussed in some detail in chapter six below.

The question of how far Klong chen pa’s interpretation of the two truths in terms of
the mind/primordial knowing distinction accords with the *Prāsańgika philosophy,
especially as interpreted by Candraklrti, is of no small importance and certainly bears
further investigation. But whatever the verdict, there is little doubt that Klong chen pa and

295 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 236.1 f..d e ’ang blos bkod pa 7 grub mtha ’ gang yang med de spros pa zhi ba 7' phyir
ro zhes ’dod cing\ \sna tshogs su snang tsam ’jig rten pa j i Itar ’jo g pa Itar brda shes p a ’i yan lag tu bzhag kyang\
Ide yang khas len med pas\ \chos su snang ba bden rdzun las ’das pas yo d med kyi mtha ’ dang da Ita ’i dus nas bral
bar ’dod do\ \ ’di ni sangs rgyas pa rnams kyi grub pa 7 mtha ’ smra ba rnams kyi rtse mo yin no\ \
The relatively low position o f *Prāsańgika-Madhyamaka in rNnying ma doxographical schemes may tempt one
to conclude that its philosophy is for the rNying ma pa simply a prelude to bigger and better things, and that its
principal role is to clear the way o f reifying tendencies for a less distorted engagement with Mantrayäna. This is in
part correct and consistent with the unanimously held Tibetan view that Mantrayäna Systems are superior to the
Paramitayäna or Laksanayäna in practice. But one must also recognize that Klong chen pa and many other Tibetan
scholastics were inclined to treat *Prāsañgika as a complete and reliable system o f liberation, with its own
efficacious views, practices and soteriological aims. This is certainly how it is presented in Klong chen pa’s Yid
bzhin mdzod ’grel. The Tibetan Buddhist schools sometimes refer to three great Systems of liberation in Tibetan
Buddhism, dBu chen, Phyag chen and rDzogs chen, where dBu chen (Great Madhyamaka) generally refers to a
system of study and practice based on the correct understanding and application o f *Prāsańgika philosophy. On
these ‘three great ones’ (chen po gsum) according to Mi pham, see Almogi 2008, 197.
his successors were intent on pushing the *Prāsańgika understanding of emptiness (śūnyatã)
and non-elaboration (nisprapañca) in the direction of a radically affirmative account of non­
dual experience. On this account, the realization of emptiness facilitates a recovery of the
originary fullness and dynamism of lived experience. Philosophy is relevant only to the
extent that it serves soteriology. We see this clearly in Klong chen pa’s Mantrayäna (and
rDzogs chen) based interpretation of the two truths presented in the eighteenth chapter of his
Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel. Recalling that *Prāsańgika was singled out as the only Indian
Buddhist sütric philosophy to clearly recognize the two truths as the indivisibility of
appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med), it is noteworthy that Klong chen pa
goes on to show how this interpretation provides a transition point from the propositional
truths of representational thinking to the disclosive truth of existential understanding:

Since this luminous primordial knowing is not touched by cloud-like conventional

phenomena of samsära, not even a trace of deluded appearance is found. If that is not
found, then one also does not establish an ‘ultimate’ evaluated as the emptiness of all
that is perceived. Since neither of these is established, then none of the distinctions
between two truths as evaluated by the philosophical Systems are established. Given
these do not exist, one goes beyond the two truths as they are intellectually imputed
in terms of what is ‘true’ and ‘false’. In this pacifying of all discursive elaborations,
since imputed truth is no longer established, we nonetheless describe things in terms
of “the indivisibility of truth/reality”. Since this goes beyond what is expressed in
terms of being conventionally established and ultimately not established, this
luminous primordial knowing as the basic expanse is described as “great utterly pure
spontaneity”. And since it also does not exist as anything like the two truths of
appearance and emptiness proclaimed in the philosophical Systems, these [two] are
described in terms of the indivisibility of truth/reality.297

What is at issue in this Mantrayäna-oriented reintepretation of ‘truth’ is something

akin to the Heideggerian distinction between truth as correspondence, the agreement
(confirmation or disconfirmation) between propositions and States of affairs, and a more
elementary form of truth as disclosure which is simply the display of a state of affairs, and

97 Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel: 1396.5 f.: ’od gsal ba ’i ye shes de la ’khor ba kun rdzob pa i snang ba sprin dang dra bas
reg pa med pas ’khrul par snang ba tsam du ’ang ma grub\ |de ma grub pa na\ \snang tshod stong nyid du gzhal ba i
don dam ma grub\ \de gnyis ma grub pas grub mthas gzhal ba ’i bden gnyis kyi dbye ba gang du ang grub pa med\
Ide med pas blos bden rdzun du sgro btags pa ’i bden gnyis las ’das te spros pa thams cad zhi ba di ni\ \btags pa i
bden pa ma grub pas kyang bden pa dbyer med ces brjod la\ | kun rdzob tu grub pa dang don dam du ma grub par
brjod du medpas\ \dbyings ’od gsal b a ’i ye shes ni\ \lhun grub rnam dag chen po zhes brjod kyang\ |grub mthar
grags pa ’i snang stong dbyer gnyis Ita bur med pas kyang bden pa dbyer med ces bya bar brjod pa yin te\ \
therefore the condition of possibility of propositional truth.298 For Klong chen pa, the shift in
perspective conceming truth coincides with the transition from representational thinking to
primordial knowing. From a disclosive standpoint, ‘emptiness’ is not in the first instance a
deductively formulated account of a state of affairs but describes the prepredicative display
of a state of affairs before its being channeled through the categories of representational
thinking and reified as this or that. Hence the emphasis on the indivisibility of presence and
emptiness.

Now, the roots of the rDzogs chen rejection of what is sometimes called an exclusive
or sheer emptiness (stong nyid rkyang ma) can be traced to early discourses on
nonconceptuality, as epitomized in one of the oldest rDzogs chen texts, the six-line Rig p a ’i
khu byug. The middle two lines of this text state:

Though the way things real ly are is nonconceptual,

It is ‘all good’ [Samantabhadra] and shines forth in [all] aspects.299

A commentary on this text in the bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa300 interprets these lines as
confirming- that the basic nature of phenomena is indeed nonconceptual and therefore

298 In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962: 218 f.) famously distinguishes the traditional Âristotelian conception of
truth as correspondence, i.e. the agreement between thought and thing (adequatio intellectus et rei), from a deeper
sense of truth as disclosure (ancient Greek aletheia, ‘unconcealment’), the original Clearing or opening onto a world
that makes any knowing o f things qua things possible. Heidegger significantly shifts the locus o f truth from the
thought, belief or Statement to the original disclosure-discovering of what shows itself. It is important to recognize
that in doing so Heidegger did not question the validity of the claim that propositional truth (or ‘correctness’as he
sometimes called it) consists in the correspondence between our beliefs or utterances and States o f affairs. What he
did criticize was the way in which such correspondence is typically construed as an agreement between
representations and objects, the assumption underlying all mediational epistemologies. Heidegger’s notion of
disclosure/unconcealment was not intended to replace or revise propositional truth but rather to articulate the
condition of its possibility. ln taking his account o f unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions
to correspond to the world, Heidegger made unconcealment the ground o f propositional truth. In his essay “Moira,”
Heidegger (1975: 97 f.) writes: ‘T he essence o f aletheia remains veiled. The visibility it bestows allows the
presencing of what is present to arise as outer appearance [Aussehen] (eidos) and aspect [Gesicht] (idea).
Consequently, the perceptual relation to the presencing o f what is present is defined as ‘seeing’ (eidenai). Stamped
with this character o f vision, knowledge and the evidence o f knowledge cannot renounce their essential derivation
from luminous disclosure, even where truth has been transformed into the certainty o f self-consciousness. Lumen
naturale, natural light, i.e., the illumination of reason, already presupposes the disclosure of the duality [i.e., of the
presencing o f what is present]. The same holds true of the Augustinian and medieval views of light - not to mention
their Platonic origins - which could only develop under the tutelage of an Aletheia already reigning in the destiny o f
the duality.”
299IOL 647 Ch.73-111-20 [29]: fol. la .l: j i bzhin pa zhes myi rtog kyang\ \rnam par snang mdzad kun tu bzang\\
Note that although rnam par snang mdzad is also the Tibetan translation o f ‘Vairocana’, central deity o f the five
buddha families, the commentaries only interpret it literally as “the shining forth of aspects”, whereas kun tu bzang
explicitly refers to Samantabhadra, the central deity in the emerging rDzogs chen system.
 inaccessible to transitive-ideational forms of meditation. It goes on to state, however, that
this suchness “is declared to ‘shine forth in all aspects’ in order to to show that this is not
like the ‘freedom from elaboration’ (nisprapañca : spros bral) of the incompatible
Madhyamaka [system].”301 The Madhyamaka system mentioned here must be the
*Svätantrika-Madhyamaka that had been introduced to Tibet in the eighth Century by
Säntaraksita and further promoted by his disciple Kamalaśīla. It is not yet the *Prāsańgika
Madhyamaka tradition of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that increasingly comes to prominence
in the classical period. So it is interesting that Klong chen pa will later draw a similar
contrast between rDzogs chen and the *Prāsańgika Madhyamaka in his mature Chos dbying
mdzod '’grel, this despite his explicit endorsement of the latter's philosophy:

The methods of evaluating reality employed by this tradition of natural Great

Perfection - such as the freedom from discursive elaborations (nisprapañcà) - are
largely in accord with the *Prāsańgika Madhyamaka. That said, the Madhyamaka
takes as its ground the deduction that things are completely empty (stong stong po)
like space. Here, on the other hand, we take open awareness alone as the ground, just
as it nakedly reveals itself in its original purity, unceasing yet not established [as
anything]. On this basis, we evaluate this [awareness] and all the phenomena
manifesting within its ränge to be free from limitations like space.302

Underlying the persistent rDzogs chen critique of taking emptiness as an end in itself
is an affirmation of the basic dynamism and fecundity of lived experience (rig pa) that is
disclosed to the extent that the abstractions and reifications that distort and conceal it have
subsided. The main point can be expressed in this way: when all that is added to life by way
of superimpositions and elaborations is stripped away, what remains is not simply neutral or
merely empty (stong nyid rkyang ma) but emphatically positive (kun tu bzang po).

NyKs vol. 103: 327 f.. Unfortunately, most of the commentaries on the early Sems sde works contained in the
bKa ma collections provide no information on authorship or place o f composition. One exception is the rTse mo
byung rgyal ’g rel pa that is ascribed to gNubs chen (and is intringuingly similar in language and content to the Rig
pa khu byug gi ’g rel pa and some o f the other commentaries). A close philological, historical and thematic analysis
o f this commentarial literature would greatly improve our understanding of the early development of rDzogs chen.
NyKs vol. 103: 333.6 f.: mi mthun pa ’i dbu ma ’i spros bral Ita bu ma yin par ston pa ’i phyir] \mam par snang
mdzad zhes pa\ |
Chos dbyings mdzod ’g rel 322.4 f.: rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po ’di ’i lugs kyis mtha ’ bral la sogs pa ’i ’ja l tshul
phal cher\ |dbu ma thal ’g yur dang mtshungs pa las\ \dbu mar stong stong po nam mkha’ ’dra ba rtsis gzhir byed
pa\ I dir rig pa ka nas dag pa rjen zang nge ba ma grub la mi ’g ag pa tsam de la gzhir byas nas\ | de dang d e ’i
ngang las shar ba ’i chos rnams mtha ’grol nam mkha ’ Itar ’ja l ba ste11...
Primordial knowing is characterized as being both empty and luminous (stong gsal dbyer
med). In later formulations, it is held to be originally pure (ka dag) in being devoid of any
trace of substances and attributes yet spontaneously present (Ihun grub) in being naturally
replete with all positive qualities and capacities. It is further characterized as being
compassionately responsive (thugs rje) in an all-pervasive (kun khyab) manner.

This last point resonates, in interesting ways, with Heidegger’s insight in Being and
Time that human life has, at its most fundamental level of world-comportment, a care
structure that is common to all our ways of being human.303 Stated otherwise, things and
beings, ourselves included, fundamentally matter to us; we have a stäke in being (and
belonging) and live, to a large extent, in light of our future possibilities. We can conclude
this discussion by simply noting, without further elaboration, the momentous ethical
implications of this insight. If caring, altruistic behaviour is in the first instance a matter of
who we are rather than how we ought to act, then it is to the constitutive structures of human
existence and not to prescriptive forms of reasoning that we should tum to discover its
sources. In this regard, the rDzogs chen analysis of primordial knowing is at the same time a
clarification of the existential foundations of ethics.

In this chapter, my philosophical task has been to show that the historical
development of rDzogs chen was characterized from the outset by a pervasive and persistent
emphasis on primordial awareness as the indispensable precondition and goal of its
doctrines and practices. But this leads unavoidably to questions of evidence and legitimacy:
on what basis can this mode of awareness be verified and accorded primacy, especially in
view of its notoriously inconspicuous and elusive character? Also, why and how should it be
distinguished from much of what is customarily associated with mind reflection,
representation, ideation and the like? Such vexing questions appear to have increasingly
taken on the Status of exigencies for rNying ma scholars in the classical period in the face of

303 See Heidegger 1952: 225 f.. See also Dreyfus 1991: 238 f.. This care structure is linked with the predominantly
futural orientation of human existence. We live always in light o f future possibilities. This anticipatory structure of
lived temporality carries the implication that our orientation to the world, our self-understandings and our
relationships to the things and beings around us, are all guided by an awareness o f potentiality as much as actuality.
It would be interesting to consider buddha nature theories in this light.
growing criticisms leveled by opponents of the ascendant gSar ma traditions. It is to some of
these scholars’ more cogent and illuminating responses that we now tum our attention.
3 I Classical Justifications of the Mind/Primordial Knowing Distinction

This chapter looks at some of the key arguments that have been used to justify and
defend the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes). Of
particular interest are those adumbrated by Klong chen rab ’byams pa in a number of his
treatises, commentaries and poetic works. In a wide ränge of doctrinal contexts, Klong chen
pa will argue that the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine becomes incoherent in theory and
amiss in practice when one fails to recognize the primacy of a primordial mode of
awareness and to unequivocally distinguish it from dualistic mind. This chapter will first
examine some of his arguments used to convince his audience of the acceptability of such a
distinction in light of theoretical and practical drawbacks of not recognizing it. It will then
focus on two types of transcendental argument (of the general form ‘for y to be possible x
must be the case’) that Klong chen pa repeatedly invokes to show that the mind/primordial
knowing distinction was not only tacitly presupposed in Indian Buddhist soteriology but
was, in fact, indispensable for making sense of the path and goal-realization.

§ 1. Why the Distinction?

Why does Klong chen pa consider the mind/primordial knowing distinction so

crucial for the understanding and practice of Buddhism in general, and of rDzogs chen in
particular? In arguing for the validity and relevance of a radical distinction between
conditioned and unconditioned modes of awareness, the author delineates certain theoretical
and practical drawbacks of not allowing for such a distinction. One theoretical consequence
is a failure to recognize mind’s obscurational and obstructive nature. This is the target of an
argument advanced in Klong chen pa’s Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan (Reply to Questions
Conceming Mind and Primordial knowing), a short treatise written in response to questions
posed by his disciple and biographer Chos grags bzang po (14th Century).304 Klong chen pa
there addresses an Opponent who fails to distinguish bodhicitta generated by an aspiring
bodhisattva from bodhicitta understood as the goal of such aspiration. In the relevant

304 For an annotated translation and critical edition of this text see “Texts and Translations”: 273-99.
passage305, Klong chen pa’s Opponent deems it untenable to maintain that mind and mental
factors are obscurations on the basis of two considerations: (1) because one generates the
mind of awakening (byang chub sems : bodhicitta) and (2) because Mind itself (sems nyid) is
held to be one’s spiritual potential (khams). The gist of his objection is this: if mind is
indeed obscurational, why would any Buddhist whose goal it is to be freed from
obscurations, want to cultivate or realize it? Klong chen pa sees this objection as
symptomatic of the general failure to distinguish conditioned dualistic mind (sems) from
unconditioned Mind itself (sems nyid). Taking each point in tum, he States:

[A] With regard to ‘producing the mind’ [of awakening], is this not also a
conceptualizing that involves accepting [some things] and rejecting [others] in the
context of samsära [and hence obscured]? If so, it would ultimately have to cease.
[B] But if one were to speak about Mind itself [in this way] then this would be
inappropriate because it cannot be established given that there is neither produced
nor producer [i.e. no causality].306

On Klong chen pa’s understanding of the issue, the failure to distinguish mind and
Mind itself, or what are traditionally called conventional and ultimate bodhicitta, constitutes
a version of what Gilbert Ryle called a ‘category mistake’307, talking of something in terms
appropriate to something of a radically different kind. In the case of generating bodhicitta,
the Opponent has wrongly ascribed characteristics associated with dualistic mind (sems)
conceptualization, acceptance and rejection, causal efficacy - to Mind itself (sems nyid), an
originary nonconceptual mode of awareness that cannot be established in terms of causal
production. He has confused the process of awakening with its goal and therefore fails to
see mind as obscurational. For Klong chen pa, this category mistake stems from a lack of
conceptual precision and signals a need to properly formulate the requisite distinction:
It seems [here] that one has not properly distinguished between mind (sems) and
Mind itself (sems nyid). Since ‘mind’ involves conceptual and analytic factors of
mind-streams belonging to the three realms, it is that which grasps erroneous
superimposed aspects together with the all-ground [comprising] the eightfold
cognitive ensemble. As the Satyadvayavibhańga maintains:

For full passage, see under “Texts and Translations”: 278 f..
Sems dangye shes kyi dris lan, 382.6 f.. See below 278.
307 Ryle 1949: 17.
 ‘Conceptualization’ consists of mind and mental factors
Having superimposed aspects that constitute the three realms.308

‘Mind itself’ is luminous primordial knowing, the tathägatagarbha. Thus it is when

mind ceases or no longer functions that Mind itself, luminous primordial knowing,
shines forth as personally realized intuitive awareness. As the
Astasãhasrikaprajñãpãramitã [5b. 1-2] States:

That Mind is not [dualistic] mind; Mind’s nature is luminous.309

[Objection:] But doesn’t great Mind (sems chen po) exist on the level of
buddhahood?
[Reply:] This refers to great primordial knowing (ye shes chen po). It agrees
completely with descriptions of the ‘great passions’ as [expressions of] primordial
knowing that are found in the tantras. In short, mind together with its mental factors
belonging to the three realms and subject to latent tendencies transmitted since
beginningless time are shown to have the two obscurations [intellectual and
emotional] as their nature and to be produced. And thus they are explained as
something to be eliminated and that must be stopped.310

In his later Theg mchog mdzod, Klong chen pa tums his critique on those who follow
canonical distinctions between mind and primordial knowing yet proceed to take mind as
ground, path and goal where path (lam) is understood as a linear succession of causes and
effects (with the two accumulations as ‘causes’) from a starting point (gzhi) toward a pre-
established telos ( ’bras bu). That they do so “in the context of an exoteric vehicle concemed

308 Full title: Satyadvayavibhahgakarika. Tib. Bden pa gnyis rnam par ’byedpa ’i tshig le ’ur byas pa, in D no. 3881,
dbu ma, vol. SA: 2.1. For English translation, see Eckel 1987.
309 As noted previously (79, n. 197), this passage is often cited by Klong chen pa as scriptural support for the
sems/sems nyid distinction. The author interprets the first occurrence o f sems (“that mind”, sems de or the less
accurate sems la in the version at his disposal) as a reference to Mind itself (sems nyid) and the second occurrence as
a reference to dualistic mind (sems). Although the sötra itself does not offer any clear terminological distinction of
this kind but simply reads tathä hi tac cittam acittam (see below 311 n. 754 for context), Klong chen pa may have
based his interpretation on the commentary o f Ratnākaraśānti (Astasãhasrika-prajñāpāramitāpañjīkā D: fol. 18a)
where the nondual mind of bodhisattvas is claimed to be distinctly superior to the minds of sentient beings which are
not free from duality and adventious factors such as attachment: de ’i phyir byang chub sems dpa ’ rnams kyi sems ni
sems can thams cad las khyad par du ’p hags pa yod par ’dod de| | des kyang rlom sems su mi byed na tha mal pa ’i
sems kyis Ita smos kyang ci dgos zhes bya ba ’i don ci dgos zhes bya ba ’i don to\ |de ci ’i slad du zhe na\ \zhes bya ba
ni rnam pa gang gis de la rlom sems med pa yin zhe na\ \ ’di Itar zhes bya ba la sogs pas lan smras so\ Isems de ni
sems ma mchis pa zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang ’dzin pa gnyis la de mi snang ba ’i phyir ro\ \gal te sems med na ’on
kyang de sems kvi ran£ bzhin ni ’od ssal ba zhes smos so| [/'/ Itar ’od gsal ba yin zhe na\ \gang gi phyir sems ni ’dod
chags la sogs pa dang dang po nas mi Idan pa yin te\ \de dag ni rang bzhin gyis glo bur ba yin pa ’i phyir ro\ \de
nyid kyi phyir phyis kyang bral ba med do\\
3,0 Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan: 383.2 f.. See critical edition under “Texts and Translations”.
with objective references” reflects their inability to escape from the grip of representational
thinking. Construing the path as an objective framework into which the individual must
somehow fit himself precludes recovering the pre-representational space of freedom in
which such objectifications have fallen away:
Also, as for fools who do not know how to distinguish between mind and Mind itself,
they are just blatantly arrogant people who pride themselves in knowing the canon.
Thus, having properly distinguished mind and primordial knowing, they nonetheless
proceed to take mind as the ground, path and goal in the context of an exoteric
vehicle concemed with objective references; but they all fail to discover what these
[three] are all about. So in this [rDzogs chen] vehicle, we are swiftly free from
samsära because we posit that primordial knowing is ground, path and goal of
buddhahood. For those others who hope for spiritual awakening from what is
fundamental ly samsära, it is difficult for them to attain it even after a long time
because of their confusion about how to construe the ground. As the Kun tu bzang po
thugs kyi me long [Ati vol. 1, 258.4] declares:

Those who claim buddhahood derives from mind deviate from me!311

§2. Some Consequences of Not Distinguishing Mind and Primordial knowing

The rDzogs chen sNying thig tantras and their commentaries repeatedly stress the
drawbacks of not recognizing this distinction. A case in point is a section in the sixty-ninth
chapter of the Rig pa rang shar entitled “Invalidating All Points of Disputation” (rgol ba
thams cad sun ’byin pa). The relevant passage advances a series of arguments in defence of
the distinction between mind and primordial knowing that are cast in the form of “a
dialogue with open awareness involving logical debate that summarizes the contradictions in
[considering these] two to be identical”.312 This passage, presented as a kind of primer for
defending the validity of the distinction in the context of logical debate, begins as follows:

Conceming the Claims of certain people,

[Some] claim that goal-realization is to be sought in mind.
This [claim] may be countered as follows.
“To what extent is mind a real entity?”
They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“Given that nothing entitative exists in the mind.
“Well then, [we say] what are the defining characteristics of mind?”

Theg mchog mdzod: 1044.1 f.. See edited text under “Texts and Translations”
Tshig don mdzod 928.4 f.: gnyis geig pa la ’g al bsdud pa 7 rig pa dri lan rgal rtsod dang bcas par gsungs p a \...
 They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“The characteristic of mind is the basic nature (chos nyid)”
You can counter this by stating:313
“Given that nothing entitative exists in the mind,
Do subject and object exist within its basic nature or not?”
In response to this question they may elaborate:314
“How could the subject object duality exist in the basic nature?
For example, it is like the characteristics of space
Because subject and object do not exist [therein].”
You may then respond with these words:
“Do subject and object exist in mind or not?”
They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“Although subject and object are present in mind,
Its basic nature is without subject and object.”
You may then utter the following response:
“You thereby violate your previous thesis:
Why? Because mind and its basic nature were [deemed] identical.
If subject and object occur in mind,
Then one could not discover buddhahood by striving for it.
Why? Because subject and object exist in mind.”315

In this dialogue (similar in form to a Socratic elenchus or argument of refutation), the

Opponent in the debate is forced to accept, on the basis of his own presuppositions,
conclusions at odds with his own original beliefs. Here the Opponent assumes an identity
between mind and its basic nature and on this basis asserts that goal-realization is to be
sought in or by means of mind. Through an interrogation of the absurd and undesirable
implications of these presuppositions, he is led to accept that the mind’s characteristic
subject/object structure makes it radically distinct from, and parasitic on, its fundamental
nondual nature and therefore unable to serve as a basis for realizing this nature.

The failure to differentiate mind and primordial knowing lends itself to two basic
kinds of erroneous premise that are identified and criticized by Klong chen: (1) that mind is

3.3 I have inserted two lines that occur in Tb though not in Tk, Ati, Theg mchog mdzod or Tshig don mdzod. These
additional lines are integral to the debate and make the argument more intelligible. See critical edition under “Texts
and Translations”.
3.4 These two lines occur in Tb and T k... but not in Theg mchog mdzod.
3.5 Ati vol. 1: 730.6 f.; Tk vol. 10: 241.5 f.; Tb vol. 11: 588.7 f.. See edited text under Theg mchog mdzod section of
“Texts and Translations”
 unceasing and (2) that cessation of mind (cittanirodha : sems *gog pa)316 is possible but
results in a blank state utterly devoid of cognition. Each of these general premises will in
tum lead to certain contemplative pitfalls. (1) The claim that mind is unceasing, that
conceptualization continues inexorably, rests on a failure to distinguish Mind itself from its
nominalizing and reifying operations. Klong chen pa sees it as a failure, in
phenomenological terms, to distinguish reflective-thematic and prereflective non-thematic
modes of intentional awareness, one that leads to the incorrect view that all conscious
experience is conceptual through and through, that all understanding involves using
concepts to make sense of things. This kind of view, long presupposed in many Western and
Eastem epistemologies, assumes (to quote Hubert Dreyfus) “that there is only one kind of
intelligibility, the unified understanding we have of things when we make judgements that
objectify our experience by bringing it under concepts.” 3,7 Klong chen pa is clearly opposed
to such a position and suggests, in his Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, that the kind of intelligibility
based on conceptual judgement presupposes another kind of intelligibility already implicit
in our most basic nonconceptual interaction with things and beings around us:
Those who are [partially] blinded by the myodesopsiam of ignorance [and] who
claim that mind is unceasing are confused. While objects are present in sensory
perception even during meditative composure, the cognitive capacity involved in
conceptualization and analysis nonetheless ceases... In brief, “mind and mental
factors” refer to the arising of conceptualization and analysis of objects that is
ostensibly causally produced by the subject-object [dichotomy]. “Primordial
knowing” refers to a [simple] object awareness in which the subject-object
dichotomy has completely subsided.319

For an illuminating study o f cessation o f mind (cittanirodha) doctrines in Indian Buddhism with particular
attention to Abhidharma and Yogācāra meditative Systems, see Griffiths 1991. There has not yet been a study o f
such doctrines in Madhyamaka, tantric or indigenous Tibetan contemplative Systems though such a study would be
of considerable interest.
Hubert Dreyfus, “Introduction I” in Todes 2001: xv.
318
Rab rib (Skt. timira) is often, though incorrectly, translated as cataracts or glaucoma. It seems rather to describe
an optic condition known as myodesopsia, more commonly known as “floaters”. In those afflicted, deposits of
varying size, shape and consistency within the vitreous humour cause them to perceive hair-like floaters (often what
look like falling hairs) in the visual field.
319
Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel: 132.5 f.: de la mi shes p a ’i rab rib kyis Idongs pa dag\ \sems mi ’g ag par ’d o d pa ni
rmongs pa ste\ \ ’di Itar mnyam par bzhag pa ’i tshe na ’ang dbang shes la yul snang yang rtog dpyod kyi shes pa
gog steI... mdor na gzung ’dzin mngon du rgyus bskyedpa ’i yul la rtog dpyod du skyes pa ni sems sems byung zhes
ya la\ \gzung ’dzin nye bar zhi bas yul rig pa ni ye shes zhes bya ste\ \
 (2) A corrollary of the view that dualistic mind is unceasing is the view that the
cessation of mind is possible but leads to a state devoid of all consciousness. This follows
logically, for if all conscious activity is conceptual and if conceptual knowledge is our only
source of intelligibility, its disruption must result in an unconscious state.320 One
consequence of this view is to espouse cognitive nihilism and take a sheer emptiness - “a
state devoid of anything whatsoever” - as the basis of contemplation. But basing one’s path
on a sheer voidness devoid of anything whatsoever, as Klong chen pa contends in his Sems
ye dris lan, proves self-stultifying: instead of eliciting the inbom qualities (yon tan) inherent
in one’s natural condition, it leads to their suppression or negation, a condition akin to the
early Buddhist attainment of an unconscious but still mundane formless meditation that is
the very antithesis of existential disclosure:

Thus we have ascertained by way of the view (Ita ba) that primordial knowing in its
luminosity constitutes the ever-present ground of being. These days, most ‘spiritual
friends’ and all ‘great meditators’ are in agreement in taking an utter emptiness
devoid of anything whatsover as the ground. This does not agree with the import of
Buddhist discourses [of the third tuming] that are of quintessential meaning. The
goal, i.e. buddhahood endowed with all inbom qualities, does not arise by virtue of
experiencing a ground that is simply nothing at all. [Why?] Because the three aspects
of ground, path and goal are misconstrued and because buddhahood being an
actualization of the goal of emancipation is unconditioned and endowed with
spontaneously present qualities. Therefore, these [views] and the view of the peak of
worldly existence321 would seem to be the same.322

This passage suggests why Klong chen pa will consider the recognition of one’s
existential condition (yin lugs) understood as a spiritual affiliation (rigs : gotra) or spiritual
potential (khams : dhätu) - the focal point of sütras of the third tuming - to be of central
importance. The sense that one has hidden depths, that somewhere - in some activity or
condition - lies a fullness and richness awaiting discovery seems central to Buddhist

320 See Fasching 2008 for an account of Hindu Yoga interpretations of cittanirodha as not involving a total cessation
o f cognitive functioning. “One would expect that to be cognitively inactive in this way is to be in a quite dull, if not
almost unconscious, state. The suprising fact is that the opposite is the case, it is a state o f being wide-
awake...Consciousness is precisely what meditation is all about: The task is to remain fully awake while letting all
intentional activity come to a halt (meditation means to inhibit everything but being conscious), one is simply
conscious without doing much eise.” (465)
321 On ‘peak o f worldly existence’ (bhavägra : srid rtse), see below 276 n. 643 and corresponding passage in critical
edition o f Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan under “Texts and Translations”
322 Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan: 380.3 f.. See critical edition under “Texts and Translations”.
soteriology, just as it was to the Buddha’s own circuitous quest.323 To construe fulfillment in
purely negative terms, as an absence of suffering, of emotionality and discursiveness, as
absence per se, is clearly only part of the picture and may, if taken as an end in itself, lead to
the negation of spiritual awakening. The question becomes whether the immediacy of
prethematized experience is mute or meaningful. Klong chen pa’s arguments for the
primacy of primordial knowing go hand in hand with the recognition of a depth dimension
of experience - as part of an integral approach that makes room for a sense of fulIness as
well as emptiness.

§3. Criticisms of the Cessation of Jñãna Doctrine

Another related position that Klong chen pa attributes to the lack of clear
differentiation betw eensems and ye shes consists in the thesis that all knowledge (jñãna : ye
shes) ceases to exist on the level of buddhahood.324 This position is advanced in a number of

323 My use o f ‘fullness’ here is not merely provocative. I employ it as a shorthand term for a large family o f rDzogs
chen technical terms - among them ye shes rtsal rdzogs, gzhi ’i yon tan, rang bzhin Ihun grub, and rdzogs pa chen po
itself - that describe a condition o f abundance, richness and fecundity toward which one aspires that becomes
explicit by way of realizing emptiness, the absence of all reification. It should be noted that the Creative
juxtaposition o f negative (apophantic) and positive (cataphatic) modes o f discourse is central to the rDzogs chen
characterization o f reality as the indivisibility o f emptiness (stong) and presence (snang), of primal purity (ka dag)
and spontaneity (Ihun grub). The emptiness/fullness dialectic is crucial to Klong chen pa’s understanding goal-
realization as a Clearing process - the dissipation (sangs) o f obscuring factors and concurrent expansion (rgyas) of
inbom capabilities (yon tan). This dialectic can be traced through many scriptural traditions of Indian Buddhism
including the tantras, siddha works and Mahāyāna sūtras o f the third tuming. A striking example is the paradoxical
formulation ‘emptiness endowed with all excellent aspects’ (Skt. sarvākãravaropetã śūnyatā : Tib. rnam pa kun gyi
mchog Idan pa ’i stong pa nyid) found in the Ratnagotravibhãga 1.92 which occupies an important place in non-
gradual Mahāmudrā teachings of the Tibetan bKa’ brgyud traditions (especially the Stod ’brug lineages) as well as
in later rNying ma exegesis. On this term in bKa’ brgyud (’Brug pa) exegesis, see Yang dgon pa’s Ri chos Yon tan
kun byung gi Ihan thabs chen mo (Yang dgon gsung ’bum vol. 3): 64.5; ’Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang’s Ngo
sprod bdun m a'i 'grel p a Man ngag rin po che'i sgron me: 276.4 and Padma dkar po’s Phyag chen gan mdzod,
67,78,103,110 etc. Among rNying ma interpretations o f the term, see Mi pham ’Jam dbyangs rgya mtsho’s gNyug
sems zur dpyad skor gyi gsung sgros thor bu rnams Phyogs geig tu bsdus pa rDo rje rin po che ’i phreng ba where
he repudiates the dGe lugs pa understanding o f the term as an explicit, non-affirming negation (med dgag) (687.5 f.)
or sheer nothingness (stong rkyang) (701.3).
24 A detailed historical and doctrinal analysis o f this Indo-Tibetan controversy with emphasis on clarifying Rong
zom Chos kyi bzang po’s position is offered by Almogi 2009. While Rong zom pa clearly denies the existence of
any cognitive element in the experience of buddhahood, he nonetheless elsewhere describes self-occurring
primordial knowing (rang byung gi ye shes) as being synonymous with purified dharmadhätu, the only constituent
(chos) o f buddhahood on his account. Rong zom pa’s diplomatic disinclination to categorically deny the existence of
primordial knowing - “Because a buddha’s jñānas are inconceivable, we do not commit the offense o f rejecting
them.” - influenced later attempts by Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912) to align Rong zom’s position with the
classical rNying ma espousal of primordial knowing by contending that the latter only excluded extrinsic primordial
knowing (gzhan byung gi ye shes) from the level of buddhahood but not self-occumng primordial knowing (rang
byung g iy e shes). This interpretation, as Almogi notes, downplays Rong zom pa’s explicit rejection of any cognitive
8th to 9th Century Indian Madhyamaka texts and appears to have been a hotly debated
polemical issue up until the demise of Buddhism in India. It was taken up by Tibetan
Buddhist scholars from at least as early as the late 8th Century and has been vigorously
defended or criticized by representatives of various schools to the present day.325
There was a semantic component of this controversy that we have had occasion to
take note of previously, namely, that the Sanskrit term jñāna possessed many different, and
sometimes divergent, connotations. We may recall gTsug lag ’phreng ba’s (1503/4-1566)
observations that jñãna could refer, on the one hand, to the consciousness (vijñāno) of a
sentient being and, on the other hand, to the primordial knowing (jñāna) of a realized being,
and also that the early Tibetan translators therefore deemed it necessary to render it by
different Tibetan terms (shes pa, mam shes, ye shes) according to context. As gTsug lag
notes, “when mam shes and ye shes are distinguished [in the Tibetan language], the
subject/object-oriented mind that should be purified [is explained by the term]
‘consciousness’ (mam shes) whereas the naturally luminous nature of phenomena ( ’od gsal
b a ’i chos nyid) is explained by the term ‘primordial knowing’ (ye shesy\326 In this regard, it
was partly due to this semantic ambivalence of the term jñāna and partly due to the all-too
human proclivity to attribute characteristics of human cognition to the transcendent
realization of a buddha that the Indian *Prāsańgika-Madhyamaka philosophers found it
expedient to baldly declare that a buddha has no jñāna, though gTsug lag adds that this view
did not preclude a positive appraisal of goal-realization: “Thus, the classical scriptures of
the profound view explain that even jñãna does not exist in order to demolish [any] clinging
to perceptual cognition being established as jñãna, but they did not [thereby] teach that the

factor in the dharmadhätu which he also terms self-occurring primordial knowing, clearly following a certain Indian
tradition represented by Dharmamitra (see Almogi 2009: 211). “The crucial difference...is that for Rong-zom-pa,
self-occurring primordial knowing is not a cognitive phenomena in any sense o f the term, thus begging the question
why it is called gnosis in the first place, whereas for Mi-pham it is the ultimate valid cognition.” (Almogi 2009:
232). I am grateful to Dr. Almogi for additional clarifications of Rong zom pa’s position in personal
correspondence.
325 The issue is already discussed by the famous Tibetan translator Ye shes sde (second half o f Century to early 9,h
Century). For an account of various positions on the controversy as advocated by Indian and Tibetan scholars, see
Almogi 2009.
326 Byang chub sems dpa ’i spyod pa la ’ju g pa ’i rnam par bshad pa Theg chen chos kyi rgya mtsho Zab rgyas mtha ’
yas pa ’i snying po: 764.6 f.: rnam shes dang ye shes ’byedpa ’i tsheyang dag bya gzung ’dzin gyi sems la mam shes
dang rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba ’i chos nyid la ye shes kyi sgras bshad pa yin zhing ’di ni yod med la sogs pa sgro
skur gyi rnam pa gang du yang mi gnas pa ’i phyir ro\ \
 buddhahood revealed was some lifeless matter or emptiness as a sheer vacancy.”327 What
gTsug lag goes on to suggest is that the whole controversy over whether or not a buddha has
jñāna is misguided from the outset since the fundamental (and more interesting) problem is
to understand the complex nature and structure of this buddhajñãna itself: “the debate over
whether or not buddhas have jñãna is a biased way of thinking. From the standpoint of the
discriminating [jñãna] (pratyaveksana\jñãna\ : so sor rtog pa[’i ye shes]), they cannot be
imputed as not having it, while from the standpoint of the [jñãna of the] basic expanse
(dharmadhãtujñāna : chos dbying kyi ye shes)32S, they cannot be imputed as having it.329

As could be expected, Klong chen pa and other classical rNying ma scholars rejected
the position that a buddha has no jñāna on the grounds that it disregards a critical distinction
between consciousness per se (the event of self-presencing itself) and the reifying super-
impositions and elaborations that both prescind from it and objectify it. It is Klong chen pa’s
view that such an oversight leads adherents of this position to conclude, among other things,
that primordial knowing and the specific forms of knowledge arising from it derive from
ignorance, the source of reification, and are therefore abandoned when the reifications are
abandoned. Without differentiating knowledge grounded in nondual primordial knowing -
as exemplified by spontaneous altruism - from knowledge grounded in dualistic ignorance,
one risks throwing out the proverbial baby with the bath water.330 In his Grub mtha ’ mdzod,

Ibid.: 764.4 f.: de nas zab mo Ita ba 7 gzhung du ye shes tsam yang mi m nga’ bar bshadpa ni rnam rig pa ye shes
grub par ’dzin pa de gzhigpa 7 phyir bstan gyi sangs rgyas bems po ’am chad stong du ston pa ma yin la...
328
gTsug lag (ibid.: 697.3 f. , 761.1 f.) observes that sütras generally recognize four jñãnas that are inseparable from
the dharmadhätu (dbyings dang ye shes dbyer med pa) within the state o f enlightenment, whereas the tantras
explicitly present this dharmadhätu as a fifth jñāna. “In general, the Guhyamantra[yāna] explains five jñānas,
whereas the Lak§ana[yäna] explain four jñānas without applying the designation jñãna to the dharmadhätu. ..” Ibid.:
761.1: spyir gsang sngags su ye shes Ingar bshad cing mtshan nyid theg par chos kyi dbyings la ye shes kyi tha
snyad ma sbyar bar ye shes bzhir bshad pa... The author’s contention that the Buddhabhūmisūtra (D no. 275,
especially 37a.5 f.) represents one example o f a sütra that does recognize dharmadhätu as a fifth jñãna is not
convincingly demonstrated by his supporting quotations.
329
Ibid.: 764.7 f.: des na sangs rgyas la ye shes mnga ’ mi mnga ’ rtsodpa yang phyogs re ’i blo ste so sor rtogs pa ’i
ye shes kyi cha nas mi mnga ’ bar gdags su med la chos kyi dbyings kyi cha nas mnga ’ bar gdags su med...
330
A trenchant critique o f the cessation o f jñāna doctrine is presented by the Zur rNying ma scholar Ye shes rgyal
mtshan (b. 1395) in his Theg pa spyi beings rtsa ’g rel, a commentary on the Theg pa dgu’i spyi beings (KMsg vol.
58: 5-58) o f his early Kah thog predecessor (and founder o f Kah thog monastery) Dam pa bde gshegs (1122-1192).
Ye shes rgyal mtshan there identifies “proponents o f non-existence o f jñãnd" {ye shes med smra ba) as a subsect of
*Prāsańgikas who proclaim that jñāna no longer exists in the mental continuum at the time of buddhahood {sangs
rgyas dus su thugs rigs p a ’i ye shes med pa). See Theg pa d g u ’i spyi beings, 258.4 f. The gist of Ye shes rgyal
mtshan’s critique is that proponents o f non-existence o f jñāna collapse the distinction between conditioned and
Klong chcn pa casts his opponents’ position in terms of principles of entailment (vyäpti)
well known from south Asian epistemology in order to underscore the absurdities that
follow from it. If the position were true, he contends, not only would the entire gamut of
Buddhist discourses conceming spiritual awakening and its associated modes of ethical
knowledge and conduct become meaningless. More seriously, one would be cut off from the
vital source of meaning and fulfillment:

Some who profess to be Mädhyamikas [maintain that] since a buddha does not have
jñāna, there is no knowledge belonging to jñāna either. This is because knowable
objects are discursive elaborations, and he is free from these. It is also because open
awareness is [wrongly construed as] what is pervaded [by] ignorance in the sense
that by eliminating the pervader, ignorance, one also eliminates open awareness, the
pervaded...
Open awareness is the basis of ignorance, but not what is pervaded by it. It does not
follow, therefore, that by undermining ignorance, open awareness will be
undermined. It is like the foundation remaining even though the house has been
demolished. The dharmakäya of buddhahood is said to be made evident by open
awareness...

Although mind ceases, not only does primordial knowing not cease but it is ever-
present as the highest good. Otherwise, on what basis does mind cease? If one Claims
its functioning is interrupted - a [vacuous] state like space - this would be similar to
the Cārvāka [position].

unconditioned modes of awareness. “If by overcoming ma rig pa at the time of reaching the end of the paths and
levels, rig pa is also overcome, then [one is forced to] absurdly conclude that primordial knowing is o f the same
nature as the mind that is defilement”. Ibid. 255.20 f.: rgyun mtha ’i dus su ma rig pa log pas rig p a log na\ \dri ma
sems kyi rang bzhin du thal\\ According to Ye shes rgyal mtshan, this denial o f buddhajnäna amounts to a kind of
auto-refutation which undercuts the very ideas and ideals that defme Buddhist soteriology (often epitmomized as the
union of transcendent insight and altruistic conduct). This denial, he argues, has the unfortunate effect of depriving
such central Buddhist ideas as the two truths (bden gnyis), the two fulfilments (don gnyis) of oneself and others, and
a buddha’s spontaneous altruistic activity ( ’p hrin las) of the kind of transcendent knowledge which they in fact
presuppose. It is noteworthy that Ye shes rgyal mtshan’s views do not reflect those of earlier rNying ma scholars of
the Zur tradition (zug lugs) who, like Rong zom, were inclined to follow the more concilliatory distinction between
(1) foundational (rten bcas) accounts o f a buddha’s altruistic activity (mdzadpa) (e.g., Haribhadra, Zhang Shes rab
bla ma) accepting the existence o f jñãna (as a kind of working basis), (2) foundationless (rten med) accounts (e.g.,
Nāgāijuna, Rong zom pa) advocating the non-existence of jñãna, and (3) ‘naturalistic’ accounts (ngo bo nyid kyi
mdzad pa) (e.g., Srisimha, Zur chung Shes rab grags pa) that view altruistic activity as an expression of the
unceasing Creative energy (rtsal) inherent in the nature of reality itself. On these views according to Zur lugs and
Rong-Klong lugs scholars, see Almogi 2009, 195 f..
 Therefore, mind and mental factors subsumed under the all-ground and eightfold
ensemble [of cognitions] are brought to cessation on the basis of primordial knowing,
open awareness... Therefore the thesis that [a buddha] has jñãna is the correct one.331

Against those who deny the presence and primacy of primordial knowing, Klong
chen pa will argue, in his Theg mchog mdzod, that the complete cessation of ignorance (ma
rig pa), of which mind is an expression, results not in the dark abyss of a vegetative state
(what cognitive neuroscientists call absence-automatism) but in the realization of a more
originary, less conditioned mode of being and awareness:

Some ignorant people claim “when there is no mind, there is [a state] similar to being
inanimate (bems po) or in a stupor (mun pa)” but they have [evidently] leamed little:
even in the absence of mind, since primordial knowing is present, it is not the case
that open awareness [also] ceases. Moreover, through the cessation of ignorance,
one’s deluded mind, the sun of luminous primordial knowing dawns just as with the
fading of night comes the dawning of day.332

To further sharpen the distinction between mind and primordial knowing, Klong chen pa
will unequivocally declare that mind is precisely what distinguishes an ordinary sentient
being (sems can), literally a ‘minded being’, from a buddha (sangs rgyas). According to the
Theg mchog mdzod:

In this regard, the term “minded being” (sems can) means one that is endowed with,
i.e. has (can), that mind (sems) which obscures open awareness. Since this mind
collects karma, it is in error: it sets in motion the process of cyclical existence where
one blunders from one confused Situation to the next. This mind is divorced from
open awareness. When clarified to the point of purity and exhausting [all errancy],
one calls it buddha (sangs rgyas) because open awareness is then divested of

Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 991.5 f.: dbu ma par ’d o d pa kha cig sangs rgyas la ye shes medpas\ \ye shes kyi mkhyen
pa ang med de shes bya spros pa yin la\ \de dang bral ba ’i phyir dang\ | rig pa ma rig pa ’i khyab bya yin te\ \khyab
byed ma rig pa Idog pas khyab bya rig pa log pa ’i phyir] ... rig pa ma rig pa ’i rten yin gyi khab bya ma yin pas ma
rig pa log pas rig pa Idog par mi ’g yur te\ \khang pa zhig kyang sa gzhi gnas pa bzhin no\ \sangs rgyas pa ’i chos sku
rig pas mngon du yed par gsungs te\... sems ’g ags kyang y e shes ni mi ’g ag gi steng du ches bzang ba de rtag tu yod
d°I Igzhan du na sems gang gi steng du ’gags\ \ ’ju g pa rgyun chad nam mkha ’ Itar ’dod na rgyang ’p hen pa dang
mtshungs par ’g yur ro\ | des na sems sems byung kun gzhi tshogs brgyad kyis bsdus pa rig pa ye shes kyi steng du
gag par byed do\ ... ces gsungs pas ye shes yod par gsungs pa ’i phyogs ’os pa nyid do\ \
Theg mchog mdzod: 1041.4 f.. See edited text under “Texts and Translations”. Compare with ’Jigs med gling pa’s
(1729-1798) comments in Yon tan mdzod ’g rel pt. 4, in ’Jigs gling gsung ’bum vol. 4: 169.3 f.: grub pa i mtha
khyad par can ’di la phyogs sngar ’dzin cing blo yul du mi chud pa dag\ \sems med na bem po yin te\ |sems ’gags
dus rig pa ’ang ’g ag pa ’i phyir ro\ \zhes ’dod pa ni bdag cag gis bka ’i don dpyis phyin pa yang ma rig la Ita sgom
spyod pa sems las ’da ’ mi nus pas m am par shes pa ’i tshogs brgyad dang ma ’dres pa ’i chos nyid kyi gnas lugs ni
*na mthong ngo zhes dam ’cha ’ ba ste \ \sems med kyang sems nyid ’od gsal ba ’i ye shes yod pas rig pa ’i bdag nyid
gag pa ga la srid\\
 defilement. Therefore, the actual contaminated phenomena to be eliminated are
simply mind. As the Mu tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517] States:

When free from this mind, there is buddhahood.

The defilements of all embodied beings are then exhausted,
Animate beings are animated by this mind,
Without which there could be no animation.
Hence animate beings are similar to automatons.333

Klong chen pa and the tantra he quotes play off the meanings of two Standard
Tibetan terms for a living being: ‘minded being’ (sems can) and ‘animate being’ ( ’gro can) -
literally ‘having mind’ and ‘having movement’. But here the relation of ‘having’ is seen to
work both ways. To possess a mind is to be possessed by mind. A minded being is a mind-
govemed being. By extension, animate beings ostensibly possess movement - we can see
them move - but how they are animated remains unseen. Often, our sources suggest, they are
animated by, controlled by, mind. Mind is what drivesthe recurrent habitualpattems of
cyclical existence, the automatized routine of actions and reactions thatpropel beings
inexorably from one Situation to the next. It is in this sense that the Mu tig phreng ba refers
to human beings as automatons, self-operating machines ( ’khrul ’khor) animated by mind.
The simile poignantly captures the feeling human beings often have of losing control of, or
even being controlled by, their own randomly occurring thoughts. On this account, the
question is how to restore psychic autonomy, how to reclaim control over our minds and
lives. In the Chos dbyings mdzod 'grel, Klong chen pa States:

When open awareness is free from dualistic mind, since it is also, by implication,
free from mind’s distorted appearances, there is no ‘place to go’ apart from the
unique state of buddhahood. This is because the very essence that is buddhahood
becomes actualized through freedom from what obscures it. When open awareness is
associated with mind, it is called ‘mind-govemed being’ (sems can). When
dissociated from mind, it is called buddha.334

333 Theg mchog mdzod: 1039.3 f.. See edited text under “Texts and Translations”
334 Chos dbyings mdzod 'grel: 494 f.: rig pa sems dang bral dus sems kyi ’khrul snang dang zhar la bral bas\ \sangs
rgyas nyag geig las ’g ro sa med de \ \ngo bo sangs rgyas su yin pa de sgrib byed dang bral bas mngon du gyur ba ’i
phyir ro\ \rig pa la sems dang bcas dus sems can zer\ \sems dang bral dus sangs rgyas zer te\ \
§4. Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments

Central to Klong chen pa’s wide-ranging polemic against those who deny the
primacy of primordial knowing is the contention that they are denying something implicit in
and indispensable to their own soteriological frameworks. The arguments he adumbrates
can, I think, be usefully regarded as examples of transcendental argument.335 In a general
sense, a transcendental argument is one that begins from some indisputable aspect of
experience or discourse (y) and moves to a stronger conclusion that is understood as a
condition for its possibility (jc). It may be formulated as the claim that ‘for y to be possible, x
must be the case’. We can recognize in Klong chen pa’s arguments in support of the
mind/primordial knowing difference two general types of transcendental argument that have
been classified in recent works on the subject336: (1) a concept-directed type and (2) an
experience-directed or phenomenological type.

(1) Conceming the first of these: Klong chen pa will argue that the mind/primordial
knowing distinction is implicit in the entire soteriological framework underlying
Buddhist doxastic norms and practices. It is here that Klong chen pa invokes a
type of modest concept-directed or belief-directed transcendental argument which
may be formulated as follows: for y to be possible, x must be the case, where x
refers to some concept/belief which is claimed to be indispensable to some
framework of concepts/beliefs (y) and whose denial would result in self-
contradiction. The point here is that such self-contradiction undermines the entire
framework.

(2) Conceming the experience-directed argument, Klong chen pa will offer a

phenomenological account of primordial knowing and mind in the context of
articulating the conditions for the possibility of nondual experience as well as its
obscuration. Here, Klong chen pa uses an experience-directed transcendental
argument which may be formulated as follows: for y to be possible x must be the

The bulk o f the recent literature on transcendental arguments falls, not suprisingly, into two camps
epistemological and anti-epistemological - both of which are ultimately indebted to Kant. (1) The epistemological
camp, represented by Stroud 1968,1999 and Stern 1999,2000 etc. and drawing on analytic philosophers such as P.F.
Strawson, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, is largely concemed with assessing the validity o f transcendental
arguments in answering the skeptical challenge o f whether there is an independently existing extemal world. There
is broad consensus that such arguments have proved inconclusive in refuting skepticism. (2) The counter-
epistemological camp, represented by Taylor 1978-9, Rorty 1971, Guignon 1983 etc. draws attention to how
transcendental arguments (or what Rorty calls ‘parasitism’ arguments) have been applied by philosophers such as
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein to the task of overcoming epistemology by
helping show the subject/object picture on which it depends to derive from a largely unarticulated background of
everyday embodied agency with its repetoire o f mostly unthematized socialized practices and coping skills.
I have here adopted two o f the four types defined by Stern 2000: 10.
 case, where x refers to some implicit mode of experience which is claimed to be
indispensable to some more explicit, derivative, mode of experience (y) as the
condition of its possibility.

It is important to note that neither form of transcendental argument can teil us anything
conclusive about the ontological Status of the world but they do, by way of a chain of
indispensability Claims, allow for deeper understandings and articulations of lived
experience.

(1) Concept-directed transcendental arguments: The indispensability argument for

the mind/primordial knowing distinction takes as its point of departure the assumption that
spiritual awakening (bodhi), the realization of nondual primordial knowing, is a worthy and
achievable soteriological aim. This is, for any Buddhist, indubitable and beyond cavil.
Otherwise, there would be no point in talking about a Buddhist path or its fruition or
engaging in any of its practices. The idea of nondual primordial knowing is the conditio sine
qua non of Buddhist doxastic norms and practice; to deny it is to render vast regions of
Buddhist discourse about the path and its telos both unintelligible and pointless. Klong chen
pa provides a number of examples in the Theg mchog mdzod, of which the following
reference to the Yogācāra/tantric idea of fundamental transformation (gnas ’gyur : āśraya-
parāvrtti, °-parivrtt'i) serves our purpose:
Among esoteric scriptures, the Vajraśikharamahāguhyayogatantra337 explains
fundamental transformation (gnas 'gyur) in passages such as [the following]: “The
five elements of conscious perception are, in their pure state, the nature of the five
modes of primordial knowing.” If it were an entity ‘mind’ that realized buddhahood,
then [concepts such as] “what is to be purified” and “fundamental transformation”
would be quite pointless.338

Klong chen pa will extend this same argument to other Buddhist soteriological
models including, as we have seen, the “cessation of mind doctrinc”. In all these, Klong
chen pa argues, nondual primordial knowing is the point of the path, both in discourse and
praxis. Elsewhere in the Theg mchog mdzod, Klong chen pa contends that even the term ma
rig pa - ignorance or unawareness - does not make sense without the idea of rig pa. On this

337 P no. 0113: 162b2-301b8; D no. 0480: 274a5-274a5.

338 Theg mchog mdzod: 1046.3. See edited text under “Texts and Translations”
 account, rig pa constitutes the basis of the negation (dgag gzhi) in the negative term ma rig
pa. Thus, rig pa (vidya) is by definition a condition for the possibility of ma rig pa (avidyä)
by virtue of an asymmetrical entailment relation that cannot be reversed without resulting in
absurdity: “when mind ceases [is negated], then the basis [i.e. mind] along with its quality,
ma rig pa [ignorance], also ceases [is negated]. But rig pa [open awareness] does not cease
[is not negated]. Why? Because the basis of the negation [in the negative term ma rig pa] is
rig pa [open awareness]. If rig pa were also to be non-existent, then please consider: with
regard to what would there be a negation? Here by negating ma rig pa [ignorance] along
with its quality, sems [mind], rig pa [open awareness] unfolds as primordial knowing.”339

Klong chen pa will argue for the existence of primordial knowing in much the same
way that Nāgārjuna (MMK 24) argued for the indispensability of emptiness - i.e. the lack of
inherent, independent existence in phenomena - as a precondition for conditioned,
transitory, dependently risen, phenomena, the Buddhist path notwithstanding. To repudiate
emptiness on the grounds that, if true, it would render the path impossible is like sawing the
branch one sits upon or, following an analogy used by Nāgārjuna (MMK 24.15), like the
herdsman who accuses someone of stealing a horse, forgetting to count the one he himself is
riding on. The point here is that the hersdman’s accusation is misdirected - emptiness, the
lack of inherent existence, is a necessary condition for any kind of change, spiritual progress
and realization included. It is what the Opponent who argues against it must already assume
in order to even mount his argument!
(b) The second prong of Klong chen pa’s arguments draws on an experience-directed
transcendental argument that seeks to articulate primordial knowing as the implicit
condition for what derives, and deviates, from it. In clarifying the ‘primordiality’ of
primordial knowing, its primacy over dualistic mind, Klong chen pa will understand it as a
kind of background of relevance and intelligibility. His account is similar, in illuminating
ways, to the kind of transcendental derivations Martin Heidegger employs in Being and
Time to situate discursive operations such as reflecting, theorizing, deliberating, and

339
For the full argument as it is developed by Klong chen pa in his Theg mchog mdzod: 1042.1 f., the reader is
referred to “Texts and Translations”: 308 f..
explaining within a background understanding (what he sometimes called preunderstanding)
that pervades our primary engagement with the world.

Now clearly Klong chen pa was not initiating a ground-breaking assault on

epistemological foundations in the way Heidegger was, for this type of critique already had
a long history in Indian Buddhism, most devastatingly in the Madhyamaka philosophy. But
what is strikingly original in the works of Klong chen pa and his rDzogs chen sources is
how this retum to pretheoretical immediacy, this dedicative receptivity to the originally
unimpeded flux and fullness of lived experience, inspired a global reconfiguration of the
entire Buddhist path around the guiding topos of primordial knowing and its existential
disclosure. Soteriology is here seen as aletheiology - the understanding of truth as
unconcealment, elicited in contemplative praxis, articulated in concepts, and sustained by
the reciprocity between the two.

Experience-directed arguments about the conditions of possibility are carried in

rDzogs chen uses of the term ‘primordial’ (ye), as seen, for example, in glosses on the term
ye shes. ‘Primordial’ does not here mean temporally prior. Neither does it mean genetically
earlier or historically more primitive. What then is the primordiality that belongs to
primordial knowing? It characterizes an ever-present mode of comportment that comes
before, but also as a condition of, what derives and diverges from it (sems). It is what one
attends from when one attends to experience, before its becoming reflexively constituted as
a seif to whom experience is thought to belong. But primordiality also belongs to that o f
which primordial knowing is always and already aware. Klong chen pa clarifies this context-
content relation of primordiality in an elucidation of ye shes given in his Theg mchog mdzod:

1) The essence of primordial knowing abides primordially as the factor of knowing

that is personally realized intuitive awareness ...
2) The etymology [of primordial knowing] is the realization and understanding (shes
pa) of what has been there primordially (ye nas).340

Or as the author States in his Zab don snying po:

340 Theg mchog mdzod'. 1071.3 f.: ...ye shes kyi ngo bo ni so so rang gi rig pa ye nas mkhyen char gnas pa ste\...
nges tshig ni ye nas gnas pa ’i don rtogs shing shes pa ste\ \
 The reason for applying the term [ye shes] is as follows: it is primordial knowing (ye
shes) because it knows (shes pa) the ground as it is, [the ground] which is the
meaning of primordial (ye) .341

Needless to say, primordial knowing can only be fully realized in the absence of what
obstructs and obscures it. It is what remains when all that it is not the hypostates and
discursive elaborations of dualistic thought - has fallen away.

A final instance of Klong chen pa’s use of indispensability arguments taken from the
Theg mchog mdzod, one that combines concept-directed and experience-directed
formulations, concems the concept of sangs rgyas (Skt. buddha) and the experience it
describes. ‘Buddhahood’ is interpreted on the basis of the two components of the Tibetan
compound as a state in which all that obscures and obstructs awakening has cleared (sangs)
allowing for the unfolding or blossoming (rgyas) of inbom qualities. On this understanding,
sangs rgyas by definition implies the dissipation of dualistic mind as a precondition for the
full disclosure of primordial knowing. In terms of the experience-directed argument, the
modes of lived experience that enable us to speak of a ground of purification (dag gzhi),
something to be purified (dag bya), a process of purification (dag byed), and the goal of
purification (dag ’bras) in short, the entire aletheiological framework presuppose a
primordial condition of awareness as their background of salience and intelligibility. Now,
if this dependence relation were reversed such that buddhahood derives from mind,
buddhahood would be subject to the same qualifications as mind cognitive distortion,
dualism, transience and karmic conditioning. In the context of a section of the Theg mchog
mdzod dedicated to invalidating erroneous lines of thought (gol lugs) by means of reasoning,
Klong chen pa argues:

If you construe the triad of buddhahood, the path and goal as deriving from mind,
then because this very mind, the basis of [your] construal, is mingled with subject
and object, it logically follows that your ground, path and goal are entirely bound up
with subject and object as well. If so claimed, there is the absurd consequence that
one does not realize buddhahood and, even if one did, it would be of a perverse kind
given that it would not be free from subject and object. Further, just as mind amasses
a variety of latent tendencies and karma, it logically follows that ground, path and

341
Zab don snying po in Zab mo yang tig vol. 1: 453.4 f.: sgra 'jug pa 7 rgyu mtshan ni\ \ye yi don gzhiji bzhin pa i
shes pa yin pas na ye shes so| |
 goal do so as well. If so claimed, there is the fallacious consequence that these
[latter] are in error.

One could respond to this by arguing back [as follows]: If there were no mind, then
there could not be any buddhahood because of it either, for you too must accept that
buddha is characterized as having a mind that undergoes purification. Reply: It is not
the case that one is or isn’t a buddha by virtue of [dualistic] mind being present or
absent. But it is due to the presence or absence of primordial knowing belonging to
dharmakäya. Let us grant it true that one is characterized as a buddha (sangs rgyas)
by virtue of the errors of mind having been cleared away (sangs). But it is not
definitive [that buddhahood only implies a cleansed mind] because there is still
buddhahood that consists in the spontaneously present ground. Thus [this cleansed
mind] is not the actual true [buddhahood] either. And although that which should be
purified may have been cleared away (sangs), that [mind] to be purified which has
been cleared away is not [itself] the buddha. And thus buddhahood does not derive
from mind.342

Klong chen pa’s adversary views mind as a necessary condition for buddhahood,
with the implication that one can think or reason one’s way to enlightenment. But this
makes as little sense as saying that clouds are a necessary condition for a cloudless sky. It
elides the dividing line between what is cleared and what is revealed. From a rDzogs chen
perspective, mind is manifestly dualistic. As we have seen, its two modes, apprending
subject-oriented mind ( ’dzin pa yul can gyi sems) and apprehended object-oriented mind
(gzung ba yul gyi sems), together engender the sense we have of being a self-contained
subject over against the world as a totality of independently existing objects.

It should be clear from the foregoing arguments that the disclosure of primordial
knowing involves a quite radical departure from this customary dualistic mode of
apprehension, whether this occurs gradually as a progressive familiarization with what is at
first only dimly sensed, or abruptly in experiences which disrupt and break through “our
ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities and points of
reference.”343 Seen in this light, indispensability arguments play the propaedeutic role of
intimating the perpetual but elusive presence of primordial awareness while indicating its

342 Theg mchog mdzod: 1045.1 f.. See edited text under “Texts and Translations”.
343 Charles Taylor 2007: 5.
 radical distinctness from the habitual, and all this by way of preparation for engaging in the
varied rDzogs chen contemplative practices344 which aim at realizing it directly.

Our foregoing inquiry into the difference between unconditioned and conditioned
modes of awareness leads unavoidably to further questions conceming the constitutive
sources of moral-spiritual awakening and delusion, the origins of freedom (grol ba) and
errancy ( ’khrul pa) within the context of human reality. It is to these questions, addressed in
the context of the rDzogs chen problem of the ground (gzhi), that we now tum our attention.

344
Most relevant in this regard are those belonging to the Breakthrough (khregs chod) teachings which occasion the
collapse o f dualistic mind and simultaneous disclosure of primordial knowing.
Part IE The Problem o f the Ground: The Kun gzhi/Chos sku Distinction

4 I The Ground in Early rDzogs chen (8th to 1 Ith c.)

§ 1. Background

What is the background of mental activity and of its cessation? Stated otherwise,
what does one attend from when one attends to objects and what remains when such
attending ceases? One traditional answer to this question common to Madhyamaka and
various Tibetan contemplative traditions is ‘nothing’ - thoughts come from nowhere,
remain nowhere and go nowhere. This is offered as an insight amenable to personal
verification in certain rDzogs chen and Mahāmudrā instructions on recognizing the unbom
nature of mind. The fact nonetheless remains that ‘thought’ and ‘no thought’, appearance
and emptiness, only make sense against a background, an ongoing stream of experience that
is constitutive of sentient existence. Such considerations make intelligible why classical
rDzogs chen analyses of dualistic mind and primordial knowing are typically preceded by
an elucidation of their respective ‘grounds’, the all-ground (kun gzhi) and ground proper
(gzhi). If the rDzogs chen problem of knowledge outlined in the two preceding chapters is
concemed with articulating the conditions of nondual primordial awareness, the problem of
the ground investigated in this chapter and the next concems the conditions of a primordial
mode of being, one’s existential condition (yin lugs). rDzogs chen exegesis from the Royal
Dynastie Period (610-910) onward underscores the fundamental inseparability of being and
awareness in their most ontologically primitive condition. In classical rDzogs chen,
dharmakäya is described as the undefiled (dri med) primordial ground (ye gzhi) of the open
awareness (rig pa) and freedom (grol ba) that characterize a buddha whereas the all-ground
is the defiled basis of ignorance (ma rig pa) and error ( ’khrulpa) that characterize a sentient
being. Thus, the all-ground and dharmakäya are the discemable sources of the two
concurrent modalities of cognition - reflective-representational and prereflective nonrepres-
entational - that are co-present in the psychic life of an individual. As the Klong drug p a ’i
rgyud States:
 The source of mind is the all-ground. Why? Because the all-ground gathers all
objects of representational thought and because it is conceived of as mental. The
source of primordial knowing is the dharmakäya. Why? Because dharmakäya is not
subject to any reflective thought pattems (dran rtog) and because it lacks any thought
that grasps objects as being other.345

Thus, while classical rDzogs chen works emphasize the fundamental indivisibility of
being and awareness (sku dang ye shes ’du 'bral med), it also draws attention to how these
two are distinct from the conditioned all-ground and dualistic mind. It is important to
reiterate that the distinction drawn between these two grounds does not imply a dichotomy
between two discrete classes of phenomena but rather a priority relation between founding
and founded (rten/brten) phenomena within a unitary experiential dimension. On this
understanding, dharmakäya as the ground of natural freedom (grol gzhi) is primary and
invariant whereas the all-ground as ground of error ( ’khrul gzhi) is parasitic and transient,
yet both belong to a single continuum of human reality. Given its founded and ancillary
character, the all-ground is considered an adventitious, transient epiphenomenon346 that
dissolves into the dharmakäya, like mist in the sky, upon realization.

We can discem in this classical rDzogs chen articulation of the distinction between
two grounds (gzhi/kun gzhi) the kind of hybridization and juxtaposition of classical
Yogācāra and Tathägatagarbha viewpoints that one also encounters in late Indian Yogācāra
discourses and that exerted a considerable influence on Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist
traditions as scholars sought to reconcile these distinct streams of Indian Buddhist thought.
An important doctrinal context for these divergent viewpoints (some of which will be taken
up later in this chapter) was the old Indian Buddhist controversy over whether there was an
order of knowing and being more fundamental than the ālayavijñãna. But we can also detect
m the above articulation of two grounds an even more formative, if less well known,
cultural current of distinctly rDzogs chen ground conceptions that was al ready widespread

Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1022.5 f.: See edited text under “Texts and Translations”.
To this extent, rDzogs chen is in agreement with gSar ma schools that view the ālayavijñāna as being essentially
unreal or only conventionally and nominally true. That said, the ālayavijñāna, like dualistic mind, is considered to
e a temporary and adventitious structure, a Substrate o f the cmotions and thoughts it engenders, that therefore
constitues a relevant object o f analysis for those on the path. It is through understanding the genesis and nature of
1 e complex workings o f the all-ground and dualistic mind that one can gain familiarity with the implicit
undifferentiated ground, Mind itself, from which they emanate.
in Mahäyoga (mal ’byor chen po) and Mind Series (sems sde/sems phyogs) literature of the
Royal Dynastie Period. This strain of thought reflects a disclosive tantric-Tathägatagarbha
model of spiritual awakening that rejects, or considers only provisional (drang don), certain
Yogācāra ideas of fundamental transformation (āśraya-parāvrtti, °-parivrtti) that assumed
goal-realization to consist in a modification of mind or altered state of cognition. It will be
seen that some of the more interesting rDzogs chen philosophical reflections on the ground
occur at the confluence of these three currents of Buddhist thought.

The present chapter investigates how and why the all-ground/dharmakäya (kun gzhi/
chos sku) distinction came to assume the importance it did in classical rDzogs chen. Why
did texts of this tradition from the 12th onward present and defend a radical distinction
between the ground itself (gzhi) or dharmakäya and the all-ground (kun gzhi), viewing the
former as originally pure and unconditioned and the latter as the source of all that is defiled
and conditioned? Why and on the basis of what antecedent Buddhist traditions and
scriptures did rNying ma sources underscore this distinction when earlier rDzogs chen
sources tended to give it little explicit attention or to emphasize unity rather than difference?
To address these questions, it is necessary to trace key developments in rDzogs chen ground
discourses from the Royal Dynastie to classical periods (8th to 14th centuries) in order to gain
a sense of how ground formulations evolved in response to the challenges of (1) reconciling
different Indian Buddhist ground theories regarding the sources of error and awakening, (2)
describing and explaining contemplative States that by their very nature elude description
and categorization and (3) addressing certain polemical critiques posed by other traditions.

§2. Two Dimensions of the Ground Problem

Scholars working with primary sources belonging to the Tibetan rDzogs chen
traditions sooner or later find themselves in a dense thicket of concepts centering around the
ubiquitous idea of a fundamental ground (gzhi). Whether in exegetical contexts of
exposition or in polemical contexts given to either criticizing or defending the idea and its
provenance, a complex tangle of terms and interpretations have been advanced with the
objective of clarifying its nature and significance. Along with terminology explicitly
refering to an unconditioned ground (gzhi) - variously described as a primordial ground (ye
gzhi), initial ground (thog m a’i gzhi), original ground (gdod m a’i gzhi), primordially pure
ground (gdod m a’i dag p a ’i gzhi), common ground (spyi’i gzhi), single ground (gzhi geig
pa), the ground as is it is (gzhi bzhin pa), grandmother ground (spyi m o’i gzhi), matrix (gzhi
ma), freedom ground (grol gzhi) one also encounters a host of cognate terms associated
with the idea of an all-ground (kun gzhi), some denoting a genuine, primordial all-ground
(don gyi kun gzhi, gzhi don gyi kun gzhi or ye don gyi kun gzhi), others referring to a
conditioned all-ground (rkyen gyi kun gzhi), an all-ground of myriad latent tendencies (bag
chags sna tshogs p a ’i kun gzhi). A closer look at these terms within their doctrinal contexts
reveals an uneasy rapprochement between the above-mentioned strains of Indian Buddhism
marked by increasing tensions throughout the period of their assmilation in Tibet.

The earliest rDzogs chen ground discourses from the Royal Dynastie Period are
dominated by this tradition’s own conceptions of an invariant and unconditioned ground
(gzhi) or all-ground (kun gzhi) that are closely associated with three constellations of core
soteriological ideas: (1) the nature of mind (sems nyid, ye shes, byang chub [kyi] sems), (2)
the nature of reality (chos nyid, de kho na nyid, de bzhin nyid) and (3) buddha nature (with a
conspieuous preference for rDzogs chen *bodhigarbha : byang chub snying po ideas in the
pre-classical period, as will be explained below). From as early as the ninth Century, there is
growing evidence of an effort to reconcile these rDzogs chen ‘ground’ discourses with the
conception of a changing, conditioned all-ground (kun gzhi) that draws heavily on the
Yogācāra idea of substratum consciousness ãlayavijñãna (Tib. kun gzhi’i mam par shes pa),
an idea originally posited to account for the genesis and continuity of conditioned becoming
and samsäric existence.347

Notwithstanding their terminological correspondences, it is clear from the early

rDzogs chen literature that that these rDzogs chen and Indian sütric ground discourses have
quite different histories, problem sets and soteriological models. To get a sense of how
different, and even incompatible, these ground discourses could be, consider the following
comments made by the 14th Century Upper ’Brug pa (stod ’brug) bKa’ brgyud master Ba ra
ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang:

The most authoritative source on this doctrine remains Schmithausen 1987, a detailed reconstruction o f the origin
and early development o f ãlayavijñãna based on meticulous historical-philological research. See also Waldron 2003.
 Now, the term ‘ground’ is considered by some Systems to be something like a field.
This ground, it is claimed, is where things ripen individually in accordance with what
has been planted, like barley, wheat, lentils and so on. But this entails the fallacy of
[assuming] the ground and results [lit. ‘fruits’] to be two different things because
when we take this ground which produces things as a field, then the resulting barley
and lentils are different from the field's soil. On this point, Chos rje Rin po che
[Yang dgon pa] has claimed that what is termed ‘ground’ is spontanously present as
the actual basis of all experiences summed up by samsāra, nirvāna and the path, and
[that this] ground abides naturally. It [nonetheless] assumes different individual
guises when it comes into contact with particular conditions and [can therefore]
manifest as anything whatsoever. As an example, it is held to be similar to a crystal
ball.348 When this crystal comes into contact with a condition such as [something]
painted [red], it tums red, or, when it comes in contact with indigo, it tums blue. But
even if it appears to tum red, the crystal has not changed in essence. And even if it
seems to tum blue, the crystal remains unchanged. So, the crystal may tum various
colours but it does not in essence tum into something eise. In the same way, Mind
may go astray into the painful experiences of the hot and cold hells, but it has not for
so much as a moment changed in essence and tumed into something evil. Even when
buddhahood occurs as a result of realization, the essence of Mind has not for a
moment changed into something good. It is not that Mind in itself realizes or fails to
realize [anything]. In Mind, there is neither good and evil nor anything that becomes
differentiated.349

’Ba’ ra ba here draws attention to a long-standing conceptual tension that had become all too
conspicuous within rNying ma and bKa’ brgyud circles by the fourteenth Century. Can the
idea of goal-realization as the re-cognition of a fundamental ground that is identified as the
uncontrived nature of mind and reality be reconciled with those (Sautrantika and early
Yogācāra) models that construed goal-realization as a kind of maturation or fruition that
results from specific causes and conditions? The metaphor of a productive ground (skyed

348 See also ’B a ’ ra ba Gsung ’bum, vol. 5: 247 f.: which cites this analogy from a Samputitantra commentary
entitled Sambuti rgyud'grel chen dri ma med pa ’i ’od in the bsTan ’gyur.
349 Ngo sprod bdun ma 7 ’g rel pa Man ngag rin po che ’i sgron me, in Rje ’Ba ’ ra ba chen po rGyal mtshan dpal
bzang gi bka ’ ’bum, vol. 11: 211.2 f.: de yang gzhi zhes pa ’ga ’ re ’i lugs kyis zhing Ita bu cig gzhi yin la\ \nas dang
gro sran la sogs pa gang btab pa bzhin so sor smin pa cig la gzhir bzhed de| |gzhi ’bras tha dad du gyur pa ’i skyon
yod ste| |skyed byed kyi gzhi zhing yin kyang\ \ ’bras bu nas dang sran la sogs p a zhing sa dang tha dad du ’g yur
ba ’i phyir ro\ | ’dir chos rje rin po che ’i bzhed pas\ \gzhi zhes pa ’khor ’das lam gyis bsdusa pa ’i chos thams cad kyi
dngos gzhir Ihun gyis grub cing gzhi gzhag tu gnas te\ \rkyen gang dang phradpa ’i rang gzugs ston cing cirb yang
’char ba ste| |dpe shel sgong Ita bu cig la bzhed de\ \shel de nyid tshos la sogs pa ’i rkyen dang phrad na dmar por
’gro zing\ \rams dang phrad na sngon por ’g ro yang\ \dmar por song yang ngo bo shel las ’gyur ba med\ \sngon por
yong yang shes las ’g yur ba med\ \de bzhin du kha dog sna tshogs su ’gyur yang ngo bo shes las ’g yur ba med pa
bzhin du\ \sems ’di ’khrul pas dmyal ba tsha grang gi sduga bsngal myong yang sems kyi ngo bo las ’g yur ba ’i ngan
du skad cig kyang ma yongs\ \rtogs te ’bras bu sangs rgyas pa ’i dus na ’ang\ \sems kyi ngo bo las ’g yur ba ’i skad cig
kyang bzang du song ba med cing\ \sems kho rang rtogs ma rtogs min pa sems la bzang ngan nam tha dad du song
ba med de| | "text: bsdug; btext: spyir
byed kyi gzhi) likened to a field is here deemed inadequate to capture the unchanging nature
of mind itself, an experiential dimension that, like a crystal ball, remains invariant through
the myriad transformations it appears to undergo. The former model works with the idea of
a developmental ground in which causes (hetu) of bondage or liberation mature into their
respective results (phala), these causes and results being fundamentally different from the
ground itself. Altematively, the latter model as developed in hybridized Yogācāra-
Tathāgatagarbha texts such as the Ratnagotravibhãga, Dharmadharmatãvibhãga, and
Mahāyānasamgraha, as well as a great many tantric and siddha scriptures features an
invariant ‘ground’, i.e. the incorruptible nature of mind and reality, that remains just as is
even while being (mis)taken for samsära or nirväna.

It should be noted that the idea that mind is originally and naturally luminous
(prabhäsvaracitta) but temporarily obscured by adventitious defilements has been a
recurrent, though by no means homogeneously formulated, preoccupation of Buddhist
thought since the time of the Päli Canon350, its earliest known expression occurring in
Ahguttaranikäya 1.6:

O bhiksus, this mind is luminous, but it is indeed defiled by adventitious

defilements.351

The issue of whether and in what sense mind can be considered naturally luminous was
already a subject of intense debate within early Sarvāstivāda schools, as Eli Franco has
shown in his analysis of portions of the so-called Spitzer Manuscript352, believed to be the
oldest philosophical manuscript in Sanskrit (dated to the Kusäna period 3rd c. CE). The
concept of luminous mind was in any case by this time quite widely accepted353 amongst
early Buddhist sects and one finds the metaphor of a crystal which only appears to change

See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 412-437 for a detailed survey o f the ‘luminous mind’ (prabhasvaracitta) idea with
many examples o f its occurrence in Indian Buddhist literature. See Ańguttaranikãya vol. 1: p. 10. See also
Wangchuk 2007: 207.
Pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam\ tarn ca kho ägantukehi upakkilesehi upakkilittham\
52 See Franco 2000: 98.. See also Franco 2001: 2.
Among Buddhist schools who accepted prabhäsvaracitta are the Theraväda, Vaibhā§ika, VatsTputriya, Andhaka,
Mahäsamghika and Vibhajyaväda. See Lamotte 1962: 53, 175, 238; Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 412, Takasaki 1966: 34, n.
7; and Wangchuk 2007: 207.
colours against different backgrounds occasionally used to illustrate the idea that the nature
of mind remains unmodified despite its temporary ‘colourations’ by adventitious (ãgantuka)
defilements.354 On this interpretation, soteriology is a matter of Clearing away adventitious
defilements so that originally pure mind can reveal itself as it is. All this points toward
Tathägatagarbha System, reflecting a strain of thought that could at times diverge from the
Yogācāra view that mind is thoroughly contaminated by conditioning factors and therefore
needs to be fundamentally transformed (āśraya-parävrtti, °-parivrtti) to be liberated.355
Much depended on how the doctrine of transformation was understood, whether as a
process of modification or elimination.

In this regard, it is important to stipulate that this idea of transformation, as Sakuma

has indicated in his study of āśrayaparāvrtti, was employed within two contrasting models:
replacement and elimination.356 Within the replacement model, as presented in the
Śrāvakabhümi, an old basis of badness or malaise (<daustulya, dausthülya)351 is replaced by a
new basis of ease (praśrabdhi). In the elimination model, as presented in the
Bodhisattvabhümi, the basis of badness is eliminated without replacement. It is clear that an
elimination model underlies the Tathägatagarbha view that goal-realization depends not on

354 This view is summarized by Franco 1997: 86: “Just as a crystal is coloured by the colour of the object it covers,
similarly pure cognition, when defiled by desire, is called “accompanied by desire” (saräga), and later on becomes
liberated: sarägam cittam vimuccati.” The Sauträntikas and Vaibhâsikas rejected this view, claiming that mind is not
originally pure but is, on the contrary, originally sullied by karma and kleśas. Lamotte 1962: 238.
355 According to Franco (1997: 87), the āśraya-parãvrttH0-parivrtti and prabhäsvaracitta models are both found in
Yogācāra texts but are seldom associated with each other. On the other hand, the two models are closely associated
within Tathägatagarbha exegesis. For his arguments and discussion o f relevant sources, see Franco 1997: 87 f.. On
the association of āśraya-parāvrtti/0-parivrtti and prabhäsvaracitta in the Ratnagotravibhäga and Vyãkhyā, see
Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 419-24. On their relationship, the author States: “C ’est en relation avec la luminosité naturelle
de la Pensée et de la pureté du tathāgatadhātu au point de vue de sa connexion avec le plan du Fruit que la R G W
fait état de la transmutation de la Base psychique, cette āśrayaparāvrtti, correspondant ainsi à l’épuisement des
impuretés.” In this connection, Franco (1997: 88) pertinently poses the question o f “whether the doctrine of
prabhäsvaracitta in Yogācāra appears only in Maitreyanätha texts (and o f course in commentaries thereon), and if
so, whether this could be explained by the fact that Maitreyanätha and his tradition were strongly influenced by
Tathägatagarbha ideas.”
356 Sakuma 1990; Franco 1997: 84 f..
357 Seyfort Ruegg 1969 (439) translates dau?tulya (Tb. gnas ngan len) as ‘la Turbulence’, Davidson 1988 (177 f.) as
‘hindrances’ (and elsewhere ‘baseness’), and Schimthausen 1987 (vol. 1: 66) as ‘badness’. Schmithausen discusses
many connotations o f the term which include badness or wickedness (kleśa-paksyam), unwieldiness (karmanyatä),
heaviness (*gurutva : lci ba nyid), stiffness (middhakrtam āśrayajādyam), incapacitation or lack of controllability
((aksamatä), and unease or misery (dausfulya-duhkha). The idea here is that unsatisfactoriness permeates human
existence to such an extent that it is perceived and feit most fundamentally as a Situation o f affliction, suffering,
degradation, malaise and powerlessness. It has the effect o f hindering, physically and mentally, a yogin’s ability to
attain his goal (Davidson 1988, 177).
modifying a defiled state of being (e.g. alayavijñana) from ‘worse’ to ‘better’ but rather of
Clearing it away entirely - on the assumption that it is not constitutive anyhow but
thoroughly adventitious and derivative - so that a primordial mode of being (tathatä) which
it has temporarily obscured can reveal itself. All this confirms that the tension between what
I am calling ‘developmental’ (causal) and ‘disclosive’ (acausal) models of awakening that so
often surfaces in the rDzogs chen problematics conceming knowledge, ground and path that
we are here investigating has a long and complex history in Indian Buddhism. At the heart
of these contrasting models and metaphorics was the soteriological problem of how to
accommodate a view of karmically affected consciousness within a disclosive view that
gives primacy to a primordial unconditioned mode of consciousness that remains unaffected
by karmic conditioning and causal production.

To better understand this tension, it is necessary to briefly sketch these conflicting

soteriological models and the problems of reconciliation that their confluence in Tibet
provoked. Our focus will be limited to specifying (1) the ränge of phenomena (within
differing views of mind) that each model was intended to characterize and (2) some of the
Problems these elicited. The assessment of these systemic problems also requires a brief
consideration of buddha nature views that came to prominence during the later stages of
Yogācāra and early stages of tantra in India and strongly influenced ensuing developments
in China and Tibet. The stage will then be set for tracing a conceptual genealogy of the
ground in the rDzogs chen tradition that looks at how its adherents sought to reconcile these
opposing currents within a dialectical view of consciousness.

§3. The Yogācāra Model: Scope and Limitations

The Yogācāra eightfold model of mind has proven a most fruitful and influential
conceptual scheme for accounting for the genesis and possible transcendence of dualistic
experience. The origin and development of the ãlayavijñãna idea have been well-
documented and need not concem us here.358 A useful summary of this development is

See above note 347.

offered by mChims ston Blo bzang grags pa (1299-1375) in his commentary on the
A bhidharmakośa:

The two Srāvaka schools [Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika] maintain a six-fold ensemble
of consciousness (mam shes tshogs drug). The two Ācārya brothers [Vasubandhu
and Asańga], however, maintain an eightfold ensemble [which expands the six to
include]: (1) a substratum consciousness (ālayavijñãna) that grasps in a non-explicit
yet continuous manner by objectifying all referents, outer and inner, the environing
world and its inhabitants; and (2) an emotionally tainted ego-mind (klistamanas) that
is subject to the aspect of grasping [and believing in] an “I” (ngar *dzin p a ’i mam pa
can) by objectifying this [substratum consciousnes] itself.359

Our interest in the ãlayavijñãna model in the present context is confmed to determining its
explanatory force and limitations. What ränge of phenomena did it seek to account for?
Recent scholarship has identified a number of problems of continuity that the ālayavijñãna
idea attempted to resolve and that were thought to be inadequately explained in the
Abhidhammic view of mind. Primary among these were the continuities of various elements
of samsäric existence including consciousness (vijñāna), feelings (vedanā), vitality (äyus),
personal identity (ahamkära, asmimäna), corporeality (nãmarūpa), latent tendencies
(anuśaya, väsana), and the relation between actions and results (karmaphala).360 Most
vexing was the problem of accounting for the continuity of consciousness, personal identity
and karmic maturation (positive and negative) after periods of unconsciousness or during
the transition from one rebirth to the next.

Against this background, the conception of a largely unconscious substratum

consciousness gradually took shape within the Abhidharma tradition in order to account for
the various continuities that play a consitutive role in samsāric existence, not least of which
is the phenomenon of dualistic karmically-conditioned consciousness. To account for the
genesis and persistence of karmic and affective conditioning both within this life and
beyond, the Abhidhammic analysis of six modes of conscious perception gave way
increasingly to an analysis of the ongoing Sedimentation of latent tendencies from previous

359 Chos mngon pa gsal byed Legs par bshadpa 7' rgya mtsho: fol. 27a2 f.: ...nyan thos sde ba gnyis rnam shes
tshogs drug tu ’dod la\ \slob dpon sku mched ni dmigs pa phyi nang snod bcud thams cad la dmigs nas rnam pa mi
gsal zhing ma chadpar ’dzin pa ’i kun gzhi ’i rnam shes dang\ \de nyid la dmigs nas ngar ’dzin pa ’i rnam pa can gyi
nyon y id de tshogs brgyad bzhed so| |
360 Schmithausen 1987.
 experience that condition consciousness and structure perception in terms of seif and other,
I and ‘mine’. One subsequently sees a number of more or less ad hoc attempts in the
Abhidharma system to account for the influence of past experience on the present. These
included the realist Sarvāstavādin theory of possession (präpti) that posited a dharma called
prãpti (‘obtaining’ or ‘acquisition’) that acts as a kind of metaphysical glue binding karmic
inheritance to a particular mental stream361 and the non-realist Sauträntika theory of seeds
(bīja) that introduced the “explicitly metaphorical notion (prajñapti-dharma) of seeds (bīja)
to represent both the latent afflicitions and accumulation of karmic potential within the
mental stream.”362

However, it is in the Yogācāra system that one encounters the first systematic attempt
to account for this ongoing Sedimentation of experience. The Yogācāra analysis of latent
tendencies, literally ‘perfuming’ (väsana : bag chags), sought to explicate in a more
methodical and thoroughgoing fashion those unconscious constitutive processes that remain
largely inaccessible for direct apprehension but which nonetheless influence consciousness
at every moment. On this view, consciousness can never be wholly accessible to direct
reflection, for it is deeply influenced by the latent traces of previous experience.
Consciousness, in other words, lives in the medium of its own history.363 It is karmically-
affected insofar as it operates in the light of the past and in anticipation of the future and
does so, by and large, under the influence of its own sedimented habits, presuppositions and
inclinations.

With the ãlayavijñãna-väsana model, the Yogācāra tradition was able to account for
those largely unconscious constitutive processes that condition and structure dualistic mind

361 See Burton 2004: 90.

362 Waldron 2003: 73.
363 A • '1
s^milar view developed in Husserl’s later phenomenology: “The Ego always lives in the medium o f its
history’; all its earlier lived experiences have sunk down, but they have aftereffects in tendencies, sudden ideas,
ansformations or assimilations o f earlier lived experiences, and from such assimilations new formations are
merged together, etc.” See Husserl 1989, 350. The growing emphasis within the Abhidharma-Yogācāra Systems on
e constitutive role o f previous experience on the present can be fruitfully compared to developments within
usserl’s phenomenology from a static phenomenology concemed with invariant formal structures of experience
SU.C as correlational (noetic-noematic) structure of intentionality toward a genetic phenomenology concemed
wit the genesis o f intentional experience in time and with how it is shaped by previous experience (Sedimentation).
thls distinction, see Steinbock 1995; Zahavi 1999: 207 f.; Thompson 2007: 28 f..
(citta). And while the ãlayavijñāna idea could account for the possibility of conditioned
becoming and dual cognition, it rcquired an accompanying soteriological model to specify
why their cessation should result in anything other or more than a sheer absence of
cognition. From a rNying ma perspective, a soteriological view premised solely on the
cessation of the mind (cittanirodha) and the ālayavijñāna could be thought to lend itself to
various types of cognitive suicide, some of which were sketched in the previous chapter. It
is entirely plausible that the late Yogācāra, and also tantric, models of transformation
mentioned earlier developed precisely to fill this explanatory gap. In any event, it is clear, as
will be shown, that rDzogs chen disclosive models developed in response to a similar
challenge and that they found in Tathägatagarbha discourses a common ground. The
objective was in each case to (A) articulate an unconditioned nondual mode of being and
awareness that is prior to and a precondition of the neutral or afflictive ālayavijñãna and (B)
provide a soteriological model to account for the relationship and possible transition
between these two.

It is in light of this twofold desideratum that there arose from the sixth Century
onward various doctrinal innovations, some internal to and others extem al to the Yogācāra
system, that sought in various ways to expand the classical Yogācāra picture of mind to
include a more fundamental nondual mode o f being and awareness. Later developments in
the Yogācāra system reflect a growing attempt to reconcile ãlayavijñãna and
tathägatagarbha models, whether this was attempted through Systems of identification or
differentiation.

§4. Toward a Primordially Unaffected Ground of Consciousness

Just as the classical Yogācāra required a conception of karmically-affected

consciousness to account for the genesis and continuity of conditioned existence, so the later
Buddhist soteriological Systems in India, China and Tibet tumed increasingly toward a
conception of a deeper layer of primordially unaffected consciousness to account for the
possibility of freedom from conditioned existence. We see here, as in the previous chapter,
an example of transcendental argumentation (of the form ‘for y to be possible x must be the
case’) forming a chain of indispensibility criteria that are established not with the aim of
providing an incorrigible account of reality but of discovering richer and more
encompassing Orders of description or levels of discourse. The changing descriptions and
explanations of consciousness as we move from Abhidhamma through Yogācāra and on to
Tathāgatagarbha and Mantrayāna discourses seem to reflect this movement toward richer
and broader articulations.

The question of what to do with the ãlayavijñāńa model in the face of the growing
influence of late Yogācāra, Tathāgatagarbha and tantric doctrines emphasizing an
unconditioned nondual mode of consciousness led to different Systems of reconciliation in
India, China and Tibet. These can be roughly divided into: (1) Systems of identification in
which ãlayavijñāna is elevated into a monistic principle, a common source of all
phenomena, samsäric and nirvänic phenomena alike, that is at times associated with buddha
nature, and (2) Systems of differentiation which sought to maintain and explain a
fundamental distinction between the ālayavijñãna and an unconditioned absolute variously
described in terms of buddha nature, the nature of mind (jñãna) or the nature of reality
(dharmadhätu). Each System attempted in its own way to specify the relationship (identity
or difference) between conditioned and unconditioned modes of consciousness and to chart
the transition between them in soteriological terms.

Identification: Identification strategies typically involved doctrinal transformations

whereby the ālayavijñãna of classical Yogācāra conceived primarily as the source of all
samsäric phenomena was reinterpreted as a common ‘all-ground’ that is the source of
samsäric and nirvänic phenomena, a ground of pollution (samkleśa : kun nas nyon mongs) as
well as purification (vyavadäna : mam par byang ba). The most striking and controversial
instance of this monistic trend was the Lańkāvatārasūtra ’s identification of the ãlayavijñãna
with tathägatagarbha.364 A much-quoted passage from the now-lost Mahãyãnābhidharma-
sütra was also at times used as scriptural support for an absolutized version of the
ãlayavijñãna:

On this interpretation and some o f its Tibetan advocates such as the bKa’ brgyud scholars Gos lo tsä ba gZhon
nu dpal and ’Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang, see Mathes 2008: 18, 117 and 464 n. 612. On the basis of this
Identification of the ālayavijñāna with the tathägatagarbha, the Lańkãvatārasūtra interprets ãśrayaparãvrtti as the
transformation or purification of the seventh consciousness (manas) which liberates the pure ālayavijñãna. See Lai
1977- f n c
 The beginningless element (dhätu)
Is the basis of all phenomena
Because it exists, [it allows for] all forms of life
As well as the attainment of nirväna.365

The semantic ambiguity of the term dhätu in this passage meant, in effect, that it could be
used to legitimize either tathägatagarbha or ãlayavijñāna doctrines as the context
demanded.366 The irony here, as as Ronald Davidson has observed, is that the author of the
passage was likely a partisan of neither of these theories but “merely wished to delineate a
rudimentary form of an imperishable element which was soteriological in nature, yet acted
as the basis for the stream of consciousness of an individual in bondage.”367 In this regard,
the term dhätu generally signifies ‘element’ and was associated in particular with ‘space’,
that element considered fundamental to the other four basic elements (mahãbhūta). But it
was also employed as a shorthand for buddhadhätu or tathāgatadhātu which were early and
widespread Indian buddha nature concepts. Seyfort Ruegg 1969 has drawn attention to a
number of doctrinal contexts wherein dhätu was used to bridge nascent ãlayavijñāna (gotra,
bīja) and tathägatagarbha theories.368 It does not require much conjecture to see‘how this
idea of a fundamental element (dhätu) or seed of all phenomena (sarvadharmabīja) could at
times be identified with the idea of a fundamental ground (älaya) that is the source not only

365 Although no longer extant, this important sütra is quoted in the RGVv. The passage in question found at RGVv
72.13-14 reads as follows: anādikãliko dhãtuh sarvadharmasamāśrayah\ tasmin sati gatih sarvã nirvānãdhigamo
’p i ca\\ See also RGVv 1.155 (J 1.152) See Takasaki 1966: 290. The Mahāyānãbhidharmasūtra has also been quoted
in the Mahāyãnasamgrahabhāsya (tr. by Paramârtha, Taisho Edition of the Chinese Tripitaka, XXXI, no. 1595:
157a) and the Trimśikãbhā§ya (Skt. ed. par Sylvain Lévi: p. 37). The Tibetan translations o f RVVv have dbyings
instead of khams (both being accepted translations of dhätu).
366 See Davidson 1985: 102 and notes 80 and 81 for examples. On the term dhätu, see n. 368 below.
367 Davidson 1985: 102.
368 Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 494 f.) has commented that the term dhätu is among the most complex and difficult terms
in Buddhist thought. He also noted its semantic affiliations with nascent ãlayavijñãna and tathägatabargha
concepts. See Abhidharmasamuccaya (p. 15), for example, where dhätu is characterized as the ‘seed of all
phenomena’ (sarvadharmabya), an identification which connects Sauträntika bya theory with Tathägatagarbha
dhätu (gotra) conceptions. The Bodhisattvabhümi establishes semantic equivalences between dhätu and the concepts
bya, gotra, ãdhāra, niśraya, hetu and so forth. In the Ratnagotravibhäga, the term dhätu (translated in Tibetan as
khams ‘space or dbyings ‘expanse’) is used more often than garbha in reference to buddha nature. See Seyfort
Ruegg 1969: 262 f.. The author notes, however, that “ ...qu’il existe un certain flottement dans l’emploi du mot
dhätu, et que ce mot n’est pas un synonyme exact de tathägatagarbha, encore que les deux termes s’emploient
souvent comme des équivalents.” (261 n. 1). He elsewhere comments that “ ...while the tathägatagarbha is said [in
RGV] to exist in all sentient beings without exception, the tathāgatadhātu on the other hand is present not only on
the level o f ordinary beings but also, evidently, on the level o f buddhahood itself.” (Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 19).
 of samsāric phenomena, but nirvānic phenomena as well. This tendency toward semantic
amalgamation of dhätu and älaya is further attested by a passage quoted by Klong chen pa
and that he attributes to the ’Jam dpal ye shes dri ma med pa ’i mdo that closely resembles
the previous quotation except that dhätu has here been replaced by älaya (kun [gy/] gzhi):

The all-ground (kun gzhi) is the ground of all (kun gyi gzhi).
It is the ground of samsära and nirväna,
And is also the ground of purification.369

Such passages point to a certain ambivalence in the use of buddha nature and ground
concepts that would, in some instances, give way to the full identification of ãlayavijñãna
and tathägatagarbha, such as we find in the above-mentioned Lańkāvatãrasūtra passage. On
balance, however, this monistic trend seemed to find more detractors than supporters
amongst Buddhist scholars in India.370

In China, such an identification was endorsed by certain Chinese Yogācāra scholars

such as Hui-yüan who drew scriptural support from Gunabhadra’s recensions of the
Śrīmãlãdevī and Lańkãvatãra sūtras371, even though Hui-yüan’s own teacher Paramärtha
explicitly rejected such an identification. The rapprochement between these Systems in
China has much to do with their close historical association and more specifically to the fact
that principal texts of both systems were translated at around the same time and by the same
Buddhist teachers.372 In Tibet, the tendency toward the identification of ãlayavijñãna and
tothägatagarbha seems to have gamered more criticism than support, whether it was

Quoted in Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, v o l.l: 271.3 f.: kun gzhi kun gyi gzhi yin te| | ’khor dang mya ngan 'das pa
anS\ \rnam par byang ba ’i gzhi ma yin\ \
Consider the following example: “ln the section o f the Tarkajvãlã devoted to Śrāvakayāna teachings it is...
pointed out that the all-pervasiveness o f the tathägatagarbha and also the Vijñānavādin's ādãnavijñãna
(~ãlayavijñāna) has been taught for the sake o f certain persons who have not freed themselves from the dogmatic
postulation o f a seif (<ātmagrāha).” Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 40.
371
See Paul 1984: 51.
According to Paul (1984: 6-7), “[s]ince Tathägatagarbha literature was translated at the same time as Yogācāra
and by the same masters, these two types o f thought became closely linked in the minds of their Chinese audience...
aramärtha’s ideas, particularly his concept o f amalavijñãna or “pure consciousness,” have often been regarded as
an amalgam o f Yogācāra and Tathägatagarbha, because o f the philosohical interfusion begun in India and the
istorical association o f the two doctrines from the outset in China.”
explicitly rejected as bad theorizing or explained away as a rhetorical ruse to lure the
spiritually immature.373

Now, the close association between buddha nature and the all-ground (kun gzhi) in
early (8lh to 12th c.) rDzogs chen exegesis is attributable to their virtual synonymity as
descriptors of the unconditioned absolute. However, when the Yogācāra ãlayavijñãna enters
the picture, as it does increasingly from the 9lh Century onward, it is invariably contrasted
with the absolute kun gzhi (along the lines of the above quotation of ’Ba’ ra ba) and
relegated to the conventional level of transient, conditioned phenomena, that are destroyed
upon realization. But this unavoidably begs the question of what this rDzogs chen kun gzhi
(älaya) concept may have originally owed to Yogācāra. More study and careful analysis of
the earliest rDzogs chen sources is required to gain a clearer sense of the textual origins and
lines of transmission of the rDzogs chen kun gzhi idea and to determine whether it perhaps
began as an abolutized version of the Yogãcāra ãlayavijñāna that was, like a great many
other rDzogs chen terms borrowed from Mahāyāna exegesis (e.g. jñāna, smrti, abhipräya
etc.), sublimated or even apotheosized in order to suit the quite different landscape of tantric
and rDzogs chen soteriology.

D ifferentiation: Another line of response to the encounter between Tathägatagarbha

and Yogācāra currents of thought was to sharpen or radicalize a difference between the
conditioned ālayavijñãna and unconditioned absolute. According to certain Yogācāra-
Tathāgatagarbha works such as the Ratnagotravibhäga and Dharmadharmatāvibhāga
ascribed Maitreya-Asańga, the ãlayavijñãna is identified as the basis of all defilement and
needs to be fundamentally transformed (ãśraya-parāvrtti, °-parivrtti) or purified away for
the realization of suchness or thatness to occur. The idea that there is a mode of
consciousness more fundamental than ālayavijñãna is implicit in the distinction between
ālayavijñãna and supramundane mind (lokottaracitta : ’jigs rten las ’das pa ’i sems) that is

373 As an example of the latter, ’Jigs med gling pa States in rDzogs pa chen po Kun tu bzang po ye shes klong gi
rgyud, in ’J igs gling gsung ’bum vol. 12: 66.1 f.: “This [älaya] is shown in the lower [vehicles] to be the nature of
*sugatagarbha but this is for the sake o f guiding spiritually immature people who are consumed by doubt about the
stainless dharmadhâtu” ’og ma rnams su ’di nyid bde gshegs snying p o ’i rang bzhin du bstan pa ni\ \re zhig chos
dbyings dri med la the tshom za ba ’i byis pa rnams drang ba ’i slad du ’o\ \
developed in Mahāyānasamgraha 1.45-48.374 Sthiramati draws a similar distinction between
ālayavijñãna and the supramundane jñãna (lokkottarajñāna : jigs rten las ’das p a ’i ye shes)
which overtums or replaces it (parävrtti) in his commentary on Trimśikā 29-30.375 We may
recall that in India and Tibet, the distinction between dual consciousness (vijñāna) and
primordial knowing (jñãna) and transformation of the former into the latter were hallmarks
of Yoganiruttara tantras (bla na med p a ’i rgyud) as systematized in Tibetan gSar ma tantric
traditions such as the Zab mo nang don system of the third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje
(1284-1339).376

As a general Observation, we can note that the Indian and Tibetan sötric and tantric
models of transformation tended to either (1) distinguish between two modes of the all-
ground - viz. a defiled mode that is the basis of samsāric existence and an undefiled mode
that is the basis of awakening or (2) introduce a ninth consciousness or ninth ground beyond
the ãlayavijñãna. (1) Bimodal all-ground schemes became widespread in emerging Tibet
Buddhist Orders during the second diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet. Examples are various
bKa’ brgyud distinctions between pure and impure all-grounds (e.g. dri ma med pa ’i kun
gzhi/ dri m a’i kun gzhi), the Jo nang distinction between all-grounds based on primordial
knowing and ordinary knowing (kun gzhi ye shes/kun gzhi mam shes)371 and various rNying
ma Mahäyoga/Sems sde distinctions (some of which will be investigated in due course)
between genuine and conditioned all-grounds (e.g. don gyi kun gzhi/ rkyen gyi kun gzhi).

Systems of transformation positing a ninth factor beyond the ālayavijñãna378 were

elaborated in those above-mentioned works attributed to Maitreya-Asańga that considered
nirvikalpajñāna, dharmakäya or dharmatä to specify a mode of being or awareness distinct
from but also a precondition of the ãlayavijñãna. This line of thought had a considerable
influence in Tibet and China as we see reflected in the works of early figures such as

374 Davidson 1985: 215 and Mathes 2008: 58.

Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Levi 1925), p. 44; Davidson 1985: 218 and n. 28.
376 c
See above 28-9.
377
See Stearns 1999: 49-52 and discussion o f doctrinal context by Mathes 2008: 56-7. This distinction is also
articulated by classical bKa’ brgyud scholars.
378
It is o f interest to note that the term ālaya without vijñãna is already being used in the Ghanavyüha to denote the
different Bodhisattva levels. See Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 35 and Mathes 2008: 442, n. 297.
Paramārtha in China and Ye shes sde in Tibet. The point emphasized in these Systems is not
that the unconditioned absolute is simply the result (phäla) of the transformation of
ālayavijñãna, but is rather that pre-existing factor (älaya) which remains when this
conditioned and conditioning Substrate has been purified out of existence. We have seen, for
example, that rDzogs chen sNying thig thinkers at times considered the idea of
transformation of basis (gnas ’gyur : ãśraya-parävrtti, °-parivrtti) to be of merely
provisional meaning (i.e. in need of further interpretation) and employed with the implicit
intention (Idem dgongs) of guiding beings in accordance with their varying interests and
degrees of understanding.379 Their reasoning can be summarized in this way: if human
reality is, in its most ontologically primitive condition, spontaneously present and
unconditioned, then its realization requires no production or modification by means of
causes and conditions.

In China, the idea of an originally and naturally stainless mode of consciousness

beyond the ālayavijñãna gained popularity in the sixth Century due to the influence of the
Indian Yogācāra monk and translator Paramärtha (499-569).380 Paramärtha posited a ninth,
immaculate consciousness (amalavijñānà) which is unaffected by the conditioning
influences of the ālayavijñāna (the karmic ‘seeds’ and their ‘fruits’ of attachments and
aversions) and which is closely associated with the absolute (parinispanna) and suchness
(tathata). According to Paramärtha, this amalavijñãna is invariant and undefiled (anäsrava)
in contrast to the ãlayavijñãna which is transient and defiled (sãsrava). While the älaya is
the source of afflictive emotions and badness (daustulya), the amala is the abiding source of
nonconceptual primordial knowing (nirvikalpajñāna) and saintly activity. For Paramärtha,
the fundamental transformation (ãs'raya-parãvrtti, °-parivrtti) of ãlayavijñãna entails its
complete elimination, the result of which is the recovery of pure consciousness
(amalavijñãná).m

379 See above p. 24 f. et passim.

380 On the life and teachings of Paramärtha, see Frauwallner 1951, Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 439 f., 109 f., and Paul
1984.
381 The fact that Paramärtha at times employs the term amalavijñāna to translate āśraya-paravrtti/pańvrtti only
confuses the issue.
 According to Paul Demiéville, the issue of whether the ãlayavijñāna or amalavijñāna
should be regarded as the basis of consciousness and the world itself was already the subject
of intense doctrinal disputes in China before Paramärtha’s arrival, and had led to two
distinct schools of thought.382 Bodhiruci’s school maintained that the foundation of all
cognition is the ãlayavijñāna, a view presented in the Mahãyãnasamgraha. Ratnamati’s
school, on the other hand, made the same claim for the tathatä, thus betraying its allegiance
to the tradition of the Mahãyãnasūtrãlamkāra. The critical point of divergence was whether
the ālaya[vijñāna] was considered (à la Bodhiruci) to be the ultimate neutral basis of human
reality or (à la Ratnamati) to be a derivative and conditioned substratum that must be
fundamentally transformed if goal-realization, understood as the recovery of an
unconditioned, invariant mode of being, is to occur. Ratnamati’s school and the late
Yogācāra exegesis of Asańga provided doctrinal support for Paramärtha’s controversial
claim that the foundation of all cognition is not the ãlayavijñãna but the amalavijñāna. By
the seventh Century, the controversy gradually subsided under the authority of Xuanzang
who came down on the side of Bodhiruci in holding the ālayavijñāna to be fundamental.383
Erich Frauwallner has pointed to numerous Indian antecedents of this controversy
that are symptomatic of an underlying tension that could not be so neatly divided along
sectarian lines.384 Despite attempts by the Chinese schools to trace their views to Indian
antecedents in the schools of Dharmapāla (ãlayavijñãna) and Sthiramati (amalavijñāna), an
analysis of their works does not render support for such clear affiliations but rather indicates
dialectical tensions of a more systemic and perennial nature. As a case in point, Frauwallner
cites the following summary of a tension between developmental and disclosive
soteriological models by Sthiramati himself in his Madhyãntavibhãgatīkã (my translation):
The dharmakäya of the buddhas consists in the transformation of the basis in that all
obstructions are eliminated and the seeds of the uncontaminated dharmas [i.e.,
buddha qualities] that function as their counteragent are accumulated; it has power
over all phenomena and is without the ãlayavijñãna...

See Demiéville 1929. On these two Yogācāra streams of thought, see Frauwallner 1951, Ueda 1967, and Paul
1984.
383
My account o f the Chinese controversy is based on Frauwallner 1951: 148.
See Frauwallner 1951.
 Others, on the other hand, say that it is only the dharmadhätu, completely purified
through the removal of all adventitious defilements, that is called the dharmakäya,
i.e., the embodiment (käya) of the nature of the phenomena (dharmatä).385

Both views construe the transformation of basis as entailing the elimination of ãlayavijñãna,
but they interpret goal-realization quite differently. The first views it developmentally, as
involving the accumulation of seeds of uncontaminated buddha qualities that serve to
counteract obscurations (i.e. seeds of contaminated phenomena) leading to their eventual
elimination. The second views it disclosively, as revealing the dharmadhätu, that which
embodies the very nature of things (<dharma[tã]kãya), when the adventitious defilements that
shroud it are purified away.386
Paramärtha’s view of mind seemed to have gained little traction in Tibet, though it
became available to scholars early on through its critique by the Korean monk Wönch’ük in
his commentary on the Samdhinirmocana that was translated in Dunhuang from Chinese
into Tibetan (under the title dGongs ’grel gyi ’grel chen) during the Tang dynasty by Chos
grub (Chinese: Facheng).387 Paramärtha’s analysis of mind and his controversial concept of
immaculate consciousness (amalavijñãna : dri ma med pa ’i mam [par] shes [pa]) appear to
have met mainly with a critical reception in Tibet, particularly at the hands of dGe lugs pa
scholars such as Tsong kha pa388 and a number of his later commentators such as ’Jam
dbyangs bZhad pa’i rdo rje (1648-1721/ 22)389, Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa’i sgron
me (1762-1823)390, Bio bzang ’Jam dbyangs (18th c.)391 and Bio bzang Dam chos rgya mtsho

385 Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgatīkã, Exposition systématique du Yogãcãravijñaptivãda, ed. par Susumu

Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934: p. 191, 4 f.: sarvãvaranaprahānãt tatpratipakjānãsravadharmabyapracayāc cāśraya-
parāvrttyātmakah sarvadharmavaśavartī anãlaya iti buddhānãm dharmakāyah... anye tu nihśe?ãgantuka-
malāpagamãt suviśuddho dharmadhātur eva dharmatākāyo dharmakäya iti varnayanti\ Quoted from Frauwallner.
386 This view, as Frauwallner notes, interprets the expression dharmakäya as deriving from dharmatākāya (‘embodi­
ment of the nature of phenomena’) by dropping the suflfix tã.
387 In Tibetan: dGongs ’g rel gyi ’g rel chen, P K no. 5517, D no. no. 4016.
388 Yid dang kun gzhi ’i dka ’ ba ’i gnas rgya eher ’g rel pa. P K no. 6149: 173-95. See also Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum
(Bkra’ shis Ihun po ed.) vol. 27 (1977): 356-474. For an annotated translation, see Sparham 1993. Nagao
summarizes Tsong kha pa’s views on Paramärtha’s amalavijñāna theory in Chükan to Yuishiki: 419-21.
389 Grub mtha ’ rnam bshad rang gzhan Grub mtha ’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma
lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu ’i re ba kun skongs. See Collected Works (gsung ’bum) o f ’J am dbyangs bzhad pa ’i
rdo rje (South India?: 1995), vol. 15: 590.3.
390 Yid dang kun gzhi ’i dka ’ gnas rnam par bshad pa mKhas pa ’i ’ju g ngog. See The Collected Works (gsung ’bum)
o f Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa ’i sgron me (Lhasa: 2000), vol. 2: 279-406.
 (1865-1917)392. While Tsong kha pa explicitly defends ālayavijñāna as valid doctrine in this
early Yid dang kun gzhVi dka’ ba i gnas rgya eher ’grel pa, he rejects Paramärtha’s
introduction of a ninth consciousness on the rationale that if there were a fundamental (gtso
bo) consciousness other than the ãlayavijñãna it would be a permanent entity (rtag pa i
dngos po : nityabhäva).393 However, given that entities (dngos po) are by nature
impermanent (mi rtag pa), the concept of amalavijñãna is self-contradictory and in any case
unverifiable. Thus the dGe lugs pa repudiate amalavijñāna on the same grounds that they
reject positive views of tathägatagarbha, namely that it represents a metaphysical postulate,
a reified abstraction that cannot withstand critical assessment.
The Tibetan reception of Indian Buddhism was marked from the outset by the kind of
doctrinal tensions between developmental and disclosive paradigms whose lines of
influence in India and China I have been tracing. In assessing the dissemination of the
disclosive paradigm in Tibet, it is crucial to factor in the paramount influence of Indian
tantric and siddha traditions during the period of assimilation. Evidence of tensions between
these different models and doctrines within early rDzogs chen is reflected in a passage from
the Sems nyid bsdus p a ’i sgron ma attributed to Vimalamitra (8th c.). In the first of the nine
mstructions which demonstrates the nature of bodhicitta (byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin
bstan pa), the text introduces a clear demarcation between the kun gzhi which is identified as
a shorthand for ãlayavijñãna, regarded as the adulterated sphere of dualistic mind, and
dharmakäya which is identified with the ground itself (gzhi) and associated with open
awareness (rig pa) and primordial knowing (ye shes):

The ālayavijñãna is [sometimes] referred to as ‘all-ground’ (älaya : kun gzhi). It is

called ‘all-ground’ because it serves as the ground of all phenomena. Since all
sentient being are pervaded by dharmakäya, this [too] is labelled ‘all-ground’.
Discursive concepts and signs are also labelled ‘all-ground’. So the mixing up of the
concepts and latent tendencies with dharmakäya is what is [erroneously] called ‘all-

Yid dang kun gzhi'i rtsa ’grel gyi dka' gnas gsal byed nyi zla zung ’jug. See The Collected Works (gsung ’bum) o f
e u tsban sprul sku Bio bzang ’jarn dbyans smon lam (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1984), vol. 1: 187 - 260.
392 riSam
M rig pa'i lugs kyi yid dang kun gzhi'i don cung zad bshadpa Ngo mtshar gzugs brgya ’char ba'i me long.
ee Collected works o f a Gelug master, Rongga Lozang Damchoe Gyatso (1865-1917) from Kham (New Delhi:
1975), vol. 1: 187-198.
Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum, vol. 27: 468.5 f.: tshogs brgyad dag las sogs pa yi\ \gtso bo rnam shes yod gyur na\
rtag pa i dngos por ’g yur ba ’i phyir] | tshogs dgur ’dod la sgrub byed med\ \
 ground’. Now, it is said that “the ‘all-ground’ is the ground of all [samsāric
phenomena], but is not the ground of purification”.394 Thus, where ālayavijñãna is
present, phenomena are present. But in the undefiled dharmakäya, not even the name
of ālayavijñãna exists. Due to its purity, for a tathägata, the ãlayavijñāna dissipates
into the ground, so not even the name is possible. In this regard, the all-ground is
associated with latent tendencies [whereas] dharmakäya is free from latent
tendencies. As for the nature of [dualistic] mind, it is called ‘mind’ inasmuch as it is
not free from latent tendencies. The dharmakäya is called open awareness (rig pa)
inasmuch as it consists in the awareness of emptiness. Moreover, there arises a
knowing that ascertains this great emptiness and clarity. Remaining in this state is
called ‘primordial knowing’ (ye shes).395

* Ye shes sde’s Eighth Century Synthesis of Late Yogācāra and Tathägatagarbha Views

It is important to recognize that Vimalamitra’s demarcation between kun gzhi and

chos sku, radical though it may seem at first glance, appears less so when we take into
account the characteristic blend of late Yogācāra, Tathägatagarbha, and tantric (most
notably, Mahayoga) viewpoints that defined the intellectual landscape of 8th Century Tibet. A
clear example of the influence of late Yogācāra views emphasizing the differentiation
between the tathägatagarbha and ālayavijñãna (kun gzhi) within a disclosive paradigm of
goal-realization is found in an eighth Century treatise by the renowned scholar-translator Ye
shes sde entitled ITa b a i khyad par (Distinction o f Views) that is probably the first
independent Tibetan treatise on Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy.396 Ye shes sde’s crucial
role in laying the groundwork for the Tibetan assimilation of Buddhism during the Royal
Dynastie Period and his exemplary translations of various texts contained in the bsTan ’gyur

394 Interestingly, this unattributed quotation is diametrically opposed to the previously-quoted Statement attributed to
the ’J am dpal ye shes dri ma med p a ’i mdo which reads “The all-ground (kun gzhi) is the ground of all (kun gyi
gzhi). lt is the ground of samsära and nirväna, and is also the ground o f purification.” As a sNying thig exponent,
Vimalamitra is here emphasizing the radical differentiation between conditioned and unconditioned ‘grounds’ of
human reality, the ālayavijñāna and dharmakäya, and their respective modes o f awareness, citta and jñāna.
395 Bi ma snying thig vol. 2: 168.5 f.: [byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin bstan pa ni\ |] kun gzhi ’i m am par shes pa de
la kun gzhi zhes bya ’o\ |chos kun gyi gzhir gyur pas na kun gzhi zhes bya'o\ \sems can kun la chos skus khyab par
gnas pa la kun gzhir ming btags\ \rnam par rtog mtshan ma la yang kun gzhir ming btags\ \chos sku dang rnam rtog
bag chags ’dres pa kun gzhi zhes bya ’o\ |de yang kun gzhi kun gyi gzhi yin te\ \rnam par byang b a ’i gzhi ma yin\
Ices gsungs .rø| | kun gzhi ’i rnam par shes pa yod pa ’i sa na chos yod de| | chos sku dri ma med pa ’i sa na kun gzhi ’i
rnam par shes pa ming yang med do\ \rnam dag des ni de bzhin gshegs pa la kun gzhi ’i rnam shes gzhi la sangs te
ming yang mi srid do\ |de bas na kun gzhi ni bag chags dang bcas p a ’o\ \chos sku ni bag chags dang bral b a ’o\
\sems kyi rang bzhin ni bag chags dang ma bral ba la sems zhes bya ’o\ \de nyid chos sku stong par rig pa la rig pa
zhes bya ’o\ \de yang stong gsal chen por nges shes skyes te| | de ’ang la gnas pa ni ye shes zhes bya ’o\ \
396 D No. 4360: 426.1 - 455.7. A different redaction of the work was retrieved from the caves at Dunhuang, on
which see Seyfort Ruegg 1981.
 and rNying ma rgyud ybum have been noted by a number of Contemporary Buddhologists.397
While the influence of his own doctrinal positions on the earliest Tibetan Buddhist
communities remains largely undetermined (it is noteworthy that the rNying ma pas count
him among their early lineage holders), his central role in the Tibetan reception and
promulgation of Indian Buddhism would suggest that his views were endorsed and shared
by many of his contemporaries, not least of all representatives of the fledgling rDzogs chen
traditions.

In underscoring the distinctiveness of Mahāyāna, Ye shes sde comments that

“amongst the many sütras such as the noble Samãdhirãja are found Statements such as ‘all
sentient beings are endowed with tathägatagarbha’ and ‘all sentient beings will become
buddhas because none among them is not a [suitable] vessel’.”398 When this
tathägatagarbha is not clearly evident it is known as ālaya[vijñãna] (kun gzhi), and when it
is clear, it is called dharmakãya .399 Each of these technical terms is carefully defined in his
text. Kun gzhi mam par shes pa, Ye shes sde explains, is specified as kun gzhi because it is
the ‘ground’ of the seeds of all phenomena virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral.400 And “since
this is of the nature of consciousness, it is also called a mam par shes p a ”m ‘All-ground’
(kun g z h i: älaya) is another word for ‘mind’ (sems : citta), explains Ye shes sde, because it
builds up latent tendencies that are virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral.402 As for the term
dharmakäya, dharma here refers to the tathägatagarbha that is one’s beginningless spiritual
affiliation (rigs) because it is the very nature of all sentient beings. Through becoming

397 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981, Snellgrove 1987, Makransky 1997.

ITa ba 7 khyadpar 434.4 f.: ... ’p hags pa ting nge ’dzin rgyalpo la sogs pa mdo sde mang po las sems can thams
cad ni de bzhin gshegs p a ’i snying po can yin no zhes ’byung ba dang\ |sems can thams cad sangs rgyas su ’g yur te\
\snod ma yin pa gang yang med do\ \zhes ’byung ba la sogs p a \...
399 .
supporting quotation from the ’Phags pa [P: ’p hags] dung phreng gi mdo reads (ibid. 436.4 f.): de bzhin
gshegs pa ’i snying po gsal bar ma gyur pa ’i tshe ni kun gzhi zhes bya ’o\ \gsal bar gyur pa de ’i tshe ni chos sku zhes
bya’o\\

ITa ba i khyad par 446.3 f.: kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dge ba dang\ \mi dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa ’i
chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gzhi yin pas kun g zh i’o\\ Compare with the observation o f Rang byung rdo ije that
18? 2^* w^en used independently o f rnam par shes pa can in some instances refer to suchness (tathatä). See below,

ITa ba i khyad par. 446.4: shes pa ’i rang bzhin yin pas rnam par shes pa ’o\ \
ITa ba ’i khyad par. 446.4 f.: kun gzhi ni ming geig tu sems zhes kyang bya ste | | dge ba dang mi dge ba dang lung
u ma bstan pa ’i bag chags sogs pa ’i phyir ro\ \
 obscured by what is unreal, it constitutes something defiled. But at the time of becoming
free from error through former reliance on [correct] application, it is present as one’s very
nature. This being present as one’s nature is known as dharmakäya.403

Ye shes sde elsewhere explains that since dharmakäya is the source (rtsa) or ground
(gzhi) in that it is not a composite phenomena and is devoid of variable epistemic qualities,
it is ever-lasting.404 It is also described as inconceivable (bsam gyis mi khyab), unchanging
( ’gyur ba med pa), and nonconceptualized (mam par mi rtog pa). “Dharmakäya is not
something having physical form [but] is the very nature of nonconceptual primordial
knowing (nirvikalpajñãna). It encompasses all knowable things. As the source of all
qualities such as the greatnesses of a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi che ba) and samädhis is is
known as tathatä and as utterly purified ãlayavijñãna.”405

It is of course crucial to distinguish Ye shes sde’s specification of kun gzhi as a

shorthand for the Yogācāra ālayavijñãna the source of error and defilement from the
rDzogs chen understanding of kun [gyi] gzhi, also widespread from the 8th Century onward,
as the undefiled unconditioned ground that is none other than the awakened mind
(bodhicitta). The two conceptions are diametrically opposed. The problem of how to relate
and/or reconcile these contrasting all-grounds posed a significant challenge to rDzogs chen
authors in the centuries to follow. The emerging doctrinal formulations reflect a dialectical
syncretism bom out of the attempt to harmonize late Yogācāra, Tathägatagarbha and tantric
streams of thought.

Before tuming to rDzogs chen views of the ground it is worth pausing to consider
just how much of Ye shes sde’s summary of what he considered the essentials of Mahāyāna
philosophy to be adopted by Tibet’s first ordained Buddhists corresponds to the key

403 ITa b a ’i khyad par. 436.6 f.: don bsdus pa zhes bya b a ’i bstan bcos las kyang chos sku zhes bya ba la\ \chos [D:
chas] ni thog ma m edpa nas rigs su gyur pa de bzhin gshegspa ’i snying po la bya ste| |sems can thams cad kyi rang
bzhin no\ | de ni yang dag pa ma yin pas bsgribs pas dri ma can du gyur te\ \gang gi tshe sbyor ba sngon du btad nas
’khrul pa dang bral ba de ’i tshe rang bzhin du gyur ro\ | rang bzhin du gyur ba de ni chos kyi sku zhes bshad do\ |
ITa ba i khyadpar. 443.1 f.: chos kyi sku ni dus byas kyi chos ma yin zhing mtshan ma tha dadpa med la rtsa ba
dang gzhi yin pas rtag pa ’o\ |

ITa ba i khyadpar. 435.5 f.: de la chos ki sku ni rnam par mi rtog pa ’i ye shes kyi rang bzhin gzugs can ma yin
pa\ Ishes bya thams cad du khyab pa\ |sangs rgyas kyi che ba nyid ting nge ’dzin la sogs pa yon tan thams cad kyi
’byung gnas de bzhin nyid dang\ \kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rnam par dag pa la bya ’o\ \
doctrinal elements of the emerging rDzogs chen tradition, particularly as these become
systematized in the classical period. These include inter alia (1) the sharp distinction
between (conditioned, defiled) kun gzhi and (unconditioned, undefiled) chos sku which Ye
shes sde moreover specifies as ground (gzhi); (2) the understanding of kun gzhi as
synonymous with dualistic mind (sems); (3) the defmition of chos sku in terms of non-
conceptual primordial knowing (nirvikalpajñãna), i.e. as inaccessible to thematic reflection
and rational inference; (4) the identification of tathägatagarbha with dharmakäya and, by
extension, with nirvikalpajñāna when these are purified of the karmic traces of the
ālayavijñānam ; and (5) the distinction (developed in the concluding passage of his text)
between ma rig pa and rig pa -407 It is evident that many of the Mahāyāna sources quoted or
cited by Ye shes sde that express these doctrinal points —particularly works ascribed to
Asańga-Maitreya - are also the ones favoured by rNying ma exegetes such as Klong chen
rab ’byams pa during the classical period of doctrinal synthesis when the focus had tumed to
elucidating the underlying continuity of Mahāyāna, Vajrayäna and rDzogs chen Systems. In
any event, it is clear that Ye shes sde, in establishing a doctrinal framework for the Tibetan
assimilation of Indian Buddhism, emphasized Mahāyāna themes and ideals that paralleled
and, in certain cases foreshadowed, developments in the classical rDzogs chen traditions.

§5. Conceptual History of the Ground in Early rDzogs chen

5.1 Soteriological Context of the Ground

Ye shes sde’s ITa ba’i khyad par may well be the first Tibetan-authored treatise to
specify the deployment of the Tibetan kun gzhi as a shorthand for the Yogācāra
ālayavijñāna. In any case, such specification may have at this time been deemed necessary

406 c trTJ ,
See iTa ba ’i khyad p a r: 447.1.
ITa ba ’i khyadpar\ 455.4 f.: “It is not the case that when ignorance ceases, there is simply nothing. Nor is it the
case that dependent origination will continue. Rather, when the trend toward pollution (samkleśa) ceases, the trend
toward purification (yyavadäna) [naturally] occurs. For example, when a sick person has taken medicine, then as his
illness and debilitations vanish, he regains health and long life. So also when ignorance ceases, open awareness
dawns. [Then all goals o f the Buddhist vehicles are progressively realized].” ma rig pa gags pas ci a n g m ed pa
gyur b a ’ang ma yin\ | rten cing ’brel bar ’byung bar ’g yur b a ’ang ma yin gyi\ \kun nas nyon mongs pa i phyogs
gags nas\ \rnam par byang ba ’i phyogs su ’g yur te\ \dper na sman bcud kyis len bya ba zos nas\ \che thung ba dang
nad mams med par gyur nas\ \tshe ring ba dang nad med pa rnyed par ’g yur ba bzhin du\ \ma rig pa gags te rig pa
byung nas...
to avoid confusion with Contemporary Mahäyoga/rDzogs chen conceptions of an absolute
kun gzhi that were also prevalent by the eighth Century. To gain a sense of what is
distinctive about the early rDzogs chen understanding of kun gzhi and gzhi, it is necessary at
the outset to consider these concepts in light of their soteriological context. We can then tum
to the specific problems their later confrontation with Yogācāra interpretations provoked. In
assessing their soteriological relevance, it is worth recalling that the principal classical
distinctions between kun gzhi/chos sku and sems/ye shes were introduced in a dass of
scriptures known as the ‘Esoteric Guidance Genre’ (man ngag gi sde) that claimed to base
themselves on oral transmissions (snyan brgyud) traced to a circle of early, mostly Indian,
masters who lived during the Royal Dynastie Period. Fundamental to these transmissions
were certain esoteric instructions (man ngag) given by a qualified master to bring a Student
face to face with the nature of mind (sems nyid) or primordial knowing (ye shes), a process
otherwise known as ascertaining the ground (gzhi gtan la dbab pa).m It is interesting to note
that this same pedagogical method of direct introduction to Mind itself (sems nyid ngo
sprod) which appears to have been widespread and relatively uncontroversial in the period
of early rDzogs chen also formed the comerstone of the Indian siddha traditions from which
the later gSar ma bKa’ brgyud and Sa skya Orders claimed descent. I say ‘uncontroversial’
because this method would become a subject of heated debate and a source of sectarian
rivalry during the new translation period when certain non-gradual Mahāmudrā teachings
associated with sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079-1153) were criticized by Sa skya
Paņdita (1182-1251) as being ‘foreign’-influenced Tibetan innovations (rang bzo) that had
little to do with the graded Indian tantric Systems.409

408 In classical rDzogs chen works, such instructions are collectively terms khregs chod or breakthrough teachings.
409 According to Sa paņ, the direct introduction circumvented, or at least rendered superfiuous, the traditional Indian
Mantrayäna Systems which generally viewed Mahāmudrā as the fruition (phala) o f a graded sequence o f tantric
initiations and stages o f practice and conforming in this way to Mahāyāna gradualist models of the Buddhist path. At
the centre o f the ensuing controversy was Sa paņ’s influential critique o f the “Present-day Mahāmudrā” or “Neo-
Mahāmudrā” Systems put forward in his sDom gsum rab dbye, Thub pa 7 dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba and sKye bu dam
pa rnams la spring ba 'i y i ge. Sa paņ’s critique was mainly directed at some o f the non-gradual Mahāmudrā
teachings of sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen emphasizing a ‘subisist’ path of directly realizing one’s natural mind,
one that stood in stark contrast to the type of gradual path sGam po pa had so carefully delineated in his Lam rim
thar rgyan. Sa paņ repudiated these non-gradual discourses on the grounds that (1) they were being taught
independently o f the Tantric system of mudräs elaborated by Näropa and transmitted in Tibet by his disciple Mar pa,
that (2) they represented newly introduced doctrinal innovations of questionable (i.e., non-Indian) provenance and
that (3) they advocated an erroneous nonconceptual, non-gradual approach to goal-realization. See Jackson 1994a
 In rDzogs chen, the ground one ascertains through direct introduction is known as
the ground’s abiding condition (gzhi’i gnas lugs). It is further identified with luminosity ( ’od
gsal), buddha nature (bde gshegs snying po), and dharmatdhätu (chos dbyings). It is said to
be unfabricated (ma bcos pa) and empty (stong pa nyid) but at the same time lucid (gsal ba)
and replete with the expressive energy of inbom qualities (yon tan rtsal rdzogs). The
primary function of the esoteric guidance teachings, then, is to enable the aspirant to directly
recognize the ground that is open awareness (rig pa), and to become progressively familiar
with this condition until it becomes an enduring reality, whereupon the inherent qualities
and capabilities manifest unimpededly for the benefit of others.410

In tantras and oral instructions of the period, the ‘ground’ already figures as the first
of three basic soteriological categories: ground (gzhi), path (lam) and fruition ( ’bras bu), or
ground, nature (rang bzhin) and fruition, or ground, cause (rgyu) and fruition. These
categories are in some cases referred to as the three aspects of tantra, literally three
continuities (rgyud gsum), to which a fourth, ‘gathering tantra’ ( ’dus p a ’i rgyud) is
occasionally added. A relatively early example of this four-fold Classification is found in the
Ye shes gsang ba bshad p a ’i rgyud contained the early Zur tantra collection Bai ro rgyud
’bum which States:

‘Tantra’ is explained as fourfold: ground tantra and path tantra, fruition tantra and
Compilation tantra. There is nothing whatsoever not comprised within these

and Seyfort Ruegg 1989. In this connection, it is important to note that the majority of Mahämudra teachings
attributed to Indian siddhas such as Saraha and Tilopa were decidedly non-gradual in character, advocating as they
did a wide ränge o f unmediated, spontaneous styles of meditation and instruction. They were also frequently taught
independently o f the tantric system o f four mudräs and their associated initiations. It is clear, then, that Tibetan
masters such as Mi la ras pa and sGam po pa based themselves upon antinomian approaches to Mahamudrä that
were well-developed in Indian siddha circles by the time o f the early Tibetan bKa brgyud masters. There is little
doubt, however, that the Tibetan adepts did far more than faithfully preserve the teachings o f their Indian masters.
By internalizing, interpreting and systematizing these siddha teachings in new ways, the early bKa brgyud masters
and their successors expanded what were probably fairly marginal Indian Buddhist tantric movements into vital
mainstreams o f the ascendant bKa’ brgyud Orders. Thus, whatever the non-Indian influences on sGam po pa’s vaned
discourses on Mahāmudrā, it is in the teachings o f the Indian siddhas and their Tibetan successors (such as Mar pa
and Mi la ras pa) that we find the major source of inspiration for sGam po pa’s own non-gradual Mahāmudrā
instructions. On the history and transmission o f Indian Mahāmudrā according to Tibetan authors, see Mathes 2011.
In this sense, the rDzogs chen approach can be seen as both sudden (insofar as the direct recognition o f mind
occurs all at once’) and gradual (insofar as the familiarization with this state generally takes time). sNying thig
sources mention only two individuals in the history of rDzogs chen, dGa’ rab rdo ije and Seng ge dbang phyug, for
whom direct recognition and remaining continuously in the state of rig pa occurred at the same time.
 [categories]. ‘Ground’ is like the essence of the sun and ‘path’ is like the sky;
‘fruition’ is like the wish-granting jewel and ‘gathering’ is like the ocean.4,1

Another text ascribed to Vairocana included in the bsTan 'gyur entitled Rin po che'i rtsod
p a ’i 'klnor lo employs the ground, path and goal triad as an interpretive Schema for
elaborating on a number of favoured rDzogs chen topics such as errancy ( ’khrul pa) and
spontaneity (Ihun grub).412

The locus classicus for the three continuities is often said to be the supplemental
tantra (uttaratantra) of the Guhyasamäja413, i.e. the eighteenth chapter appended to the root
text, wherein ‘ground’ is presented as the first of three aspects of a single stream or
continuum (rgyun/rgyud).414 One must note, however, that the tantra’s categories of ground
(gzhi), nature (rang bzhin) and inalienableness (mi ’phrog pa) and its definitions of these are
difficult to reconcile with the well-known Tibetan categories of ground, path and goal. For
example, the tantra defines ground as ‘stratagem’/ ‘method’ (thabs : upäya), a definition that
does not square with the Tibetan rDzogs chen understanding of ground as being essentially
unconditioned, unmodified and empty.415 According to the rDzogs chen understanding,

41'Bg vol. 3, 5.5 f.: rgyud ces bya ba gzhi ru bshad\ \gzhi y i rgyud dang lam gyi rgyud[ \ ’bras bu ’i rgyud dang ’dus
pa ’i rgyud[ | ’di ru ma ’dus gang yang med\ \gzhi ni nyi ma ’i snying po la\ \la ni nam mkha ’ Ita bur bde\ \ ’bras bu
y id bzhin nor bu la\ \ ’dus pa rgya mtsho Ita bu ’o\\
4.2 D vol. 204,422.4 f. and 432.4 f. respectively.

4.3 According to colophonic information appended to this text in different editions o f the rNying ma rgyud ’bum, the
Guhyasamäja mülatantra was translated by Vimalamitra and sKa ba dpal brtsegs circa 8th Century, whereas the
appended uttaratantra (Ch. 18) known in Tibetan as gSang ’dus rgyud phyi ma (“Later Guhyasamäja”) was
translated later by Buddhaguhya and ’Brog mi dpal ye shes. See Mayer 2004, 130 n. 4. On Buddhaguhya (Tib.
Sangs rgyas gsang ba), see n. 419.
gSang ba dus pa rgyud, Tb vol. 18, 944.4 f.: “‘Tantra’ is known as a stream. This stream has three aspects
distinguished as ground, the nature corresponding to that, and inalienableness. The nature aspect is the cause factor,
while inalienableness is the goal. Ground is known as ‘stratagem/method’.These three summarize what is meant by
‘stream’.” rgyud ni rgyun zhes bya bar grags\ \rgyun de mam pa gsum ’gyur te\ \gzhi dang de bzhin rang bzhin
dang\ \mi ’p hrogs pa yis rab phye ba\ \rnam pa rang bzhin rgyu yin te\ \de bzhin mi ’p hrogs ’bras b u ’o\ \gzhi ni
thabs shes bya ba ste| |gsum gyis rgyun gyi don bsduspa ’o\\
Rog bande Shes rab od s (1166-1244) bsTan pa i sgron me (163.6 f.) gives a quite different construal o f the
Guhyasamäja passage, bringing it more into line with the rDzogs chen understanding: "Tantra has three aspects
classified as ground, the nature ofthat, and inalienableness. The nature o f that ground is cause. To not be alienated
[ffom] that is the goal.” rgyud ni rnam pagsum ’g yur te\ \gzhi dang de y i rang bzhin dang\\mi phrog pa y i rab phye
ba\ Igzhi de rang bzhin rgyu yin te | | de bzhin mi phrog ’bras b u ’o\\ Yet anotherversionof the passage is given by
Rang byung rdo ije in his auto-commentary to the Zab mo nang don where ‘connection’ ( ’brel ba) replaces
‘continuum/stream’ (rgyun) as the defining feature of ‘tantra’. Zab mo nang don gyi ’grel pa, Rang byung rdo rje
gsung bum vol. 7, 366.1 f.. rgyud ces bya ba brel ba i don\ \ brel ba la yang rnam gsum ste\ \gzhi dang rang bzhin
’bras bu dang\ \mi ’p hrogs pa yis phye ba nyid\ \gzhi dang rang bzhin rgyu yin te\ \de bzhin mi ’p hrog ’bras b u ’o\\
 stratagems (thabs) are included under the rubric of the path as means of familiarizing
oneself with this unconditioned ground. A similar interpretive scheme consisting of ground,
cause and goal (gzhi, rgyu, ’bras bu) is adpoted by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his
commentary on the dGongs ’dus p a ’i mdo (late 9th c.), root tantra of the Anuyoga dass, to
characterize the three yogas of action, action-performance and non-action which he employs
as interpretive categories for organizing the subject matter of the tantra. They are then
compared to seeds, farming activities, and reaping the fruits of one’s labour.4161 mention
these early rDzogs chen examples only because the basic rubrics of ground, path and goal
served as a prototype for more elaborate soteriological schemes417 widely used from the 14th
c. onward by Klong chen rab ’byams pa and his successors to structure the essentials
Buddhist thought and practice.418

5.2 A Typology of the Ground in early rDzogs chen

How was this primordial ground or all-ground understood in early rDzogs chen?
Given its central place in rDzogs chen soteriology, it is not suprising that the ground was
closely associated with the three main constellations of core soteriological ideas that define
early rDzogs chen exegesis: (a) the nature of mind (sems nyid, ye shes, rig pa, byang chub
[kyi] sems), (b) the nature of reality (de bzhin pa, de kho na nyid, chos nyid, chos dbyings)
and (c) buddha nature (de bzhin/bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po, byang chub snying po). What
!s common to these otherwise disparate gnoseological, ontological and buddhological
conceptions is their reference to human reality in its most originary condition. While
4’h16 I W Pa *8 ° cha (vol. 1, 8.2 f.) gNubs chen States that the three successive yogas of action (bya ba ’i rnal
yor), action performance (bya ba byed pa ’i rnal ’byor) and non-action (bya ba med pa ’i rnal ’byor) can be
erstood in terms o f ground, cause and goal. bya ba ’i rnal ’byor dang] | bya ba byed pa ’i rnal ’byor dang\ | bya ba
e* Zm a ^ ^y°r ro\ ’i don ni gzhi dang\ \rgyu dang\ \ ’bras bur ston te | ... de dag ni dpe sa bon dang\ \so nam
8yi ya ba dang\ | ’badpas brnga btsas byas pa ’i ’bras kyi phung po Ita bu ’o\ |
Rang byung rdo rje has commented on the relationship between the variously formulated categories o f ground,
Pa and goal and the three types o f aspirant famously articulated in Ratnagotravibhäga 1.47, viz. the impure
, lnary heings), partly pure partly impure (bodhisattvas on the path), and pure (Tathägatas). Zab mo nang don gyi
? P f' ßan8 byung rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 7, 377.5 f.: de la gnas skabs rnam pa gsum du ’g yur te ma dag pa
ang cas pa sems can gyi gnas skabs dang\ | ma dag pa dang dag pa gnyis ka Idan pa byang chub sems dpa ’ lam
1Snas stobs dang\ \shin tu rnam par dag pa de bzhin gshegs pa ’i gnas skabs te| | de Itar rnam pa gsum po ’di la
gi tha snyad kyi rnam grangs su\ \gzhi dang lam dang ’bras bu dang\ \gzhi rgyud dang thabs rgyud dang ’bras
u 1rgyud gsum dang\ \gzhi dngos po ’i gnas lugs dang lam gyi rim pa dang ’bras bu skye ba ’i rim pa zhes bya ba la
sogs pa sngon gyi mkhas grub rnams kyis gsungs äo| |
Chapter six discusses a number o f rNying ma soteriological schemes and their impliciations.
detailed treatment of these categories would far exceed the scope of the present study, I will
provide a brief synopsis of each with a focus on doctrinal developments distinctive of early
rDzogs chen that have hitherto received little attention in Contemporary scholarship.

(a) Ground as the Nature o fM in d

In the sBas p a ’i rgum chung, an early rDzogs chen text recovered at Dunhuang
attributed to Sangs rgyas sbas pa (Buddhagupta419), an identification is already made
between the ground (gzhi ma) and Mind itself (sems nyid):

Mind itself is the sky[-like] expanse [of] awakening,

It is the ground for realizing awakening.
Mind itself which is itself without ground or root
Is not found by searching for it, just like space.420

An interlinear note further clarifies Mind itself as denoting the nature of the all-ground (kun
gzhi chos nyid).421 Elsewhere among early rDzogs chen scripture the term ‘self-occurring

419 Karmay identifies the author as Buddhagupta (Tib. Sangs rgyas sbas pa) who is not to be confused with the
earlier Buddhaguhya (Tib. Sangs rgyas gsang ba), an 8th c. Indian authority on Yogatantras who was instrumental in
the early translation and transmission o f Yoga, Kriyä and Caryä tantras in Tibet at the behest o f king Khri srong
lde’u btsan (742-797). On Buddhaguhya, see Karmay 1988, 62 f., and Germano 2002, 229 f.. The traditional
identification o f Buddhaguhya and Buddhagupta is problematic. As evidence for Buddhagupta’s authorship of the
sBas p a ’i rgum chung, Karmay cites gNubs chen’s discussion o f the teachings and teaching methods o f one Sangs
rgyas sbas pa in the Mahäyoga section o f his bSam gtan mig sgron. It is also worth pointing out that gNubs chen in a
later section o f the same work identifies Buddhagupta ( ’Bu dha kug ta) as the chief proponent o f a dass o f rDzogs
chen teachings emphasizing freedom from deliberate activity (bya btsal dang bral ba) (see Table E on 171).
Buddhagupta is included in lists of early rDzogs chen masters and is credited with co-translating (with Vimalamitra,
Līlāvajra and others) a number o f works on Māyãjāla (sGyu ’p hrul drwa ba) tantras belonging to the rNying ma
Mahäyoga d ass that are included in the Peking bsTan ’gyur. See Karmay 1988, 62 f.; Kapstein 2008, 281 f..
420 sBas p a ’i rgum chung, IOL 594 Ch.73.III.21, fol. lb.4 f.: The full passage including linear notes (indicated by
round brackets) reads: sems nyid (kun gzhi chos nyid) nam mkha * byang chub dbyings (bdus drangs)\ \byang chub
sgrub pa ’i gzhi (btsal sems dang bral ba) ma yin\ \gzhi rtsa m yedpa ’i sems nyid la (thog ma dang tha ma dang dbu
ma dang mtha ’ myod [myed] do)| |btsal bas myi rnyednam mkha ’ ’dra\ \(mye yisb chu gsodpa dang ’dra\ \ri dvagsc
smigsd rgyu snyogpa\\). Note here that sems nyid is glossed as kun gzhi chos nyid. atext: ka\ btext: ’is; ctext: dags;
dtext: smug. “Mind itself (the very nature of the ground o f all) is the sky[-like] expanse [ofj awakening (gathering
[all] together). It is the ground for realizing awakening (that eludes the searching mind). Mind itself being without
ground or root (without beginning and end, centre and periphery) is not found by searching, just like space. (Like
[trying] to quell water by means o f fire [or like] deer chasing after a mirage).”
421 In an interesting Contemporary Tibetan commentary on this text, the sBas p a ’i rgum chung gi tshig ’grel,
Namkhai Norbu identifies kun gzhi chos nyid as a semantic equivalent (don geig) of don gyi kun gzhi which he
contrasts with bag chags sna tshogs kyi kun gzhi. See Norbu 1984, p. 187-8. From a chronological standpoint, it
should perhaps be noted that the specification of a genuine all-ground (don gyi kun gzhi) that is distinguished from a
conditioned ground is not attested in works prior to the Period o f Fragmentation.
primordial knowing as the all-ground’ kun gzhi rang byung ye shes is employed to
characterize the nature of the mind of awakening (byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin).422
In this literature, the locutions ground (gzhi) or ground of all (kun [gyi] gzhi) are used
synonymously with and frequently in combination with ‘mind of/as awakening’ (byang chub
kyi sems), arguably the most important and influential idea/ideal in early rDzogs chen
discourses. The conjunction kun gzhi byang chub [kyi] jem s ‘awakened mind that is the
ground of all’ is attested in several of the early rNying ma tantras423 assigned to the Mind
Genre (sems sde or sems phyogs as it at times designated in earlier works) and invites
comparison with the appositional compound rig pa byang chub kyi sems which we discussed
earlier. Fairly typical in this regard is the Statement from the Srog gi ’khor lo, one of the
early corpus of eighteen Sems sde ‘tantras’424:

The uncontrived mind of awakening, the ground of all [in which appearances] are
non-existent, is natural luminosity. Since the environing world and its inhabitants are
without exception fully awakened, there have never been any to train. Since
everything without exception is buddhahood, it is the great way of the Tathägatas.425

Other related Synonyms of the ground include well known rDzogs chen technical terms
Mind itself (sems nyid), the nature of mind (sems kyi rang bzhin, sems kyi chos nyid), self-
occurring primordial knowing (rang byung ye shes), open awareness (rig pa), as well as an
early neologism of gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes: the awakened mind of self-awareness (rang
rigpa’i byang chub kyi sems).

Byang chub sems rdo rje ’od ’p hro ’i brgyud kyi rim pa, Bg vol. 4, 146.4.
The occurrence o f this term in two o f the eighteen sems sde tantras, the rTse mo byung rgyal and rMad du byung
ba, and their commentaries, is discussed below, 186 and n. 487.
4 There is evidence to suggest that this corpus o f eighteen tantras (rgyud bco brgyad) that was known to early
rDzogs chen adherents consisted of translations o f one corpus among a number of recensions that were current in
India during this period. The existence o f Indian Originals would also account for a similar corpus of tantras in China
dating to the same period. See Germano 2002 (231) who cites an unpublished paper presented by Eastman 1981. It
is worth noting that the many Tibetan texts bearing the titles o f the works that traditionally make up the rgyud bco
brgyad that one finds in the rNying ma rgyud ’bum and Bai ro rgyud ’bum often vary considerably from one another
in length and content. This suggests the possibilities of (a) different recensions of the Indian corpus o f texts
translated into Tibetan and/or (b) the later addition and interpolation of material into earlier Tibetan translations.
425 See for example, Srog gi ’khor lo, Bg vol. 1: 307.1 f.: m edpa kun gzhi byang chub kyi sems ma bcos rang bzhin
& ’od gsal ba yin te\ \snod bcud ma lus par byang chub pas da gdod sbyang du gang yang med pa'o\ \thams cad
ma ^us Pa sangs rgyas pas bde gshegs pa ’i lam chen po\ \
 The relationship between ground and Mind itself is further clarified in the ’Phrul gyi
me long (Mirror o f Manifestation) of gNyags Jñānakumāra: “The ground is the very nature
of mind (sems kyi chos nyid),” States gNyag, “it is the way things are in the myriad ways
they are, reality itself as it is ascertained, indistinguishable in buddhas and sentient
beings.”426 This type of presentation is widely adopted in classical rNying ma exegesis
where the idea of the ground, whether discussed as a soteriological category (gzhi - lam -
'bras bu) or as one of the eleven adamantine topics (rdo rje’i gnas) of the sNying thig
system, is identified with the nature of mind (sems nyid), primordial knowing (ye shes) and
open awareness (rig pa).

(b) Ground as the Nature of Reality

Just as early rDzogs chen ground concepts are associated with the nature of mind
they are likewise associated with what this mode of cognition opens onto, the nature of
reality - tathatã, dharmadhätu, dharmakäya. In several Dunhuang rDzogs chen manuscripts,
the ground (gzhi, gzhi ma) or ground of all (kun gzhi) is used in conjunction with ji bzhin pa
(‘suchness’, literally ‘just as is’, ‘the way things are’) and de kho na nyid (‘thatness’, lit.
‘that alone itself). An interlinear note to the sBas p a ’i rgum chung glosses kun gzhi as the
utterly pure expanse of space (mkha’ dbyings mam par dag pa).427 It may be recalled that
the Dunhuang commentary on the Rig pa ’i khu byug had also characterized suchness as “the
ground producing all that is good” (legs pa thams cad skyedpa’i gzhi).428

By the late 9th to early 10th centuries, a period that coincides with the Period of
Fragmentation or so-called dark period in Tibetan history, ‘ground’ (gzhi) had become a
cover term for all the defining elements of rDzogs chen itself. In his bSam gtan mig sgron,
gNubs chen identifies nine views of rDzogs chen that were prevalent at the time of its
composition (late 9th- early 10th c.). These provide some idea of the spectrum of early
rDzogs chen views on the nature of reality prevalent during the early period. As these have

426 Ibid.: 977.2 f.: gzhi la nges pa bzhin de kho n a ji snyed pa'i j i bzhin pa sems kyi chos nyid sangs rgyas sems can
dbyer med pa la\...
427 sBas pa 7 rgum chung IOL 594 Ch.73-11-21: fol. 1a.5: kun gzhi mkha ’ dbyings rnam par dag pa 7 ngo bstan pa...
428 See Karmay 1988: 57.
 been documented and discussed by Samten Karmay, I will summarize them here in a table
along with the early rDzogs chen teachers429 with whom the views are associated in
interlinear notes to the bSam gtan mig sgron:

Table E: rDzogs chen views and proponents according to bSam gtan mig sgron

10th c. rDzogs chen V iew s (Ita ba) P roponents of Views

1. Free from [any] fram es o f reference M ahārāja of Oddiyäna and Vimalamitra

(gza’ gtad dang bral b a ’i Ita ba) (o rgyan ma ha ra tsa dang vi ma mi tra)
2. A great state of spontaneity Vajraprabha
(Ihun gyi grub pa ’i ngang chen por ba) (dga ’ rab rdo rje)
3. Supreme principle Vairocana
(bdag nyid chen po) (be ro tsa na)
4. Self-occurring primordial knowing dGe slong ma Kun dga’ ma
(rang byung gi ye shes) (dge slong ma kun dga ’ ma)
5. Free from deliberative activity Buddhagupta
(bya btsal dang bral ba) ( ’bu dha kug ta)
6. Great bliss Kukkuräja and Śrīsimha
(bde ba chen po) (ku ku ra tsa dang shi ri seng ha)
7. Non-duality Mañjuśrīmitra
(gnyis su med pa) ( ’jam dpal shes gnyen)
S. Single great sphere Sras thu bo Ha ti Rä dza has ti (Räjahasti)
(thig le chen po cig) (Ingas [?1 thu bo ra tsa nyas sti)
9. Suchness as ground o f all phenomena dG a’ rab rdo rje, rGyal po ’D a’ he na ta, and gNubs chen
(chos thams cad gzhi j i bzhin pa) (dga ’ rab rdo rje dang rgyal po ’da ’ he na ta lo ’i bzhed/

Each of these views is discussed at length in the bSam gtan mig sgron. It is of interest
that gNubs chen singles out only the ninth “the view of suchness as the ground of all
phenomena” (chos thams cad gzhi ji bzhin par Ita ba) as the position favoured by gNubs
chen himself, dGga’ rab rdo rje (identified by tradition as the first human teacher of rDzogs
chen) and rGyal po ’Da’ he na ta. Among all the views, gNubs chen explains, this view of
the naturally present ground of all phenomena, the very being of existent entities, is least
mistaken insofar as it is implicit in all the other rDzogs chen views: “Here, the view of
suchness as the ground of all phenomena (gzhi ji bzhin pa) is particularly unmistaken. Why?

Assuming that “Mahārāja o f Oddiyâna” (o rgyan ma ha ra tsa) refers to the Lha’i mkhan po ma ha ra included in
r Z08s chen lineage listings, all these teachers are attested in the teaching lineage (snyan brgyud) of early rDzogs
7>en masters Presented in the Paņ sgrub rnams kyi thugs bcud snying gi nyi ma, the first text of the Bai ro rgyud
um and likely a prototype for later lists. On this text and its importance, see Kapstein 2008.
Because the very thatness of all existent entities is in itself uncontrived and unfalsified.
Therefore it is called the Atiyoga Great Perfection.”430

Commenting on a passage from the rNnal ’byor grub p a ’i lung Kun ’dus rig p a ’i
mdo43\ an early text classed as Anuyoga, that reads “Because the ground is suchness (lit.
“just as is”), it is uncontrived” (gzhi ji bzhin p a ’i phyir ma bcos p a ’o), gNubs chen explains
that “the point here is that suchness is [defined] with regard to reality itself because it
alludes in a merely figurative way to something inconceivable.”432 Thus, the simple reality
of the ground (gzhi ’i don tsam) is claimed to be inexpressible (brjod du med pa) by thought
and language and is in this sense nameless (ming med).433 The ground is inherently
nonconceptual, gNubs chen continues, even if we introduce dualistic concepts to
differentiate between samsära and bodhi, between immature sentient beings obscured by
adventitious clouds of false conceptions and buddhas for whom such adventitious have been
purified away.434 Thus, in response to the question posed in the Kun ’dus rig p a ’i mdo of
whether “the ground that is named is ultimately nonconceptual?”, gNubs chen responds that
the simple reality of the ground utterly confounds representation and concludes with a
consideration of the unavoidable aporias this viewpoint entails:

When it comes to conceptualizing the nonconceptual, it is actually [as if] one’s

capacity to use language had not yet developed. But that is not all: insofar as the

430 bSam gtan mig sgron: 375.5 f.: de la chos thams cad gzhi j i bzhin par Ita ba ni\ \khyad par du ’ang ma nor ba ste |
Ide ’i phyir zhe na\ \dngos po rnams kyi de kho na nyid kha na ma bcos ma bslad pa nyid pas a ti yo ga rdzogs pa
chen po ’o\ \
431 The text’s full title is De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba ’i ye shes don gyi snying po rdo rje bkod
pa ’i rgyud rNal ’byor grub pa ’i lung Kun ’dus rig pa ’i mdo Theg pa chen po mngon par rtogs pa chos kyi rnam
grangs rnam par bkod pa zhes bya ba 'i mdo. This is one o f the so-called five (or later four) so-called root tantras of
Anuyoga corpus and is said to be the root tantra (rtsa rgyud) for which the dGongs ’dus pa ’i mdo (another of the
four) was an explanatory tantra (bshad rgyud). These works were included in the bsTan ’gyur. The Kun ’dus rig pa ’i
mdo is found in P. no. 0452: 81b3-276b4; D. no. 0829: 290a7-290a7.
432 bSam gtan mig sgron: 385.6: don des na j i bzhin de kho na nyid las\ \blo dvags tsam du bsam gyis mi khyab pa ’i
chos su grags pa ’i phyir] \
433 These are two of the seventy descriptions o f rDzogs chen gNubs chen discusses in the bSam gtan mig sgron.
434 bSam gtan mig sgron: 387.5 f.: gzhi’i don tsam du yang mi rtog\ \rnam par mi rtog tags so| |de ci ’i phyir zhe na\
gzhi’i don tsam zhig ni ’di zhes sangs rgyas nyid kyis btsal yang mi rnyed do\ |de bas na glo bur gyi rtog pa dang\
Imi rtog pa la sangs rgyas dang\ \sems can zhes btags par zad kyi\ \de bzhin nyid de la ni sangs rgyas dang\ \sems
can du cung zad kyang med do\ \ ’on tang na byis pa rnams ni glo bur gyi sprin gyis sgrib pa la\ \glo bur gyi chos
dag byed du med cing\ | ’khor ba dang\ \byang chub gnyis su rtog par byed do\ | Text in bold is from the Kun ’dus rig
pa ’i mdo.
 reality of things just as they are (ji bzhin pa de kho na nyid) is without causes and
conditions, it has no origin whatsover. Because it is spontaneously present it does not
itself depend on anything. Yet because it is free from any basis, it is itself
foundationless (gnas med pa) and groundless (gzhi med pa). Since in being
foundationless, it does not cease in any way, it is not a nihilistic [extreme]. But since
its nature is ascertained as being without permanence, it is [also] not an etemalistic
[extreme].435

The attempt to understand the ‘ground’ inescapably comcs up against the limits of thought
and language. We are confronted with the quixotic prospect of naming what is unameable
and conceiving the nonconceptual, all in an attempt to understand an abiding ground that is
nonetheless groundless in the dual senses of being unceasing and impermanent. With this
characterization of the ground as transcending the limits of thought and language, and the
extremes of nihilism and etemalism, gNubs chen sets the stage for sNying thig formulations
of the ground as both empty and luminous, originally pure yet spontaneously present.

(c) The Ground as Buddha Nature

Pre-classical rDzogs chen sources (8th to I I th c.) predate the period of intensive
buddha nature exegesis and debate that followed the ascendancy of new (gsar ma) Tibetan
religious schools from the 1Ith onward, a period that saw the translation of important buddha
nature śāstras, the most influential being the Ratnagotravibhäga. It is nonetheless well-
established that Mahāyāna tathägatagarbha doctrine was well known in 8th Century Tibet
since it is a subject found in early translations of many important sütras and in a few
independent Tibetan treatises.436 We have already drawn attention to one such treatise, Ye
shes sde’s ITa b a ’i khyad par. Another is the Thabs shes sgron ma of the rDzogs chen author
dPal dbyangs (8th c.), one of the original seven monks (sad mi mi bdun) ordained by
Śāntaraksita and the second Tibetan abbot of bSam yas monastery.437 In this short text

bSam gtan mig sgron 388.3 f.: mi rtog pa la rtog pa ni don la brda ’ shed ma bye ba ’o\ |de yang ma zad de| [ji
zhin pa de kho na nyid de ni rgyu rkyen med la gang du yang thogs pa med de| \lhun gyis grub pa i phyir\ |gang
o ang rag ma las pa\ | de ni rten dang bral ba ’i phyir] |gnas med pa gzhi med pa ’i phyir] \rten med pa gang du ang
ma gags pas\ Ichad par ma yin pa\ \ther zug med de rang bzhin nges pas rtag pa med pa\ \
Wangchuk 2005 has commented that almost all of the Indian sources on tathägatagarbha noted by Seyfort
Uegg 1973 are contained in the early IDan dkar ma catalogue. Ye shes sde (8th c.) is thus able to quote or eite many
of these in his ITa b a ’i khyad par.
437

D no. 4449, vol. no, 768.6-769.6. On dPal dbyangs, see Tucci 1980: 5 f.; Snellgrove 1987, vol. 2: 430 f.. See
also 170 and 33 n. 61 and 86 n. 220 above.
 covering the essentials of Mahāyāna from the standpoint of realizing the nature of mind,
dPal dbyangs explicitly identifies buddha nature with the nature of mind. According to dPal
dbyangs, *sugatagarbha, the nature of mind, appears in each and every mind-stream that
grasps a ’self’ among the long-deluded sentient beings while its very nature remains one
with the dharmakäya of the victorious ones.438

The term bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po (*sugatagarbha439), a virtual synonymn of de

bzhin gshegs p a ’i snying po (tathägatagarbha), also occurs in many tantras of the period.440
It is found in many early rDzogs chen texts such as the Srog gi ’khor lo441, Byang chub sems
bde b a ’i myu gu442, *Guhyagarbha443, and dGongs ’dus p a ’i mdo444. All belong to the
formative Mahäyoga tantric traditions and Sems sde (“Mind Genre”) or, as it was
sometimes called, Sems phyogs (“Mind Orientation”) tradition of rDzogs chen. The first
two texts mentioned are found among the corpus of eighteen tantras (rgyud bco brgyad)
belonging to the Mind Genre that are said to have been transmitted by Vairocana (8th c.).
The *Guhyagarbha is the root tantra (mülatantra) within the Mãyājãla (sGyu ’phrul drwa
ba) cycle and classified as Mahäyoga. The dGongs ’dus is eventually (14th c.) considered the

D fol. 769.1 (also NyKs vol. 82: 1052.2): bde gshegs snying po sems kyi rang bzhin la\ yun ring dus nas rmongs
pa 7 sems can rnams\ | bdag tu ’dzin pa ’i sems rgyud so sor snang\ | rang bzhin nyid ni rgyal ba ’i chos skur gcig\ | .
439 Seyfort Ruegg (1973: 68) notes that the Sanskrit equivalent is not attested in any Buddhist Sanskrit works.
440 See Wangchuk 2005.
441 Srog gi ’khor lo, Tk vol. 1: 446.3 f.: khams gsum brtags na ’khor ba mya ngan med\ \phyogs char brtses na bde
gshegs snying po yin\ \kun gyi rang bzhin ’j a ’ tshon snang bzhin med\ | In Tb vol. 1, the second line reads: phyogs
char char ba rtses na bde gshegs snying po yin\ The passage as found quoted in the bSam gtan mig sgron o f gNubs
Sangs rgyas ye shes is. khams gsum brtags na khor ba mya ngan med\ |phyogs char gtsen na bde gshegs snying po
min\ I. This reading (min not yin) is corroborated by a commentary on this tantra found in the bK a’ ma shin tu rgyas
pa (NyKs, vol. 103: 248.3 f.): phyogs char gces na bde gshegs snying po min\ \kun gyi rang bzhin j a ’ tshon snang
bzhin med\\ “If evaluated in a partial manner [commentary: “i.e. by way o f epistemological means o f valid
cognition”], it is not the *sugatagarbha. The nature o f all is rainbow[-like], apparer.t yet nothing.” The term bde
gshegs snying po is not found in the version o f Srog gi ’khor lo contained in Bg vol. 1: 305. 5: which appears to be
an altogether different work, though the term snying po byang chub, a semantic equavalent, occurs twice. See 307.3
f. and also 310.5 f. which States: “Because the naturally occuring transcendent conqueror has always been the
essence of ultimate reality, it is also called the awakening-quintessence that is inconceivable.” rang byung gi bcom
Idan ’das don dam pa ’i ngo bo ye nas yin pas\ \snying po byang chub dgongs su med pa zhes kyang bya\ \
442 Tk vol. 1: 449.7 f.: Ihun gyis grub pas che ba la\ \thams cad bde gshegs snying po las\ \rnam rtog las kyis ’khrul
pa la\\ For identical passage in Tb see vol. 1: 630.6 f..
441 See below 180-1.
444Tbvol. 16:31.1, 146.1.
root tantra of the Anuyoga class445, though nowhere in the tantra itself or in the works of
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, who is credited with assisting in its translation and
authoring its first commentary, is this identification made. Rather, the scope of the tantra is
the Guhyamantra tradition as a whole inclusive of Mahä, Anu and Ati446 as these were
known and practiced in m id-^-m id-lO 111 Century Tibet.447 It is thus apparent that
Tathägatagarbha doctrine was already quite widespread in Tibet by the eighth Century, both
in sütric and tantric sources, and that it appears to have been accepted as an important and
valid Buddhist doctrine that, at this time, generated little controversy.

What intrigues us about these scattered references to tathägatagarbha/sugatagarbha

in early rDzogs chen scripture is that these terms, the focus of so much theorizing in later
times, are here passed over with little notice. This undoubtedly has much to do with the
virtually unanimous Tibetan view that the tantric and siddha paths are superior to sütric, a
view reflecting the ascendancy and widespread influence of Indian Buddhist tantric models
and teachings at the time of assimilation. Despite the early propagation of late Mahāyāna
buddha nature doctrines in Tibet, our oldest rDzogs chen sources consecrate considerable
attention to buddha nature terms and ideas that do not appear to be linked in any obvious
way with sütric discourses. To be more specific, the authors of the Mahäyoga/Sems sde
scriptures as well as their early Tibetan commentators, gNubs chen and Rong zom pa in
particular, evidently preferred to use the terms byang chub [kyi] snying po448 (‘quintessence

Rog Bande Shes rab ’od makes this assocition in his 13th Century bsTan pa 7 sgron me.
The dGongs ’dus became the locus classicus for the well-known rNying ma Classification of nine vehicles. While
earlier nine-fold Systems had been attempted in Dunhuang texts and elsewhere, the dGongs dus may have been the
first source to present them as they appear in the later tradition”. See Dalton 2002: 85.
447 See Dalton 2002: 318-19. Dalton notes the rtsa lung practices which became a hallmark of later rDzogs chen
characterizations o f Anuyoga are given only passing notice in the dGongs ’dus.
448 The term occurs frequently in the rTse mo byung rgyal, Tk vol. 1: 434.4, 435.5 (ye nas Ihun grub byang chub
snying po), 437.7, 439.6, 440.4, 440.6. Among the very numerous occurrences of the term in Sems sde works, see
Khyung chen Idings p a , Tk vol. 1: 422.5; Khyung che Idings pa ’i ’g rel pa, NyKs vol. 103: 22.2; dGongs ’dus pa ’i
ndo, Tb vol. 16: 415.1; Byang chub sems ’khor lo rdo rje, Tk vol. 2: 309.4, 310.4, Nam mkha'i m tha'dang mnyam
pa’i rgyud chen po, Bg vol. 1: 182.1, 197.4, 237.3, 261.1. Occurrences o f the term in gNubs chen’s works include
rTse mo byung rgyal ’grel pa: 205.5, 207; Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 2: 50.6, 55.1; bSam gtan mig sgron: 394.4. The
term is discussed by Rong zom pa in his Theg chen tshul ’jug, Rong zong gsung ’bum vol. 1: 503.9 where, in the
context o f specifying deviations (gol sa) from bodhigarbha, he characterizes it as (1) free from all charactensics of
appearance (503.18), (2) unmodified by extraneous influences (503.24), and (3) unproduced by causes and
conditions (504.14). See also his rGyud rgyal gsang ba snying po dkon cog ’grel: 127.13 (discussed below). e
term is also found in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras of the sNying thig system, as for example in Kun tu bzang po
of awakening’; *bodhigarbha^ 9) and snying po byang chub450, and occasionally byang chub
kyi sems snying po (‘quintessence of mind of awakening’) or snying po byang chub kyi sems,
terms likely favoured because of their kinship with the all-important concept bodhicitta and
because of the tantric/rDzogs chen identification of buddha nature with this bodhicitta451.

In the dGongs ’dus, for example, bde gshegs snying po occurs as but one in a series
of terms for buddha nature that includes ye nas snying po (‘primordial quintessence’)452
snying po byang chub (‘awakening-quintessence’)453, kun gyi snying po (‘quintessence of
an»)454, r(}0 rj e snying po (‘adamantine quintessence’)455, gsang ba dam pa snying po
(‘quintessence of secret authenticity’)456, terms that variously describe an implicit
unconditioned mode of being and awareness that eludes the appropriations of objectifying

thugs kyi me long, Ati vol. 1: 258.1 and 260.5 where this *hodhigarbha is said to be without obscurations or
deviations: byang chub snying po gol dang sgrib pa med pa la\\ The six occurrences of the term in this tantra include
the formulations byang chub don gyi snying po (Ati vol. 1: 250.2) and byang chub snying po ’i sku (ibid. 263.1). See
also Rig pa rang shar, Ati vol. 1: 472.5 f. where *bodhigarbha is held to be equal to all buddhas and linked with
unchanging and unerring bodhicitta which totally pervades living beings ’gyur med byang chub sems la ’khrul pa ga
la yod\ I ’khrul med byang chub sems ni ’g ro ba yongs la khyab\ \byang chub snying po sangs rgyas kun dang
mnyam\ \
449 The term *bodhigarbha is not attested in Indian Buddhist texts though byang chub [kyi] snying po is used to
render the Sanskrit bodhimanda, a widely used term referring to the ‘seat o f enlightenment’, both as an actual or
metaphorical place a buddha attained awakening (e.g. Bodhgaya). See Mahävyutpatti no. 4114. Given their quite
different contexts, it seems unlikely that these two uses of byang chub snying po have any genetic connection.
450 See for examples: Srog gi ’khor lo, Bg vol. 1: 305. 5: 307.3: 310.5; Mi nub rgyal mtshan, Tk vol. 1: 425.3; bCom
Idan ’das lung thams cad kyi rang bzhin, Bg vol. 2: 232.3; Nam mkha'i mtha' dang mnyam pa'i rgyud chen po, Bg
vol. 1: 241.4, 276.5. See also Khyung che Idings pa ’i ’g relpa, NyKs vol. 103: 22.5, where snying po byang chub is
identified with the [tathägata]garba vainly sought after in different Buddhist teachings and 26.5 where ye snying po
byang chub pa is explained according to the Nam mkha ’ che (i.e. Mi nub rgyal mtshan). An interlinear note the sBas
pa ’i rgum chung. IOL 594 Ch.73-11-21 fol. la. 1 uses the abbreviated form nying byang chub which Namkai Norbu
glosses as ye gzhi snying po byang chub kyi sems in his commentary. See Norbu 1984: 116. gNubs chen often
employs snying po byang chub as, for example, in rTse mo byung rgyal ’g rel pa: 186.6, 207.6, bSam gtan mig
sgron: 395.3. The term snying po byang chub (kyi sems) occurs frequently in gNubs chen’s Mun p a ’i go cha, as for
example vol. 1: 244.5, 245.6, pt. 2: 50.3. Rong zom pa also uses the term interchangeably with byang chub snying
po, as in Theg chen tshul ’jug: 503.15, 509.14.
451 On this idea and its importance in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, see Wangchuk 2007. It would appear that
*bodhigarbha concepts remained in vogue in rDzogs chen traditions well into the eleventh Century, after which time
they were steadily eclipsed by the sütric variants. This undoubtedly had much to do with the widespread appeal of
the Ratnagotravibhäga and the saliency o f its disclosive path model to the important hermeneutical problem of
bridging sütric and tantric conceptions of the path (on which see chapter six below).
Tb vol. 16: 145.4.
Tb vol. 16: 145.7.
Tb vol. 16: 146.2.
Tb vol. 16: 146.6.
Tb vol. 16: 146.7.
 cognition. Significantly, gNubs chen’s commentary on the relevant section of chapter
nineteen does not so much as mention the term bde gshegs snying po or even quote the line
in which it occurs, though he does elaborate each of the other terms (except ye nas snying
po) listed above.457 In his bSam gtan mig sgron, we are told that the quintessence of
awakening (byang chub kyi snying po) is the true purport (dgongs pa dam pa) of all the
buddhas, where ‘true purport’ refers to ineffable suchness, the nature of everything.458 All
this leads us to the conclusion that buddha nature, or more accurately “bodhi nature”, ideas
were indeed of central importance to early rDzogs chen scholars, though less as a means of
defining or defending a particular line of interpretation based on Mahāyāna buddha nature
discourses (as was later increasingly the case) than as a way of conveying, using
terminology specific to the rDzogs chen System, the nature of mind or awakened state itself.

This brings us to the question of why these *bodhigarbha terms and ideas were
favoured over their traditional Mahāyāna counterparts in the early period. One consideration
that helps explain the prevalence of and obvious preference for bodhi nature concepts in
pre-classical rDzogs chen exegesis is brought to our attention by Rong zom Chos kyi bzang
Po (b. I I th c.) in his commentary on *Guhyagarbha 2.15, a passage containing the only
instance of the term bde bar gshegs p a ’i snying po in the tantra. There Rong zom
distinguishes, with characteristic perspicacity, the two contrasting paradigms of interpreting
buddha nature and the terminology specific to each:

In this context, the term *sugatagarbha is widely known in ordinary [scriptures]

which claim that all sentient beings possess the cause of awakening [and] are
endowed with the seed of incorruptability. According to the profound [scriptures], it
is called the ‘quintessence of awakening’ (*bodhigarbha) because the very nature of
mind is awakening. Thus, because this is so, it may appear as bondage and by virtue

See M unpa 7 go cha vol. 1: 244.5 f..

bSam gtan mig sgron: 394.4 f.: byang chub kyi snying po ni\ |sangs rgyas kun gyi dgongs pa dam pa la
- dgongs pa dam p a zhes gang la bya\... thams cad kyi rang bzhin rang lags pa de kho na nyid do\ ...thams
CQ ran8 bzhin gsang sngags bya bya\...thams cact kyi rang bzhin gang lags pa de ni\ \gang gis kyang ma
T! lw/ ri°gb spyod yul du ma gyur] \smrar med pa\ \brjod pa las ’das pa\ \bsam du med pa\ \bsam gyis mi
knyabpa\... atext: thad; btext: rtogs
 of it[s presence], it may appear as freedom. It has been taught because one has not
[yet] seen the reality (don) wherein bondage and freedom do not exist.459

In other words, the so-called ‘profound scriptures’ a category which, for Rong zom,
included sütric and tantric scriptures that discuss subjects deemed to be of definitive
meaning (nges don) regard buddha nature not as a germinal potential that is made to
mature through appropriate causes and conditions (the causal-developmental model) but
rather as bodhicitta itself which is already fully present but temporarily shrouded by
adventitious obscurations that need to be cleared away (the goal-disclosive model).

In his groundbreaking work on early rDzogs chen, Samten Karmay made the
comment that in early Great Perfection texts “no reference is made to bde gshegs snying po
in connection with the Primordial Basis [i.e. gzhi]”460 However, two commentaries of gNubs
chen that have since become available explicitly identify this primordial ground with
*bodhigarbha which we have established, with corroboration from Rong zom pa, as the
early rDzogs chen alternative to the sütric bde bar gshegs p a ’i snying po. Commenting on a
passage from the rTse mo byung rgyal that declares that *bodhigarbha that is nondual and
selfless is not found as any reality other than the unity of primordial knowing and its
expanse, gNubs chen explains that since the ground that is the awakening-quintessence
(snying po byang chub kyi gzhi) is simply one’s self-awareness (rang rig pa), the qualities of
goal-realization are not to be discovered elsewhere.461

In the fifty-fifth chapter of his lengthy commentary on the dGongs ’dus, a chapter
largely devoted to the idea of the all-ground (kun gzhi), gNubs chen explicitly identifies this
all-ground with buddha nature. In several instances, such as the following, he describes the

459 rGyud rgyal gSang ba snying po dkon cog ’grel, 127.13 f.: de la bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po zhes bya ba ni\
Ithun mong du grags pa sems can rnams byang chub kyi rgyu can zag med kyi sa bon dang Idan pa ’o\ \zhes ’dod do\
Izab mo Itar na sems kyi rang bzhin nyid byang chub yin pas byang chub kyi snying po ’o\ | de Itar yin pa las bcings
par snang zhing d e ’i dbang gis grol bar yang snang ste| |bcings grol med p a ’i don ma mthong bas de bstan pa
phyir\ |
460 Karmay 1988: 184.
461 rTse mo byung rgyal gyi ’g rel pa: 207.4 f.: bdag med gnyis med byang chub snying po las\ \dbyings dang ye
shes mnyam sbyor ma gtogs pa\ \chos nyid chos tshol chos rnam gzhan na med\\ zhes pa\ \de Itar bdag nyid chen
po ’i rnam p a ’ang mi rnyedpas tha d a dpa mi rn y e d p a ’i snying po byang chub kyi gzhi de| |tha snyad du go mjal
byed pa tsam las\ \ngo bos rang rig pa byang chub snying pos ’bras bu ’i chos gzhan nas gnyer bas ’bras bu rnams
mi thob ste| | rtsa ba gnas su lung ngan ’khyams pa ’i phyir ro\ | Bolded text is from rTse mo byung rgyal.
 quintessence of awakening that is the ground of all (kun gzhi byang chub kyi snying po),
using examples and characterizations reminiscent of Standard buddha nature discourses:

The ground and root of all inbom qualities belonging to dharmakäya of the perfectly
realized buddha — i.e. the quintessence of awakening (*bodhigarbha) that is the
ground of all - is that very nature which is associated with ignorance. Thus, just as
the root of a lotus flower is planted firmly in a swamp, so the root of great awakening
is present in this cyclical existence itself. So also the errancy of the all-ground stems
from the two aspects of co-emergent ignorance.462

gNubs chen goes on to specify that the very source of buddha-qualities is at the same time
the source of spiritual darkness: “The nature of spiritual darkness is the awakened mind as
self-awareness (rang rig pa byang chub sems), because its essence is difficult to realize
given that it lies very deep and is difficult to fathom.”463 Nonetheless, he adds, one cannot
ascertain this quintessence of awakening by means of arduous procedures of rational
mference (blos dpag). Since *bodhigarbha is realized very swiftly, it is also not arrived at
through progressive striving (brtsol bgrod).464 Beings remain blind to their own fundamental
nature because of deeply rooted ignorance that persists up to the tenth spiritual level.

Even in bodhisattvas on tenth spiritual level, there is still the innate ignorance which
is without polluting emotions such that the great root (rtsa ba chen po) remains
unseen. It thus remains obscured up to the tenth level and the obscurations are
present in greater and lesser, subtler and coarser, degrees in each and every person so
long as their minds arise in the States associated with dwelling on these levels.465

gNubs chen goes on to explain that the nature of reality that is the ground or *bodhigarbha
remains unseen because it is empty and therefore beyond the scope of reifying thought. In

See Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 2: ch. 55, 50.6 f.: yang dag par rdzogs p a ’i sangs rgyas kyi chos kyi sku’i yon tan gyi
d rtsa ^un byang chub kyi snying po ma rig pa dang bcas p a ’i ngo de nyid yin pas\ \dper me tog
^’kh m<i 7 rtSa ^ am zu8 Pa har] Ibyang chub chen po ’i rtsa ba ’ang ’khor ba nyid la yod pa ’o\ \des kun gzhi
ru pa yang Ihan cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa gnyis las byung ba ’o\ | The two aspects of innate or co-emergent
!gnorance are later specified as that which has polluting emotions and that which is without polluting emotions (still
Presenton the 10th bhumi).

Man p a ’i go cha vol. 2: 51.4 f.:...mun p a ’i rang bzhin rang rig pa byang chub sems shin tu gting dpag dka ’ bas
"go bo rtogs par dka ’ ba ’i phyir] \

c^a vo^ ^ ’ f-: blo dpag par dka ’ bas nges par ma shes\ \byang chub snying po shin tu myur bas
r so bgrod kyis ma slebs pa o\ I
465 Ih1n• 51.6: ...sa bcu pa ’i byang chub sems dpa ’ la ’ang kun nas nyon mongs pa med pa ’i Ihan cig skyes pa i ma
‘g p a yo d p a sl \rtsa ba chen po ma mthong bas sa bcu man chad la sgrib cing\ \sa la gnas pa ’i skabs sems skyes pa
an c Qh d" rang rang la sgrib tshab che chung phra rags y o d pa ’o\ \
language reminiscent of Indian sötric buddha nature discourses, he concludes that self-
awareness is fully disclosed only at the time of spiritual awakening, though it has been
present all along as an implicit knowing that, paradoxically, makes possible all explicit acts
of knowing while itself remaining unknown. It is, in gNubs chen’s words, like the eye that
cannot see itself.

Klong chen pa will later trace this relationship between the ground and buddha
nature to the Mäyäjäla tantric cycle where buddha nature is characterized as the ground of
possibility of errancy as well as freedom, even if it cannot be a direct source of the former.
One early source of such an interpretation is the previously-noted passage from the Byang
sems bde b a ’i myu gu that reads: thams cad bde gshegs snying po las\ |mam rtog las kyis
’khrul pa la\ “From the *sugatagarbha [present in] all things, one goes astray due to
dichotomous thinking and karma”. Now, these lines closely resemble and suggest a different
reading of the two oft-quoted lines on *sugatagarbha from the *Guhyagarbha (2.15) e m a’o
bde gshegs snying po las\ |rang gi mam rtog las kyi sprul| “E ma ho! From the *sugatagarbha
individual dichotomous thinking manifests due to karma.”466 Here, it is conceivable that the
term sprul was mistaken for ’khrul (a near homophone distinguished only by the aspirated
initial consonant of the latter term). Indeed Klong chen pa’s numerous quotations of this
*Guhyagarbha passage (e.g. in Sems ye dris lan, Grub mtha' mdzod, Yid bzhin mdzod, Sems
nyid ngal gso ’grel) render sprul (‘manifest’, ‘emanate’) as ’khrul (‘err’, 'go astray’), though
not in his commentary the Phyogs bcu mun sei which retains sprul. His commentary on the
passage in question, however, accommodates both readings, suggesting that errancy ( ’khrul)
and the ensuing phenomenal manifestation (sprul) derive from a common ground, buddha
nature:

“£ ma hol” expresses the very nature of kindness. Errancy ( ’khrul pa) has derived
from the dimension of the *sugatagarbha, one’s primordial abiding condition,
luminous Mind itself. Here, *sugatagarbha refers to luminous Mind itself which
abides as the very essence of the three käyas which are inseparably united... In the

466 See critical edition in Doije 1987: 188.

 sGyu ’phrul rgyas pa467 its meaning is the actual all-ground that is unconditioned
( ’dus ma byas don gyi kun gzhi):

It is not the all-ground of dichotomous thinking,

But the genuine ground that is without intrinsic nature.
That is called the expanse of phenomena,
Primordial knowing of suchness.
When errancy occurs due to any given conditions, since dichotomous thoughts of
individual sentient beings occur of their own accord, this great city of samsära
manifests like a self-appearing dream by virtue of causally efficacious karma.”468

The passage is also cited in the author’s Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel where *sugatagarbha is
identified as the ground (gzhi), more specifically the genuine all-ground as one’s abiding
condition (gnas lugs don gyi kun gzhi), from which samsära and nirväna emerge469 and to
which the aspirant seeks to retum. The all-ground in question is here qualified as the
genuine or actual all-ground (don gyi kun gzhi) to distinguish it from the conditioned all-
ground (rkyen gyi kun gzhi) of causal production, the Yogācāra ālayavijñãna. This important
distinction, as we will shall explain in the next chapter, was introduced in early rNying ma
tantras and given its first philosophical treatment by gNubs chen in his M unpa’i go cha.

To conclude, it would appear that tantric *bodhigarbha concepts remained in vogue

m rDzogs chen traditions well into the eleventh Century, after which time they were steadily
eclipsed by the Indian sütric terminology during the period of Monastic Hegemony as
Indian buddha nature theories and controversies took centre stage. This displacement
undoubtedly had much to do with the growing influence of the Ratnagotravibhäga and
related works within classical Tibetan schools and the perceived relevance of its disclosive

Hiis refers to the sGyu ’p hrul brgyad bcu pa in 82 chapters which is found in Tk vol. 14: 67.6-317. I have so far
een unable to locate this quotation in it.
468 Ph
nyogs bcu mun sei in NyKs vol. 68: 118.6: brtse ba ’i rang bzhin gyis e ma ho brjod nas\ \gdod ma ’i gnas lugs
z s ^ l h ^ ° d g sa l ba bde gshegs snying po ’i ngang las ’khrul lo\ \de’ang bde gshegs snying po ni sems nyid ’od
s^u gsum ’du ’bral med pa ’i ngo bor gnas pa de nyid yin te 11... sgyu ’p hrul rgyas pa las\ \rnam rtog kun gzhi
yin pa\ Irang bzhin med pa don gyi gzhi\ | de ni chos kyi dbyings zhes bya\ | de bzhin nyid kyi ye shes so| |zhes pa
I dus ma byas don gyi kun gzhi ’i don nyid\ | ... rkyen gang gis ’khrul na sems can rang rang gi rnam par rtog
pa rang shar du byung bas rgyas byas pa ’i las kyis ’khor ba ’i grong khyer chen po ’di rang snang rmi lam Itar sprul
so II
469
2sh 1
Yd h u-
mdzod ’grel: 151.1 1.3: gang las ’khrul p a ’i gzhi nyid dang por bshad pa\\ thog m a ’i ’od gsal bde
snying po nyid\ \don gyi kun gzhi rang bzhin ’dus ma byas\ |ye nas rnam dag nyi m kha’ Ita bu la\ | ma rig
a 1 ag chags g.yos pas na\ |sems can rnams ’khrul pa nyid do\ \
path model to the important rNying ma hermeneutical problem of bridging the divergent
sutric, tantric and rDzogs chen discourses conceming the Buddhist path.

Looking back on our reconstruction of some early developments in rDzogs chen

ground theories in Tibet, we can see that the Yogācāra concept of ālayavijñāna was known
to Tibetans from at least as early as the 8th c. and was at times denoted simply by the
shorthand kun gzhi. It was also noted that this ãlayavijñāna was generally given a negative
evaluation by rDzogs chen writers in a manner commensurate with those late hybridized
Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha texts that described ãlayavijñãna as a defiled mode of
consciousness that must be purified, transformed or transcended if one is to realize
buddhahood.470 By contrast, the early rDzogs chen idea of a primordially pure kun gzhi was
accorded a positive evaluation and identified with buddha nature, the nature of mind, and
nature of reality. It must be acknowledged that the line between these grounds was not
always clear. Even by the fourteenth Century, the third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje still
deemed it necessary to point out that the term kun gzhi (älaya) when it is used independently
of mam par shes pa (vijñãna) is not necessarily a shorthand for kun gzhi mam par shes pa
(ālayavijñãná) but “can also refer to suchness” (tathatä : de bzhin nyid).411 Another potential
source of confusion was the long-standing proclivity among rDzogs chen scholars to try to
accommodate conditions of freedom and errancy within a single common ground conceived
as the source of both delusion and awakening, samsära and nirväna. Classical authors who
were heir to this tangle of different and at times conflicting ground conceptions recognized
the need for clearer formulations and sharper distinctions.

470 Tibetan doxographical works distinguish within the false aspectarian (Nirākāravādins) branch o f Cittamatrins
those who claim that the ālayavijñāna is impure and that error is inherent in it and those who claim it is pure
(epistemically undifferentiated and karmically neutral) and that error is instead inherent in the manovijñāna. See for
example treatments by Klong chen pa in his Grub mtha ’ mdzod, Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel, Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel.
471 Zab mo nang don gyi ’g rel pa, Rang byung rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 7: 383.2: 'di yang kun gzhi zhes bya ba la
rnam par shes pa ’i sgra ma smos na de bzhin nyid la yang kun gzhis brjod du rung ba ’i phyir rnam par shes pa
smos so|| Klong chen pa also distinguishes älaya from the ālayavijñãna. See below 216-7 n. 541 for passage.
 5 I Distinguishing the sNying thig Ground o f Freedom (grol gzhi)

The rDzogs chen problem of the ground receives its most penetrating and systematic
philosophical treatment during the Period of Monastic Hegemony as the emerging rNying
ma order sought to forge a new cultural and institutional identity by defining its most
distinctive ideas and practices in relation to the broader currents of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist
soteriology. For classical rNying ma exegetes, increasing doctrinal tensions between rDzogs
chen and sütric views of the ground and their disclosive and developmental models of goal-
realization signaled the growing need to more rigorously elucidate the grounds of freedom
and errancy (grol gzhi, ’khrul gzhi) and clarify the relations of ontological priority between
them. If earlier rDzogs chen masters had articulated (and claimed to have experienced) a
ground more fundamental than the ālayāvijñãna, the onus was on the new generation of
scholars to specify the nature of this state and also argue for its acceptability within the
wider frames of Buddhist philosophy and soteriology.

§1. Stages of Differentiating the Sütric and rDzogs chen Grounds

We are now in a position to address the problem of why classical rDzogs chen
sNying thig scriptures draw a sharp distinction between their own ideas of an unconditioned
ground or all-ground and the sütric conditioned all-ground when early sources were inclined
to focus on unity rather than difference. To understand this shift in perspective, it is
necessary to trace the growing Separation between the two as rDzogs chen ground
discourses are confronted with earlier Yogācāra developmental ground models, and align
themselves increasingly with disclosive tantric and late Yogācāra/Tatāgatagarbha
paradigms. We have seen that late Yogācāra traditions in India, China and Tibet confronted
similar tensions in their encounter with the Tathägatagarbha system and sought to resolve
them through Systems of identification (absolutizing the ãlayavijñãná) or differentiation (i.e.
hetween the ãlayavijñãna and the absolute as it was variously described). The sNying thig
gzhi/kun gzhi distinction is best seen as an offshoot of this differentiation trend that was
radicalized in the classical period as undesired implications of identification became too
onerous to ignore. The result was a dialectical sycretism that could accommodate the
developmental ground model within the disclosive model while emphasizing their difference
in terms of priority relations of founding and founded, fundamental and derivative.

What I am calling the rDzogs chen problem of the ground crystallized around the
idea of a common ground (spyi gzhi) that is the source of both conditioned and
unconditioned phenomena, samsära and nirväna. Now, the ground of early rDzogs chen is
viewed as unconditioned and invariant, remaining just as is despite the modifications it
appears to undergo. Yet it is at the same time considered a precondition of both pollution
and purification, a ground of errancy ( ’khrul gzhi) as well as freedom (grol gzhi). This leads
unavoidably to the question of whether we should be talking here of two grounds or one. Is
the relation between the errancy ground and freedom ground one of identity or difference?
The problem of understanding the origin of errancy and its relationship to the ground
generated a host of related questions first posed in S^-IO111 Century texts and pursued with
great rigour by subsequent generations of rDzogs chen scholar-adepts. Does errancy exist in
the ground? Stated otherwise, does the ground have error as a constitutive element? What
are the essence, nature, and characteristics of delusion ( ’khrul pa)? Do sentient beings and
buddhas have a common ground? Or does the mind of a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi thugs)
differ fundamentally from the mind of a sentient being (sems can kyi sems)?

My philosophical aim in investigating such questions and their responses is to

determine how ongoing speculations conceming the ground and errancy led to a Separation
of the ground of all (kun gzhi) samsäric and nirvänic phenomena from the ground proper
(gzhi nyid, ye gzhi, grol gzhi), a trend culminating in the radical sNying thig distinction
between the ground and all-ground. We can somewhat loosely identify three stages in this
Separation: (1) an emphasis on identity from the Royal Dynastie Period (610-910), (2)
indications of divergence during the ensuing Period of Fragmentation (910-1249), and (3)
increasing trend toward differentiation during the Period of Monastic Hegemony (1249-
1705) onward. If these ‘stages’ reflect differences of degree more than kind (it is instructive
to observe all three perspectives represented in the works of gNubs chen, for example), the
purpose in highlighting them is to indicate a general trend toward more nuanced distinctions
between the grounds of freedom and error during this period.
 1.1 Identity : Ground as Common Source of Samsara and Nirvana

rDzogs chen texts from the 8th to 9th centuries typically maintain that sentient beings
and buddhas, samsära and nirväna, share a common ground. We read the following in a
Mahäyoga text discovered at Dunhuang:

Because that which manifests either as samsäric or nirvänic phenomena depending

on whether it is realized or not realized, is nondual, it is called the single ground or
single principle.472

The idea that samsära and nirväna, sentient beings and buddhas, share a common ground but
differ depending on whether or not this ground is directly realized (rtogs) appears to have
been an important theme in the oral teachings of the earliest rDzogs chen masters. In the Rin
po che 'phags lam bkod pa ’i rgyud, a tantra recording answers given by Śrisimha to various
questions, the master is asked whether buddhas and sentient beings are the same or
different. He replies:
In the ground that is primordially pure, there is no duality between the state of
buddha and sentient being. Buddhas who realize this very ground dwell as authentic
embodiments and primordial knowing (sku dang ye shes). Sentient beings who do not
realize it dwell as ordinary bodies and latent tendencies (lus dang bag chags). Thus
there is no fundamental difference between buddha and sentient being in ground
realization. But during the time of the path, they manifest differently. Take as an
example the medicine camphor. It is the best of medicines if one knows [how to]
administer it, but a danger to one’s life if one does not know [how to]. So too, if one
recognizes the all-ground (kun gzhi), emtpy yet luminous, it is real buddhahood, but
if one does not recognize it, it is the cause of samsära. Although its true essence is
without error, [error] nonetheless occurs due to the coordination of four
conditions473. For example, although there is no mistaken [qualities] such as
yellowness in the essence of a conch shell, it appears as yellow to a man with
defective [eyesight].474

IOL Tib J 454, Ch.82.11.1: 1.103: rtogs ma rtogs kyi khyadpar gyis ’khor ba dang mya ngan las das pa i chos su
snang bas gnyis myed de\ \gzhi geig pa ’am don geig pa zhes bya\ | On this incomplete Mahäyoga commentary that
contains proto-rDzogs chen terms and viewpoints, see van Shaik 2008 and Dalton and van Shaik 2006: 196-7.
These are not specified in the text but are likely the traditional four conditions (rgyu i rkyen, dmigs rkyen, bdag
P° *rkyen, de ma thag rkyen) as they are used to elaborate the process of errancy ( ’khrul pa) in rDzogs chen works.
J b vol. 1: 849.5; Tk vol. 4: 162.2: gdod nas dag pa ’i gzhi nyid la\ \sangs rgyas dang n t sems can gnyis\ \gnyis su
•V° pa ma yin te\ \gzhi nyid rtogs pa ’i sangs rgyas ni\ \sku dang ye shes nyid du gnas\ \de ma rtogs pa i sems can ni\
US d°ng bag chags nyid du gnas\ \de yih sangs rgyas sems can gnyis\ \gzhi rtogs0pa la tha dad med\ \lam pa i dus
S° sor snang\ Idper na ga bur sman bzhin du\ \gtongd shes sman gyi mchog yin no\ \ma shes na nisrog gi bdud\
h6 ^Un stong gsal yang\ | rtogs na sangs rgyas dngos yin te\ | ma rtogs na ni khor ba i rgyu \ \don gyi ngo
0 hrul med kyang\ \rkyen bzhir ’dzomsg pas ’khrul pa byung\ \dper na dung gi ngo bo la\ \ser po la sogs khrul
This passage takes kun gzhi to be synonymnous with the primordially pure ground (gdod
m a’i dag p a ’i gzhi), an invariant and unconditioned state that buddhas realize but sentient
beings fail to realize. gNyags Jñānakumara uses a similar medicinal metaphor to
demonstrate the inherently impartial character of Mind itself (root text italicized):

“For example, like a medicine that embodies the nature o f benefit or harm ” That is,
like a single medicine that embodies the essence of either benefit or harm. “Its
essence does not change into something d i f f e r e n t That is, since the mind does not
gravitate either toward buddha or ordinary being (rgyal ’gro), the flaws of being so,
not being so, or remaining indifferent do not obtain.475

gNyags advances a series of arguments to establish the nonduality (gnyis med) or

indivisibility (dbyer med) of the Mind of buddhas (sangs rgyas kyi thugs) and the mind of
sentient beings (sems can gyi sems) in response to what emerges time and again as a central
problem for early rDzogs chen authors: Are the minds of buddhas and sentient beings
fundamentally different or the same? gNyags considers seven absurdities that follow from
assuming a categorical distinction between them:

Now, if the Mind (thugs) of a buddha and mind (sems) of a sentient being were
different, it would follow that buddhas and sentient beings are fundamentally
different. Their being [1] essentially different and [2] mutually exculsive implies that
it would be [3] impossible to pursue one’s spiritual aim, [4] it would be impossible to
realize buddhahood, [5] it would be impossible to abandon afflictive emotions and
purifiy obscurations; [6] There would consequently be no point in the buddhist
teachings and [7] one would end up with the extreme of independent etemalities.476

med kyang\ \mi skyon can la ser bor snang\\*Tk pa dang; T k de 7; T b,T k rtog; dTk stong; cTk rgyu; fTk gzhi: 8Tk
j o ms
475 ’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor kyi ’g re lpa, NyKs, vol. 82: 992.1 f.: dpe sman nyidphan gnod bdag gnas ltar\ |ces
pa sman cig kyang phan gnod gnyis ka ’i ngo bor gnas pa ltar\ \ngo bo tha dad ’gyur ba med\ \ces pa sems rgyal
’g ro gang gi phyogs su ma gyur pas\ \yin min lung du ma bstan pa ’i skyon mi ’byung ngo\\ Root text in bold face.
According to another early rDzogs chen master, Aro Ye shes ’byung gnas (10th c.): “Buddhas and sentient beings are
of a single nature (rang bzhin geig), but diverge due to the absence or presence o f conceptualizing. So even if you
happen to perceive the nature o f reality, all the dichotomic concepts are [still] a fetter of samsära. It is thus by way
o f dharmakäya, a self-awareness that is nonconceptual and beyond discursive thought, that one abandons
conceptualizing and attains self-awareness.” Theg pa chen po rnal ’byor la ’ju g p a ’i thabs, NyKs, vol. 59: 35.1:
sangs rgyas sems can rang bzhin geig mod kyi\ \rnam rtog yo d med dbang gis khyad zhugs pas\ \tha na chos nyid
ngang la dmigs kyang rung\ \rnam rtog thams cad ’khor ba ’i chings ma ste\ \mi rtog bsam ’das rang rig chos sku
pas\ \rnam rtog spang zhing rang rig thob bya ’i phyir\ |
476 ’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor kyi ’g rel pa: 983.2: ...sangs rgyas kyi thugs dang ’gro b a ’i sems tha dad na yang\
Isangs rgyas sems can gnyis rang bzhin tha dad du ’gyur\ \ngo bo tha dad du ’g yur bas ’brel pa med pas don byar
 To view the minds of buddhas and sentient beings as fundamentally different is to
construe them as having fixed natures. This hypostatization, as Nāgārjuna had similarly
demonstrated in his critique of inherent natures (svabhäva), precludes the possibility of any
form of spiritual realization, transformation or liberation, in short, any type of ‘change’ that
would allow for the prospect of a sentient being ever becoming a buddha. This argument for
the indivisibility of the minds of buddhas and sentient .beings, widely accepted in early
rDzogs chen writings that reflect Mahäyoga and Sems sde views, will later be subject to
qualification, if not Wholesale revision, within the emerging sNying thig traditions.
A pivotal figure in this differentiation trend is gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes. His
tenth Century discussions of the ground reflect a growing need to reconcile the
unconditioned but common ground (spyi gzhi) of rDzogs chen with the Yogācāra älaya. In
some instances, gNubs chen explicitly emphasizes the indivisibility of the minds of sentient
beings and buddhas, as in the 55th chapter of his commentary on the dGongs ’dus (Mun pa i
go cha) where he sets out to clarify how the fundamental bodhicitta (rtsa ba byang chub kyi
sems) is the root or source (rtsa)411 of both error and awakening and to demonstrate the
means by which it can be known: “Though the natures of the Mind (thugs) of a buddha and
mind (sems) of a sentient being are nominally distinguished, they are essentially indivisible.
So, it is due to this root [bodhicitta] being realized or not realized that it manifests as buddha
(light) and sentient being (darkness).”478

The association of bodhicitta/bodhigarbha with light and the description of

conditioned existence as a realm of darkness are both drawn from the root tantra (dGongs

mi btub\ I ’g ro ba tshang rgyar mi btub\ \nyort mongs pa spangs zhing sgrib pa byang du m ibtub rgyal bas bstan pa
tu dgospa med\ |so sor rtag pa ’i mthar ’g yur ba dang bdun no\\ I here take ‘the extreme of independent etemalities
(so sor rtag pa ’i mthar) to refer to the supposition that the minds o f buddhas and sentient beings are fixed
(permanent) natures that exist independently o f one another, precluding any possibility of a sentient being becoming
a buddha.
This follows the complex hermeneutical structure o f the dGongs ’dus which divides the text into three yogas
{mal ’byor), three doors (sgo), and three keys (Ide), each key in tum having: 6 branches (yan lag), 4 discourses
{mdo) and 3 roots (rtsa). The fifty-fifth chapter consitutes the doctrinal heart of the tantra and deals with the
realization of the second o f the three roots, the root o f ‘awakening’, viz. the all-ground, and the elimination of
spiritual darkness that results from non-realization of this ground. On the thematic structure of the tantra, see a ton
2002: 303.

Mun pa i go cha vol. 2, ch. 55: 46.3 f.: sangs rgyas dang sems can gyi thugs dang sems kyi chos nyid tha snyad
S0 so yong ngo bos dbyer med pa de ’o\ | de yang rtogs ma rtogs kyi rtsa bas (snang) sangs rgyas dang (mun) sems
Can snang b a ’o\\ See corresponding passage in tantra Tb vol. 16: 414.4 f..
’dus p a ’i mdo). There it States that “one should understand the realm of spiritual darkness as
paired with purity in order to negate attachment to seeking this reality elsewhere.”479 As
gNubs chen explains, the realm of darkness (associated in the commentary with
ignorance480) and quintessence of awakening, although present in different guises, are
essentially indivisible.481 The aim of the chapter, therefore, is to understand the origin,
nature, essence and characteristics of this spiritual darkness in order to dispel it.

1.2 Divergence: Conflicting Intepretations of Kun gzhi

It is in tracing the common source of spiritual darkness and the luminous

quintessence that gNubs chen runs up against the problem of reconciling the sütric and
rDzogs chen all-grounds. Before tuming to gNubs chen’s treatment of the problem, it is
important to understand why the distinction and reconciliation of these two senses of kun
gzhi had become a significant hermeneutical problem by the 10th Century. We gain some
sense of the doctrinal context of this issue from Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po in his I I th
Century defence of rDzogs chen, the Theg chen tshul ’j ug (Entering the Way o f the
Mahāyãna):

From the standpoint of the lower vehicles, the defining characteristic of kun gzhi is
that it subsists and matures as the essence of causes and results of all contaminated
phenomena. It is therefore similar to a fruit tree and the ripening [of its fruits]. Since
it is [also] merely the basis or foundation of all uncontaminated phenomena, it is like

479Mun pa ’i go cha vol. 2, ch. 55: 49.3 f.: de ’ang gzhan du tshol ba ’i shen pa dgag pa ’i phyir\ \mun pa ’i khams pa
dag dang cha geig tu shes par bya’o\\ The theme of the juxtaposition of spiritual light and darkness and the
association of the dGongs ’dus with Bru sha (currently the Gilgit-Baltistan region of northem Pakistan) which lay
along the ancient Silk road suggest the possibility of Manichaean influence (minus its metaphysical dualism between
light and darkness), a matter that warrants further investigation. It is known that by the middle of the 8th Century,
Manichaean communities were scattered throughout the Tarim basin and into Northem China. Their numbers and
influence increased dramatically after the powerful Uighur empire adopted Machichaeism as the state religion in
763, an affiliation that would last until the 10th Century when Uighur rulers began to transfer their sponsorship to
Buddhism. Prior to its acceptance by the Uighurs, the presence of Manichaeism in Inner Asia was largely confined
to communities of Sogdians who had fled the conquest o f Transoxiana by Arabs in the 7th Century. One may recall
that Sog po (Sogdian/Manchu-Mongolian) dPal gyi ye shes was an important figure in the transmission o f early
rDzogs chen, being one o f the two main successors o f gNyag Jfiānakumāra and a teacher of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas
ye shes. On the Tibetan knowledge o f Manichaeism during the Royal Dynastie Period, see Stein 1980. On
Manichaeism among the Sogdians and Uighurs, see Clark 1997: 83-123; Beckwith 2009: 148 et passim.
480 Ibid. 50.1 f.: d e ’ang mun pa ni ma rig pa dang mtshungs pa ’i shes pa ste||; 50.4 mun pa ’i rtsa ba ma rig p a ’i
sems kyang der ’dus so| |
481 Ibid. 49.3 f.: zhes pa Idog pa ’i tha dadyod kyang ngo bo mun pa ’i khams dang byang chub snying po dbyer med
pa ’o zhes gsungs pa ’o\ \
 the presence of medicine in a pot of poison. From the standpoint of the higher
vehicles, the defining characteristic of kun gzhi is said to be primordial bodhicitta.
The latent tendencies for afflictive emotions and malaise (gnas ngan len : daustulyä)
are but adventitious defilements like the patina on gold or mud covering precious
jeweis. It is not that the real nature [of bodhicitta as all-ground] is debased but only
that its inbom qualities are not able to shine forth at all.482

From Rong zom’s Sems sde perspective which is largely in accord with the disclosive
standpoint of the Tathãgatagarbhasūtra and Maitreya works, the semantic ränge of
ālaya[vijñãna\ in the lower vehicles is overextended inasmuch as it is made to accommodate
not only all that is perishable, defiling and debilitating in human existence but also for all
that is lasting, pure and liberative. For Rong zom and many other classical scholars, the
issue with this semantic amalgamation, as with the controversial equation of ālayavijñãna
and tathägatagarbha proposed by the Lańkãvatāra, was that it blended two discourses
descriptive of fundamentally heterogeneous strata within the experiential continuum, and
thus elided the priority relations between them. On this interpretation, as Rong zom explains
it, the all-ground is comparable to a king’s treasury that contains not only priceless je weis
but also vile substances such as poisons.483 There is no relation here of ontological priority;
rather, the conditioned and unconditioned, defiled and undefiled, are thrown together and
intermingle “like medicine in a pot of poison”. In the disclosive perspective, by contrast, the
all-ground which is identified as ever-abiding bodhicitta has ontologically primacy whereas
the myriad sources of defilement and malaise, are derivative and parasitic, having a merely
fictitious and adventitious character. Rong zom pa concludes, however, by stating that.

All phenomena both white and black [i.e. virtuous and non-virtuous] are merely
appearances of the ālayavijñãna. But these appearances are appearances due to the
power of latent tendencies of karmic predispositions such that, however things
appear, they are not present as they really are. So when one realizes all phenomena

482 Theg chen tshul ju g , in Rong zom gsung ’bum vol. 1: 545.6 f.: theg pa ’og ma ba ’i tshul gyis\ \kun gzhi ’i mtshan
nyid ni zag p a dang ’bras bu bcas pa ’i chos thams cad kyi rgyu dang ’bras bu ’i ngo bor gnas shing smin pa yin pas\
\s ing thog dang ’dra la\ \zag pa med pa rnams kyi rten dang gnas tsam yin te\ \dug gi bum pa i nang na sman gnas
Pa Ita bu o\ \zhes bshad\ \theg pa gong ma ’i tshul las ni\ \kun gzhi ’i mtshan nyid gdod ma nas byang chu kyi sems
? es ^ya M Inyon mongs pa dang gnas ngan len gyi bag chags ni glo* bur gyi dri ma ste gser g.yas g.yogs pa am \
I"Of bu rin po che 'dam du bsubs pa bzhin yon tan cung zad mi snang bar zad de\ \rang bzhin nyams par byas pa
meddo\\ W blo
483
Theg chen tshul ’ju g : 545.2.
 as being of the nature of nirvana, one opens the king’s royal treasury because at this
time, even a monkey can take [what it wants].484

The ālayavijñãna, then, can be viewed as the source of all deluded appearances because it is
also and more fundamentally the source of karmic tendencies that influence how we come to
see things as other than they really are. It is important to bear in mind, however, that this
neutral, largely unthematized background out of which karmic tendencies and deluded
perceptions occur —the ãlayavijñāna itself —is thought to belong to or to be founded upon a
more primordial experiential dimension that is not simply indeterminate but wholly
unconditioned and empty. This line of thinking, as we will later see, finds its culmination in
the sNying thig idea of a luminous but empty primordial ground (ye gzhi).

Given that gNubs chen was likely the first Tibetan thinker to clearly specify a ninth
ground beyond the Yogācāra ālayavijñāna and to deal philosophically with the problem of
relating these lower sütric and rDzogs chen conceptions of kun gzhi, it is worth taking stock
of his contributions. The term kun gzhi occurs only twice in his bSam gtan mig sgron, once
in a quote from the rTse mo byung rgyal485 and once in the compound kun gzhi byang chub
kyi sems ,486 In both cases, the rDzogs chen invariant all-ground is implied. It is in his
commentaries to the dGongs ’dus pa ’i mdo and rTse mo byung rgyal that gNubs chen brings
the Yogācāra ãlayavijñãna into the equation and seeks to clarify its relationship to the
rDzogs chen kun gzhi. In his commentary to the rTse mo byung rgyal, an extremely
important Sems sde scripture for understanding the early rDzogs chen concept of kun
gzhi487, gNubs chen clearly identifies this kun gzhi as a ninth consciousness that is distinct
from the ãlayavijñāna. The term kun gzhi or its variant kun gyi gzhi occurs five times in the

484 Theg chen tshul jug: 546.18 f.: mdor na gang Itar yang rung ste dkar nag gi chos thams cad kun gzhi rnam par
shes pa ’i snang ha tsam yin la\ \snang ba de ’ang ’du byed kyi bag chags kyi dbang gis snang ba yin te\ \ji Itar snang
ba de bzhin y o d pa ma yin pas\ \chos thams cad rang bzhin gyi mya ngan las ’das par rtogs na\ \rgyal po ’i dkor
mdzod kha phye ba yin te\ \de ’i tshe spre ’u yang bzung ba yin no\ \
485 bSam gtan mig sgron: 334.4.
486 bSam gtan mig sgron: 2.2. For a discussion of this, see Karmay 1988: 178.
487 There are five occurrences of kun gzhi or kun gyi gzhi in the tantra. See below. A commentary on the rMad du
byung ba (another of the eighteen tantras) found in the Bai ro rgyud ’bum identifies kun gzhi byang chub kyi sems as
the predominant meaning (mgo mjug gi don) o f rDzogs chen Atiyoga (sems sde): Bg vol. 1: 303.6 f.: mgo mjug gi
d o n ji Itar ston na\ \kun gzhi byang chub kyi sems brdal ba chen po mi zad pa ’i klong\ \ye nas brjod pa ’i tha snyad
dang bral ba\ |
 tantra, one of these being in the compound kun gzhi mam par shes, the Standard Tibetan
translation of ãlayavijñāna but here intriguingly qualified as primordial dharmadhätu.m In
one of the other instances, the utterly pure kun gzhi is identified as utterly pure primordial
knowing (ye shes mam par dag [pa]) which in tum is utterly pure dharmadhätu,489 In yet
another instance, the kun gyi gzhi is the central principle of consciousness (mam par shes
pa’i gtso ho) in the same way that Samantabhadra is envisaged as the central principle of the
mandala around whom the subsidiary deities are arrayed. As gNubs chen explains “since
this ninth genuine all-ground that is the ground itself (gzhi don gyi kun gzhi dgu pa) is free
from concepts, it is the actual basis for the mandalas of the vehicles of cause and effect in all
their complexity.”490 The final two occurrences of kun [gy/] gzhi are in a passage describing
rDzogs chen itself as the “ground of [all] knowing and objects of knowledge” (shes bya shes
byed kun gyi gzhi gyur pa).m The passage from the root tantra identifying the all-ground
with rDzogs chen itself reads as follows:

The rDzogs chen path, utterly free and without progression,

Is the unbom expanse of reality, spontaneously perfected without doing a thing.
Since the categories of vehicles are all harmonious [in it] as skillful means,
Distinctive qualities are an adomment of its total perfection.
Like rivers arising from and retuming to the vast expanse of the ocean,
It is the treasury of Lords492 ritually empowered [to govem] the kingdom.
It constitutes the ground of all knowing and objects of knowledge.
Since this perfect mandala of the transformed all-ground (kun gzhi gnas ’gyur)
Spans493 all of consciousness, being equal to space in its vastness,
It is the expanse of great bliss, the commanding peak (rtse mo byung rgyal).494

vol. 1: 438.1: kun gzhi rnam par shes p a y e nas chos kyi dbyings\ It is evident from later passages in the tantra
at the transformed ālayavijñãna is here implied. See quotation and discussion to follow.
Tk vol. 1: 436.6 f.: kun gzhi rnam dag ye shes rnam par dag\ \ye shes rnam dag chos dbyings rnam par dag\ \
490 T
rrse mo byung rgyal ’g rel ba, in NyKs vol. 103: 201.3 f.: ...gzhi don gyi kun gzhi dgu pa rtogpa dang bral ba
nyt yin Pas rgyu ’bras theg pa ’i dkyil 'khor j i snyed pa ’i dngos gzhi ’o\ \
491 T
rise mo byung rgyal ’g rel ba: 201.3 f.: ...gzhi don gyi kun gzhi dgu pa rtogpa dang bral ba nyid yin pas rgyu
fas theg pa i dkyil ’khor j i snyed pa ’i dngos gzhi ’o\ \
gNubs chen (188.3) takes “ Lords” as referring to all the great universal ancestors (spyi mes chen po thams cad), a
erm also used as an epithet o f rDzogs chen.
493
gdengs ka literally “the expanded hood o f a cobra” probably derives from Indian mythology wherein the hood of
Co ra used figuratively to refer to something overarching and expansive.
Tk vol. 1: 433.3 f. (corrected on basis o f gNubs chen’s commentary): bgrod med rnam grol rdzogs pa chen po i
am\ Ibyar med Ihun rdzogs skye med chos kyi dbyingsa\ \theg p a ’i rnam grangs thabs cha mnyam pa | |ma dres
°s rnams yong su rdzogs pa ’i rgyan\ \klongc yangs rgya mtsho chu bo ’i ’p hro ’du bzhin\ \rgyal thabs spyi blugs
rDzogs chen is considered the ground of all, explains gNubs chen, because “it constitutes
the source of the objects [of knowledge] and viewpoints of all vehicles which is pure in its
own right without having to reject any knowledge thereby gained. Having emerged all
together as the ninth consciousness that is without inherent nature, all [views and objects of
knowledge] are completely included within the spontaneous rDzogs chen without losing
their distinctness.”495
The qualification of the tantric all-ground as a fundamentally transformed all-ground
points to an important late Yogācāra precedent for the introduction of a ninth all-ground.
Commenting on the rTse mo byung rgyal, gNubs chen specifies that the kun gzhi, kun gyi
gzhi, and kun gzhi mam shes in this tantra all refer to a tantric ground, a “ninth factor’7or
“ninth consciousness” beyond and structurally prior to the conditioned and conditioning
ālayavijñãna. It is in his commentary on the dGongs ’dus, however, that the nature of these
two types of kun gzhi and their relationship are clarified.

1.3 Difference : Clearly Distinguishing the Grounds

gNubs chen’s distinction between the rDzogs chen and sütric ‘grounds’ is based on a
lengthy section of the fifty-fifth chapter of the dGongs ’dus concemed with the realization of
the root (rtsa) of ‘awakening’, namely the unconditioned all-ground, and with the dispelling
of the spiritual darkness that prevails so long as it is not realized. Only the sections of this
chapter and gNubs chen’s commentary directly relevant to the distinction between sütric
and rDzogs chen all-grounds concem us here.496 The root of awakening, the all-ground, is
elaborated by way of the hermeneutical categories of four discourses (mdo : sütra): the
ground (gzhi), objective reference (dmigs pa), appearance (snang ba), and engagement ( jug

dbang phyug rnams kyi mdzod\ |shes bya shes byed kun gyi gzhir gyur pa\ \kun gzhi gnas gyur rdzogs pa ’i dkyil
’khor ni\ \rnam shes gdengs ka nam m kha’ rgyas mnyam pas\ \rtse mo byung rgyal bde ba chen p o ’i
dbyings\\*gNubs: skye ba med pa ’i dbyings: btext: snyam pas: °text: klung: dtext: gdeng ka
495 rTse mo byung rgyal ’g rel pa: 189.1 f.: theg pa kun gyi yul dang Ita ba rnams kyi rtsa bar gyur pa ni\ \lon pa ’i
shes pa nyid ma spangs par rang sar dag pas\ \rang bzhin med pa ’i rnam par shes pa dgu pa ril gyi ’byung nas
Ihun grub rdzogs chen ma 'dres la yongs su rdzogs pa ’i khyon ni\ | ...
496 This central chapter and gNubs chen’s commentary on it merit detailed study, not least o f all because o f the
wealth of detail they provide on developments of rDzogs chen kun gzhi doctrines in 9lh to 10th Century Tibet vis-à-
vis prevailing Yogācāra and tantric conceptions.
 pa).497 gNubs chen clarifies that these four refer to the ãlaya[vijñāna\ , the klistamanas,
manovijñãna and the five sensory modes of consciousness respectively.498 Among these, we
will consider only the first. On the subject of the ground, the tantra begins by refuting what
it takes to be a mistaken view of this ground, and then describes the genuine ground:

The spiritually immature [Vijñānavādins] claim the ground is “like this”.

They are preoccupied with the formless ‘names’ (ming : näma)*99.
It is this and only this non-existent realm
That arises as the essence of all cognition.
It appears as the objects that are the knowable.
It is the cause giving rise to everything.

As for what is primordially unoriginated by nature,

It is unfabricated, an all-embracing luminosity.
It is unconditioned since it is devoid of causes and conditions
Since it is uninterrupted, it [comprises] all objects.
It arises together with the non-explicit [mode of] consciousness.500

In commenting on this passage, gNubs chen clearly distinguishes the älaya of the
Vijñānavādins - namely, as a *störe house’ retaining all karmic propensities as well as their
resultant actions, perceptions and conceptions and the source of all phenomena including
factors conducive to purification and pollution from the naturally diaphanous and
unfabricated all-ground that is the acausal and essenceless nature of the former. The
Vijñānavādin ãlaya is the nature of spiritual darkness while the uncorrupted rDzogs chen
älaya is associated with primordial luminosity.

Given that gNubs chen’s analysis of the above passage offers what may well be the
first systematic distinction between the two grounds and introduces specific rDzogs chen

Tb vol. 16: 418.5 f.: g zh i’i mdo dang\ \dm igspa’i mdo dang\ \snang b a ’i mdo dang\ \ ’ju g p a i mdo o||
498
Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 2: 57.5 f.: ...m do bzhi nye bar bstan pa ni\ | kun gzhi dang\ \nyon mongs pa can gyi yid
an£\ \yid kyi mam par shes pa dang\ ligo Inga ’i rnam shes so| |
499
In other words, among the five psychophysical aggregates (skandhas) that constitute a person and that are known
as ndma~rüpa (“name and form”) in the chain o f dependent arising (pratityasãmūtpãda), the Vijñānavādins are
Preoccupied with those factors apart from corporeality (rüpa) that comprise the conscious processes - vijnäna,
vedanã, samjñã, and samskāra.
Tb vol. 16: 418.6 f.: (corrected on basis o f commentary): g zh i’i mdo ni ’di Ita ste\ \gzhi ni byis pa di Itar dod\
med ming la mngon zhen H \medPa khams ny'd de kho na\ \shes pa kun ngo bor byun^ 1she\ bya,
nyi de yul du snang\ \thams cad ’byung bar byed pa ’i rgyu\ |ye nas ngang gis ma skyes la\ \ma bcos yongs kyis^ od
g ba\ [rgyu rkyen med pas ’dus ma byas\ \yongs su ma chad yul kun la\ \shes pah mi gsal Ihan cig ’byung\\ text:
yonggi- btext: la
ground terminology that is used extensively, though by no means homogeneously, in later
formulations, it is worth quoting in full (interlinear interpolations in round brackets):

In particular, this [passage] explains (the ground) as the nature of spiritual darkness.
Here, the meaning is that those (immature ones) such as the Vijñānavādins whose
capacities are still undeveloped try to prove (their tenets regarding) the nature of kun
gzhi by reasoning as follows. (They dwell in the formless [states] and) are [thus]
preoccupied with the subtler aspects (i.e. are attached to those skandhas that make up
the four ‘names’) of what is a mere designation, ‘names’ consisting in imagined
qualities [taken as] defining characteristics of what is not concretely present due to
the subtler aspects of its nature. And so the very essence of what they think about is
conspicuously non-existent. Thus [the ālayavijñāna) is named by analogy with the
formless realm. It appears (as the essence of) all (mental factors comprising the six
and eight) modes of cognition specifically based on karma. “It appears as the objects
that are the knowable] It is the cause giving rise to everything.” This refers to the all-
ground. For example, just as a monk, through ‘contemplation of the impure’
(iaśubhabhãvanã), visualizes the sensory field as a pile of skeletons501, so the all-
ground as the source of all (knowable) objects, on account of error, appears as
myriad extemal objects. And since it is comprised of all the seeds [as latent karmic
tendencies,] it is the cause that makes manifest phenomena of pollution (kun nas
nyon mongs) [but is also] the basis for purification (rnam par byang ba). Therefore it
is called the ‘actual all-ground of union’ (sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi).

As for the nature of the ‘actual all-ground that is the ground itself’ (gzhi don gyi kun
gzhi): if it is simply claimed that the actual all-ground of union errs on account of
four conditions502, then it is not simply a global amalgamation due to negative
influences in each individual like a straw hut or house503. Since the beginning, [this
actual all-ground] has by nature not arisen as any essence. Having not been fashioned
by an creator (unfabricated), it is all-embracing luminosity. It is the (unconditioned)

501gNubs chen here repudiates one o f the oldest defences o f Buddhist idealism as presented in an early Mahāyāna
sūtra entitled Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra or *Bhadrapãlasūtra (translated into Chinese as
early as 139 C. E.). The third chapter o f this sütra points out that a bodhisattva’s visualizations in meditation, be they
the pure visions o f buddhas or the decaying corpses and skeletons envisaged in contemplation of the impure
(aśubhabhãvanā : mi gtsang pa bsgoms pa), are similarily unreal, mere projections o f the mind. A bodhisattva
should extend this understanding of the unreality of visualizations to hold for all phenomena in order to realize that
they are nothing but mind (cittam eva). Schmithausen (1976: 246 f.) discusses the significance o f the this passage
and presents evidence for establishing the *Bhadrapãlasūtra as “the first text to enunciate the thesis of universal
idealism and to express this by the term cittamätra” (246-7). gNubs chen’s account suggests that mind’s reifications
occur on the level o f the all-ground of union but subside on the level of the actual all-ground that is the ground itself.
This transcendence leaves no basis for subjective idealism.
502 These are not specified but likely refer to the rgyu 7' rkyen, dmigs rkyen, bdag po ’i rkyen, de ma thag rkyen.
503 This would appear to be a criticism of the Yogācāra depiction o f the alayavijñāna as a ‘store-house’ containing
karmic propensities.
 state of non-origination, the very nature of phenomena free from causes and
conditions.504

Here, if gNubs chen does not completely discount the Vijñānavāda construal of the
all-ground as a storehouse wherein karmic propensities inhere and whence they give rise to
all objects and inclinations, he does relativize it as a superficial description of consciousness
that is confined to its Operation within the three realms. This all-ground is in any case
wholly distinct from the unfabricated all-ground that is luminously clear and devoid of any
essence. We may recall that the extended *Guhyagarbha (sGyu ’phrul rgyas pa) had also
made reference to an unconditioned all-ground devoid of inherent nature (rang bzhin med
pa'i kun gzhi). We can also note that a distinction similar to gNubs chen’s is found in the
longer of two tantras entitled rDzogs pa chen po Kun tu bzang po Ye shes gsal bar ston pa ’i
rgyud that are contained in the Bai ro rgyud 'bum and rNying ma rgyud 'bum.505 The account
in that tantra is similar but also less ambiguous insofar as only the pure and unconditioned
all-ground, a synonym of dharmakäya, is qualified as genuine (don gyi), whereas the impure
all-ground is qualified as conditional (rkyen gyi):

The all-ground is identified in terms of two [types]:

A genuine all-ground of primordiality (ye nyid don gyi kun gzhi) and
A conditional all-ground of union (sbyor ba rkyen gyi kun gzhi).

Mun p a ’i go cha vol. 2: 58.3 f.: de yang don shed ma bye ba (byis pa) rnam rig pa la sogs pa kun gzhi i rang
bzhin ’di Itar ’thad par ( ’dod pa) sgrub ste| | (gzugs med pa ’i khams la gnas shing) rang bzhin cha phra bas dngos
su mi snang ba ’i (gzugs med) mtshan nyid brtags pa ’i mtshan ma ’i ming (la) tha snyad tsam la (ming bzhi i phung
po la zhen) cha phra bar (mngon) zhen cing rtog pa ’i ngo bo gsal bar med pa de ni\ |gzugs med pa i khams dang
cha mthun pas (gzugs med pas der na) bos te\ \las kyi khyad par gyi shes pa (drug dang brgyad sems byung thams
cad kun gyi ngo bor gyur) snang ba ’o\ \shes bya nyid de yul du snang\ \thams cad ’byung bar byed pa 7 rgyu\ |zhes
pa de Ita bu ’i kun gzhi de\ \dper dge slong mi gtsang pa bsgoms pas\ \spyodyul rus pa ’i phung por snang ba Ita bur\
Iyul (shes bya nyid de) thams cad kyi yang rtsa kun gzhi ’khrul pas\ \phyi rol gyi yul sna tshogs (su) par snang zhing\
b« bon thams cad pa yin pas kun nas nyon mongs pa ’i chos rnams snang bar byed pa ’i rgyu rnam par byang ba i
rten sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi ’o\ \ye nas ngang gis ma skyes la\ \ma bcosyongs kyis ’odgsal ba\ \rgyu rkyen med
Por ’dus ma byas\ |zhes pa gzhi don gyi kun g zh i’i rang bzhin ni\ \sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi rkyen bzhis khrul ba
do tsam na\ \spyil bo ’am khang pa Ita bur rang re rnam pa gtses pas spyi ’dus bdo ba tsam med de| | thog ma nas
rang bzhin (ngang gis) gyis ngo bo (ma skyes) ma byung ba\ \byed pa pos (ma bcos par) ma byas par yong gi od
(rang) gsal ba\ |rgyu rkyen bral ba’i chos nyid skyes ba med ( ’dus ma byas) pa ’i ngang de ’o\ | I have translated only
those interlinear notes that help clarify the relevant passages. Lines from root tantra (in bold) are from Tb: 419.2 f..
505 See Tk vol. 8: 101.6 f.: and Bg vol. 3: 221 f., which are essentially the same though the latter has fewer scribal
errors. While the colophon o f the Tk Version simply notes that the tantra was translated by Śri Simha and gNubs
Sangs rgyas ye shes, the colophon o f the Bg version States that “people like me Sangs rgyas ye shes delighted the
guru Sri Sirpha through faith and so this tantra appeared. It was not to be revealed to anyone but concealed as a
treasure [to be recovered when appropriate conditions prevail].” Bg vol. 3: 234.3 f.: bdag ’dra sangs^ rgyas ye shes
|gwa ru shri sing ha la\ \dadpas mnyes byas rgyud ’di snang\ \su l a ’ang byin gter dusbas\\ ...atext: ghu Both
attributions are problematic given that gNubs chen probably lived about a Century later than Srīsimha.
 The conditional all-ground of union refers to
All sentient beings given the
Previous [accumulation of] latent tendencies and
Subsequent [manifestation of] afflictive emotions and concepts.
For example, it is like mixing soil and water,
And the accumulation and retention of impurities.
These three [aspects] mingle in the dharmakäya
But they are not the dharmakäya.
The genuine all-ground of primordiality
Is, for example, like the clarity of water when uncontaminated.
The awareness which is not vitiated by
Latent tendencies, concepts and emotions
Is dharmakäya, self-emergent and devoid of apprehending subject.
Awareness, by relaxing in its own natural condition,
Is most happy in this open limpid state of knowing,
A affliction-free state of being non-attached.506

It is in this distinction between a genuine or de facto all-ground (don gyi kun gzhi)
and conditional all-ground (rkyen gyi kun gzhi) and related pre-classical distinctions that we
can perhaps identify the earliest sources for the classical rNying ma distinctions between (1)
unconditioned and conditioned all-grounds presented in bridging works and (2) the more
radical and specifically sNying thig differentiation between the conditioned all-ground (kun
gzhi) in all its modalities and the ground proper (gzhi) or dharmakäya. Both Systems seek to
accommodate Yogācāra formulations of the ãlayavijñãna within the distinctly rDzogs chen
models of the unconditioned gzhi and kun gzhi.50n Their most striking difference is that

506 Bg vol. 3: 230.1 f.; Tk vol. 8: 109.3 f.: kun gzhi gnyis kyi ngo nas bzung a| \ye nyid don gyi kun gzhi dang\ \sbyor
ba rkyen gyi kun gzhi gnyis\ | \sbvor ba rkyen gyi kun 2zhi ni\ \]c sems can thams cad yin pa te\ \sngar gyi bag chags
dag dang ni\ \phyis kyis nyon mongs rnam par rtogâ\ \dper na sa dang chu ’dres la\ \rnyog m are ’dzin pa dag dang
’thun\ Ide gsum dag dang chos skur ’dres^l \de ni chos sku ma yin te| \ve nvid don evi kun 2zhi ni\ \dper* chu ma
rnyogs na dangs1 bzhin\ \bag chags rtogf pa nyon mongs kyi[s]\ \ma slad pa y ik shes pa de| | ’dzin med rang shar
chos kyi sku\ \shes pa rang lugs glod byas pas\ \shes pa dang sangs bde ba la\ \ma zhen pa ’in zug rngu med\ T k
sku gzhi gnyis kyi dngos bzung ba; T k rgyen; cadd. as per Tk; T k dag; T k snyoms par; fTk mthun; 8Tk ’brel; hom.
Tk; 'Tk dang pa; T k rtogs; kTk pa ’i; T k chos sku de; mTk dangs; nTk ma zhen rtogs pa ’i
507 More specifically, the first line of interepretation, developed in Klong chen pa’s bridging works such as the Sems
nyid ngal gso and Yid bzhin mdzod autcocommentaries, and in his Grub mtha ’ mdzod, draws on conceptions of the
genuine all-ground (don gyi kun gzhi) introduced in early rDzogs chen scriptures belonging to Mahäyoga and Sems
sde scriptures such as the extended *Guhyagarbha (sGyu ’p hrul rgyas p a \ dGongs ’dus pa ’i mdo and Kun tu bzang
po ye shes gsal bar ston p a ’i rgyud. The second and more distinctly rDzogs chen line of interpretation that is
elaborated in Klong chen pa’s sNying thig summaries such as the Tshig don mdzod, Theg mchog mdzod, Chos
dbyings mdzod and various works in the sNying thig ya bzhi cycle, draw on extensive formulations of the primordial
ground itself (ye gzhi, gdod ma ’i gzhi, thog ma ’i gzhi) and the various modes of the conditioned all-ground (kun
gzhi) as both are presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras and related tantras belonging to the Esoteric Guidance
Genre (man ngag sde) of rDzogs chen teachings.
 whereas the first preserves the early rDzogs chen idea of an unconditioned all-ground, the
second draws a sharp distinction between a wholly unconditioned ground (gzhi) and a
conditioned all-ground (kun gzhi) that is further classified into three or four types
comprising virtually all the elements of kun gzhi present in earlier formulations.508 This
realignment allows for no positively qualified variant of the kun gzhi, to the extent that even
the primordial genuine all-ground (ye nyid don gyi kun .gzhi) and genuine all-ground of
union (sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi) are reinterpreted as basic conditions of error and karmic
conditioning.509 On the one hand, the sNying thig kun gzhi absorbs virtually all the attributes
associated with the classical Yogācāra developmental ground model that was introduced to
account for the genesis and persistence of karmic conditioning and causal production. Thus,
many of the central problems of continuity that the ālayavijñãna sought to resolve -
specifically, continuities of consciousness (vijñāna), corporeality (nāmarūpa), latent or
habitual tendencies (<anuśaya, väsana), and the relation between actions and results are
here assimilated into the three or four different modes of the conditioned kun gzhi. On the
other hand, the sNying thig model also absorbs the later formulations of a neutral kun gzhi

The Classification and function of this all-ground are summarized by Klong chen pa in his Theg mchog mdzod,
(vol. 1: 1029 f.) as follows: “Its Classification is four-fold: [A] the genuine primordial all-ground (ye don gyi kun
gzhi), [B] the genuine all-ground of union (sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi), [C] the all-ground of embodiment tendencies
(bag chags lus kyi kun gzhi), and [D] the all-ground for a variety o f latent tendencies (bag chags sna tshogs kyi kun
gzhi). [A] The first is the inital ground as the source (dhätu : dbyings) of all phenomena belonging to samsära. It is
described from the [perspective] of the incipient stirring o f the act/agent o f scrutiny (dpyod byed), i.e. a tuming away
tøat is closely associated with ignorance (ma rig pa) [or basic non-recognition] with regard to open awareness. [B]
The second is described from the perspective o f this cognition which, when not fully aware of itself (rang ma rig
Pd), unites with samsära and, when fully aware o f itself, unites with nirväna. [C] The third is described from the
perspective of this foundational cognition in which through the presence o f latent tendencies for embodiment there
emerges the body-mind [complex] with its flesh, blood and radiant hue. [D] The fourth is described from the
Perspective o f this cognition serving as the ground of all (kun gyi gzhi), i.e., the source o f all impure actions and
tneir latent tendencies.” [III] dbye na\ | [i] ye don gyi kun gzhi\ | [ii] sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi\ | [iii] bag chags lus kyi
ungzhi\ I[iv] bag chags sna tshogs pa ’i kun gzhi dang bzhi ’o\ | [i] ’khor ba ’i chos thams cad kyi dbyings dang po ’i
gzhi\ Idpyod byed thog ma ’i ’gyu ba rig pa la Itos pa ’i ma rig pa mtshungs Idan du yod pa ’i zlog pa nas brjod pa ’o\
IM gnyis pa ni\ |shes pa de nyid la rang ma rig na ’khor bar sbyor la\ |rig na myang ’das su sbyor ba ’i cha nas
fjodpa o\ I[iii] gsum pa ni\ |rtsa ba ’i shes pa de nyid la lus kyi bag chags yodpas\ \sha\ \khrag\ \ ’od\ |yid lus ’char
, a i c^a nas brjod pa ’o\ | [iv] shes pa de nyid la ma dag pa ’i las dang bag chags kyi ’byung khungs kun gyi gzhi
yedpa ’i cha nas brjod pa o|
509 in
I
the general rNying ma account o f two modes o f kun gzhi, the sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi refers to the
,Jnconditioned and uncontaminated ground and is contrasted with the conditioned, contaminated bag chags sna
tshogs kyi kun gzhi. In the sNying thig model, however, it refers either to a pivotal indeterminate state which makes
room for samsära when not recognized as it is (rang ma rig pa) or nirväna when recognized (rig pa), or to the state
° f fundamental ignorance. This mode o f the kun gzhi in tum depends on the still more fundamental actual primordial
a -ground (ye don gyi kun gzhi) that is no longer a primordially undefiled Substrate but a condition of beginningless
‘gnorance and the very source o f samsära itself.
that is the source of all latent tendencies (bag chags), whether they lead to samsära or
nirväna. This process of semantic drift (as schematized in Table F) brings the entire
cumulative development of the kun gzhi concept into alignment with the conditioned mode
of being and awareness and into stark Opposition to dharmakäya and primordial knowing.

Table F: Stratigraphy of rDzogs chen ground conceptions, 8th to 14th centuries

Period Proponent rDzogs chen Unconditioned Neutral kun gzhi Conditioned

Tradition(s) * » » « « (+ )( (+/.) kun gzhi C)
8thc.? Early rNying Mahäyoga ye nyid don gyi kun gzhi, bag chags rkyen gyi
rgyud tantras* Sems sde 'dus ma byas don gyi kun kun gzhi
gzhi
10th c. gNubs chen Mahäyoga gzhi don gyi kun gzhi sbyor ba don gyi
(Mun pa'i Sems sde kun gzhi
go cha)
I I th c. Rong zom pa Mahäyoga tantric/rDzogs chen kun sütric kun gzhi
(Theg chen tshul Sems sde gzhi
'jug)
14th c. Klong chen pa - Sems sde sbyor ba don gyi kun gzhi kun gzhi bag chags sna tshogs
rNying ma Klong sde (=bral gzhi) pa'i kun gzhi
(SN, Yid bzhin (=bral bya)
mdzod,Grub
mtha' mdzod)
14th c. Klong chen pa - Man ngag sde gzhi, grol gzhi, ye gzhi, ye don gyi kun gzhi
sNying thig (sNying thig) gdod ma'i gzhi etc.
sbyor ba don gyi kun
(TC, Tshig don
gzhi
mdzod,ZN etc.)
bag chags sna tshogs
- based on 17
pa'i kun gzhi
tantras
bag chags lus kyi kun
(12th c. or
gzhi
earlier)
14th c. rGod Idem Man ngag sde 1) gnas lugs ngo bo nyid
(dGongs pa (sNyingthig) kyi gzhi (chos nyid spros
zang thal) - bral)
based on 17 2) bkod pa lus kyi gzhi (rdo
tantras rje'i lus)

* e.g. Kun tu bzang po Ye shes gsal bar ston pa’i rgyud, sGyu ’phrul rgyas pa

§2. A Central Problem: Does Errancy Exist in the Ground?

At the heart of rDzogs chen attempts to resolve the tension between developmental
and disclosive ground models was the question “does errancy exist in the ground” or, put
another way, “does the ground have error (as a constitutive element)?” That this question is
taken up repeatedly from the eighth Century onward testifies to its importance as an
orienting framework for bringing into view new formulations and clarifications of the
 rDzogs chen ground. Taken in chronological sequence (from 8th to 14lh centuries), we can
see reflected in the responses of rDzogs chen scholars to this question a growing emphasis
on the differentiation of the absolute and neutral grounds and increasingly nuanced attempts
to clarify the specific nature of this relationship. To better understand these developments,
we will briefly examine the responses of three rDzogs chen masters belonging to different
periods: gNyags Jñānakumāra (8th c.), Rog Bande shes rab 'od (13th c.) and Klong chen rab
’byams pa(14ül c.).

2.1 The Response of gNyags Jñānakumāra (8th Century)

gNyags broaches the question of whether error exists in the ground in his Mirror o f
Manifestation ( ’Phrul gyi me long). He there adduces a number of absurd consequences that
follow from assuming that error either exists or does not exist in the ground:

[I.] If deluded appearances ( ’khrul snang) existed in the ground, then due to the flaw
that this samsäric ground is permanently autonomously existent: [1] obscurations
would not arise510, [2] there would be no awakening to buddhahood, like a glass
trinket511 [that never becomes a real gern], [3] there would be a fundamental
difference between the family lineages (rigs rgyud) of victors and ordinary beings,
[4] there would be no point in teaching buddhist doctrine, [5] the manifestation of
nirväna would stop, and [6] samsära would become an absolute. [7] Since there
would be no connection [with buddhahood], [8] it would be impossible to pursue
one's aim. And thus [9] phenomena belonging to the ground would be inherently
defiled...
[II.] However, if error did not exist in the ground, this would entail [1] the fallacy
that co-emergent [innate] ignorance does not exist, [2] the fallacy of an etemally
non-existent nature, [3] nirväna becoming an absolute, and [4] the denial [cessation]
of deluded appearances. If samsära manifests in the absence of a ground, [5] samsära
would have arisen from the very beginning, [6] one’s life-stream even when purified
[would be] samsäric, [7] there would be no point in cleansing obscurations, [8] there
would be no purpose in [teaching] buddhist doctrine. If manifestation derived from a
ground that is nothing, [9] this would imply a manifestation [ex nihilo taught by] the
nihilist heretics [tīrthika]. This would involve the fallacy of [10] nothing existing

If the ground is permanently deluded, the claim that it is only adventitiously obscured would be erroneous.
5,1 tu -
t his analogy is also found in the dGongs ’dus pa mdo (Tb vol. 16, ch. 55: 422.2 f.) in the context of descnbing
characteristics o f the unchanging essence o f the ground: shel sgong bsgyur kyang gting mi ’gyur] \ ’ching bu bsgyur
kyang rin chen min\ |sa rdo bsres kyang ’drer mi rung\ \glog ’g yus gzhi la mun pa med[ \
 previously, [11] the fallacy of there being no relation between one thing and another,
and [12] [the fallacy] of the primordial ground being nothing.512

gNyags construes the relationship between ground and error as one of mutual entailment.
Errancy requires something like a ground, a fundamental mode of being, to be intelligible:
one has to confused or wrong about or in relation to something. Yet it is too much to assert
either that error exists or does not exist in or as this ground. To say error rises ex nihilo is to
espouse a nihilist view of perpetual non-existence (chadpa), but to say error preexists in the
ground is to espouse an etemalist view of perpetual existence (rtag pa). Both views fail to
account for how error adventitiously arises within a medium that is originally pure and
unconditioned. gNyags concludes that “the existence or non-existence of deluded
perceptions in the ground contradicts the meaning of ‘nonduality7, is not present amongst
the scriptures, and is not supported by logical arguments. It is therefore [deemed] untenable
by means of reasoning.”513 gNyags here applies Madhyamaka reasoning to the rDzogs chen
ground problem. ‘Ground’ and ‘error’ are co-implicates like health and illness, order and
chaos - concepts that depend on each other for their definition and without which the edifice
of Buddhist soteriology would collapse. gNyags therefore charts a middle way between the
extremes of existence and non-existence, etemalism and nihilism, acknowledging that
errancy simply occurs due to certain causes and conditions, as in the example of mistaking a
rope for a snake, without independently existing or having any determinate source for its
occurrence.

512 ’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor gyi ’g rel pa bzhugs: 984.4 f.: ’khrul snang gzhi la yod na gzhi ’khor ba rang rgyud
rtag p a ’i skyon gyis sgrib pa mi ’byung\ | ’ching b u ’i dpes ’tshang mi rgya\ \rgyal ba dang ’g ro ba rigs rgyud tha
dad ’byung] \bstan pa gsung pa la dgos ched med\ \mya ngan ’das pa ’i snang ba ’gag\ | ’khor ba mthar ’gyur\ \ ’brel
ba med pas don byar mi btub\ \gzhi’i chos dri ma can du ’g yur b a ’o\... gzhi la ’khrul pa med pa yin n a ’ang\ \lhan
cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa med pa ’i skyon dang\ \rang bzhin chad pa ’i skyon dang\ \mya ngag las ’das pa mthar ’gyur]
I ’khrul snang ’gag\ \gzhi med pa la ’khor ba snang na\ | ’khor ba la thog ma ’byung\ |rgyud dag pa yang ’khor\
Isgrib pa s byang mi dgos\ \bstan pa la dgos ched med\ ]ye nas gzhi la med pa las snang na\ \mu stegs chad p a ’i
snang bar ’gyur] \snga na med pa ’i skyon dang] |geig la geig med pa ’i skyon dang] ]ye nas gzhi la med pa dang bcu
gnyis ’byung]]
5,3 Ibid. 985.4 f.: gzhi ni ’khrul snang yod med gnyis su med pa ’i don dang ’gal] | bka ’ lung las mi snang ba] \gtan
tshigs kyis ma rgyas pa] \de Itar rigs pas mi ’thadpa 'o] |
 2.2 The Response of Rog Bande Shes rab ’od (12th Century)

In the concluding section of his bsTan p a ’i sgron me, Rog bande Shes rab ’od (1166-
1244) takes up the question of whether the ground has error a Step further by reversing the
formulation of the problem: “Errancy does not exist in the ground,” says Rog, “but the
ground does exist in errancy.” Like gNyag, Rog would agree that error presupposes a
ground (what one is mistaken about) as a condition of its possibility. But Rog is primarily
concemed with determing the nature of this ground. The ground exists in errancy in the
sense that it is the basis for error, the precondition for its own non-recognition, just as the
rope is the basis and condition of being (mis)perceived as a snake. Rog is also interested in
determining the nature of error. He defines errancy as the non-realization of the ground
whereby the ground’s expressive energy (rtsal) manifests as reflections (mnemic and thetic)
that fail to recognize the ground as it really is and theinselves as they really are, namely,
expressions ø/this ground. This analysis of error in terms of the ground’s expressive energy
(rtsal) prefigures treatments of the ground problem presented in the sNying thig sources.

In summarizing the rDzogs chen view (Ita ba) of the ground, Rog States that “as all
phenomena consiting in appearance and worldliness, samsära and nirväna, are in essence
great self-occurring primordial knowing, the great sphere, dharmakäya, they have been
primordially present as buddhahood without [requiring any] deliberate effort.”514 He goes on
to present a detailed treatment of the ground under three topics: (1) the actual abiding
condition of the ground (gzhi dngos p o ’i gnas lugs), (2) the process of errancy due to not
realizing it, and (3) the ascertainment of errancy as primordial knowing.515 The first two
topics on the ground and errancy are relevant to the present discussion:

First, conceming its actual abiding mode, the ground is endowed with four qualities.
The nature of mind, the actual abiding mode of what is knowable, [is such that]: [A]
As one does not find the slightest intrinsic essence, it is unique like the sky
encompassing everything. [B] As it cannot be identified [as anything], it is unique

bsTan pa 7 sgron me: 294.3 f.: snang srid ’khor ’das kyi bsdus pa ’i chos thams cad\ | thig le chen po chos kyi sku
ranS byung gi ye shes chen po ’i ngo bor\ \bya rtsol med par ye nas sangs rgyas par gnas p a ’o\\ Rog’s supporting
?nti!te 1S fr°m Nam mkha ’ che, a scripture frequently quoted by gNubs chen and therefore at least as early as the
*0 Century.
5,5 As Jan
r .p a. ’i sgron
me: 294. 6 f.: bye brag tu gtan la dbab pa la gsum ste| |gzhi dngos p o ’i gnas lugs bstan pa
ang\ Ide Itar ma rtogs ’khrul pa ’i tshul bstan pa dang\ \ ’khrul pa ye shes su gtan la dbab pa bstan pa 'o\ |
 like a jewel that fulfills all needs and desires, manifesting as anything whatsoever.
[C] As one doesn’t find any basis for appearance (snang gzhi), it is unique like a
dream in which appearances arise without gravitating toward [the extreme of]
unreality. [D] As it abides in its primordial greatness without modification or
alteration, it is unique like the finest gold.516

As for the process of errancy due to not recognizing this ground, Rog has this to say:

The process of errancy due to not realizing [the ground] has three aspects. [A] first,
the ground from which one errs, [B] second, how the process of errancy occurs, and
[C] third, the outcome of erring in this way. [A] First, the ground from which one
errs has three aspects: [a] If there is error from [the standpoint of] errancy existing in
the ground, then this errancy could not be abandoned by trying to eliminate it
because errancy [pre-]exists in the ground. [b] But if there is errancy [from the
standpoint of] errancy not existing the ground, it would entail the absurd
consequence that error would come about in a buddha whose mind-stream is
purified. Query: Well, then how does it occur? [c] Errancy does not exist within the
ground but the ground does exist within errancy. Take the example of mistaking a
rope for a snake. Although there is no aspect of a snake whatsoever in the rope, the
basis of mistaking it for a snake is nonetheless made [possible] by the rope. In
accordance with this example, although there is no basis whatsoever for erring with
regard to the knowable nature of things, errancy is nonetheless made [possible] by
not realizing this knowable nature of things.

[B] How errancy occurs: Conceming the uncontrived ground, the spontaneously
present nature of reality in which one does not find any intrinsic essence whatsover,
its expressive energy (rtsal) manifests as anything whatsoever. It arises as the
expressive energy (rtsal) of [mnemic and thematic] reflection (dran pa). Since this
reflection does not recognize by itself what it really is, it serves as the cause of innate
[or coemergent] ignorance (Ihan cig skyes p a ’i ma rig pa). This in tum serves as the
condition for ignorance of wrongly imagining (log par brtags p a ’i ma rig pa) all
objects. By then believing these objects to be self-existent, [mind] takes its own
reflections to be real like [one’s] face [in] a mirror. It believes things to be other than
they are like mistaking a scarecrow for a man. [Thus] it ensnares itself by itself like
the spittle of a silkworm [that forms a cocoon around itself].517

516 bsTan pa ’i sgron me: 295.1 f.: dang po dngos po ’i gnas lugs ni\ \gzhi chos bzhi Idan yin te\ \sems kyi rang bzhin
shes bya dngos po ’i gnas lugs te \ \rang gi ngo bo tsam yang ma grub par kun la khyab par nam mkha ’ Ita bu geig
yin\ Ingos bzung med par cir yang ’char ba nor b u ’i dgos ’dod ’byung ba Ita bu geig yin\ \snang gzhi ma grub par
snang ba dngos med phyogs med du ’char ba rmi lam Ita bu geig yin\ | bcos slad med pa ye nas chen por gnas pa
gser sa le sbram Ita bu geig yin no\ \
517 bsTan pa ’i sgron me: 295.5 f.: ma rtogs te ’khrulpa ’i tshul la gsum ste\ \gang las ’khrulp a ’i gzhi dang gcig\ \ji
Itar ’khrul pa ’i tshul dang gnyis\ \de Itar ’khrul pa ’i ’bras bu dang gsum mo\ \dang po gang las ’khrul pa ’i gzhi la
gsum ste I Igzhi la yo d pa las ’khrul na\ \ ’khrul pa spanggis mi spong bar ’g yur te\ \gzhi la yod p a ’i phyir ro\ \gzhi la
’khrul pa med kyang ’khrul na\ \rgyud dag pa ’i sangs rgyas la ’khrul pa ’byung bar thal lo\ \ ’o na j i Itar yin zhe na\
Igzhi la ’khrul pa med kyang\ \ ’khrul pa la gzhi yod par thag pa la sprul du ’khrul pa Ita bu yin te| | thag pa la sprul
 The upshot of Rog’s account of error is not only that one errs on account of not recognizing
the ground as it is, the nature of mind and the abiding condition of what is knowable, and
taking it as other than it is, but also that this ground is prior to and a condition of possibility
of all error. The possibility of error occurring within a primordially pure and unconditioned
ground is attributed to ground’s expressive energy (rtsal) in the form of discursive
reflections (dran pa) that apprehend their source and themselves to be subject and objects.

2.3 The Response of Klong chen rab ’byams pa (14th Century)

The issue of whether error is present in the ground is taken up repeatedly by Klong
chen rab pa in his rDzogs chen exegesis. Among his most philosophically penetrating
treatments is the response to the last of three points of controvery conceming the rDzogs
chen ground that he presents in his Zab don rgya mtsho’i sprin, a highly original summation
and defence of rDzogs chen sNying thig system contained in the mKha’ ’gro yang tig.5ls The
point at issue is whether error exists or does not exists in the original ground (gdod ma ’i
gzhi).519 Klong chen pa presents the two sides of the debate as follows: (1) If errancy existed
in the ground, then the original ground could not be one’s authentic abiding condition (yang
dag p a ’i gnas lugs) which is by definition free from error. (2) On the other hand, if error did
not exist in the ground, this would have the absurd consequence that there is no cause for
error at all given that there could be no other source of error independent of this most primal
ground of experience. Like gNyags long before him, Klong che pa is careful to avoid the
two homs of this dilemma. Since there no evidence of error in the ground itself, he reasons,

gyi rnam pa gang yang med kyang\ \sprul du ’khrul pa ’i gzhi thag pas byas so\ | dpe de bzhin du shes bya ’i gshis la
khrulpa ’i gzhi gang yang grub pa med kyang\ | ’khrul pa ni shes bya ’i gshis ma rtogs pas byas so\ 1/7 Itar khrul pa
ni\ Igzhi ma bcos Ihun gyis grub p a ’i chos nyid rang gi ngo bor cir yang ma grub pa la rtsal ci yang char ba ste|
\dran pa i rtsal du shar\ \dran pa rang ngo rang gis ma shes pas\ \lhan cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa rgyu byas\ \des yul
un iog par brtags pa ’i ma rig pas rkyen byas nas\ \yul rang rgyud du bzung nas\ \rang gi gzugs brnyan la bden
Pur bzung ba me long dang bzhin Ita bur gyur] \min pa la yin par bzung ba mtho yor la mir ’khrul pa Ita bur gyur]
Ir<*ng gi rang beings pa srin gyi kha chu Ita gyur to\ \
518
mKha’ ’g ro yang tig vol. 2: 91 f.. The first two points of controversy are whether (1) the ground is something
perceptable or imperceptable (snang mi snang), and (2) the ground’s aspects o f essence, nature and responsiveness
(ngo bo, rang bzhin, thugs rje) are the same or different.
5'9
My presentation abridges the arguments presented as follows in the Zab don rgya mtsho 7 sprin: 92.4 f.: gdod
*& hi de la ’khrul pa yod dam med\ \yod na gdod ma ’i gzhi de yang dag pa ’i gnas lugs ma yin par ’g yur na\ \ci ’i
P yir khrul pa yod\ \med na ’khrul pa rgyu med par thal] \ ’khrul p a ’i byung sa la ’khrul pa ’i rgyu med de \ \de las
gzhan la ’khrul rgyu med par btags pa mtshungs pa ’i phyir zhe na\ \gnyis pa lan ni\ \gzhi la ’khrul pa grub pa med
Tas\ I khrul rgyu yod ma myong la\ | ’char gzhi ma ’g ags pas me long dang ’dra ’o\ \
the ground has never known the existence of any cause of error. Error nonetheless occurs
because the ground functions unceasingly as the basis for arising ( ’char gzhi) in the same
way that a mirror functions unceasingly as the source of reflections. Just as reflections
appear in the mirror without the mirror being altered in any way, so errancy appears without
the ground being altered in any way. But this begs the question of why error should occur in
the absence of any basis for it:

Objection: Isn’t ‘error’ untenable given there is no ground/basis of error? Reply: It is

analogous to the lack of contradiction in [assuming that there is] [1] a basis for the
arising of myriad dreams within the nonconceptual [state of] sleep, though no [actual
basis] is found, and [2] a basis for the arising of the yellow appearance of a white
conch under the influence of jaundice, though there is no [actual] basis for [this]
yellowness.

Objection: But could we not therefore conclude that the subtle awareness of inner
radiance as the primordial responsiveness (gdod m a’i thugs rje) [one of the three
aspects of the ground], is simply the all-ground (kun gzhi) or all-ground cognition
(kun gzhi ’i shes pa) given that it is present as the subtle aspect functioning as the
source of arising of all cognitions present in the ground? Reply: This is not so
because [1] this original ground is open awareness that is not confined in any way to
samsära or nirväna, and thus does not serve as a basis of obscuration, whereas [2] the
all-ground as the neutral cognitive capacity belonging to ignorance (ma rig p a ’i shes
pa) does serve as a basis for myriad karma, and is thus similar to the earth (sa gzhi)
or to a carpet of silk brocade520.521

The dialogue has so far drawn attention to two points in need of clarification: (1) The first is
the need to reconcile the original ground (gdod m a’i gzhi) that, like a mirror, remains
invariant under the transformations it appears to undergo with its function as a basis for
arising ( ’char gzhi) that consists in its capacity to make room for appearances, comparable
to a mirror’s capacity to make room for a limitless variety of reflections. (2) The second
point is the need to distinguish this invariant originary ground and its expressive nature from
the generative or developmental all-ground (kun gzhi) that is the Substrate for all karma and

520 On the example ‘carpet o f silk brocade’ (za ’o ggi ’ding ba), see below 302 n. 720; also 200 n. 520.
521 Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin: 92.6 f.: ’o na ’khrul gzhi med pa la ’khrul pa mi ’thad do zhe na\ \gnyed rtog med la
rmi lam sna tshogs kyi ’char gzhi ma grub bzhin du snang ba dang\ \bad kan gyi rkyen gyi dung dkar po la ser po ’i
gzhi med kyang ser por snang ba ’i ’char gzhi byed pa mi ’g al ba bzhin no\ \yang gdod ma ’i thugs rje nang gsal gyi
rig pa phra mo de kun gzhi ’am\ | kun gzhi ’i shes pa nyid du thal\ \gzhi gnas kyi shes pa kun gyi ’char gzhi byed pa ’i
phra mor gnas pa ’i phyir zhe na\ | ma yin te gdod ma ’i gzhi de ’khor ’das gang du yang ma chad pa ’i rig pa yin la\
Isgrib pa ’i rten mi byed pa ’i phyir kun gzhi ni ma rig pa ’i shes pa lung ma bstan las sna tshogs pa ’i rten byed pas sa
gzhi ’am za ’og gi ’ding ba Ita bu yin pa ’i phyir ro\\
obscurations. The two are irreducible to one another. The originary ground is the prior and
pervasive open awareness empty in essence, luminous in nature, and all-pervading in
responsiveness (ngo bo stong pa rang bzhin gsal ba thugs rje kun la khyab pa); the
derivative all-ground is the neutral cognition belonging to fundamental ignorance.

Klong chen p a’s imagined interlocutor then asks whether we are not forced to
conclude that the original ground cannot possibly serve as the source (skye rten) of the two
dissimilar categories of samsära and nirväna given the untenability of deriving two
dissimilar types of result from an essentially singulär cause. In reply, Klong chen pa takes
the case of the Buddha’s cousin Devadatta who is a friend to some but an enemy to others: it
is inadmissable, he argues, to conclude that we are dealing here with two different agents -
one who makes people happy and another who makes them miserable - because both have a
single referent, i.e. Devadatta. Klong chen pa then employs the traditional simile of a crystal
ball: “Now, just as a single crystal ball appears as water under the condition of the rising
moon at night or as fire under the condition of the rising sun [at dawn], so it Stands to reason
that this ground functions as the ground for arising of both nirväna and samsära due to
conditions of open awareness and the lack thereof (rig pa ma rig pa), even though this
original ground is not itself established in any way as samsära or nirväna.”522

While the originary ground is naturally unbiased and uncurtailed in scope (rgya chad
phyogs Ihung med pa), it is nonetheless primordially and spontaneously active as the great
basis for arising ( ’char gzhi chen por) of all that constitutes samsära and nirväna.523 Klong
chen pa is now in a position to conclude that errancy does not exist in the ground per se, but
nonetheless occurs owing to the indeterminacy (ma nges pa) of the ground’s self-
manifestation (gzhi snang; rang snang), a spontaneous self-manifestation that may appear as
samsära when not recognized as is or as nirväna when so recognized. Because error is
conceived as an auto-manifestation (rang snang) lacking any extraneous foundation (gzhi
med), it can be regarded as a kind of boot-strapping process that unfolds of its own accord
522
Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin: 94.1 f.: gzhan yang shel sgong geig nyid mtshan mo zla ba shar ba i rkyen gyis chu
byung la\ Inyi ma shar b a ’i rkyen gyis me ’byung ba bzhin\ \gzhi de nyid rig ma rig gi rkyen gyis khor das gnyis
kyi char gzhi byed pa ’thad de \ \gdod ma ’i gzhi de la ’khor ’das gang du ’ang ma grub par\ \
523
Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin: 96.2 f.: ’dir yang gdod m a ’i gzhi de \ \rgya chad phyogs lung med pa i tshul gyis
khor das thams cad kyi ’char gzhi chen por ye nas Ihun gyis grub po zhes legs par lan thebs so||
under the appropriate conditions and also ceases of its own accord when the conditions for
its functioning are no longer operative.

By means of the foregoing sequence of questions and answers, Klong chen pa

clarifies the logical steps leading to the fully developed sNying thig formulation of the
original ground, one emphasizing the indivisibility of original purity (ka dag) from the
perspective of its empty essence and spontaneous presence (Ihun grub) from the standpoint
of its luminous nature. Klong chen pa concludes:

In short, since the essence of this original ground is primordially empty, [the ground]
is not established as any substance or attribute. It is [also] empty due to its making
room for everything [to manifest]. It abides as the all-encompassing nature of things.
Since its nature radiates as light ( ’od), it transcends the coarse and subtle elements. It
is fully present as manifestations of spiritual embodiment (sku) and primordial
knowing (ye shes), luminosity, and spontaneously present maņdalas. Since its
compassionate responsiveness is nonconceptual, it transcends the domain of the all-
ground with its eightfold ensemble [of cognitions]. Since it is self-occurring
primordial knowing, it is sensitive and caring, serving as the ground for the arising of
myriad spontaneous activities that work [for the benefit of others]. Moreover, since
its essence is empty, it does not fall into the extreme of etemalism. Since its nature is
luminous, it does not fall into the extreme of nihilism. And since its compassionate
responsiveness is all-encompassing, the three embodiments are inseparably united.524

Here, in characterizing the originary ground as originally pure and yet spontaneously
present, empty in essence and yet luminous in nature, Klong chen pa charts a course
between the Scylla of etemalism and Charybdis of nihilism.

§3. The sNying thig Prim ordial G round and its Critics

To this point, we have followed two lines of differentiation leading to the fully
articulated sNying thig conception of a primordial ground that both (1) transcends the
Yogācāra ãlayavijñāna and all the complex workings of dualistic consciousness and (2)
constitutes a condition of ontological freedom that is essentially devoid of error but at the

524 Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin: 95.2 f.: mdor na gdod ma ’i gzhi de ngo bo ye nas stong pas dngos po dang mtshan
mar ma grub\ |kun gyi go ’byedpas stong pa\ \yongs la khyab pa ’i bdag nyid du gnas\ \rang bzhin ’od du gsal bas
phra rags kyi ’byung bas las ’das\ \sku dang ye shes kyi snang ba gsal ba\ \ ’tsher ba\ \lhun gruba pa ’i dkyil ’khor du
rdzogs\ Ithugs rje rnam par mi rtog pas kun gzhi tshogs brgyad kyi yul las ’das\ | rang byung gi ye shes yin pas
mkhyen pa brtse ba\ \mdzad pa ’i phrin las sna tshogs kyi ’char gzhi byed pa ’o\ \de yang ngo bo stong pas rtag pa ’i
mthar ma lhung\ \rang bzhin gsal bas c h a d p a ’i mthar ma lhung\ \thugs rjes kun la khyab pas sku gsum ’du ’bral
m e d p a ’o\\ atext: Ihunsdug
 same time a precondition for its arising ( ’char gzhi). As tempting as it may be to view this
affirmation of a primordial ground as a foundationalist enterprise, its portrayal in rDzogs
chen sNying thig sources suggests the opposite. There the ground is presented not as an
object of metaphysical speculation or even rational inference but as an implicit, if generally
obscured, mode of being that is nonetheless accessible to personal experience. To directly
recognize open awareness (rig pa rang ngo shes) is to ascertain the ground (gzhi gtan la
dbab pa). Here, one ought not disregard the context of living praxis and pedagogy within
which this attestation of the ground is traditionally situated. To do so would be to underplay
the testimonial tenor of rDzogs chen ground presentations which owe their evidential force
less to abstract reasoning and deductive inference than to first-hand accounts of personal
experience. Indeed, writings on rDzogs chen praxis customarily specify a number of
indications (rtags) and measures (tshad) of attainment that are said to accompany the
ascertainment of the ground. Later exegetes such as Klong chen pa further explained that the
ground is so-named precisely because it is groundless having no further foundation from
which it originates or root from which it develops (gzhi med rtsa bral). This original
‘groundless’ ground is precisely what remains when reifying abstractions have ceased, the
most pemicious of which is the beliefs in real entities and their having real characteristics.

3.1 The Abiding versus Metaphysical Grounds

It is in this anti-foundationalist spirit that the sNying thig scriptures distinguish the
ground experienced as one’s abiding condition (gzhi kyi gnas lugs) from the various grounds
posited as intellectual objects (shes bya’i gzhi)525 on the basis of different philosophical
presuppositions ( ’dod lugs). mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum (1158-1213) specifies that the abiding
ground is a matter of direct experience for those adherents of the path (lam du rjes su ’dzin
P â ), whereas the intellectual, or what we can call ‘metaphysical’, grounds are products of
abstract theorizing entertained by adherents of philosophical Systems (grub pa ’i mtha ’ rjes

The distinction between ‘ground’ as intellectual object (shes bya’i gzhi) and ground as abiding condition (gnas
fags kyi gzhi) is introduced in a rare, though often quoted, extra-canonical rNying ma tantra entitled Klong gsal bar
ma nyi ma'i gsang rgyud: 37a.2. It is also taken up by mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum in his rDzogs pa chen po Tshig don
bcu geig pa: 16.7 f., and is the source for discussions of this distinctions in mKha ’ ’gro snying thig vol. 1: 341.3 f. as
WeH as the rDzogs rim man ngag snying po from the gTer ma collection Bla ma dgongs ’dus (mTshams brag ed.)
v°l- 10: 634.3 f..
su ’dzin pa).526 The sNying thig tantras and their commentaries identify six or seven
metaphysical ‘grounds’527 that represent realist ontologies based on differing reductionist
accounts of how things really are. These grounds (presented in Table G below) are therefore
called ‘grounds based on extremist beliefs’ (mthar ’dzin gyi gzhi). The relevant passage
from the sGra thal ’gyur reads as follows:

The abiding [ground] as it naturally occurs

Is present in a seven-fold manner:
[1] It is known as spontaneous from the perspective of its myriad expressions,
[2] Indeterminate from the standpoint of everything changing,
[3] Determinate from [the perspective of] its immutability,
[4] Able to transform into anything [given the] Creative energy of manifesting,
[5] Amenable to any propositions because it [may] arise as everything,
[6] Originally pure because errancy has been purified, and
[7] Variegated given its diverse ways of manifesting.528

Valid though these characterizations may be as partial perspectives, they are

considered flawed or erroneous (skyon can) to the extent that they are appropriated for
personal, doctrinal, or sectarian purposes and elevated to the Status of absolute truths. Klong
chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod invokes the traditional Indian parable of the seven blind men

526 See rDzogs pa chen po Tshig don bcu geig pa: 16.9 f.. This analysis is followed by Klong chen pa in his Tshig
don mdzod: 778.5 f..
527 There is an extensive literature on these grounds. The primary sources o f this doctrine are the sGra thal ’g yur and
Klong drug tantras and other works associated with the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra. See sGra thal 'gyur, vol.
12: 152.3 f. and Klong drug, Tb vol. 12: 437.2 f.. The passages from the two Atiyoga tantras have been the subject
of detailed philosophical analyses in the following works: (1) mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s 12th Century Tshig don bcu
geig pa; (2) commentaries on these two tantras attributed to Vimalamitra (sGra thal ’g yur rtsa rgyud ’g rel vol. 2, in
NyKs vol. 111: 734.2 f. and Kun tu bzang po Klong drug rgyud kyi ’grel pa, in NyKs vol. 109: 609.2 f.); (3) Klong
chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod (vol. 1: 646.2 f.) and Tshig don mdzod (776.2 f.); (4) later rNying ma exegetical works
based closely on Klong chen pa and his sources such as rTse le sna tshogs rang grol’s Nyi ma ’i snying po (Theg pa
thams cad kyi mchog rab tu gsang ba bla na med pa ’od gsal rdo rje ’i snying po ’i don rnam par bshad pa Nyi ma 'i
snying po, in rTse le sna tshogs rang grol gyi bka ’ ’bum, vol. 8: 439.2 f.)., and ’Jigs med gling pa’s rNam mkhyen
shing rta (Yon tan mdzod ’g rel in ’J igs gling gsung ’bum, vol. 4: 26.2 f.); and Yon tan rgya mtsho’s Zab don snang
byed nyi m a ’i ’o d ze r ( Yon tan rin po ch e ’i mdzod kyi ’g rel pa, in NyKs vol. 55: 530.1 f.); and (5) two 14th Century
gTer ma collections linked with the oral transmissions o f Vimalamitra, the dGongs pa zang thal (for e.g., Bi ma mi
tra ’i snyan brgyud chen mo, in dGongs pa zang thal, vol. 4: 208.5 f.) and Bla ma dgongs ’dus ( for e.g., rDzogs rim
man ngag snying po in Bla ma dgongs ’dus (mThams brag ed.) vol. 10: 634.2 f.). For a concise overview on the six
or seven grounds, see Achard 2002. See also Germano 1992 vol. 1: 143 f..
528 Tb vol. 12: 152.3 f.: babs* las grub pa ’i gnas lugs ni\ \gnas pa bdun gyi tshul las yang\ \sna tshogs ngos nas Ihun
grub labI I ’gyur tshad cha nas nges med pa\ | mi ’gyur ba las nges pa can\ \snang b a ’i rtsal ni cir yang bsgyur\
Ithams cad ’byung phyird khas len bcas\ \ ’khrul pa dag phyir ka dag la\ \snang tshul tha dad khra bor ’dod\\ aAti
bab; bAti pa; c,gyu corrected to ’g yur as per Ati; dAti zhing. The Klong drug p a ’i rgyud reproduces this list
(reversing the last two views) but describes them in greater detail and provides a critique of each.
 and the elephant529 to illustrate the partial and perspectival nature of the seven intellectual
grounds.530 In his Tshig don mdzod it is the “six grounds propounded by those who adhere to
philosophical Systems” that are “shown to be flawed because these people succumb to views
based on extreme beliefs stemming from their attachment to their own particular
perspectives. They are like the interpretations of the colour and shape of a divine elephant
by six blind men based on what they [can] grasp with their hands.”531 In short, the enemy

Varying versions o f this parable are found in Buddhist, Jain, Brahmanical and Sufi literature. It has generally
been used to illustrate perspectivism, the doctrine that no account o f reality can be taken as definitively true since it
is always relative to the perspective from which it is formulated. Jains use the parable to illustrate the ‘maybe
doctrine’ (syadvädä) which is perhaps the earliest clearly worked out doctrine of persepectivism in world
philosophy, predating Nietzsche’s doctrine by some 2200 years. On Nietzsche’s perspectivism, see Nehamas 1985.
The seven-fold Jain formula is used to demonstrate that every proposition is relative or conditional, none can be
absolutely affirmed or denied. According to this doctrine, there are no absolute truths but only partial truths or
perspectives (naya) that are relative to the particularities o f the Situation (space, time, substance and state) in which
they occur. Such is the account given in the Jaina Syādvādamañjarī. In Buddhism, the parable is found in early
Buddhist canonical sources such as Udãna VI, 4: p. 66-69 as well as later Mahāyāna sources such as the
Mahāyānasamgraha III: 235 (Chinese edition, Lamotte 1938). For further references, see Winternitz vol. 2: 84-85;
Nakamura 1992: 219 f.. Klong chen pa may have followed mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s use of this parable (Tshig don
bcu geig pa: 21.10 f.) in his own Tshig don mdzod and Theg mchog mdzod, though his early Sems nyid ngal gso
grel does quote a passage from the Buddhahrdayasütra (Sangs rgyas kyi snying po ’i mdo) that invokes the parable
of various blindmen describing an elephant to illustrate the fritility o f trying to express buddha nature
(buddhagarbha : sangs rgyas kyi snying po) when one has no direct acquaintance with it (see Sems nyid ngal gso
grel: 327.2 f.). I have not identified this text which appears to be other than the Buddhahrdayanāmadhãranī
( Phags pa sangs rgyas kyi snying po zhes bya ba'i gzungs, D no. 515) that does not contain this passage.
Ironically, there has been a divergence of opinion on the issue o f whether all seven of these views are to be
considered mistaken or only the six apart from the distinctively rDzogs chen idea of original purity (ka dag). The
two root tantras explicity declare all seven views to be one-sided partial perspectives. While this view is endorsed by
t e sGra thal ’g yur commentary, the Klong drug commentary interpolates another flawed view of the ground (by
oubling the fifth) in order to salvage the controversial rDzogs chen idea of an originally pure ground (ka nas dag
Tk 7 ^ om set ° f seven flawed grounds and vouchsafe its Status as a (or the) valid description of the ground.
e 12 Century Tshig don bcu geig pa o f mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum likewise distinguishes original purity as a
awless interpretation o f the ground in contrast to the other six flawed interpretations. Tshig don bcu geig pa: 16.7:
e r shes bya ’i gzhi bdun la ’dod lugs gnyis su dbye ste\ \gzhi drug skyon can du gnas pa dang\ \ka dag skyon med
rang gzhung du gtan la dbab pa ’o\\ mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s Tshig don bcu geig pa , as I suggested previously, may
ave served as a prototype for Klong chen pa’s Tshig don mdzod, a work similarily structured according to the
e even salient sNying thig topics (tshig don : padärtha) but dealing with the subject matter in much greater detail.
is conjecture is supported by the fact that the Tshig don mdzod similarily distinguishes ka dag as the only flawless
Interpretation o f the ground. On the other hand, Klong chen pa’s most mature and extensive sNying thig summary,
e Theg mchog mdzod, follows the root tantras in holding all seven views to be partial perspectives. Both lines of
Interpretation can be traced through later rDzogs chen exegesis on the seven intellectual grounds. The account o f six
awed grounds flnds support in the Bla ma dgongs ’dus and dGongs pa zang thal as well as in rTse le sna tshogs
ran8 grol’s Nyi m a ’i snying po where the author offers a cogent defence of the ka dag doctrine by showing its
contmuity with earlier Buddhist views. Support for seven flawed grounds is found in the works of ’Jigs med gling pa
an Yon tan rgya mtsho, though they are careful to specify that the view of original purity is mistaken only to the
fcxtent that it is considered to the exclusion o f spontaneous presence and taken as an end in itself. Absolutizing
original purity in this way is said to be no different than clinging to a sheer emptiness (stong pa rkang ma) that
excludes presence (snang ba) and awareness (rig pa).
Tshig don mdzod: 779.1 f.: grub mtha ’ rjes su ’dzin pas gzhi drug skyon can du bstan pa ni phyogs re la zhen nas
mt or dzin gyi Ita bar Ihung ba ni\ | dmus long drug gis Iha ’i glang po che la lag pas nyal nas dbyibs dang kha dog
here is not the six or seven views themselves which may be perfectly valid as partial
accounts but rather the tendency toward reductionism and absolutization that lead their
adherents to elevate a given viewpoint to the Status of an all-embracing dogma.532 mKhas pa
Nyi ’bum notes that “the six ways of abiding [of the ground] are not inherently flawed
because if we investigate each as a partial expression, there is no mistake. But if one
believes any of them to be a real essence, this is a grave error.”533
The following table delineates the seven views of the ground as presented in the
Atiyoga tantras and the treatises and commentaries that explain them.

’ja l ba ’dra la\ \lam rjes su ’dzin pas ka dag skyon med rang gzhung du ’dod pa mig dang Idan pas glang po che ’i
rang bzhin ’j a l ba Ita bu ste| |
532 Tshig don mdzod'. 778.3 f.: “Thus, in the case of showing [the ground] to be seven-fold, although it may be
analyzed in these varying ways on the basis o f interpreting the reality of the one open awareness, these words, letters
and opinions are not established in any way within the essence of open awareness. For this reason, I do not here
subscribe to any assertions that are attached to one extreme, declaring “it is only this”. de Itar bdun du bstan payang
rig pa geig gi don ’ja l ba las so so nas brtags kyang rig pa ’i ngo bo la tshig dang yi ge dang ’dod tshul gang du ’ang
ma grub pas ’di kho na ’o zhes mtha ’ geig tu zhen pa ’i khas len ni ’dir mi ’dod | |
533 Tshig don bcu geig pa: 21.8 f.: gnas lugs drug po de ngo bo nyid kyi skyon can ma yin te rtsalphyogs re la brtag
na nor ba ’ang ma yin la de la ngo bo nyid bden par bzung na\ \shin tu ’khrul ste| ... The author proceeds to illustrate
his point using the parable o f the blindmen and the elephant.
 Table G: The seven metaphysical grounds: flawed or partial perspectives on
the Ground according to Atiyoga tantras and related works

sGra thal ’gyur rgyud Klong drug rgyud Theg mchog mdzod, Tshig don bcu geig pa,
(with ’grel pa) (with ’grel pa) Tshig don mdzod dGongs pa zang thal,
Bla ma dgongs ’dus,
1. spontaneously present spontaneously present originally pure3 spontaneously present
(Ihun grub) (Ihun grub) (ka dag) (Ihun grub)
2. indeterminate indeterminate spontaneously present indeterminate
(nges med) (ngespa med pa) (Ihun grub) (ma nges pa)
3. ultimate foundation ultimate foundation indeterminate ultimate foundation (nges
(nges pa don gyi dngos (nges pa don gyi dngos gzhi) (ma nges pa) pa don gyi gzhi)
gzhi)
4. able to transform into able to transform into ultimate foundation able to transform into
anything (cir yang bsGyur anything (cir yang bsGyur du (nges pa don gyi dngos anything (cir yang bsGyur
du btub pa) btub pa) gzhi) du btub pa)
5. ammenable to any ammenable to any able to transform into ammenable to any
proposition (cir yang khas proposition (cir yang khas anything (cir yang bsGyur proposition (cir yang khas
blang du btub Da) blang du btub pa) du btub pa) blang du btub pa)
6. originally pure1 variegated or varied2 ammenable to any varied
(ka dag) (khra bo'am sna tshogs) proposition (cir yang khas (sna tshogs)
blang du btub pa)
7. variegated originally pure varied originally pure
(khra bo) (ka nas dag pa) (sna tshogs) (ka dag)
Conclusions: 1-7 » » 1-7 are flawed Claims based Tshig don mdzod: 2-7 are 1-6 are flawed, being
flawed daims based on on one-sided perspectives of flawed; reified expressions (rtsal)
one-sided perspectives of the ground (commentary 1 (ka dag) is flawless. of gzhi;
the ground reinterprets this)2 TC: 1-7 are flawed; 7 (ka dag) is flawless
Actual gzhi is ka dag Ihun ( as in Tshig don mdzod)
grub dbyer med

Notes on Tahle r . -

Although the sGra thal ’gyur ’g rel pa follows the root tantra in identifying all seven grounds as flawed partial
perspectives o f the ground, original purity is nonetheless qualified as a view “held by those having minds in which
errors have resolved themselves” ( ’khrul pa rang dag pa'i blo can la/ ka dag tu ’dodp a ...) vol. 2, 749.2.

The Klong drug ’g rel pa (631.2 f.) here adds a 6th analysis o f the ground (brtag pa drug pa) that is an essentialized
Version of the 5th ground, i.e. “a ground held to be ammenable to propositions conceming the essence of whatever is
ammenable to any proposition” (gzhi cir yang khas blang du btub pa de ci ’i ngo bor khas blang du btub pa i dod
Pd). This interpolation allows for a less radical interpretation o f the seven grounds that preserves the controversial
idea of ka dag as a valid description of the ground. With this addition, the Klong drug’s 6th flawed ground, the so-
called variegated or varied, becomes the commentary’s 7th so that the ka dag is no longer included in the set of seven
flawed interpretations o f the ground but is considered the correct or flawless interpretation of the ground.

According to Klong chen pa’s Tshig don mdzod, original purity (ka dag) is a correct or flawless description o f the
ground as distinct from the other six descriptions which are partial or distorted perspectives (in contrast to both
tantras which delineate seven flawed interpretations inclusive o f ka dag). Although this view is not corroborated by
Ihe Klong drug or sGra thal ’g yur tantras, it does agree with the Klong drug commentary attributed to Vimalamitra,
^Khas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s Tshig don bcu geig pa and the dGongs pa zang thal and Bla ma dgongs ’dus. By contrast,
Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod (which expands on all the themes of the Tshig don mdzod along with a great
many others) follows the root tantras in including original purity among the partial views and further specifies the
correct understanding o f the ground as consisting in the indivisibility of original purity and spontaneous presence
(ka dag Ihun grub dbyer med).
 Without venturing into a detailed investigation of the seven grounds and their
historical antecedents - a task which would take us well beyond the compass of this work -
let it suffice here to briefly consider the doctrine in light of some of the central problems of
the ground we have been examining in this chapter. Foremost among these were the
tensions between invariance and change, emptiness and appearance, quietism and exertion,
and (perhaps most distinctively) freedom and error, that early articulations of the ground
sought in various ways to reconcile. From a sNying thig standpoint, the main problem with
the idea that the ground, i.e., human reality in its fundamental condition, is immutable and
determinate (nges pa) is that it renders all change, and most importantly soteriological
change (the Buddhist path), impossible. To posit an ontological foundation on which all
other things depend but which does not itself depend on anything eise is to court
determinism and etemalism. Such an absolutist and etemalist view is little different from
Brahmanical ätman doctrine and likewise vulnerable to the type of antifoundationalist
critique advanced by Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and CandrakTrti. By contrast,
the view that the ground is inherently indeterminate protean, transformable and
ammenable to any proposition about it - runs the opposite risks of relativism and nihilism. A
fundamentally indeterminate, random ground that can become anything, and that can be
anything one asserts of it - a ground of all (kun gzhi) where ‘all’ is understood to comprise
all actual and possible determinations - takes the barb out of the Buddhist path. Without the
ratchet effect of incontrovertable realizations, there is nothing to prevent a hard-won
condition of freedom from slipping back into bondage and error, whether because the
ground is inherently changeable and subject to arbitrary vacillations or because it conforms
to whatever proposition we may entertain about it. Thus the rDzogs chen ground problem is
fundamentally a soteriological one: how to reconcile in theory and praxis the abiding and
manifesting aspects of the ground (gnas lugs, snang lugs), the abiding invariant ground of
experience and the directionality and dynamism of the path of disclosure. In classical
rDzogs chen exegesis, the resolution lies in the attestation (as distinct from rational proof or
inference) of a ground (open awareness) that consists in the indivisibility of original purity
and spontaneous presence (ka dag dang Ihun grub dbyer med), emptiness and lucidity.
 In presenting the sNying thig ground as originally pure (emptiness) and
spontaneously present (lucidity), Klong chen pa addresses a possible objection that this
definition of the ground simply introduces an eighth intellectual ground that is vulnerable to
the same antimetaphysical critiques as the others. The Opponent argues that original purity
and spontaneous presence have each proven to be invalid as a characterization of the
ground: (1) If the ground were, in its very essence, originally pure, having never known the
existence of samsāra, one would be forced to conclude that it makes no sense that sentient
beings could ever be in error ( ’khrul pa). (2) If, moreover, the ground’s nature were
spontaneously present (replete with all buddha qualities), one must conclude that beings are
always already free (ye grol bar) without making the slightest effort. (3) One is therefore led
inescapably to conclude that the alleged unity of original purity and spontaneous presence
serves only to render thè Buddhist path of liberation unnecessary given that beings are
already free from error. According to Klong chen pa, this criticism is based on a serious
misunderstanding of the priority relation between freedom and error, the pristine ground
and its indeterminate spontaneity: although samsära and sentient beings do not actually exist
given that the ground’s essence is originally pure, they nonetheless vividly appear to do so,
like dream images suddenly manifesting out of dreamless sleep, due to the mere expressive
energy (rtsal) or playing forth (rol pa) of spontaneity.534

3.2 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Critique and rNying ma Responses

The classical rDzogs chen conception of an invariant ground structurally prior to,
and yet a precondition of, the Yogācāra ālayavijñāna not suprisingly became the target of
refutation by representatives of gSar ma traditions. A notable example of this is the
trenchant critique put to the Zur rDzogs chen master Sog zlog pa Bio gros rgyal mtshan
(1552-1624) by eighth Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), a brilliant and original
thinker whose penetrating interrogation raises a number of important questions:
In the context of explaining the ground in counterfeit instructions you pass off as the
meaning of the tantras, [certain questions arise]. The New (gsar ma) traditions assert
[the following]. Most Indian scholar-adepts such as the hero Nāgārjuna and
especially Dharmaklrti, maintain that:

See Theg mchog mdzod pari 1: 663.2 f..

 The all-ground consciousness (<alayavijñāna)
Is unobscured [and] neutral in essence.535
Just as a mirror is devoid of any reflections when [considered] in its essence, so the
all-ground is devoid of the seven modes of consciousness together with their mental
factors when [considered] in its essence. In the same way that [a mirror] does not
lose its clarity, its capacity for any reflections whatsoever to appear, so [the all-
ground] does not lose its capacity for the latent tendencies of samsära, nirväna and
the path to be imprinted on it. Just as when a mirror in itself does not encounter any
objective conditions, it remains a neutral [or indeterminate] clarity (lung ma bstan
pa ’i gsal ba), likewise the all-ground when it is not swayed by karmic dispositions
toward freedom or errancy is claimed to be a neutrality that does not veer one-
sidedly toward samsära or nirväna.
By contrast, your tradition declares that the ground is originally pure (ka dag) and
primordially free (ye grol). So in your tradition, does this mean that original purity
and the all-ground are the same or different? If they are the same, the all-ground
would be the common ground of both samsära and nirväna, in which case it would
possess innate ignorance because it is [considered] the root of all ignorance.
Consequently, it would not fulfill the stipulations of being ‘originally pure’ and
‘primordially free’. Now, if the all-ground and original purity are not the same but
different, then which comes first (thog mar gang snga), original purity or the all-
ground? If original purity were prior, this would imply that first there was original
purity which later collapses when emerging as the abiding state of the all-ground.
This is untenable from the standpoint of scripture and reasoning because the all-
ground is one’s primordial abiding condition that does not veer one-sidedly toward
either samsära or nirväna, so there is nothing at all that is prior to it. If the all-ground
is prior, then it would not be originally pure or primordially free. Consequently, what
you call ‘original purity’ is claimed, in Bon texts, to be the initial primordial absence
(dang po ye med) and the failure to realize original purity and worldly existence as a
bit of primordial existence (ye yod) deriving from that is called the ground for
straying into samsära ( ’khor b a ’i ’khrul gzhi). Thus you have simply modified [Bon]
terminology.536

535 This quotation is not found in Steinkellner’s Verse-Index o f Dharmakīrti’s Works 1977. The attribution o f such a
view of ālayavijñāna to Nāgārjuna also seems dubious to say the least.
536 rGyal ba ’i dbang po Karma pa mi bskyod rdo rjes gSang sngags snying ma ba la dri ba ’i chab shog gnang ba ’i
Dris lan lung dang rigs p a ’i ’brug sgra, in Sog bzlogpa gsung ’bum vol. 2: 68.2 f.; NyKs vol. 117: 117.2 f.: yang
rgyud de dag gi don yin pa Itar bcos pa ’i gdams pa rnams kyi gzhi bshad pa ’i skabs na\ \gsar ma lugs ni klu sgrub
dpa ’ bo la sogs ’p hags yul gyi mkhas grub phal mo che dang\ \khyadpar chos kyi grags pa ’i bzhedpas\ \de la kun
gzhi ’i rnam shes ni\ | ngo bo ma sgribs lung ma bstan\ \ces pa Itar me long rang gi ngo bo ’i dus na gzugs bmyan gyi
stong pa bzhin du\ \kun gzhi rang gi ngo bo ’i dus na tshogs bdun sems byung dang bcas pas stong pa\ \gzugs brnyan
cir* yang snang rung gi gsal ba mi ’dor ba bzhin du\ | ’khor ’das lam gsum gyi bag chags ’jo g rung gi nus pa mi ’dor
ba\ Iyul rkyen dang ma phrad pa ’i me long rang gi dus na lung ma bstan gyi gsal ba yin pa bzhin kun gzhi ’khrul
grol ’du byed ma g.yos pa ’i dus na ’khor ’das kyi phyogs su ma Ihung ba ’i lung ma bstan du bzhed pa la\ \khyed
rnams kyi lugs la gzhi ka dag dang ye grol du ’dod zer ba\ \khyed rang gi lugs la ka dag dang kun gzhi geig gam tha
dad\ Igeig na kun gzhi ’khor ’das gnyis kyi spyi gzhi yin pa ’i don gyi Ihan cig skyes pa ’i ma rig pa yod la\ \de ma rig
pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin pas ka nas dag pa dang ye grol gyi don ma tshang\ \kun gzhi dang ka dag gnyis mi geig
tha dad na\ \ka dag dang kun gzhi thog mar gang snga\ \ka dag snga na\ \dang po ka dag la rjes zhig nas kun gzhi ’i
 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s critical questions draw attention to two pertinent issues that are
only partially addressed in Sog bzlog pa’s rejoinder.537 First of all, the eighth Karmapa
equates the all-ground (kun gzhi : älaya) with the all-ground-based consciousness (kun gzhi
mam par shes pa : ãlayavijñãna) which he understands along classical Yogācāra lines as the
neutral and as yet unobscured fundamental consciousness that retains all latent tendencies
which give rise to samsäric or nirvänic phenomena. He then questions how there could be
anything more fundamental than this. On his view, to posit a still more primordial ground
(gzhi) that is originally pure (ka dag) and primordially free (ye grol) is to court absolutism,
as his reference to the ‘primordial absence’ (ye med) doctrine of the Bon indicates. It also
contradicts those scriptures which view the all-ground as one’s primordial abiding
condition.
On this last point, it has previously been shown that scriptural support for the
primacy of ãlayavijñãna was by no means commonplace even among Yogācāra sources; on
the contrary, many late Yogācāra works such as the Mahãyānasamgraha, Abhidharma-

gnas lugs su byung ba ni lung rigs gi ngos nas kyang mi ’thad de| | kun gzhi ni ’khor ’das kyi phyogs su ma Ihung
u i gdod ma 7 gnas lugs yin la\ \de 7 gong na gang yod med pas so| \kun gzhi snga na ka dag dang ye grol du mi
gyur bas\ |de bas na ka dag ces pa ni bon gyi gzhung na\ \dang po ye med du ’dodpa ka dag dang\ \de las ye yod
cung zadsridpa la ma rtogs pa ’khor ba 7 ’khrul gzhi zhes ming ’dogs bsgyur ba yin mod[\ aNyKs cing
537

Sog bzlog pa’s response consists primarily in reiterating the central rDzogs chen distinction between the all-
ground (kun gzhi) which is identified with dualistic mind (sems) and its essence, i.e., the ground (gzhi) itself or
eedom ground (grol gzhi) which is identified with open awareness (rig pa). According to his Dris lan lung dang
rigs pa i ’brug sgra: 69.4 f.: “The essence of the so-called ‘all-ground’ is unconditioned, inexpressible, naturally
occuring and not partial in any way. It is called the originally pure and primordially free ground when referring to
I e victorious Samantabhadra who is free within this very ground. We do not, however, assert that the all-ground
itself is originally pure and primordially free. Consequently, the term ‘originally pure’ (ka nas dag pa) refers to that
w has never known errancy from the very beginning. The meaning o f the term “Kun tu bzang po” (“All Good”)
is one who has never known errancy for “all” (kun tu) time and is hence described as “good” (bzangpo). This is how
!t is explained in our tradition and the description ‘primordially free’ [basically] has the same meaning, so it should
n°t thought otherwise. Therefore, our Statements about the originally pure and primordially free ground should be
recognized as referring to the ‘freedom ground’ (grol gzhi) but not as assertions about the ‘all-ground’ (kun gzhi)
ecause in our tradition, the all-ground is dualistic mind (sems), whereas the freedom ground is open awareness (rig
a^"£round an(t original purity are not in any way the same or different.” kun gzhi zhes pa 7 ngo bo ni\
dus ma byas brjod du med pa ’i rang byung phyogs gang du yang ma Ihung ba yin la\ |de la gzhi ka dag dang ye
gro ces pa rgyal ba kun tu bzang po gzhi de nyid kyi thog tu rang grol ba la zer ba yin gyi\ \kun gzhi nyid ka dag
ang ye grol du ’dod pa ma yin no\ \de ’i phyir ka nas dag pa zhes bya ba gdod ma nas ’khrul ma myong ba ’i dag pa
c a zer la\ \kun tu bzang po zhes pa ’i sgra don ni dus kun tu ’khrul pas nam yang gos ma myong ba de ’i phyir
zang po zhes bya ba\ \ ’di ’i lugs la ’chad pa yin zhing ye grol zhes pa yang de dang don geig pa yin pas na gzhan
u mi bsam mo\ \de ’i phyir ’dir gzhi ka dag dang ye grol zhes gsungs pa grol gzhi la ngos ’dzin pa yin gyi kun gzhi
u dodpa ma yin no\ \ ’dir kun gzhi sems yin la\ \grol gzhi rig p a yin pa de ’i phyir] \kun gzhi dang ka dag gnyis geig
ang tha dad gang yang ma yin no\ \
smuccaya and Trimśikā portrayed the ãlayavijñāna as impure and conditioned and therefore
fundamentally distinct from the pure dharmakäya and suchness. We have also seen that this
association of kun gzhi and dualistic mind (sems) on the basis of such sötras is already made
by Ye shes sde in the 8th c. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the third Karmapa Rang
byung rdo rje draws scriptural support from late Yogācāra-Tathãgatagarbha sūtras in his
identification of the ãlayavijñāna with impure mind (sems ma dag pa)m and of buddha
nature with pure mind (sems dag pa) which he further characterizes as “the ground (gzhi) of
all that constitutes samsära and nirväna”.539

Let us tum our attention, then, to the principal logical argument (rigs p a ’i rtsod) Mi
bskyod rdo rje offers for accepting the primacy of ãlayavijñāna. The author takes the
epistemic and affective neutrality of the ālayavijñāna when it is disengaged from the seven
modes of consciousness and “not swayed by karmic dispositions toward samsära or
nirväna” to be evidence of its ontological priority. In this regard, it is interesting that
classical rNying ma scholars would interpret this neutrality not as an indication of ultimacy
but rather of ignorance and delusion in any but the fully realized. As Klong chen pa puts it:

In this regard, some teachers in the past have said that “if there is no discursive
analysis due to emotionally-afflicted ego-mind [in the ãlayavijñãna], then there is no
accumulation [of karma] by cognitions of the six senses because [mind] is
unconditioned by any of the three emotional poisons.” This [assumption] must be
investigated, however, because while it may be like this in the case of view,
meditation and conduct when one has recognized the nature of things, in beings who
have not directed their minds in this way, [deeply ingrained] deludedness (gti mug :
möha)540 still exists so there is still an accumulation of non-virtue.541

538 Zab mo nang don gyi ’g rel pa, Rang byung rdo rje gsung 'bum vol. 7: 382.3 f.: ma dag pa la sems su brjodpa ni
kun gzhi ’i rnam par shes pa zhes gsungs p a ... |
539 Zab mo nang don gyi ’g rel pa, Rang byung rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 7: 381.6 f.: ...sangs rgyas kyi snying po la
sems su brjod cing ’khor ’das thams cad kyi gzhi ’i don yin no\ | The identification o f buddha nature with pure mind
follows Ratnagotravibhāga 1.55-57.
540 As the author explains, this refers not to the delusion counted among the five poisons but to a more fundamental
deludedness synonymous with innate ignorance (Ihan cig skyes p a ’i ma rig pa) that exists prior to, and as a
condition for, the manifestation of the five poisons. See Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, vol.2: 275.4 f..
541 Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel, vol. 1: 277.5 f. [da ni kun gzhi dang tshogs brgyad kyi dbye ba ni\ \de ’ang bag chags
sna tshogs p a ’i kun gzhi lung ma bstan ni me long dang ’dra zhing\ \kun g zh i’i rnam par shes pa ni me long gi
dangs gsal dang ’dra zhing\ |sgo Inga ’i shes pa ni gzugs brnyan shar ba dang ’dra ste\ | de la don snga ma las kyis
dpyod pa ’am sgo Inga ’i snang yul la ’di ’o zhes dang por shar ba ni y id shes yin la\ \d e ’i rjes la yul la chags pa
sdang ba bar ma gsum dang mtshungs Idan du shar ba ni nyon mongs pa can gyi yid ces bya ’o\] de ’ang nyon yid
 In other words, dwelling in a non-discursive state devoid of epistemic-affective activity is
by itself no guarantee that dualistic mind and karmic conditioning have abated. Here, the
very neutrality of the prereflective ãlaya[vijñãna] that certain late Yogācāra traditions took
as verification of its ultimacy is taken by Klong chen pa to be proof of its opposite, i.e., its
fundamentally delusive nature. This neutrality is portrayed as a state comparable to stupor or
deep sleep (not unlike the Upänisadic turlya) in which the accumulation of non-virtue is not
even suspended let alone arrested. The ãlayavijñãna is for this reason identified with
dualistic mind (sems) and ignorance (ma rig pa) and considered the source of grasping for
and believing in the existence of subject and object, ‘I’ and ‘mine’.542 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s
polemic brings to light a problem that had evidently become a bone of contention among
Tibetan Buddhist scholars in the classical period. The issue was whether there is anything
more fundamental than the ãlayavijñãna. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, the
classical rNying ma answer to this question was an emphatic "yes”. Its doctrinal response
was to gradually separate, and in the case of the sNying thig system radically differentiate,
the conditioned Yogācāra conditioned ãlaya[vijñãna] from the rDzogs chen unconditioned
ground of freedom while clarifying the priority relation between them.

§4. Concluding Remarks: The rDzogs chen idea of freedom

While questions about the distinction between ultimate sources of error and freedom
led to increasingly nuanced articulations of the ground and all-ground, it also opened up
fresh persepectives on the age-old Indian problem of freedom. In Buddhism, as in Indian
rcligions generally from the period of the Upanisads onward, the idea of freedom (Skt.
masc. moksa!fern, mukti; both < etymon muc signifying ‘release’) has been employed in a
reHgious sense as denoting liberation from the sources of suffering and bondage (primarily

kyis ma dpyad na tshogs drug gi shes pas la mi sog ste\ \dug gsum gang rung du 'dus ma byas p a 7 phyir zhes slob
Pon snga ma dag gsung p ’ang dpyad dgos te\ \chos thams can kyi rang bzhin shes nas Ita ba dang sgom pa dang
sPyodpa i gnas skabs su de Itar yin la\ \de Ita bu la blo kha ma phyogs pa 7 ’g ro ba la gti mug tu yod pas las mi dge
a soSs pa yin no\ | Untranslatcd section in square brackets provides the author’s analysis o f the kun gzhi and eight
consciousnesses.
542
See Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, vol. 1: 208.5 f.. Klong chen pa later (209.3 f.) quotes a passage from the ’J am dpal
l^ S r^ an md° *n support of this interpretation: “Dualistic mind (sems) is the all-ground consciousness (kun
p z i rnam shes). The belief in ‘mine’ (ngar ’dzin pa) is the ego-mind (yid).” sems ni kun g zh i’i rnam par shes\
ngar dzin p a ni y id yin no\ \
the karma and kleśas) that constitute cyclical existence (samsära). Already in early rDzogs
chen, this traditional idea of freedom as the liberation from or o f factors that bind one to
samsära was rendered problematic by the insight that human reality is, in its most basic
condition, devoid of error and bondage and in this sense primordially free (ye grol). Strictly
speaking, there really is no error or karma or samsära . On this account, freedom has at best
a provisional meaning since humans are fundamentally aways and already free. We get a
clear sense of this from gNubs chen:

Query: If one does not analyze and investigate anything, how can one free one’s
mind? Reply: One is free by the very absence of doing something to become free.
Why is that? Because given that one does not perceive any bondage within [this
state] that transcends conceptualization and analysis, the term ‘freedom’ is a mere
figure of speech.543

With this idea of primordial freedom, the stage is set for the sNying thig construal of
freedom as the ground of human existence (grol gzhi) where it is understood not as the
absence of error, nor as its opposite, but as the very condition of its possiblity. This
ontological idea of freedom is first sketched in the earliest stratum of rDzogs chen tantras
and further developed by gNubs chen and Rong zom pa.544 But it is in rDzogs chen sNying
thig writings that the idea receives its most lucid and far-reaching analysis. In his Zab don
rgya mtsho’i sprin, Klong chen pa traces the genesis of the grounds of freedom and errancy
to the recognition or non-recognition of the ground’s spontaneous presence as an outward
effulgence. On this account, not erring is a necessary but not sufficient condition of
freedom. This is because humans dwell in the light of presence; so long as they are alive and
sentient, they are the dative of manifestation. Consequently, freedom lies also, and more

543 bSam gtan mig sgron: 295.1 f.: 'o na cir yang ma brtags ma dpyad na sems grol du btub bam zhe na grol bar
byar med pa nyid kyis grol ba ste| | ci 7 phyir zhe na\ \rtog dpyod la ’das pa la beings pa nyid ma dmigs pa 7' phyir
tha snyad tsam du grol zhes bya ’o\ | See also Mun pa 7 go cha vol. 1 (NyKs vol. 93): 512.2 f.: dngos po gzhal zhing
don tshol ba ’i bya byed med pa nyid kyis tha snyad tsam du grol zhes kyang bya ste| |de la beings pa ’i chos ma
dmigs pa 7 phyir ro\ \
544 See for example Mi nub rgyal mtshan (one o f the five earlier sems sde texts), Tk vol. 1: 424.4 f.: “Objectives do
not disturb the way things are. By no activities but by freedom [itself] is one free. Since self-occurring primordial
knowing is effortless, it is shown also to be a path o f freedom by way o f freedom” don rnams j i bzhin mi skyod de\
Ibya ba med pas grol bas grol\ \rang byung ye shes brtsal med pas\ \grol nas grol ba ’i lam yang ston\\. This passage
is quoted by gNubs chen bSam gtan mig sgron 295.3 under the title rDo rje sems dpa ’ Nam mkha ’ che (this is also
the title used by Rong zom pa for the Mi nub rgyal mtshan). The text continues: “Freedom naturally abides in
everything. Even erroneous concepts are self-occurring in freedom and are not from [anything] other.” grol ba kun
la rang bzhin gnas\ \phyin ci log tu rnam rtoga kyang\ |grol bar rang byung gzhan las min\ \ aTk: rtogs; Tb: rtog
 fundamentally, in recognizing this self-manifestation as it is, and not (mis)taking it for
something it is not.

What is the reason for erring from the [spontaneous presence of the ground]? Now,
one may think that if one does not err from the originary ground, this is sufficient
[for realizing freedom]. But that is not the case because the originary ground, as an
inner radiance, abides as the unique condition of freedom, the very nature of which is
without error. If one recognizes the spontaneous. presence manifesting from this
[ground] as an outer radiance just as it is, it displays as the ground of freedom (grol
gzhi) of Samantabhädra. If one does not recognize it, it displays as the ground of
errancy ( ’khrul gzhi) of sentient beings. Thus it is known as “indeterminate
spontaneity” (ma nges p a ’i Ihun grub). It is also called the “great ground
manifestation (gzhi snang chen po).”545

Freedom is here construed as a primary mode of being rather than as a teleocratic

goal, whether this latter is defined negatively (freedom from) or positively (freedom to). In
the same way that health is best understood not simply as the absence or opposite of ilIness
but as a basic condition of well-being546, freedom is best understood not simply as the
absence of bondage but as the most fundamental way of being of the subject. Freedom
reframed in this way has nothing to do with capacities and properties of agents. It has more
to do with how we are than what we can or cannot do. Understood as a mode of being rather
Ihan the capacity of an agent as it is conceived, for example, in the Western theo-
philosophical problem of “free will” - ontological freedom is both prior to and a condition
of possibility of all choice and deliberation. This understanding is implicit in the term grol
ha, ubiquitous in sNying thig sources, that is construed grammatically as an intransitive
verbal noun (perhaps best translated as “being free”) and radically distinguished from
earlier Buddhist conceptions of liberation (moksa : thar pa) which carry the sense of
becoming free o f or from ”. Five modes of ontological freedom are elaborated in rDzogs
chen works, the details of which go beyond the scope of the present discussion: (1) seif-

^ ° n r^ a mtsh° i sprin: 137.6 f.: de nas ’khrul p a ’i rgyu mtshan ci yin\ \yang na gdod m a ’i gzhi nas ma
w l na de ’i chog m od snyam na\ \ma yin te gdod ma ’i gzhi ni nang gsal ’khrul pa med pa ’i bdag nyid grol ba geig
P° nyid du bzhugs la\ \de las phyir gsal du shar ba ’i Ihun grub ni rig na kun tu bzang po ’i grol gzhir ’ong la\ \ma rig
na sems can gyi ’khrul gzhir byung ba ma nges pa ’i Ihun grub ces kyang bya\ \gzhi snang chen po zhes kyang bya\ \
546 A
According to the World Health Organization: “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well­
i g and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”
occurring freedom (rang grol), (2) primordial freedom (ye grol), (3) naked freedom (cer
grol), (4) unbounded freedom (mtha’ grol) and (5) unique freedom (geig grol)-541

Descriptive of our most fundamental opening onto the world, freedom is to be

understood neither as an absence of contraint (negative freedom), as in the goal of ‘freedom
from samsära’, nor as a disposition of the will (positive freedom), as in deliberative striving
toward the pre-established goal of awakening (bodhi), but rather as the ontological
precondition of both these. Freedom is human existence itself as the fundamental Clearing or
disclosedness (to use Heideggerian language) through which being and world are always
and already there for us at all. “The term ‘freedom’,” says Klong chen pa, “means being free
through simply letting be and being free directly through simply being aw are...”548 He goes
on to distinguish this ontological freedom as an intransitive mode of being and knowing
from traditional conceptions of freedom as a telos arrived at by causal means:

‘Freedom’ (grol) is not the same as ‘liberation’ [from constraint] (bkrol). So there is
no need to make efforts in view and meditation. Given that freedom abides as one’s
natural mode of being, it has the sense of ‘being without artifice or modification’.
Because this is so, letting body, speech and mind simply relax in their natural
condition and abiding in the natural state of Mind itself is what we call “freedom”.
Moreover, since it is always already present in this way, it is superior to the ordinary
vehicles [which advocate negative freedom].549

This letting be in freedom is less quietistic than the passage may suggest. For, it will be
recalled that letting be (non-interference) is interpreted not as an end in itself, but as a way
of letting the ground of being manifest in all its fecundity without (mis)taking its outward

547 On these modes o f freedom, see Mu tig phreng ba Tb vol. 12: 339.1 f.; Ati vol. 2: 465.5 f.: ’g ag pa med p a ’i rig
pa la\ I ’khrul rgyua med pas ldogb pa med\ |ye grol yin pas gtan nas ’phags\ \rang grol yin pas yul rkyen zad\ \cer
grol yin pas snang ba dag\ \mtha ’ grol yin pas mu bzhi ’gags\ \geig grol yin pas du ma stongs\\ aAti pa; bAti rtog.
See also sGra thal ’gyur, Tb. vol. 12: 150.3 f.; Ati vol. 1: 178.6 f.: gzhan yang grol b a ’i chos nyid bshad\ \gnad kyis8
grol bas ’bad rtsol zad\ \ye nasgrol bas bskyar mi dgos\ \rang grol yin pas gnyen po med\ | cer grol yin pasb mthong
sar yal\ \yongs su grol bas rang bzhin dag\ |dus kyT grol bas goms mi dgos\ \rang bzhin grol bas ma bcos p a ’o\
Igrol zhesd tha snyad tsam nyid de\ \rtogs dang ma rtogs su yi chos\\ “Tb kyi; fb phyir, cTb kyis; dTb shes. See also
Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 1614.4: ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod ’grel vol. 2: 627.4 f. and
630.2 f. for extended discussions o f these modes o f freedom.
548 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 1613.2 f.: grol zhes bya ba la\ \bzhag pa tsam gyis grol ba dang\ \shes pa tsam gyis
gnad thog tu grol ba\...
549 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 1615.2 f.: grol ni bkrol ba Ita bu ma yin pas\ \Ita sgom gyis ’bad mi dgos\ \grol zhes
rang lugs su gnas pa las\ | bcas bcos med pa ’i don no\ | de Itar yin pas lus ngag yid gsum rang lugs la Ihod chags
shing\ \sems nyid rnal du phebs pa la grol zhes bya\ | de yang gtan du de Itar gnas pas theg pa thun mong pa las
’p hags p a ’o\\
shining forth for something it is not, namely, as an ‘inner7 subject apprehending ‘outer7
objects. It is important here as in all other dimensions of rDzogs chen thought to bear in
mind this dialectical intertwining between emptiness and luminosity, primordial purity and
spontaneous presence.

Central to classical rDzogs chen reinterpretations of freedom along ontological rather

than causal lines is their critique of traditional conceptions of action that construe it
primarily as guided by reason (toward a predefined goal) and sustained by will.550 For
rDzogs chen scholars, action so conceived can scarcely be identified with freedom this
would be to annul the traditional Indian distinction between karma and moksa. Action to be
free must neither be motivated by rational deliberation nor guided toward a preconceived
goal.

In short, the classical rDzogs chen tradition reconceptualizes freedom in such a way
that it no longer implies the mere absence of error and conditioning but the disclosive
ground of its possibility; it is the originary mode of being to which one remains attuned
through recognition or from which one errs through non-recognition but which, in either
case, abides as is. That freedom is a precondition of errancy means not only that it makes
the ränge of phenomena subsumed under the category of errancy intelligible (both logically
and phenomenologically) but also that the recognition of errancy as errancy is a necessary
condition of the consciousness of freedom. As I have attempted to show in this chapter, the
sNying thig reinterpretation of freedom as an ontological precondition of errancy is integral
to its understanding of the ground as ontologically prior to the all-ground. The dialectic
between errancy and freedom has tumed out to be the Creative tension underlying and
animating the rDzogs chen problem of the ground.

117^n s similar critique of teleological action and his ontological conception of freedom, see Villa 1996:

221
Part IV The Problem o f the Path: Implications o f the Semslye shes Distinction

6 1 rNying ma Path Hermeneutics and the Problem o f Reconciliation

This chapter looks at some soteriological implications of the rDzogs chen distinction
between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) through the lens of
classical rNying ma path summaries. Its main focus is the problem of how the authors of
these summaries sought to reconcile progressivist sötric and non-progressivist tantric
models of the Buddhist path on the basis of this distinction. There are few better ways of
coming to understand a religious tradition than by examining how it articulates its
fundamental aims and the proposed routes to their attainment. In the case of Buddhism, our
most valuable references are the summaries of the Buddhist path (märga) that have emerged
periodically from the time of the Päli Canon onward in response to the growing need to
summarize and systematize an increasingly heterogeneous body of ideas and practices.
Among these works, the varied and voluminous Tibetan genre of path summaries known as
Lam rim or Stages o f the Path551 is of particular relevance to such inquiry insofar as its

551 The attempt to delineate in a single work the essentials of the Buddhist way can be traced back as far as a work
entitled the Patisambhidämagga, The Path to Thorough Comprehension in the Pali Canon. This text, one o f fifteen
belonging to the Khuddanikäya o f the Suttapifaka, presents thirty discussions (kathas) on various topics of
Buddhism arranged in an orderly progression. This short work represents the first attempt to systematize the various
discourses and dialogues o f the Buddha into an orderly all-embracing account. See A.K. Warder’s introduction to
The Path o f Discrimination, in Nanamoli 1982. See also Warder 1970: 312. In the early development o f Indian
Buddhism, path summaries came to play an increasingly important role as the need to synthesize and organize the
growing body o f exegetical and commentarial literature increased. This need was practically fulfilled in the fifth
Century CE by the Visuddhimagga, The Path o f Purification, a Standard text o f Theravâda Buddhism ascribed to
Buddhago§a. The all-encompassing scope o f the work is indicated by the author’s interpretation o f its title:
“Visuddhi means the nibbana which is wholly and thoroughly purified, and free from dirt o f every description and
the path which leads to this purification is called Visuddhimaggd,\ Wintemitz 1922: 195. In the text, Buddhaghosa
schematizes the subject matter, namely the essentials of the Buddha’s discourses as i.anded down by the elders of
the Theraväda tradition, according to the three trainings o f a Theraväda monk: ethics (i/7a), meditation (samädhi)
and disceming insight (prajñā). It is worth noting that the increasing prevalence o f path summaries in early
Buddhism coincided with the growing importance of the path idea itself as a hermeneutical device for reconciling
the varying needs and inclinations o f aspirants. We find, for example, in two quasi-canonical Pali texts on
hermeneutics, the Nettippakarana and the Petakopadesa, the path being used to reconcile different religious
concems and needs while preserving the idea that the dhamma embodies a single truth and leads to a single goal,
nibbana. See George Bond, ‘The gradual path as a hermeneutical approach to the Dhamma,’ in Lopez 1988: 29-45.
By the time Mahāyāna had reached its zenith in India (circa 8th Century CE), path summaries had become a Standard
form of presentation. Some were simply compilations of quotations arranged sequentially and interspersed with the
author’s commentary and verses. Examples are Śāntideva’s Śiksãsamucaya (Anthology o f Training) and Nāgāijuna’s
Sūtrasamuccaya (Anthology o f Sütras). Other path summaries sought to delineate the path o f a bodhisattva in a
 works attempt to delineate the viewpoints, ideas and practices that were taken as definitive
of the traditions within and for which they were composed.552 Of special importance are

relatively lengthy series o f verse stanzas. Examples are Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (Entering the Way o f
Awakening) and Atiśa’s (982-1084) Bodhipathapradīpa (P no. 5343). Although written in Tibet, the
Bodhipathapradīpa (Lamp fo r the Path to Awakening), which became a prototype for a large number of Lam rim
texts in the new bKa’ gdams (bKa’ gdams gsar ma) tradition, was originally composed in Sanskrit and later
translated into Tibetan by its author with the assistance o f dGe ba’i blos gros. The followers of this tradition were
commonly referred to as dGa’ Idan pa after the dGa’ Idan monastery founded by Tsong kha pa up until the 17th
Century when the name dGe lugs pa (said by Thu’u bkvan Bio bzang chos kyi nyi ma to be a euphonic variant of
dGa’ lugs pa) begins to appear in texts. See Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 371 n. 2. This manifesto of monastic reform,
together with its auto-commentary (Bodhimãrgapradfpapañjikã, P no. 5322), is itself a concise and orderly synthesis
ofthe basic tenets o f Mahāyāna Buddhism as embodied in various Standard Indian path summaries. Its presentation
is structured according to the Classification o f three types o f person (skyes bu gsum) which has a long pedigree in
Indian Buddhism. On this threefold characterology, see n. 581.
To these influential works must be added another, less well-known, dass o f short metric works which briefly outline
the stages o f the path. Three examples are the Bodhisattvamārgakramasamgraha (P no. 4543) or Compendium o f
the Stages o f the Bodhisattva Path o f Śākyaśribhādra (1127-1225 CE), the Mahãyãnapathakrama (P no. 5359) or
Stages o f the Mahäyäna Path o f Subhagavajra (date unknown), and the Jinamãrgãvatãra (P no. 5372) or Entering
the Path o f the Victors o f Buddhaśrijñāna (10th to 1I th Century CE). What is noteworthy about these relatively late
Indian Mahäyäna path summaries (coinciding with the beginnings of Lam rim in Tibet) is their structural similarity
to Tibetan Lam rim texts. All three begin by discussing the four preliminary topics - the uniqueness of human
existence, impermanence and death, the relationship between actions and consequences, and the miseries of
samsära. They go on to emphasize the need to rely on a spiritual friend who assists one in intemalizing the
teachings. They next elaborate how to cultivate the awakened mind (bodhicitta) and conclude with aspects of the
Mahäyäna path conducive to attaining the goal of buddhahood. Such topics were to become the hallmarks of the
Lam rim genre.

As we may conclude, the Tibetan Lam rim corpus crowns a long lineage o f path summaries dating to the earliest
stages of Indian Buddhism. Like their Indian forerunners, the Lam rim works arose in response to the need for
systematic and practical synthesis o f the major themes o f Buddhist thought and praxis. This need was particularly
acute for Tibetans who had become heir to a diverse body o f Buddhist teachings - Hīhayāna, Mahäyäna and
Vajrayäna - that had been developing for over a millennium in India.
The Lam rim corpus is as varied as it is vast. A listing o f Lam rim texts in a bibliography compiled by A khu rin
po che (1807-1875) includes in addition to those works containing lam rim in their title many belonging to related
genres such as bsTan rim (Stages o f the Teaching), Khrid rim (Stages o f Guidance), Lam khrid (Guidance on the
Path) and Bio sbyong (Mental Training). See Lokesh Chandra 1963. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 17-32 for an
excellent overview o f the Lam rim genre with a primary focus on gSar ma works and their antecedents. On bsTan
rim and Bio sbyong genres, see Jackson 1996 and Sweet 1996 respectively. Texts designated as Lam rim are found
mithin the collections o f all four schools o f Tibetan Buddhism though this designation is all that some o f these works
s are in common. There has so far been no systematic attempt to identify the hallmarks of the Lam rim genre. For
our purposes, it is useful to identify certain constitutive features that the most influential Lam rim share in common.
ese comprise both functional (contextual) and formal (textual) criteria. The fimctional criteria concem the
ormative role the major works have played, and continue to play, in the overlapping spheres o f individual praxis
and tradition. Within the individual sphere, the works serve to (a) introduce the aspirant to the essentials o f Buddhist
octrine and praxis and (b) guide him or her through the stages o f the Buddhist path toward the realization of
en ightenment. Within the sphere o f tradition, the texts play a major part in representing the distinctive approaches
and ideas o f a given tradition and thus preserving its identity over time. This latter factor is of particular relevance to
e Pon^ative Lam rim works considered in this paper given that the exfoliation o f the Lam rim genre was so closely
associated with the institutionalization o f Tibetan Buddhism. Because the authors o f these works were also the
ounders or Organizers of their respective schools o f Tibetan Buddhism, the texts were all taken as representative of
e defining ideas, ideals and approaches o f these schools. The formal or textual features common to the formative
am riin works may be briefly schematized in terms o f content and organization. Lam rim texts include, with certain
yanations in sequence and content, the following:
certain formative Lam rim works composed during the so-called later diffusion (phyi dar) of
Tibetan Buddhism that played an critical role in the institutionalization and self-definition of
three of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. They are the Bodhipathapradīpa of
Atiśa alias Dīpamkaraśrijñāna (982-1084), founder of the bKa’ gdams pa order, the Tharpa
rin po che’i rgyan of sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079-1153), founder of the main
bKa’ brgyud lineages through four of his major disciples, the Sems nyid ngal gso (and
autocommentaries) of Klong chen rab ’byams pa Dri med 7od zer (1308-1363), principal
organizer of the rNying ma order, and the Lam rim chen mo of Tsong kha pa Bio bzang
grags pa (1357-1419), whose New bKa’ gdams or dGe lugs order styled itself as a
continuation of the original bKa’ gdams. All were composed with the intention of
synthesizing and systematizing a remarkably diverse and complex amalgam of doctrines and
practices, and all continue to serve in present-day monastic settings as study and practice
manuals introducing students to what their respective traditions have identified as the most
salient teachings of Buddhism. The rNying ma tradition produced a number of Lam rim-type
works, the most important and influential being Klong chen pa’s above-mentioned Sems
nyid ngal gso as well as his later Yid bzhin mdzod (with their autocommentaries). These
served as models for later rNying ma path summaries, most notably ’Jigs med gling pa’s
(1729-1798) Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod (with autocommentaries and commentaries) and
dPal sprul rin po che’s (1808-1887) beloved Kun bzang bla ma zhal lung. A comparative
study of the most important and influential rNying ma and gSar ma path summaries
provides a context for establishing areas of convergence and divergence with respect to the
different traditions’ distinctive aims, Orientations, and favoured methods of goal-realization.

1. Preliminary Topics
A. The difficulty o f finding a human existence (dal ’byor rnyed dka )
B. Impermanence and mortality (mi rtag pa; ’chi ba)
C. Karma and its consequences (las rgyu ’bras)
D. The miseries o f Samsära ( ’khor ba ’i nyes dmigs)
2. Relying on Spiritual Friends
3. MahSySna: Developing bodhicitta (aspiration phase) - 4 immeasurables: love, compassion, joy and
equanimity
4. Cultivating bodhicitta (pursuance phase) - 6 pāramītas consisting in skillful means (1-5) and insight (6)
5. M antrayāna - Creation and Completion Stages [only in rNying ma path summaries]
6. rDzogs chen - various contemplative practices [only in rNying ma path summaries]
7. Goal-realization
 As a first foray into this little explored terrain, the present chapter offers a
comparative analysis of classical rNying ma path hermeneutics that examines the major
exegetical and hermeneutical problems confronting authors of path summaries in this
tradition and the distinctive strategies by which they sought to resolve them. These problems
centred around the challenge of how to reconcile both in theory and practice the complex
variety of intellectual/spiritual approaches that Buddhism had become by the time of its
reception in Tibet. Buddhism had by this stage become less a single creed that is the same
for all than a graded series of idealized vehicles - as many as nine or sixteen are presented in
rNying ma doxographies553 formulated to meet the varying needs and interests of its
aspirants at different stages of their intellectual, ethical and spiritual itinerary. Fundamental
to these late Indian early Tibetan Classification schemes was the abstract doxography of
three vehicles Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna reflecting doctrinal developments

In his Grub mtha ’ mdzod (690.1 f.), KJong chen pa discusses a number o f vehicle classifications, ranging from
one to as many as sixteen (1 through 5, 9, 16) while allowing for a potentially infinite number to meet the endlessly
vaned needs, abilities and interests of their aspirants. Klong chen pa’s account closely resembles the presentation of
one to nine vehicles (1 through 5, 9) given by Rog Shes rab ’od (1166-1244) in his Grub m tha’ bstan p a ’i sgron me
( yKs vol. 114: 131.6 f.). There is compelling evidence to suggest either that this earlier text was an important
source for Klong chen pa’s doxographical analyses (found in Grub m tha’ mdzod, Yid bzhin mdzod and Theg mchog
mdzod) or that both drew on still earlier as yet undetermined source(s). Among other things, one can observe
similarities in their (a) hermeneutics o f the three tumings, (b) doxographies of philosophical schools, (c) detailed
c assifications o f rnying ma and gsar ma tantras, (d) interpretations o f buddha nature (bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying
P°) as synonymous with sems nyid and ye shes, and (e) schematization o f the path as the disclosure o f this buddha
nature/Mind itself. Definitive conclusions, however, would have to depend on close textual comparison and
consideration o f possible earlier influences. A Contemporary analysis o f vehicle models that covers one through five,
nine, n-vehicle and no vehicle (<āyāna) classifications is offered by Wangchuk 2007: 109-120.
Klong chen pa begins his vehicle classifications by approvingly quoting a well-known passage from the
Lankãvatāra 2.204 (p. 135.2-3) and 10.458 (p. 322.15-16): “So long as the mind is engaged, there will be no end to
e vehicles ’ (Skt. yānānãm nāsti vai ni$fhã yãvac cittam pravartate\ citte tu vai parāvrtte nayänam na cayäyinah\
1Jo ^ sr*dsems ni j u g p a ’i bar\ \thegp a ’i m tha’ la thugpa med\\). See Kapstein 2000: 209 and Wangchuk 2007:
• Klong chen pa concludes with a plea for soteriological pluralism echoing the Buddha’s admonition both “to
^void those who view things incorrectly because they are overwhelmed or intimidated by these vast sea of spiritual
itions and to pursue [the vehicles] with a sense o f purpose.” (Grub m tha’ mdzod 696.5 f.) Among the
c assifications o f yänas he mentions, the most important from a rNying ma standpoint is the nine-fold scheme
^ t i n g in Atiyoga (rDzogs chen) that is ascribed to Buddhaguhya (7lh c.) and popularized by rNying ma
cholars of the early dynastic period such as Padmasambhava. See Dalton 2005. On this account, the eight lower
Ve īcles from Śravakayāna up to Anuyoga are based on dualistic mind (sems) while the ninth, Atiyoga, is based on
Pnmordial knowing (ye shes). See Kun byed rgyal po chs. 28 and 38 (Tk 85.2 fand 110.4). The sixteen-fold scheme
|s attributed to the gSang ba spyodpa sa bon gyi rgyud (discussed in Grub mtha ’ mdzod 694.6 f.), a tantra contained
in t e ß i ma snying, vol. 1: 73-271, though not in any extant editions o f the rNying ma rgyud ’bum or the Bai ro
^ C l a s s i f i c a t i o n consists o f two mundane vehicles of gods and men, two non-Buddhist vehicles
ttternalists and Nihilists), two Śrāvaka vehicles (Vaibhä§ika and Sauträntika), two Mahāyāna vehicles (Cittamätra
Svatāntrika Madhyamaka), Prasängika Madhyamaka, Kriya, Cârya, Yoga, Mahä, Anu, Ati and culimating in
v h rat^er lofty sounding sixteenth vehicle known as rdo rje snying po ’od gsal Ihun gyis grub pa ’i theg pa or “the
e *c e o f spontaneously present luminosity that is the adamantine quintessence.”
characterized by divergent ethical norms and ideals, world-views, exemplary lifestyles, and
conceptions of the path.554 Central to the Tibetan assimilation of Buddhism was the problem
of how to bridge non-tantric Mahāyāna traditions with esoteric Vajrayäna traditions that had
become increasingly influential and populär in Indian Buddhism from the time of their rise
to prominence circa 7th Century CE. Claiming to offer more effective and expedient means
of realization than their predecessors, Buddhist tantric traditions developed a highly
complex repetoire of teachings and contemplative practices aimed at facilitating awakening
in a single lifetime. Although Vajrayäna developed out of late Mahāyāna, building on the
shared comerstones of compassion and emptiness, tantric scholar-adepts were quick to
criticize the Mahāyānist tendency to give intellectual and moral refinement priority over
spiritual illumination. They also criticized the inclination to suppress those very elements of
life erotic desires and other intense bodily, emotional, and aesthetic experiences that
could prove the most potent means of self-transcendence. Given these developments, it is
understandable that the task of accommodating sütric and tantric approaches within a
theoretically integrated and practically viable path structure had become the central
challenge facing those Tibetan scholars who were at the vanguard of cultural appropriation.
Their reception and interpretation of a remarkably heterogeneous amalgam of Buddhist
teachings that had been developing for more than a millennium and over an entire
subcontinent called for unusually innovative forms of doctrinal synthesis and practical
guidance.

§1. OverView: Bridging the Vehicles

In exploring the soteriological implications of the principal rDzogs chen distinction

between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes), I am proposing that it be
viewed as an indispensable hermeneutical key to understanding how rNying ma authors
sought to synthesize divergent, and at times seemingly contradictory, models of the

554 O f course, any attempt to reconstruct a narrative history o f these vehicles and to specify their dates, leading
proponents, representative texts and doctrines is far from unproblematic. See Seyfort Ruegg 2004. The overview
offered here concems the type of idealized soteriological narrative - based on largely abstract doxographies and
characterologies - that one so often encounters in Indian and Tibetan path summaries, the main value of which (for
research purposes) lies in the ways it represents and codifies the hierarchy o f motivating aims, ideas and practices
that is endorsed by a given tradition.
 Buddhist path within a single framework of study and practice. It is possible to identify two
major problems of reconciliation confronting the rNying ma authors in the classical period
(12th to 14th c). The first was the exegetical or content-focused problem of combining in a
single narrative structure the quite different models of the path delineated in the sütras and
tantras. At issue was a distinction introduced in tantric sources such as the Susiddhi-
karamahätantra555 and He ru k a ’i gal po556 between a so.-called cause-oriented vehicle of
characteristics (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa : *Laksanayäna) or vehicle of perfections (pha rol tu
phyin p a ’i theg pa : Pāramitāyāna) advocating a linear progression toward a pre-established
goal by means of causes and conditions and a goal-oriented secret mantra vehicle (gsang
sngags kyi theg pa : Guhyamantrayäna) or adamantine vehicle (rdo rje theg pa : Vajrayäna)
emphasizing an ever-present goal identified as the nature of mind, primordial knowing,
buddha nature.557 The second, and arguably more important, challenge was the
hermeneutical or context-focused problem of how an individual can make sense of and
mtemalize, or literally ‘make an experience of’ (nyams su len), these divergent paths
through his or her own application. rNying ma scholars like Klong chen pa, ’Jigs med gling
pa (1729-1798), and Yon tan rgya mtsho (b. 19th c.) were unusually sensitive to this problem
and sought to thematize it on the basis of the mind/primordial knowing structure of
consciousness. We have previously considered the rDzogs chen view that this structure is
discemable in the difference between the simple taking place of consciousness itself known
as primordial knowing (ye shes) or Mind itself (sems nyid) and the self-identifications with

This tantra is quoted as a source o f the distinction between cause-oriented Pāramītayāna and goal-oriented
ajrayana by Klong chen pa (Grub m tha’ mdzod 1012.5 f.): rgyu dang ’bras bu ’i dbye ba yis\ \pha rol phyin pa i
Pa dang\ \rdo rje theg pa bla na med\\ The work possibily refers to a Kriyayoga tantra entitled Susiddhikara-
àtantra-sãdhanopāyikapatala (Legs par grub par byed p a ’i rgyud chen po las sgrub pa ’i thabs rim par phye
J . P no' 168-222. A palm leaf Sanskrit manuscript o f a related tantra of the Susiddhi dass, the
ws/ dhatantrasiddhärthalavamantrasyamandala belonging to the Nor bug ling ka is listed in the Krung go i bod
ty* s es rig zhib ’ju g Ite gnas su nyar ba ’i ta la ’i lo ma ’i bstan bcos (spyin shog ’dril ma ’i par) kyi dkar chag mdor
8Sa . This is a catalogue o f microfilms owned by the Tibetan Cultural Research Center in Beijing. On the Susiddhi
-ategory o f tantras, see Hunter 2004.
556TK I ^ P' 225.7 f.: mtshan nyid rgyuyi thegpayis\ |sems nyid sangs rgyas rgyu ru shes\ \ ’bras bu sngags kyi
th
eg pa y/s| Isems nyid sangs rgyas nyid du bsgom\ |.
This is the interpretation of such authors as Rog Bande Shes rab ’od, Klong chen pa and their successors.
particular configurations of what one is conscious of, collectively termed ‘mind’ (sems).m
Mind is a representational mode of awareness that is seen as deriving from a primordial pre-
representational mode of awareness that is a condition for its possibility. Thus understood,
the rNying ma approach to reconciling sütric and tantric vehicles came down to the task of
distinguishing an intransitive and prereflective path that is simply the progressive disclosure
of primordial knowing simpliciter (ye shes kyi lam) from the representational paths
grounded in dualistic mind (sems kyi lam). One interesting corollary of this distinction is
that traditional path narratives used to structure soteriological activities and chart possible
trajectories must (like the narrative ‘self’ implicated as the putative protagonist of such
paths) be viewed as products of reflective and representational thought (sems) that not only
capture less than life as pre-reflectively lived, but also add to it certain assumptions of unity
and directionality that are more than experience delivers.559 Without discounting the
importance of orienting narratives for making sense of experience and giving it a sense of
direction, rNying ma authors were nonetheless intent on distinguishing life in its
presentational immediacy from the unifying linear narratives imposed on it.

From this standpoint, an whole tangle of interconnected soteriological tensions or

antinomies that had increasingly become the focus of debate and controversy in late Indian
and early Tibetan Buddhism including gradualism/subitism, causal/acausal attainment,
rational inference/direct acquaintance, conceptual/nonconceptual realization, nature/nurture
end up being reframed by rNying ma scholars as different facets or expressions of the
underlying structural polarity between dualistic mind and primordial knowing. Recalling the
classical distinction (AK 8.39ab) between the two principal senses of the term dharma when
it is used to denote ‘Buddhist teachings’ - namely, dharma as scripture (lung) and dharma as

558 See Fasching (2008: 464): “In meditation, I would suggest, one ceases to be actively occupied with the objects of
consciousness in order to become conscious of consciousness itself (which usually remains “hidden” behind what it
is conscious of).”
559 Here, I fully agree with Zahavi’s criticisms o f strong narrative identity theories that maintain ‘we are nothing but
the stories we teil': “Although it might be true that many of our actions easily lend themselves to narrative
articulation, human life is made up o f more than just actions. Moreover, it is one thing to claim that actions can be
narrated, and something quite different to claim that they can all be fitted into one unifying narration without thereby
imposing more unity upon them than they had to start with.” See Zahavi 2005: 113. 1 am particularly interested in
how Zahavi’s recommendation that “ ...the narrative or hermeneutical take on seif must be complemented by an
experiential or phenomenological take on the se if’ applies also to the ‘stories’ themselves, in this case Buddhist path
narratives.
 realization (rtogs)60 - 1 further propose that rNying ma approaches to reconciling vehicles in
a single path structure belonged to the broader problematic of relating the path as codified
by tradition to the path as realized individually. Needless to say, the task of reconciling
heterogeneous spiritual approaches by elucidating the differences between them in terms of
dialectical tension between mind and primordial knowing led to some interesting and highly
distinctive views of the path.

§2. The Problem of Gradualism in rNying ma Perspective

The idea that spiritual teachings ought to be applied to one’s specific life-situation in
order to discover their true validity and efficacy has been a leitmotiv of Buddhism since its
inception. It is in light of this normative constraint that Buddhism has traditionally called
itself a path (märga)561 or, more accurately, a series of paths formulated to lead individuals
of varying needs, abilities and aspirations toward spiritual realization. Despite the traditional
consensus that Buddhism should be applied as a path or directed course of soteriological
activity, there have been considerable differences amongst Buddhist traditions as to what is
actually meant by “path” and how best to pursue it. It is also worth noting that there has
bcen far more consensus on how to describe the goal realized - a goal generally defined as
extinction (nirväna), awakening (bodhi), buddhahood, primordial knowing and variously
characterized as unconditioned, nondual, nonconceptual and beyond causal production -
than on the most suitable means of its realization. Is goal-realization best understood as the
560 1 w
n s Yon tan mdzod ’g rel (vol. 1: 166.5 f.), Yon tan rgya mtsho provides the following definition o f dharma:
e essence o f dharma is the elimination o f any cognitive and emotional obscurations or that which serves as the
eans of eliminating them. By definition, since it eures ( ’chos) afflictive emotionality in one’s being like a medicine
nunistered for an illness, it is called dharma (chos). Its Classification is dharma as scripture (lung) and dharma as
tg31Zal,on (rtogs)->or the two truths o f cessation and the path. In terms of etymology, it derives from the [Sanskrit]
arrna, [which in tum derives from the root dhr] meaning ‘to hold’; since it does not let one go onto the paths
samsära and evil destinies and holds one onto the authentic path, it is called ‘dharma’. nyon shes kyi sgrib pa
ong rung spang ba ’am spong byed kyi thabs su gyur pa chos kyi ngo bo\ |nges tshig ni\ \nad la smadgtong ba Itar
gnvi ny ° n rmongs pa ’chos pas na chos so| |dbye na lung dang rtogs pa ’i chos sam\ | ’g og lam gyi bden pa
to lS . *s&ra d °n w/l \dha rma zhes p a ’i sgra las drangs na ’dzin pa ste ’khor ba dang ngan song gi lam du mi
ng zhing\ \yang dag pa ’i lam du ’dzin pas na chos so| |
561 TH
e Jibetan lam renders a variety o f Sanskrit terms including märga (Pali: magga), patha, advan, paddhati,
is ° lßa*PraßPad(a) and vartanf, terms that all mean way, path, road, course or joumey depending on context. Patha
ctually an old Indo-European term, cognate to the English ‘path’, that is found also in the Zoroastrian Avesta.
g\ e«*e arf ,a.^ 8*ven *n the Mahâvyutpatti s.v. lam. According to the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis no. 223 (Ishikawa: 77-
Po t s h l *S So name^ because by this path one seeks or is shown or perceives or attains cessation.” lam des ’g og
0 a am mtshon pa ’am dmigs pa ’am ’thob par ’g yur ba la bya ste lam zhes bya\
result of a lengthy step-by-step (rim gyis) accumulation of virtues and knowledge or as
occurring spontaneously and ‘all at once’ ([g]c/g c[h\ar) in directly recognizing the nature
of mind? During the early period of the Tibetan assimilation of Buddhism, the confrontation
between such conflicting approaches to awakening had reached something of a climax in the
so-called bSam yas debate, as we previously noted in examining early Tibetan debates over
nonconceptuality. Our focus in the present context is confined to the question of how rNying
ma path hermeneutics positioned itself in relation to the two poles of this old controversy. In
this regard, one must at the outset take note of the general disinclination on the part of early
rDzogs chen commentators on the controversy such as gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes to take
either side of the sudden/gradual polarity. This is hardly suprising given that the categories
of gradual and sudden were not primarily employed in rDzogs chen works to demarcate
religious traditions but to distinguish, within a given tradition, swifter (more immediate) and
slower (more mediated) methods of propounding and/or realizing a particular teaching in
line with the differing capacities of individuals or of a single individual as he or she
progresses along the path.562 In other words, whether a given teaching was taught and
practiced in a step-by-step or all-at-once fashion depended on the capacities of the aspirant
to realize the teaching directly and the capacities of the teacher to facilitate such
realization.563 To these categories was occasionally added the intermediary category of one
who can realize a teaching in mixed order or by skipping steps (thod rgal ba).564

562 See Collins 1982: 93. Dighanikaya no. 14, III: 6.

563 This view is o f course well known from Chinese Chan sources. See McRae in Gregory 1987: 227-278 and
Yampolsky 1967. Consider the following passages from the Platform Sutra o f The Sixth Patriarch Hui Neng: “Good
friends, in the Dharma there is no sudden or gradual, but among people some are keen and others dull. The deluded
recommend the gradual method, the enlightened practice the sudden teaching. To understand the original mind of
yourself is to see into your own original nature. Once enlightened, there is from the outset no distinction between
these two methods; those who are not enlightened will for long kalpas be caught in the cycle o f transmigration.”
(Yampolsky 1967: 137). “Although in the teaching there is no sudden and gradual, in delusion and awakening there
is slowness and speed.” (ibid.: 160). “The Dharma is one teaching, but people are from the north and south, so
Southern and Northern Schools have been established. What is meant by ‘gradual’ and ‘sudden?’ The Dharma itself
is the same, but in seeing it there is a slow way and a fast way. Seen slowly, it is the gradual; seen fast it is the
sudden [teaching]. Dharma is without sudden or gradual, but some people are keen and others dull; hence the names
‘sudden ’ and ‘gradualY’ (ibid.: 162-3). On the Indian variants of the distinction, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989, 97 f..
564 The Tshig mdzod chen mo s.v. thod rgal provides two definitions: (1) “disrupting the order o f progression” as in
“ascending to higher stages from lower by leaps [and bounds]” (rim pa ’chol ba\ ... rim pa ’og ma nas gong du thod
rgal gyis ’dzegs pa\) or (2) the Leap-over teachings [of rDzogs chen snying thig] that are concemed with
spontaneous presence (Ihun grub thod rgal dang don gcig\). For an informative discussion o f this term, see R.A.
Stein “Sudden Illumination or Simultaneous Comprehension,” in Gregory 1987: 51-4.
 In light of these considerations, it is not suprising that when the old rubrics of
'simultaneous’ and ‘gradual’ were used to define schools of Buddhism, the early rDzogs
chen authors were inclined to view' them as caricatural one-sided positions that fail to
capture the complexity of the Buddhist path or the human beings who pursue it. Recall that
gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes went so far as to declare in his 10th c. bSam gtan mig sgron that
both the gradualist Mahayänist path and simultaneist Chinese path represent deviations (gol
sa) from the more inclusive rDzogs chen perspective.565 His relatively low evaluation of
both gradualist and subitist approaches in contrast to the allegedly superior Vajrayäna and
rDzogs chen Systems is reflected in his aforementioned hierarchy of the Buddhist traditions
prevalent in Tibet during his time (late 9th to early 10th c.).

gNub’s doxography suggests what is in fact bome out by subsequent developments in

rNying ma path hermeneutics: namely, that the Buddhist path is best viewed as neither
exclusively gradual nor sudden/simultaneous but as incorporating elements of both.
Nowhere is this more evident than in rNying ma “Stages of the Path” summaries which are
by definition gradualist in structure and yet explicitly oriented toward recovering a kind of
non-representational mode of awareness and intelligibility in which gradualist frames of
reference are transcended. From this perspective, the dialectical tension between gradual
and subitist approaches to awakening and the typologically similar tension between sütric
progressivist and rDzogs chen non-progressivist conceptions of the path (bsgrod du lam and
bsgrod du med p a ’i lam) both reflect the concurrent reflective-representational and
prereflective non-representational modalities of cognition, i.e. dualistic mind and primordial
knowing. Thus the retrieval of primordial knowing from the appropriations of dualistic
mind, however gradual or abrupt, is mirrored in the transition from progressivist to non-
progressivist accounts of the path.

§3. Nature and Scope of the Reconciliation Problem

At the heart of classical rNying ma path hermeneutics is the problem of how to

reconcile in theory and practice the quite different paths delineated in the sötras and tantras.
Let us now look more closely at the two overlapping dimensions of the reconciliation

bSam gtan mig sgron 55.6 f. and 65.1 f.. See above 71.
problem as they are developed in rNying ma path summaries: the exegetical or content-
focused problem of synthesizing heterogeneous subject matter within a single narrative and
the hermeneutical or context-focused problem of how this subject matter is to be
appropriated by the individual.566 The exegetical dimension of the problem was imposing
enough: how to combine in a single narrative two obviously distinct, and at times seemingly
irreconcilable, idioms of leaming - the cause-oriented *Laksanayäna advocating a model of
linear progression toward a pre-established goal or telos, and the goal-oriented Mantrayäna
advocating the immediacy of prethematized experience and the endotelic (or goal-implicit)
character of the way of leaming and how to clarify the transition between them both in
theory and practice. Klong chen rab ’byams pa characterizes this distinction in his Sems nyid
ngal gso in the context of discussing the Triple Refuge:

There are two objects of refuge: an ordinary cause-oriented one

And an extraordinary goal-oriented one.
Now as for what is asserted conceming ‘cause’ and ‘goal’:
The claim that the goal will be accomplished at some other time characterizes
the cause-oriented vehicle
Whereas the claim that it is realized right right now as our own Mind
characterizes the goal-oriented approach.
They are presented [here] by means of a distinction introduced in the
Vajrayäna.
Since discussions of this topic derived from the vehicles of characteristics
Are only nominally similar, they must be considered one-sided.567

The exegetical side of the problem of how to combine these two idioms in a single
discourse required that the authors articulate a path structure that could somehow
accommodate their associated models of leaming (doctrinal synthesis) while disclosing the

566 These dimensions reflect different but intimately related forms of discourse. Pierre Hadot has distinguished
between two senses of “discourse” in ancient Western philosophy that are relevant to the present discussion: “On the
one hand, discourse insofar as it is addressed to a disciple or to oneself, that is to say, the discourse linked to an
existential conlext, to a concrctc praxis, discoursc that is actuallv spiritual exercise; on the other hand, discourse
considered abstractly in its formal struclurc, in its intclligible contcnt. It is the lattcr that the Stoics would consider
different from philosophy, but which is precisely what is usually made the object o f most of the modern studies of
the history of philosophy. But in the eyes of the ancient philosophers, if one contents oneself with this discourse, one
does not do philosophy.” (Hadot 1995: 26).
567 Sems nyid ngal gso, ch. 6, verse 4, in Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 1: 426.4 f.: yul rnams gnyis te thun mong
rgyu dang ni\ \thun mong ma yin ’bras b u ’i skyabs gnas gnyis\ |rgyu dang ’bras bur dam ’c h a ’ de yang ni\ \dus
gzhan ’g rub ’dod rgyu yi theg pa dang\ | da Ita nyid grub rang sems ’bras bu ’i tshul] \rdo rje theg pa dag gi dbye bas
bzhag] \mtshan nyid theg las de nyid gsungs pa ni\ \ming tsam mthun pas phyogs geig nges par bya\\
 continuity between them (narrative unity). We will see that rNying ma scholars understood
this problem of narrative unity as part of the larger problem of relating a presentational path
identified as the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing to the various
representational paths used to map this process. Obstacles loomed whenever a given model
of reality slipped into the reality of the model, and wherever the representations
consequently served more to conceal than reveal the phenomena they sought to represent.
Thus, the exigetical problem of combining the heterogeneous subject matter of the vehicles
in a single narrative was inseparable from the hermeneutical problem of how best to apply
such narratives to one’s present Situation. This shift in focus from the exigetical to the
hermeneutical involves a transition from the universal to the particular, from teachings
(chos) as codified by tradition (lung) to teachings as realized (rtogs) by an aspirant.

3.1 The Exegetical Dimension : Doctrinal Synthesis and Narrative Unity

We have indicated that the Tibetan Lam rim genre evolved as a series of attempts to
synthesize and systematize the heterogeneous body of teachings that make up the Buddhist
path in response to the combined demands of doctrinal coherence and practical guidance.
While the numerous texts belonging to this genre vary widely in style and content, all in one
way or another attempt to present a systematic and practical overview of the Buddhist path
(lam) in its entirety. Serving both as comprehensive doctrinal summaries and step-by-step
practical manuals, the texts were representative of the leading ideas and practices of the
traditions to which they belonged, not least of all because the authors of the formative path
summaries Atiśa, sGam po pa, Klong chen pa and Tsong kha pa were all either the
founders or principal Organizers of their respective traditions. Consequently, each of these
authors emphasized the need to properly combine the diverse yänas and their soteriological
discourses in a single path structure and to clarify the transition between them. Let us now
look at how rNying ma authors addressed this problem and evaluate how their responses
differed from gSar ma approaches.

The synthesis problem is addressed in the colophons of Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid
n8al gso and his later Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod and auto-commentaries wherein he
discusses the purpose (dgos pa) of the texts. In the section of his Sems nyid ngal gso
colophon where he cites the reasons it is necessary to compose the text, he criticizes the
intellectually myopic scholars (blo mig ma dag pa) of his day who “hold the paths laid out in
the tantras and sütras to contradict one another, not knowing how to properly combine
them.”568 In his commentary on this verse, he explains:

With the departure of the great scholars and siddhas of yore, their great scriptural
traditions, having long been preserved, became unclear since they were distorted by
people each having his own preconceptions about their meanings. The intended
meanings belonging to the differing paths of the great tantra classes of Mantra[yäna]
and the scriptural traditions of the Pāramīta[yāna] are very profound [and extensive].
Consequently, because these [scriptures] were not studied in depth and were
distorted by the mere negative opinions of rationalists, these fools who boast about
their erudition hold them to be incompatible and thus do not know how to synthesize
their profound meanings. For this reason, by busying themselves trivially only with
individual words, they have a one-sided perspective.569

Klong chen pa here echoes a familiar rNying ma trope extolling the superiority of
early translations (snga/mying 'gyur) over later ones (phyi/gsar 'gyur), a view he defends in
other writings that is probably based on similar accounts by Rong zom pa and Rog Bande
Shes rab ’od in the I I th and 12th centuries.570 According to these authors, the translators of
the Royal Dynastie Period (9lh to 10lh centuries) such as Vairocana belonged to an unbroken
lineage of adepts who had studied and realized the import of the Mahāyāna, Vajrayäna and
rDzogs chen vehicles. Their ability to combine, communicate and translate the essentials of
the vehicles in clear and direct language was counted among the fruits of their realization.571

568 Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel vol. 2: 372.3 f.: ding sang phal gyi glo mig ma dag pas\ \sngags dang pha rol phyin
gzhung so so ’i lam\ \ ’g al bar ’dzin pas geig tu sdu mi shes\ |de phyir de dag phyogs re ’i mig can yin\ \
569 Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 2: 372.4 f.: sngon gyi mkhas grub chen po mams ni gshegs la\ \de dag gi gzhung
lugs chen po rnams kyang ring zhig nas rang rang gi don rtog gis dkrugs pas gsal bar med la\ \sngags kyi rgyud sde
chen po rnams dang\ \pha rol tu phyin pa ’i gzhung so so ’i lam gyi dgongs pa shin tu brling bas\ \mang du ma thos
shing rtog ge ’i ngan rtog tsam gyis dkrugs nas blun po mkhas pa ’i mngon rlom can rnams kyis ’g al bar ’dzin pas\
\dgongs pa zab mo rnams geig tu bsdu bar mi shes pa ’i phyir] \cung zad re ’i tshig tsam Ihur len pas phyogs re ’i mig
can du gyur pa yin no\ \
570 See bsTan p a ’i sgron me (208.1 f.) where Rog presents six ways in which rNying ma tantric traditions are
deemed superior to gSar ma ones ( ’p hags pa ’i che ba drug) as they were taught by Rong zom pa (rong pa chos
bzang gi zhal nas). These six superiorities are revealed in the difference between their respective: 1) patrons who
gave invitations (spyan ’dren pa'i yon bdag). 2) temples where traditions were practiced (phyag bzhes gtsug lag
khang), 3) translators ( ’g yur byed lo tsa), 4) scholars (pa ndi ta), 5) donations [for receiving teachings] such as
flowers (zhu rten me tog), 6) teachings communicated (brjod bya).
571 Grub m tha’ mdzod: 1049.5 f.: “Since the earlier translators were buddhas incamate, they were capable of
masterful translations and therefore displayed tremendous power [in fathoming the nature of reality]. Since the later
translators appeared as scholars but for the most part in the manner of ordinary individuals, their literalist wordings
 Translators from the time of Rin chen bzang po onward are, by contrast, described as
consisting mainly of ordinary persons who tended to produce mechanical word-by-word
translations that more often than not missed out on the implicit sense of the texts. So it is in
the spirit of the early translators that Klong chen pa sets out in his Sems nyid ngal gso is to
present the essentials of the Mahāyāna, Vajrayäna and rDzogs chen tradition while revealing
their underlying unity. In combining in a single narrative the implicit meanings of the cause-
determined and goal-sustained vehicles what the author seeks to disclose is not only the
compatibility of the vehicles but, more importantly, their complementarity within an
essentially tantric conception of the path as the progressive disclosure of primordial
knowing or Mind itself. Thus the author goes on to indicate the unifying character of his
Sems nyid ngal gso, an account that is largely repeated in his later Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel:

Here in this treatise, we have combined the definitive meaning (nges don) of the
cause-oriented *Laksanayäna in terms of ground, path and goal, the meanings of the
goal-sustained Mantrayäna in terms of ground, path and goal, whatever arises from
the teachings on the subject matter of the sütras and tantras, scripture and logic, and
esoteric instructions (man ngag), as well as the meanings of the profound ultimate
reality that issues from the authentic Bla ma.572

How does Klong chen pa propose to reconcile the two idioms? In his Sems nyid ngal
gso, the author sets out to reveal their underlying continuity and complementarity by
juxtaposing the teleological *Laksanayäna and endotelic Mantrayäna approaches the
former bound up with dualistic mind (sems) and the latter with Mind itself (sems nyid) - and
by shifting the emphasis from the former to the latter in the course of the text. This creates
in the narrative progression of the text a tension between the voluntary and involuntary
trajectories of existential disclosure whose attempted resolution is the path itself. The path
unfolds as both “a push from below and a pull from above,” to echo a maxim attibuted to

are difficult to widerstand. It happened in this way because they merely strung together words to reproduce the
Indian [texts] but were otherwise incapable o f translating their meaning.” sngon gyi lo tsä ba rnams sangs rgyas kyi
sprul pa yin pas rang dbang bsgyur nus pa 7 phyir rlabs che bar mngon no\ \dus phyis kyi lo tsä ba rnams gang zag
phal pa ’i iUgS fcyj mkhas pa rnams byon pas\ \tshig grims la go bar dka ’ ba ste| | rgya dpe 7 tshig gi rim pa tsam las
don ’g yur ma nus pas de Itar byung ba ’o\ \
Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 2: 373.1 f.: bstan bcos ’dir ni rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg p a ’i nges don gzhi lam
bras bu dang bcas pa dang\ \ ’bras bu gsang sngags kyi theg pa ’i gzhi lam ’bras bu ’i don rnams\ \mdo dang\ | rgyud
dang\ Ilung dang\ \rigs pa dang\ \man ngag gi gnas bstan pa las j i skad ’byung ba dang\ \bla ma dam pa las ongs
bo i zab mo ’i de kho na nyid kyi don rnams geig tu bsdus te| | ... A similar listing of sources is given in the author’s
commentary to the Yid bzhin mdzod, Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel: 886 f..
Padmasambhava.573 Klong chen pa’s Positive Path o f Awakening (Byang chub lam bzang)574
one of four autocommentaries on the text reveals a sequential arrangement of subject
matter ranging from Mahäyäna (first eight chapters) to Vajrayäna (chapter 9) to rDzogs
chen (chapters 10 through 13), each stage reflecting a deepening familiarization with Mind
itself or primordial knowing. This familiarization is precisely how Klong chen pa defines
the path in the introductory section of his auto-commentary:

When the turbulence of mind and its mental factors have come to rest, Mind itself -
luminous primordial knowing arises from within. We call the progressive
familiarization with this [primordial knowing] the path of awakening.575

From the foregoing, it is clear that Klong chen pa’s response to the exegetical
problem of synthesizing the teachings of the sütras and tantras is to incorporate the core
subject matter of Mahäyäna, Vajrayäna and his own rDzogs chen tradition into the narrative
progression of the text. To do so he invokes the tantric and buddha nature model of the path
as a Clearing process576 that progressively lays bare one’s abiding condition primordial
knowing, buddha nature. This model in tum presupposes a difference inscribed in the
innermost structure of human reality between a conditioned, dualistic mode of awareness
bound up with conceptual superimposition and an implicit unconditioned and nondual mode
of awareness that is not yet channeled through the categories of representational thinking.
The path unfolds as the recovery of this prerepresentational knowing from the
appropriations of dualistic mind as discursive elaborations fall away. It is this dialectical
tension between dualistic mind and primordial knowing that Klong chen pa and his
successors take as the framework for elucidating the hermeneutical dimension of the
reconciliation problem, the problem of making the goal the path.

573 This is the gist of the Statement ascribed to Padmasambhava. “Vision draws from above. Conduct ascends from
below.” Ita ba yas phub spyod pa mas ’dzeg\ See Zhal gdams dmar khrid don bsdus thugs kyi phreng ba in Bla ma
dgongs dus (Gangtok ed.) vol. 5: 703.6.
574 This is a systematic guide to intemalizing the teachings of the Sems nyid ngal gso that analyzes the subject matter
of the root text into 141 contemplative topics, 92 belonging to Mahäyäna (6 et seq.), 22 to Vajrayäna (69 et seq.) and
27 to rDzogs chen (91 et seq.).
575 Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 1: 130 f.: gang gi tshe sems dang sems las byung ba ’i rnyog pa zhi ba na sems nyid
’od gsal ba ’i ye shes khong nas ’char ba ste\ \de nyid goms par byed pa byang chub kyi lam zhes brjod de| |
576 See discussion below on 249-53 and Table H where different disclosive soteriological models are presented and
discussed.
 * Comparison with gSar ma Path Summaries of Atiśa, sGam po pa, Tsong kha pa

Before tuming our attention to this problem, it is worth comparing Klong chen pa’s
framing of the exegetical problem with those of other Lam rim authors. To what extent are
Klong chen pa’s criticisms of his contemporaries justified? To what extent had they failed to
understand the implicit meanings of the paths of sütras and tantras and to combine them in
their path summaries? This is difficult to judge since Klong chen pa, following an unspoken
Tibetan scholastic rule of decorum, does not name his adversaries. It is worth noting,
however, that each of the Lam rim authors I have mentioned cites concems similar to Klong
chen pa’s as reasons for composing their texts. It is with the explicit aim of clarifying the
essentials of Mahāyāna and Vajrayäna and the relationship between them that Atiśa, sGam
po pa, and Tsong kha pa (who was bom a few years before Klong chen pa’s death) set out to
compose their own path summaries. In fact, Klong chen pa’s criticisms echo the same
worries about Tibetans’ inability to properly combine sütric and tantric teachings that had
motivated Atiśa, sGam po pa and later Tsong kha pa to write their path summaries. It is
equally clear, however, that while the so-called new (gsar ma) or new translation (gsar
gyur) traditions acknowledged the superiority of Mantrayäna approach over *Laksanayäna
as a matter of course, the gSar ma Lam rim authors generally, and for reasons we will
briefly explore, confined their path summaries to Mahāyāna traditions, reserving treatment
of Mantrayäna for separate works.577

Atiśa’s treatment o f Mantrayäna in his Pañjikā (on stanzas 60 - 67 o f the Bodhipathapradīpa) is devoted mainly
to listing the various rites, powers and classes o f tantras which he presents with little elaboration. There are
IniPortant historical considerations behind his rather perfunctory treatment o f tantra in the Bodhipathapradīpa and
auto-commentary despite his personal familiarity with it. According to Tibetan historical and biographical sources,
tiśa devoted many years to the study and practice o f tantra. Noteworthy in this regard is Sa paņ’s remark that it is
a contradiction o f Lord Atiśa’s tradition itself to assert that this is not an era for Mantra practice when Lord Atiśa
irnself practiced it.” See Rhoton 2002, 161. Atiśa’s biographers include among his tantric preceptors Rähulagupta
as well as Maitripäda (alias Avadhutipa), the renowned siddha-scholar in the traditions of Saraha with whom Atiśa
is said to have lived from ages twelve to eighteen. This latter relationship need not be entirely doubted since Atiśa
twice quotes “my guru Avadhutipa” (ya ba ’di pa) (albeit, a widely used name) in his Pañjikã (P no. 5344, 334b,
6b). For an overview o f sources on Atiśa’s early tantric career, see Chattopadhyaya 1981: ch. 8.
Surveying the author’s writings collected in the bsTan ’gyur confirms that Atiśa wrote extensively on tantra and also
collaborated in the translation o f many tantras during his soujoum in Tibet. However, he is also said to have
complained o f not being allowed to teach his beloved songs o f realization (dohu) which were then so populär in his
native Bengal. See Davidson 2005: 111 f.. Tibetan histories relate that Atiśa was commissioned to write the
fdhipathapradfpa by the monk Byang chub ’od who had invited Atiśa to Tibet on the advice o f his uncle king Ye
shes ’od as part o f the latter’s program to instigate monastic reform in Tibet and clear up misconceptions conceming
1 © practice o f tantra. The reformist campaign evidently met with a mixed reception. While Atiśa gained
 According to Atiśa’s Pañjikã, the root text was written at the request of the I I th
Century King Ye shes ’od and his nephew Byang chub ’od who had invited the renowned
Bengali pandit to Tibet to help clear up the many prevailing misconceptions about
Buddhism: “Gurus and spiritual friends are arguing with one another about matters they do
not fully understand. Each has his own line of reasoning and his own preconceptions
conceming the meanings of what is profound and vast.”578 Of particular concem were the
deviant practices of tantra and, above all, the flagrant violations of the monastic celibacy
vows, a concem that had led the king to adopt a critical stance toward those who practiced
tantrism “too freely”, i.e., without the proper training and knowledge. Atiśa, an ardent
proponent of both Mahāyāna and Vajrayäna579, considered the main source of all this
confusion and uncertainty to lie in the inability among Tibetans to reconcile the scholastic
approach to Buddhism outlined in the sütras with the experiential approach detailed in the
tantras. This problem had preoccupied Indian Buddhists from as early as the 7th c. but now
reached an unprecedented magnitude with the rapid influx of diverse and often quite
contrary ideas and norms expounded in the sütras and tantras. Atiśa sets out in his
Bodhipathapradīpa not only to outline a basic framework for monastic Buddhism in Tibet
but also, as he reveals in the Pañjikā, to rectify two widespread misrepresentations of tantra
that had led their proponents to two contrasting reactions: (1) One was a tendency to reject it

considerable fame as a teacher and monastic reformer, and is said to have humbled the pride o f Tibet’s famous gSar
ma translator and tantric scholar, Rin chen bzang po, not everyone welcomed Atiśa’s reformist agenda. ’Brog mi,
founder of the Sa skya tradition who was renowned in Tibet for introducing the tantric Lam ’bras teachings, is said
to have avoided meeting Atiśa. The great yogi Mi la ras pa, on the other hand, pointed the finger o f accusation not at
Atiśa but at ’Brom ston rGyal ba’i ’byung gnas (1008-1064), Atiśa’s leading disciple and financial patron (bdag
gnyer), who he criticized for suppressing his master’s attempts to teach Mantrayâna to Tibetans. See his colourful
remarks to sGam po pa recorded in ’Gos lo tsä ba’s Deb ther sngon po, Roerich 1976: 453 f.. Mi la ras pa’s criticism
aside, it is known that ’Brom ston collaborated with Atiśa on the translation o f tantric ritual manuals such as the
Cakrasamvara and Yamäntaka. See R. Davidson 2005: 111 f.. It would appear that ’Brom ston’s suppression of the
teaching of tantra was motivated more by the alleged misrepresentations and abuses o f tantra by those lacking
proper training than by reservations about the viability of tantra as a path. It should also be emphasized that Atiśa
never denounced tantra per se but only those charged with either excluding it from the Buddhist teachings, an
instance o f unwarranted deprecation (skur ’debs), or embracing it as a licence for brazenly immoral conduct, an
instance o f illegitimate exaggeration (sgro ’dogs). See his Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikã, P vol. 103, no.5344: 44.4 f..
See also Seyfort Ruegg 1981. Tsong kha pa’s Lam rim chen mo was also composed with the explicit intention of
furthering Atiśa’s reformist campaign and restoring the balance between study and practice in Tibet, as noted in his
introduction and colophon to the treatise.
578 See Bodhimārgadīpapañjikã, trns.by author as Byang chub lam gyi sgron m a ’i d k a ’ ’g rel, P no. 5344: 22.2 f..
See Bu ston Rin chen grub’s account in Obermiller 1932: 212-13.
579 On Atiśa’s tantric background and affiliations see above n. 577.
 outright, an instance of unwarranted deprecation (skur 'debs). (2) The other was the
tendency to wrongly embracing tantra as a license for reprehensible behaviour, an instance
of illegitimate imputation (sgro 'dogs).580 The destruction of the Buddhist teachings, Atiśa
teils us in the colophon of his Pañjikā, is due not only to commoners or non-Buddhists but
to Buddhists as well, and particularly the ordained members of the community. With such
concems in mind and with his financial patronage in the hands of a staunch reformist ’Brom
ston rGyal ba’i ’byung gnas (1008-1064), Atiśa initiated a modest campaign of monastic
reform in Central Tibet and composed his summa of Mahāyāna doctrine as a kind of
manifesto of this movement.

Born five years before Atiśa’s death, sGam po pa composed his lucid summary of the
Buddhist path, the Thar pa rin po che’i rgyan or Jewel Ornament o f Liberation with the aim
of “uniting the two streams of sütras and tantras.” sGam po pa had studied under the Bengali
master’s disciples at a bKa’ gdams pa monastery, and soon gained renown for his extensive
knowledge of Mahāyāna Buddhism and his considerable expertise as a Madhyamika
philosopher. The decisive tuming point in his spiritual career, however, was his encounter
with the famous Tibetan yogi Mi la ras pa who followed the esoteric Mahāmudrā teachings
which his teacher Marpa had received from Nāropa/Nādapāda in India. This encounter with
the non-gradual Mahāmudrā teachings of the siddhas was to profoundly influence sGam po
pa’s life and work. The majority of sGam po pa’s teachings gathered in his bKa’ ’bum and
recorded in the works of his disciples reflect emerging indigenous traditions of non-gradual
Mahāmudrā teachings inspired in no small measure by the Indian Buddhist siddha
movement. That said, sGam po pa’s Thar rgyan was composed primarily a practical
compendium of Mahāyāna Buddhism and is thought to belong to the period soon after his
meeting with Mi la but before he had fully realized the import of the latter’s teachings
during a period of extended retreat.

Atiśa’s reformist campaign was revived and strengthened in the 14th Century by
Tsong kha pa whose New bKa’ gdams order sought to retum to the essentials of Indian
monastic Buddhism. Like Atiśa and Klong chen pa before him, Tsong kha pa lamented that

580 See above n. 577.

“the teachings preserved by scholars of the past had gradually declined so that the good path
was for a long time lost”. He therefore composed his Lam rim chen mo to “summarize the
main points contained in all of the canonical literature of the Victorious One” Hīnayāna,
Mahäyäna and Vajrayäna. Just as Atiśa’s monastic reforms served as a model for Tsong kha
pa’s much more ambitious and wide-ranging campaign of monastic reform, so Atiśa’s
Bodhipathapradīpa served as the scriptural basis for Tsong kha pa’s Lam rim chen mo
which elaborates in extenso on the paths of the three types of person.581
From the foregoing it is clear that all the authors of the most influential Tibetan Lam
rim works shared a common concem to bridge the different Buddhist vehicles, Mahäyana
and Vajrayäna in particular. But to what extent did these authors actually synthesize the
subject matter of these vehicles and accommodate their divergent approaches to goal-
realization in the structure and content their texts? Here it is evident that the gSar ma
authors confined their summaries of the Buddhist path almost entirely to Mahäyäna, though
they were unanimous, as were virtually all Tibetan scholars, in proclaiming the superiority
of Mantrayäna over Paramītayāna. Atiśa and Tsong kha pa discuss Vajrayäna only briefly in

581 The Classification of three types o f person (skyes bu gsum), or three stages in the spiritual career o f a single
individual, has a long history in Buddhist literature. As Steven Collins has observed in the context of Theravâda
Buddhism, “[t]he idea that there is a social and psychological ränge in the appreciation of doctrine refers not only to
a difference between individual persons (puggala-vemattata), to which much attention was devoted, but also to
differences of insight within each individual as he progresses along the path.” (Collins 1982: 93). Atiśa Claims, in the
Pañjikā to his Bodhipathapradīpa (P vol. 115: 189.1), to derive his three-fold characterology from Vasubandhu's
Abhidharmakośabhā$ya which distinguishes between the lesser person who works only for his own hâppiness, the
intermediate one who tums away from suffering due to his own lack o f happiness but thereby continues to suffer,
and the worthy individual (dam pa) who works for the welfare of all others by tuming away the basis of their
suffering, and thereby suffers on account o f their suffering. See also the Yogãcãrabhūmi (P vol. 111:7.5 f.) where
Asańga delineates various ways of classifying individuals into lesser, intermediate and superior. He begins his
analysis with the Statement that “The three persons, lesser, intermediate, and superior have their inception in modes
of realization (sgrub)." Anoiher source familiar to Atiśa was the Anthology o f Discourses (Sütrasamuccaya) ascribed
to Nāgāijuna which Atiśa interprets, in his commentary Sūtrasamuccayasamcayãrtha, in light o f the Classification of
Dharma practitioners into three types: lesser, middling and superior. In any case, the three-fold characterology is
found already in Pali sources such as The Mahãpadānasūtta o f the Pali Canon which compares people o f varying
intellectual capacity to three types o f lotus plants: those which remain submerged in the pond; those which grow
only up to its surface; and those which rise above the water, unmuddied by it. Only the latter o f the three types,
“those whose eyes are nearly free from dirt”, are considered ripe for the Buddha's teaching. See Dialogues o f the
Buddha pt. II, tms.T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davis (London: Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1971): 31. See also Dīghanikãya III:
118-19 where a distinction is made between the ‘ordinary man’ (puthujjano) who is outside Buddhism, the ‘leamer’
(sekho) in the teaching, and the ‘adept’ (asekho) in accordance with three types o f insight appropriate to them The
Vimuttimagga o f Arahant Upatissa, a text thematically similar to the Visuddhimagga of Budhaghosa but extant only
in its Chinese translation, associates three types o f individual with the three trainings: “The Blessed One expounded
the training o f higher virtue (śīla) to a man o f the lower type, the training o f higher thought (citta) to a man o f the
middle type and the training o f higher wisdom (prajñā) to a man of the higher type.” The Path o f Freedom tms.by
N.R.M. Ehara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1977): 3.
 their basic Lam rim works, although both composed separate works on the subject.582 sGam
po pa had composed his Thar rgyan with the explicit aim to “unite the streams of sütras and
tantras”, yet he only briefly touches on Mantrayäna, and certain Mahāmudrā teachings
attributed to Indian siddhas, in a later chapter on the sixth perfection prajñãpāramitā. Given
its introductory scope and the fact that it was most likely commissioned by a bKa’ gdam pa
monastic583, sGam po pa’s exceedingly lucid and practical text is devoted mainly to
Mahāyāna, leaving Mantrayäna and Mahāmudrā teachings as separate subjects to which the
majority of the other works contained in his bK a7 ’bum are devoted. Thus each of the gSar
ma Lam rim works leaves the reader with the impression that the tantras advocate a mode of
leaming distinct from that of the *Laksanayāna, one that is almost univerally acknowledged
as superior but reserved only for advanced candidates who have taken the appropriate
bodhisattva and tantric vows.

That being said, Tsong kha pa must be credited with underscoring the unity and
compatibility of the three yänas. He sets out in his Lam rim chen mo (and the shorter Lam
rim chung ba) to emphasize how the canonical teachings (gsung rab) contained in the sütra
and tantra vehicles, whose key points are said to be combined in Atiśa’s text584, reflect
stages in the spiritual progress of a single individual. “Here [in Atiśa’s Bodhipathapradīpa]
to understand that all these teachings [of the Buddha] are free of contradiction means to

582
Among the long list o f works in the Otani index to the Tibetan bsTan ’g yur that Atiśa played a role in either
franslating or revising (almost always in collaboration with a Tibetan such as Rin chen bzang po, dGe ba’i blo gros,
Tshul khrims rgyal ba, or ’Brom ston) are many that are tantric in nature: tantras, sâdhanas, and tantric dharânis. The
index also includes works attributed to Atiśa himself which comprise a large number of tantric works such dohäs,
vajragltis and sädhanas. Tsong kha pa composed a lengthy Vaijayāna Lam rim-type work, the sNgags rim chen mo
(Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum vol. 3) and also provides a cursory overview of Sūtrayāna and Vajryäna in his Lam gyi
rim pa mdo tsam du bstan pa (A Concise Summary o f the Stages o f the Path) composed in response to a letter by
dKon mchog tshul khrims.
583
The work is said to have been written at the request o f Dar ma skyabs (’Dar ma’ being a prefix characteristic of
Bka gdams followers). After thirteen months with Mi la, tradition relates that it took sGam po pa three years of
arduous solitary practice, as predicted by Mi la, to fiilly understand the nature o f his teacher and the import o f his
teaching. This period was spent at Se ba lung, a Bka' gdams monastery in the Gnyal region of Central I ibet. It was
Ükely during this period that sGam po pa composed the Thar rgyan which is dedicated to Atiśa and Mi la ras pa,
though the latter’s teachings are only briefly alluded to in the penultimate chapter.
584
Lam rim chen mo in Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum vol. 13: 18.1: “Since it teaches by summarizing the vital points of
both sötra and tantra, its subject matter is comprehensive...” mdo sngags gnyis ka ’i gnad bsdus nas stong pas brjod
yayongs su rdzogs p a \...
comprehend that they constitute the path whereby a single individual becomes a buddha.”585
Tsong kha pa argues that there is no contradiction between the teachings and ethical norms
characteristic of the different yänas - the differences simply reflect a gradation in
intellectual and spiritual maturation. The approach here is inclusivistic: the principal
teachings of early Buddhism are incorporated into the more encompassing and altruistic
Mahāyāna as preparatory stages:

To proclaim that you need not train in the scriptural collections of the HTnayäna
because you are a Mahāyānist is proof of the opposite. There are both shared and
unshared paths to enter the Mahāyāna. Since the shared [paths] are those that derive
from the scriptural collections of the HTnayäna, how could these be something to give
up? Therefore, the Mahāyānist must intemalize all those things with only a few
exceptions such as seeking happiness and quiescence for oneself alone. This is the
reason the exceedingly vast scriptural collections of the bodhisattvas teach in extenso
all three vehicles.586

Similarily, the Vajrayäna path(s) is in no way incompatible with Mahāyāna; in fact, it

should be seen as an extension o/Pāramitāyāna, grounded in the same altruistic ethos of the
bodhisattva who cultivates bodhicitta for the welfare of all:

Although it is necessary, in entering the Great Vehicle of the pāramitãs, [to follow]
the paths explained in the scriptural collections of the Hlnayäna, one might think
when entering upon the Vajrayäna that it does not share anything in common with
the paths of the Pāramitāyāna because [the two approaches] are incompatible. This
too is most unreasonable. The very essence of the Pāramitāyāna comprises the
intention to develop bodhicitta and its engagement in training in the six pāramitãs.
That it is absolutely necessary to rely on all these [procedures]... is also maintained in
many Mantra texts.587

5*5Lctm rim chen mo 18.6 f.: de thams cad ’gal ba med par rtogs pa ni\ \ 'dir gang zag geig ’tshang rgya ba 7 lam du
go ba ste |...
586 Lam rim chen mo 19.6 f. theg pa chen po pa yin pa ’i phyir thog dman gyi sde snod la bslab par mi bya ’o zhes
smra ba ni ’gal ba ’i rtags po\ \theg pa chen po ’i lam la ’ju g pa la lam thun mong ba dang thun mong min pa gnyis
yod la\ \thun mong pa ni theg dman gyi sde snod nas ’byung ba rnams yin pas de dag dor byar ga la ’gyur] \des na
rang geig pu zhi bde don gnyer la sogs pa ’i dmigs bsal can ’ga ’ re ma gtogs pa thams cad theg chen pas kyang
nyams su blang dgos pas\ \byang sems rnams kyi shin tu rgyas pa ’i sde snod lam theg pa gsum ga rgya eher ston
pa ’i rgyu mtshan yang de yin no\ |
587 Lam rim chen mo 20.6 f.: gal te pha rol tu phyin p a ’i theg pa chen por ’ju g pa la theg dman gyi sde snod nas
bshad pa ’i lam rnams dgos na ’ang\ \rdo rje ’i theg par ’ju g pa la ni phar phyin kyi theg pa ’i lam rnams thun mong
bar mi ’gyur te lam mi mthun pa ’i phyir ro zhe na\ \ ’di yang ches mi rigs te\ \pha rol tu phyin pa ’i lam gyi ngo bo ni
bsam pa byang chub tu sems bskyed pa dang\ \spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa drug la slob par ’du ba yin la\ |de ni
rnam pa thams cad du bsten dgos par... gzhan yang sngags kyi gzhung du mar gsungs so| |
Thus “the path of the pāramitās is the path common to both sütra and tantra.” It is clear that
Tsong kha pa’s inclusivism is decidedly Pāramitãyāna-centric, the pivotal practice of
pāramitãs serving both as the ethical aim for Hīnayānists making the transition from self-
interest to other-interest and as the indispensable ethical norm for Vajrayänists. On Tsong
kha pa’s account, Mahāyāna is the common ground for early Buddhist vehicles as well as
Vajrayäna. If one is to clearly understand the implicit gradation of the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna
and Vajrayäna, Tsong kha pa continues, one must not only read the many texts of these
traditions but take them to heart as personal instructions. Be this as it may, Tsong kha pa
follows Atiśa’s lead in emphasizing the need to gain a mastery of Indian Pāramitāyāna,
especially its altruistic ethos, before embarking on the Mantrayäna so as to avoid the many
potential misrepresentations and pitfalls. The author’s Lam rim chen mo therefore deals
almost exclusively with Mahāyāna, reserving detailed treatment of Mantrayäna for his
sNgags rim chen mo.5SS Mantrayäna is postponed for future consideration, along with the
goal itself.

The Pāramitāyāna had provided Atiśa with a framework for delineating the Buddhist
path in terms of a well-known three-fold typology of individuals - the lesser, middling and
superior - of which only the superior, the compassionate bodhisattva, is deemed a suitable
candidate for following the Mahāyāna path. The two lesser types, the lesser worldly non-
Buddhist and the intermediate self-seeking śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha, are introduced only
as counter-examples to the superior individual who is motivated by compassion to pursue
the Mahāyāna path of self-fulfillment and other-enrichment (rang don; gzhan don). Tsong
kha pa does not simply adopt Atiśa’s model but reinterprets the three types of individuals as
three phases in the life of a single individual. The two lower types, rather than serving as
counter-examples to the superior candidate, are now seen as representing ascending stages
in his spiritual maturation which come successively into play as his spiritual aims become
increasingly less self-centered. Thus Atiśa’s three-fold typology is reformulated as a three-
phase teleology such that the path of the superior individual contains within its scope the

To this day, dGa’ ldan pa/dGe lugs pa monasteries have separate Colleges for Mahāyāna and Vajrayana studies
and maintain separate curriculums for their study and practice.
lesser paths and, accordingly, the Mahayana encompasses all yãnas, Hinayana as well as
Vajrayāna:

Since the paths shared in common with both the lesser individual who seeks worldly
contentment and the intermediate individual who seeks liberation from samsära
merely for his own sake are not really intended as distinct instructions for pursuing
different paths, but rather as preliminary instructions preparatory to the path of the
superior individual, they are taken as adjunctive aspects of linking up with the main
path of the superior individual.589

Tsong kha pa’s reinterpretation of Atiśa’s typology constitutes a shift from a class-
theoretical approach which deals with types or categories and presupposes a certain
atomistic independence of the classes involved - toward a field-theoretical approach, which
deals with phases and their interactions within a single field or continuum of experience.
Fundamental to both Atiśa’s and Tsong kha pa’s path summaries, however, is the
assumption of a teleological path involving the accumulation of virtues and knowledge, the
only difference being that Atiśa excludes the lesser aim as being unsuitable while Tsong kha
pa incorporates it within the overarching path structure of the superior person as a
preparatory stage.

While the new translation (gsar sgyur) schools generally treated the cause-related
and goal-sustained paths as separate disciplines, rNying ma scholars, drawing on rDzogs
chen traditions going back to the Royal Dynastie Period, were inclined from early on to
view them as differing approaches to goal-realization that reflect an implicit tension
between their two predominant modes of knowledge: an inferential-representational mode
endorsed by the sütras and an experiential-presentational mode advocated by the tantras.
Against this background, it is possible to see Klong chen pa’s aforementioned criticisms as
targeting a general tendency amongst his contemporaries to treat the Mahāyāna
progressivist conception of goal-realization as the normative model for understanding the
relationship between vehicles. It is one thing to acknowledge, as all Tibetan Buddhist
traditions do, both that the Mahāyāna ethos of altruism (compassion and bodhicitta) is a
precondition for Vajrayäna practice and that Vajrayäna is the highest branch of Mahāyāna.

589 Lam rim chung ngu: 193.3 f..

 It is another thing to take the Mahayäna progressivist model of the path as a framework for
understanding and practicing Vajrayäna.

From a rNying ma standpoint, it was not acceptable to treat the path espoused by the
tantras as a mere adjunct to Pāramitāyāna, an add-on reserved for advanced candidates and
therefore relegated to a separate work or chapter of a work. Such an approach would
privilege the sütric cause-oriented and teleocratic conception of goal-realization as the result
of a long-drawn process of intellectual and moral refinement - accumulations of knowledge
and virtues which serve as causes and conditions for its attainment. It is in this sense a
worldly path based on naive preconceptions about the nature of goal-realization. As Klong
chen pa distinguishes these in his Zab mo yang tig :

The essence of the path consists in skillful means of travelling to the state of
goal-realization.
Its definition is the going itself.
Its Classification is a cause-oriented path of characteristics and a goal-oriented
mantra path.
Its analogies are a worldly path like the trail beings plod along or an effortless
path like the trail of a bird across the sky.590

3.2 The H erm eneutical D im ension : Intem alizing the Path

We can recapitulate the main steps in the foregoing argumentation in this way:
understanding how to combine the ‘paths’ codified in the sütras and tantras within a single
soteriological narrative requires understanding what it means to be on a path in the first
place, and this in tum requires disceming, by means of contemplative investigations, the
heterogeneous structure of lived experience that makes a path of existential disclosure
possible. It is this structure that best explains the traditional distinction between sütric and
tantric vehicles in terms of their proximity (both temporal and existential) to goal-
realization.591 Rog Bande Shes rab ’od in his 13th Century bsTan p a ’i sgron ma noted that

7 h
■, mo y w g dg vol. 2: 436.4 f.: lam gyi ngo bo ’bras bu ’i sar bgrodpa ’i thabs\ \nges tshig bgrodpar byed la\
\ ye na rgyu mtshan nyid kyi lam dang\ | ’bras bu sngags kyi lam gnyis so| | dpe ni ’g ro ba ’i lam ’jig rten gyi lam
an8\ Irtsol med kyi lam nam mkha ’ bya ’i lam du gyur pa Ita bu ste| | .
591 R
8 Shes rab 'od characterizes this distinction in his bsTan p a ’i sgron me, NyKs vol. 114: 196.1 f.:
here is said to be a great dilTerence beween the Lak§ana[yäna] - the method o f step by Step realization used by
ose o f duller faculties and Guhyamantra[yâna] - the method o f all at once realization by those o f sharp faculities.”
•■mtshan nyid ni dbang po rtul pos rim gyis rtogs par byed pa ’i thabs yin la\ \gsang sngags ni\ \dbang po rnon pos
the so-called cause-oriented *Laksanayāna (rgyu’i mtshan nyid kyi theg pa) and goal-
oriented Mantrayäna ( ’bras buyi gsang sngags kyi theg pa) presuppose quite different
conceptions of path and goal, the former viewing the nature of mind as a cause for goal-
realization, the latter taking it as the goal itself.592 For Rog, the differences in how
proponents of these two vehicles envision and articulate Buddhist soteriology stem directly
from their relatively ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ descriptions of the *ground’ - primordial awareness,
buddha nature - and the correlative views of its role in awakening. As he understands it, the
Mantrayäna injunction to take the goal as the path ( ybras bu lam du byed pa) means
retrieving an ever-present primordial condition of being and knowing: “simply recognizing
what was not yet recognized or making clear what was not yet clear or letting manifest what
was not yet manifest is what we call ‘taking [the goal] as the path’”.

Klong chen pa further develops this line of thought in his Grub mtha' mdzod where
he specifies how each of these vehicles construes the categories of ground, path and goal
and then draws out the implications these have for their respective approaches to
soteriology. In delineating these standpoints, the author at the same time explicates the basic
Mantrayäna framework underlying classical rNying ma interpretations of the path:

geig char rtogs par byed p a ’i thabs yin pas khyad par che gsungs\\ As scriptural support for this distinction, Rog
quotes the Mdo gdam ngag bog pa ’i rgyal po.
592 bs Tan p a ’i sgron me, NyKs vol. 114: 196.3 f.: “Understanding Mind itself to be merely a cause o f buddhahood
and taking this [cause] as the path is called the cause-oriented *Lak§anayäna. Understanding Mind itself to be the
very essence o f the goal and then taking this [goal] as the path is called the goal-oriented Guhyamantrayäna. Some
people refute this as follows: “You Guhyamantra followers take the goal as the path in [the sense] that a goal is
brought to fruition that had not come to fruition previously.” Our initial reply is: We need not exaggerate the fruition
o f the goal or denigrate its non-fruition because we instead take the very essence o f the goal as the path. Should you
ask: “What is this essence o f the goal?” our answer is spiritual embodiment (sku) and primordial knowing (ye shes):
Their being primordially present in oneself is called the goal. Therefore, simply recognizing what was not yet
recognized or making clear what was not yet clear or letting manifest what was not yet manifest is what we call
“taking it as the path” To summarize, the presence in oneself right now of what is to be attained is the goal. To
simply clear away the attachments [and identifications] that have obscured this is called “taking it as the path”.”
sems nyid sangs rgyas kyi rgyu tsam du shes nas lam du byed pa ni rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa\ \sems nyid ’bras
bu ’i ngo bor shes nas lam du byed pa ni ’bras bu gsang sngags kyi theg pa zer ro\ \de la rgol ba dag na re\ \khyed
gsang sngags pa ’bras bu lam du byed pa ste\ \ ’bras bu sngar ma smin pa smin par byed pa yin no\ \zhes bya ’o\
\dang po ’i lan ni\ | ’bras bu smin zhes sgro mi ’dogs\ \ma smin zhes skur pa mi ’debs te\ | ’bras bu ngo bo lam du
byed pa yin no\ \ ’bras bu ’i ngo bo gang yin zhe na\ |sku dang ye shes yin la\ | de ye nas rang la gnas pa ni ’bras bu
yin pas\ | de ma shes pa shes par byed pa ’am\ \mi gsal ba gsal bar byed pa ’am\ \mngon du ma gyur pa gyur par byed
pa tsam la lam du byed zer ba yin\ \mdor na thob bya da Ita nyid nas rang la gnas pa ni ’bras bu\ \de la sgrib par
byed pa ’i zhes pa ’dag par byed pa tsam la lam du byed zer ba yin no\ \
 Although these [vehicles] share the same purpose of ascertaining the ground the
luminous quintessence - and the phenomena founded on that, there is a difference in
terms of how they understand it. The Laksana[yäna] is confused when it comes to
ascertaining ground, path and goal as they really are, while the Mantra[yäna] is not
confused. [Consider] how each evaluates what is profound [ultimate] and extensive
[conventional]. The Laksana[yäna takes] the profound as an objective reference
consisting in [1] a ground that is a mental construct the ultimate truth that is
investigated by means of logical reasoning and evaluated by the valid epistemic
instrument of rational inference, [2] a path that places [the mind] in that state by
means of willful striving - i.e., merely [through] calm abiding (zhi gnas) followed by
insight (Ihag mthong) and [3] a teleocratic goal that is attained after many aeons. As
for what is extensive, it consists of nothing but ascertaining conventional truth - all
the skandhas, dhätus, and äyatanas and so forth, which are founded on one’s spiritual
potential - in order to determine which things to accept and reject.

The Mantra[yäna] brings about a direct recognition of the profound as follows.

Without recourse to logical reasoning, one simply works directly with the vital points
of body, speech, the energy channels, currents and potencies. In this way, one
ascertains nonconceptual primordial knowing that is not a mental construct [but] the
very quintessence of dharmakäya as the ground. By then letting the mind remain
naturally in this state, one realizes, in one life time or less, the ultimate truth that is
the dharmadhätu, whereby spiritual awakening becomes fully manifest. As for what
is extensive, [1] one clearly ascertains this basic expanse (dhätu) primordially
present as a mandala of luminosity - to be the ground aspect of tantra. [2] One then
implements the path aspects of tantra in ascertaining that the conventional aspects
founded on this [expanse] all the skandhas, dhätus, and äyatanas constitute the
array of deities, their mansions and realms, with nothing to be accepted or rejected.
[3] Through this revelation, one ascertains the goal aspect of tantra whereby the
temporary goal of the eight siddhis and ultimate goal of supreme awakening are
realized. Thus it is a teaching that shows how anything at all can become the path.
For these reasons, [Mantrayäna] is without confusion when it comes to the meaning
of the profound and extensive.593

„ m tha’ mdzod 1013.3 f.: de yang gzhi ’od gsal b a ’i snying po dang\ \de la brten p a ’i chos mams gtan la
ebs par don geig kyang\ \mtshan nyid kyis j i Ita ba bzhin gzhi la ’bras bu gtan la ’bebs pa rmongs la\ |sngags kyis
murmongs par shes pa ’i khyad par yo d de \ \ji Itar zab pa dang rgya che ba dag ’ja l ba na\ \mtshan nyid kyis gtan
igs kyi sgo nas gzhig ste rjes dpag nges pa ’i tshad mos gzhal ba ’i don dam gyi bden pa blos byas kyi gzhi dang\
I e i ngang la ’bad pas ’jo g pa ’i lam zhi Ihag tsam dang\ \dus bskal pa mang po na thob pa la phyogs pa ’i ’bras bu
o dmigs pa ’i zab pa tsam dang\ | rgya che ba ’ang khams la brten pa ’i phung po khams dang skye mched la sogs pa
Un rdzob kyi bden par gtan la phab nas blang dor ’b a ’ zhig tu byed pa tsam las med do\ \sngags ni gtan tshigs la
ma dos Par\ \lus ngag rtsa rlung thig le la sogs pa ’i gnad bsnun pa tsam gyis\ \blos ma byas pa ’i ye shes rnam par
m rtoS Po chos sku ’i snying po gzhir gtan la phebs nas\ | de ’ang du rang bzhin gyi blo gnas pas tshe geig la sogs pa
no dbyings don dam pa ’i bden pa rtogs nas byang chub mngon du byed pas zab mo mngon sum du skye ba nyid
f*ng\ \rgya che ba ’ang dbyings ’od gsal gyi dkyil ’khor du ye nas grub pa gzhi ’i rgyud du gtan la phab nas\ \de la
, r*en Pa * kun rdzob p a ’i rnam pa phung khams skye mched thams cad spang blang med par Iha dang gzhal yas
ang dang zhing gi bkod par gtan la ’p hebs pa ’i lam gyi rgyud rnams su len pa bstan pas\ \gnas skabs su grub
 On this interpretation, the *Laksanayäna bases itself on a rationalistic epistemology
that misconstrues ground, path and goal by objectifying them, treating them as an objective
framework into which the individual is supposed to somehow fit himself. By taking the
ground, ultimate truth (the emptiness of all phenomena), as something that one can
“investigate through logical reasoning and evaluate through the epistemic instrument of
rational inference”, it reduces this ground to a mental construct, a deductive conclusion. The
path on this account becomes an instrumental means toward a predefined telos. In contrast
to this teleological view of ground, path and goal, the Mantrayäna understands the goal as
nonconceptual primordial knowing which, far from being “a conceptual construct” arrived
at through rational inference, is an implicit invariant structure of consciousness that is
directly realized through non-ideational, intransitive modes of contemplation.594 In taking
primordial knowing, not dualistic mind, as ground, path and goal, one (re)discovers a mode
of awareness that is both prior to and pervasive of the wholly derivative repertoire of
rational procedures that belong to the paths of mind.
To conclude, classical rNying ma authors of path summaries argued that the
*Laksanayäna conception of the goal as a telos extraneous to human existence that one
progresses towards is fundamentally at odds with the Mantrayäna conception of a goal
always and already present as one’s own Mind itself, a goal progressively disclosed by
whatever stratagems are deemed capable of dispelling what obscures it. From the
perspective of rNying ma path hermeneutics, there is a natural gradation in the application
of such stratagems that is mirrored in the transitions from Mahāyāna to Vajrayäna to rDzogs
chen where these represent critical phases in the Clearing of obscurations of dualistic mind
that progressively reveals primordial knowing. On this view, the path cannot be a linear

chen brgyad dang mthar thug byang chub mchog la sogs pa mgnon du byed cing\ \gang yang lam du gyur pa ’i chos
ston pa ’bras bu rgyud gtan la ’bebs pa ’i phyir zab pa dang rgya che ba ’i don la rmongs pa m edpayin no\ \
594 My use o f the term intransitive follows the grammatical distinction between transitive verbs which take a direct
object (e.g. to dream) and intransitive verbs which cannot take a direct object (e.g. to sleep). The former express an
action undertaken by a subject toward an object, whereas the latter express States in which the act-object structure is
not involved. Now, applied to consciousness (and, by extension, to contemplation), the distinction can help clarify
two distinct ways in which one is said to be aware of one’s conscious mental state. Consciousness can be given to
itself transitively, i.e. when taken taken as its own object. But this is possible because conscious is already given to
itself intransitively, i.e. in simply being aware, a state phenomenologists call first personal givenness. ‘Being
conscious’ is thus ambitransitive (see Legrand 2009) in the specific sense that all transitive intentional states of
being conscious o f something are given from this first-personal perspective as experiences I am undergoing, i.e. they
share this dimension of intransitive pre-reflective self-consciousness.
 Progression from a starting point to a pre-established goal; the goal must be implicitly
present from the Start, even if it is concealed to varying degrees by adventious defilement.

§4. rNying m a Soteriological Schemes: From Soteriology to Aletheiology

4.1 The Path as an Em ancipation Process and Clearing Process

rNying ma path summaries typically employ the basic categories of ground, path and
goal, or more elaborate schemes based on these, as interpretive frameworks for delineating
their subject matter. An overview of relevant Schemata presented and discussed by Klong
chen pa in some of his more influential works is provided in the following table:

Table H: 14th c. Soteriological schemes based on ground, path and goal in works of Klong chen pa

Three Continua Emancipation Model Purification Model Disclosure Model

Sources: various Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel Theg mchog mdzod (TC) Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel, Yid
bzhin mdzod 'grel, Grub mtha'
mdzod
ground ground of emancipation ground of purification ground where Clearing
(gzhi) (bral gzhi) (dag gihl) occurs (sbyang gzhi)
= *sugatagarbha = primordial knowing = *sugatagarbha, dharmatä,
(bde bar gshegs pa'i snying po) (ye shes) [dharma]dhatu
path causes emancipaton purification process Clearing process
(lam) (bral rgyu) (dag byed) (sbyong byed)
= aspects of path, virtues conducive = dissipating errors of mind =creation and completion
to liberation (sems kyi 'khrulpa sangs pa) stages (bskyed & rdzogs rim)
objects to be emancipated from object to be purified away objects to be deared away
(bral bya) (dag bya) (sbyang bya)
= all-ground of myriad latent = dualistic mind (sems) = all-ground of myriad latent
tendencies (bag chags sna tshogs tendencies with 8 modes of
kyi kun gzhi) consciousness
goal goal of emancipation goal of having purified goal of having deared
___ ('bras bu) (bral 'bras) (dag 'bras) (sbyangs 'bras)
= disclosure of inherent qualities = buddhahood as disclosure of actual all-ground
(yon tan mngon du gyur pa) dharmakōyajñāna (don gyi kun gzhi)

While Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso is structured according to the basic
ground, path and goal rubrics which are also used to show its connection with the triology as
a whole595, the author draws upon a derivative model of the path conceived as an

Ngal gso skor gsum spyi don legs bshad: 223.3 f.: where he discusses the intratextual structuring of the trilogy
according to the paired categories gzhi/lta ba, lam/sgom pa, and grogs/spyodpa. Intertextually, the last four chapters
0 the Sems nyid ngal gso s thirteen chapters are arranged such that ch. 10 reveals the ground, chapters 11-12 the
Path, and chapter 13 the goal.
emancipation process (bral byed) in his lengthy discussion of buddha nature. After
explicating this model, he compares it to the model of the path as a clearing/purifying
process (sbyong byed) that is specific to Mantrayäna.

In our account, one should understand there are four [phases]: [1] the ground where
emancipation occurs (bral gzhi), [2] the causes of emancipation (bral rgyu), [3] the
goal that is emancipation (bral ’bras), and [4] the objects to be emancipated from
(bral bya). [1] The emancipation ground is our spiritual potential, the *sugatagarbha;
[2] the causes of emancipation are the facets that comprise the path, those virtuous
actions conducive to liberation that clear away the defilements accreted on this
[quintessence]; [3] the goal that is emancipation is the disclosure of qualities once the
*sugatagarbha has been freed from the plethora of defilements; and [4] the objects to
emancipated from comprise the eightfold ensemble [of cognitions] that are founded
on the all-ground of myriad latent tendencies (bag chags sna tshogs kyi kun gzhi) as
well as the latent tendencies [themselves].
In the Mantrayäna, these phases are declared to be [1] the ground where Clearing
occurs, [2] the Clearing process itself, [3] the goal where obscurations have been
cleared away, and [4] the objects to be cleared way. Although the names used are
different, their meaning is the sam e.596

It is not suprising that the Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel adopts the idiom of
‘emancipation’ for its detailed presentation of buddha nature as presented in Mahāyāna
literature; the path when viewed from the standpoint of individual aspiration appears as a via
negativa, a progressive Stripping away of all that is found not to provide fulfillment. The
author’s later path summary, the Yid bzhin mdzod, combines the idiom of the emancipation
with the specifically Mantrayäna idiom of a Clearing process which he adopts as a
framework for organizing the content of that text. As the author explains:

We here take the *sugatagarbha, our spiritual potential, as the ground. The two
aspects of [1] Clearing away the defilements of one’s potential by means of the
insights of studying, thinking and meditating and [2] directly recognizing the basis
which is the tathägata, the goal emancipated from all defilements are here
summarized in terms of: [A] the emancipation ground, [B] the progressive stages of
factors aiding the emancipation process, and [C] the goal that is the culmination of

596 Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 1: 273.1 f.: skabs ’dir bral gzhi\ \bral rgyu\ \bral ’bras\ \bral bya dang bzhir shes
par bya’o\ \de la bral gzhi ni khams sam snying po ’o\ \bral rgyu ni d e ’i steng gi dri ma sbyong byed thar pa cha
mthun dge ba lam Idan gyi rnam pa ’o\ \bral ’bras ni bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po dri ma mtha ’ dag dang bral nas
yon tan mngon du gyur pa ’o\ \bral bya ni bag chags sna tshogs pa ’i kun gzhi la brten pa ’i tshogs brgyad bag chags
dang bcas p a ’o\ \ ’di dag gsang sngags Itar na\ \sbyang gzhi\ |sbyong byed\ \sbyangs ’bras\ |sbyang bya dang bzhir
grags pas ming la tha dad kyang don la geig go\\
 emancipation. Thus, chapter one concem s the ground where Clearing occurs, chapter
two elaborates on this, chapters three through seven detail the defilements that should
be cleared away, chapters eight through twenty-one delineate the means for
implementing the Clearing process, and chapter twenty-two presents the goal that is
the culmination of the Clearing process.597

This idea that the path is a Clearing process (sbyong byed) is again reminsicent of the Greek
idea of truth as unconcealment (aletheia), a central theme pf Martin Heidegger’s existential
phenomenology that is developed from the period of Being and Time onward. According to
Joseph Kockelmans, “Heidegger tries to think non-concealment in many ways. It is the free
(das Freie) of the Clearing process, which nonetheless abides in self-concealment. It is also
the neamess which brings close, while it preserves famess. It is called the dimension of all
dimensions...the region which as the open expanse (die Gegnet) lets beings be encountered
in its openness.”598 Later in Klong chen pa’s Yid bzhin mdzod, in the section of the twelfth
chapter on philosophical Systems, the author explains the superiority of Mantrayäna over
Laksanayäna in terms of the idiom of the Clearing process. The Mantrayäna schematization
of the path as a Clearing process supercedes essentialist accounts given in lower vehicles
insofar as it dispenses with the erroneous assumptions that goal-realization depends on
causal and teleological progression. Instead, it identifies the goal with the ever-present
ground - primordial knowing, buddha nature - that the path progressively lays bare. Klong
chen pa’s overview recapitulates the overall scope of the Yid bzhin mdzod, underscoring its
Mantrayäna standpoint:

Thus, in the cause-oriented [vehicle of] characteristics it is claimed that the

*sugatagarbha, our spiritual potential, exists merely as a seed and that buddhahood is
attained by making it grow through the two accumulation [of virtues and knowledge]
as conditions. It is therefore called a cause-oriented vehicle because it is held that
cause and effect follow [sequentially] one after the other.

Yid bzhin mdzod ’g rel: 453.2 f.: de la khams bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po gzhir byas te\ \thos pa dang bsam pa
ang sgom pa las byung ba ’i shes rab kyi khams kyi dri ma sbyong ba dang\ | dri ma thams cad dang bral ba ’i bras
J* de bzhin gshegs pa ’i sa ngos bzung pa rnam pa gnyis te\ \bral ba ’i gzhi dang\ \bral byed gnyen po ’i rim pa dang\
I ral ba mthar phyin p a ’i ’bras bu ’dus p a ’i phyir\ \le ’u dang por sbyang b a ’i gzhi dang\ \gnyis par d e ’i ’p hros
^s an io\ \gsum pa nas bdun p a ’i bar du sbyang b y a ’i dri ma dang\ \brgyad pa nas nyi shu rtsa geig pa i bar du
s yong byed thabs kyi rim pa dang\ \rtsa gnyis par sbyang pa mthar phyin pa ’i ’bras bu mam par gzhag pa yin no\\
598
Kockelmans 1984: 99.
 In the Mantra [vehicle], however, the spiritual quintessence (garbha : snying po) is
spontaneously and naturally present in sentient beings lacking in none of its
extensive inbom qualities. It constitutes the ground where Clearing occurs (sbyang
gzhi) which is like the shining sun. The objects to be cleared (sbyang bya) are the
eightfold ensemble [of cognitions] together with their all-ground which constitute
samsära and cover [this sun] like clouds.5" When the obscurations have been
progressively cleared away, like clouds dissolving [in the sky], through cultivating
the empowerments and the creation and completion stages600 which make up the
Clearing process (sbyong byed), temporary qualities are actualized. It is held that
thereafter, the actual all-ground (don gyi kun gzhi), i.e. the goal where obscurations
are cleared away (sbyangs ’bras), is disclosed as it is in all its luminosity, like the
sun. At this time, since the defilements that were there previously no longer exist,
and since even the name of the all-ground with its latent tendencies has vanished, the
[enduring] reality shines forth without any distinction between an earlier and a later
[state]. As the Hevajratantra [II, iv, 69] States:
Sentient beings are actually buddhas
Though [their true nature is] shrouded by adventitious obscurations.
When these obscurations clear, they are indeed buddhas.601

Here the Mantrayäna idiom of the Clearing process with its disclosive hermeneutic of
ground, path and goal relativizes all causal interpretations of the path as a linear progression
toward a temporally and existentially distant telos. The goal, always and already present as
the ground, replete with all spontaneously present qualities, discloses itself by way of an
acausal endotelic process of Clearing, bringing to light what has been implicitly present all
along. Klong chen pa’s choice of the Mantrayäna over the *Laksanayäna idiom is central to
the text’s foremost premise: that the path is not so much an extrication from... as a retum

599 In his Grub mtha ’ mdzod, Klong chen pa emphasizes the need to distinguish the all-ground of myriad latent
tendencies (bag chags sna tshogs pa ’i kun gzhi) which constitues samsäric phenomena that are to be cleared away
(sbyang bya) and undermined/reversed (Idogpa) from the genuine all-ground of one’s abiding condition (gnas lugs
don gyi kun gzhi) that is the ground where Clearing occurs (sbyang b a ’i gzhi) and which therefore cannot be
undermined/reversed (mi Idog).
600 I.e., bskyed rim and rdzogs rim.
601 Yid bzhin mdzod ’grel: 1169.4 f.: de yang rgyu mtshan las khams bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po sa bon du yod pa
tsam rkyen tshogs gnyis las gong du ’p hel bas sangs rgyas thob par ’dod pa ’i phyir rgyu ’i theg pa zhes bya ste\
Irgyu ’bras snga phyir khas len pa ’i phyir ro\ | sngags kyi snying po de sems can thams cad la rang chas Ihun grub
tu yon tan rgya chen ma tshang ba med par yod par sbyang gzhi ’i nyi ma ’dra ba nyid la\ \sbyang bya ’khor ba 'i
rang bzhin tshogs brgyad kun gzhi dang bcas pa sprin Ita bus bsgribs pa nyid[ \sbyong byed dbang dang bskyed
rdzogs bsgoms pas sprin sei ba Itar rim gyis sbyangs pas gnas skabs kyi yon tan grub nas\ |sbyangs ’bras don gyi
kun gzhi nyi ma Itar gsal ba ci bzhin pa mngon du ’g yur bar ’dod de| | de tshe sngar gyi dri ma med pas kun gzhi ’i
ming bag chags dang bcas pa log kyang don sna phyi rnam dbye med par gsal te \ \brtag gnyis las\ \sems can rnams
ni sangs rgyas nyid\ | ’on kyang glo bur dri mas bsgribs\ |de bsal na ni sangs rgyas nyid\\
 to... Emancipation presupposes an originary Clearing. On this view, soteriology is only
intelligible in light of aletheiology, the understanding of truth as unconcealment.

4.2 Yon tan rgya m tsho on Disciplines (sdom ) as Stages of Refinement

It may be useful at this juncture to briefly consider a later rNying ma interpretive

strategy, outlined in ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod and commentaries, that
emphasizes the continuity of the ethical norms of the three vehicles within a fundamentally
Mantrayäna path structure. This path structure situates Tsong kha pa’s inclusivism of
overlapping ethical norms within a Mantrayäna conception of the path as process of
progressive refinement and clarification, one inspired in no small measure by Klong chen
pa’s path summaries. In the Yon tan mdzod commentary of Yon tan rgya mtsho602, the
ethical disciplines or vows (sdom) delineated in the prätimoksa of early Buddhism advocate
an ethos of renunciation (nges ’byung), the bodhisattva discipline an ethos of helping others
(gzhan phan), and Vajrayäna discipline an ethos of pure vision (dag snang), i.e. a
transformative vision of things as they are, undistorted by exaggerations or deprecations.
The distinction between these ethical norms, he contends, should not prevent us from seeing
their essential unity and continuity. Indeed, the monastic rules (Skt. prätimoksa : Pali
pätimokkha) of early Buddhism came to serve as the ethical frameworks for all subsequent
forms of monastic Buddhism just as the altruistic bodhisattva vows served as the
indispensable foundation for both Mahāyāna and Vajrayäna practice. Considered in light of
the progressive broadening of the aspirant’s moral/spiritual horizons in the transformations
from individualism (Hinayäna) to altruism (Mahāyāna) to pure perception (Vajrayäna), the
spiritual vehicles and their ethical disciplines reflect crucial milestones or phase-transitions
along a single path.

Yon tan rgya mtsho characterizes the transition between the disciplines as a
transformation (mam 'gyur) which he likens to the process of extracting and refining

z V
on tan mdzod ’grel vol. 1: 306.4 f.: zhib tu dpyad na\ \sor sdom gyi ngo bo nges ’byung\ |byang sdom gyi ngo
o gzhan phan\ sngags sdom gyi ngo bo dag snang du ’jo g dgos pa spyir btang yin la\ |de yang nges byung tsam
ang\ \gzhan phan tsam dang\ \dag snang tsam zh ig y o d pas de dang d e ’i sdom pa mtshan nyid par mi ’g yur na
y°ngI Ibsam pa de dag gis nges par zin pa zhig dgos pas de skad ces bya ’o\ |
gold.603 The transformation from the individualistic Hinayana ethos to the altruistic
Mahāyāna ethos is likened to extracting gold-bearing ore from rock; the transformation
from altruistic aspiration to the Vajrayäna visionary ethos, whereby dualistic concepts and
activities are transmuted into primordial knowing, is compared to the refinement of the ore
to produce gold. By analogy, the path is seen as the progressive clarification and refinement
of what has been there all along, primordial knowing or buddha nature. Here
Transformation’ is used figuratively, the pertinent sense being that spiritual refinement, like
the refinement of gold, does not change what is sought (i.e. one’s natural condition, gold)
but only removes all that it is not so as to allow it to be progressively revealed. What is
eliminated in the process are the dross of individualism (HTnayäna) and excessive
intellectualism and moralism (Mahāyāna). Thus the later rNying ma Lam rim authors tended
to view the three vehicles and their associated spiritual disciplines not only as stages in the
ethical/spiritual maturation of a single individual, but also as stages in the auto-disclosure of
one’s natural condition.

603 This is o f course a common Buddhist metaphor for goal-realization. On Indian and Chinese Buddhist
developments o f this theme, see Gomez 1987.
 7 I rDzogs chen Transformations o f the Path

§1. The rD zogs chen Path W ithout Progression (bgrod du med p a fi lam)

^ Thus since all these [eight] lower vehicles are fixated on paths of effort and
H achievement by way of cause and effect, and since they do not realize Mind
;| itself as it is, they are shown to be deviations whereby one goes astray from
® the Great Perfection.604

gZhan phan mtha’ yas ’od zer,

Kun byed rgyal po ’i ’grel pa

The 12th Century Sa skya hierarch Sa paņ Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182-1251)
famously declared in his sDom gsum rab dbye that rDzogs chen Atiyoga should not be
considered a spiritual vehicle (theg pa : yäna): “While the view of Atiyoga may be
primordial knowing, it is not a vehicle. To make something that defies expression a topic of
expression is not the thinking of a wise person.”605 Various rNying ma scholars have
responded to this Charge. An interesting example is found in a compendium of replies to
questions posed by Karma Mi pham mgon po (17th c.) by the great 17th Century rDzogs chen
and Mahāmudrā master rTse le sNa tshog rang grol (b. 1608). Before responding, sNa
tshogs rang grol quotes a passage from a commentary by unidentified authors (mdzad po
mams) that explains Sa paņ’s comment: “The term ‘vehicle’ (theg pa) applies to what is like
ladder-rungs or a mount whereby one ascends from lower to higher. But in explaining
Atiyoga’ as being the royal peak of all teachings among the vehicles [and] applying the
term ‘vehicle’ with respect to what has no destination higher than itself, the words of these

un byed rgyal po 9grel: 843 f.: de Ita bu 7 9og ma 7 theg pa thams cad rgyu 9bras rtsol sgrub kyi lam la zhen pas
Sems "y id ji bzhin pa ’i don ma rtogs pas na rdzogs pa chen po las gzhan du gol ba ’i gol sar bstan pa yin te11
6°S
sDom gsum rab dbye, in Sa skya b k a ’ ’bum (Tokyo, 1968), vol. 4, no. 132: 311.4.5 f.: a ti yo g a ’i Ita ba ni\ |ye
s e$ yin gyi theg pa min\brjod bral brjod byar byas pa ni\ \mkhas p a ’i dgongs pa min zhes bya\\ On Sa paņ’s
cntique of the rDzogs chen conception o f ‘vehicle* see Karmay 1988: 147 f.. For a survey of commentaries on the
sDom gsum rab dbye, see Jackson 1983: 12-23.
rNying ma pas are [just] signs of unrefined fools and are their own fabrications (rang bzo).
For this we reprimand them.”606 sNa tshogs rang grol then replies as follows:

While Atiyoga is indeed primordial knowing, it is valid to call it a vehicle because all
other vehicles also arise from the primordial knowing that is a buddha’s awareness
(sangs rgyas kyi mkhyen p a ’i ye shes). In this case, the presence or absence of causes
for ascending higher depend on whether you are a person who has personally
experienced that vehicle [i.e. primordial knowing]. Even so, within Ati[yoga], it is
not true that there is no cause for rising higher because from Ati there is the ascent to
sPyi ti, and from sPyi ti to Yang ti [these being further subdivisions within the man
ngag sde division of Atiyoga]. Ati[yoga] is not the work of foolish rNying ma
persons because they are simply taking as authoritative the intentions of the tantric
collections that are the stainless buddha-word of Samantabhadra and Vajradhära.”607

One issue vitally relevant to the foregoing dispute but not addressed by either side was that
traditional Buddhist metaphors of spiritual progress (‘paths’, Tevels’, ‘vehicles’) had proved
singularly ill-suited to the kind of non-linear paradigm of existential disclosure that had
been developing in rDzogs chen traditions since as early as the 8th Century. My aim in this
chapter is to shed light on the development and momentous impact of this paradigm.
Toward this end, it is important to stipulate at the outset that classical rNying ma
path interpretations need to be considered not only against the background of Indian path
formulations found in the canonical sütras and tantras, but also in light of contrarian
conceptions of the path that had been endemic to rDzogs chen discourses from early on.
There the nature of the rDzogs chen path is couched in language fundamentally distinct
from the progressivist paradigm of Mahāyāna Buddhism, but also at variance with the
antinomian language one encounters in general Vajrayäna traditions that propose a rapid
path (myur lam), a short cut (nyer lam), a path of desires (chags lam) that makes use of the
very passions and adversities of human life that the Mahāyānist seeks to avoid or counteract.

606 Dri ba snga phyi tha dad m dzadpa 7 dri lan thor bu 7 skor, in Tsibri spar ma vol. 26: 582.1 f.: theg pa zhes pa 7
sgra ni ’og nas gong du spor du yod pa ’i stegs sam zhon pa Ita bu la ’ju g la\ | a ti yo ga ni theg pa ’i chos thams cad
kyi rtse rgyal yin par bshad na de las gong du bgrod sa med pa la theg pa ’i ming sbyar ba ni rnying ma rnams brda
la ma byang ba ’i blun rtags dang rang bzo yin par bka ’ bkyon mdzad ring\
607 Ibid. 582.5 f.: a ti yo ga ni ye shes kyang ’os yin te\ \theg pa gzhan thams cad kyang sangs rgyas kyi mkhyen pa ’i
ye shes las byung ba dang\ \ ’dir gong du spor rgyu yod med ni theg pa de nyams su len pa po la ’ang rag mod\ |a ti
las gong du spor rgyu med pa ma yin te\ | a ti nas spyi ti\ \spyi ti nas yang ti spar du yod pa dang| | lar yang a ti lo
theg pa ’i ming sbyar ba ’di rnying ma ’i gang zag blun po rnams kyis byas pa ma yin te\ \kun bzang rdo rje ’chang gi
bka ’ dri ma med pa ’i rgyud sde ’i dgongs pa sor bzhag yin phyirj
By contrast, rDzogs chen sources cast doubt on the very definition of the path itself by
calling into question the tacit assumptions of progression and effort common to all Buddhist
path conceptions hitherto proposed, Vajrayäna notwithstanding. The 10th Century rNying ma
scholar Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po has summarized these developments as follows:

This [rDzogs chen tradition] is called the unsurpassed highest summit of all paths. In
this regard, the śrāvakas’ freedom comes about through emancipation from causes
and conditions. Their contemplation involves dwelling in States having objective
references. The pratyekabuddhas’ freedom comes about through emancipation from
the path of speech. Their contemplation involves dwelling in a kind of ineffable
reality. Mahāyānists’ freedom comes about through the jñãna divested of conceptual
fabrications of subject and object. Their contemplation involves entering into the
expanse of phenomena that is exceedingly and thoroughly pure. As for the Mantra
system: it is in the inseparability of both aspects of freedom and contemplation that
one discovers the experience of the three diamond-like aspects [i.e. samädhis]. Now
all these [systems] depend on progression and evolution. But here [in the Great
Perfection], we don’t establish anything like that: since that which is devoid of
progression is supreme among paths, it is called the highest summit of all vehicles.

The path espoused in rDzogs chen works is variously called an effortless path (rtsol
med kyi lam), a spontaneous path (Ihun gyis grub p a ’i lam), a path without cause (rgyu med
pa’i lam), a path without destination (phyin du med p a ’i lam), a supreme path (lam chen po),
a genuine path (yang dag p a ’i lam), and a self-unfolding path (rang 'gros kyi lam). It is
qualified as a path of primordial knowing (ye shes Jcyi lam) or open awareness (rig pa i lam)
as distinct from the wayward paths of dualistic mind. It is a path of the basic expanse
(dbyings kyi lam), a path of luminosity ( ’od gsal kyi lam). The rDzogs chen path is further
paraphrased as a “supreme path that spontaneously unfolds without having to search for it
(brtsal ba myed par Ihun gyis grub p a ’i lam chen po), a “supreme extraordinary path of
natural great perfection” (rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen p o ’i thun mong ma yin pa i lam chen
P° ), and most frequently as a “path without progression” (bsgrod du med p a ’i lam).

Theg pa chen po ’i tshul la ’ju g pa, Rong zom gsung ’bum vol. 1: 473.23 f.: de bas na lam thams cad kyi yang rtse
bla na myed pa zhes bya ’o\ | de la nyan thos rnam kyi rnam par grol ba ni\ \rgyu dang rkyen dang bral ba las skyes
PaI Iting ne ’dzin ni dmigs pa dang bcas pa ’i sa la gnas pa\ \rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi rnam par grol ba ni\ \ngag
gi lam dang bral ba las skyes pa\ \ting nge ’dzin ni brjod du myed pa ’i chos kyi tshul la gnas pa\ \theg pa chen po i
rnam par grol ba ni\ \gzung ba dang ’dzin pa ’i rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba ’i ye shes las skyes pa\ \ting nge dzin
ni shin tu rnam par dag pa ’i chos kyi dbyings la spyod pa\ \gsang sngags kyi tshul ni\ \mam par grol ba dang ting
nge ’dzin gnyi ’ ka dbyer myed par] \rdo rje Ita bu rnam pa gsum gyi nyams rnyed pa ces ’byung na\ \de dag thams
cad ni bgrod cing ’byung ba la Itos pa yin la\ \ ’dir de Ita bu gang yang mi sgrub ste | | bgrod du myed pa nyid lam gyi
mchog yin p as\ \de ’/ phyir na theg pa thams cad kyi yang rtse zhes bya ’o\ \
 One could endlessly eite passages in rDzogs chen tantras and oral literature
describing this path without progression, but I will limit my discussion to a few illustrative
examples. This idea of a path devoid of progression appears to have its roots in contrarian
path conceptions advanced in early rDzogs chen texts of the Royal Dynastie Period
belonging to the Mind Genre (sems sde).6™It subsequently becomes a central theme of the
Kun byed rgyal po (All-Creative Monarch), an important and highly influential rDzogs chen
tantra of the Mind Genre (sems sde) that represents a later synthesis of this system. It
receives further elaboration in sNying thig tantras and oral instructions that become
increasingly influential in Central Tibet from the twelfth Century onward. A concise
summary of its meaning is given in the following passage ascribed to Padmasambhava:

The heart of all paths is summarized as a “path without progression”. Other paths are
transient and impermanent. The path of spiritual awakening has nothing to do with
progression - it is the very essence of the awakened mind. When one realizes the
meaning of the nonduality of the never-erring empty expanse that is authentic reality
and primordial knowing that is luminous, there is no more travelling or progression
on what is commonly called a ‘path’. When one thus deeply understands what is
meant by no more coming nor going, then the very nature of what what we call
‘vehicles’, ‘levels’ or ‘paths’ is without any concrete foundation. Devoid of doing
something, it is like a diamond and is thus known as indestructible buddhahood.
When one realizes what is meant in this way, this is called probing to the heart of all
paths.610

The Kun byed rgyal po repeatedly characterizes rDzogs chen as a path without progression.
A chapter of the work devoted to this non-progressive path declares that because aw akened

mind (byang chub sems) is naturally present as a depth dimension of experience, it has

609 Such ideas abound in the five earlier Sems sde tantras. The Khyung chen Iding ba, Tk vol. 1: 421.1: for example
criticizes “those who set out on a path where there is no path” (lam med lam du ju g pa rnams). The rTsal che
sprugs pa Tk vol. 1: 423.6 proclaims that there is “no path for arriving [anywhere]” (phyin p a ’i lam med). The Mi
nub rgyal mtshan, Tk vol. 1: 426.3 f. compares one who would travel a path to a bli».d man trying to grab hold of
space: the sphere o f buddhahood has no destination to be discovered by searching for it just as space has no limit to
be reached by grasping.
6,0 Zhal gdams dmar khrid don bsdus thugs kyi phreng ba in Bla ma dgongs ’dus (Gangtok ed.) vol. 5: 835.3 f.: lam
thams cad kyi gnad ni\ \bsgrod du med pa ’i lam du ’dus payin\ \lam gzhan ni ’gyur zhing mi rtag pa ’o\ \byang chub
kyi lam la bsgrod du med de| | byang chub kyi sems kyi ngo bo de| |yang dag pa ’i don phyin ci ma log par stong pa ’i
dbyings\ |gsal ba ’i ye shes gnyis su med pa ’i don la ’ju g pa ’i don rtogs'1dus na\ \lam zhes bya bar ’g ro ba dang
bsgrod du med p a ’o\ \de Itar ’g ro ’ong med p a 'i don rtogs p a ’i dus na\ \theg p a sa lam zhes bya b a ’i chos nyid
dngos po ’i gzhi med pa de| | bya ba med pa rdo rje Ita bu\ | j’ig pa med pa ’i sangs rgyas zhes bya ste| | de Ita bu ’i don
rtogs na lam thams cad gnad du tshud pa zhes bya ’o\ | a don pa ’i rtogs corrected to don rtogs on basis o f Bla ma
dgongs ’dus (mTsham brag ed.) vol. 7: 497.5.
 nothing to do with a path leading somewhere eise (gzhan du bgrod p a ’i lam) or to some
fixed destination. The text goes on to say:

The path of progression is described as five-fold or three-fold611.

To claim that one arrives [somewhere] by travelling on it
Is to claim one attains a result [or goal] from a cause.
This is incompatible with the rDzogs chen [path] devoid of progression.612

In his commentary on this passage, gZhan phan mtha’ yas ’od zer explains that all
progressivist models of the path presuppose that the goal, buddhahood, is extraneous to
one’s existence and therefore wrongly construe its realization in terms of attaining
something new or unprecedented through deliberations based on erroneous presuppositions
of causal progression:

The supposition that one arrives at the goal, the level of buddhahood, by travelling on
these paths that have lower and higher stages is a system of asserting that the goal
reached by means of these [paths] comprised of vehicles predicated on [the
relationship between] cause and effect is attained as something new and
unprecedented. It is thus incompatible with the sense that the fundamental nature of
Great Perfection is without progression and hence constitutes a contradiction. For
this reason, [the Kun byed rgyal po] declares that there is no need to travel on the
path of Great Perfection - and even if one could traverse it, there would be nowhere
to arrive.613

After illustrating how the strained efforts necessary to make progress along these lower
*Laksanayäna and Mantrayäna only lead one away and astray from naturally occurring
primordial knowing, the ever-present ground and goal, the tantra advises:

Don’t travel the path in this way!

Were you to travel a path based on ignorance,

As gZhan phan mtha’ yas States, these are the five Laksanayâna paths o f accumulation (tshogs lam), application
(sbyor lam), meditation (sgom lam), seeing (mthong lam) and no more leaming (mi slob pa i lam) and the three
Paths described in the context o f Mantrayäna - view (Ita ba), meditation (sgom) and conduct (spyod pa). Kun byed
rSyalpo ’g rel pt. vol. 2 in NyKs vol. 106: 734 f..
Tk vol. 1, ch. 51: 148.3 f.: ... de Ita bus bgrod pa ’i lam ni Inga dang gsum bstan te\ \de la bgrod nas phyin par
dodpa ni\ \rgyu las ’bras bu thob par ’dod pa yin\ \rdzogs chen bgrod pa med dang mi mthun te\...
Kun byed rgyal po ’g rel pt. 2, in NyKs, vol. 106: 734.5 f.: ...gong ’og rim pa can gyi lam de la bgrod pas bras
w sangs rgyas kyi sar phyin par ’dod pa ni rgyu dang ’bras bu yi theg pa can rnams kyis bras bu sngon med gsar
u thob par ’dod pa ’i lugs yin pa ’i phyir na rdzogs pa chen po ’i chos nyid bgrod du med pa don dang mi mthun te
gal bar gyur pa yin pa ’i phyir rdzogs pa chen po ’i chos nyid bgrod du med pa ’i don dang mi mthun te gal bar gyur
P° yin pa ’i phyir na rdzogs pa chen po ’i lam la bgrod mi dgos la\ \gal te bgrod par byas kyang phyin du med par
gsungs teI...
 You would never arrive [anywherel, never attain realization.
By travelling, you never reach the state of buddhahood.
Buddhahood is your own mind free from conceptualization.
By travelling, you don’t arrive at your own concept-free mind.614

Summarizing the chapter, gZhan phan mtha’ yas concludes:

Thus since all phenomena that appear, being of the essence of Mind itself as Gre
Perfection (sems nyid rdzogs pa chen po), are already buddhahood that
primordially and spontaneously present without having to search for it, there is sa
to be no progression on any path apart from that.615

All paths leading away from the spontaneous way of naturally occurring primordi
knowing are alike in deriving from dualistic mind (sems) and its deliberative schemes. B
these only obscure the natural simplicity and sovereignty which dualistic mind is prone
lose sight of and to obscure:

It is said that if you directly recognize this naturally occurring primordial knowin
Mind itself, the All-Creative Monarch, you regain complete sovereignty over tl
everlasting kingdom of dharmakäya, Samantabhadra. [But] if you do not direct
recognize it, you will not be free however much you may exert yourself by way <
the paths of the lower vehicles.616

That the rDzogs chen path unfolds effortlessly and spontaneously precisely when no long
obstructed by willful interference is proclaimed in a rDzogs chen tantra of the Esoter
Guidance Genre (man ngag gi sde) entitled Nam mkha ’ klong yangs kyi rgyud:

Through strained efforts on a path of doing something,

Naturally occurring spiritual awakening (byang chub) is obstructed.
Hence this primordial knowing, an awareness that comes effortlessly,
Is declared to be true primordial knowing as the path.617

6UKun byed rgyal po ’g rel vol. 1, in NyKs vol. 105: 149.2 f.: ...de bas lam la bgrod par ma byed cig\ \gal te ma /
lam la bgrod gyur na\ \phyin pa ’i dus med rtogs thob dus med te\ \bgrod pa sangs rgyas sa ru phyin pa med\ \san
rgyas rang sems rtog pa bral ba yin\ | bgrod pas rang sems rtog bral der mi phyin\ \
615 Kun byed rgyal po ’g rel pt. 2, in NyKs, vol. 106: 734 f.: 'di Itar snang ba ’i chos thams cad sems nyid rdzogs
chen po ’i ngo bor ma btsal ye nas Ihun gyis grub par sangs rgyas zin pas de las gzhan du lam la bgrod du med
’di gsungs so 11
616 Kun byed rgyal po ’g rel pt. 2, in NyKs, vol. 106: 357.6 f.: .. .kun byed rgyal po sems nyid rang byung gi ye sh
’di nyid rang ngo shes na kun bzang chos sku ’i gtan srid la rang dbang ’byor bar ’g yur la de nyid ngo ma shes
theg pa ’og ma ’i lam gyis ’bad rtsol j i tsam byas kyang mi grol bar gsungs pa ’o\|
617 Tk vol. 7: 132.2 f.: bya byed lam gyi ’bad rtsol gyis\ \rang byung byang chub 'gegs yin pas\ \shes pa rtsol med
shes 'di\ \lam gyi ye shes dam par gsungs\ \
 A similar view is echoed in the sPros bral don gsal chen po ’i rgyud which goes so far as to
characterize soteriological striving as a kind of sickness, reiterating a theme emphasized in
the eighteen Mind Genre (sems sde) scriptures618:

Those who proceed on a path [where] no path exists are victims of the great illness of
the path. Wanting to get somewhere, they are like deer chasing a mirage [in search of
water]. Therefore, this is not a certain path. The implicit order of things (<dgongs pa)
with nothing to add or remove [and] which is fully present as a path without
Progression is the one great infallible path of certainty. By travelling by means of
effort [to reach] awakened mind - the ultimate reality devoid of progression one
remains far from the boundary of primordial knowing. By striving to enter the path
of primordial knowing of self-awareness where there is nothing to enter, one falls
into the boundary [Situation] of suffering.619

The tantra goes on to specify the essence, definition, Classification and analogies of the path:

The essence of the path shown by me [Vajradhära]

Is the yoga not subject to construction or Separation.
Conceming the etymology of the path:
It is called ‘path’ because one remains on it without separating from it [and]
Without [having to] travel and proceed somewhere eise.
Its Classification is two-fold:
A cause-determined path and a goal-sustained certain path.
Conceming its examples, [the former] is similar to a path in the world.
As for the illustrative example of the effortless path,
It is like the great garuda soaring in the sky.620

See for example the Khyung chen Iding ba (counted as on of the five earlier (snga Inga) Sems sde tantras), Tk
vol. 1: 420.7 f.: bde ba chen po ’dodpas chags pas nadyin te\ \mi g.yo rang bzhin gnas pa ’i sman chen ma byas na\
\mtho ris bgrodpa ’i rgyu des nyon mongs zin par ’gyur lam med lam du ’ju g pa rnams kyi nad che ba\ \phyin par
od pas ri dags smig rgyu snyeg pa ’dra\ \rnyed pa ’i yul med ’ju g rten gsum las yong mi ’byung\ \sa bcur Itos pa i
gnas kyang byang chub sgrib pa yin\ |shin tu myur b a ’i ye shes bsam pa kun dang bral\\ Compare with similar
passage from Spros bral don gsal and Thig le kun gsal in the following footnote.
Tb vol. 13: 226.6 f.: I here follow the corrected version o f this passage from the Thig le kun gsal (Tb vol. 13:
4-1 f.) which (as previously noted) appears to be an abridged version o f the Spros bral don gsal: lam med lam du
Jug pa rnams lam gyi nad che ba\ \phyin par ’dod pas ri dags smig rgyu snyeg* ’dra\ \de bas nges pa i lam ma yin\
8^°d med lam la rab gnas pa ’i\ \ ’du ’bral med pa ’i dgongs p a la | | ma nor nges pa ’i lam chen cig\ \bgrod du med
Pu i chos nyid byang chub sems\ \rtsol bas bgrod pas ye shes mtha ’ las ring\ \ ’ju g tu med do rang rig ye shes lam\
\ jug pa i rtsol bas sdug bsngal mtha ’ ru lhung\... *sPros bral don gsal: smig rgyu rgyu ba; b *sPros bral don gsal:
las.

Tb vol. 13: 228.2 f.: ngas bstan lam gyi ngo bo ni\ | ’du ’bral med pa ’i m al ’byoryin\ \lam gyi nges tshig bstan pa
\gzhan du bgrod cing ’ju g tu mect\ \mi ’bral gnas pas lam zhes bya\ \dbye ba rnam pa gnyis yin te\ \rgyu yi lam
ong bras bu nges p a ’i lam\ \dpe ni ’jig rten lam dang ’dra\ \rtsol bral lam gyi mtshon dpe ni\ \mkha la khyung
c en Iding ba ’dra\\ * Thig le kun gsal: ’j u g pa dang
Rong zom pa clarifies that the supreme path not travelled is nothing and nowhere apart from
the act of existing itself as a condition of ontological freedom:

[The supreme path] is not a matter of attaining an extraneous goal by training on an

extraneous path, as is the case with the lower spiritual vehicles. The fact that all
sentient beings are already of its nature and simply remain in this freedom naturally
is what we call the “supreme path”. Anyone who in becoming attuned to this deeply
understands and gains conviction in it and is thus equal to glorious Vajrasattva or
Samantabhadra is said to be “free in freedom” or to be “buddha again”.621

The problem of ‘finding freedom’, the goal of all lesser Buddhist paths, is resolved in the
recognition that human beings do not have freedom but fundamentally are free; freedom is
not an attribute of a subject, not something we have, but the ontological precondition of
human existence.
From these illustrative passages, we can formulate five propositions about the
rDzogs chen path and indicate their implications for later rNying ma path formulations: (1)
The path is endogenous: since it is found nowhere apart from existence and is only
d/scovered to the extent that all that obscured it has cleared, it does not depend on
extraneous means or ends as in the cause-determined vehicles. (2) It is self-emergent: since
it is not already there for us to follow but emerges in our going along, it is different from
linear representations of the path which abstract from lived space and time, relocating the
path in an idealized representational space. (3) It is spontaneous and effortless: since it arises
effortlessly, it does not require deliberative action, viz. the accumulation of virtues and
knowledge advocated by Mahāyāna. (4) It is non-discursive: because it discloses one’s
natural condition in its unmodified simplicity only when mentalistic-linguistic proliferations
have subsided, it supercedes the mind-forged path-models adhered to by the lower vehicles.
(5) It is endotelic: since the path is the self-disclosure of an ever-present goal, it is in no
sense predetermined, having no pre-established point of departure, no trajectory and no
destination. In short, the rDzogs chen path as a process of existential disclosure is neither

621 Theg pa chen p o ’i tshul la ju g p a , Rong zom gsung 'bum (Thimpu ed.): 276.5 f.: [don de nyidkho na lam chen
po yin te\] theg pa ’og ma Itar lam gzhan la sbyangs pas\ | ’bras bu gzhan thob pa ni ma yin te\ \de ’i rang bzhin du
sems can thams cad rang bzhin gyis grol ba nyid du gnas pa ni lam chen po zhes bya\ | de nyid rnal ’byor gyi skyes
bu gang gis rtogs shing rdeng du gyur pas\ \dpal rdo rje sems dpa ’ ’am kun tu* bzang po dang mnyam par gyur pa
ni grol ba grol zhes kyang bya\ \yang sangs rgyas zhes kyang bya ste\ ...atext: du. See also ibid. (507.12) where Rong
zom States that “claiming to progress on the stages of the path constitutes a deviation from the path of no
Progression.” . ..lam gyi rim pa la bgrod par ’dod pas\ \bgrod du m edpa ’i lam las gol bar gyur pa ni\ ...
instrumental (pursued as a means toward an end) nor teleocratic (channeled toward a pre-
established end); it is a path that is forged in the going, without one knowing precisely
where or even why one is going. It is in this sense a “path without progression”.

This brief overview of rDzogs chen non-progressivist path conceptions casts light on
how the presentational path of primordial knowing becomes the animating principle of all
rNying ma path hermeneutics. The problem of reconcilin'g *Laksanayäna and Mantrayäna
here gives way to the problem of accommodating a path espousing purposive progression to
an effortless rDzogs chen path that spontaneously unfolds precisely when the willful
deliberations of dualistic mind have ceased. How is this accommodation possible? The key
to addressing this question lies in Klong chen pa’s definition of the path, cited earlier, as the
progressive familiarization with ever-present primordial knowing that reveals itself to the
extent that the turbulence of mind and its mental operations has come to rest. This
familiarization is understood as the disclosure of an unconditioned mode of being and
awareness that is nonetheless a precondition for all the conceptual representations that flow
and follow from it. This path as a disclosive Clearing process is not to be confused with the
linear schemes used to represent it. To do so is to confuse the map with the territory.
 §2. W here the Ladder Ends: A Path Beyond its R epresentations

The ladder urges us beyond ourselves. Hence its importance.

But in a void, where do we place it?

Edmond Jabès,
The Book of Questions: Volume II

Were one to read only the Mahāyāna chapters of rNying ma path summaries such as
the Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel, Yid bzhin mdzod and Yon tan mdzod, one could be forgiven for
presuming that these works endorse a staunchly gradualist approach to the Buddhist path.
Indeed, Klong chen pa devotes several pages of his Yid bzhin mdzod autocommentary to
arguing, with scriptural support from a wide ränge of sütras and tantras, why it is necessary
to follow the stages of the path in their proper order and why it is detrimental to not do so.622
It is only in the later tantric chapters of these path summaries, however, that the inherent
limitations of progressivist paradigms and the way beyond them are made clear. There is
perhaps no better example of this shift in perspective than in the author’s Sems nyid ngal gso
'grel, specifically in the contrast it draws between path models presented in the earlier
Mahāyāna and later rDzogs chen chapters of the text. At the beginning of the sixth chapter
on “Taking Refuge” Klong chen pa concisely summarizes why it is essential for the
beginner to follow the path in step-by-step fashion without omitting any stages:

One should train in the path of liberation in a gradual manner. Why is that? Because
[1] it does not make sense to [try] to proceed by skipping steps (thod rgal du), [2]
you certainly won’t be able to attain the higher qualities of the path if you haven’t
elicited the lower ones, and [3] you won’t be be able to arrive at the higher [levels] if
you don’t ascend step-by-step. As the Buddha stated in the Mahāparinirvānasūtra:
Just as my profound teaching
Is like the rungs on a ladder,
So too we should strive and leam step-by-step;
It is not by skipping steps that we reach the top!623

622 Yid bzhin mdzod ’g rel: 604.5 f..

623 Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 1: 421.5 f.: ...thar p a ’i lam la rim gyis bslab par bya\ \ci’i phyir na zhe na thod
rgal du ’ju g par mi rigs pa ’i phyir te\ \lam gyi yon tan ’og ma ma skyes par gong ma thob par mi nus pa nyid dang\
With this passage, Klong chen pa defends the type of gradualist, step-by-step approach to
liberation that was most famously championed by Kamalaśila in the context of the bSam yas
Debate. However, in the tenth chapter of the text, where the rDzogs chen realization of
one’s abiding condition (gnas lugs) is introduced, Klong chen pa movingly describes how
this progressivist model of the path breaks down precisely at the point where the
subjectivizing and objectifying mode of thinking on which it has depended loses its hold:

Previously, you relied on the gradation of paths and levels leading from lower to
higher like the rungs on a ladder by way of well-ordered stages and sequences of
view, meditation and conduct. You also strove to acquaint your mind with how these
yogas unfold from lower to higher. [But] in this present moment, the ground and root
of mind has gone and given way to equality [of all that is]. So now there are no
familiar points of reference and here there are no willful deliberations. Like a
drunkard soused on beer, you don’t grasp for whatever occurs. Like a young child,
you also don’t identify with what appears. Since the orderly sequence in terms of the
stages of ‘doing something’ no longer exists, there is only openness, naturalness and
vastness. Since there is no longer [any] frame of reference, the overarching unity in
which habitual grasping has been transcended, and opposing elements have
collapsed, arises within oneself.624

For Klong chen pa, this breaking point, this sense of losing one’s bearings as familiar
frames of reference fall away, marks not the end of the path but the entry into an immediacy
prior to its representation. Put another way, the vanishing point of the path of mind is the
starting point of the path of primordial knowing. The root text describes it as an experience
not unlike being lost, with nowhere and nothing to tum to, an experience in which familiar
landmarks and seemingly stable certainties and identities are all suddenly swept away. Yet it
is this precisely this loss of one’s customary sense of seif and world that makes way for a
more primordial kind of intelligibility and certitude. As Klong chen pa the poet expresses
this experience in his root text:

\rim pas ma ’jogs par gong du phyin par mi nus pa ’i phyir te\ \mya ngan las ’das pa ’i mdo las\ {ji Itar skas kyi rim
Pa bzhin\ \ngayi bstan pa zab moyang\ \rim gyis bslab cing nan tan bya\ \thod rgal ma yin mthar chags so||
Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 2: 167.2 f.: sngon Ita sgom spyod p a ’i go rims dang khrigs shin tu legs pas sa lam
gong og gi rim pa skas yi gdang bu Ita bu la brten zhing\ \rnal ’byor gong 'og gi skye tshul la blo goms dris su
oyedpa rnams dus ’dir sems kyi gzhi rtsa stor ba dang mnyam du stor bas\ \da ni gang la ’ang gtad so dang dir
rSyag med de\ \ji Itar sharyang ’dzin pa m edpa smyon pa chang gis bzi ba Ita bu dang\ |snang la os gzung m edpa
u °hung Ita bu dang\ \bya c h a ’i rim pa rnams la khrigs su med pas phyal pa dang\ \lhug pa dang\ \yengs pa dang\
\gtad so med pas zhe ’dzin las ’das par phyam geig pa ste ya cha ba ’i rnam pa zhig bdag la shar ba ni\...
 Having reached the primordial state flawless as the sky,
There is no place to retum to - so where do I go now?
Having found this point of resolution, there’s nowhere to arrive.
But where am I now that I am not seen by anyone?
If you know this, you no longer need anything eise.
Those who are free like me have cut through error.
I have no questions now; the ground and root of mind is gone.
There is no frame of reference, no grasping, no certainty, no ‘this is it’.
There is only openness, fullness, immensity and unity.
Having realized it in this way, now I sing:
I, Flawless Sunrays625, have shown this by dawning and have gone.626

Without discounting the orienting narratives used to facilitate the ascertainment of

the abiding condition (gnas lugs gtan la dbab pa), the rDzogs chen approach nonetheless
gives primacy to the primordial space of knowing that prefigures all schemes imposed on it.
This gnoseological standpoint provides Klong chen pa with an interpretive framework for
reconciling the linear teleological and nonlinear endotelic paths: although the individual
must initially rely on stages of leaming (lam rim) and aspire intellectually and ethically
toward invariant modes of being and awareness (sku dang ye shes), this abiding mode
increasingly takes over as mind’s obscuring superimpositions, including the heuristic
fictions of paths and levels, fall away. It is precisely at this point where the elaborate
architecture of mind falls apart that primordial awareness reveals itself. In soteriological
terms, this breaking point marks the transition from the progressive paths of mind to the
non-traversable path of primordial knowing, a path that is simply the living present, having
no pre-established starting point, route or destination.

625 I.e., Dri med ’od zer, one o f the author’s many names.
626 Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel vol. 2: 165.3 f.: mkha ’ bzhin dri med gdod ma ’i ngang du phyin\ \ldog pa 7 gnas med da
ni gang du ’gro\ |zad sar thug sie 'ong ba 'ga’yang med\ |mv kyang mi mthong kho bo gang na ’dug\ \de nyid shes
na gzhan zhig gdos mi ’g yur] |grol ba rnams ni nga bzhin ’khrul pa chad\ \da ni mi ’dri sems kyi gzhi rtsa stor\ \gtad
med ’dzin med nges med ’di yin med\ \phyal pa Ihug pa yengs pa phyam geig pa\ | ’d i Itar rtogs nas da ni glu len te\
\dri med ’od zer shar bas bstan nas song\\
 Section Two

Texts and Translations

1. Klong chen p a ’s Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan

§1.1 Introductory Remarks:

The Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan (Sems ye dris lan) is a short treatise contained in Klong chen
rab ’byams pa’s (1308-1363) Miscellaneous Writings (gSung thor bu)627 that is devoted to clarifying
the central rNying ma distinction between sems and ye shes. Composed at the behest o f Klong chen
pa’s foremost Student and biographer Chos grags bzang po (14th c.), it offers a concise but very lucid
response to the latter’s question(s) concem ing this distinction. The Sems ye dris lan synthesizes and
builds on arguments for the mind/primordial knowing distinction advanced in the author’s Shing rta
chen po (Great Chariot; hereafter Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel), a lengthy auto-commentary on the Sems
nyid ngal gso (Relaxing in Mind itself), the first o f the root texts in the author’s Ngal gso skor gsumm
(Trilogy on Relaxation). The result is a penetrating and systematic investigation into the nature and
scope o f the distinction that calls attention to its far-reaching implications for understanding and
directly realizing rNying ma view ( Ita ba) and meditation (sgom pa).

A survey of Klong chen pa’s extant writings confirms that the accounts o f the sems/ye shes
difference found in the Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel and Sems ye dris lan predate Klong chen pa’s
reception o f the rDzogs chen sNying thig (Heart Essence) teachings and constitute preliminary and
exoteric treatments o f a topic that would be a matter o f abiding interest to the author throughout his
lifetime. Viewed in relation to Klong chen pa’s esoteric treatments o f the mind/primordial knowing
distinction, Sems ye dris lan should therefore be regarded as a relatively early contribution to a
complex subject that he would retum to again and again in his writings. By situating the distinction
within the broader framework o f Buddhist doctrine and praxis, Klong chen pa is able to employ it as
a kind o f hermeneutical key for understanding the nature and import o f the Buddhist path in its
entirety, a path consisting in the progressive disclosure o f primordial knowing. Thus the chief
importance o f the Sems ye dris lan lies in its concise and systematic overview o f the formative
elements o f classical rNying ma doctrine from a scholar-practitioner who did more than anyone to
define its character and determine its direction. Because it encapsulates many o f the key doctrinal
elements o f the classical rNying ma system, it is worth shedding some light on its genesis, form and
content.

In literary form, the Sems ye dris lan is a classic example o f the Response to Questions (Dris
lan) genre o f Tibetan scholastic literature629. Though we have no way o f knowing the precise
question or questions to which Klong chen pa composed this response, a short passage from the
Chos ’byung o f sMyo tshul mkhan po (1932-1999) indicates that the proper understanding and

627 On the two extant editions of Klong chen pa’s gSung thor bu, see bibliography. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to the Sems ye dris lan and gSung thor bu refer to the A ’dzom ’brug pa chos dgar edition.
628 For an annotated translation of the three root texts o f the trilogy, see Guenther 1975-6.
629 Works designated as dris lan are found in many of the collected writings o f Tibetan masters o f all Orders. There
has to date been no systematic study o f this genre. Works designated as dris lan in many cases consist of a question
or series of questions followed by the teacher’s replies as recorded for posterity by someone present. The Sems ye
dris lan exemplifies another, less common, type which consists in an author’s systematic written response to such
question(s).
realization o f the mind/primordial knowing distinction was a matter o f central concem to both
Student and teacher - one that played a formative role in their spiritual relationship:

Chos grags bzang po developed an unshakeable faith in the great Omnicient One. When
Klong chen pa questioned him about the difference between mind and primordial knowing,
his erudition... eam ed the master’s praise. Klong chen pa in tum gave extensive answers to
his student’s questions about mind and primordial knowing and discussed the Classification
o f ground, path and goal. With this, the uncontrived conviction that his guru was truly a
buddha arose in Chos grags bzang po, and he bowed at Klong chen pa’s feet, begging to be
taken under his care.630

The work was composed at a relatively early period o f the author’s literary career, probably during
the author’s eight year tenure at the seminary ( bshad grwa) o f gSang pu (famous for its rigorous
curriculum o f Buddhist logic and epistemology) where Klong chen pa took up residence at age nineteen.
It was here that he first met Chos grags bzang po who would become his foremost disciple and successor
in maintaining the rDzogs chen sNying thig lineage. On the basis o f textual analysis and comparison, the
Sems ye dris lan can be chronologically placed some time after Klong chen pa had completed at least the
first part o f his Ngal gso skor gsum, namely the Sems nyid ngal gso and its two auto-commentaries, and
before his introduction by his root teacher Kumārāja/dza to the sNying thig system631. The place o f its
composition, as we leam from the colophon, is Gangs ri thod dkar (‘White Capped Mountain’), site o f the
cave hermitage Orgyan rdzong where the majority o f Klong chen pa’s writings were committed to
writing. The hermitage is located about 500 meters above Shug gseb, today a flourishing nunnery with
about 250 inhabitants that is a two hour road joumey ffom gSang pu monastery and on a slope
overlooking the sKyid chu river valley.

Like many o f the author’s other works, the subject matter o f the Sems ye dris lan is thematically
structured according to the three basic categories o f ground, path and goal. The first section sets out to
elucidate how primordial awareness is ever-present as the ground o f being (gzhi) - our abiding, existential
condition (gnas lugs, yin lugs) — despite its being obscured by adventitious cognitive-emotional
defilements. The next section proceeds to clarify how this implicit mode o f being and awareness is
disclosed through a path (lam) o f familiarization with it in which nonideational forms o f meditation

Pang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po ’i chos ’byung rig ’dzin brgyud pa ’i rnam thar Ngo mtshar nor bu bai du rya
phreng ba, vol. 2: 46b.5 f.. See English translation by Barron 2005: 358 which is here altered slightly for sake of
consistency.
This teacher introduced Klong chen pa to the Seventeen Tantras that are quoted no where in the first two parts of
J e trilogy (Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, bSam gtan ngal gso ’grel). The third part, however, contains a few quotations
°m lbis corpus, e.g. Rig pa rang shar in sGyu ma ngal gso ’grel, in Ngal gso skor gsum vol. 2 : 600.1 and rDo rje
sems dpa snying gi me long: 624.6. However, Wangchuk proposes that the bSam gtan ngal gso grel may have been
composed after sGyu ma ngal gso ’grel (although the author assigns it to the second part of the trilogy in his general
commentary) because the former refers to the latter. See Wangchuk 2008: 213 f.. The supposition that the second
^nd third parts were written after the first is supported by the occurrence o f references to the Sems nyid ngal gso
grel in both bSam gtan ngal gso ’g rel and sGyu ma ngal gso ’g rel.
1 here draw on David Fontana’s useful distinction between meditation with ideation and meditation, on which see
Montana 2007.
play a crucial role. The third and final section discusses how goal-realization ( ’bras bu), the full
disclosure o f primordial awareness (ye shes) and its spiritual embodiments (sku), occurs once the
discursive proliferations of mind and mental factors have ceased.

Central to Klong chen pa’s elucidation and justification o f the distinction is the doctrine of
buddha nature which he considers to be the last and highest o f the three teachings o f buddha-dharma in
India. We will therefore conclde this introduction with a concise overview o f the author’s position on this
important topic.

* Klong chen pa’s hermeneutics of the three tumings

Given Klong chen pa’s emphasis on the primacy o f primordial knowing and his construal of
the path as the Clearing o f what obscures it, it is not suprising that in his interpretation o f the so-
callcd three tumings of the wheel o f the dharma (dharmacakrä), the meditative practices o f de-
identification formulated in second tuming teachings on emptiness and no seif are considered to be
o f merely provisional meaning (drang don) or in need o f further interpretation. On the other hand,
those third tuming teachings that emphasize one’s natural condition (yin lugs), primordial knowing,
buddha nature are taken as definitive (nges don)633. In his Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel, Klong chen pa
outlines his position on the three tumings:

Those who put on false airs and who are blind-folded by the golden veil o f wrong view s tum
their back on the intended meanings o f sütras and tantras that are o f definitive meaning.
They declare that what is o f quintessential meaning is o f provisional meaning and that the
main import [of the teachings] is that the ‘effect’ [goal-realization] occurs only if one trains
in its ‘causes’ [such as the two accumulations]. Hey handsome one, wearing your lotus
garland, you truly do not understand the intentions that were conveyed in the three tumings
o f the buddha-word. You are certainly attached to the extreme o f emptiness! In this regard,
the first tuming o f the buddha-word was intended for those who were neophytes and who
were o f lower capacity. Thus in order to have them tum away from samsära by taking the
four truths in terms o f things to be be abandoned [suffering and its cause] and their antidotes
[the cessation o f suffering and the path], [the first tuming] was a skillful means for them to
gain complete liberation from what is to be abandoned. The middle [turning] was intended
for those who had thoroughly cleared away [these impediments] and who were o f medium
capacity. Thus it taught sky-like emptiness together with the eight examples such as
illusion634 as skillful means to free them from the fetter o f becoming attached to these
antidotes. The final [tuming] for the sake o f those who had reached fulfilment and who were
o f sharpest capacity taught the nature o f all that is knowable, as it really is. As such, it bears
no similarity to the seif (ätmari) o f the Hindu heretics because (a) these people in their

633 It is worth noting that many rNying ma scholars including Rog Shes rab ’od (1166-1244), Mi pham rnam rgyal
(1846-1912) and, more recently, Dil mgo mkhyen brtse rin po che (1910-1991) and bDud ’joms rin po che (1904-
1987) have maintained that the last two tumings are both o f definitive meaning, a view consonant with the rNying
ma emphasis on the indivisibility o f appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). See Wangchuk 2005.
634 On the eight examples, see below 280 n. 653.
 ignorance speak o f a “s e l f ’ that does not actually exist, being a mere imputation
superimposed on reality; (b) they take it as something measurable;635 and (c) they do not
accept it is a quality o f spiritual embodiment and primordial knowing (sku dang ye shes). But
even this preoccupation with ‘no s e if (anätma) and ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā) [concems what
are] merely correctives to [the beliefs in a] seif and non-emptiness but which are not of
definitive meaning.636

Indian and Tibetan theories o f the three dharmacßkras reflect varying attempts to
hierarchically distinguish stages o f the Buddha’s teachings in line with corresponding levels of
intellectual-spiritual acumen and maturation in his audience. Klong chen pa’s interpretation o f the
three tumings regards the first two tumings as remedial steps intended to clear the way for an
undistorted understanding o f on e’s natural condition637 On this account, the Buddhist emptiness and
no seif doctrines were initially formulated within a religio-philosophical climate rife with
speculations concem ing the existence o f a creator God, permanent true seif or selves and an
unknowable absolute reality. Against this background, the Buddha’s discourses conceming anätma
(no seif) and śünyatā (emptiness) were offered as corrective measures with the express aim of
invalidating and eliminating wrong view s and extreme conclusions, particularly those based on the
proclitivity to take things as enduring and independently existing. The doctrine o f ‘no seif’ was
expounded both as 1) a sectarian critique o f various Hindu and Jain beliefs in a seif —i.e. beliefs that

The idea that the seif is measurable is found in Brahmanical and Jain traditions. The Katha Upanisad, for
example, is quoted as saying (II.4.12—13) that “A person the size o f a thumb lives in the middle of the body like a
flame without smoke. He is the lord o f the past and the future. He is the same today and the same tomorrow . ln
•lainism, the seif (jiva) though non-material occupies space, expanding and contracting to conform to the dimensions
of the physical body. This shape is retained, though featureless, when, as the pure ätman, the soul/self abandons its
ties to corporeal existence and rises to the top o f the uni verse where, according to Jain traditional cosmology, it
resides for etemity. Kristi L. Wiley. Historical Dictionary ofJainism. Toronto: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2004.
Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel vol. 1: 329 f.: de la phyin ci log gi lus sgyings shing log par rtog pa i gser gyi dra bas
gdong g.yogs pa\ \nges pa don gyi mdo dang sngags kyi dgongs pa la rgyab kyis phyogs pa dag snying po i don ni
drang don te| \rgyu sbyang na ’bras bu ’byung ’g yur la dgongs te gsung pa yin no\ \kvaye bzhin bzangpad ma i dra
ha can\ \khyed kyis bka ’ khor lo gsum du gsungs pa ’i dgongs pa yang mi shes pa re bden\ |stong pa i mtha la nges
Par ’dzin to\ \ ’di Itar bka ’ ’khor lo dang por ni las dang po pa dang\ \dbang po dman pa rnams la dgongs nas bden
bzhi spang gnyen du bya bas ’khor ba las bzlog pa ’i phyir spang bya las rnam par grol ba i thabs so| | bar bar yongs
su sbyang ba byas pa dang\ \dbangpo ’bringpo la dgongs nas gnyen por ’dzin pa ’i ’ching ba las grol ba i thabs su
sgyu ma ’i dpe brgyad dang nam mkha ’ Ita bu ’i stong pa nyid bstan to\ \tha mar mthar phyin pa dang\^ \dbang po
mon po ’i ngor shes bya ’i gshis j i Itar gnas pa de Itar gsungs pa yin no\ | de ’ang mu stegs pa i bdag ni di dang mi
mthun te \ \de dag gis mi shes bzhin du bdag ces sgro btags pa nyid kyis gshis la med pa dang\ | che chung gi tshad
du byed pa dang\ \sku dang ye shes kyi chos su mi ’dod p a ’i phyir ro\ \khyed kyi bdag med pa dang\ \stongpanyid
a z"en pa ’ang bdag dang mi stong pa ’i gnyen po tsam yin gyi nges pa ’i don ni ma yin te11
This point is reiterated by KJong chen pa in his later Tshig don mdzod: 897.1 f.: “From among what was taught in
three tumings of the Buddha word by the Transcendent Conqueror, although this topic [i.e. buddha naUire] was
tøoght in the final tuming, you have nonetheless failed to recognize this fact. If sheer emptiness (stong nyid rkyang
P°) were the ultimate, then how does it make sense that the Buddha taught three tumings separately [and in this
8equence]? Rather, he taught emptiness as being o f provisional meaning with the intention of merely undermining
(*) the fear o f the abiding reality and (b) the belief in a seif [entertained by] neophytes.” ci bcom Idan das kyis bka
hör lo gsum du gsung pa las gnas ’di ni tha ma don dam rnam par nges pa ’i chos kyi ’khor lor gsungs pa y a"8
hyod kyis ma shes\ \stong nyid rkyang pa don dam yin na\ \ ’khor lo gsum la tha dad du bstan pa ang j i Itar tha
e\ \stong nyid drang don du gsungs kyi\ |de yang gnas lugs kyi skrag pa dang\ \las dang pos bdag tu dzin pa gag
tSam dgongs pa ste\ \
there is a permanent, singulär, self-sufficient individuating principle that underlies and anchors the
swirling flux o f experience and survives death, and 2) as a psychological account o f how the coarser
elements o f our ‘sense o f self’ - those rooted in the sense w e have o f being a psychic unity that
transcends actual experience - constitute fabrications or superimpositions added to our most basic
experience o f things and beings around us. The doctrinal belief in seif can be seen to depend on the
psychological sense o f seif; and both are undermined by realizing that things and persons lack any
inherent independent nature.

Now the target o f Klong chen pa’s critique o f reificationism is not only the first order
reification o f ‘selves’ (viz. identities o f things and persons) but also the second order reifications of
those very means (e.g. teachings on emptiness, no seif) used to undermine first order reifications.638
The point being that spontaneously present unfabrictated buddha nature - understood as self-
occurring primordial knowing replete with inbom qualities - comes to the fore only to the extent that
all such reifications have subsided. So, far from being comparable to the ontologized seif o f Hindu
and Jain speculations, buddha nature is precisely what remains when dualistic superimpositions,
especially the habitual sense o f a seif anchoring our everyday experiences, subsides. Buddha nature
consists in the indivisibility of awareness and its expanse (dbyings dang ye shes ’du ’bral med pa)
and o f clarity and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med).

In sum, the Sems ye dris lan's clear and concise formulation o f what would become an
increasingly central focus o f the author’s later works - the distinction between conditioned and
unconditioned modes o f being and awareness (sems versus ye shes) - and his attempt to show its
affiliation with major currents o f Buddhist thought make this text an indispensable source for
understanding the development o f this distinction and its place in classical rNying ma thought.

638 This is brought out more clearly in the Grub m tha’ mdzod 654.3 f.: “If we classify [the authentic teachings] by
way o f temporal phases, the wheel o f the Buddha-word was tumed in three successive stages. Among these, there
arose three teachings: at the time o f the neophyte, by primarily showing the stages o f rejecting what is to be
abandoned and accepting the antidotes in order to protect the mind from the emotional affliction that bind it due to
the automomous [functioning of] subject and object, the teachings of the four noble truths [were given]. In the
middle, in order to negate the habituation to these very antidotes, the teachings on the lack o f inherent characteristics
[were given]. And finally, the teachings on ascertaining ultimate reality [were given] that revealed how our basic
nature is present just as is.” dus kyi sgo nas dbye na bka ’ ’khor lo rim pa gsum du bskor ba rnams so| |de ’ang las
dang po pa ’i tshe gzung ’dzin rang rgyud pas beings pa ’i nyon mongs pa las sems bsrung ba ’i phyir spang gnyen
blang dor byed pa ’i rim pa gtso bor ston pas bden pa bzhi ’i chos kyi rnam grangs dang\ \bar ba gnyen po la mngon
par zhen pa dgag pa ’i phyir mtshan nyid med pa dang\ \tha ma gshis j i Itar gnas bstan pa don dam rnam par nges
pa ’i chos kyi rnam grangs gsum du byung ba yin\ |
 §1.2 Annotated Translation:

Reply to Questions Conceming

Mind and Primordial knowing:

Instructions for Investigating

Mind and Primordial knowing

Praise to All buddhas and bodhisattvas

I bow in homage to the Victors with their sons, an ocean

Whose depth of sensitivity and caring cannot be fathomed
In which the turbulence of mind and mental factors is stilled
[Within] the clear oceanic expanse of their nondual Mind.

The essential meaning of the eighty-four thousand ways of teaching,

The unerring intention of the sütra and tantra genres,
Is summarized in terms of the distinction between mind and primordial knowing.
Having investigated its meaning, I shall write about the stages of its cultivation.

[Introduction:]

The perfectly realized buddha tumed the wheel o f the doctrine in three successive stages.
Conceming the first discourse teachings on the four noble truths: these were primarily intended for
the progression o f neophytes and those o f weak, inferior intelligence.t378] They clearly conveyed the
skillful means for intemalizing [these truths] through the stages o f things to be abandoned [i.e. the
truths o f suffering and is cause] and their antidotes [i.e. truths o f cessation and the path]. Conceming
the middle discourse teachings on the absence o f defining characteristics: these were primarily
intended for the stage o f progress o f those with some training and middling capacity. They conveyed
with the antidote o f teachings on the absence of intrinsic essence that those things taken as ‘selves’
[or identities] are unoriginated. Amongst the final discourse teachings of definitive meaning: these
Primarily conveyed in extenso the teachings on how one’s existential condition is present for the
stage o f progress o f those belonging to the vehicle o f complete fulfilment and who were o f sharpest
capacity.

The first [discourse] taught a path for tuming away from the characteristics o f samsära that
are to be abandoned. The middle taught the elimination o f intellectual obscurations based on the fact
that the natures one apprehends [and believes in] amongst what is to be eliminated are without
intrinsic essence. The last disclosed our existential condition as the vital quintessence (yin lugs
snying po).
 Having thus clearly distinguished the meaning o f what was taught on the basis o f gradations
in capacity and stages in how one progresses, one intemalizes them [accordingly]. Here, the first
stage is an impure condition because o f its possessing defilement. [The next] is a partly pure, partly
impure condition corresponding to the degrees to which defilements are purified by way o f the path.
[The last] is a condition o f total purity divested o f all defilements. With regard to these three
[conditions], they have each been elucidated according to the gradation o f (1) ground, (2) path and
(3) goal. [379| Among discourses corresponding to the final stage o f promulgation, the
Ratnagotravibhäga [1.47] States

According to the phases o f being impure,

Partly pure and partly impure, and completely pure,
One speaks o f a sentient being, a bodhisattva
And a Tathägata [Thus-gone].

‘Ground’ refers to the presence in oneself o f luminous primordial knowing during the time
o f being a sentient being. ‘Path’ refers to the four [phases] o f Accumulation, Integration, Seeing and
Cultivation during the time o f being a bodhisattva. ‘G oal’ refers to the final attainment o f the inbom
qualities such as the strengths at the time o f being a Tathägata. Since Mind itself (sems nyid) in its
luminosity within mind-govemed beings (sems can) is suchness possessing defilements, it is
described as “quintessence o f the Tathägata,” “o n e’s virtuous disposition”, “Mind itse lf’, and
“luminosity.”

[Part One: Ground]

Section One: A discussion of the meaning of “ground’. The nature o f reality in its primordial
luminosity is unconditioned and spontaneously present. From the perspective o f its emptiness, since
it cannot be posited as any substance or characteristics and also cannot be negated as ‘samsära’ or
‘nirväna’ and so forth, it is free from all limitations o f discursive elaborations like the sky. From the
perspective o f its lucency, it is spontaneously and primordially imbued with the natural expression of
the spiritual embodiments (sku) and modes o f primordial knowing (ye shes), and is luminous like the
orbs o f the sun and moon. These two facets abide primordially as the nature o f reality as a unity
without fusion or Separation. As is stated in the sNying po rab tu bstan pa’i mdo
[Mahāyānābhidharmasütra]: ,380|

The beginningless element (dhätu)

Is the basis o f all phenomena.
Because it exists, [it allows for] all forms o f life
As well as the attainment o f nirväna.639

639 The often quoted passage is from the Mahãyānābhidharmasūtra. Although no longer extant, this important sütra
is quoted at R G W 72.13—14: anādikāliko dhãtuh sarvadharmasamāśrayah\ tasmin sati gatih sarvä
nirvānādhigamo ’p i ca\\ See also R G W 1.155 (J 1.152) See Takasaki 1966: 290. The Mahāyãnābhidharmasūtra
has also been quoted in the Mahāyānasamgrahabhūsya (tr. by Paramärtha, Taisho Edition of the Chinese Tripitaka,
XXXI, no. 1595: 157a f.) and the Trimśikābhā§ya (Skt., ed. par Sylvain Lévi: p. 37 f.). The Tibetan translations of
 Although not different before or after...
Suchness remains pure.640

And [the Ratnagotravibhäga [1.51 cd] States:

A s it was before, so it is after -

Such is the nature o f invariance.641

As the Rin po che rgya mtsho’i rgyud observes:

Tathägatagarbha in its primordial luminosity is

Like a jew el, perfectly replete with all qualities.
And, like the undefiled sky and the orb o f the sun,
It is spontaneously present as käya[s] and jñāna[s].M2

Thus we have ascertained by way o f the view (Ita ba) that primordial knowing in its
luminosity constitutes the ever-present ground o f being. These days, most ‘spiritual friends’ and all

R G W have dbyings instead o f khams (both being accepted translations of dhätu). See Mathes 2008: 71. It is
mteresting that Klong chen pa here and elsewhere (e.g. Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel: 312.6) refers to the text as sNying
po rab tu bstan p a ’i mdo, a designation which may be a nod to his Contemporary, Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339)
whose similarily titled sNying po bstan pa (Full title: De bzhin gshegs pa ’i snying po bstan pa zhes bya ba ’i bstan
cos; in Rang byung rdo rje gSung ’bum, vol. 7: 282 f.) presents (on 283.2 f.) the above Mahāyānãbhidharmasūtra
passage as the second o f its three opening stanzas which consist o f three well-known quotations conceming buddha
nature. Rang byung rdo rje is known to have been both Student and teacher o f Klong chen pa and both were at one
time disciples o f the renowned rDzogs chen master Ku ma rä dza. All that remains of their correspondence is a letter
'vntten by Klong chen pa posing critical questions to Rang byung rdo ije about the idea o f a First Buddha
(oaibuddha : dang po ’i sangs rgyas), an idea espoused in the Kälacakra and Mañjuśrināmasãmgīti and taken up in
t e Rang byung rdo ije’s Zab mo nang don and auto-commentary. Klong chen pa may have been following the lead
0 the Mahāyānasūtrãlamkãra (MSA) which had similarily questioned the idea of a First Buddha. The letter entitled
£ yal ba Rang byung rdo rje la phul ba ’i dri yig is found in gSung thor bu (A ’dzom ’brug pa ed.) vol. 1: 363-377.
°r a French translation, see Arguillere 2007.
Klong chen pa begins with a line from MSA 10.22 but adds a line emphasizing the abiding purity of suchness.
ls ßrves a different sense than MSA 10.22 which reads snga ma phyi mar khyad med kyang\ |sgrib pa kun gyi dri
medpa\ |de bzhin nyid ni sangs rgyas ’dod\ \dag pa m ayin ma dag min\\ “Although not different before and after, it
4n^ lttlout defilements of all the obscurations.Suchness is accepted as buddhahood, neither pure nor impure.” D no.
18.3 f.. That is to say, it cannot be considered pure (where purity connotes a loss o f impurity) because it
remains unchanged over time but also cannot be considered impure because it remains undefiled by obscurations.
641 A
gain the text is slightly different in wording (though not in sense) than RGV 1.51 cd (R G W : 41.21) which has:
^ny d d ^ ™ 0™ tüt^ Paścūd avikãritvadharmatā\ \ RGVt: j i Itar sngar bzhin phyis de bzhin\ \ ’g yur ba med pa ’i chos

642Th'
ms possibly refers to the Dākārnavamahāyoginītantrarāja (Dpal m kha’ ’gro rgya mtsho'i rgyud kyi dkyil ’khor
SV* khor lo'i sgrub thabspadma rä ga'i gter). D no. 372. vol. KHA: 2.1 Tr. by Dharma yon tan (Dar ma yon tan?),
. ough I could not locate this passage. The Sanskrit edition with Tibetan translation o f chapter fifteen of this tantra
,s round in Maeda 1995: 147-169.
‘great meditators’ are in agreement in taking the ground to be a sheer emptiness devoid o f anything
whatsover. This does not agree with the import o f Buddhist discourses [of the third tuming] that are
o f quintessential meaning. The goal, i.e. buddhahood endowed with all inbom qualities, does not
arise by virtue o f experiencing a ground that is simply nothing at all. [Why?] Because the three
aspects of ground, path and goal are confounded and because buddhahood being an actualization of
the goal o f emancipation is unconditioned and endowed with spontaneously present qualities.
Therefore, these [views] and the view o f the peak o f worldly existence643 would seem to be the same.

Here [in our tradition], this unconditioned and spontaneously present luminosity is precisely
what we call the ‘ground.’[381| From the dimension of this very ground, by failing to recognize one’s
existential condition (yin lugs) as it is, there is ignorance (ma rig pa). When one thereby goes astray
into the [duality o f an] apprehended object and apprehending subject, one circles around (samsära)
in the three realms. A s is stated in the Māyājāla [i.e. *Guhyagarbhatantra 2.15]:

E ma ho! From the *sugatagarbha

Individual divisive concepts644 manifest due to karma.645

643 ‘Peak of worldiness’ (bhavägra : srid rtse) describes the highest o f the mundane formless meditations practiced
by an Arhant. It is described as a sphere in which there is neither conceptual ization nor nonconceptualization
(naivasamjñãnãjñãsamjñataná) that occurs in the fourth and final formless attainment (ārūpya-samāpatti). This
attainment either leads to the state of cessation [of all conception and Sensation] ([.samjñãvedita]nirodhasamãpatti)
in case o f the Ärya who is able to complete the stages o f meditation that transcend worldliness (lokattara), or it
represents the final destination for one unable to access this higher state and who therefore remains confined to
worldly (laukika) States o f mind. See AK. 2.24 et passim and a illuminating comments by Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 192
f.. See also Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel (vol. 2: 241 f.) where the limited bhavägra is distinguished
from nirodha intererpreted (in light o f MKv) as “cessation of discursive elaborations of mind” ( ’gog pa ni sems kyi
spros pa ’g og pa ’i phyir) which, in the case o f a bodhisattva, brings with it a heightened compassion for living
beings.
644 Klong chen pa’s quotation o f this passage here and elsewhere (e.g. Grub mtha ’ mdzod, Yid bzhin mdzod, Sems
nyid ngal gso ’g rel) take the *Guhyagarbhatantra's sprul (manifest, emanate) as the near-homophone (aspirated)
’khrul (errancy) though not at sGyu ma ngal gso ’grel (601.4) which correctly has sprul. ln his commentary on this
tantra (Phyogs bcu mun sei: 118.6 f.), Klong chen pa elucidates the passage as follows: “E ma ho is used to express
the nature o f kindness. Errancy has derived from the dimension o f the *sugatagarbha, one’s primordial abiding
condition, luminous Mind itself. Here, *sugatagarbha refers to luminous Mind itself which abides as the very
essence o f the three käyas which are neither conjoined nor disjoined... In the sGyu ’p hrul rgyas pa (Tk vol. 14: 67.6
f.) its meaning is the actual all-ground that is unconditioned ( ’dus ma byas don gyi kun gzhi): “It is not the all-
ground of divisive conceptualizing, but the actual ground without intrinsic nature. That is called the expanse of
phenomena, primordial knowing of suchness.” ... When errancy occurs due to any given conditions, since divisive
concepts o f individual sentient beings occur of their own accord, this great metropolis o f samsära manifests like a
self-appearing dream by virtue of causally efficacious karma.” brtse b a ’i rang bzhin gyis e ma ho brjod nas\ \gdod
ma ’i gnas lugs sems nyid ’od gsal ba bde gshegs snying po ’i ngang las ’khrul lo\ \de ’ang bde gshegs snying po ni
sems nyid ’od gsal ba sku gsum ’du ’bral med pa ’i ngo bor gnas pa de nyid yin te | ... sgyu ’p hrul rgyas pa las\ \rnam
rtog kun gzhi ma yin pa\ \rang bzhin med pa don gyi gzhi\ \de ni chos kyi dbyings zhes bya\ \de bzhin nyid kyi ye
shes 5o| Izhes pa dang\ \ ’dus ma byas don gyi kun gzhi ’i don nyid\... rkyen gang gis ’khrul na sems can rang rang gi
rnam par rtog pa rang shar du byung bas rgyas byas pa ’i las kyis ’khor ba ’i grong khyer chen po ’di rang snang
rmi lam Itar sprul so| |
645 See critical edition in Dorje 1987: 188.
Thus, the non-recognition o f one’s abiding condition is the ‘fundamental ignorance’ ( rtsa ba'i ma rig
pa). From the context o f what is the ground or seed or basis o f the development o f this incipient
errancy, the [ensuing] upwelling o f hypostates based on dualistic beliefs constitutes the
conceptually elaborated ignorance’ (kun tu brtags p a ’i ma rig pa). When from these two [modes],
there arise all the different phenomenal categories o f sentient beings comprising the lower three
wretched destinies, the middle human realm, and higher divine realms, then due to the potentialities
imprinted in the form o f various latent tendencies on the all-ground, one experiences the joys and
sorrows o f one’s own vision, the heights and depths o f samsära,. like the tuming of a water mill. The
Ratnagunasamcayagāthā [28.5ab] States:

Sentient beings, lower, middle and higher, however many,

Are all declared by the buddha to arise from ignorance.646

Although the three realms continue separately, the *sugatagarbha without being adversely
affected, remains pervasively present in all sentient beings. As the Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra
States:

All beings are totally pervaded by tathägatagarbha.647

And as is stated in the Ratnagotravibhäga [1.27]:

All embodied being are always imbued with the buddha-quintessence

Because the spiritual body o f perfect buddhahood radiates, 1382)
Because suchness is undifferentiated, and
Because the spiritual affiliation is present.

Moreover, during the phase o f sentient beings, the tathägatagarbha is obscured by [dualistic] mind
and remains defiled. As is stated in the Māyājāla:

As water present in the centre o f the earth

Is always naturally uncontaminated,
So one’s spiritual potential obscured by mind,
Is naturally present within all sentient beings.648

Full title: Prajñãpāramitāratnagunsamcayagāthā (Tib. ’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdudpa tshigs
su bcadpa, in D no. 13, shes phyin, vol. KA: 2.1). For Sanskrit and Tibetan recensions of the text, see Obermiller
1937 and Yuyama 1976. For the relevant passage Ratnagunsamcayagāthā 28.5ab in Sanskrit, see Yuyama 1976:
110; Obermiller 1937: 103. For the Tibetan, see Yuyama 1976: 185, Obermiller: 103.
647
Full title: Śnmālãdevīsimhanãdanãmamahãyãnasūtra (Tib. Phags pa Iha mo dpal phreng gi seng ge i sgra zhes
y° ba theg pa chen po ’i mdo, in D no. 92. dkon brtsegs, vol. CHA: 509.1). For English translation see Wayman and
Wayman 1974. The passage is also cited in Klong chen pa’s Grub mtha ’ mdzod: 871.5 f. and in his Phyogs bcu mun
sei: 119.4 f. where it is incorrectly ascribed to the Samādhirājasūtra.
648
This passage is not found in the *Guhyagarbhatantra (see critical edition Doije 1987) but possibly belongs to
another text from the Māyājãla cycle.
 Were there an inexhaustible treasure
Underground beneath a poor man’s house,
Neither would he know o f its presence,
Nor could the treasure teil him “here I am”.

Likewise, as all beings have failed to realize

The most precious treasure contained within their minds -
Their true nature, immaculate without anything added or removed.
Thus they continually experience the manifold miseries o f impoverishment.

In this context, the tathägatagarbha is comparable to the orb o f the sun while the all-ground together
with its latent tendencies - the whole complex o f mind and its mental factors within the mind-
streams belonging to the three realms - is comparable to clouds.

Some fools who boast about their erudition [claim the following]: It is untenable [to maintain
that] mind and its mental factors are obscurations because (A) one produces the mind [of awakening,
i.e. bodhicitta] and because (B) Mind itself which is luminous is one’s spiritual potential (khams).
[383, Consequently, [we reply that] it would symptomatic o f not comprehending the import of the
sütras and tantras to say that [dualistic] mind is accepted as being one o f the meditative absorptions
(samadhi) [belonging to] the facets o f nonconceptual awakening. [Our argument is as follows:] (A)
With regard to ‘producing the mind’ [of awakening], is this not also a conceptualizing that involves
accepting [some things] and rejecting [others] in the context o f samsära [and hence obscured]? If so,
it would ultimately have to cease. (B) But if one were to speak about Mind itself [in this way] then
this would be inappropriate because it cannot be established given that there is neither produced nor
producer [i.e. no causality].

It seem s [here] that one has not properly distinguished between mind (sems) and Mind itself
(sems nyid). Since ‘mind’ involves conceptual and analytic factors o f mind-streams belonging to the
three realms, it is that which grasps erroneous superimposed aspects together with the all-ground
[comprising] the eightfold cognitive ensemble. As the Satyadvayavibhańga maintains:

‘Conceptual ization’ consists o f mind and mental factors

Having superimposed aspects that constitute the three realms.649

649 Full title: Satyadvayavibhańgakārikā. Tib. Bden pa gnyis rnam par ’byedpa 7 tshig le ’ur byas p a , in D no. 3881,
dbu ma, vol. SA: 2.1. In his Satyadvayavibhañgavrtti, Jñānagarbha glosses this passage as follows:
“Conceptualization refers to what arises as having superimposed aspects o f mind and mental factors that constitute
the three realms.” D Toh no. 3882, dbu ma, vol. SA: 25.5 f.: khams gsum pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba'i sgro
btags pa'i rnam pa can du ’byung ba'i rnam pa ni rtogpayin no\\ For English translation, see Eckel 1987.
‘Mind itse lf is luminous primordial knowing, the tathägatagarbha. Thus it is when mind ceases or
no longer functions that Mind itself, luminous primordial knowing, shines forth as personally
realized intuitive awareness. As the Astasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā [5b. 1-2] States:

That Mind is not [dualistic] mind; Mind’s nature is luminous.650

lObjection:] But doesn’t great Mind (sems chen po) exist on the level o f buddhahood?
[Reply:] This refers to great primordial knowing (ye shes chen po). It agrees completely with
descriptions o f the ‘great passions’ as [expressions of] primordial knowing that are found in the
tantras. In short, (384| mind together with its mental factors belonging to the three realms and subject
to latent tendencies transmitted since beginningless time are shown651 to have the two obscurations
[intellectual and emotional] as their nature and to be produced. And thus they are explained as
something to be eliminated and that must be stopped.

Moreover, it is claimed that to now depend upon a method that [itself] does not depend on
the state o f Mind itself in its luminosity is comparable to a cloud adrift in space. As the
Ratnagotravibhäga [1.55-57] States:

Earth is spported by water, water by air,

And air is supported by space.
But space is supported neither by
The elements o f air, water nor earth.

Likewise our psychophysical aggregates, sensory elements and sensory

capacities
Are supported by actions and afflictive emotions.
Actions and afflictive emotions are supported completely by
The inappropriate mentation.

Inappropriate mentation is in tum supported by

The purity o f mind
The nature o f mind, however, is not
Supported by any o f these phenomena.

As the Pramānavārttika [1.208ab] States:

650
The corresponding passage from the Sanskrit are given in Schmithausen 1977: 41 as lines E.b.1-2 tathä hi tac
cittam acittam\ prakrtiś cittasyaprabhãsvarā\\. This passage is commented on above 79 n. 197 and 118 n. 309.
SYa has brten pas whereas SYd and SYk have bstan pas. Both readings are possible but the latter is better suited
jo the context o f citing scriptural support for the distinction between sems and ye shes (or sems chen po). A reading
ased on the former would be “ ...mind together with its mental factors belonging to the three realms and subject to
atent tendencies transmitted since beginningless time depend upon having the two obscurations [intellectual and
emotional] as their nature and upon being produced.”
 This mind is by nature luminous.
The defilements are adventious.652

This Statement agrees with this [rNying ma] approach insofar as ‘the nature o f m ind,’ ‘the basic
nature o f mind,’ ‘Mind itself’ and ‘the naturally pure expanse’ and ‘the abiding condition as the
nature o f things’ have one and the same meaning.

Mind, on the other hand, consists o f three conditional States by virtue o f its Classification in
terms o f the three realms: (A) a one-pointed conceptless [state in the realm o f form lessness], (B) a
simple clarity [state in the realm o f aesthetic forms] and (C) a conceptual [state in the desires
realm].|3851 Thus these phenomena o f samsära that depend on mind and appear mistakenly due to
latent tendencies are unreal, deceptive, a childish delusion, compounded, hollow, insubstantial, and
without essence, [like] a bubble about to burst [or] a plantain. They are therefore illustrated by way
o f eight examples653 such as magic, a reflected image and so forth. They constitute a distortion, a
visual anomaly, apparent yet nothing as such. Being devoid o f abiding nature throughout the time of
their appearing, they cannot withstand intellectual analysis. They are mere appearances to
conventional, erroneous [cognitions] like the visions o f one who has ingested [the hallucinogenic]

652 While the SY has sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal ba\ \dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba\\, my rendering is based on
Pramãnavãrttika 1.208ab: prabhäsvaram idam cittam prakrtyã’ ’g antavo malāh\|and corroborated by Tibetan
translation in D: sems ’di rang bzhin ’od gsal te| \dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba\\ On differing views on what
Dharmakīrti may have meant by this passage, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 425-28; Schmithausen 1987: 160-62; Franco
1997: 85-93; and Wangchuk 2007: 208.
653 Klong chen pa’s sGyu ma ngal gso (in Ngal gso skor gsum vol. 2) elaborates on the eight examples (dpe,
upamāná) to illustrate the emptiness o f all phenomena: (1) dream (rmi lam, svapna), (2) magical illusion (sgyu ma,
māyã), (3) reflected image (mig yor, pratibhāsá), (4) mirage (smig rgyu, marici), (5) moon‘s reflection on water
(chu ’i zla ba, udakacandra), (6) echo (brag ca, pratiśrutkã), (7) Gandharva city (dri z a ’i grong khyer,
gandharvanagara), (8) apparition (sprul pa, nirmäna). Varying lists of such examples are found throughout
Buddhist literature from the Pali canon (where they illustrate the lack of seif in persons) through Mahāyāna and
Vajrayäna literature (where they are used to illustrate emptiness o f all phenomena). On early Buddhist and
Mahāyāna sources, see Lamotte 1944-80 I: 357, n. 1. The eight examples presented in Klong chen pa’s sGyu ma
ngal gso match the ten elaborated in Mahãprajñāpāramitāśãstra 11.1 (Lamotte 1944-80 tome I: 357), excluding
shadow (chāyā) and space (akāśa) and having reflected image (mig yor : pratibhāsalprodbhãsa) instead o f mirror
reflection (pratibimba). A number of further references to these eight examples in Madhyamaka literature are noted
by Tillemans 1990, vol. 1: 289, n. 437. Klong chen pa’s sGyu ma ngal gso together with its auto-commentary (sGyu
ma ngal gso ’g rel) offers a detailed analysis of each of the eight examples (with a great many supporting quotations
from sütras and tantras) in its eight consecutive chapters, correlating them with the eight negations (in four pairs)
that are presented in the dedicatory stanza o f Nāgāijuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakãrika in order to indicate that all
phenomena, insofar as it they are dependently arisen, ultimately elude any positive assertions: “Whatever is
dependently arisen is unceasing, unoriginated, unannihilated, not permanent, not coming, not going, without
difference, without identity...” The complete opening päda reads anirodham anutpādam anucchedamaśāśvatam\
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam\ yah pratītyasamutpādani prapañcopaśamam śivam\ desayāmāsa
sambuddhah ta vande vandatām varam\\ See Mūlamadhyamakakãrika (ed. La Vallée Poussin: p. 11; ed. P L.
Vaidya: p. 4). ln Klong chen pa’s arrangement, (1) dream illustrates non-origination (skye ba m edpa, anutpãda), (2)
illusion illustrates non-cessation( ’gag pa medpa, anirodha), (3) reflected image illustrates not coming ( ’ong ba med
pa, anägama), (4) mirage illustrates not going ( ’gro ba medpa, anirgama), (5) moon’s reflection on water illustrates
non-annihilation (chad pa med pa, anuccheda), (6) echo illustrates non-permanence (rtag pa m edpa, aśāśvata), (7)
Gandharva city illustrates non-difference (tha dad pa ma yin pa, anänartha), (8) apparition illustrates non-identity
(geig tu ma yin pa, anekärtha).
dhatura. Meanwhile one should recognize [these phenomena] as appearances due to grasping the
apprehended object and apprehending subject as real.

The luminous vital quintessence should be understood as follows: it is ultimate reality, it is

enduring, stable, without transition or change, utterly calm and non-deceptive. The very essence of
primordial knowing, the ground just as is from time immemorial until the end, is free from all
limitations o f discursive elaborations and, like the unobscured orb o f the sun, remains the same in
nature - it has not been shrouded, is not now shrouded and [will remain] unshrouded by the
defilements o f all phenomena belonging to mind and its mental factors.

[Part Two: Path]

Section Two: How to make an experience of the path. Having realized the presence o f the
quintessence o f buddhahood within oneself, one meditatively cultivates this state. By way o f the
Parämita System, one cultivates it after generating [bodhi]citta. By way o f Mantra[yäna], ,386, one
additionally brings about maturation by means o f the empowerments and brings about freedom by
means of the oral instructions. Here [in our system], the method o f intemalizing it as a single essence
is thus in harmony with the sütras.

ln this regard, once comfortably seated, one takes refuge and develops [bodhi\citta. After
having clearly visualized in an instant the deity o f on e’s predilection , [while seated in a posture]
endowed with the seven qualities o f Vairocana654, one becomes evenly composed in the expanse of
this clear, vivid and vast state o f open awareness which does not conceptualize anything, does not
grasp anything, and is not identified by the mind as any apparent object. One thus relaxes in the
experience o f luminosity. A s it is extolled by Ārya Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamakaratnãsukośa:

D on’t conceptualize anything and don’t grasp anything!

Relax freely in its nature without making it something contrived.
This uncontrived state is the precious treasury o f the unbom.
It is the road travelled by all the Victors o f the three tim es.655

And as the Heruka Galpo Tantra declares:

The seven-point posture refers to an ideal meditation posture having seven qualities of the deity Vairocana (mam
snang chos bdun): (1) legs crossed (in vajra posture, right leg over left leg with backs of feet sitting on tops of
thighs), (2) hands in gesture o f equanimity (right hand rests on left four finger’s width below navel), (3) spine
straight, (4) neck bent slightly forward, (5) shoulders broadened (“like the wings of a vulture’ ), (6) eyes gazing in
direction o f the nose (i.e. gazing unfixedly into space twelve to sixteen finger widths in front o f nose), (7) tongue
touching the palate. rkang pa skyil krung\ |lag pa mnyam gzhag\ \sgal tshigs drang po bsrang ba\ \mgrin pa cung
ZQd gug pa\ Idpung pa rgod gshog Itar brgyang ba\ \mig sna rtser phab pa\ \lce rtse ya rkan la sbyar ba ste bdun
no\\

There is no canonical text bearing the title to which this passage is attributed (Tib. Dbu ma skye med rin po che i
mdzod) although there is a very short text entitled Ratnāsukośa (Tib. Skye med rin po che’i mdzod) ascribed to
ãgaijūna. E.g. D no. 3839, vol. TSA: 299.4. This passage does not occur in it.
 Devoid o f thought is Mind itself as vast as space.
Mind itself is space beyond all thoughts.
Conceming this Mind itself [vast as] space and devoid o f thought,
There is no apprehension in space nor anything apprehended.656

So at this time, when mind and all its mental factors have ceased, the nonconceptual
primordial knowing is present as the essence o f personal self-awareness. A s a scripture [i.e.
Prajñāpãramitāstotra by Rahulabhädra] States:

Devoid o f what can be expressed in language and thought, such is Prajñāpāramitā. (387|
Unbom, unceasing, the essence of space itself,
It is the scope o f primordial knowing as individual self-awareness.
Praise to the Mother o f all Victors o f the three times.657

In this context, ultimate truth is declared to be beyond the domain o f the mind and intellect.
What this implies is that when mind ceases and one transcends intellect, that primordial awareness
which has been present in oneself is [revealed as] the very nature o f reality (dharmatä) like the
shining sun when it is free from clouds. As for settling into the composure state: at a time when there
is a cloudless sky which enhances the process o f separating the essence from the dregs [i.e. open
awareness from obscuring thoughts], sit with your back to the sun. By letting your eyes gaze toward
the centre or expanse o f the sky, a limpid nonconceptual state o f awareness arises. At this time, since
mind has stopped, the two types o f apprehension lack any objective reference, the two types being
(a) the apprehension of the ‘outer’ apparent object as a real entity and (b) the apprehension the
‘inner’ mind as a real entity. When therefore one no longer conceptualizes entity or non-entity, there
is a calm in which any third alternative type o f apprehension apart from those two would [also] be
without objective reference. The Bodhicaryãvatāra [9.34] States:

When neither entity nor non-entity

Is present before the mind,
At that time, since there is also no other representation,

656 Full Title: He ru ka ’dus pa'i rgyudphyi ma dpal he ru ka'i gal po dur khrod mngon par ’byung ba zhes bya ba'i
rgyud, Tk vol. 25: 93.1 f.. One o f the eighteen Mahäyoga tantras devoted to Ye shes dri med, the heruka of the
Tathägata family among the five buddha families. I was unable to locate the quotation in this source.
657 The passage which the Sems ye dris lart here ascribes to ‘a scripture’ (lung) is elsewhere quoted by Klong chen
pa under the title Yum la bstodpa (Skt. Prajñāpãramitãstotra). See, as examples, Theg mchog mdzod vol. 1: 1051.3,
sPyi don legs bshad rgya mtsho in Ngal gso skor gsum vol. 3: 40.1, and sGyu ma ngal gso ’grel in Ngal gso skor
gsum vol. 2: 597.4. Most Indian, Tibetan and Chinese sources attribute this hymn to Rahulabhädra (Tib. sGra gcan
’dzin bzang po). The hymn is prefixed (with this authorial ascription) to a number o f Prajñāparamitāsūtras in
Sanskrit (though neither the Tibetan nor Chinese translations contain the praise). See Seyfort Ruegg 2004: 19. The
early (9th c.?) Tibetan IDan dkar ma catalogue lists a Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la bstod pa'i tshig gi sdeb
sbyor that it ascribes to this author. See Lalou 1953 no. 452. In the existing bsTan ’gyur collections, however, the
Prajñāpāramitãstotra (Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’i bstod pa) is only found as one o f the eighteen stotras
ascribed to Nāgarjūna. E.g. D no. 1127, vol. KA: 151.1 f.. Nothing resembling the passage in question is found in
this work. See comparison o f the two Tibetan translations o f the Rahulabhädra text by Seyfort Ruegg in Doboom
1995: 83 f..
 Lacking any obejctive reference, it remains thoroughly calm.658

As the Mañjuśrīnāmasamgīti [58b] states:

[He is] to be individually intuitively known —unwavering...659

A Dohā states: t388)

Relax simply in self-clarity [like] water and a lamp [reflected in it].

Or as Kaudälika [i.e. Kotälipa] puts it:

Meditating by way o f mind is not meditation.

But not meditating is also not meditation.
Beyond meditating and not meditating,
The very absence o f mentation is Mahämudrä!660

On this occasion, “cessation o f mind” means that open awareness makes evident the spiritual
embodiment o f primordial knowing (ye shes kyi sku : jñānakāya). [The Madhyamakãvatāra
(H .H d )661 states:]

Due to mind’s cessation, that [suchness] is made evident by the käya.

658 Th’ f • '

_ is amous line from Säntideva’s ninth chapter on insight is presented as the Madhyamaka response to the
the^h ara ^Uestl° n (Bodhicaryãvatãra 9.33) “When the thing investigated which is said to not exist is not perceived,
rtK-11 \°W Can Some ao~thing, devoid o f basis, be present before the mind?” The answer is that it can’t: neither entity
rtnmg) nor non-entity (no-thing) in fact exist.
659 ‘U »
^ ° course refers to Mañjuśri who in this text personifies primordial knowing. D vol. KA: 7.6. The Skt. for
re evant part o f 58b is pratyätmavedyo hy acalah... For critical edition o f Sanskrit text and translation, see
Davidson 1981.
660 Th
(To t <!° w^om Passaße is attributed was an Indian mahäsiddha, known in Tibetan works as Tog rtse pa
grand ^ »^ attoc^‘m a n w ^° ßained fame in Tibet for his non-gradual Mahämudrä teachings. sGam po pa’s
Indi ent rten mgon po once commented that from among all the Indian and Tibetan adepts, it was only the
Ro and Tibetan sGam po pa who directly pointed out mind. See Jackson 1994a: 13 and 142. Also see
« , The quoted passage is not found in Kaudälika’s oft-quoted Acintyakramopadeśa (Tib. Bsam
z khyab pa ’i rim p a ’i man ngag), D no. 2228, vol. 51:198.5 f..
661 T
•‘on and ^ ^ t i o n corrected according to MAv: 361. This edition is based: as Tauscher (1989: p. VI) observes,
(see C .Canon*ca^ e(lifion o f the Madhyamakãvatãrabhā$ya [5263] o f Peking, to which that o f Narthang, a
identTV^ ^ non~canonical edition which La Vallée Poussin obtained from Stcherbatsky and which I am unable to
cjrc I ail(* occasionally Jayänanda’s commentary have been compared.” In addition to copies of the MAv that
one b ^N *n ^ ^ et’ or without the bhä$ya, there are two different canonical translations o f the MAv: an older
bv P i f utS^0 rgyäl ba and Kr§ņapaņ^ita in Peking (P 5261) and Narthang editions and a newer one
reDla3 H k 013 and Tilaka(kalaśa) (P 5262 and D 3861). Although the earlier translation was largely
corr CC H ^atCr’ cont*nue(l to usec* at ^east until the 15th Century. Klong chen pa’s quotations from MAv
pas eS^° to earber Nag tsho translation though he invariably interprets 12, 8d as if ’g ag pa had the ergative
This is one quarter o f [of the stanza].

N ow , in the case o f genuine meditative absorption, there occurs [a state that does] not stray
from the sphere of open awareness which is free from the entire complex o f mind consisting of the
all-ground and all-ground consciousness, along with ego-based cognition, and the conscious
experiences o f the five sense perceptions. The Inconceivability (Skt. acintya Tib. bsam gyis mi khyab
pa) chapter o f the Ratnaküta States:

Though free from mind, ego-mind and dichotomizing cognition662, one has not also abandoned
the state o f contemplative absorption.663

By meditating in this way, the three experiences o f bliss, clarity and nonconceptualization naturally
emerge and, moreover, they are beyond limit. As the mDo gdams ngag ’bogpa’i rgyal po States:

If one settles mind without thought in

The nature o f reality without thought,
There arises a feit experience without bias or partiality.664

N ow, the procedure for this meditative absorption that transcends mind belonging to the
three realmS|389| is as follows. In the formless [realms] the single-pointed nonconceptual [cognition]
has no apparent object ( snang yul med pa). This means that although there is no conceptualization,
the appearance o f objects (yul snang ba) is not suppressed, rather it is the single-pointed grasping
that is absent. As for mind belonging to the [realm of] forms, although there is the appearance of
objects, this may involve thoughts and analyses (rtog dpyod) or be devoid o f these. But even if it is
imbued with the good feelings o f a meditative trance, it doesn’t go beyond a kind o f grasping. The
mind which doesn’t go beyond matters o f speculation because its doubts have not been resolved and
the mind belonging to the desires [realm] are predominantly conceptual and analytic. In this context,
what constitutes nonconceptual primordial knowing and, moreover, the meditative absorptions o f the
three individual realms still involve latent tendencies for mind’s apparent objects and thus the nature

662 rNying ma texts often quote this passage in support o f the idea that the varying accounts o f dual cognition found
in Buddhist texts - mind (sems : citta), ego-mind (yid : manas) and dichotomizing cognition (rnam \par] shes [pa] :
vijñāna) - which that Abhidharmakośa Claims are synonymous, must ultimately be abandoned in order to realize a
more fundamental mode o f awareness.
663 This refers to the Acintyaguhyanirdeśa which makes up section three of the Ratnaküfa. Full title:
Āryamahãratnakūtadharmaparyāyaśatasãhasrikagranthetrisamvaranirdeśaparivartanāmamahāyānasūtra (Tib.
’Phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen po ’i chos kyi rnam grangs stong phrag brgya pa las sdom pa gsum bstan
pa ’i le ’u zhes bya ba theg pa chen po ’i mdo, in D no. 45: 199.1).
664 The title to which this passage is attributed likely refers to the dGongs ’dus (Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs
pa ’dus pa ’i mdo), a text sometimes referred to by the title [mDo] gDams ngag ’bogs pa ’i rgyal po or close variants
thereof by rNying ma pa and bKa’ brgyud scholars including Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po, Bu ston Rin chen
grub, ’Gos lo tsä ba, and Klong chen pa. For this identification and its problems, see Karmay 1998: 84-89. The
dGongs ’dus is an important rNying ma tantra (despite the mdo in its title) that is regarded as as one o f five principal
tantras of the Anuyoga tradition o f rDzogs chen.
of one’s abiding condition remains unknown. But here [primordial knowing and absoprtions] are
nonetheless endowed with numerous special qualities such as realizing the essence of the ground
whose nature is luminosity, being embraced by the bodhicitta, and uniting [the forces of] skillfull
means and discerning insight. In this regard, the four concentrations and four formless States are of
two sorts: (a) those subsumed under the mind o f samsära, i.e. grasping which, in this context should
stop, and (b) the transworldly formless concentrations which should be cultivated because they are
the genuine primordial knowing. So as you progressively become familiar with luminous primordial
knowing, |390| you successively traverse all the spiritual levels and paths and the super-knowledges665
such as the [divine] eye666 and so forth arise automatically like reflections arising spontaneously in
clear water.

[Part Three: The Goal]

Once you have thus recognized the ground and have purified, through cultivating the path,
the defilements o f mind and its mental factors that have obscured your spiritual potential, and after
experiencing the diamond-like absorption at the end o f the series o f ten spiritual levels, primordial
knowing o f buddhahood dawns. Since one’s spiritual disposition is then free o f every last
defilement, this is known as the fundamental transformation o f spiritual awakening (byang chub tu
gnas ’gyur). At this time, the dharmakäya in its luminosity makes true cessation in which mind has
ceased clearly evident by way o f primordial knowing, self-awareness as it is individually realized.
As the Madhyamakãvatāra [11.17] States:

Through the incineration o f the dry kindling o f all that

Is knowable, the [ensuing] peace is the dharmakäya o f the victors.
At this time there is neither arising nor cessation.
Due to mind’s cessation that [suchness] is made evident by the käya.667

The six super-knowledges (<abhijñã : mngon par shes pa) are: 1) capacity for miraculous transformations, 2)
divine eye (that sees the deaths, transmigrations and rebirths o f all sentient beings), 3) divine ear (that hears all
sounds in the universe), 4) clairavoyance (that knows all the thoughts o f others), 5) remembering past lives (of
oneself and others), and 6) ability to destroy imperfections (in oneself and others). These are discussed in AK
7.42ad. See La Valleé Poussin 1971, vol. 4: 97 f.. ln his Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel (vol. 1: 455.4 f.), Klong chen pa
includes the six as one o f the twenty-one categories o f undefiled qualities of the Buddha presented in
Abhisamayālamkãra 8.2-6. For additional details on the six super-knowledges, see ’Jigs med gling pa s Yon tan
ndzod rang ’grel vol. 1: 341.3 f. and Yon tan rgya mtsho’s Yon tan mdzod ’g rel vol. 1: 792.1 f..
The term spyan (honorific o f mig or ‘eye’) refers to the divine eye (divyacaksus : Iha’i mig/lha i spyan), one of
the six super-knowledges (see preceding note). See AK 7.54cd.
This quotation and the following one (MAv 11.17 and 11.19) are here presented (with intervening päda 11.18)
along with Candrakīrti’s auto-commentary as they are found in the critical edition MAv: 361:
shes bya ’i bud shing skam po ma lus pa\ \
bsregs pas zhi ste rgyal rnams chos sku ste\ \
de tshe skye ba med cing ’g ag pa med\ |
sems ’g ags pas de sku yis mngon sum mdzad\ | [11.17]
ye shes kyi rang bzhin can gyi sku shes bya ’i bud shing skam po ma lus pa bsregs pa las shes bya i skye ba med pas
ba med pa dang Idan par ’g yur ba gang yin pa ’di ni sangs rgyas rnams kyi chos kyi sku o| | di nyid kyi dbang
du mdzad nas\ \
 This spiritual embodiment (kāyà) [of suchness] is o f three kinds: (1) the dharmakäya,
luminous by nature, (2) sambhōgakāya, endowed with five definite attributes668, and (3)
nirmānakāya, manifesting in order to train each trainee according to their aspirations. O ne’s inbom
qualities are thereby spontaneously present like a wish-granting jew el. So long as samsära
persists,,391| spontaneously occurring buddha-activity arises in order to fulfil the two aims o f living
beings669. This [buddha activity] manifests and is actualized in the spiritual embodiment of
primordial knowing that is free from all discursive elaborations. As this text goes on to say [11.19]:

The embodiment o f calm radiates like a wish-fulfilling tree.

And like a wish-granting jew el, it ever enriches the world,
Without premeditation, until beings are free.
This is manifest in a state free from elaboration.

N ow , at the time o f buddhahood, although mind and mental factors cease, since primordial
knowing does not cease, it is not like space that is empty o f matter. Rather, [this primordial
knowing] works for the fulfillment o f sentient beings by way o f inconceivably great insight and
compassion comprising (a) qualities o f renunciation, that is, the freedom from all obscurations and
(b) qualities o f realization including the ten strengths670, four kinds o f fearlessness671, four correct

sangs rgyas mam s ni chos nyid lta\ \

’dren pa rnams ni chos kyi sku\ |
chos nyid shes bya ’ang ma yin te\ |
de ni shes par nus ma yin\ \ [11.18]
zhes gsungs 5o| | chos kyi sku ’di ni\ \de tshe skye ba med cing ’g ag pa med pa ste\ \ ’di nyid kyi dbang du mdzad nas
’jam dpal skye ba med cing ’g ag pa med pa zhes bya ba ’di ni de bzhin gshegs pa ’i tshig bla dvags so zhes gsungs
5o| Ide Itar na ye shes kyi yul de kho na nyid la mam pa thams cad du d e ’i yul na sems dang sems las byung ba
rnams mi ’ju g pas sku kho nas mngon sum du mdzad par kun rdzob tu rnam par bzhag go\ \ ’di ni
zhi sku dpag bsam shing Itar gsal gyur zhing\ \
y id bzhin nor bu j i bzhin rnam mi rtog\ \
’gro grol bar du ’jig rten ’byor slad rtag\ \
’di ni spros dang bral la snang bar ’gyur | | [11.19]
sku gang gis de kho na nyid ’di mngon sum du mdzad par bshad pa de ni zhi ba ’i rang bzhin can du ’dod de| |sems
dang sems las byung ba dang bral b a ’i phyir ro\ |zhi b a ’i rang bzhin can yin yang sems can gyi don mdzadpar
spyod pa gsal bar byed pa ni\....
668 These five certainties (nges pa Inga), also known as five exquisite qualities (phun sum tshogs Inga), specify the
structure common to the varied manifestations o f sambhōgakāya. They are: (1) setting (gnas), (2) duration (dus), (3)
teacher (ston pa), (4) his teaching (bstan pa), and (5) his retinue(’£Aor). These became widespread in Tibetan
exegesis on the three käyas lfom at least as early as the fourteenth Century. See Makransky: 106 f.; Almogi: 242-
243, n. 19. In classical rNying ma works from Klong chen pa onward, the five are sometimes elaborated in great
detail, as in Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 2: 322.1 f. and Yon tan mdzod rang ’g rel vol. 2: 805.4. f.. Makransky
suggests a possible source for the list o f definitive attributes of sambhōgakāya in Atiśa’s eleventh Century Condensed
commentary on the Abhisamayālamkãra, the Prajñāpāramitāpindārthapradipa, P 5201: 106.5.4 f., which has a
listing o f four certainties that includes all but duration.
669 That is, the aims/values of oneself (rang don) and others (gzhan don).
670 The ten strengths (bala : stobs) comprise: (1) knowing what is possible and what is not possible (with regard to
karma), (2) knowing how actions bring about results (in minutest detail), (3) knowing the higher and lower
discriminations672, ten powers673 and so forth, and it is unconditioned and spontaneously present. It is
the actualization o f a capacity which exists as a quality which you have had primordially in your
spiritual potential. As the Ratnagotravibhäga [1.5] States:

Buddhahood is endowed with the two aims:

a) It is unconditioned, spontaneously present,
And is not realized through extraneous conditions.
b) It is imbued with knowing, caring and capability.

In short, the goal is what is known as spiritual awakening (byang chub) replete with|392|
capabilities belonging to on e’s spiritual potential which is luminosity. For a more detailed exegesis
of these matters, you should have a look at the treatise I composed called Nges don Shing rta chen
pom .

[Colophon]

Through any virtue that may accrue from concisely elucidating

capacities o f humans (ranging from dull to sharp), (4) knowing the myriad elements (both the spiritual affinities of
beings and the five elements that make up the world), (5) kr owing the varying aspirations of beings (both for the
teachings and for what is most profound) (6) knowing the paths that lead everywhere (i.e. the paths to evil destinies,
the paths to higher destinies and the path to liberation), (7) knowing meditations and liberations (i.e. the four
meditations and eight liberations), (8) knowing previous lives (the innumerable previous rebirths of oneself and
others), (9) the knowledge o f death and transmigration, (10) knowing that the defilements are exhausted (namely, all
the obscurations together with their latent tendencies). These ten are listed among the eighteen undefiled Buddha-
qualities in AK 7.28ab. See La Valleé Poussin, vol. 4: 66 f.. In Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel (vol.l:
456.1 f.), they are subsumed under one o f twenty-one categories o f undefiled Buddha-qualities as they are presented
in Abhisamayãlamkāra 8.2-6. This and additional details given by Yon tan rgya mtsho in Yon tan mdzod grel (vol.
1: 494.4 f.) are summarized in the above list.
The four kinds o f fearlessness (vaiśāradhya : mi jigs pa) are demonstrated in the following declarations o f the
Buddha which he did not fear any truthful person could deny: (1) Declaration of renunciation (his abandonment of
all the cognitive and affective obscurations along with their latent tendencies); (2) Declaration of realization (his
perfect awakened realization o f all that is to be known); (3) Declaration o f the path that benefits other (viz. if one
depends on it, there is no possibility that one will not gain deliverance); (4) Declaration of what hinders the path that
benefits others (viz. if one indulges in those things that block the path, there is no possibility they will not become
obstacles to the path). These are again included among the eighteen undefiled Buddha-qualities in AK 7.32ac. See
La Valleé Poussin, vol. 4: 74 f.. The presentation here is based on Abhisamayãlamkāra 8.2-6 and its interpretations
by Yon tan rgya mtsho in his Yon tan mdzod ’grel vol. 1: 495.4 f. and Klong chen pa’s Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel vol.
1: 456.3 f..
These comprise the correct analytical knowledge (pratisarrivid : so sor yang dag par rig pa) encompassing (1)
teachings (every one o f the inconceivably numerous words of the teachings), (2) meanings (every one o f the
meanings based on these words), (3) vocabularies (every one o f the languages and terminologies used to reveal the
teachings to others); (4) confident eloquence (although he taught beginning from his first teaching until the end of
me aeon and beyond, his intelligence remained inexhaustable). This presentation follows Abhisamayãlamkāra 8.2-
’ Ton tan mdzod ’grel vol. 1: 497.1 f.; Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, vol. 1: 455.5 f..
These are the power (dbang : vaśitā) over: (1) life, (2) mind, (3) necessities, (4) karma, (5) rebirth, (6) devotion,
au (8) mirculous powere, (9) primordial knowing, (10) dharma. This presentation follows
ohisamayālamkãra 8.2-6; Yon tan mdzod ’grel vol. 1: 493.1 f.; Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, vol. 1: 455.6 f..
That is, the rDzogs pa chen po Sems nyid ngal gso ’i ’grel pa Shing rta chen po (see Sems nyid ngal gso grel).
 The distilled meaning of ground, path and goal,
May all beings without exception realize the meaning of luminosity
And be Victors of the dharma, spontaneously \fulfilling] life ’s two aims.

In the vast ocean-isle in the jeweled sea of intelligence [dwells]

The serpent[-buddha] adomed with precious hood of the three trainings.
Endowed with goodness and renownedfor qualities ofpure dharma675,
May this elucidation of the teaching provide a lasting foundation.
By clarifying, in accordance with my command of the subject matter,
The distilled quintessence of scripture, reasoning and personal guidance,
May all beings without exception traverse the path to liberation
And may they spontaneously realize life ’s two glorious aims.
While I have longed to meet with you,
Time and place have grantedfew opportunities,
But infuture times, it is hoped we will be reunited in
Pure buddha-fields overflowing with the riches of inborn qualities.
This reply to the question(s) you have asked
Is my modest contribution to a subject dijficult to understand. [393]
But as far as I am able, I have put into words the subject matter
Of which I am certain and ojfer it respectfully to you.

These Instructions on Investigating Mind and Primordial knowing have been respectfully
offered by this contemplative who teaches the dharma, Tshul khrims blo gros, from [the hermitage
at] Snow Capped Mountain (Gangs ri thod dkar) to the master676 Chos grags bzang po. May all
beings hereby gain mastery over the exquisite worldy and transworldly splendours in all times,
places and situations, and as their bright qualities expand, may they effortlessly accede the highest
citadel o f supreme liberation.

Sarvam Mangalam! Kuśala, kuśala, kuśala.

675 Klong chen pa here incorporates his disciples name Chos grags bzang po [“Good one renowned for dharma”]
into the kävya, a trope employed in many Indian and Tibetan verses of dedication.
676 Klong ch en pa here re s p e ctfu lly ad d resses his Student (slob ma) as a m aster (slob dpon).
Three extant versions o f the Sems ye dris lan have been consulted in preparing this critical edition:

1) Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan. (SYa) A xylographic copy from blockprints
contained in the A ’dzom chos sgar edition o f the Klong chen pa gSung thor
bu vol. 1 (o f 2), 377.2-393.
2) Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan. (SYd) A xylographic copy from blockprints
in the Derge edition o f the Klong chen pa gsung thor bu vol. 1 (of 2), 292-304.

3) Sems dang ye shes brtag pa’i man ngag. (SYk) A manuscript copy o f Sems ye dris lan
contained in the bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa (NyKs) vol. 49 (of 120), 344-365.

The first two versions contain only minor discrepancies and would appear to derive from a common
source. The third, a reproduction o f the text contained in the manuscript copy o f the NyKs, contains
many scribal errors and has been o f limited philological value in preparing the edited text. In
addition, I was able to consult a rescension o f the text from the 26 volume Klong chen gsung ’bum in
book format that was recently published in China. A s this magnificent collection is largely677 based
on existing editions o f Klong chen pa’s works and no significant discrepancies were found, I saw no
need to include it in the works consulted.

In my translations and critical edition of the Sems ye dris lan, page references in subscript
square parentheses ( ] within the body o f the translation and edited transliteration refer to paginations
in the primary source used. The A ’dzom chos sgar edition (SYa) was taken as my primary source
with variant readings from the other editions (apart from the obvious scribal errors in SYk) included
in the notes to the edited text. These notes also indicate variants o f quotations found in Sanskrit
Originals or other Tibetan versions o f the quoted passages. Klong chen pa’s writings present a
particular challenge in this regard as he apparently (and is credited by tradition with) quoting texts
from memory. I have therefore attempted as far a possible to correct quotations on the basis of
Sanskrit edition and/or canonical recensions o f Tibetan translations wherever these are available. For
ease o f reference, I have included all other citation information for quoted passages and textual-
critical comments in the notes to the translation.

Abbreviations: In addition to the sigla for bibliographic references noted above and those included in
the Bibliography, I have employed the following abbreviations:

add. = addidit = added

om. = omittit or omisit = omits or omitted.
SYadk = all editions o f SY employed in this critical edition, i.e. SYa, SYd and SYk

I say largely because the last volume (26) contains works on the gCod system that have not appeared previously.

289
§1.4 A Critical Edition of Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan:

Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan zhes bya ba bzhugs\ \

Sems dang ye shes brtag pa ’i man ngag ces bya ba\ \

sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad la phyag ’tshal lo| |

gang thugs gnyis med chu gter dag pa’i dbyings| |

sems dang sems byung myog pa rab zhi zhing| |
mkhyen brtse’i gting mtha dpag gis mi lang ba’i| |
rgyal ba rgya mtsho sras bcas spyi bos mchod| |

chos tshul brgyad khri bzhi stong snying p o’i don| |

mdo dang rgyud sde’i dgongs pa ma nor bar| |
sems dang ye shes mam pa gnyis su ’dus| |
de don brtags nas sgom pa’i rim ba bri| |

de la yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas kyis chos kyi ’khor lo rim pa gsum du bskor ba yangl
|bka’ dang po bden pa bzhi’i chos kyi mam grangs las|gtso bor las dang po pa dang blo cung zad
dman pa mam ’jug pa |378) la dgongs te| |spang gnyen gyi rim pas nyams su len pa’i thabs gsal bar
gsungs shing|bka’ bar pa mtshan nyid med pa’i chos kyi mam grangs las|gtso bor cung zad sbyangs
pa dang dbang po ’bring po mams ’jug pa’i rim pa la dgongs te|ngo bo nyid med pa’imam grangs
kyi gnyen po la bdag tu ’dzin pa mams skye ba med par gsungs la| |bka’ tha ma nges pa don gyi chos
kyi mam grangs las|gtso bor yongs su rdzogs pa’i theg pa mams dang dbang po mon po mams ’jug
pa’i rim pas gshis la ji Itar gnas pa’i mam grangs rgya eher gsung te| |dang pos ’khor ba’i mtshan
nyid spang bya las ldog pa’i lam bstan| |bar pas spang bya las ’dzin pa’i rang bzhin ngo bo med pas
shes sgrib spang bar bstan| |tha mas yin lugs snying por bstan te| |dbang p o’i rim pa dang| |’jug tshul
gyi go rim la brten nas gsungs pa mams kyi don gsal rab phyed nas nyams su blang ba las| |’dir dang
po dri ma dang bcas pas ma dag pa’i gnas skabs dang| |lam gyis sbyangs pas dri ma rim pa bzhin du
dag pa ma dag pa dag pa’i gnas skabs dang| |dri ma thams cad dang bral ba shin tu mam dag gi gnas
skabs mam pa gsum la ltos nas| |gzhi dang| |lam dang| |’bras bu’i rim pa mams re zhig gsal bar mdzad
pa ni| |bka’ |379, tha ma’i rim pa bzhin brjod pa las| |rgyud bla mar\ |

ma dag ma dag dag pa dang| |

shin tu rnam dag go rim bzhin| |
sems can byang chub sems dpa’ dang| |
de bzhin gshegs pa zhes brjod do| | zhes gsungs te| |

sems can pa’i dus kyi ’od gsal ba’i ye shes rang la yod pa ni gzhi‘o| |byang chub sems dpa’i dus kyi
tshogs sbyor mthong sgom bzhi ni lam mo| |de bzhin gshegs pa’i dus kyi stobs sogs kyi yon tan de
mthar phyin pa ni ’bras bu’o| |de yang sems can pa’i sems nyid 'od gsal ba ni dri ma dang bcas pa’i
de bzhin nyid yin pas chos khams dge ba de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po sems nyid ’od gsal ba zhes
bya’o| I

1) ’dir dang po gzhi’i don bshad pa ni| |ye nas ’od gsal ba’i chos nyid ’dus ma byas shing lhun gyis
grub pa stong pa’i ngos nas dngos po dang mtshan ma gang du’ang ma grub cing ’khor ba dang mya
ngan las ’das pa la sogs pa gang du’ang ma chad pas spros pa’i mtha’ thams cad dang bral ba nam
mkha’ Ita bu| |gsal ba’i ngos nas sku dang ye shes kyi rang bzhin ye ldan du lhung gyis sgrub cing
’od gsal ba nyi zla’i dkyil ’khor Ita bu| |de gnyis ka’ang ’du bral med pa’i chos nyid du ye nas gnas
pa ni| Isnying po rab tu bstan pa ’i mdo las [380] 11

thog ma med pa’i dus kyi dbyings678| |

chos mams kun gyi gnas yin te| |
de yod pas na ’gro ba kun| |
mya ngan ’das pa679 thob pa yin| | zhes dang| |

mdo sde rgyan las| |

snga ma phyi ma680 khyad med kyang| |

de bzhin nyid ni dag gyur ba681| |

zhes dang| |

ji Itar snga bzhin phyis de bzhin| |

'gyur ba med pa’i chos nyid do682! | ces pa dang| |

rin po che rgya mtsho ’i rgyud las| |

ye nas ’od gsal bde gshegs snying po ni| |

nor bu bzhin du yon tan ma lus rdzogs| |
dri med mkha’ dang nyi m a’i dkyil ’khor bzhin| |
sku dang ye shes lhun gyis grub pa nyid| | ces pa la sogs pa’o| |

de Itar ’od gsal ba’i ye shes ni gdod m a’i gzhir Itar pas gtan la dbab pa’o| |ding sang ni dge ba’i bshes
gnyen phal dang| |sgom chen kun mthun par| |stong rkyang ci yang med pa la gzhi byed pa ni snying
Po’i don gyi dgongs pa dang mi mthun te| |ci’ang med pa’i gzhi nyams su blangs pas ’bras bu sangs
rgyas yon tan thams cad dang ldan pa mi ’byung ste| |gzhi lam ’bras bu gsum ’jol ba’i phyir ro| |sangs

8 R G W khams
R G W pa ’ang
680nvrub mtha ’ mdzod has mar
MSA 1X.22 D has first line but not second. See translation and annotation.
SYadk ’gyur ba med pa de bzhin nyid; RGVt ’gyur ba med pa ’i chos nyid do
rgyas de ni ’dus ma byas shing lhun gyis grub pa’i yon tan can bral ba’i ’bras bu mngon du gyur pa
zhig yin pa’i phyir ro| |des na srid rtse’i Ita ba dang de dag mthun par snang ngo| |’dir ni ’dus ma byas
shing lhun gyis grub pa’i ’od gsal ba nyid gzhir ’dod pa [381] yin no| |gzhi de Ita bu’i ngang las yin
lugs ngo ma shes pas ma rig par gyur te| |de las gzung ’dzin du ’khrul nas khams gsum du ’khor bar
sgyu 'phrul d rva ba ’i rgyud las| |

e ma ho bde gshegs snying po las| |

rang gi mam rtog las kyis sprul683! I zhes so| |

d e’ang gnas lugs ma shes pa rtsa ba’i ma rig pa ste| |dang po’i ’khrul pa bskyed pa’i gzh i’am sa bon
nam rten gzhir gyur pa’i ngang las| |gnyis su ’dzin pa’i kun rtog längs pa ni kun tu brtags pa’i ma rig
pa ste| |de gnyis las sems can tha ma ngang song gsum dang| |’bring mi dang| |mchog 1ha mams so
so ’i snang ba mi ’dra ba tha dad du shar nas kun gzhi la bag chags sna tshogs su bzhag pa’i nus pas
’khor ba mtho dman du zo chu’i khyud mo bzhin rang snang bde sdug so sor spyod pa ni| |sd u d pa
lasj I

sems can tha ma ’bring dang mchog gyur ji snyed pa| |

de kun ma rig las byung bde bar gshegs pas gsungs| | zhes so| |

de Itar khams gsum so sor brgyud kyang bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ni ngan du ma song bar sems
can thams cad la khyab byed du gnas te| |d b ra l p h re n g gi m do las| |

bde gshegs snying pos 'gro kun yongs la khyab| | ces dang| |

rg y u d bla m a las| |

rdzogs sangs sku ni ’phro phyir dang| |

de bzhin nyid [3821 dbyer med phyir dang| |
rigs yod phyir na lus can kun| |
rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can| | zhes gsungs pa bzhin no| |

d e’ang sems can pa’i dus na bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po de| |sems kyis bsgribs te dri ma dang bcas
par gnas pa ni| |sg yu 'phrul d rva ba las

sa yi dkyil na yod pa’i chu| |

rtag tu rang bzhin dri ma med| |
de bzhin sems kyi sgrib pa’i khams| |
gro ba kun la rang bzhin gnas| | zhes pa dang| |

rg yu d bla m a las| |

683 Theg mchog mdzod has ’khrul; *Guhyagarbha 2.15: sprul

 ji Itar mi dbul khyim nang sa 'og na| |
mi bzad pa684 yi gter ni yod gyur la| |
mi des de685 ma shes shing686 gter de yang| |
de la nga ’dir yod ces mi smra ltar| |

de bzhin yid kyi nang chud rin chen gter| |

dri med gzhag dang bsal687 med chos nyid kyang| |
ma rtogs pas na dbul ba’i sdug bsngal ni688| |
mam mang689 kun tu skye rgu ’dis myong ngo| | zhes pa Itar ngo| |

de yang bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ni nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor Ita bu yin la| |kun gzhi bag chags dang
bcas pa khams gsum pa’i rgyud kyis bsdus pa’i sems sems byung thams cad sprin dang ’dra ba yin
no| |mkhas par rlom pa’i blun po kha cig| |sems sems byung sgrib par mi ’thad de sems bskyed pa’i
phyir dang| |sems nyid ’od gsal ba khams yin pa’i phyir ro| |des na sems [383) rtog med byang chub kyi
yan lag ting nge ’dzin du ’dod do zer ba ni mdo rgyud kyi dgongs pa ma long pa’i mam gyur yin te
sems bskyed pa’ang ’khor ba’i gnas skabs na blang dor du byed pa’i rtog pa min nam| |yin na ni
mthar thug ’gag dgos la| |sems nyid la zer na ni bskyed bya bskyed byed gnyis med pas mi ’grub pa’i
phyir ’os pa ma yin no| |sems dang sems nyid so sor phyogs ma byed par snang ste| |sems ni khams
gsum pa’i rgyud kyi rtog pa dang dpyod pa cha dang bcas pas sgro btags ’khrul pa’i mam pa ’dzin
byed kun gzhi tshogs brgyad dang bcas pa yin te| |dbu .na bden gnyis las| |

sems dang sems byung khams gsum pa’i| |

sgro btags mam pa can rtog yin| | zhes so| |

sems nyid ni bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ’od gsal ba’i ye shes te| |de’ang sems ’gags shing ma
mchis pa’i tshe sems nyid ’od gsal ba’i ye shes so so rang gi rig pa la snang ba yin no| |yum brgyad
stong pa las| |

sems de ni690 sems ma mchis pa691 te sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal ba lags so692| | zhes
gsungs pa yin no| |

684 SYadk sa; RGVt pa

685 SYadk ngo; RGVt Je
SYadk, RGVt shing; D (sasträ) te
SYadk bsal dang bzhag; RGVt gzhag dang bsal
688 SYadk nyid; RGVt ni
689 „
SYadk p a ; RGVt mang
SYadk la; D de ni (corroborated by Skt. see note in translation)
91 SYadk om.p a
SY adk ba ’o; D ba lags so
sangs rgyas kyi sa na| |sems chen po yod do zhes na| |de ni ye shes chen po la zer te| |rgyud las nyon
mongs pa chen po nyid ye shes su bshad pa dang mam pa mthun no| |mdor [3M] bsdu na khams gsum
pa’i sems sems byung cha dang bcas pa thog ma med pa nas brgyud pa’i bag chags can sgrib pa
gnyis kyi ngo bo ’dzin cing| |bskyed par brten693 pas spang bya yin zhing dgag dgos par bshad pa yin
no| |de yang sems nyid 'od gsal ba’i nang la brten pa med pa’i tshul gyis da Itar brten pa ni nam
mkha’ la sprin lding ba Itar ’dod de| \rgyud bla ma las| |

sa ni chu la chu rlung la| |

rlung ni mkha’ la rab tu gnas| |
mkha’ ni rlung dang chu dag dang| |
sa yi khams la gnas ma694 yin| |
de bzhin695 phung po khams dbang mams| |
las dang nyon mongs dag la gnas696| |
las dang nyon mongs tshul bzhin min|
yid la byed pa rtag tu gnas| I697
tshul bzhin ma yin yid byed ni| |
sems kyi dag pa la rab gnas| |
sems kyi rang bzhin chos mams ni| |
thams cad la yang gnas pa me698| | zhes so| |

rnam ’grel las| |

sems ’di rang bzhin ’od gsal te| |699

dri ma mams ni glo bur ba| |

zhes pa’ang tshul de dang mthun te| |sems kyi rang bzhin| |sems kyi chos nyid| |sems nyid| |dbying
rang bzhin kyis dag pa| |don dam pa’i gnas lugs mams don geig yin pa’i phyir ro| |sems de yang
khams gsum gyi dbye bas rtog med rtse geig pa dang| |gsal ba tsam dang| |rtog bcas kyi gnas skabs
gsum mo| ||385| d e’ang sems la brten cing bag chags kyis ’khrul par snang ba ’khor ba’i chos ’di dag
mi bden pa| |bslu ba| |byis pa ’drid pa| |gsog| |gsob| |yama brla| |snying po med pa||lbu ba rdos pa||chu
shing| |sgyu ma| |mig yor la sogs pa dpe brgyad kyis bstan te| |ra ri| |’al ’ol||med bzhin snang ba|
|snang dus nyid nas rang bzhin med pa| |blos dpyod mi bzod pa| |kun rdzob ’khrul pa’i ngor snang
tsam dha du ra zos pa’i snang ba dang ’dra bar| |bar skabs su gzung ’dzin la bden par zhen pa’i mthus

693 SYa brten; SYd, SYk bstan

694 SYadk pa; RGVt ma
695 SYadk ni; RGVt bzhin
696 SYadk brten; RGVtg«as
697 lineadd. as per RGVt 1.56d
698 SYadk ma yin; RGVt pa med
699 SYadk sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal ba\; D sems ’di rang bzhin ’od gsal te\ Correction corroborated by Skt.
prabhäsvaram idam cittam prakrtyägantavo maläh\ See note to translation for sources.
snang bar shes par bya’o| |’od gsal ba’i snying po ni| |don dam pa’i bden pa| |rtag pa| |brtan pa| |’pho
'gyur med pa| |rab tu zhi ba| |mi bslu ba| |thog ma med pa nas tha ma’i bar gzhi ji bzhin pa ye shes kyi
ngo bo spros pa’i mtha’ thams cad dang bral zhing| |sems dang sems las byung ba’i chos thams cad
kyi dri mas ma gos mi gos gos pa med pa’i rang bzhin mnyam pa nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor sgrib pa med
pa Ita bur shes par bya’o| |

2) don gnyis pa lam nyams su blang ba ni| |de Itar sangs rgyas kyi snying po rang la yod par rtogs nas
de’ang ngang du bsgom pa ste| |de’ang pha rol tu phyin pa’i lugs kyis sems bskyed nas bsgoms la|
Isngags kyis d e’i steng du l386J dbang gis smin par byas te gdams pas grol bar byed pa’o| |’dir ngo bo
geig tu nyams su len tshul mdo dang mthun te| |de yang stan bde ba la ’dug nas skyabs su 'gro ba
dang sems bskyed de| |gang la mos pa’i lhar skad cig gis gsal btab pa’i rjes la| |mam700 snang gi chos
bdun dang Idan pas gang la’ang mi rtog cing ci la’ang mi ’dzin yul snang thog tu blos ma bzung ba’i
rig pa sal le sing nge wa le ba’i nang la mnyam par bzhag pa ni| |’od gsal ba’i don la ’jog pa yin te|
I'phags pa klu sgrub kyis dbu ma skye med rin po che ’i mdzod las| |

gar yang ma rtog cir yang ma ’dzin cig| |

bcas bcos ma byed rang bzhin Ihug par zhog| |
ma bcos pa de skye med rin chen mdzod| |
dus gsum rgyal ba kun gyi gshegs shul lags| | zhes dang| |

he ru ka gal po las| |

bsam du med de sems nyid nam mkha’ che| |

sems nyid nam mkha’ bsam pa kun dang bral| |
bsam du med pa’i sems nyid nam mkha’ ni| |
nam mkhar701 mi dmigs pa yang dmigs su med| | ces so| |

de yang d e’i tshe sems dang sems byung thams cad ’gags nas mam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes so so
rang rig pa’i ngo bor gnas pa ste| |lung las| |

smra bsam brjod med shes rab f3871 pha rol phyin| |
ma skyes mi ’gags nam mkha’i ngo bo nyid| |
so so rang rig ye shes spyod yul ba| |
dus gsum rgyal ba’i yum la phyag ’tshal lo| |702 zhes so| |

de’ang don dam pa’i bden pa ni sems b lo’i yul las ’das pa zhes pa’ang tshulde la zer gyi| |sems’gags
shing blo las ’das pa’i dus na ye shes rang la gnas pa de ni chos nyid desprin dang bral bas nyi ma
gsal ba bzhin no| |de Itar mnyam par ’jog pa la dangs snyigs phyed pa’i bog ’byin nam mkha’ sprin
med pa’i tshe nyi ma la rgyab phyogs par ’dug ste| |mig nam mkha’i dkyil lam ngos der bltas pas

SYa, SYd rnam; SYk rnams

SYa, SYd mkha SYk mkhar
702 T U
1ne passage is often quoted by Klong chen pa. See note to translation.
shes pa dvangs la rtog med byung ngo| |de’i tshe sems ’gags pas phyi rol snang yul la dngos po ngos
bzung du ’dzin pa dang| |nang sems dngos po ngos bzung du ’dzin pa gnyis dmigs pa med pas dngos
po dang dngos po med pa la mi rtog pa na| |de gnyis las gzhan du ’dzin pa’i phung po gsum pa dmigs
pa med pa zhi ba ste| |spyod jug las| |

gang tshe dngos dang dngos med dag| |

blo yi mdun na mi gnas pa| |
de tshe mam pa gzhan med pas| |
dmigs pa med pa rab tu zhi| | zhes pa dangj |

mtshan brjod las| |

so so rang rig mi g.yo ba| |703 zhes pa dang| |

do ha las| |

chu dang mar l388| me rang gsal geig pur zhog| | ces dang| |

tog rtse pas\ \

sems kyis bsgom pa bsgom ma yin| |

mi sgom pa’ang sgom pa min| |
sgom dang mi sgom las ’das pa| |
yid la med do phyag rgya che| | zhes gsungs pa’i don te| |

de’i tshe sems ’gags pa’i don rig pa ye shes kyi sku mngon du gyur pa ste| |

sems ’gags pas704 de sku yis mngon sum mdzad705| |

ces pa’i zur geig yin no| |de yang ting nge ’dzin yang dag pa zhig yin na| |kun gzhi dang kun gzhi’i
mam shes kyi sems dang| |yid shes dang| |sgo lnga’i mam par shes pa thams cad dang bral ba’i rig
pa’i ngang las mi g.yo ba ’byung ste| |dkon mchog brtegs pa’i gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyabpa’i le’u
las| I

703 Skt. pratyätmavedyo hy acalah... See translation n. 60.

704 SYadk ’g ags pa; P n. 5262; ’g ags pa; D, P n.5261 ’g agpas. See n. 62 and n. 104 for text critical comments on
variant readings.
705 This oft-quoted line is generally given as sems ’gag pa de sku yis mngon sum mdzad\ in Klong chen pa’s works.
See Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel, Sems ye dris lan, Grub mtha ’ mdzod, Chos dbyings mdzod, Theg mchog mdzod, Zab
don snying po with occasional variants, e.g. Sems nyid ngal gso ’g rel vol. 1: 132: sku y i though not Sems nyid ngal
gso vol. 2: 314: sku yis; Grub m tha’ mdzod: 799: dgag pa instead o f ’g ag pa, though not Grub m tha’ mdzod 992:
993: ’gag pa.
 sems dang yid dang mam par shes pa thams cad dang bral la| |ting nge ’dzin gyi gnas kyang mi
’dor ba ste| | zhes gsung pa yin no| |

de Itar bsgoms pas nyams bde ba| |gsal ba| |mi rtog pa gsum ngang gyis ’byung zhing gzhan yang
tshad med de| \mdo gdams ngag ’bog pa ’i rgyal po las| |

bsam du med pa’i chos nyid la| |

bsam du med pa’i blo gzhag na| |
phyogs ris med pa’i nyams myong skye| | zhes so| |

de’ang ting nge ’dzin ’di nyid khams gsum pa’i sems dang bral ba’i tshul ni| |(389, gzugs med na
rtog706 med rtse geig pa snang yul med pa yin la| |’di ni mam rtog med kyang yul snang ba mi 'gog
pa dang| |rtse geig pa’i ’dzin pa med pa’o| |gzugs kyi sems ni yul snang ba yin yang rtog dpyod kyi
cha dang bcas pa dang| |rtog dpyod med cing bsam gtan gyi dga’ bas brgyan kyang ’dzin pa las ma
’das pa ste| |mtha’ ma chod pas b lo’i yul las ma ’das pa dang ’dod pa’i sems ni gtso bor rtog dpyod
dang bcas pa ste| |’dir ni mi rtog pa’i ye shes yin pa dang| |gzhan yang khams gsum so so ’i ting nge
’dzin de ni sems kyi snang yul bag chags dang bcas pas| |gnas lugs kyi rang bzhin ma shes bzhin du
gnas la| |’dir ni rang bzhin ’od gsal ba’i gzhi’i ngo bo rtogs pa dang sems bskyed pas zin pa dang|
|thabs dang shes rab zung du ’brel ba la sogs pa’i khyad par du ma dang bcas pa’o| |de yang bsam
gtan bzhi dang gzugs med pa bzhi yang gnyis te| |’dzin pa ’khor ba’i sems kyis bsdu pa ni ’dir ’gag
dgos la| l’jig rten las ’das pa’i bsam gtan gzugs med ni yang dag pa’i ye shes yin pa’i phyir blang bar
bya ba yin no| |de Itar na ’od gsal ba’i ye shes rim gyis goms pa l390, las| |sa dang lam thams cad gong
nas gong du bgrod cing| |spyan dang mngon par shes pa la sogs pa rang chas su yod pa mams ’char
ba ni| |chu dvangs pa las gzugs bmyan ngang gis ’char ba bzhin no| |

3) don gsum pa ’bras bu ni| |de Itar gzhi shes nas lam bsgoms pas khams la sgrib pa’i sems sems
byung gi dri ma cha dang bcas pa dag nas| |sa bcu rgyun gyi tha mar rdo rje Ita bu’i ting nge ’dzin
gyi rjes la sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ’char ba ni khams nyid dri ma mtha’ dag dang bral bas byang
chub tu gnas 'gyur ba zhes bya’o| |de’i tshe chos kyi sku ’od gsal ba so so rang gi rig pa’i ye shes
kyis707 sems ’gag pa’i ’gog pa dam pa mngon du mdzad do| \’jug pa las| |

shes bya’i bud shing skom po ma lus pa| |

bsregs708 pas zhi ste709 rgyal mams chos sku ste| |
de tshe skye ba med cing ’gag pa med| |
sems ’gags pas710 de sku yis mngon sum mdzad| \ ces so| |

06 SYa, SYk rtogs; SYk rtog

/07 SYa kyi; SYd, SYk kyis
8 SYadk bsreg; MAv bsregs
09 SYadk de; MAv ste
SYadk ’gag; MAv ’gags
sku de yang mam pa gsum ste| |chos kyi sku rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba dang| |long spyod rdzogs
pa’i sku nges pa Inga Idan dang| |sprul pa’i sku gdul bya so s o ’i mos pa Itar gang la gang ’dul du
snang ba ste| |yid bzhin gyi nor bu Itar yon tan lhun gyis grub pa| |’khor ba ji srid par ’gro (391, ba’i
don gnyis lhun gyis grub pa’i phrin las 'byung ba ’di ni spros pa thams cad dang bral ba’i ye shes kyi
sku la snang zhing mngon du mdzad pa ni| |de nyid las| |

zhi sku dpag bsam shing Itar gsal gyur cing| |

yid bzhin nor bu ji bzhin mam mi rtog| |
'gro grol bar du ’jig rten ’byor slad rtag| |
’di ni spros dang bral la snang ba ’gyur7,,| | zhes so| |

de’ang sangs rgyas pa’i tshe sems dang sems byung ’gags kyang| |ye shes mi ’gag pas bems stong
nam mkha’ Ita bu ma yin te| |spangs pa’i yon tan sgrib pa thams cad dang bral zhing| |rtogs pa’i yon
tan stobs bcu dang| |mi ’jigs pa bzhi dang| |so so yang dag pa’i rig pa bzhi dang| |dbang bcu la sogs pa
bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i mkhyen rab dang thugs rjes sems can gyi don mdzad cing| |’dus ma byas
shing lhun gyis grub pa ni khams la yon tan ye Idan du yod pa’i nus pa mngon du gyur pa ste| |rgyud
bla ma las| |

’dus ma byas shing lhun gyis grub| |

gzhan gyi rkyen gyis rtogs min pa712| |
mkhyen dang brtse dang nus par713 ldan| |
don gnyis Idan pa’i sangs rgyas nyid| | ces so| |

mdor na 'od gsal ba’i khams kyi nus pa rdzogs |392, pa’i byang chub ces bya ba ni ’bras bu’o| |’di dag
gi mam par bzhag pa rgyas par ni| |kho bos byas pa’i bstan bcos Nges don Shing rta chen por blta bar
bya’o| I

de Itar gzhi lam ’bras bu’i don bsdus pa| |

cung zad gsal bar byas pa’i dge ba des| |
ma lus ’gro kun ’od gsal don rtogs nas| |
don gnyis lhun grub chos kyi rgyal por shog| |
blo gros chu gter yangs pa’i mtsho gling na| |
bslab gsum klu dbang rin chen gdeng kas mdzes| |
chos dkar yon tan grags pa bzang po can| |
bstan pa’i gsal byed yun du gnas gyur cig| |
lung rig man ngag snying p o’i bcud bsdus te| |
ji Itar sbobs bzhin gsal bar byas pa des| |
ma lus 'gro kun thar pa’i lam bgrod de| |
dpal Idan don gnyis lhun gyis grub par shog| |

7.1 SYadk MAv ’g yur

7.2 SYadk dang; RGVt/w
713 SYadk pa; RGVt par
 dam pa khyed dang mjal bar spro na yang| |
dus dang gnas kyis cung zad skal par gyur| |
phyi dus yon tan ’byor pas yongs gang ba’i| |
dag pa’i zhing du lhan cig mjal bar smon| |
dam pa khyed kyis dris pa’i lan ’di ni| |
rtogs dka’i gnas te 'on kyang cha shas tsam| |
ji Itar nus shing t393| kho bos nges pa’i gnas| |
yi ger bkod nas phyag tu gus pas ’bul| |

sems dang ye shes brtagpa'i man ngag ces bya ba| |gangs ri thod dkar nas chos smra ba’i bsam gtan
pa tshul khrims blo gros kyis| |slob dpon chos grags bzang po'i phyag tu phul ba phyogs dus gnas
skabs thams cad du ’jig rten dang ’jig rten las ’das pa’idpal phun sumtshogs parmnga’ dbang’byor
zhiiig| l’gro ba thams cad kyi dkar po mam par ’phel bas thar pachen po’i grongkhyer mchog tu
’bad pa med par phyin par gyur cig| |

sarvam mangalam| |dge’o| |dge’o| |dge’o| |

2. Klong chen pa’s T heg m ch og m d zo d XIV (excerpts)

§2.1 Introductory Remarks:

Among Klong chen pa’s extant writings, the Theg mchog rin po che’i mdzod Stands as
something of a monument to the author’s vast erudition and extraordinary skills in doctrinal
synthesis and interpretation. The architectural metaphor is appropriate here for the work is
constructed, as Klong chen pa explains in his colophon, as a Tibetan stupa (mchod rten), a
monument to the enlightened mind of a buddha (thugs kyi rten), which the author has assembled and
reverentially offered for the sake of preserving the sNying thig teachings for posterity out of fear
that they would otherwise disappear.714 Its twenty-five chapters which are referred to as ‘stories’
(rim khang)1 throughout the text are said to be organized like five ascending steps of a stupa, each
adomed with five subsidiary parts.716 The scope of the work is also monumental. In two volumes
with a combined total of 2179 folia sides, this massive treatise elaborates on virtually every element
of the rDzogs chen sNying thig system as presented in the Seventeen Tantras. The author’s Tshig
don mdzod covers some of the same ground but not nearly as much of it and in not nearly as much
detail. Among the works of Klong chen pa’s predecessors one also finds few extant attempts to
systematize the sNying thig system, apart from mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum’s Tshig don bcu geig pa, and
certainly none with anything like the attention to detail that marks the Theg mchog mdzod.
The sections included here are from the fourteenth chapter of the treatise which consists in a
lengthy explication (166 folia sides) of the nature of primordial knowing and its place in rDzogs
chen soteriology. In this pivotal chapter, Klong chen pa takes up the two principal rDzogs chen
distinctions as key points for understanding the scope and complexity of ye shes, both in doctrine
and contemplative praxis. The chapter concludes with fifteen examples (dpe) used to illustrate the
sems/rig pa distinction based on the Rig pa rang shar (Ati vol. 1, 667.4) followed by sixteen key
points for realizing its meaning (don) so that one does not confuse the two. Given the constraints of
this investigation, I have confined my focus to Klong chen pa’s brief introductions (mdor bstan) to

714 Theg mchog mdzod vol. 2: 2165.5 f.: gnas gzhan grub pa ’i goms tshugs ’khyor zhing zab mo ’i gnad rnams ’thor
dogs nas\ \ring por m a thogs bka yi bsdu ba rim khang nyi shu Inga par\ |snying po ’i don rnams phyogs geig bsdus
nas thugs kyi rten du gus pas bsgrubs] \
7.5 The term rim khang (literally ievel-house’) is not attested in any o f the dictionaries I have consulted but is likely
similar to bang rim, the steps o f a stüpa.
7.6 Theg mchog mdzod, vol. 2: 2166.1 f.: theg mchog mnyam pa ’i sa gzhi la\ \ ’od gsal rdo rje snying po ’i rtse\ |rim
khang Inga phrag Ingas brgyan pa\ \zab cing rgya che ’i bdkodpas mdzad\ \chos mchog rin chen snying po las grub
pa\rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po ’i mchod rten n\ \snang srid ’khor ’das zhing kun thag grus khyab\\
 the two distinctions where he summarizes the essence and characteristics of sems/ye shes and kun
gzhi/chos sku and advances some of his most cogent arguments to justify these distinctions.

§2.2 Annotated Translation: Treasury ofthe Supreme Vehicle XIV (excerpts)

Theg p a ’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod (TCa: pp. 1019.4-1027.3):

Chapter Fourteen: Exposition on the Topic of the Founded Cognition (excerpts)

Thus, having explained in detail the body as a founding basis (rten lus) and its other associated
phenomena, we shall now ascertain the nature of the cognition founded on it (brten pa shes pa) by
way of three [topics]:

1) The distinction between all-ground (kun gzhi) and dharmakäya (chos sku) (102oi
2) The distinction between mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes)
3) A detailed explanation of other distinctive phenomena717

1) The first is two-fold:

A) A brief Indication
B) A detailed Explanation

A) First, when we look at [what is] the ground of sentient beings (sems can) and the ground of
buddhas (sangs rgyas), we should understand that the all-ground and dharmakäya are of two types in
that [the latter] is the essence of open awareness (rig pa) in its mode of being as undefiled original
purity and [the former] is the ground of all mistaken appearances and mistaken apprehensions which
are contaminated by defiled ignorance and a morass of conceptual fabrications. As the sGra thal
'gyur [Ati vol. 1 , 128.5718] States:

Conceming the vital points of the all-ground and the dharmakäya...719

The all-ground, characterized by ignorance, is like a resevoir since it is serves as a receptacle

°f latent tendencies, being the initial basis, intermediate locus, and final abode of everything
comprising mind and its mental factors. By contrast, the dharmakäya is characterized by the reversal

This section comprises two sets o f teachings on the distinction between dualistic mind and open awareness
(sems/rig pa): the first consists o f fifteen examples illustrating the distinction as presented in the Rig pa rang shar
with commentary on each by Klong chen pa; the second consists in an elaboration on sixteen specific points of
comparison and contrast between open awareness as realized in the sNying thig System and the operations of
dualistic mind in lower sütric and tantric Buddhist traditions. The source for these is a passage from the Kun nt
bzang po klong drug.
718 rp,,
Tk vol. 10: 473.3; Tb vol. 12: 107.2.
719
This line introduces a passage that Klong chen pa quotes at length and comments on later in the text.
of ignorance. It transcends the domain of mind and its mental factors and is thoroughly purified
of all actions (karman) and their latent tendencies. The all-ground is the ground of multifarious
appearances, like a carpet of silk brocade720. It embraces the various objects, i.e., what appears as an
[outer] habitat, and the many subjects, i.e., the six classes of beings that appear as inhabitants of the
three realms along with their bodies, their joys and their sorrows, and the many erroneous features of
their minds. By contrast, the dharmakäya is the absence of all this and is not associated with ego-
mind and the other [modes of consciousness]. As the Rig pa rang shar [Ati vol. 1,737.5721] states:

The all-ground embraces dichotomic thoughts.

It is vitiated by mistaken cognitions of myriad things.722
The all-ground is a state of fundamental ignorance.
The term ‘all-ground’ is to be taken in this sense.

The text also states [Ati vol. 1, 736.4723]:

Surely the ground of a sentient being and ground of a buddha

Are demarcated by a single distinction.

As the Mu tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 518.4724] states

It is all-ground because it accumulates [contaminated phenomena].

The dharmakäya is the elimination of contamination (zag pa).
Empty „0221 and clear, it is clear and [all-]pervasive.725

720 The sense o f za ’og gi bar gding which I render as ‘carpet of silk brocade’ is not completely clear. A similar
expression za ’og gyi ’ding ba occurs in Klong chen pa’s Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin where it is likewise employed
as an anology (alongside ‘earth’ sa gzhi) for the all-ground in its role as the source o f myriad phenomena stemming
from the indeterminate cognition characterized by ignorance. m Kha’ ’g ro yang tig vol. 2: 93.4 f.: ...kun gzhi ni ma
rig pa ’i shes pa lung ma bstan las sna tshogs pa ’i rten byed pas sa gzhi ’am\ |za ’og gi ’ding ba Ita bu yin pa ’i phyir
ro\\
721 Tk vol. 10: 246.6 f.; Tb vol. 11: 594.4 f..
722 I follow the Theg mchog mdzocTs sna tshogs ’khrul p a ’i shes pas bslad\ that helps clarify the sense of sna tshogs
p a y i shes pas bslad\ that is found in the canonical recensions I have consulted (Ati, Tk, Tb).
723 Tk vol. 10: 246.1; Tb vol. 11:593.5.
724 Tk vol. 9: 569.4 f.; Tb vol. 12: 380.3 f..
725 The Mu tig phreng ba ’g rel ascribed to Vimalamitra (NyKs vol. 112: 436.1 f.) explains this and the preceding
line as follows: “It is called dharmakäya due to the fact that it is without corporeal limitations. Since the
contamination o f the elemental forces is depleted, it is not confined to materiality and atoms. Since the
contamination o f afflicitive emotionality is depleted, there is no [determinate] link between earlier and later
[predicated onj subject and object. And since the contamination of temporal succession (snga phyi) o f latent
tendencies is depleted, habitual attachments freely resolve themselves. In this way, since real entities (dngos po) are
themselves depleted, [dharmakäya] prevails as emptiness and the abiding nature of everything. It is luminous (gsal)
due to the presence of the effulgence o f the five modes of primordial knowing and it shines forth directly in its
clarity (gsal ba) due to the presence of the guru’s esoteric instructions. In thus realizing this [dharmakäya] all at
once (cig char du rtogs), it is all-pervading, even in the absence o f the guru’s scriptural transmissions.” chos kyi sku
ni\ lus kyi mtha ’ stong pa ’i phyir na\ | ’byung ba ’i zag pa zadpasa sa rdul dang rdul phran la mi gnas\ \nyon mongs
 Uncontaminated by thinking, it is cleansed of reflections.726
Free from discursive elaborations727,
It is pervasive and empty like space.
Intrinsically pure, it is beyond description.728
The all-ground together with [its] causes and conditions729
Is similar to a resevoir because it accumulates latent tendencies.730
The dharmakäya is free of latent tendencies.
From the consolidation of ego-mind, mind and so förth,
The all-grounds of embodied beings appear as multiple things. 731
Since the dharmakäya is free from ego-mind and so forth,
It is without corporeality appearing in many forms.732

p a ’i zag pa zad pas bzung ’dzin snga p h y i’i bsdebs med pa dang\ \bag chags snga p h y i’i zag pa zad pas zhen pa
rang thog tu grol ba ’o/de Ita bu de dngos po zad pas stong zhing thams cad kyi bdag nyid du byung pa dang\ \ye
shes Inga ’i gdangs y o d pas gsal la\ \bla ma ’i man ngag yod pas gsal ba mngon sum du snang bas de nyid cig char
du rtogs la bla m a ’i lung med .kyang kun la khyab p a ’o\\ ^ext: p a ’i. Interlinear interpolations in Ati vol. 2: 518.5
give the following interpretation o f the second line: stong zhing (rang dangs) gsal ba (rig pa) gsal zhing (thugs rje)
khyab\\. This is suggestive o f the rDzogs chen triad of empty essence (ngo bo - stong pa), luminous nature (rang
bzhin - gsal ba) and all-encompassing responsiveness (thugs rje - kun khyab). Interlinear interpolations in Tb gloss
gsal ba as referring to primordial knowing as spontaneously nature (rang bzhin Ihun grub kyi ye shes) and
primordial knowing as all-encompassing responsiveness (thugs rje kun khyab kyi ye shes), and gsal as referring to
the five modes o f primordial knowing.
726 An interlinear note (Ati vol. 2: 518.6) specifies that “dharmakäya which transcends reflective thinking is bliss
supreme” dran bsam las ’daspa ’i chos sku bde ba chen po\. Further clarification is found the Mu tig phreng ba ’grel
(NyKs vol. 112: 436.4 f.): “Now, since this dharmakäya which transcends reflective thinking manifests as bliss
supreme, open awareness shines in its own clarity, unadulterated by conceptual differentiations. Conceming the
cleansing o f adventitious reflections, the nature of things which is naturally devoid of discursive elaborations is free
from the proliferation of language itself insofar as it is without any superimpositions. And since it is ffee ffom
intellectual elaborations, it is [also] devoid o f the freely arising, independently existing elements.” de yang drana
bsam las ’das pa ’i chos sku bde ba chen por shar bas rnam par rtog pa tha dad pas ma sbags par rig pa rang ngo
na gsal la\ \glo bur gyi dran pa rnams sangs pa ni\ \rang bzhin du spros pa med pa ’i chos nyid la\ \tshig gi spros pa
nyid dang bral ba ste sgros btags su med\ | blo ’i spros pa dang bral bas ’byung ba rang rgyud pa thal byung du
tnedW “ text: bran
727
An interlinear note (Ati vol. 2: 518.6) glosses “free ffom discursive elaborations” (spros pa nyid dang bral ba) as
meaning “beyond words and letters” (tshig dang yi ge las ’das pa).
8 The Mu tig phreng ba ’g rel explains (NyKs vol. 112: 436.6 f.): “For example, like space, [the dharmakäya] is all-
pervasive and empty in essence. Since is essence is pure by nature, it is ffee from all the blessings and the symbols,
the skillful means used to reveal it. Consequently, it is said to have not departed fforn the single ground” dper na
nam m kha’ Ita bur kun la khyab cing\ \ngo bos sto n g p a ’o\ \ngo bo de rang bzhin gyis dagpas\ \thabs kyis mtshan
pa ’i brda dang\ \byin rlabs la sogs pa kun dang bral bas gzhi geig las ma g.yos pa zhes bya ’o\\
729
An interlinear note (Ati vol. 2: 519.1) glosses ‘cause(s)’ (rgyu) as referring to ignorance (ma rig pa) and
conditions’ (rkyen) to the five elemental forces ( ’byung ba Inga).
730
According to the Mu ti phreng ba ’g rel (NyKs vol. 112: 437.3), just as water collects everything, so the all-
ground collects all of saipsära and nirväna.
This interpretation o f the last line follows Mu tig phreng ba ’g rei. de yang lus can kyi gzhi du mar byung ba ’o\ \
This reading follows Theg mchog mdzod, Ati and the Mu tig phreng ba ’grel (NyKs vol. 112: 437.5 f.) which
States: “Since dharmakäya is free ffom the many afflictive emotions such as ego-mind and the rest, it is without the
flesh and blood corporeal elements appearing as the forms o f many things such as the subtle and coarse elements
Moreover, the all-ground is the source of mind while the dharmakaya is the source of primordial
knowing. As is stated in the Kun tu bzang po Klong drug pa’i rgyud [Ati vol. 2, 165.3733]:

Hey Great being! The source of mind is the all-ground. Why? Because the all-ground gathers
all objects of representational thought and because it is conceived of as mental. The source of
primordial knowing is the dharmakäya. Why? [1023j Because dharmakäya is not subject to any
reflective thought pattems (dran rtog) and because it lacks any thought that grasps objects as
being different.

Some blatantly arrogant people assert that “the all-ground is the dharmakäya”. In this regard,
on the one hand, in [certain] exoteric treatises it is claimed that the all-ground is the founding basis
of all that is pure and impure. And within the ‘pure’ [category], dharmakäya is held to be undefiled
thusness.734 On the other hand, in certain Mantra[yäna sources], the fundamentally transformed all-
ground (kun gzhi gnas gyur) is claimed to be the pure factor (dag pa’i cha), i.e. primordial knowing
belonging to the dharmadhätu (chos dbyings) and the svabhāvikāya (ngo bo nyid kyi sku). It is said
that:

The all-ground is the ground of everything.

It is also the ground of nirväna.735

It is also said that “the fundamentally transformed all-ground is primordial knowing belonging to the
dharmadhätu, i.e., the svabhãvikāya.” Thus amongst [types of] difference too, they assert that
substantial [difference between the all-ground and the dharmakäya] is contradictory.

There are ways to invalidate these [claims]: If the all-ground were the dharmakäya, ll024j this
would entail the absurd consequence that the dharmakäya is subject to defilement. Also, just as the
errors of the habitat and its inhabitants are produced by the all-ground, so it would follow absurdly
that errors are likewise produced by the dharmakäya. And if it is agreed [that errors are produced by
the dharmakäya], then this would be invalidated by various logical reasonings, such as the absurdity

and so forth.” chos sku yid la sogs pa ’i nyon mongs pa du ma bral bas ni\ | ’byung ba phra rags la sogs pa ’i du ma ’i
gzugs kyi snang ba ’i ’byung ba sha khraggi lus m e d p a ’o\\
733 Tk vol. 10: 642.3; Tb vol. 12:433.5
734 This assumes that the dharmakäya, when conceived as the pure aspect o f an all-ground seen as encompassing all
that is both pure and impure, is founded on the all-ground as one of its derivative qualities. The reversal o f this
asymmetrical founding-founded (rten-brten) relation is a hallmark of the rDzogs chen sNying thig system.
735 Compare with the passage attributed to the ’J am dpal ye shes dri ma med pa ’i mdo that is quoted in certain of
Klong chen pa’s works (see above p. 153 but also 160 n. 394): kun gzhi kun gyi gzhi yin te\ \ ’khor dang mya ngan
’das pa dang\ |. It is possible that Klong chen pa is here merely paraphrasing Statements made in this and other works
such as the Mahãyānābhidharmasūtra to the effect that the all-ground (or dhätu) is the source of all that is
conditioned and unconditioned, a view that became increasingly problematic within classical rNying ma soteriology,
as I have shown above in chapter four.
that after buddhahood one would once again err as a sentient being. It is also invalidated by
unsurpassed scriptures. According to the Kun tu bzang po Thugs kyi me long [Ati vol. 1, 258.2736]:

The claim that the all-ground is the dharmakäya is a deviation from me.

And according to the Rig pa rang shar [Ati vol. 1, 736.6737]:

Some people claim “the all-ground is the dharmakäya”.

In order to show how to respond to this, [one may ask]:
“What are the characteristics of this all-ground?”
To this they may then reply:
“It is ‘ground of all’ because everything is perfected [in it].”
You may then retort with this line of questioning:
“Then it Stands to reason that buddhas can change.
Why? Because the all-ground manifests in myriad ways.
Given that everything is perfected [in it],
It would stand to reason that sentient beings are in fact buddhas.738
Why? U025JBecause everything is perfected [in the all-ground].
Moreover, buddhas739 would altemate [with sentient beings].
Why? Because [the all-ground] manifests in myriad ways:
Sometimes it would become buddha and
Sometimes it would become a sentient being.
Why? Because it altemates.”
In response to [such] questioning, [the Opponent] may then argue:
“Well then is the all-ground non-existent or what?”
The reply to this question may be framed [as follows]:
“The all-ground embraces dichotomic thoughts.
It is vitiated by mistaken cognitions of myriad things.

736 Tb vol. 10: 594.5; Tb vol. 12:261.5.

737 Tk vol. 10: 246.3 f.; Tb vol. 11: 593.7 f..
This view would appear to be supported by the widespread claim in buddha nature and Mantrayäna discourses
that sentient beings are in fact buddhas but that this is obscured by adventitious obscurations. It is important to note,
however, that such Statements characterize buddhahood as a mode of being implicit in sentient beings that has to be
niade explicit through the Clearing of emotional and cognitive defilements. This contrasts with the kind o f strong
identity Claims repudiated in the Rig pa rang shar that collapse the difference between buddha and sentient being
into an identity relation. In the buddha nature and Mantrayäna perspective, the difference between buddhas and
sentient beings is to be understood as a distinction without Separation, along the lines of the difference between ye
shes as a superoordinate category term and sems as a suboordinate one. The point is to preserve the asymmetrical
relation between the referential domains referred to by the terms ‘sentient being’ and ‘buddha’ in order to reveal
how recovery of the latter from the obscuring factors that collectively define the former is possible. Such a view
maintains a kind of intermediary position between strong Claims o f identity or difference, acknowledging the
plasticity o f the category sentient being (sems can) as a differentiated and derivative (khyab bya) mode o f being
while preserving the invariance o f buddhahood as an undifferentiated and encompassing (khyab byed) mode of
being.
739 A
Add. as per Ati, Tk, Tb.
 The all-ground is the fundamental state of ignorance.”

It is therefore crucial to distinguish between the all-ground and the dharmakäya. As the Klong
drug [Ati vol. 2, 165.5740] maintains:

Therefore, if one fails to distinguish between the all-ground and the dharmakäya, it is similar
to a cognition that apprehends a single form as different [ones]; these [latter, being unreal,]
cannot appear as [performing] their individual functions.741

To illustrate these two using examples, they are like the ocean and a boat. The dharmakäya,
originally pure open awareness, is like the clear expanse of the ocean which has never known the
existence of defilement. |1026) While it is not established as anything whatsoever it unceasingly
[makes] room for the emergence of anything whatsoever. Since the original ground (thog m al gzhi)
is thoroughly pure by nature and also free from the defilements of adventitious conditions, this
expanse is the factor endowed with twofold purity where the citadel [of realization] has been
attained. By contrast, the all-ground is like a boat [adrift] on the surface of the ocean that has been
boarded by men. During the time of going astray from the originary expanse, the non-recognition of
the ground (gzhi ma rig pa) is similar to the boat insofar as it is the basis, encompassing [mileu] and
fundamental source of everything [conditioned]. It is filled with a multitude of men [who personify]
the errancy of mind and mental factors, and their latent tendencies. As it says in the Rig pa rang shar
[Ati vol. 1, 667.6]:

740 Tk vol. 10: 642.5; Tb vol. 12:434.1

741 This example is explained in the Klong drug ’grel ascribed toVimalamitra (Dilgo Khyentse ed.: 232.6 f.; NyKs
vol. 109: 564.5 f.): “Query: What is the drawback of this [failure to distinguish kun gzhi and chos sku]? Reply: It
would be like a cognition that apprehends the single form of any given being as [many] different ones - i.e. as three
or four or ten or a hundred thousand; these [derivative and unreal forms] are unahle to appear as performing
individual functions. Likewise, since the dharmakäya does not become differentiated by way o f the separate
categories deriving from the all-ground, all phenomena would be emptiness and would not perform any [functions]
at all. Consequently, in all the ways the all-ground thus appears or does not appear and emerges as everything and
accordingly exists or does not exist, there is not the slightest thing that is not pervaded by dualistic mind together
with its all-ground. Similarly in its universal nature (rang gi chos nyid), while no property possessors (chos can) are
established, whatever appearances there may be do not cease. Thus, all that appears as differentiated bases, i.e., as
extemal property possessors, is included in the all-ground alone. There being no change in the very essence o f mind
it is seif present and thus is the primordial knowing that does not depend upon dualistic mind. Since the nature of
this [primordial knowing] occurs o f its own accord as the unchanging path, it is the skillfull means of
Mantra[yäna].” d e ’ang skyon cir ’gyur zhe na\ \ ’gro ba gang yang rung b a ’i gzugs cig la gsum mam bzhi’am
bcu ’am brgya stong la sogs pa tha dad du ’dzin pa ’i shes pa dang ’dra ste\ \de dag gis don byed so sor snang bar mi
nus 5ø| Ide bzhin du kun gzhi las so so ’i bye brag gis chos sku tha dad du ’ju g pa ma yin pas chos thams cad stong
pa nyid gang du yang mi ’byedpas\ \de yang kun gzhi ni ’di Itar snang ba dang\ \mi snang ba dang\ \thams cad du
byung ba dang\ \de bzhin du yo d pa dang med pa thams cad la kun gzhi dang bcas pa ’i sems kyis ma khyab pa gang
yang med do\ |de Itar rang gi chos nyid brdal ba chen po la\ \chos can grub pa med la cir yang snang ba ma ’gags
pas na\ \phyi chos can gyi gzhi tha dad du snang ba thams cad kun gzhi geig tu ’dus te\ \sems kyi ngo bo la gnas mi
’gyur bar rang ’dug pas sems la bltar med pa ’i ye shes so| | de ’i rang bzhin lam mi ’g yur bar rang byung bas gsang
sngags yi thabs so| |
 Examples of the dharmakäya and all-ground are as follows: the aspects of the ocean and a
boat because [the all-ground] occurs as a pathway [of the dharmakäya]1*2... and the aspects of
falling asleep and waking because of the differences in their [respective] capacities.

In this regard, open awareness, the very essence of the undefiled dharmakäya, remains
incontrovertible throughout time and is present as the ground of ultimate freedom. By contrast, it is
necessary to arouse oneself from the sleep-like all-ground fl027i that serves as the basis of all the
manifestations of dreams of deluded appearances. Hence, it is very important to distinguish [the
dharmakäya and all-ground]. In this regard, it is necessary to retum [or revert] from sleep and
dreaming but not necessary to retum from open awareness. Therefore, one should realize this
dharmakäya as the ground. One in this way familiarizes oneself with its abiding nature and comes to
recognize the goal as a state of freedom. One should thus understand the all-ground and all
phenomena that depend on it to be defilments that are to be purified.

Theg p a ’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod (TCa: pp. 1037.2 -1050.1):

2) The distinction between mind and primordial knowing. This has two parts:

A) A Brief Indication of their Essences

B) A Detailed Explanation of their Individual Natures

A) A Brief Indication: As the Mu tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517.1743] States:

The distinction between mind and primordial knowing

Must be known by those who are leamed.

Mind (sems) is closely associated with fundamental ignorance (rtsa ba ma rig pa): it is simply
samsära as defiled phenomena, similar to clouds insofar as it obscures the sun of primordial
knowing. Primordial knowing (ye shes) is closely associated with dharmakäya. Similar to the sun, it
is undefiled and does not coexist with the reflective thought pattems of mind. n038i As the [Mu tig
phreng ba] goes on to say [Ati vol. 2, 517.2744]:

Mind is the ground of all latent tendencies,

It is the defilement of all embodied beings.

This interpretation follows Klong chen pa’s commentary on the verse in Theg mchog mdzod (vol. 1: 1172.5 f.)
where he says that “the all-ground arises in the manner o f an obscuring factor or pathway or expressive energy of
dharmakäya.” chos sku 7' sgrib cha ’am lam mam rtsal gyi tshul du shar.
743
Tk vol. 9: 568.6; Tb vol. 12: 379.4.
744
Tk vol. 9: 568.6 f.; Tb vol. 12: 379.5 f..
 It is what is apprehended and the apprehender.745
Therefore, it is the very nature of samsära.

It also States:

Primordial knowing is free from the very basis of discursive reflection.

The Klong drug States [Ati vol. 2, 164.6746]:

If one fails to distinguish the instrinsic essences of mind and primordial knowing, then like
the sun obscured by masses of clouds, [primordial knowing] will be unable to perform its
function of shining outwardly.747

Now, mind is the ground, source, accumulator and activator (kun nas slong ba) of all actions,
afflictive emotions and latent tendencies. Since it always dwells within the abode of ignorance, it is
opposed to and obscures the sun of primordial knowing. As the Rig pa rang shar [Ati vol. 1, 676.1]
States:

Mind consolidates all latent tendencies. Mind activates all latent tendencies. Mind accumulates
all afflictive emotions. Mind is the ground of all latent tendencies. ll039, Since these latent
tendencies are also difficult to stop, they serve to obscure the illumination in oneself. They
coexist with ignorance...

As the Mu tig phreng ba, Ati vol. 2, 516.6748] States:

Because mind comes about through Consolidated collections749,

And since it is also contaminated with defilements,
The mind and so forth750 that gather [in] the all-ground.
Are counted among the defilements.751

745 I follow the reading found in the canonical recensions, gzung ba yin la ’dzin pa yin which implies the two kinds
of sems that Klong chen pa explains in the text. See note in edited text below.
746 Tk vol. 10: 641.7; Tb vol. 12:433.2.
747As the Klong drug ’g rel (Dilgo Khyentse ed.: 229.5; NyKs vol. 109: 556.6 f.) explains. “To give an example, it is
like the sun’s being obscured by masses o f clouds: given that the very essence o f primordial knowing does not shine
forth directly in its inherent purity, it has been obscured by the myriad representational thoughts [of] cloud-like
dualistic mind; these grasp [and believe] in object and subject as identities. Thus primordial knowing is unable to
perform its function o f manifesting outwardly.” de yang dper na nyi ma sprin phung gis sgribs pa dang ’dra ste\ \ye
shes kyi ngo bo rang dag tu mngon du snang du ma ster bas\ \sems sprin pa dang ’dra ba bsam pa sna tshogs pas
bsgribs te| |yul dang yul can bdag tu ’dzin par gyur te\ \de yang ye shes phyir snang ba ’i don byed mi nus so| |
748 Tk vol. 9: 568.6 f.; Tb vol. 12: 379.4 f..
749 An interlinear note in Ati (516.6) clarifies that mind collects afflicitive emotions.
750 An interlinear note in Ati (517.1) States “the body develops by way of [this] accumulation”
 ln this regard, the term “minded being” (sems can) means one that is endowed with, i.e. has,
that mind which obscures open awareness. Since this mind collects karma, it is in error: it sets in
motion the process of cyclical existence where one blunders from one confused Situation to the next.
This mind is divorced from open awareness. When clarified to the point of purity and exhausting [all
errancy], one calls it buddha (sangs rgyas) because open awareness is then divested of defilement.
Therefore, the actual contaminated phenomena to be eliminated are simply mind. As the Mu tig
phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517] States:

When free from this mind, there is buddhahood.

The defilements of all embodied beings are then exhausted,
Animate beings are no^) animated by this mind,
Without which there could be no animation.
Hence animate beings are similar to automatons.

This ‘mind’ is subsumed under two types: 1) an apprehended object-oriented mind that
grasps apparent objects as ‘this’ or ‘that’ using symbols, names and universals, and 2 ) an
apprehending subject-oriented mind that analyzes the specific features of that [apparent object] and
introduces [increasingly] subtle distinctions. It is therefore explained that ‘mind is the apprehended
object and the apprehender’. These [two aspects of mind] being presupposed, the exoteric literature
also States [e.g. Madhyamakāvatāra XI.17d]:

Due to mind’s cessation, that [suchness] is made evident by the käya.

And as it says in the Prasannapadä,

The succession of mind and mental factors is interrupted.

As the Ratnaküta States:

Though free from mind, ego-mind and dichotomizing cognition, one has not also abandoned
the state of contemplative absorption. This is the inconceivable mystery of the Mind of the
Tathägatas.752 no411

‘Primordial knowing’ is like the sky in which discursive proliferations subside, and is the
ground and source of immeasurable buddha qualities. It always dwells together with its vast
ensemble of affiliated modes of primordial knowing within the abode of dharmakäya. Thus it is

Interlinear annotations in Ati (517.1) specify that defilements here refer to the cognitive and emotional
obscurations. 1 have rendered the line without the ergative-conditional ending gyur bas na which anticipates the next
two lines: ‘T he distinction between mind and primordial knowing must be known by those who are leamed.
752 o
See above 285 and n. 663.
present like a [blazing] fire since it bums away all the dense thicket of afflictive emotions and their
latent tendencies. According to the Mu tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517.6]:

Buming away all divisive concepts,

Primordial knowing is [all-]consuming like a fire.
It is comparable to the sky.
It is imbued with emptiness, clarity and open awareness.

In this context, some ignorant people claim “when there is no mind, there is |a state] similar
to being inanimate (bems po) or in a stupor (mun pa)” but they have [evidently] studied little: even in
the absence of mind, since primordial knowing is present, it is not the case that open awareness
[also] ceases. Moreover, through the cessation of ignorance that is one’s deluded mind, the sun of
luminous primordial knowing dawns just as with the fading of night comes the dawning of day.[i042i

Some [others]753 claim that because ignorance is a pervader (khyab byed) of open awareness,
when mind ceases, open awareness also ceases. This is a very grave error: while open awareness (rig
pa) does pervade (phar khyab) ignorance (ma rig pa), ignorance does not in tum pervade (tshur ma
khyab) open awareness, [the counter-example being] the case of a buddha’s primordial knowing.
Since mind is pervaded by ignorance, it is correct that [ignorance] is a pervader of mind, but
ignorance does not pervade open awareness. Hence we maintain ignorance is excluded from the
sphere of open awareness and radically cut off from it. Therefore, when mind ceases [is negated],
then the basis [i.e. mind] along with its quality, ma rig pa [ignorance], also ceases [is negated]. But
rig pa [open awareness] does not cease [is not negated]. Why? Because the basis of the negation [in
the negative term ma rig pa] is rig pa [open awareness]. If rig pa were also to be non-existent, then
please consider: with regard to what would there be a negation? Here by negating ma rig pa
[ignorance] along with its quality, sems [mind], rig pa [open awareness] unfolds as primordial
knowing and one enjoys the two kinds of sensitive knowing [quantitative and qualitative]. The Mu
tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517] States:

[Enlightened] Mind (thugs) is free from all agitation but (1043|

Is not like some inanimate thing.
Rather it is cognizant and aware, an illuminating light.

Such is the differentiation between mind and primordial knowing. Even the exoteric texts
make a distinction between mind and naturally pure Mind itself. In that case, ‘mind’ (sems) refers to
samsäric phenomena that are conceptual fabrications. ‘Mind itself’ (sems nyid) refers to nirvänic
phenomena that are free from discursive elaborations. As the Astasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā 5 b. 1-2
States:

753 Compare with Grub mtha ’ mdzod 244.3 f..

 That Mind is not [dualisticl mind. Mind’s nature is luminous.754

The passage is [to be interpreted] as follows: ‘Mind’ [in the locative case] is first shown to be the
inclusive basis, i.e. one’s essential abiding condition. Next, [dualistic] ‘minds’ that are subject to
discursive elaborations - such as those that project and reabsorb phenomena that are defiled due to
conceptual fabrication and those that are single-pointed like [the absorptions] that function in the
higher realms - [all these] are without any inherent natures. [Finally,] ‘nature of mind’ (sems kyi
rang bzhin), ‘abiding condition of Mind’ (sems kyi gnas lugs) and ‘Mind itself’ (sems nyid) ll044i are
synonyms in so far as they [commonly] abide as [Mind’s] intrinsic nature present as luminous
primordial knowing.

Also, as for fools who do not know how to distinguish between mind and Mind itself, they
are just blatantly arrogant people who pride themselves in knowing the canon. Thus, having properly
distinguished mind and primordial knowing, they nonetheless proceed to take mind as the ground,
path and goal in the context of an exoteric vehicle concemed with objective references; but they all
fail to discover what these [three] are all about. So in this [rDzogs chen] vehicle, we are swiftly free
from samsära because we posit that primordial knowing is ground, path and goal of buddhahood. For
those others who hope for spiritual awakening from what is fundamentally samsära, it is difficult for
them to attain it even after a long time because of their confusion about how to construe the ground.
As the Kun tu bzang po Thugs kyi me long declares:

Those who claim buddhahood derives from mind deviate from me!

Such ways of deviation are invalidated £1045, both by a) logic and b) scripture as follows. a) If
you construe the triad of buddhahood, the path and goal as deriving from mind, then because this
very mind, the basis of [your] construal, is mingled with subject and object, it logically follows that
your ground, path and goal are entirely bound up with subject and object as well. If so claimed, there
is the absurd consequence that one does not realize buddhahood and, even if one did, it would be of a
perverse kind given that it would not be free from subject and object. Further, just as mind amasses a
variety of latent tendencies and karma, it logically follows that ground, path and goal do so as well.
If so claimed, there is the fallacious consequence that these [latter] are in error.

[An Opponent could] respond to this by arguing back [as follows]: If there were no mind,
then there could not be any buddhahood on account of it either, for you too must accept that buddha
is characterized as having a mind that undergoes purification. Reply: It is not the case that one is or

The line in the original Sanskrit, Schmithausen 1977, 41, E.b.1-2, reads tathã hi tac cittam acittam\ prakrtiś
cittasya prabhãsvarã\ which is rendered in the D as sems de ni sems ma mchis pa ste\ \sems kyi rang bzhin ni od
gsal ba lags jo ||. See above notes 309 and 650. All instances of this passage in Klong chen pa’s works begins with
sems la. I have not retained this (wrong) locative construction in my English rendering of the passage although the
author’s interpretation to some extent depends on this reading. His interpretation is in fact a leamed play on the
classical grammatical terminology used to specify the locative case, namely the locus (gnas gzhi) that is specified.
Here Mind in the locative refers to the inclusive basis (gzhi bsdu ba), i.e. Mind itself which is one’s essential abiding
condition (ngo b o ’i gnas lugs), and this is said to be without dualistic mind which is subject to discursive
elaborations and reifications and without inherent nature.
isn’t a buddha by virtue of [dualistic] mind being present or absent. But it is due to the presence or
absence of primordial knowing belonging to dharmakäya. |I046) Let us grant it true that one is
characterized as a buddha (sangs rgyas) by virtue of the errors of mind having been cleared away
(sangs). But it is not definitive [that buddhahood only implies a cleansed mind] because there is still
buddhahood that consists in the spontaneously present ground. Thus [this cleansed mind] is not the
de facto true [buddhahood] either. And although that which should be purified may have been
cleared away (sangs), that [mind] to be purified which has been cleared away is not [itself] the
buddha. And thus buddhahood does not derive from mind.755

b) Conceming the invalidation by scripture, even exoteric scriptures [such as] the Madhyama-
kāvatāra XI.17d States:

Due to mind’s cessation that [suchness] is made evident by the käya.

Among esoteric scriptures, the Vajraśikharamahāguhyayogatantra756 explains fundamental

transformation (gnas ’gyur) in passages such as [the following]: “The five elements of dichotomizing
cognition are, in their pure state, the nature of the five modes of primordial knowing.” Now, if it
were an entity ‘mind’ that realized buddhahood, then [concepts such as] “what is to be purified” and
“fundamental transformation” would be quite pointless. Among unsurpassed scriptures, the eighty-
sixth chapter of the Rig pa rang shar entitled “The Refutation of All Adversaries” ri0471 [ch. 69 in Ati
vol. 1,730.6757] has this to say:

Conceming the Claims of certain people,

[Some] claim that goal-realization is to be sought in mind.
This [claim] may be countered as follows.
“To what extent is mind a real entity?”
They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“Given that nothing entitative exists in the mind...”
“Well then, [we say] what are the defining characteristics of mind?”
They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“The characteristic of mind is the basic nature (chos nyid).”
You can counter this by stating:758
“Given that nothing entitative exists in the mind,
Do subject and object exist within its basic nature or not?”
In response to this question they may elaborate:759

755Here the author bases his argument on a leamed gloss on the Tibetan rendering o f the Sanskrit buddha by sangs
rgyas which means dissipation (sangs) of cognitive and emotional obscurations and expansion (rgyas) o f inborn
qualities and capabilities.
756 See P 0113; D 0480.
757 Tk vol. 10: 241.5 f.; Tb vol. 11: 588.7 f..
758 I have inserted this and the previous line as found in Tb though not in Tk, Ati, Theg mchog mdzod or Tshig don
mdzod. These additional lines are integral to the debate and make the argument more intelligible. See critical edition.
 “How could the subject object duality exist in the basic nature?
For example, it is like the characteristics of space
Because subject and object do not exist [therein].”
You may then respond with these words:
“Do subject and object exist in mind or not?”
They may develop an answer to this question as follows:
“Although subject and object are present in mind,
Its basic nature is without subject and object.”
You may then utter the following response:
“You thereby violate your previous thesis:
Why? Because mind and its basic nature were [deemed] identical.
If subject and object occur in mind,
Then one could not discover buddhahood by striving for it.
Why? Because subject and object exist in mind.”
In response to this question, they may elaborate:
“But, if the absence of mind is buddhahood itself,
Then how could it be discovered by you?”
In reponse to this question, one may elaborate:
“The goal is not to be sought in mind.
Why not? Because myriad things arise from mind,
Mind is the consolidation of latent tendencies.
Why? Because the subject moves toward objects,
Mind is the root of samsära.
Mind is [also] the stages of abandoning [obscurations].
Why? Because of the presence of the actual self-awareness.
Mind is the root of error
Because everything branches out from that.
Why? Because it marks a deviation from a pure common ground.
Mind is shown to possess defilements.
Why? Because divisive thoughts are present.
Mind is like a [drifting] bird feather.
Why? Because it is without focus760.”
They may then utter these words in response:
“Well how can you then assert Mind itself?”
In response to this question one may elaborate: |1049|
“We do not assert that mind is the goal
Because there is primordial knowing of open awareness.’7
“Well then, conceming this open awareness:

759 This line and the previous occur in Tb and Tk but not in Theg mchog mdzod or Tshig don mdzod.
60 The meaning of this line is unclear. Tb and Tk have sems d p a ' (.sattva: being) instead of the homophone sems pa
(cetana: motivation, intentionality). I have retained the Theg mchog mdzod reading (TCagdms) because the drifting
feather simile is commonly used with reference to the wandering mind (as in the passage from death to rebirth).
 Does it have any kind of characteristics?”
One should then respond in this manner:
“The characteristics of primordial knowing of open awareness
Are emptiness, clarity and pervasiveness.’

Query: If open awareness is taken as ground, taken as path and taken as goal, then wouldn’t
this open awareness be characterized as an entity? Reply: No it wouldn’t because it is empty and
clear and yet altogether devoid of any grasping and fixation. As the text goes on to say [Ati vol. 1,
733.1]:

The knowing awareness is present as clarity itself.

On what account? If it is present as clarity,
Wouldn’t it be something characterized?
Why? Because it is adomed by clarity.
One should respond to this questioning as follows:
It would not be anything characterized because
There is no attachment to it.
Moreover, one should understand it in this way.
For example, it is like the orb of the sun,
It shines clearly (1050, but without partiality.
Why? Because it is without inclination.
 Four extant versions of the Theg mchog mdzod have been consulted in preparing the edited text of
the translated excerpts:

1) TCa: Theg pa’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod. Oddiyana Institute edition published by
Tarthang Rinpoche based on blockprints from Khreng tu'u: 1999?

2) TCg: Theg mchog rin po che’i mdzod. A xylographic copy from A ’dzom chos sgar
blockprints contained in Mdzod bdun, Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche, n.d. [Reprint:
Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan, n.d.]

3) TCd: Theg mchog rin po che ’i mdzod. A xylographic copy from blocks carved at sDe dge
printery and published as Mdzod bdun: The Famed Seven Treasuries of Vajrayäna
Buddhist Philosophy. 6 vols. Gangtok: Sherab Gyaltsen and Khyentse Labrang, 1983.

4) TCm: Theg mchog rin po che’i mdzod. Mang yul Gung thang edition of the Theg mchog
rin po che ’i mdzod. Reproduced in The Oldest Block Print of Klong-chen rab- ‘byams-
pa ’s Theg Mchog Mdzod. In Lumbini International Research Institute Facsimile Edition
Series 1. Lumbini International Research mstitute, Lumbini, 2000.

All editions consulted contain only minor discrepancies and would appear to derive from a common
source, possibly TCm which is now considered to the oldest block print of this text. In addition to
these sources, I was able to consult the rescension of the Theg mchog mdzod included in volumes 17-
18 of the recently published 26 volume Klong chen pa gsung ’bum (TCs) but found no discrepancies
from the other editions. Page references in subscript square parentheses [ j within the body of the
translation and edited transliteration refer to paginations in the primary source used. I have used the
exquisite Khreng tu’u edition (TCa) published by the Oddiyana Institute as the main source for the
selected passages with variant readings from the other editions included in the notes to the edited
text. These notes also indicate variants of quotations found in Sanskrit Originals or other Tibetan
versions of the quoted passages.

Abbreviations: In addition to the sigla for bibliographic references noted above and those included in
the Bibliography, I have employed the following abbreviations:

add. = addidit = added

om. = omittit or omisit = omits or omitted.
TCadgms = all editions of Theg mchog mdzod employed in this critical edition
§ 2.4 Edited text of Theg mchog mdzod 14 (excerpts)

Theg p a ’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod (TCa: pp. 1019.4-1027.3)

de Itar rten lus dang de’i chos tshogs pa gzhan yang mam par bshad nas| |da ni de la brten pa shes
pa’i rang bzhin gtan la dbab pa la gsum ste| | [1] kun gzhi dang chos sku’i khyad par| ||i02oi [2] sems
dang ye shes kyi khyad par| | [3] khyad par can gyi chos gzhan mam par bshad pa’o| |l) dang po la
gnyis te| |[A] mdor bstan pa dang| | [B] rgyas par bshad pa’o| |

[A] dang po ni| |sems can gyi gzhi dang sangs rgyas kyi gzhi la ltos nas rig pa’i ngo bo yin tshul ka
dag dri ma med pa dang| |dri bcas ma rig pa rtog tshogs dang bcas pas sbags pa ’khrul snang ’khrul
’dzin kun gyi gzhir gyur pa’i cha nas| |kun gzhi dang chos sku mam pa gnyis su shes par bya ste| \thal
’gyur las| |

kun gzhi dang ni chos sku’i gnad| | ces so| |

de la kun gzhi ni ma rig pas khyad par du byas pa sems dang sems byung thams cad kyi dang po’i
rten| |bar gyi gnas| |tha ma’i khyim| |bag chags kyi snod du gyur pas rdzing dang ’dra la| |chos sku ni|
|ma rig pa log pas khyad par du byas pa| |sems dang sems byung gi yul las ’das pa| |[10211 las dang bag
chags thams cad las mam par dag pa’o| |kun gzhi ni| |za 'og gi bar gding Itar du mar snang ba’i gzhir
gyur pa| |yul sna tshogs snod du snang ba dang| |yul can du ma rigs drug khams gsum bcud du snang
ba dang de’i lus dang| |bde sdug dang| |sems kyi ’khrul pa’i cha shas mang po ’dzin la| |chos sku ni|
|de thams cad med pa| |yid la sogs pa dang lhan cig mi gnas pa ste| |rang shar las| |

kun gzhi mam rtog ’dzin pa la| |

sna tshogs ’khml pa’i761 shes pas bslad| |
kun gzhi ma rig dngos po yin| |
kun gzhi zhes kyis762de la bya| | zhes pa dang| |

yang| |

sems can gzhi dang sangs rgyas gzhi| |

khyad par geig gis phye bar nges| | zhes pa dang| |

mu tig phreng ba las| |

kun gzhi nyid ni bsags pa’i phyir| |

chos kyi sku ni zag pa zad| ||l022j
stong zhing gsal la763 gsal zhing khyab| |

761 Ati, Tk, Tb sna tshogs p a y i

762 Ati kyang; Tk kyi; Tb ni
 bsams pas ma sbags dran pa764 sangs| |
spros pa nyid dang bral ba ste765| |
nam mkha’ Ita bur khyab766 cing stong| |
rang dag mtshon pa kun dang bral| |
rgyu dang rkyen bcas kun gzhi la| |
bag chags767 sog768 phyir rdzing dang ’dra| |
chos kyi sku ni bag chags bral769| |
yid dang sems sogs ’dus pa las| |
lus can kun gzhi du mar snang| |
chos sku770 yid sogs bral bas na| |
du ma771 gzugs snang772 lus med pa’o| | zhes so| |

de yang kun gzhi ni| |sems kyi gnas yin la| |chos sku ni ye shes kyi gnas yin te| |kun tu bzang po klong
drug pa ’i rgyud las| |

kye sems dpa’ chen po| |sems kyi gnas ni| |kun gzhi yin no| |de ci’i phyir zhe na| |773 kun gzhi ni
bsam pa’i yul thams cad sdud cing| |sems su shes pa’i774 phyir ro| |ye shes kyi gnas ni chos kyi
sku yin no| |(1023| de ci’i phyir zhe na| |chos kyi sku ni dran775 rtog776thams cad mi mnga’ zhing|
|yul777 tha dad du ’dzin pa’i shes pa med pa’i phyir ro| | zhes so| |

de la mngon pa’i nga rgyal can kha cig ni| |kun gzhi chos skur ’dod de| |’di la thun mong gi bstan
bcos las kyang| |kun gzhi dag ma dag thams cad kyi rten du ’dod la| |chos sku dag pa’i nang nas
kyang dri ma med pa’i de bzhin nyid du ’dod cing| |sngags kha cig las kyang| |kun gzhi gnas gyur te
dag pa’i cha chos kyi dbyings kyi ye shes dang ngo bo nyid kyi sku ’dod de| |

763 Ati, Tk, Tb ba

764 Tb pas
765 Tk de
66 Ati kun tu khyab
7 Ati here and in next line has bag chag
8 Ati bsog; Tk sogs
769 Tk bags
° Ati, Tk, Tb chos sku
Ati dum
72 Tk gzugs brnyan
Tk om. de ci ’i phyir zhe na\
Tk, Tb sems su ’du shes pa ’i
75 Tk Idan
776 TL
I b rtogs
777
Tk, Tb yul can
 kun gzhi kun gyi gzhi yin te| |
mya ngan ’das pa’i gzhi ma’ang yin| |

ces pa dang| |kun gzhi gnas gyur pa ni| |chos kyi dbyings kyi ye shes ngo bo nyid kyi sku’o zhes
bshad pas tha dad kyi nang nas kyang rdzas 'gal bar bshad do|| |’di la gnod pa yod de| |gal te kun gzhi
chos sku yin (1024| na chos sku dri ma can du thal ba dang| |kun gzhis snod bcud kyi ’khrul pa bskyed
pa Itar chos skus ’khrul pa bskyed par thal la| |’dod na| |sangs rgyas nas slar sems can du ’khrul par
thal ba la sogs pa’i rigs pas gnod cing| |bla na med pa’i lung gis kyang gnod de| |kun tu bzang po
thugs kyi me long las| |

kun gzhi chos skur ’dod pa nga las gol ba yin| | ces pa dang| |

rig pa rang shar las| |

la la kun gzhi chos skur ’dod| |

de la lan gdab778 bstan pa’i phyir| |
kun gzhi’i mtshan nyid ji779 Itar yin| |
de nas de yis780 lan smras pa| |
thams cad rdzogs phyir kun gzhi yin| |
de nas dris pa’i tshig gis bzlog| |
sangs rgyas ’gyur ba yod par rigs| |
[ci phyir]781 kun gzhi sna tshogs ’char ba’i phyir| |
de las782thams cad rdzogs pa’i phyir| |
sangs rgyas nyid du sems can rigs| |[10251
ci phyir thams cad rdzogs pa’i phyir| |
yang na [sangs rgyas]783 res ’jog can du 'gyur| |
ci phyir sna tshogs ’char ba’i phyir| |
res 'ga’ sangs rgyas yin par gyur| |
re ’ga’ sems can yin par ’gyur| |784
ci phyir res ’jog yod pa’i phyir| |
de nas dris pa bzlog785 ste smras| |
’o na kun gzhi med dam ci| |

778 Ati, Tk: btab

779 TCagdm 'di:; Ati, Tk, Tb j i
780 Ati, Tk, Tb yi
781 add. as per Ati, Tk, Tb
782 Ati la
783 add. as per Ati, Tk, MGm
784 om. Tk
785 Tb zlog
 de nas dris pa’i lan btab pa| |
kun gzhi mam rtog ’dzin pa la| |
sna tshogs ’khrul pa’i786 shes pas bslad| |
kun gzhi ma rig dngos po yin| | ces so| |

des na kun gzhi dang chos sku phyed pa gces te| |klong drug pa las| |

de’i phyir na kun gzhi dang chos sku ma phyed na gzugs geig la tha dad du ’dzin pa’i shes
pa787 dang ’dra ste| |don so sor snang bar mi nus so| | zhes so| |

‘di gnyis kyi dper brjod ni| |rgya mtsho dang gru’i mam pa ’dra ste| |chos sku ka dag gi rig pa dri ma
yod ma myong ba dbyings rgya mtsho II026) dangs pa ’dra ba| |gang du’ang ma grub la gang du’ang
’char ba’i go ma ’gags pa| |thog ma’i gzhi rang bzhin mam dag dang| |rkyen glo bur gyi dri ma bral
bas dbyings der btsan sa zin pa dag pa gnyis Idan gyi cha yin la| |kun gzhi mtsho’i steng na grur mi
zhugs pa ltar| |thog ma’i dbyings las ’khrul dus gzhi’i ma rig pa thams cad kyi rten dang| |khyab byed
dangl |ngo bor gnas pa gm Ita bu| |sems sems byung las dang bag chags ’khrul pa’i mi mang pos gang
ba ste| Irang shar las| |

kun gzhi dang chos sku’i dpe ni| |

rgya mtsho dang gru’i tshul te lam byung| |
gnyid log pa dang sad pa’i tshul te| |
dbang po’i khyad yod pa’i phyir zhes so| |

de’ang rig pa dri ma med pa chos sku’i ngo bo dus thams cad du ldog bya ma yin zhing mthar thug
grol gzhir yod la| |kun gzhi gnyid Ita bu ’khml snang gi rmi lam thams cad [I027] ’char ba’i rten du
gyur pa las sangs par byed dgos pas khyad shin tu che’o| |de’i gnyid dang rmi lam ldog dgos kyang|
|rang gi rig pa ldog mi dgos pas| |chos sku gzhi rtogs bya yin la| |de’i ngang goms byar gyur zhing|
I’bras bu grol sar ngos gzung ngo| |kun gzhi dang de la brten pa’i chos mams dag bya dri mar shes
par bya’o| |

Theg p a ’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod (TCa: pp. 1037.2 -1050.1):

[2] dongnyis pa sems dang ye shes kyi khyad par la gnyis te| | [A] ngo bomdor bstan pa dang| | [B]
soso’i rang bzhin rgyas par bshad pa’o| | [A] dang po ni||mu tig phreng ba las| |

sems dang ye shes dbye ba ni| |

mkhas pa mams kyis shes par bya| | zhes ’byung bas| |

86Ati, Tk, Tb sna tshogs p a y i

Ati, Tk, has ’dzin pa instead of ’dzin pa ’i shes pa
sems ni| |rtsa ba ma rig pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa dri ma dang bcas pa’i chos ’khor ba rang ka
ma ye shes kyi nyi ma sgrib pas sprin dang ’dra la| |ye shes ni| |chos kyi sku dang mtshungs par ldan
pa dri ma med cing sems kyi dran bsam dang lhan cig mi gnas pa nyi ma Ita bu ste| |I1038j de nyid las| |

sems ni bag chags kun gyi gzhi| |

lus can mams kyi dri ma yin| |
gzung ba yin la ’dzin pa yin| |788
de phyir ’khor ba’i chos nyid do| | zhes pa dang| |

yang| I

ye shes dran gzhi nyid dang bral| | ces so| |

klong drug pa las kyang| |

sems dang ye shes rang gi ngo bo789 ma phyed na| |nyi ma sprin phung gis bsgribs790 pa dang
’dra ste phyir snang ba’i don byed mi nus so| |791 zhes so| |

de’ang sems ni| |las dang nyon mongs pa dang bag chags thams cad kyi gzhi dang ’byung khungs
dang sog byed dang kun nas slong ba dang| |ma rig pa’i khyim na rtag tu gnas pas ye shes kyi nyi ma
dang ’gal zhing sgrib pa ste| |rang shar las| |

sems ni bag chags thams cad792 sdud pa’o| |sems ni bag chags thams cad slong ba’o793| |sems ni
nyon mongs pa thams cad sog794 pa’o| |sems ni bag chags thams cad kyi gzhi [1039| yin te| |bag
chags de yang 'gegs795 par dka’ bas| |rang gi snang ba sgrib796 par byed pa| |ma rig pa dang797
mnyam du gnas pa798| | zhes dang| |

mu tig phreng ba las| |

788 TCagdms gzung ba yul la ’dzin pa sems\; Ati, Tk, Tb gzung ba yin la ’dzin payin\
789 Tk bor
790 Tk gi sgribs
791 add. 11
792 Ati, Tk bag chags thams cad; TCa bag chags dang thams cad
793 Tk, Tb klong pa ’o
794 Ati gsogs; Tk: sogs
795 Ati ’g og; Tk, Tb dgog
796 Ati ’grib; Tk: bsgrib
797 TCa, Ati ma rig pa mnyam du; Tk, Tb ma rig pa dang mnyam du
798 TCa, Ati pas; Tk, Tb: pa
 sems ni ’dus tshogs ’byung ba’i phyir| |
dri ma nyid dang yang sbags799 pas| |
kun gzhi sdud pa’i sems la sogs| |
dri ma’i grangs su gyur pas na| | zhes so| |

de’ang rig pa la sgrib byed sems de yod par ldan pas sems can zhes bya la| |sems des las bsags pas
’khrul pa nyid ’khrul geig nas geig tu ’khor ba’i las byed do| |sems de rig pa las grol| |dag zad byang
na sangs rgyas zhes bya ste| |rig pa dri ma dang bral ba’i phyir ro| |des na bral bya dri ma’i chos yang
dag pa ni| |sems kho na yin te| |de nyid las| |

sems de bral na sangs rgyas sa| |

,,
lus can kun gyi dri ma zad| |
’gro ba mams ni sems 1 0 4 0 des ’gro| |
de min ’gro bar nus min te| |
de phyir ’gro mams ’khrul ’khor bzhin| | ces so| |

sems de yang yul snang ’di dang ’di’o zhes brda dang ming dang spyi ’dzin pa gzung ba yul gyi
sems dang| |de’i khyad par dpyod cing zhib mor ’byed pa ’dzin pa yul can gyi sems gnyis su ’dus pa
yin pas| |gzung ba yul la ’dzin pa sems| |zhes bshad pa yin no| |’di dag dgos par thun mong gi gzhung
las kyang| |

sems ’gags pa de sku yis mngon sum mdzad| | ces pa dang| |

tshig gsal du| |

sems dang sems las ’byung ba’i ’jug pa yang rgyun chad| | dang zhes pa dang| |

dkon mchog brtsegs pa las| |

sems dang yid dang mam par shes pa dang yang bral la| |ting nge ’dzin gyi gnas kyang mi dor
ba ste| |’di ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i thugs kyi gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa’o| |800
zhes gsungs pa yin no| | |l04„

ye shes ni| |nam mkha’ Itar spros pa zhi zhing sangs rgyas kyi chos tshad med pa’i gzhi dang ’byung
khungs ’khor ye shes rgya mtsho’i tshogs dang lhan cig chos sku’i khyim na rtag tu gnas pas nyon
mongs pa dang bag chags kyi tshang tshing thams cad bsregs pas me Itar gnas pa ste| |mu tig phreng
ba las| I

mam par rtog pa kun bsregs pas| |

ye shes nyid ni me bzhin za| |
799Ati
800 ,,,
A*■sngags
add. 11
 nam mkha’ nyid dang mtshungs pa yin| |
stong gsal rig bcas nyid yin no| | zhes so| |

‘dir mi shes pa kha cig| |sems med na bems po’am mun pa Itar 'gyur ro zhes pa’ang thos pa chung ba
yin te| |sems med kyang ye shes yod pas rig pa ’gag pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro| |de’ang ma rig pa ’khrul
pa’i sems ’gags pas| |ye shes gsal ba’i nyi ma ’char te| |mtshan mo sangs pas nyin mo shar ba „0421
bzhin no| |kha cig ni| |ma rig pa rig pa’i khyab byed yin pas| |sems ’gags dus rig pa ’gags par ’dod
pa’ang shin tu nor ba chen po ste| |rig pas ma rig pa la phar khyab kyang| |ma rig pas rig pa la tshur
ma khyab ste sangs rgyas kyi ye shes bzhin no| |sems la ma rig801 pas khyab pas| |sems kyi khyab
byed du ’thad kyi| |rig pa la ma khyab pas| |ma rig pa rig pa’i dbyings nas ldog pa’am rgyun ’chad
par ’dod do| |des na sems 'gags dus gzhi ma rig pa cha dang bcas pa ’gags kyang| |rig pa ma ’gags te
’gag gzhi rig pa yin pa’i phyir ro| |rig pa’ang med na gang gi steng du ’gag pa bsam par ’os so| |’dir
ma rig pa sems kyi cha dang bcas pa ’gags pas rig pa ye shes su rgyas te mkhyen pa gnyis la longs
spyod pa ni| \mu tig phreng ba las| |

thugs ni bskyod pa kun bral bas| |fl043]

bems po Ita bu ma yin te| |
shes shing rig la gsal byed snang| | zhes gsungs pa yin no| |

des na sems dang ye shes so so yin te| |thun mong gi lung las kyang| |sems dang sems nyid rang bzhin
gyis dag pa gnyis su ’byed do| |de la sems ni kun rtog pa ’khor ba’i chos| |sems nyid ni spros pa dang
bral ba mya ngan las ’das pa’i chos te| |'phags pa shes rab kyipha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgyad
pa las kyang| |

sems la sems ma mchis te| |sems kyi rang bzhin ni ’od gsal ba lags so| | zhes gsungs so| |

sems la zhes pa ni gzhi bsdu ba ste ngo bo’i gnas lugs su mtshon nas| |sems spros pa can kun rtog pa
dri ma’i chos phro ’du dang rtse geig pa khams gong ma’i ’jug pa Ita bu mams rang bzhin med de|
|sems kyi rang bzhin| |sems kyi gnas lugs| |sems nyid ces ,,044] pa ming gi mam grangs te de nyid kyi
gshis ’od gsal ba’i ye shes su gnas so zhes ’byung ngo| |

sems dang sems nyid ’byed par mi shes pa’i blun pos kyang sde snod shes par rlom pa mams mngon
pa’i nga rgyal can du zad do| |de Itar sems dang ye shes legs par phye nas thun mongba dmigs bcas
kyi theg par sems la gzhi lam ’bras bur byed kyang| |de thams cad don thog tu ma phebs pas| |theg pa
’dir ye shes la sangs rgyas kyi gzhi lam ’bras bur mam par ’jog pas| |myur por ’khor ba las grol la|
Igzhan dag ’khor ba’i rtsa ba la byang chub re bas ring mo zhig na’ang de thob pa dka’ ste| |gzhi
cha’ lugs ’dzol ba’i phyir ro| |kun tu bzang po thugs kyi me long las| |

sems las sangs rgyas ’dod pa nga las gol ba yin| | ces gsungs so| |

801 'T'/'T •
TCg rigs
gol lugs ni| |rigs pa lung |1045| gnyis kas gnod pa can zhig ste| |’di Itar sems las sangs rgyas dang lam
dang| |gzhi gsum ’cha’ na| |’cha’ gzhi sems de nyid gzung ’dzin dang bcas pa’i phyir khyed kyi gzhi
lam ’bras bu ril por gzung ’dzin dang bcas par thal lo| |’dod na sangs rgyas mi ’grub pa dang grub
kyang phyin ci log tu thal te| |gzung ’dzin las ma grol ba’i phyir ro| lyangsems bag chags dang las
sna tshogs sdud pa ltar| |gzhi lam ’bras bu yang der thal la| |’dod na ’khrul par thal ba’iskyonyod
dol

tshur rgol bas ’di skad du| |sems med na des kyang sangs rgyas mi rigs la| |sangs rgyas de dag bya
sems kyi khyad par du byas par khyed kyang ’dod pa’i phyir ro zhe na| |lan smras pa| |sems med pa
dang yod pas sangs rgyas pa ma yin gyi| |chos sku’i ye shes yod med kyis de Itar byung ba’o| | „o^
sems kyi ’khrul pa sangs pas sangs rgyas khyad par byas pa bden du chug kyang da dung gzhi lhun
grub kyi sangs rgyas kyis ma nges pas bden po dngos kyang ma yin la| |dag byar sangs kyang sangs
pa’i dag bya de sangs rgyas ma yin pas| |sangs rgyas sems las byung ba ma yin no|| ‘dir lung gis
kyang gnod de| |thun mong gi lung| |dbu ma ’jug pa las kyang| |

sems ’gags pa de sku yis mngon sum mdzad| | ces pa dang| |

thun mong ma yin pa’i lung| |rdo rje rtse mo las kyang| |

mam par shes pa’i khams Inga dag pa ni ye shes lnga’i rang bzhin no| |802

zhes pa la sogs pa gnas ’gyur bshad de| |sems dngos la sangs rgyas ’grub na| |dag bya dang gnas gyur
don med do| |bla na med pa’i lung| |rig pa rang shar gyi rgyud le’u brgyad cu rtsa drug pa’i phyir rgol
ba thams cad sun dbyung ba’i le’u las| | n047]

la la dag gi ’dod pa ni| |

sems la803 ’bras bu tshol bar ’dod| |
de la ldog804 pa ’di Ita ste| |
sems kyi dngos po ci805 tsam806 lags| |
dris lan rgyas par btab807 pa ni| |
sems la dngos po med pa’i phyir| |
’o na sems kyi mtshan nyid ci808| |
dris lan rgyas par gdab pa ni| |

802 , , . .
add. 11
803 Ati, vol. 1,730.6 las
804 Ati bzlog
805 Tk j i
»06 A l .
Ati ci Itar
807 Tb gdab;
 [sems kyi mtshan nyid chos nyid yin| |
de la bzlog par smra ba ni| |]809
sems la dngos po med pa’i phyir| |810
[chos nyid gzung ’dzin yod dam med| |
dris lan rgyas par gdab pa ni| |]811
chos nyid gzung ’dzin ga la yod| |
dper na nam mkha’i mtshan nyid bzhin| |
gzung812dang ’dzin pa med pa’i phyir| |
de la Idog813 pa’i tshig smras pa| |
sems la gzung ’dzin yod dam med| |
dris lan rgyas par gdab814 pa ni| |
sems la gzung dang ’dzin yod kyang| |
chos nyid gzung ’dzin med pa’i phyir| |
de la Idog815 pa yang smras pa| |
gang816 gi dam bca’ nyams par ’gyur| |
[ci phyir]8,7 sems dang chos nyid geig pa’i phyir| |
sems la gzung ’dzin byung gyur na| |
sangs rgyas ’bad pas myed mi gyur818| | (I048,
[ci phyir]819 sems la gzung ’dzin yod pa’i phyir| |
dris lan bzlog820 ste smras821 pa ni| |
gal te sems med sangs rgyas nyid| |
khyod kyis myed dam gang gi822 phyir| |
de la dris lan rgyas btab823 pa| |
sems la ’bras bu mi ’tshol824te| |

809 Tb sems ... smra ba ni; om. in Ati, Tk, TCagdms, and in Tshig don mdzod. These two lines are integral to the
debate and make it more intelligible.
810 This line occurs in TCagdms but not in Ati, Tk or Tb or Tshig don mdzod.
811 Tb chos nyid... gdab pa ni; om. in Ati, Tk, TCagdms, TD.
812 Tk consistently has bzung instead of gzung which occurs in Ati, Tb, Theg mchog mdzod and TD.
813 Ati, Tb, Tk bzlog
814 Ati bstan
815 Ati, Tb bzlog; Tk: zlog
816 Ati, Tb gong
817 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
818 Tb mi rnyed ’g yur
819 add. as per Ati, Tb and Tk
820 Tb Idog
821 Ati bstan
822 Tk gis
823 Ati gdab
 [ci phyir]825 sems las sna tshogs ’byung ba’i phyir| |
sems ni bag chags sdud pa yin| |
[ci phyir]826 ’dzin pa yul la 'gyu ba’i827 phyir| |
sems ni ’khor ba’i rtsa ba yin| |
sems ni spang ba’i828 rim pa yin| |
ci phyir rang rig dngos po yod pa’i phyir| |829
sems ni ’khrul pa’i rtsa ba ste| |
thams cad de las gyes pa yin| |
[ci phyir]830 ’dra gzhi dag las831 gol ba’i phyir| |
sems ni dri ma can du bstan| |
ci phyir832 mam rtog yod pa’i phyir| |
sems ni bya sgro Ita bu yin| |
ci phyir sems pa833 med pa’i phyir| |
de nas834bzlog835 pa’i tshig smras pa| |
‘o na ji Itar836 sems nyid ’dod| |
de nas dris lan rgyas gnang ba837| | (1049]
sems la838 ’bras bu mi ’dod de| |
rig839 pa’i ye shes840 yod pa’i phyir| |
*o na rig pa ’di nyid la| |
mtshan nyid841 mam pa du dang ldan| |
de nas dris lan ’di Itar bya| |

824 Ati ’tshal

825 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
826 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
827 Ati, Tb and Tk ’g yus p a ’i
828 —,
1b spangs pa i
829 Corrected as per Ati, Tb; Tk ci phyir rang rig dang po yod pa ’i phyir]; TCagdms ci phyir sems su yod pa i phyir]
830 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
831 Tb, Tk la
832 Tb duplication ci phyir ci phyir]
833
Tb sems dpa ’ (sattva: ‘a being’); Ati spangs pa (‘abandonment’).
834
Ati, Tk de nas tshur la
835
Ati bzlog; Tb zlog
Ati ci Itar
837 Ati btab p a ; Tk snang ba
838 Tk las
839 Tk rigs
840 Tb rig pa ye shes
841 Tk ’dzin
 rig pa’i ye shes mtshan nyid ni| |
stong dang gsal dang khyab pa yin| | ces so| |

rig pa la gzhi byed lam byed ’bras bu byed na| |rig pa de nyid dngos po mtshan mar mi ’gyur ram zhe
na| |mi ’gyur te| |stong pa dang gsal ba dang ’dzin zhen gang yang med pa’i phyir ro| |yang de nyid
lasj I

shes rig gsal ba nyid du yod| |

ci phyir gsal bar yod gyur na| |
mtshan ma can du mi ’gyur ram| |
ci phyir gsal bas mdzes pa’i phyir| |
de la842dris lan ’di Itar bya| |
mtshan ma can du mi ’gyur te| |
de la chags pa med pa’i phyir| |
de yang ’di Itar shes par bya’o| |
dper na nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor bzhin| |
gsal yang phyogs su |,05o] ma lhung ba’o| |
ci phyir zhe ’dod med pa’i phyir| | ces so| |

842 Ati nas

3. ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 with Yon tan rgya mtsho’s
Commentary

§ 3.1 Introductory Remarks:

What follows is an annotated translation and edited text of ’Jigs med gling pa’s (1729-1798)
Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 with commentary from mKhan chen Yon tan rgya mtsho’s (b. 19th c.) Zab
don snang byed Nyi ma ’i ’od zer, the third part (hum) of his Yon tan rin po che ’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa
in which the Vajrayäna and rDzogs chen Systems (chs. 10-13) are treated. This excerpt covers the
first three of ten basic rDzogs chen distinctions introduced by Yon tan rgya mtsho as topical
headings for structuring ’Jigs med gling pa’s presentation on rDzogs chen distinctions in chapter
twelve. My translation of the commentary on the third distinction terminates before a series of
quotations that have already been encountered in previous parts of this study. I have chosen not to
include the section on the kun gzhi/chos sku distinction because it consists largely in a recasting of
material found in Klong chen pa’s Theg mchog mdzod, Tshig don mdzod and Chos dbyings mdzod
that has also been dealt with in earlier parts of this work. Among the ten distinctions, the three
included here provide the most cogent treatment of the difference between mind and primordial
knowing. In style and content, these excerpts reflect the revitalizing spirit that animates the
renaissance of sNying thig teachings in the 18th Century visionary movement of ’Jigs med gling pa
and his successors that was known as Klong chen snying thig (“sNying thig as systematized by
Klong chen pa”). As this designation would suggest, the subject matter found in the works of this
tradtion is profoundly indebted to earlier rDzogs chen sNying thig presentations, above all the
summaries of Klong chen pa. The originality of the renaissance works lies less in their content than
in the directness of expression and syncretistic spirit with which it is presented. The illustrious lives
and prolific writings of a succession of luminaries in the Klong chen snying thig lineage - a long list
that includes ’Jigs med ’phrin las ’od zer (1745-1821), dPal sprul ’Jigs med chos kyi dbang po
(1808-1887), A ’dzom ’brug pa (1842-1924) and 'Jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse'i dbang po (1820-1892)
- are powerful testimony to the breadth of leaming (mkhas pa) and depth of personal realization
(grub pa) that are hallmarks of this tradition.

§3.2 Annotated Translation of Treasury of Qualities (XII.9-23) with Commentary from Yon tan
rgya mtsho’s Sun’s Rays Illumining the Profound Meaning (vol. 3, 616.6-625.5):

Part two. [617] This explanation of the distinctions has ten parts. [Specifically,] we will explain the
distinctions between:

1) Mind and open awareness (sems/rig pa)

2) Stability and essence (gnas pa/ngo bo)
3) Proliferation and expressive energy ( ’phro ba/rtsal)
4) Mode of freedom and key points (grol tshul gnad)
5) All-ground and dharmakäya (kun gzhi/chos sku)
6) States of errancy and freedom ( 'khrul/grol skabs)
 7) Spontaneity as ground and goal (,gzhi/‘bras Ihun grub)
8) Original purity as path and goal (lamTbras ka dag)
9) Intermediate state and deities (bar doAha)
10) Resting place and [buddha-]field (dbugs ’byin/zhing)

[1] The distinction between mind and open awareness:

This open awareness beyond anyone’s mind

Is the special teaching of natural Great Perfection.
Those who realize it are free in open awareness from the ground.
Sentient beings who do not realize it circle in an [occluded] state of that. [12.9]

First we shall explain the distinction between ’mind’ and ‘open awareness’. After the term
anyone (gang dag), we tum our attention to [the senses of] the two terms realize and not realize. In
this regard, mind refers to the conditioned factor, that is, the clear and knowing consciousness(gsal
rig gi shes pa) that harbours a complex variety of latent tendencies and possesses aspects of
apprehended object and apprehending subject stemming from those [tendencies]. Now, from object-
oriented mind, apprehended objects that are non-existent yet clearly apparent manifest as the five
aspects of forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactile sensations. From subject-oriented mind appear
limitless actions, their ripened [consequences] and afflictive emotions.843 Open awareness that is
beyond this [mind] is present as the unceasing self-effulgence of all nirvänic phenomena within the
sky-like dimension, the unconditioned which is empty and luminous. According to the Yid bzhin rin
po che ’i mdzod [ 1.3]:

From this sugatagarbha, original luminosity,

The genuine all-ground, unconditioned by nature,
Primordially pure in every respect like space,844 ,618]

The direct unmediated introduction to this open awareness is the special teaching of
natural Great Perfection. Those who properly realize the nature of open awareness do not analyze
the extemal objects while they manifest as a playing forth (rol pa) from the expressive energy (rtsal)
of open awareness that is the ground, and also do not grasp for an ‘inner mind’. They are thereby
free from grasping at appearances and cognitions. The agent of the apprehending subject and
apprehended object [simply] collapses. When actions and emotions have been voided, all samsäric
phenomena are free in this state of open awareness devoid of inherent independent nature. When
such [practioners] attain the state of the dissolution [of phenomena] into the very nature of things
(chos nyid zad pa), they have arrived in the realm of Samantabhadra (Kun tu bzang po). This is
known as taking one’s place in the ever-lasting kingdom of the monarch dharmakäya. As stated in
the Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod [X.39]:

843 This passage is taken almost verbatim from Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: 495.3 f..
844 Yid bzhin mdzod ch. 1.3: 4.2 f..
 At that time, you have arrived at the implicit intent that is dharmakäya,
Like space in which no erroneous phenomena of outer and inner are perceived.
Since you have attained the state of dissolution - without any coming or going,
You have finally reached the sublime citadel of the dharmakäya,
The realm of Samantabhadra [where] everything is infinite vastness.845

Since those who do not realize the very nature of open awareness cling to the [apparently]
extemal and internal entities that manifest from the all-ground as ‘appearances’ and‘mind’ and as
‘seif and‘other’, they are known as mind-govemed beings (sems can). They circle in thisstate of
the all-ground, all the while having never strayed from thatness846, the expanse of open awareness.
1619, According to the [Seng ge] rtsal rdzogs [Ati vol. 2, 314.2]

The ignorant in their childishness,

Make great efforts to tie knots in the sky.
They take as appearance what is devoid of objective appearance.
They take as conceptual what is devoid of concepts.847
They mistakenly take as seif and other
What is devoid of seif and other.848

If distinguished using images, they are iike water and bubbles in water.
Mind and awareness are alike to the extent that both can be nonconceptual,
However, awareness, being without intrinsic nature, is totally unrestricted,
Whereas mind swirls and clouds like a small lagoon. [ 12.10]

Stated briefly, if we indicate [how] these two, mind and open awareness, are distinguished
using illustrative images, open awareness is like the water of an ocean, a greatopen expanse of
ultimate reality, not chumed up by waves of ignorance with its eightfold ensemble[of cognitions].
So once those who have entered the path of Atiyoga, the pinnacle of spiritual vehicles, recognize
[how] to preserve the immediacy of this [reality]; they no longer need to resort to the various
antidotes used in renunciation that are just conceptual mind, like pictures drawn on water. There is
no transition or change from the implicit intent that is dharmakäya. And in all the vehicles belonging
to the eight gradations ranging from the efforts by śravakas to accept or reject things in accordance
with the four truths after having seen the defects and qualities in samsâra and nirväna [respectively],
up to the completion stage (rdzogs rim) meditation on bliss and emptiness belonging to the

845 Chos dbyings mdzod: 58.3 f..

846 Yon tan rgya mtsho here takes liberties with de nyid by interpreting it as thatness or suchness. In the root text de
nyid could refer either to the sentient beings (though a plural marker de dag or de rnams would be more correct) or
to the ground o f the preceding as Yon tan rgya mtsho has read it. On his reading, which I have loosely followed in
my rendering o f the line, the state o f that ground in which beings circle is the all-ground which is a derivative
occluded state o f the ground itself.
847
This line is missing in Yon tan mdzod ’g rel but present in canonical editions. See edited text.
84,1 Tb vol. 12: 619.6 f.; Tk vol. 9: 287.6 f..
Anu[yoga] path, it is just this incidental conceptual mind that has never known the natural state of
the ever-present dharmakäya and which has the nature of impermanence and change, like froth or
bubbles in water, that has been taken as the path. If one is then freed from mind’s defilements, it is
claimed that primordial knowing of the dharmakäya becomes directly present right now.[620| Such is
the difference between the two. According to the Rig pa rang shar [Ati vol. 1, 667.5]:

Examples of open awareness and ignorance are water and drawings on it.849

And [it continues] [Ati vol. 1, 667.5]:

Examples of mind and open awareness are water and froth. [Awareness] is not under the
power of mind.850

According to the Mu tig phreng ba [Ati vol. 2, 517.1]:

The distinction between mind and primordial knowing

Must be known by those who are leamed.
Mind is the ground of all latent tendencies,
It is the defilement of all embodied beings.
It is what is apprehended and the apprehender.
Therefore, it is the very nature of samsära.
When free from this mind, there is buddhahood.
The defilements of all embodied beings are then exhausted,
Animate beings are animated by this mind,
Without which there could be no animation.
Hence animate beings are similar to automatons.851

Further, in the state of meditative equipoise (mnyam par bzhag pa), the one-pointed mind
and objectless open awareness would seem to be the same to the extent that the unceasing
conspicuous flickering of mind’s conceptual [activity] has ceased and is no longer present.
However, objectless open awareness is essentially a thorough understanding whose fundamental
nature is to be without intrinsic nature (rang bzhin med p a’i chos nyid) and it present in a totally
unrestricted way, being free from shrouding obscurations due to mind. Thus, because it transcends
the causality of views and meditation, if you become familiar with that state, all the karma and latent
tendencies for rebirth will be exhausted. (62I) Whereas, mind when it is one-pointed at the time of
nonconceptual absorption apprehends the various referential objects as one, but it is not one taste (ro
geig) with the deep dharmadhätu that is free from limits. It thus swirls around like eddies in a small

849 Tb vol. 11: 537.4; Tk vol. 10: 193.5.

850 Tb vol. 11: 537.4; Tk vol. 10: 193.5.
851 This passage is analyzed in separate sections by Klong chen pa in Theg mchog mdzod chapter 14. See translation
and edited text of relevant passages above sections 3.2 and 3.4.
lagoon and becomes murky so it clouds the self-occurring light of open awareness. This is because
it is latently present as the anchor of the subject-object duality with its associated ignorance.
According to the Klong drug:

Views are defilements of the mind.

In pure ultimate reality which is undefiled
One is free from the dualism of the viewed and a viewer.
In viewing itself there is nothing viewed.
Why? Because if there is anything to be viewed,
The lamp of open awareness will be absent.852

Open awareness is like the deep glow of the new moon.

Mind is similar to the full moon mingling with objects.
The quality of open awareness is pristine clarity without objects.
The distinctive trait of mind is to mingle thoroughly with objects. [12.11]

Furthermore, to give an example, since open awareness does not enter into the objects of
ego-based consciousness that are manifestations of its expressive energy, it is known as primordial
knowing of individual self-awareness. It is like the deep glow of the self-luminous [new] moon on
the thirtieth day [of the month]853 that does not shine outward. Although in the unceasing lucent
aspect of self-abiding open awareness, the five modes of primordial knowing are spontaneously
present, it initially does not conceptualize the natures of objects. Since it subsequently does not
analyze them, does not grasp them continuously, even though all apparent objects like reflections of
one’s own face in a mirror are unceasingly displayed, it does not lose itself in these outer objects. ,622]
Since mind goes after the variety of objects that are seen as ‘out there’, then apprehends and
analyzes them as this and that, it is similar to the self-radiant [full] moon on the fifteenth day of the
month which shines outward pervading and mingling with all of its objects from the earth up.
Therefore, since the clarity aspect of direct deeper insight (Ihag mthong) has none of the turbidity of
ignorance, in its pristine clarity, it remains uncontaminated by aspects of objects. As such it exists
in primordial uncontrived harmony with the single-pointed calm abiding (zhi gnas). Thus, the fact
that the foundation of subject and object has been annulled is the quality of open awareness. There
are no nirvänic phenomena apart from this. The distinctive trait of mind is to mingle thoroughly
with objects of the six modes of consciousness, to spread out into all sorts of coarse notions together
with their mental factors [and to thereby] consolidate myriad causes of worldliness through the
building up of all manner of good and evil karma.

But that is not all. When discemed by means of an acute analytical awareness that
conceptually analyzes formulations such as ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, one may attain the unity
of the so-called [1] ‘calm abiding,’ i.e. the factor of one-pointedness that is based on meditative
equipoise within the framework of the epistemic certainty of thinking “it is selfless” or “it is empty”

852 1 have been unable to locate this passage in the Klong drug or any o f the Seventeen Tantras.
853 gnam stong zla ba, ‘moon o f the empty sky' refers to the new moon on the thirtieth day o f the month.
or “free from elaboration” and [2] ‘deeper insight’, i.e. the factor of analyzing things as being
without intrinsic nature. However, |623) this [analytical meditation] is still bound up with subject and
object and thus does not transcend the worldly concentrations. So although one has not simply
abandoned the cause of true deeper insight belonging to the ordinary path, this [meditation] is
nonetheless a pitfall on this path that takes open awareness as the path. Thus as the Kun byed [rgyal
po] States:

Since self-occurring primordial knowing does not conceptualize objects,

Latent tendencies of divisive conceptualizing do not modify it.854

[2] The distinction between stability and essence:

Similarily, open awareness as self-abiding insight does not depend

On concentration techniques and is free from elation and depression
Since mind is has a one-pointed focus on intentional objects,
Its absorptions stand in a relationship of founding and founded. [12.12]

Similarily, if one abides in the state of having directly recognized unimpeded open
awareness, that is known as appreciative insight abiding primordially as one’s own fundamental
nature or as deeper insight (Ihag mthong). Since in essence it is beyond removing or positing
[anything], it does not depend on techniques such as suppressing thought proliferations and
achieving mental stability by forcing mind into a state of concentration. Since it is endowed with
the intensity of being naturally knowing and lucid, it is devoid of depression; [and] since thought
movements are purified away in being self-liberated, it is free from elation.

With regard to the concentration that takes mind as the path: since it has entered the one-
pointed state by having a fixed apprehension ( ’dzin stangs) of its intentional object - be it a deity
or a nonconceptual [state] or anything eise - both the [resulting] meditative absorptions and the pre-
established object of vision stand in a relationship such that there is [1] a founding basis that is of
the nature of seeing a meditative object |624, and [2] a founded absorption that is the meditating
subject. Since [this dualism] consequently becomes what obscures the open awareness that is free
from subject and object, it is certainly ineffective apart from providing temporary reprieve from
divisive thoughts. According to the rDzogs chen po Ye shes nam mkha ’ dang mnyam pa ’i rgyud:

Confusing the non-active stable awareness of concentration and

The deeper insight and open awareness of rDzogs chen
Leads to deviation.855

854 Tk vol. 1: 146.1; Tb vol. 1: 169.5.

855 The full title o f this tantra is rDzogs pa chen po nges don thams cad ’dus p a / Ye shes nam mkha' dang mnyam
pa'i rgyud/ ITa sgom thams cad kyi snying po rin po che rnam par bkod pa / The title is found in Tb vol. 7: 2.1-433.5
(but not in Tk). I was unable to locate this passage in it.
[3] The distinction between proliferation and expressive energy:

Although open awareness experiences objects, it is not overwhelmed

By their appearances, like mercury that has fallen on the ground.
Mind, however, with its subject and object aspects,
Mingles with the appropriating inclination of divisive thinking. [12.13]

Open awareness experiences objects means that although the effulgent expressive energy
of responsiveness manifests unceasingly, it [does not] split into the duality856 of [1] its intrinsic
essence and [2] the manifesting of its expressive energy. This is because [1] one has not failed to cut
off [mind] at the root857 through retracing thoughts involving the supposed extemality of objects, and
[2] all thought movements become naturally purified, non-entitative, since they do not become
anything other than the naked disclosure of the nature of reality where there is no analyzing the
extemal, investigating the internal, or positing anything in between. So [awareness] is not
overwhelmed by the aspects of appearance. To give an example, it is like mercury that has fallen
on the ground: although it lands in the dirt, it does not mingle with the dirt, so it remains
uncontaminated by it. In the case of mind, however, when apparent objects manifest in open
awareness, since one has not fully mastered the state of directly recognizing this self-manifestation
to be without intrinsic nature, one becomes attached to the aspects of objects. Consequently, the flow
of divisive thoughts with their subject and object aspects coming one after another |625| it is never
cut off at the source. [Mind] thus mingles with the inclinations for appropriating worldly
existence and thereby builds up karma. According to the Klong drug [Ati vol. 2, 143.4]:

Open self-awareness free from thought and

The myriad embodied sensations of mind -
What a mistake take these two as similar!
Insight complete in its own expressive energy and
The extemally straying reflections of ego-mind858-
What a mistake to take these two as similar!859

Now, one may wonder whether to take the factor of what arises unceasingly in mind as the path or
rather the factor of responsiveness [wherein thoughts are] freed upon arising. One should [definitely]
base one’s path on the factor of responsiveness since it is described as the bare open awareness
which is the very basis for the arising [of thought] which does not stray from its natural resting

856 Corrected in accordance with Yon tan mdzod rang ’g rel (165.6) “Although open awareness experiences objects,
since its intrinsic essence and expressive energy do not bifurcate”
857 Literally, “because it is not the case that you have not severed the root...”
858 I here follow the line y id kyi dran pa phyir shor gnyis\ found in Ati, Tb, Tk. The linegiven in Yon tan mdzod
’g rel yid kyi dran bsam sna tshogs gnyis\ would read “The myriad thematic reflections o f ego-mind...”
859 Tb vol. 12: 416.3 f.; Tk vol. 10: 628.2 f..
place. On the other hand, one should not base one’s path on the factor of thoughts, already arisen in
mind due to the expressive energy [of open awareness], by way of all its aspects. As I have
explained again and again, when you relax in the essence, open awareness, just let mind go where it
likes and it will dissipate on its own. This key point is very important.860

860 This passage is adopted almost verbatim from Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: 496.3 f..
 Two recensions of ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 were consulted in preparing
the edited text of the excerpts herein translated:

1) Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod dga’ ba’i char. ln ’Jigs gling gsung ’bum A ’dzom edition:
The A- ’dzom chos-sgar redaction of the Collected Works of Kun-mKhyen ’Jigs-med
gling-pa Rang-byung rdo-rje mkhyen-brtse’i ’od-zer. 14 vols. Paro: Lama Ngodrup and
SherabDemy, 1985-, vol. 1, 138.1-138.6.

2) Yon tan rin po che ’i mdzod dga ' ba ’i char. ln Yon tan rin po che ’i mdzod kyi rgya eher
’grel rNam mkhyen shing rta Larungar edition. 2 vols. (book format), Bla rung sgar:
gSer ljongs bla ma rung Inga rig nang bstan slob grwa chen mo, 1999?, vol. 1,

No discrepancies were noted in these rescensions or in the occurrence of these passages in ’Jigs med
gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod ’grel (editions listed in Bibliography).

The rescension of Yon tan rgya mtsho’s Zab don snang byed Nyi ma’i ’od zer (vol. 3 (hum) of the
author ’s Yon tan mdzod kyi ’grel pa) from which the present excerpt was drawn is found in bKa’ ma
shin tu rgyas pa (NyKs), vol. 55. It is identical to the xylographic copy of the block print edition
published by Dilgo mKhyentse Rinpoche, Shechen Monastery, Bodhnath, in three volumes (n.d.).

As in the preceding edited texts and translations, page references in subscript square parentheses (,
within the body of the translation and edited transliteration refer to paginations in the Zab don snang
byed Nyi ma ’i ’od zer. Variant readings based on relevant sources are included in the notes to the
edited text. These notes also indicate variants of quotations found in Sanskrit Originals or other
Tibetan versions of the quoted passages. For ease of reference, I have included all other citation
information for quoted passages and textual-critical comments in the notes to the translation.

Abbreviations: In addition to the sigla for bibliographic references noted above and those included in
the Bibliography, I have employed the following abbreviations:

add. idit = added

om .: tit or omisit = omits or omitted.

§3.4 Edited text of ’Jigs med gling pa’s Yon tan mdzod XII.9-13 and relevant section from Yon
tan rgya mtsho’s Zab don snang byed Nyi ma’i ’od zer (vol. 3, 616.6-625.5):

[II.] gnyis pa [617J shan ’byed kyi ’phyong bshad pa| |shan ’byed kyi ’phyong bshad pa la bcu ste| |
[1] sems rig don gyis| | [2] gnas pa ngo bo’i| | [3] ’phro ba rtsal gyi| | [4] grol tshul gnad kyi| | [5]
kun gzhi chos sku’i| | [6] ’khrul grol skabs kyi| | [7] gzhi ’bras lhun grub kyi| | [8] lam ’bras ka dag
gi| I [9] bar do 1ha yi| | [10] dbugs ’byin zhing gi shan ’byed bshad pa’o| |
 [1. sems rig don gyi shan ’byed]

[gang dag sem s las ’das pa’i rig pa ni| |

rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po’i khyad chos yin| |
rtogs pa rnams ni gzhi las rig par grol| |
ma rtogs sem s can de nyid ngang du ’khor| |] [12.9]

dang po sems rig don gyi shan ’byed bshad pa ni| |gang dag zhes pa’i ’og tu rtogs pa zhes dang| |ma
rtogs zhes pa gnyis la bsnyegs pa yin la| |de la sems zhes bya ba ni bag chags sna tshogs pa ’dzin pa’i
gsal rig gi shes pa ’dus byas kyi cha dang| |de las shar ba’i gzung ’dzin gyi mam pa can te| |de yang
bzung ba’i sems las gzung yul med pa gsal snang gzugs sgra dri ro reg bya sngar snang la| |’dzin pa’i
sems las las dang mam smin nyon mongs pa dpag tu med pa snang bar 'gyur ro| |de las ’das pa’i rig
pa ni| |stong gsal ’dus ma byas pa nam mkha’ Ita bu’i ngang na mya ngan las ’das pa’i chos thams
cad rang gdangs ’gag pa med pa’i tshul du gnas pa ste| |Yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod [1.1] las| |

thog ma’i ’od gsal bde gshegs snying po nyid| |

don gyi kun gzhi rang bzhin ’dus ma byas| | (6181
ye nas mam dag nyid mkha’ Ita bu las| | zhes so| |

de Ita bu’i rig pa car phog tu ngo sprad pa ni rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po’i khyad chos y in te rig
pa’i chos nyid tshul bzhin du rtogs pa rnams ni gzhi rig pa’i rtsal las rol par shar dus phyi yul du
ma dpyad| |nang sems su ma bzung bas snang shes kyi ’dzin pa las grol| |gzung ’dzin gyi mkhan po
'gyel te| |las dang nyon mongs pa stongs nas ’khor ba’i chos thams cad rig pa rang bzhin med pa’i
ngang der grol te| |chos nyid zad pa’i sar thug pa na kun tu bzang po’i zhing du phyin te chos sku
rgyal po’i gtan srid zin pa zhes bya ste| |chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod [X.39] las| |

de tshe mkha’ ’dra phyi nang ’khrul pa’i chos| |

gang yang mi dmigs chos sku’i dgongs par phyin| |
zad pa’i sar thug 'gro dang 'ong med pas| |
thams cad klong ’byams kun tu bzang po’i zhing| |
chos sku’i pho brang mchog tu phyin pa yin| | zhes so| |

rig pa’i chos nyid ma rtogs pa mams kyis kun gzhi las shar ba’i phyi nang gi dngos po mams la
snang sems dang| |bdag gzhan du bzung bas sem s can zhes bya ste| |rig pa’i dbyings de nyid las ma
g.yos bzhin kun gzhi’i ngang du ’khor bar ’gyur te| 11619) rtsal rdzogs las||

mi shes byis pa’i ngang nyid kyis| |

nan gyis mkha’ la mdud pa bor| |
yul snang med la snang bar bzung| |
[rtog pa med la rtog par bzung| |]861
bdag dang gzhan du med pa la| |

861 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk

 bdag dang gzhan du ’khrul pas bzung862| | zhes so| |

[rnam pas dbye na chu dang chu lbur bzhin| |

rtog med tsam du sems rig mtshungs na’angl |
rig pa rang bzhin med par zang thal la| |
sems ni lteng ka Ita bur ’khyil zhing rmongs| |] [12.10]

mdor na rig pa dang sems gnyis po de dpe yi rnam pas dbye ba phye ste bstan na| |’di Itar rig pa ni
ma rig pa tshogs brgyad dang bcas pa’i rlabs kyis mam par ma dkyugs pa’i chos nyid yangs pa chen
po rgya mtsho’i chu Ita bu yin pas theg pa’i rtse mo a ti yo ga’i lam du zhugs pa mams kyis de nyid
thad drang du skyong shes nas sems rtogs chu la ri mo bris pa Ita bu’i spang gnyen sna tshogs pa la
ltos mi dgos par chos sku’i dgongs pa las ’pho ’gyur med pa dang| |nyan thos pa mams kyis ’khor
’das la skyon yon du bltas nas bden pa bzhi’i blang dor la brtson pa nas| |a nu’i lam du bde stong gi
rdzogs rim bsgom pa’i bar gyi rim pa brgyad po’i theg pa thams cad du ni| |gdod ma nas chos sku’i
gshis la grub ma myong ba’i sems rtog glo bur ba chu’i bdu ba’am chu lbur bzhin mi rtag cing
'gyur ba’i chos can de lam du byas nas sems kyi dri ma dang bral na chos sku’i ye shes gzod mngon
du ’gyur bar ’dod pa [620] gnyis kyi khyad par te| |rang shar las| |

rig pa dang ma rig pa’i dpe ni| |863 chu dang ri mo’i tshul te| |

zhes dang| |

sems dang rig pa’i dpe ni| |864 chu dang bdu865 ba’i tshul| | sems kyi dbang du ma gyur| |
zhes dang| |

mu tig phreng ba las| |

sems dang ye shes dbye ba ni| |

mkhas pa mams kyis shes par bya| |
sems ni bag chags kun gyi gzhi| |
lus can mams kyi dri ma yin| |
gzung ba yin la ’dzin pa yin| |866
de phyir ’khor ba’i chos nyid do| |
sems de bral na sangs rgyas sa| |
lus can kun gyi dri ma zad| |
'gro ba mams ni sems des gro| |

862 Ati, Tb, Tk bzung ba ’i ’khrul

863 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
864 add. as per Ati, Tb, Tk
865 Ati, Tb, Tk Ibu
866 Yon tan mdzod ’g rel, Ati, Tk, Tb: gzung ba yin la ’dzin pa yin\; TCagdms: gzung b ayul la ’dzin pa sems\
 de min ’gro bar nus min te| |
de phyir gro mams ’khrul ’khor bzhin| | zhes so| |

yang mnyam par bzhag pa’i gnas skabs na sems rtog gi ’gyu ba mgnon ’gyur ba ’gags nas med pa
tsam du sem s rtse geig tu zin pa dang| |rig pa yul med du zin pa gnyis mtshungs pa Itar yod na’angl
|rig pa yul med du zin pa ni rang bzhin med pa’i chos nyid yongs shes kyi ngo bor sems kyi sgrib
g.yogs dang bral bar zang thal du gnas pas Ita sgom rgyu ’bras las ’das pa’i phyir de’i ngang la
goms na yang srid len pa’i las dang bag chags thams cad zad par ’gyur ba yin I62i, la| |sems ni mi rtog
par bzhag pa’i tshe rtse geig tu zin na’ang gting mtha’ dang bral ba’i chos kyi dbyings dang ro geig
tu ma gyur par dmigs pa’i yul bye brag pa geig la bzung bas rgya chung ba lten g k a ’i chu bran Ita
bur ’k h yil zhing ma rig pa dang mtshungs par Idan pa’i gzung ’dzin gyi brtod phur bag nyal gyi
tshul du yod pas rig pa rang byung gi sgron ma la rmongs nas sgrib par ’gyur te| |klong drug pa las| |

Ita ba sems kyi dri ma yin| |

dri med dag pa’i chos nyid la| |
blta bya Ita byed gnyis dang bral| |
Ita ba nyid la blta ru med| |
ci phyir blta ba yod gyur na| |
rig pa’i sgron ma med par ’gyur| |867 zhes so| |

[rig pa gnam stong zla ba gtin g gsal ’dra| |

sem s ni bco ln g a ’i zla ba yul ’dres mtshungs| |
dangs la yul med rig pa’i yon tan te| |
yul dang kun nas ’dres pa sem s k yi khyad| | ] [12.11]

gzhan yang dper na rig pa ni rtsal snang yid shes kyi yul la mi ’jug pas so so rang gi rig pa’i ye
shes zhes bya ste| |gnam stong gi zla ba rang ’od phyir mi ’gro bar g tin g na gsal ba dang ’dra bar
rang gnas kyi rig pa’i gsal cha ma ’gags pa la ye shes Inga po lhun grub tu yod kyang yul gyi rang
bzhin la dang por mi rtog| |rjes su mi dpyod rgyun chags su mi ’dzin pas rang ngo ma la me long gi
gzugs brnyan Itar snang yul thams cad ma ’gags par bra yang phar yul thog tu ’chor [622| la| |sems ni
kha phyir bltas su yul sna tshogs pa’i rjes su ’brangs nas de dang der ’dzin cing dpyod pas tshes
bco lnga’i zla ba rang ’od phyir phros te sa gzhi’i bar gyis yul thams cad la khyab cing ’dres pa
dang m tshungs pa des na mngon sum pa’i lhag mthong gsal ba’i cha la ma rig pa’i myog pa med
pas dvangs868 la yul gyis mam pas gos pa med par rtse geig tu gnas pa’i zhi gnas dang ye nas bcos
pa med par zung ’brel du yod pas gzung ’dzin gyi gzhi stongs pa ni rig pa’i yon tan yin te| |de las
gzhan pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa’i chos med la| |tshogs drug gi yul dang kun nas ’dres te sems
byung dang bcas pa’i rtog pa rags pa du ma mched de dge sdig gi las du ma ’du byed pas srid pa’i
rgyu sna tshogs pa sdud par byed pa ni sem s k y i khvad par yin la| |

867 Passage not found in Klong drug or any of the Seventeen Tantras.
868 Alternative rendering of dangs found in root text with identical meaning.
der ma zad yod med la sogs pa’i spros pa rtog dpyod kyi dpyad rig mon pos bcad nas| |bdag med
pa’am| |stong pa’am| |spros pa dang bral lo snyam pa’i nges shes de’i ngang la mnyam par gzhag
nas rtse geig pa’i cha la zhi gnas dang| |rang bzhin med par dpyod pa’i cha la lhag mthong zhes
zung ’jug tu bsgrub kyang| |gzung ’dzin dang bcas pas |623| ’jig rten pa’i bsam gtan las na mi ’phar
ba’i phyir thun mong ba’i lam du yang dag pa’i lhag mthong gi rgyu tsam du mi spangmod kyang
rig pa lam du byed pa’i lam ’di’i ni gol sa yin no| |de Itar kun byed las| |

rang byung ye shes yul la mi rtog pas| |

rnam par rtog pa’i bag chags gos mi ’gyur| | zhes so| |

[2. gnas pa ngo bo’i shan ’byed]

[de bzhin rig pa rang gnas shes rab ste| |

bsam gtan thabs la ma ltos bying rgod bral| |
sem s n i dm igs p a ’i yul la rtse geig pas| |
tin g nge ’dzin dang rten dang brten par ’brel| |] [12.12]

gnyis pa gnas pa ngo bo’i shan ’byed ni| |de bzhin du rig pa zang thal du ngos zin pa’i ngang la
gnas na de ni rang gi chos nyid kyi gshis la ye nas gnas pa’i shes rab bam lhag mthong ste ngo bo
bsal bzhag dang bral bas bsam gtan gyi ngang du sems geur nas ’phro ba dgag pa dang gnas pa
sgrub pa sogs kyi thabs la ma ltos par rang bzhin gis rig pa gsal ba’i ngar dangIdan pas bying ba
yang med la ’gyu ba rang grol du dag pas rgod pa dang bral ba yinzhing| |sems lam dubyed pa’i
bsam gtan ni| |lha dang mi rtog pa la sogs dm igs pa’i yul la ’dzin stangs dang bcas pas rtse geig tu
’jog pa yin pas| |bsgom pa’i tin g n ge ’dzin dang sngar gtan la dbab par byas pa’i Ita ba’i don de
gnyis yul bsgom bya Ita ba’i rang bzhin rten dang yul can sgom (624, byed ting nge ’dzin brten pa
Ita bur zung du ’brel bas na gzung ’dzin dang bral ba’i rig pa’i sgrib byed du song nas gnas skabs
mam rtog ngal gso ba’i bsti gnas tsam las chod chung ba nyid de| |rdzogs pa chen poye shes nam
mkha ’ dang mnyam pa’i rgyud las| |

bsam gtan shes gzhi byar med dang| |

rdzogs chen lhag mthong rig pa gnyis| |
’dra dang nor bas gol te ’gro| | zhes so| |

[3. ’phro ba rtsal gyi shan ’byed]

[rig pa yul la shar kyang snang ba yi| |

zil gyis m i non dngul chu sar lhung ’dra| |
sem s ni gzung ’dzin cha dang bcas pa yi| |
rnam rtog nye bar len pa'i phyogs dang ’dres| |] [12.13]

gsum pa phro ba rtsal gyi shan ’byed ni| |rig pa ni yul la shar ba ste thugs rje’i rtsal mdangs ma
’gags par snang ba yin kyang rang ngo dang rtsal shar ba gnyis tha dad du gyes te yul gyi phyi
 bzhin rtog pa rjes mthud nas rtsa ba ma chod pa ma yin par phyir ma dpyad| |nang du ma brtags|
|bar du ma bzhag pa’i chos nyid rjen par bud pa las gzhan du mi ’gyur bas ’gyu ba thams cad dngos
med rang dag la 7gro ba’i phyir| |snang ba yi chas zil gyis mi non pa dper na dngnl chu sar lhung
ste rdul gyi gseb tu tshud kyang de rdul dang mi ’dres bas de la gos pa med pa dang ’dra ba yin la|
|sems ni yul snang rig pa la snang dus rang snang rang bzhin med par ngo shes pa’i ngang ma
’khyong nas yul gyi mam pa la zhen te gzung ’dzin gyi cha dang bcas pa yi (6251 rnam par rtog pa
geig rjes su geig mthud de gzhi rtsa ma chod par srid pa nye bar len pa’i phyogs dang ’dres nas
las sogs par ’gyur te| |klong drug las| |

rang rig bsam pa bral ba dang| |

sems kyi byung tshor sna tshogs gnyis| |
’dra’o ’dra’o nor ra re| |
shes rab rang rtsal rdzogs pa dang| |
yid kyi dran pa phyir shor gnyis| |869
’dra’o ’dra’o nor ra re| | zhes so| |

’o na sems ’char ba mi ’gags pa’am| |shar grol thugs rje’i cha de lam du mi byed dam zhe na| |thugs
rje’i cha ’char gzhi’i rig pa zang ma rang mal las ma g.yos pa la zer bas de lam du byed kyi| |rtsal
las sems su shar zin rtog pa’i cha de mam pa thams cad nas lam du mi byed de| |ngo bo rig pa la
bzhag dus sems gar dgar rang sangs la bskyur ba yin no zhes yang yang bshad pa yin gsungs| |gnad
’di shin tu gal ce ste| |

869 Yon tan mdzod ’g rel has yid kyi dran bsam sna tshogs gnyis\; Ati, Tb, Tk y id kyi dran pa phyir shor gnyis\
Bibliography and Abbreviations

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Ati: rNying ma ’i rgyud bcu bdun: Collected Nyingmapa Tantras o f the Man ngag sde Class
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Bg: The rGyud ’bum o f Vairocana: A Collection o f Ancient Tantras and Esoteric Instructions Compiled and
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D: Derge edition o f bsTan ’gyur. The Tibetan Tripifaka, Taipei Edition. Taipei, Taiwan: SMC Publishing
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dGongs pa zang thal. ed. rGod kyi Idem ’phru can. Leh: S.W. Tashigangpa, 1973.

IDPd: International Dunhuang Project Database, http://idp.bl.uk/database

IOL: India Office Library

NyG: rNying ma rgyud ’bum

NyK: rNying ma bka ’ ma rgyas pa. H. H. Bdud-’joms Kin-po-che, ed., Kalimpong, West Bengal: Dupjung Lama,
1987.

NyKs: bKa ma shin tu rgyas p a , 120 vol. Mkhan po ’Jam dbyangs, ed., Chengdu: Mkhan po mun sei, 1999.

P: Peking edition o f Bstan ’gyur. The Tibetan Tripifaka, Peking Edition. Tokyo/Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka
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Tb: mTshams brag edition o f the rNying ma rgyud ’bum. The Mtshams brag Manuscript o f the rNying ma
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Tk: gTing skyes edition o f the NyG. rNying m a ’i rgyud ’bum: A Collection o f Treasured Tantras Translated
during the Period o f the First Propagation o f Buddhism in Tibet. 36 vols. Thimbu, Bhutan: Dingo Khyentse
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2. P rim ary Sources: Indian W orks*

Abhisamayãlamkãra. Th. Stcherbatsky & E. Obermiller, eds., Abhisamayālamkãra-Prajñãpãramitā-Upadeśa-

Śastra: The Work o f Bodhisattva Maitreya. Part 1: Introduction, Sanskrit Text and Tibetan translation. 1929.
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Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 8. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1967.

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*Guhyagarbhatantra. See Doije 1987.

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MAv: Madhyamakãvatāra par Candrakīrti: Traduction Tibétain. Bibliotheca Buddhica. IX. Publiée par Louis
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MAvBh: Candrakīrti. Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya. Tibetan, Derge edition, translated by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and
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MSA: Mahāyānasūtrālamkãra. S. Levi. Paris, ed.. Champion, 1925.

MMK : Mūlamadhyamakakārikã'. Nāgāijuna. Mūlamadhyamakakãrikãs (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la

Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St. Petersburg
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Pramānavārttika. Dharmakīrti. See PV.

Pramānaviniścaya. DharmakTrti. See PVin.

PV: Pramānavarttikakãrikã (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Yüsho Miyasaka, ed., Acta Indologica II. Narita: Naritasan
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PVin: Dharmakfrti ’s Pramãnaviniścaya Chapters 1 and 2. Critically edited by Emst Steinkellner. Beijing and
Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007.

Ratnagotravibhäga/Uttaratantra. See RGV.

RGV: Ratnagotravibhãga Mahāyãnottaratantraśāstra. Asańga/Maitreya. E. H. Johnson ed., Patna: Bihar

Research Society, 1950. (Includes Ratnagotravibhãgavyākhyā.)

RGVt: Critical edition o f Tibetan translation of Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyãnottaratantraśāstra. See

Nakamura, Zuiho.

R G W : Ratnagotravibhāgavyãkhyã (see RGV).

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Bla ma dgongs ’dus (Gangtok ed.). 13 vols. Sangs rgyas gling pa (rediscoverer). Gangtok, Sikkim: Ngagyur
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Bla ma dgongs ’dus (mTshams brag ed.). 18 vols. Sangs rgyas gling pa (rediscoverer). Paro, Bhutan: Lama
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Bod rje ’bangs dang btsun rnams la springyig. Buddhaguhya. In: P 5693.

bSam gtan mig sgron. gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes. Sgom gyi gnad gsal bar phye ba bSam gtan mig sgron.
Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod series, vol. 74. Leh, 1974.

bSam gtan ngal gso ’grel. Klong chen rab ’byams p a rDzogs pa chen po bSam gta ngal gso ’i ’grel pa shing rta
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bsDus don gyi gnas rgya eher dbye ba. Klong chen rab 'byams p a rDzogs pa chen po Sems nyid ngal gso ’i ’g rel pa
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bsTan p a ’i sgron me. Rog Bande Shes rab ’od. Grub mtha ’ so so ’i bzed gzhung gsal bar ston pa chos ’byung
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Byang chub lam bzang. Klong chen rab ’byams pa. rDzogs pa chen po Sems nyid ngal gso ’i gnas gsum dge ba gsum
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Byang chub sems dpa ’i spyod pa la ’ju g pa ’i rnam p ar bshad pa Theg chen chos kyi rgya mtsho Zab rgyas mtha ’
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Chos ‘byung me tog snying po sbrang rtsi’i bcud. Nyang Nyi-ma ’od-zer. Gangs-can rig mdzod Series 5. Lhasa:
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Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: Klong chen rab ’byams pa. Chos dbyings rin po che ’i mdzod kyi ’g rel pa Lung gyi gter
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Dam chos y id bzhin nor bu thar pa rin po che ’i rgyan. sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen. Chengdu: Si khron mi
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Dri ba snga phyi tha dad mdzad pa ’i dri lan thor bu ’i skor. rTse le sNa tshogs rang grol. In: dKar rnying gi
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dGongs ’dus pa ’i mdo: Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dgongs pa ’dus pa ’i mdo chen po. Full title: De bzhin gshegs
pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba ’i ye shes; Don gyi snying po rdo rje bkod pa ’i rgyud; Rnal ’byor grub pa ’i
lung; Kun ’dus rig pa ’i mdo; Theg pa chen po mong par rtogs pa; Chos kyi rnam grangs rnam par bkod pa
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gNyug sems ’od gsal gyi dort la dpyadpa rdzogs pa chen po gzhi lam ’bras bu ’i shan ’byed blo grol snang ba. Mi
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Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho. Gangtok 1971, vol. 24,411-566.

gNyug sems zur dpyad skor gyi gsung sgros thor bu rnams phyogs geig tu bsdus p a rdo rje rin po che ’i phreng
ba (Part 3 of gNyug sems skor gsum). Mi pham ’Jam dbyangs mam rgyal rgya mtsho. In: Collected Writings o f
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Grub mtha ’ mdzod. Klong chen rab ’byams pa. Theg pa mtha ’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa Grub mtha ’ rin po che ’i
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gSang ba ’dus pa rgyud: dPal gsang ba ’dus pa rgyud kyi rgyal po. In: Tb vol. 18, 752.3-969.7.

’J igs gling gsung ’bum. ’Jigs med gling pa Rang byung rdo ije. The Collected Works o f Kun-mkhyen ’Jigs-med-
gling-pa. 9 vols. Lha sa edition. (Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab series, vols. 29-37). ed. Sonam T. Kazi. Gangtok,
India, 1970-75. Also consulted: The A- ’dzom chos-sgar redaction o f the Collected Works ofKun-mKhyen ’Jigs-med
gling-pa Rang-byung rdo-rje mkhyen-brtse’i ’od-zer. 14 vols. Paro: Lama Ngodrup and Sherab Demy, 1985-.

Khyung chen Iding ba. Tk vol. 1, 419.4-423.3; Bg vol. 5, 308.1-314.1.

Klong chen gsung ’bum. 26 vols. Klong che rab ’byams pa. Peking: Krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2009.

Klong chen gsung thor bu: Klong chen rab ’byams pa. Kun mkhyen Klong chen p a Dri med ’od zer gyi gsung thor
bu. Reproduced from xylographic prints from A ’dzom ’brug pa chos sgar blocks. 2 vols. Pema Thinley, Gangtok,
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Reproduced from xylographic prints ffom sDe dge blocks. 2 vols. Lama Ngodrup and Sherab Drimey, Delhi, 1982;
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Klong drug ’g rel. Vimalamitra (ascribed). Kun tu bzang po klong drug rgyud kyi 'grel pa. NyKs vol. 109, 5-930.
Dilgo Khyentse ed. refers to a different rescension published by Samdrup Tsering for Dilgo Khyentse, New Delhi:
1988.

Kun byed rgyal po: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems Kun byed rgyal po. Tk vol. 1, 2.1 -166.6.
Tb vol. 1,2.1-192.5.

Kun byed rgyal po ’grel: Phan yon mTha’ yas ’od zer. rDzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems Kun byed rgyal
po ’i ’grel pa Kun bzang dgongs rgyan. 3 parts: Pt. 1 (Om) in NyKs vol. 105, 7-896; Pt. 2 (Äh), vol. 106, 7-920;
Pt. 3 (Hum), vol. 106, 923-1452.

Kun mkhyen chos kyi rgyal po gter chen dri med ’od zer gyi rnam par thar pa cung zad spros pa ngo mtshar skal
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Kun mkhyen dri med ’od zer gyi rnam thar mthong ba don Idan. In: Kun mkhyen klong chen rab ’byams kyi rnam
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Kun mkhyen klong chen rab ’byams kyi mam thar. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1994. Comprises
bSod nams chos ’grub’s (1862-1944) Kun mkhyen chos kyi rgyal po rig ’dzin klong chen rab ’byams kyi m am thar
dad pa gsum gyi ’ju g ngogs, 1-166 and Chos grags bzang po’s (14th c.) Kun mkhyen dri med ’od zer gyi m am thar
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Lam gyi rim pa mdo tsam du bstan pa. Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa. In: Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum vol. 2.

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pa gsung ’bum. In: Tsong kha pa gsung ’bum vol. 13.
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mDzod bdun: Klong chen rab ’byams pa. mDzod bdun. 1 vols. Based on the Oddiyana Institute edition
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Nam mkha ’i mtha ’ dang mnyam pa ’i rgyud: rDo rje sems dpa ’ Nam mkha ’i mtha ’ dang mnyam pa ’i rgyud. Bg vol.
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’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor. gNyags Jñānakumāra. In: NyKs, vol. 82, 965-971.

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Phyogs bcu mun sei: Klong chen rab ’byams pa. dPal gsang ba snying po de kho na nyid nges pa ’i rgyud kyi ’g rel
pa phyogs bcu ’i mun pa thams cad rnam par sei ba. In: NyKs vol. 68, pp. 5-683. See also Doije 1987.

Rang byung rdo rje gsung ’bum. Rang byung rdo rje (third Karmapa). vol. 1-16. Ziling: mTshur phu mkhan po lo
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Rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po ’i chos ’byung rig ’dzin brgyud pa ’i rnam mthar Ngo mtshar nor bu bai du rya ’i
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 Index
Abhidharma System, 6 5 ,12-14, 85, 148-9
Abhidharmakośa, 72-3nl64, 148, 228, 276n643,
285nn665-6, 287nn670-l
Abhidharmakośabhāsya, 69nl56, 240n581
Abhidharmasamuccaya, 152n368, 215-6
Abhisamayālamkāra, 285n665, 286n668, 287nn
670-3
abiding condition (gnas lugs), 11, 20, 46-7, 61, 87,
104, 165, 181, 198, 201,204, 208,212,265-6,
269, 311; See also existential condition (yin lugs)
absurd consquences (prasańga, thal ’g yur), 39, 124-
5, 130, 135, 186, 199
Advayavajra. See Maitripäda
aggregates (skandha, phung po) 193n499,279
ālayavijñãna (kun gzhi ’i mam par shes pa, substrat-
um consciousness),
älaya- separate from vijñāna, 155n378, 182n471
buddha nature, identified with, 151-54n364, 183
conditioned kun gzhi, relation to, 181
defmition, 161nn400-l
eightfold cognitive ensemble, relation to, 60
mind (sems), relation to, 60, 67, 161-3, 182
origin and development of, 143, 147-8
Tibetan/Chinese reception, 11, 24, 151-63, 181-2
unreality of, 39n346, 160
vs. absolute kun gzhi (early rDzogs chen), 154
vs. amalavijñāna, 156-9
vs. buddha nature, 154n373, 163, 183
vs. gzhi (sNying thig), 204,207
vs. supramundane mind, 154-6, 183
See also all-ground
aletheiology, 136, 249-53
Alīkākāravādins/Nikāravādins, 39, 95, 182n470
all-ground (älaya, kun gzhi),
älaya- separate from vijñāna, 155n378, 182n471
ãlayavijñāna, as shorthand for, 159, 161
bodhicitta, relation to, 87n210, 190n487
concepts and terminology, 143
don gyi kun gzhi, 143, 155, 181, 191,198-8, 252
kun gzhi as kun gyi gzhi, 153n369
Mahâyoga/Sems sde conceptions, 38,43, 164,
182-207
ninth all-ground, 191 n491
pure vs. impure, 155, 182-207
sNying thig Classification (4-fold), 1 1 ,196n508
stratigraphy o f kun gzhi interpretations, 197
vs. ālayavijñāna, 182
vs. dharmakäya, 8-9, 18, chs. 4-5, 159-61, 163
vs. gzhi (sNying thig), chs. 4-5, 183-4
vs. rig pa, 88
See also ālayavijñãna, a\\-ground/dharmakäya
amalavijñāna (dri ma med p a ’i rnam shes), 155-9
anätma (bdag med, no seif), 271n637
Andhaka tradition, 145n353
antirealism, global, 47
Ańguttaranikāya, 145nn350-l
Anuyoga, 42n85, 167, 172n431, 175, 330; See also
Five Anuyoga tantras, 42n85
appearance (snang ba), 40, 60, 75, 284
Asańga. See Maitreya-Asańga
āśrayaparāvrtti/0-parivrtti (gnas ’gyur). See trans­
formation o f basis
Astasāhasrikã, 83nl97, 122n309, 279n650, 310-7
Atiśa, 44,46, 224, 231, 237-9n577,240-4nn581-3
Atiyoga. See rDzogs chen
ätman (bdag, seif), 212, 270,271n635
avidyä (ma rig pa). See ignorance
awakening (bodhi, byang chub) passim; 12,28-9,
59, 65-6, 102, 111, 121, 123, 127, 130, 134, 139,
142, 147, 168-9, 180, 187-8, 192, 199,220, 226,
229-31, 236, 246-7, 258,260, 278, 285, 287, 311
’Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang, 127n323,
143-4nn348-9, 151n364, 154
badness. See daustulya
Bai ro rgyud ’bum, 19, 32-3, 97, 166, 169n424,
171n429, 195n505
bDud ’joms Rin po che (Dudjom Rinpoche), 35,41,
270n633
*Bhadrapãlasūtra, 194n501
bhavägra (srid rtse, peak of wordliness), 126n321,
276n643
Bhäviveka, 92n227
bhümi (sa). See levels
Bi ma snying thig, 18-9nn6-7, 32n39, 34n51, 49,
96n241, 108n281, 160n395
bKa’ brgyud, 25, 2 9 ,45n92, 61nl33, 79, 114n296,
127n323, 144, 151n364, 155, 164-5n409, 224
bKa’ gdams, 43-6, 222-3n551, 224, 239, 241n583
bKa ’ ma shin tu rgyas pa, 19n8 et passim
Bla brang pa Chos dpal rgyal mtshan, 45n94,46n97
Bla ma dam pa bSod nams rgyal mtshan, 45n92
Bla ma dgongs ’dus, 20nl0, 101n258, 211
Bla ma yang tig, 49, 58-9nnl 31 -3 and 136
Blo bzang Dam chos rgya mtsho, 158-9
Blo bzang ’Jam dbyangs, 159
bodhi (byang chub). See awakening
Bodhicaryãvatãra, 91, 93, 222-3n551, 282-3
bodhicitta (byang chub kyi sems, awakened mind),
9 ,2 0 ,8 1 ,8 7 ,9 1 , 121, 143, 159, 168-70, 176-9,
187, 190, 258, 260
*bodhigarbha (byang chub [kyi] snying po, quint­
essence of awakening), 43, 91, 143, 173-82, 187
*bodhigarbha, cont’d
all-ground, identification with, 179
bodhicitta, connection to, 176n451,187
early rDzogs chen buddha nature concept, 175-6
related terminology, 177
self-awareness, identified with, 178-9
suchness (tathatä), identified with, 177, 180
bodhimanda (byang chub [kyi] snying p o , seat o f
enlightenment), 176n449. See *bodhigarbha
Bodhipathapradīpa (andpañjikā), 237-40 and notes
Bodhiruci, 156
bodhisattva, passim
Bodhisattvabhümi, 27n23, 147, 152n368
Bon tradition, 9, 55, 213-4
’Bri gung bKa’ brgyud, 52
’Bri gung dPal ’dzin, 34n51
’Brom Rin chen ’bar, 31n34, 33
’Brom ston rGyal ba’i ’byung gnas, 31n34, 237-5
n577,241n582
Bru sha (Burushaski), 41-2n80, 42n85
bSam yas Debate, 37n60, 229
bSam yas monastery, 43-5n90, 52, 174
bSamgtan mig sgron, 36,41-3, 75, 171-2 et passim
bSam gtan ngal gsol ’grel, 51, 269n631
bskyed rim (utpattikrama, creation phase), 251
bSod nams rgyal mtshan. See Bla dam pa
bsTan rim (Stages o f Teachings), 46, 223n552
bsTan rim chen mo, 46n99, 223n552
bTsan dgon pa gZhon nu bsam gtan, 46n97
Bu ston Rin chen grub, 238n578, 284n664
Buddha/buddha (sangs rgyas), passim; See
Säkyamuni; sangs rgyas
buddha nature. See *bodhigarbha; *sugatagarbha;
tathägatagarbha/T athâgatagarbha
buddhadhãtu, 152
Buddhaguhya (Sangs rgyas gsang ba), 168n419
Buddhagupta (Sangs rgyas sbas pa), 3 6 ,168n4l9,
171
buddhajñãna (sangs rgyas kyi ye shes), 11, 65, 129,
130n330; See also primordial knowing
Bum thang (in Bhutan), 52-3
Bum thang Iha ’i sbas yul gyi bkod p a la bsngags pa
Me tog skyed tshal, 52
byang chub [kyi] snying po. See *bodhigarbha
Byang chub lam bzang, 45-9 and notes
Candrakīrti, 46-7, 92n228,94, /7/-5n290, 117,
285n667
cessation o f jñāna, critique of, 127-8n324, 129n330
cessation o f mind (cittanirodha, sems ’g og pa), 24,
125n316, 126n320, 150,276n643
Chan tradition, 32, 37n61,42, 75, 77, 230n563
Che btsan skyes, 41
chen po gsum (Three Great Ones), 114n296
Chos dbyings mdzod/’g rel, 26n22, 50-1, 68nl49,
89n217, 98nn246-7, 105-6nn272 and 274,
117n302, 132n334, 328-9n845
Chos dpal rgyal mtshan. See Bla brang pa
Chos grags bzang po, 13, 120, 268-9, 288
Chos mngon pa gsal byed, 148n359
citta (sems, mind). See mind
Cittacaitanyaśamanopāya, 81
Cittakalpaparihāradrsti, 80
Cittamätra (sems tsam, Mind-Only). See Yogācāra
Cittamätra followers, 39, 97-8
Cittanirodha. See cessation of mind
Cittaratnadrsti, 80
Clearing process (sbyong byed), 21, 64,236, 249-53
compassionate responsiveness (thugs rje), 71-2, 79,
106, 108, 110, 118, 204-6, 333
conceptual/nonconceptual (savikalpa/nirvikalpa,
rtog bcas/rtog med), 74-8
Dam pa bde gshegs, 129-30n330
dam tshig. See vows
Dam tshig gsum bkod, 51 n 107
Dan ’bag monastery, 47nl02
Dar ije dPal gyi grags pa, 42n85
dau§tulya (gnas ngan len, badness), 27n23,146n
357, 156, 189
dBu ma (pa). See Madhyamaka (Mädhyamika)
dBu ru, 31n35, 43n88
de bzhin nyid (tathatä). See suchness
defiled ego-mind (klistamanas, nyon mongs pa can
gyi yid), 68; See also ego-mind
deviation (gol sä), 72, 75, 175-6nl48, 231, 255,
305,311,313, 332
dGa’ rab rdo ije, 20, 31, 171
dGe lugs, 43n89, 70, 80, 94-6,158-9, 223-4n552,
239-40
dGongs ’g rel gyi ’grel chen, 158n387
dGongs pa ’dus pa ’i mdo, 2 5 ,41-2n85,47, 91,
167, 174-9, 187-8, 190, 192, 284n664
dGongs pa zang thal, 19n6, 20nl0, 33-4, 197,
210
dharma (chos), passim; definition, 229n560
Dharmadharmatãvibhāga, 27n23, 81nl90, 145,
154
dharmadhätu (chos kyi dbyings), 82, 106,127n324,
129n328, 151, 158, 165, 167, 170, 191,247, 304
dharmakäya (chos sku), passim; 59, 138
and/as freedom, 141
and/as rig pa or ye shes, 58, 78, 88, 131, 141
as source/ground o iyeshes, 141
characteristics of, 140-1
definition of, 157-8, 159-62
See also all-ground
Dharmakīrti, 46, 69nl56, 92n231, 213-4n535
dharmatä (chos nyid). See reality; suchness
dhätu (khams/dbyings, element), 127, 151,152-3nn
365-8, 274, 304; See also dharmadhätu
Dīghanikāya, 240n581
Dignāga, 92n230, 93
direct introduction (ngo sprod), 104, 164n409
disclosive paradigm, 12, 14,27-30, 115-6, 142, 147
150, 157-60, 178, 183-4, 189, 198,251-2,263
distinctions (shan ’byed);
gzhi/kun gzhi (sNying thig), chs. 4-5, 183-4
history o f two rDzogs chen distinctions, 18-26
kun gzhi/chos sku. See aU-gyound/dharmakäya
kun gzhiye shes/kun gzhi rnam shes, 155n377
pure/impure kun gzhi, 155
rnam shes/ye shes, 28-9, 128
sems/sems nyid. See mind/Mind itself
sems/ye shes. See mind/primordial knowing
sources o f two distinctions, 18n6, 33-4
ten distinctions in Yon tan mdzod ’grel, 327-8
divine eye (divyacaksus, Iha ’i mig/spyan), 285n666
dNgos gzhi ’od gsal snying po ’i don khrid, 57-60
Dohākośagīti, 80nl87
dPal dbyangs (Śffgho§a), 37n61, 81 n 191, 90n220,
173-4n437
dPe don nges don rdo rje ’i mgur, 26n21
’Dra ’bagchen mo, 33n43, 102n262
dualism (as characteristic o f mind), 57-60, 67-9, 70-
2, 85n205, 95-9, 123-5, 137, 202, 257, 307-13,
330-2
dualism (body/mind), 93-4n234
Dudjom Rinpoche. See bDud ’joms Rin po che
effulgence (gdangs), 57, 60-4, 68, 88, 218, 328
ego-mind (manas,yid), 85-6n205, 216, 217n542,
284n662,302-3n732, 309, 333
eight centres (gling brgyad; in Bhutan), 52
eight examples (dpe brgyad), 270, 280n653
eighteen Sems sde tantras (rgyud bco brgyad), 36,
169n424, 174, 261
eightfold cognitive ensemble (tshogs brgyad), 30,
57, 60, 67, 75, 121, 131, 147-8, 194, 206, 250,
252,278, 329
Eighth Karmapa. See Mi bskyod rdo ije
eighth metaphysical ground (sNying thig), 213
elaboration, discursive. See prapañca
emancipation process (bral byed), 249-50
emotions, afflictive (kleśa, nyon mongs), passim,
73nl67, 85n205, 216n540
emptiness (śūnyatã, stong pa nyid), passim,
and appearance (snang), 105,113, 115, 212,
270n633, 272
and awareness (rig), 107, 160-1
and compassion (snying rje), 226
and clarity (gsal), 66, 105-7, 118, 221, 310
as sheer vacancy (stong nyid rkyang ma), 116-7,
126, 128-9, 248, 270-1
endowed with all excellent aspects, 127n323
*Prāsańgika view of, 113-7, 135
primordial knowing of/as, 106-7, 110
rDzogs chen affirmative account of, 114-8
enlightened intent ([sangs rgyas kyi] dgongs pa), 58,
79, 261, 271n636
epistemology, mediational, 8nl, 74, 78, 95-6, 116
n298
error/errancy (bhränti, ’khrul pa), 39, 59-60, 67-71,
166, 179-80, 183-4,199-206, 217-21, 276, 306
etemalism. See extremes o f etemalism and nihilism
existential condition (yin lugs), 127, 140, 269-70,
273, 276; See also abiding condition
expressive energy (rtsal), 32, 60-1, 71, 82, 85n
209, 101, 104-6, 110, 201-3, 213, 328, 333-4
extremes of etemalism and nihilism, 173, 200, 206,
2 1 2 ,225n553
Facheng (Chos grub), 158
Fifth Dalai Lama. See Ngag dbang Blo bzang rgya
mtsho,
five aggregates (skandhä). See aggregates
five Anuyoga tantras, 42n85, 172n431, 284n664
five buddha families, 116n299, 282n565
five certainties (nges pa Inga), 286n668
five earlier translations (Sems sde), 36, 218n544,
258n609, 261n618
five elements (bhüta, ’byung ba), 110, 287n670,
303n729
five freedoms (sNying thig). See freedom
five paths (lam Inga) (Mahāyāna). See path
five imperial dharmas (rgyalpo ’i chos Inga), 42n85
five poisons (dug Inga). See emotions, afflictive
five propositions about rDzogs chen path, 262-3
five sense perceptions (vijñãna, rnam shes), 62nl37
68nl49, 193,284, 328
four concentrations (dhyäna, bsam gtan), 285
four conditions, 185n474, 194n502
four correct discriminations (pratisamvid: so sor
yang dag par rig pa), 287n672
four discourses (mdo, sūtra) (dGongs 'dus), 192-3
four kinds o f fearlessnesses (vaiśāradhya, mi ’jigs
pa), 287n671
four kun gzhi (sNying thig). See all-ground
four mudrā (seals), 164n409
four names (nâma, ming), 193n499
four powers (vaśitã, dbang), 287n673
four qualities o f ground (gNyags), 201-2
four truths, 229n560, 272-3n638, 329
four visions (snang ba) (sNying thig), 110n288
four vows (dam tshig) (rDzogs chen), 5 I n l 07
four yogas (Ita sgom spyod ’bras), 9n3, 51nl07
freedom (moksa/mukti, grol ba),
five kinds o f freedom (sNying thig), 219
Indian idea of, 12, 217-8
rDzogs chen idea of, 12, 217-21
Gangs ri thod dkar, 48, 52, 269, 288
gCod system, 44, 289n677
Ghanavyüha, 155n378
gling brgyad (eight centres; in Bhutan), 52
gNas lugs mdzod/ ’g rel, 50-1 n 107
gNas lugs phyag chen, 61 nn 133-4
gnoseological trend/terminology, 10, 19-20, 78-112
gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes, 32, 35-6, 38, 40-3, 75-
8 ,91,98-9, 102, 109, 167, 170-3, 175, 177-80,
187-8, 190-5,218, 231
gNyags Jñānakumāra, 37-40,41-2, 170, 186,199-
201
gNyug sems zur dpyadskor, 127n323
’Gos lo tsä ba gZhon nu dpal, 151 n364, 284n664
gotra (rigs). See spiritual affiliation
gradualism, 26, 77, 228-31, 264-6
grāhya-grãhaka (gzung ’dzin). See dualism
Great Perfection. See rDzogs chen
Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas, 46
ground (älaya, gzhi),
abiding vs. intellectual, 10n4, 207-11
as buddha nature, 173-82 (See *bodhigarbha)
common ground (spyi gzhi), 184-8
disclosive and developmental models, 143-7
error, relation to, 199-207
gnoseological interpretations, 168-72
nine views o f (gNubs), 171-2
ontological interpretations (suchness), 170-3
problem o f the (rDzogs chen), chs. 4-5
productive vs. invariant grounds, 145-6
seven (or six) grounds (sNying thig), 208-13
soteriological interpretations, 165-7
stratigraphy o f ground conceptions, 198
terminology, 142-3
typology in early rDzogs chen, 167-82
vs. all-ground, chs. 4-5, 140-3, 183-4
See also ālayavijñãna; all-ground
ground-manifestation (gzhi snang), 23, 70-1 n 159,
85n205, 205,219
ground o f error/errancy ( ’khrul gzhi), 11, 141, 183-
4,21 4,219
ground o f freedom (grol gzhi), 11, 141, 143, 183-4,
217-19
Grub mtha ’ bstan pa ’i sgron me, 166n415, 201,
225n553,234n570, 246n592
Grub mtha ’ mdzod, 22n 14, 50, 54, 81 n 191, 94-5
n236 and nn238-9, 129, 131n331, 197, 225n553,
234n571,245-8,272n638
gSang ba bde ba'i ’g rel pa, 38nn64-5, 39nn67-8
gSang ba spyodpa sa bon gyi rgyud, 225n553
gSang phu monastery, 43n89,44-8n90
gTer ma (treasure texts), 32n38
gTsug lag ’phreng ba, 101n257, 128n326, 129n328
*Guhyagarbhatantra, 20, 22, 38, 47, 52, 174, 177-
8, 180, 195, 276n644
Guhyamantrayäna. See M antrayäna/Vaj rayäna
Guhyasamājatantra, 166nn413-5
Gung thang dKon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me, 158-9
g.Yo[n] ru, 31n35, 43n88
g.Yu sgra snying po, 35, 37
gZhan phan mTha’ yas ’od zer, 82nl93, 103n267,
255n604,259-60nn613-16
gzhi (älaya). See ground
gZhi snang ye shes sgron ma, 70nl 59, 84
gZhon nu bsam gtan. See bTsan dgon pa
gZhon nu don grub, 47nl01
gZhon nu dpal. See ’Gos lo tsä ba
gZhon nu rdo ije, 46n98
gZhon nq rgyal po. See Kumārādza
gZhon nu rin chen, 46n97
gzung ’dzin (grãhya-grāhaka). See dualism
Hadot, Pierre, 6n4, 232n566
Heidegger, Martin, 115, 118, 220-ln550, 135-6
Heshang Mohoyen, 37, 75
Hevajratantra, 252
Hīnayāna, 14, 27, 225n553,240, 242-3,253-4
ignorance (avidyä, ma rig pa), passim;
asymmetrical relation to rig pa, 72-4
mind, association with, 57, 61, 66-7, 69-74
rDzogs chen interpretation, 69-74, 86-9, 124,
129, 134, 178-9, 199, 203, 213, 275-6, 300,
304-9, 328-30
sNying thig three-fold ignorance, 70-2
sNying thig vs. Abhidharma views, 72-4
two kinds o f ignorance, 69-70nl56,202
inclusivism, 25n20, 243,253
indivisibililty (dbyer med, ’du ’bral med), of:
appearance and emptiness, 105, 113, 115, 270n
633, 272
expanse (dbyings) and ye shes, 129n328,272
ka dag and Ihun grub, 106, 118, 206,211-3
käyas and jñãnas, 141
clarity (gsal ba) and emptiness, 66, 105-7, 118,
221,310
minds o f buddhas and sentient beings, 185-8
the two truths, 115-6n297
insight, disceming (prajñā, shes rab), 9n3, 70, 72,
9 9 ,222n551,240n581,
’Jam dbyangs bZhad pa’i rdo rje, 158n389
’Jam dpal bshes gnyen. See Mañjuśrīmitra
Jinamãrgãvatāra, 222-3n551
jñāna (ye shes). See primordial knowing
Jo nang tradition, 155n377
ka dag. See original purity
Kälacakratantra, 29, 44, 274-5n639
Kamalaśīla, 75, 117
Karma Mi pham mgon po, 255-6
Kati channel (ka ti shel gyi sbu gu can), 60, 63n 141
käya (sku, embodiment), passim; See dharmakäya
Khri srong lde btsan, 36, 37, 168n419
Khregs chod (Breakthrough), 23nl7, 58, 89, 104
 ’khrul gzhi. See ground of error/errancy
’khrul pa (bhränti). See error/errancy
Khu Byang chub ’od, 38
Khuddanikäya, 222n551
Khyung chen Iding ba, 27-8n25, 202n259, 258n609
kleśa (nyon mongs). See emotions
klistamanas. See defiled ego-mind
Klong chen pa, passim;
Bhutan, exile in, 52-3
biography of, 43-53
distinctions, work on, 21 -4
epithets of, 45n91, 53nl 13
teachings received by, 44-9
works of, 19n9, 21 nl 1, 22nnl2-14, 50-3
Klong drug pa ’i rgyud, 82n 196, 140-1,211, 304n
7 33,306n741, 308n747
Klong sde (Space Genre), 20, 25-6, 48, 51
knowledge, problem of (rDzogs chen), 11, chs. 2-3
Kumārāja (Kumārādza), 23nl5, 3 ln 3 6 ,48-9, 269
Kun byed rgyal p o , 22, 33-4, 81-2nl91, 103n266,
225n553, 258-9
Kun byed rgyal po ’g rel, 85n 191, 86n 193, 107n267,
259n604, 263-4nn613-16
Kun ’dus rig pa ’i mdo, 42n84, 82n 195, 172n431
Laksaņayana (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa, Vehicle of
Characterstics), 45, 114n296, 227, 232, 235-7,
241,246-8, 251,252, 259, 263
lam (märga). See path
Lam ’bras (Path and Fruition) system, 44
Lam rim (Stages of the Path genre), 12-4, 221-8
gSar ma path literature, 46,236-44
hallmarks o f Lam rim genre, 222n552
Indo-Tibetan path summaries, 221n551
related genres (Blo sbyong etc.), 221n551
rNying ma path literature, 10, 42, 233-6, 245-54
Lam rim chen mo, 46, 224, 239-43
Lam rim thar rgyan, 14, 165n409, 239, 241n538
Lańkāvatārasūtra, 151-3n364, 189, 226n553
latent tendencies (vāsanā, bag chags), passim; 57,
60, 65-7,69, 122, 137, 148-9, 160-2, 185, 189,
196, 198, 214-5,250, 252, 277-80, 285, 291,
301-3, 306, 308, 310-1, 314, 328, 330, 332
lCe btsun Seng ge dbang phyug, 30-lnn33-4,
34n51, 165n410
IDan ma lhun rgyal, 48
levels (bhümi, sa), 46, 179, 256, 258, 264-6, 285
Lha ring brag, 48
Ihun grub. See spontaneity
ITa ba ’i khyad par, 160-3
luminosity (prabhäsvara, ’od gsal), passim;
dying, presence during, 60, 64
ground (gzhi), aspect of, 165, 169, 206, 247, 252
hallmark o f sentience (idealism), as, 93-4
nature of things ( ’od gsal ba ’i chos nyid), 128
Mahäyoga interpretations, 98-9, 180-1
mind (prabhäsvaracitta), and, 90, 145-6nn350-l
Pali Canon, reference, 145
path o f ( ’od gsal kyi lam), 257
Pramãnavārttika [1.208ab], reference, 280
primordial knowing, of/as, 110, 236, 279
rDzogs chen interpretations, 90, 126, 190, 274
Sems sde interpretations, 169, 193, 195
synonyms of, 274
ma rig pa (avidyä). See ignorance
Madhyamaka
*Prāsańgika-°, 46, 111-7
*Svātantrika-°, 113n294, 117, 225n553
Madhyamakãlamkāra, 93n234
Madhyamakāvatãra (and bhäsya), 22, 92n228,
112n290, 283n661, 286n667, 312
Mädhyamikas, 39-40, 97, 130
Madhyãntavibhāga (and tīkā), 157-8n385
Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po, Great Seal),
23nl7, 61nl33, 79, 127n323, 1 40,164-5n409,
239, 241,255, 283n660
Mahāpadãnasūtta, 240n581
Mahāparinirvãnasūtra, 264
Mahãprajñāpãramitãśãstra, 280n653
Mahāsamghika, 145n353
mahāsiddhas/siddhas, 80, 234, 239
Mahäyäna. See Laksanayãna; Pāramitã-0; vehicle
Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, 151 -2n368, 274-5n639,
304n735
Mahāyānapathakrama, 222-3n551
Mahāyãnasamgraha (and bhāsya), 27n23, 152nn
365 and 368, 155n374, 157, 215, 274n639
Mahāyānasūtrãlamkãra, 29, 209n529, 274-5n639
Mahäyoga (m al ’byor chen po) tradition/system, 20,
36, 38-9,42, 75-6, 81, 87, 97-9, 104, 109, 142,
155,160, 164, 175, 187, 198
Maitreya-Asańga, 46, 240n581, 148, 154-5, 157,
163
Maitripāda, alias Advayavajra etc., 237n577
Majjhimanikāya, 91n226
Man ngag mdzod, 50
Man ngag sde (Esoteric Guidance Genre), 18, 23,
25, 32, 34, 36,48, 51, 164, 256; See sNying thig
manas (yid). See ego-mind
maņdala (dkyil ’khor), 60, 63, 191,206, 247
Mañjuśrimitra ( ’Jam dpal bshes gnyeri), 20, 88, 171
Mañjuśrīnãmasamgīti, 275n639, 283n659
mantra (gsang sngags). See Mantrayäna/Vaj rayäna
Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna, passim; 24,40, 47, 114-5n
296,151, 227-8, 232-54, 259, 263
Mar pa Chos kyi dbang phyug, 165n409
Māyājāla (sGyu ’p hrul drwa ba), 20, 22, 3 9 ,42n85,
174, 180, 276-7
mChims phu (hermitage), 44, 53
mdzod bdun. See Seven Treasuries
mGos khug pa lha btsas, 42n85
Mi bskyod rdo rje (Karmapa VIII), 213-7
Mi la ras pa, 165n409, 237-8n577, 239-1 ln583
Mi nub rgyal mtshan, 176n450, 201n514, 176n450,
218n544, 258n609
Mi pham rNyam rgyal rgya mtsho, 27n23, 91, 94-6,
114n296, 127n323, 270n633
Middle Way. See Madhyamaka
mind (citta, sems), passim; See also Mind itself
cessation of, 24, 125n316, 126n320, 150
characteristics of (rDzogs chen), 57-60
collapse o f (in Khregs chod), 89n218
definition/synonyms of, 68nl50, 128, 138, 309
dual structure of, 67-9, 93, 309
effulgence o f ye shes, as, 68n 151
locus and genesis of, 61-2nl35, 68-9
obstacle and obscuration, as, 65-6
path(s) o f mind (sems kyi lam), 13, 25-6,228
typology o f (sNying thig), 84-6, 138, 309
Mind itself (sems nyid), passim; 79-86
definition/synonyms of, 79-80
expression (rtsal) o f rig pa, as, 82, 88
provenance o f term, 80-1
rDzogs chen interpretations of, 79-86
typology o f (sNying thig), 84-6
ten-fold sNying thig Classification, 82
vanishing point of mind, as, 84
vs. mind, 84-6
mind/Mind itself distinction, 83-6, 121-3, 310-4
mind/primordial knowing distinction, passim;
characteristics of, 8, 57-60
clarifications of, 65-6, 121-3, 310-1
doctrinal background, 8-9, 13-4,18-26, 34
justification of, ch. 3
scope of, 58-9, 78
uniqueness of sNying thig distinction, 59, 61
mKha’ ’g ro snying tig, 49n 105
mKha ’ ’g ro yang tig, 49, 52, 69nl 52, 203-7
mKhas pa Nyi ma ’bum, 10n4, 19,2 3 n l5, 31,71,
207n525, 208n527, 210-1, 300
moksa/mukti (grol ba). See freedom
monastic rules (prätimok$a, so sor thar pa), 253
Mu tig phreng ba, 108n280, 110-ln289, 132, 220n
547, 302-4nn725-32, 307-10
Mūlamadhyamakakãrikā, 68, 135, 112n290, 280n
653
Mun pa ’i go cha, 32n40,42-3n85, 167n416, 181,
187-8nn478-81,193-5
Mun sei skor gsum, 51 -2
Myang Ting nge ’dzin, 31n34, 36-7n61, 48
Nāgāijuna, 22, 46, 6 8 ,111-7, 129-30n330, 135,
187, 212-4n535, 240n581,280n653,281
Nam mkha ’ che. See Mi nub rgyal mtshan
Nam mkha ’ klong yangs kyi rgyud, 29-30nn30-1,
260n617
Nam mkha ’ mnyam pa ’i rgyud, 30n32
Nam mkha ’i mtha ’ dang mnyam pa ’i rgyud, 102-
3n264
Nam mkha ’i rgyal po, 82n 194
Nāropa/Nādapāda, 45, 164n409, 239
negation (pratisedha, dgagpa), 72-3nl64, 135, 310
non-affirming (prasajya-°, meg dgag), 127n323
Ngag dbang Bio bzang rgya mtsho (Dalai Lama V),
61nl34, 11ln289
Ngal gso skor gsum, 5 1 ,268-9n628 and 631
nges pa Inga. See five certainties
Ngo sprod bdun ma'i ’grel pa, 127n323
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 209n529
nihilism, See extremes of etemalism and nihilism
nine vehicles (rDzogs chen). See vehicles
nine views o f rDzogs chen (gNubs). See views
ninth consciousness (rnam par shes pa dgu pa),
155, 1 5 9 ,190-ln491, 192
ninth ground (gzhi dgu pa), 190-1 n491
nirodhasamäpatti ( ’g og pa 7 snyoms par ’ju g pa,
state o f cessation), 276n643
nirväna (mya ngan las ’das pa), passim
nisprapañca (spros bral, free from elaboration), 57,
60, 64, 74-8, 8 3 ,113-7, 130, 237, 274,281,
286, 303n727, 321, 332; See also prapañca
nityatä (rtag pa, permanence), 159; See extremes
nonconceptuality (nirvikalpa, mi rtog pa), 75-8
four Tibetan systems o f (gNubs chen), 75-6
Northern Treasure tradition (byang gter), 33
Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer, 18-9n6,4 1 ,42n85
Nyäyabinduftka, 92n231
’od gsal (prabhäsvara). See luminosity
open awareness (vidyä, rig pa), passim;
basis o f Khregs chod and Thod rgal, as, 89
definition/synonyms of, 86n206
provenance o f term rig pa, 86-7
rDzogs chen interpretations, 20, 57-66, 86-9
rig pa byang chub kyi sems, 87, 169
vs. ignorance, 72-4, 87-8
original purity (ka dag), 23nl7, 86, 89, 104, 106,
110, 127n323, 209n530, 211-2, 214-5, 328
Other Emptiness tradition (gzhan stong), 61
Own Emptiness tradition (rang stong), 61
Padma las ’brel rtsal, 49nl05
Padmasambhava, 12, 18-9n6, 36-7,41,43-4,49,
101, 225n553, 236n573, 260
Paņ sgrub rnams kyi thugs bcud snying gi nyi ma,
33n42, 81nl92, 102n262
Paramärtha, 153, 155-7
Pāramitāyāna (pha rol tu phyin pa ’i theg pa, Vehicle
of Perfections), 227,242-3, 245
path (märga, lam), passim;
definition of, 236, 258, 261-2
five paths (lam Inga) (Mahāyāna), 259n611
path o f awakening (bodhi), 12, 102,236, 258
path (mãrga, lam), cont’d
path without progression, 38, ch. 7
problem o f the path, chs. 6-7
rDzogs chen conceptions of, 21, 38, ch. 7
rNying ma path hermeneutics, ch. 6
sütric and tantric models, 8, ch. 6
three paths (Ita sgom spyod), 259n611
See also vehicle
Patisambhidämagga, 222n551
perfection(s) (pãramitā, pha rol tu phyin pa), 242
periodization o f Tibetan history, 9n2
perspectivism, 209n529
pervasion/entailment (vyäpti, khyab pa), 73, 87, 130,
134-5, 310
Phag mo gru pa, 45n92, 52nl08, 284n664
’Phrulgyi me long, 38-40, 76n 175,106n275, 170,
186nn475-6, 199-200nn512-3
phun sum tshogs Inga (five exquisite qualities). See
five certainties
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, 46nn92 and 94
Phyag chen gan mdzod, 127n323
Phyag rgya chen po. See Mahämudrä
Phyogs bcu mun sei, 180-ln468, 276n644
pollution (samkleśa : kun nas nyon mongs), 151,
163n407, 184, 193-4
prabhãsvaracitta[*tā] ( ’od gsal ba ’i sems [nyid]),
See luminosity
prajñā (shes rab). See insight
Prajñāpāramitā (literature, tradition, etc.), 46n98,
241,282
Prajñāpāramitāpindārthapradīpa, 286n668
Prajñāpāramitāratnagunasamcayagãthā, 277n646
Prajñāpāramitãstotra, 282n657
pramäna (tshadma, valid cognition), 75, 247-8
Pramānavāda/vādin, 8, 22, 39, 73
Pramãnavārttika, 279-80n652
Pramānaviniścaya, 22, 92-3n231
prapañca (spros pa, elaboration), passim; 57, 60,
67, 74-8. See also nisprapañca
*Prāsańgika. See under Madhyamaka
Prasannapadã, 112n290, 309
pratyekabuddha(s), 97, 243, 257
primordial knowing (jñãna, ye shes), passim;
expression (rtsal) of rig pa, as, 82, 88
cessation o f jñãna, 127-32n324, 129n330
characteristics of, 57-61
Classification of,
five-fold (Mantrayäna), 30, 107-8n281, 110,
129n328, 134,312, 332n725
five-fold (Sems sde), 106n275
four-fold (Indian Buddhist), 129n328
ten-fold (sNying thig), 106-7n279
three-fold (rDzogs chen), 108-10
twenty-five fold (sNying thig), 110n283
two-fold (Indian Buddhist), 110n284
definition and meanings o fy e shes, 66, 100-2
locus and genesis of, 63
nonconceptual (nirvikalpajñāna), 155-6, 162-3
path of (ye shes kyi lam), 12, 228, 236, 257, 261-
3, 265-6
rang byung ye shes (svayambhūjñāna), 30, 90,
96, 97-8,101-3, 169
rDzogs chen interpretations of, 99-110
Sems sde interpretations, 101-3
sNying thig interpretations, 104-10
so sor rang rig pa ’i ye shes (pratyätmaveditavya/
pratyātmavedanīyá), 90-2, 96, 112
Tibetan renderings o f jñãna, 100-1, 128n326
purification (vyavadäna : mam par byang ba), 151,
163n407, 184, 193-4
Rang byung rdo ije (Karmapa III), 2 3 n l5 ,29,45,
155, 161n400, 167nn416-7, 182n471, 216nn538-
9 , 274-ln639
Rang byung ye shes chen po, 90n221
Rang grol skor gsum, 51
rang rig (svasamvedana). See self-awareness
Rai pa can, 36
Ratnagotravibhäga, 22, 27n23, 92, 145-6n355,
152n368, 154, 167n417,1 7 3 ,176n451, 181, 216
n539, 274-9, 287
Ratnākaraśānti, 122n309
Ratnamati, 157
rDza dPal sprul Rin po che, 38, 55, 224, 327
rdzogs rim (nispannakrama/utpannakrama, com-
pletion phase), 31, 249, 252, 329
rDzogs chen (Great Perfection), passim; 18, 25-6,
32-3,225n553, 255-6, 328; See also Sems sde;
Klong-°; Man ngag-°; sNying thig
rDzogs pa chen po ’i khridyig Rigs ’dzin zhal lung,
61nl34, 11ln289
reality, nature of (dharmatä, chos nyid), passim; 12,
46, 81nl90, 87, 124, 128, 143, 155, 1 5 8 ,170-3,
249, 282, 312, 328; See also suchness; thatness
reconciliation, problem of, 12, ch. 6
reification, rDzogs chen analysis of, 74-8
rGod kyi Idem ’phru can, 18-9n6, 20nl0, 33
rGod tshang pa mGon po rdo ije, 44, 61 n l 33
rGyal ba Rang byung rdo rje la phul ba ’i dri yig,
274-5n639
rGyal po ’Da’ he na ta, 171
rig pa (vidya). See open awareness
Rig pa bsdus pa ’i sgron ma, 19, 108n281
Rig pa rang shar, 31n34, 85n205, 105n271, 123-4,
300-2n717, 303, 305-6n738, 308, 312, 331
Rig pa ’i khu byug, 76n 175, 81 n 192, 87n207,
97n243, 116n299, 170
rigs (gotra). See spiritual affiliation
Rin chen bzang po, 235, 237-8n577, 241n582
rMad du byung ba, 169n423, 190n487
rNam shes ye shes ’byed pa ’i bstan bcos, 29
rNam thar mthong ba don Idan, 22nl2, 43n88
rNgog Legs pa’i shes rab, 44
rNgog lo tsä ba Blo ldan shes rab, 46n95
rNying ma (Ancient Ones), passim; 8, 24-5, 31, 34,
40, 43, 51, 182, 224-5, 227-9, 233-4
rNying ma rgyud ’bum, 19,47, 161, 195
Rog Bande Shes rab ’od, 32,47, 201-3, 234n570,
245-6
Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, 33-4, 36, 47, 77,
90n221, 96,175-8n459,188-90nn482-4, 218n
5 4 4 ,234n570, 257n608,262n621
rTse mo byung rgyal/’grel, 43n86, 178n461, 190-
2nn488-91and 498-500
Sa skya paņtfita/Sa paņ, 26, 75, 163-4, 164n409,
238n577, 255-6
Sākāravādins/Satyākāravādins, 39,95
Śākyamuni, historical Buddha, 127, 205, 241, 271
samädhi (ting nge ’dzin, absorption), 46, 76nl76,
84,86, 162, 222n551, 252, 257
Samādhirãjasūtra, 161
Samantabhadra (Kun tu bzang po, All Good), 116-7,
191,256, 328
samaya. See vows
Samdhinirmocana, 158
samsära ( ’khor ba), passim
sangs rgyas (buddha, buddha[hood]),
rDzogs chen intepretation of, 64, 127n323,
137-8, 311-2
Sangs rgyas dpal rin, 53nl 10
gs rgyas gling pa, 20nl0
tarak$ita, 37, 93n234, 94,96, 117, 173
Śāntideva, 46, 93-4, 112, 212-3n551
Saraha, 80, 164-5n409, 237n577
satkäyadr§ti (personalistic false views), 69-70nl56
Satyadvayavibhañga, 121-2n308, 278n649
Sauträntika, 27n23, 144-6n354, 148-9, 152n368,
225n553
sBas pa ’i rgum chung, 168nn419-21, 170n427,
176n450
sDom gsum rab dbye, 164n409, 255n605
self-awareness (svasamvedana, rang rig), passim;
Mahäyoga/Sems sde interpretations, 40n71,
90n220,98-9, 178-9
*Pramānavāda interpretations, 92-3
rDzogs chen critique o f svasamvedana, 94-6, 97
rDzogs chen interpretations, 90-1, 96-7
two Indian Buddhist interpretations of, 93-4
Yogācāra interpretations, 92-4
See also ye shes : so sor rang rig pa ’i ye shes
sems (citta). See mind
sems ’g og pa (cittanirodha), See cessation o f mind
sems nyid. See Mind itself.
Sems nyid bsdus pa ’i sgron ma, 79, 159
Sems nyid ngal gsol ’g rel, 13-4, 22,46, 51, 79, 125-
6n319, 224, 232n567, 233-6, 249-50, 264-5,
268-9, 270-1 n636
Sems sde ( Mind Genre), 20, 22, 25-6,32-3, 35-8,
42-3,47-8, 51, 77, 81-2, 96, 101-4, 142, 155,
169, 175, 187, 189-90,198, 258, 261
Sems ye dris lan, 13, 22nl4, 83, 125, 268-299
Seng ge rtsal rdzogs, 89n219
seven grounds (sNying thig). See ground
seven transmissions (babs bdun), 33n44
Seven Treasuries (mdzod bdun), 50-1
seventeen sNying thig tantras, 13, 18-9nn6-8, 23,
33, 37, 48-9, 51, 61, 67, 104, 108, 300
sGam po pa, 164-5n409, 224, 237-9n577, 241n583
sG rathal ’gyur, 69nl54, 75, 104-5n271, 108-10,
208n528, 211,301
sGron ma dgu skor (Vimalamitra), 79nl 81
sGron ma drug (dPal dbyangs), 81 n l 91, 90n220
sGyu ma ngal g so /’grel, 5 1 ,269n631, 276n644,
280n653, 282n657
sGyu ’p hrul drwa ba. See Māyãjãla
siddhas. See mahäsiddhas/siddhas
Siksäsamucaya, 222n551
six consciousnesses (vijñāna, rnam shes), 148-9, 194,
216, 331
six perfections. See perfections
six seminaries (chos grva chen po drug), 43n89
six super-knowledges (abhijñã, mngon par shes pa),
285n665
sKa ba dPal brtsegs, 166n413
skandha (phung po). See aggregates
sNgags rnying ma ’i rtsod spong ’Bri khung dpal
’dzin gyi brtsod lan, 34n51
sNying thig (Heart Essence) system, passim;
doxographical Systems, 225n553
key figures in, 15, 35-7, 43-53
history of, 20, 30-5
tradition/system, 9,18, 20,23, 31, 32-3, 36,48-52,
61,202, 299, 327
See also Man ngag sde; tantra
sNying thig ya bzhi, 49, 196n507
Sog po dPal gyi ye shes, 38,41-2, 188n479
Sog zlog pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan, 213-5
spiritual affiliation (gotra, rigs), 126, 152n368, 161, 277
spiritual exercises (exercitia spiritualia), 10n4
spontaneity (Ihun grub), passim;
Mahäyoga/Sems sde interpretations, 32, 38-9, 76-
8nn 175-7, 171,260
sNying thig interpretations, 23nl7, 25, 51 n l 07, 89,
102-3, 104-8, 110, 115, 117, 205,208-12,218
Spros bral don gsal, 18-9n6,49, 106-7n279, 261n619
Spyi gsang sngags lung gi ’grel pa, 38nn64-6
śrāvaka(s) (nyan thos[pa]), 25, 148, 261n553, 243, 257
Śrãvakabhūmi, 27n23, 146n357
Śrāvakayāna, 25, 153n370, 225n553
Srimaladevīsimhanada, 153, 277n647
Śrisimha (dPal gyi seng ge), 20nl0, 171, 185-6n474
Sroggi ’khorlo, 169-70nn424-5, 174n441, 176n450
Sthiramati, 155, 157-8n385
sTod ’brug (Upper ’Brug pa bKa’ rgyud), 44, 127n
323, 143
subitism ([g]cig c[h]ar [ba]), 75-7, 228, 231
suchness (tathatā, de bzhin nyid), passim; 76nl76,
78, 97-9, 102, 112n290, 117, 154, 156, 161n400,
170-2, 177, 181-2, 216, 274, 275n640, 285-6
*sugatagarbha (bde bar gshegs pa ’i snying po,
quintessence o f the Sugata), 6 6 ,174-8, 180-1,
249-52, 276-7, 328
śūnyatã (stong pa nyid). See emptiness
superimposition(s) (samäropa, sgro ’dogs), 74-9,
114, 117, 129, 236, 266, 272, 303n726
supramundane citta/jñāna, 154-5nn374-5
Sütrasamuccaya, 222,n551, 240n581
svasamvedana/°-vitti. See self-awareness
Syãdvãdamañjan, 209n529
Ta’i si tu Byang chub rgyal mtshan, 45n92, 52nl08,
tantra (rgyud), passim;
definition, 166nn411 and 414
four classes (gSar ma), 47
ground, path and goal, as, 166nn411 and 414
three genres o f rDzogs chen (sde gsum), 35n52,
48, 51; See Sems sde; Klong-°; Man ngag-°
Yoganiruttara, 29,47, 155
Tarkajvālã, 92n227, 153n370
tathāgatagarbha/īathāgatagarbha (de bzhin gshegs
pa 7 snying po, buddha nature), 11-3, 24, 54, 66,
83-4, 100, 122, 141-2, 145-7n355, 150-4n368,
159, 160-3,173-8, 182, 183, 275, 277-9
Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, 189
tathatā (de bzhin nyid). See suchness
Temple o f the Hat (zhwa’i Iha khang), 30-ln34, 36-
7, 48
ten powers (dbang : vaśitā), 287n673
ten strengths (bala, stobs), 286-7n670
Thar pa gling monastery (Bum thang), 52
thatness (tathatä, de nyid/de kho na nyid), 27n23,
154, 170, 172, 329n846
Theg mchog mdzod, 13, 28n27, 50, 63nn 139-42, 83-
6 and nn, 108, 113-4, 122-3, 131-8, 209-11,
249, 300-26
Theg pa chen po ’i tshul ’jug, 175-6n448 and 450,
188-90nn482-4, 198
theory and practice, on relationship between, 9n3
Theraväda, 146n353, 222n551, 240n581
Thig le kun gsal, 18-9n6, 49, 106-7n279, 261n619
thirteen later translations (Sems sde), 36,43
Thod rgalJthod rgal (‘Leap-over’/ ‘mixed order’),
disambiguation, 230n564
sNying thig teaching on, 23nl7, 24, 89, 104
‘non-sequential,’ 230, 264
Thod rgal gyi rgyab yig nyi zla gza skar, 70n 159
three adamantine precepts (rdo rje ’i tshig gsum), 88
three genres (sde gsum) of rDzogs chen. See tantra
three natures (svabhäva, ngo bo nyid), 24, 27n23
three prajñā (Indian Buddhist). See insight
three realms (dhätu, khams), 68, 75
three tumings (of dharmacakrä), 22, 126-7, 225,
270-2nn633 and 636-7
three ye shes. See primordial knowing
three yogas (gNubs), 167n416, 187n477
threeyogaslmärgas (Mantrayäna), 9n3, 51nl07,
249n595,259n611,265
Thub bstan Chos kyi grags pa, 93
Thugs kyi me long, 18n6, 11 ln289, 123, 305, 311
thugs rje. See compassionate responsiveness
Tilopa, 164-5n409
timira (rab rib, myodesopsia, floaters), 125n318
transcendental arguments, 11, 120, 133-9n335
transformation o f basis (ãśrayaparāvrtti/0-parivrtti,
gnas ’gyur), 2 4 ,27-30n23, 134, 142, 145-6, 150,
155-8, 187, 253-4, 285,312
Trimśikã (and bhãsyá) 152n365, 155,216,274n639
trisvabhäva (ngo bo nyid gsum). See three natures
Tshig don bcu geig pa, 10n4, 19n9, 23nl 5,31, 69n
155, 70-1 nn 160-1, 208nn526-7, 209n530, 211
Tshig don mdzod, 19n9, 50, 55, 66nl46, 71 n 162,
198, 208-9nn527 and 533-6, 300
Tshul khrims rdo rje. See Padma las ’brel rtsal
Tsong kha pa, 46, 94, 158-9n388 and 397, 224, 233,
237-44, 253
two stages. See bskyed rim and rdzogs rim
two truths (satya), 22, 111-9, 130n330
Vaibhä§ika, 27n23,145-6n353-4, 148
Vairocana (deity), 116n299
Vairocana (person), 18-9n6, 20nl0, 33-8, 166, 171,
174,234, 281n564
VajrakTla/Vajrakilaya tradition, 38, 39
Vajrayäna. See Mantrayana/Vajrayäna
vãsanā (bag chags). See latent tendencies
Vasubandhu, 46, 72-3nl64, 148, 240n581
VätsTputffya tradition, 145n353
vehicle(s) (yäna, theg pa),
classifications o f (1 to 16-fold), 225n553
definition of, 255-6
nine vehicles (rDzogs chen), 25, 34, 175n446,
225n553, 255-6
problem o f reconciling, ch. 6
rDzogs chen as vehicle, question, 26, 255-6
rNying ma Classification of, 24-6
vehicle of Characteristics. See *Lak§anayäna
vehicle of Mantra. See Mantrayāna/Vajrayāna
vehicle of Perfections. See Pāramitāyāna
See also path;
Vibhajyavâda tradition, 145n353
vidyä (rig pa). See open awareness
view(s) (<drsti/darśana, Ita ba), Zab mo nanggi don/rang ’g rel, 29, 155, 166n415
four views o f reality (gNyags), 39-40 167n417, 274-5n639
nine rDzogs chen views (gNubs), 171-2 Zab mo yang tig, 49, 51nl07, 52, 67nl48, 68nn
rDzogs chen view (Ita ba), 126, 268, 275-6 150-1, 69nl55, 70nl57, 78nl80, 88n213, 137n
rDzogs chen view(s) o f ground, 201 341, 245n590
two personalistic false views, 69-70nl56 Zhal chems gsum, 53nl 14
view that reveals abiding condition, 46 Zhi byed system, 44
See also four yogas Zur tradition (zug lugs) (rNying ma), 130n330,
vijñāna (rnam par shes pa, consciousness). See six 165,213
consciousnesses; eightfold cognitive ensemble;
älaya-°; amala-°; ego-mind; defiled ego-mind;
ninth consciousness
Vijñānavāda, 189n499. See Yogācāra
Vijñaptimātra. See Yogācāra
vikalpa (rnam par rtog pa, conceptual). See con-
ceptual/nonconceptual
Vimalamitra, 18-9n6, 30-ln34, 32-4, 35-7,38-9,
42,49, 58, 79, 96n241, 104, 108, 159-60n395,
171, 208n527, 211
Vimuttimagga, 240n581
Visuddhimagga, 222n551, 240n581
vows (samaya, dam tshig),
four sNying thig, 51 n 107
twenty-five Mahāyāna, 51 n 107
twenty-seven Vajrayäna, 51nl07

Wönch’ük, 158

Xuanzang, 157

Yang dgon pa, rGyal ba, 61nl33, 127n323, 144

Yang tig skor gsum, 52
ye shes (jñãna). See primordial knowing
Ye shes gsal bar ston pa 7 rgyud, 195n505, 196
n507, 198
Ye shes gsang ba bshad pa ’i rgyud, 165-6n411
Ye shes gsang ba ’i rgyud, 90n220
Ye shes mtsho rgyal, 49
Ye shes sde, 128n325, 1 56,160-3, 173n436, 216
Yid bzhin mdzod/’grel, 13-4,46, 50, 94-5n240, 113-
5n294 and 296, 181, 198, 224, 2 35,249-52, 264
yoga (rnal ’byor), 126n320, 261, 265; See also
Mahäyoga; Anu-°; Ati-°; three yogas; four yogas
Yogācāra, 11, 24, 27, 29, 65, 67, 91-9, 109, 141-63,
181-98, 2 06,213-7
Yogãcãrabhūmi, 69nl56, 240n581
Yoganiruttaratantras. See tantra
Yon tan mdzod/’grel, 13-4, 107n278, 131n332, 208n527,
220n547, 229n560,, 253-4n602, 264, 285n665,
286n668, 287nn670-3, 327-340

Zab don gnad kyi me long, 51 n 107, 67n 148, 78n 180
Zab don rgya mtsho ’i sprin, 203n 5 19,204-6nn521-
4, 218-9n545,
Zab don snying po, 68nn 154-5, 136-7n341, 296n705
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