Europe as a Smart Power: The Impact of the European External Action Service

Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross

Senior Researcher
ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
Maia.cross@arena.uio.no

Prepared for delivery at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 1-4, 2011.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association

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THE SMALL WORLD OF SMART POWER

There is growing interest in the idea of smart power – defined as the effective

combination of hard and soft power – in policy circles on both sides of the Atlantic.1 For

example, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made smart power a key part of her message

during her Senate Confirmation hearing (Naughton 2009), and has since mentioned it repeatedly

in her diplomacy with other countries. The Center for Strategic and International Studies in

Washington DC has launched a Smart Power Initiative, which has resulted in a number of

meetings and publications, including the Commission on Smart Power, chaired by Richard

Armitage and Joseph Nye (Armitage and Nye 2007). On the other side of the Atlantic, the

Security & Defence Agenda, a leading Brussels-based think tank, held a day-long conference at

the European Parliament in 2009 to discuss EU smart power. Shortly before that, European

Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn spoke at Oxford University, outlining the way forward

for the European Union (EU) to exercise smart power as it fulfills its goals. Smart power seems

to be an emerging buzz word, but how much substance does it really have? And does the

concept have any place in long-standing scholarly debates about power that have been so central

to the study of international relations?

Academic interest in smart power has been somewhat lacking. This may be surprising

given that a significant proportion of scholarly work in international relations (IR) deals

fundamentally with different forms of power. Ernest Wilson (2008) and Joseph Nye (2008;

2009a; 2009b) are two of only a small handful of scholars to write about the concept directly. It

is increasingly common for IR scholars to mention it in passing, but only a few have researched

its implications, and even then, almost exclusively as it pertains to US power. Recent research in

the field of EU studies actually contributes much to our understanding of the EU’s potential to
1
S. Nossel first coined the term (2004).

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become a smart power, even if only implicitly (Reid 2005; Ilgen 2006; McCormick 2006 and

2010; Leonard 2006; Laïdi 2008; Hill 2010; Moravcsik 2010). Yet it still appears that the

concept of smart power itself is too ambiguous and misunderstood to be useful, even though

there is general agreement that this is where Europe’s real strength lies. Policy experts continue

to throw the term around and academics continue to give it short shrift.

I seek to clarify the meaning of smart power first by unpacking its two main components

– hard and soft power – to analyze each separately. Through a review of the literature that

defines the tools of power and their relationship to hard and soft power, I argue that soft power is

fundamentally different from hard power in significant ways, and this has implications for smart

power. Second, I bring the two concepts of hard and soft power back together again to re-

conceptualize how we conceive of smart power, and to make the concept analytically useful.

Third, I consider the case of Europe, and specifically, the recent launch of the European External

Action Service (EEAS). I suggest that the EU is mostly a soft-power actor that occasionally

engages in very targeted smart power, and that the EEAS is a key example of smart power in a

number of ways. I conclude that the study of smart power has much potential, and that more

focused and explicit research can reveal the various ways in which the combination of hard and

soft power can be maximized.

THE TOOLS OF POWER

The greatest misinterpretation of smart power stems from how one defines soft and hard

power separately. In Joseph Nye’s 2004 book, he defines soft power as when A gets B to want

what A wants (co-option), and hard power as when A gets B to do something that B would not

otherwise do (coercion). He argues that the use of force or sanctions are the main resources used

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to coerce, while values, culture, institutions, and policies are resources that can be wielded to

attract or co-opt. In so doing, he somewhat conflates the tools of power (i.e. persuasion, military

force, trade agreements, etc.) with the type of power (soft or hard). In other words, if a state

engages in persuasion and diplomacy, this is assumed to be an exercise of soft power. By

contrast, if a state uses military force to accomplish a task, this is assumed to be an exercise of

hard power. Zaki Laïdi and others correctly point out that the ends are not necessarily correlated

with the means (2008).

To illustrate this point, Janice Mattern argues that language, often thought of as a tool for

soft power, can be used in a coercive way (2007). Through verbal fighting, an attacker can

undermine a victim’s subjectivity by closing off its options. Mattern uses the example of the

phrase “war on terrorism” to argue that the US was not just retaliating against 9/11, but

defending the world against terrorists (2007, 113). When supplemented with President George

W. Bush’s statement to the world that, “you are either with us or with the terrorists,” the phrase

“war on terrorism” effectively set a verbal trap that constituted a “non-choice.” The message

was that if you, as a state, wanted to be considered on the side of the “good,” you had to be in the

US camp. Obviously, the implication was that any other option was equivalent to siding with the

terrorists. Mattern argues that this form of verbal coercion actually made certain states like

Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey favor the US in their international dealings because they

needed to establish their status as “good” states (2007, 115).

From the other direction, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

illustrates how military power can be attractive. In cases of humanitarian intervention or

peacekeeping, military power is often used as a form of soft power because people tend to want

this kind of aid, even if it entails the use of force. The EU is explicit about obtaining a UN

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mandate before launching a CSDP military operations, and thus gaining international legitimacy

for its actions. In a later work, Nye agrees with the point that the tools of power must be

conceptually disaggregated from the type of power that is being exercised. He argues that myths

of invincibility, well-run military campaigns, military-to-military cooperation and training can all

augment soft power (2007, 167).

At the same time, Nye warns that attractive military power can quickly lose its allure if

principles of legitimacy or efficiency are lost in the process, such as with the example of prisoner

mistreatment at Abu Ghraib (2007, 168). Indeed, there is a sense in which the very existence or

buildup of military power may be unattractive to some publics. Scholars like Ian Manners, who

explore the idea of Europe as a normative power, argue that the more the EU militarizes, the

more it will lose its normative power, regardless of the fact that such militarization strengthens

the EU’s ability to engage in humanitarian action (2006). This view supports the notion that on

some level, military power is going to be seen as coercive and decisive. Alexander Wendt refers

to this as “rump materialism” (Wendt 1999, 112-3). Nonetheless, the fact remains that there are

still numerous and significant ways in which military power is attractive. The case of the EU

makes this ever more apparent. The same type of argument can be made about some of the most

innocuous forms of soft power, like public diplomacy, educational exchange, and cultural

diplomacy. Their purpose is to encourage engagement, two-way dialogue, and listening, but

they may easily cross the line into propaganda and indoctrination (Cull 2009).

With these nuances in mind, the overarching argument remains that we cannot

automatically associate the tools of power with the type of power. What is most important is

whether the tool is used to coerce or to attract. This is a basic point that sets the stage for a better

understanding of smart power. It also raises several broader questions. Are hard and soft power

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just two sides of the same coin? Or, are they in some ways intrinsically different? Who

perceives hard and soft power? How are various audiences impacted by the exercise of power?

HARD AND SOFT POWER COMPARED

Soft power is in several ways a completely different animal than hard power, especially

in the context of the post-Cold War world. Globalization has made it easier to communicate

across national boundaries, develop thick transnational ties, and obtain accurate, real-time

information about what is happening within other states and on the other side of the globe

(Keohane and Nye 2000). Because of the quickness and transparency of transnational

interactions, we no longer live in a world in which states can be boiled down to black boxes (if

indeed we ever did). Most security threats are from non-state actors, either sub-national or

transnational. This has changed the nature of the international system, de-prioritizing traditional

militaries poised for territorial defense, and prioritizing other factors like economic

interdependence, security against terrorism and related public knowledge, the internet and cyber-

security, Hollywood films, and the influence of transnational networks of experts.

In this context, I advance three arguments about the nature of hard and soft power. First,

soft power is now a far more expansive concept than hard power. Second, soft power can be

both purposeful and non-purposeful, while hard power is only purposeful. Third, soft power is

more likely to be perceived differently by various audiences compared to hard power, making it

much more difficult to control or anticipate. All of these qualities are inter-related and have

important ramifications for the exercise of smart power.

First, soft power is a more expansive concept (Nye 2008, 143). This comes in the

distinction between having power as a resource and exercising power as an instrument of

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influence (Baldwin 2005). I contend that hard power is only recognized as such when tools of

power are exercised or threatened as an instrument of coercion. Otherwise, those very resources

could just as easily be used to attract or co-opt. Neo-realists, for whom hard power resources

determine outcomes in international relations, define these resources as “size of population and

territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and

competence” (Waltz 1979, 192). But are these resources necessarily coercive without the state

that possesses them actually wielding them for some end? No. The fact that India’s population

is expected to surpass that of China in 2026 is not regarded by most people as a threat. The

efforts of the EU to build up a common military capability is not generally seen as a bid for

hegemony even though member states spend more on military than the next six biggest spenders

after the US combined. The size of the Japanese economy is not regarded as a threat even

though it is around the same size as China’s and it holds nearly the same level of US debt. For

much of the world, France’s nuclear weapons mean something far more benign than Pakistan’s

or China’s. Wendt points out that power resources must be placed in their social context to have

meaning (1999). Today’s social context is not the same as during World War I or the Cold War,

when the power resources that neo-realists identify may have had more predictive value.

This leads to the second point: hard power is purposeful power. The real measure of hard

power is how a state uses or threatens to use its resources to coerce. And even then, a state may

not be able to successfully convert its resources into hard power (Schmidt 2005, 47). As

Baldwin writes,

Planes loaded with nuclear bombs may be worse than useless in a situation calling for
planes with conventional weapons with insufficient time to unload the nuclear weapons
and reload the planes with conventional ones (2005, 179).

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In today’s context, the neo-realist argument that the simple act of increasing one’s military

strength is enough to make other states fear for their own security and trigger an arms race (the

so-called security dilemma) has not played out. The US has nearly doubled its defense spending

since 9/11 without any other states rising to challenge its military superiority, and it has

simultaneously lost its unipolar status, defying realist expectations. Part of this has stemmed

from its inability to convert its military resources into fungible hard power in light of the

particular threats it faces. Another part can be attributed to the weaknesses in the perceptions of

US power. In fact, it can be argued that American use of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan

has actually degraded its status as a hard power actor because it has shown the world that the

largest military power can easily become overstretched and incapable of achieving the goals it

sets for itself. It took ten years to catch Osama bin Laden, and in the end even this was the result

of a small contingent of special forces personally directed by President Obama. Making hard

power resources fungible is not a straightforward task even when its use is purposeful.

By contrast, soft power can be either purposeful or non-purposeful; a state can be

attractive even without trying to exercise power over others. A country like Norway, for

example, can be attractive for its high quality of life, environmental standards, strong economy,

democratic values, and culture (Nye 2004, 112). Domestic attributes like these can serve as soft

power resources without necessarily being exploited for gain vis-à-vis other states. At the same

time, just like hard power, soft power can be purposefully exercised in a particular instance to

co-opt others into changing their behavior or adopting favorable policies to the state wielding it.

For example, it can be argued that the US co-opted the UK to join it in the 2003 Iraq War,

drawing upon its longstanding relationship, shared norms, and personal ties between George

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Bush and Tony Blair. The implication is that a state’s resources that can potentially contribute to

soft power are generally much more prevalent than those that can be used for hard power.

The third property of soft power that distinguishes it from hard power relates to how

audiences perceive it. Soft power is open to interpretation depending on who you are and where

you sit in the world. For example, China engages with African nations to attract them to support

Chinese interests at the UN. But soft power has different audiences beyond the one it targets, so

while many Africans find Chinese gestures attractive, many Europeans find them unattractive.

Even if state A is trying to target state B specifically, states C, D, and E also form their own

perceptions about state A. This is true whether state A seeks to co-opt or to coerce state B.

States that are not targets of coercion may actually find the action to be attractive. For example,

when the EU sanctions Iran or freezes the bank accounts of Syrian leaders, many other countries

applaud it, and the EU gains legitimacy in the eyes of others. In effect, the exercise of either

hard or soft power has direct soft power implications, whether positive or negative, all over the

world. The information revolution certainly enables this. Political leaders are constantly aware

that even narrow, targeted attempts to influence are being observed by third parties.

The same is not true for hard power. The efforts of state A to attract state B do not have

hard power implications in other areas of the world. For example, the Eastern Partnership, which

involves closer engagement between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,

Moldova, and Ukraine, may seem threatening to Russia, but the impact is not to force Russia to

change its behavior in support of EU policies. If anything, Russia has responded by competing

for influence with these six countries, through both soft and hard power strategies. Russia has

retaliated, behaving in a less favorable way towards the EU. However, the efforts of state A to

coerce state B may have hard power implications for third parties under specific circumstances.

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For example, European military action in Libya could serve as a warning to other dictators in the

Middle East and North Africa, thereby coercing them to change their behavior. Overall, the

implications for hard power are thus more limited than for soft power when it comes to third

publics.

In addition to the factors that distinguish hard and soft power from each other, there are at

least two key similarities. First, states compete for hard and soft power. As the example above

illustrates, China and the EU compete for influence over Africa. China offers mutually

beneficial trade deals with Africa that bear no conditionality. The EU has numerous aid and

trade programs that help improve African countries’ democratic institutions, stability, human

rights, health, and quality of life. And in the case of the Eastern Partnership countries, Russia

and the EU compete for influence. Russia is a major supplier of energy and other goods to the

Eastern Partnership countries, and draws upon long-standing historical ties and geographic

proximity. The EU offers access to its markets, lessons in best practices, help with good

governance, and so on. In both cases, Russia, China, and the EU compete in both soft and hard

power terms.

Second, both hard and soft power have negative and positive aspects. Soft power can

lead to attraction or repulsion, depending on the audience. Hard power can be viewed as a carrot

or a stick. An actor can be coerced because it wants access to a new market (carrot) or because it

fears a trade embargo (stick).

HARD AND SOFT POWER COMBINED

Despite the fact that the coexistence of hard and soft power has long been observable

before Nye coined the term “soft power”, smart power still waits on the sidelines of academic

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debates. This is likely because the definition of smart power – an effective combination of both

soft and hard power – is analytically useless. Since effectiveness is wrapped into the definition,

we cannot immediately use the concept to assess the degree to which smart power works.

“Smart” is only an adjective describing an outcome, and provides no hint as to the process or the

alternatives. But there is much to be gained from rethinking smart power.

A simple step in enhancing the utility of smart power is to take effectiveness out of the

definition. Smart power can be redefined as the strategic and simultaneous use of coercion and

co-option. This enables scholars to differentiate between an actor’s attempts to use smart power

and the end result, which can be effective, ineffective, or somewhere in between. This allows us

to consider such questions as: What goes into the composition of smart power? Are particular

tools for power better combined than others? Is smart power more likely to be effective when

hard and soft power are developed separately or in tandem? Under what conditions are actors

more likely to use smart power and when is it more likely to be effective? By separating

effectiveness from the idea of smart power, a potentially important and distinctive research

agenda emerges that addresses these questions.

Another step in enhancing the utility of smart power is to recognize the diverse ways in

which hard and soft power can be combined, which builds upon the above analysis of the tools of

power (see Table 1). This is the added value of the concept of smart power. It opens up

potential research agendas to consideration of both forms of power in tandem, rather than

separately. For example, smart power might entail long-term attraction alongside short-term use

of coercion when necessary. Long-term soft power could involve cultivating legitimate and

efficient domestic institutions, maintaining a rapid reaction military force on standby, or

projecting elements of domestic culture that have universal appeal. It may also come about

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through consistent outreach to foreign publics through public diplomacy efforts, such as support

for cultural programs, educational exchanges, and tourism campaigns.

Table 1: Examples of Long- & Short-Term Power

Long Term Short Term

Hard Power Ex. sanctions, trade conditionality,
military posturing, coercive
diplomacy, refusal of cooperation,
rhetoric of distrust, indirect coercion
Soft Power Ex. fostering legitimate domestic
institutions, transparency, strong
humanitarian intervention
capabilities, public diplomacy, aid,
sharing of best practices, promoting
domestic culture & minority rights
Ex. sanctions, boycott, military
invasion, cut-off of energy supply,
embassy closings, severing diplomatic
ties, leaking information, issuing
threats through media or high-level
speech, freezing bank accounts
Ex. media rhetoric, high-level political
speech, aid program, diplomatic
summit, high-level visit to foreign
country, new cooperative treaties,
promoting foreign interests
domestically

Another way to achieve smart power might be to employ both soft and hard power approaches in

every episode of influence. Or, a state could remind foreign publics of its ability to coerce over

the long term, but rely mostly on soft power when it needs particular results. Since there are

multiple audiences observing every exercise of power, it is important to remember that a single

action, like EU sanctions on Syria, has both hard and soft power ramifications. There is likely an

interaction effect in the use of both, which has so far not been explored in the IR literature.

Finally, how do we determine whether these various combinations are more or less

effective? Given that the tools of power are numerous and context specific, it is perhaps helpful

to examine how the idea of smart power might apply in the context of Europe, and the case study

of the EEAS, which is still a work in progress.

THE CASE OF THE EEAS & EUROPEAN POWER

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 On 1 December 2010, the EU inconspicuously launched the new European External

Action Service (EEAS). Much of the world was unaware that anything had changed. But

despite its quiet beginnings, the EEAS actually represents a major innovation in the field of

diplomacy as the first supranational diplomatic service of its kind. To be sure, it was not created

from scratch. It builds upon the infrastructure of the 136 Commission delegations around the

world that were already in place. But the powers of the new EU delegations are significantly

broader and more ambitious than the old Commission delegations. Rather than being responsible

for enacting the policies of just one institution, the EEAS is charged with coordinating, shaping,

and enacting the entire body of EU foreign policy, under the command of the EU’s foreign

policy chief, Catherine Ashton. In this sense, rather than being an offshoot of just one EU

institution, the EEAS is set to become the embodiment of common EU foreign policy, and is in

the process of cultivating a distinctive institutional identity.2

Of all the Lisbon Treaty’s innovations, the EEAS most demonstrates the EU’s

commitment to smart power. The EEAS is still in its first year and it is too soon to know what

role it will ultimately have, but its very existence is an important indication of the EU’s evolving

approach to foreign policy. From the 2003 Iraq war to the 2011 Libya crisis, it is easy to point

out the recent, high-profile episodes in which member states were not readily able to coordinate

their foreign policies, but it would be a mistake to draw any conclusions from these events alone.

As discussed below, from a longer-term perspective, the fact that Europeans were willing to

launch an ambitious, new multinational diplomatic institution shows that they are taking smart

power seriously. This bodes well for the EU’s ability to be better prepared in the face of crises,

and to become a more consistent foreign policy actor.

2
Richard Whitman, 2010. “Strengthening the EU’s External Representation: The Role of the European External
Action Service,” European Parliament.

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 The launch of the EEAS reflects a European commitment to smart power in a number of

ways. First, the EEAS is designed to bind the foreign policies of member states and EU

institutions more closely together, facilitating better coordination of hard and soft power. This is

of course key to achieving effective smart power. Member states have been the main purveyors

of hard power, while the EU has been more of a source of soft power. This is true both in

response to unanticipated crises as well as in terms of policy emphases. The EU has been

reluctant to coerce (or to appear to coerce) because it is a multinational actor that is committed to

institutional and legal processes that are transparent and voluntary. Hard power tactics would go

against its normative character. Indeed, the EU resorts to hard power only to support its most

important norms and values, such as to stop human rights violations or discourage authoritarian

practices. Typically, the EU draws upon its wealth of soft power. Depending on the audience,

the EU is attractive because of its democratic norms, model of regional integration, commitment

to enlarging its membership, history of overcoming a violent past, and so on.

By contrast, member states have tended to control the hard power side of foreign policy,

to the extent that this is necessary, because it is much easier for them to act decisively and

legitimately in ways that involve coercion. When it comes down to it, statesmen still have the

distinct authority to make difficult foreign policy decisions unilaterally and to implement them as

quickly as they deem necessary. Of course, member states also have a wealth of soft power

resources at the same time, such as programs of educational exchange, cultural promotion, and

public diplomacy. The creation of the EEAS shows the political will to bring these various tools

of power together, and to set the stage for better coordination of both hard and soft foreign policy

strategies.

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 Second, the creation of the EEAS is “smart” because the EU is fundamentally a

diplomatic actor. This is where its real strength lies. The primary way in which member states

and EU institutions articulate their interests in the international arena is through diplomacy. The

common market, Schengen zone, justice and home affairs issues, enlargement, and so on, were

all built on a strong process of internal diplomacy among member states. High-level,

professional diplomats based in Brussels push integration forward and translate new treaties into

tangible policy. By strengthening this hallmark of Europe – diplomacy – the EU capitalizes on

what it does best. Without exception, member states have put forward their best and most

qualified ambassadors to lead the new EU delegations, and at lower levels in the diplomatic

hierarchy competition for EEAS postings has been fierce. Given that the success of the EU

delegations will rest in part on the people who populate them, there is reason to believe that all

parties involved want to equip the EEAS to be a smart power actor. Diplomats are well-

positioned and professionally trained to use soft power consistently, and hard power when

necessary. By focusing on diplomacy as the tool for future EU foreign policy, and then

endowing the new institution with the best and the brightest, Europeans have clearly shown a

commitment to smart power.

Third, the EEAS enables the member states to articulate their common voice more

strongly. In doing so, it amplifies both hard and soft power. Indeed, the oft-repeated goal of

member states to speak with one voice comes from an understanding that by acting together,

Europe is stronger. Collectively, the 27 member states have much at their disposal – over half a

billion people, the largest economy in the world, the second-highest level of military spending

globally, the largest contribution of foreign aid, transnational collaboration in research and

development, and so on. For several decades now, member states have renewed and

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strengthened their goal to speak with one voice in foreign policy matters: from the 1970

European Political Cooperation to the 1992 Common Foreign and Security Policy to the 1998

European Security and Defense Policy. Now in 2011, with the EEAS, Europeans have one of

the largest diplomatic services in the world. This new diplomatic body is distinctive in that it

actually puts thousands of high-level foreign policy experts on the ground who will be able to

judge first-hand how events impact EU interests and goals. They will also be able to shape

responses to these events, and to build strong relationships that they can draw upon when

unexpected crises strike in the future. This will serve to make both Europe’s hard and soft power

more visible.

In sum, the EEAS facilitates better coordination of hard and soft power, capitalizes on a

successful tradition of professional diplomacy, and amplifies hard and soft power. The potential

for effective smart power clearly exists. Of course, it is still up to the member states to decide

what they will allow the EEAS to do, and how far it will go in its development. Ashton has

already faced the challenge of coordinating diverse member-state positions in the wake of

several crises. The EEAS is ideally suited to exercise smart power, but it must still have a

mandate to act. Stronger leadership going forward is necessary so that member states are

encouraged to see their diplomatic creation reach its potential.

Naturally, the EEAS does not mean that member states will be able to speak with one

voice all the time, but there are reasons to be optimistic. The EU’s development of its own

internal diplomacy has shown that professional diplomats often find ways of proving their

abilities on the job (Cross 2007, 2011). The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper),

comprised of member states’ ambassadors to the EU, is an excellent example of this. Coreper

started out with a limited mandate to prepare Council meetings. By many accounts, it has now

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grown into the central engine of EU integration. This occurred in large part because of the

initiative of these highly experienced ambassadors. Could the EEAS also achieve this kind of

authority and influence on the global stage? This may be a more challenging proposition, but as

already noted, it is off to a good start. Moreover, the fact that European leaders launched this

new entity in the first place shows a commitment to smart power. These leaders now have a

stake in the outcome, and the right ingredients are in place for success.

Looking beyond the EEAS, there are clearly numerous sources of European soft power.

Its domestic, multi-level institutions and policies are generally attractive to the outside world. It

has a strong tradition of providing welfare for its citizens, protecting civil liberties, and being

willing to reform rules and laws. Europeans citizens trust EU institutions (48%) more than they

trust their own national governments (34%) (Risse 2010, 232). The EU is the biggest donor of

aid, and it has engaged in 24 CSDP operations around the world to promote stability, reform

institutions, and prevent human rights abuses, among other things.

Moreover, the EU serves as a model for others because of its historical path from the

bloody violence of the first half of the 20th century to the achievement of a permanent peace on

the continent. Its achievements in terms of integration and enlargement have inspired other

experiments in regional cooperation from Africa to Latin America to Southeast Asia. Just by its

very existence, the EU has attracted others to its cause. Its success in this respect is underlined

by the recent UN vote approving its status as an actor equal to states in the Assembly, among

other things.

In terms of more purposeful elements of soft power, the EU has a proven record in

normative power terms. Laïdi defines the EU’s normative power as, “its capacity to produce and

set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible to organize the world,

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discipline the interplay of its actors, [and] introduce predictability in their behavior” (2008, 35).

Some of the EU’s strongest areas of influence derive from its attempts to persuade others and

shape the nature of the international system. Laïdi identifies the central norms that the EU

espouses: an emphasis on institutions in spreading norms and providing good governance, a

global approach to tackling global problems, and long-term cooperation and interdependence to

transcend anarchy. In this respect, Laïdi argues that the EU has actually surpassed the United

States as a norm-setter (2008, 65).

Of course, the EU has its own share of flaws when it comes to soft power. In recent

years, the financial crisis has caused many observers to question the viability of the euro, and to

debate whether Europeans made a mistake in adopting it in the first place. Before that, the

controversy over the Constitutional Treaty tarnished the EU’s image. Critics argued that a

failure to pass the treaty signified the failure of the European project. And before that, European

disagreement over the Iraq war and accusations of “old” vs. “new” Europe made headlines.

Similar examples abound throughout its history, but the EU has not only endured, it has

responded to each crisis with more resolve for further integration. The biggest challenge the EU

faces in this respect is that negative external perceptions of these crises are often overblown,

while the EU’s numerous achievements often go unnoticed. This indicates that even though the

EU is a significant soft power actor, it still punches below its weight.

In terms of hard power, Laïdi argues that Europe has two instruments it can wield:

“conditional access to its market and conditional access to its institutional system through the

process of accession” (2008, 24). Indeed, one of the strongest sources of EU hard power is

offering the carrot of EU membership in exchange for adopting the entire body of EU laws and

norms. Other instances of hard power are relatively targeted and light, such as when the EU

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includes conditionality in trade or aid agreements and when it issues sanctions to countries that

violate human rights. These are clear, purposeful decisions to coerce using carrots or sticks. But

in all of these instances, the EU avoids exercising hard power without soft power. In general, the

EU appears to be following a model of long-term soft power with the occasional use of short-

term hard power. Further research can establish the extent to which this hypothesis bears out by

comparing episodes of coercion against the backdrop of the EU’s ongoing soft power reserves,

and paying careful attention to how third audiences respond.

While a cursory glance at the European case would seem to suggest that the EU is weak

on the hard power side, it is important to take into account the differences between how

democracies and non-democracies exercise smart power. As Nye argues, it is typically better to

rely on soft power in democratic societies because hard power is more difficult to exercise

effectively and morally (Nye 2008, 30). In Europe, engaging in external coercion sits

uncomfortably with many leaders, and thus is a last resort. However, the recent case of Libya

does show that in dealing with actors that continue to defy international norms, a good dose of

hard power alongside soft power would enable the EU to maximize its influence. The EU’s use

of smart power is typically reserved for specific and rare instances, and it could benefit from

becoming more able to agree on the use of smart power. The European case is particularly

revealing in that it is clearly a strong soft-power actor that aims to develop the capacity for

coercion, but only in the name of the norms it espouses.

CONCLUSION

The direct study of smart power as a key international relations concept is certainly in its

nascent stage. Yet, there are many reasons why it should be an obvious next step in the study of

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power. One of the main shortcomings of the research program at this stage is the ambiguity

surrounding the definitions of soft, hard, and smart power. Future research in this area should

recognize that the tools of power are not associated with any one type, and that soft and hard

power are not two sides of the same coin. Soft power is far more encompassing, and rests on a

greater diversity of tools that states have at their disposal. Yet, all actors at one point or another

will want to have the capacity for coercion, and there is a gap in the literature when it comes to

understanding the circumstances under which adding hard power to the soft power mix is most

effective. Research into this question can begin to offer such explanations as to whether there is

an interaction effect in the use of hard and soft power, whether hard power legitimizes soft

power, or whether the two have a zero-sum relationship. The world of smart power at this point

may be small, but the question of how states combine hard and soft power, and the properties

that define effectiveness, are certainly fruitful avenues for research.

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