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A common space? The

Falklands/Malvinas and
the new geopolitics of the
South Atlantic
a a
Klaus Dodds & Lara Manóvil
a
Department of Geography, Royal Holloway
College , University of London , UK
Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Klaus Dodds & Lara Manóvil (2001) A common space? The
Falklands/Malvinas and the new geopolitics of the South Atlantic , Geopolitics,
6:2, 99-126, DOI: 10.1080/14650040108407719

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650040108407719

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 A Common Space?
The Falklands/Malvinas and the
New Geopolitics of the South Atlantic1

KLAUS DODDS AND LARA MANÓVIL

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This article explores the possibility of developing a more progressive sense of place
which recognises the mutual interdependence and interconnection of South America,
the Falklands (Malvinas) and the South Atlantic rather than perpetuating exclusive
identities and sovereignty. Since the 1982 South Atlantic conflict, there have been
considerable improvements in Anglo-Argentine relations resulting in a decade-long
period of South Atlantic co-operation and the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement. The
difficulties of generating a progressive sense of place in regions where conflict,
distrust and bitterness endure remain powerful forces. These endeavours will require
all parties to develop a more plural sense of culture, geographical identity and place.
The recent public recognition of shared loss by former President Carlos Menem and
HRH the Prince of Wales is interpreted as a promising development in the long-term
process of co-operation and forgiveness. Finally, this investigation considers how
political geographers can contribute to these acts of reconciliation and recognition.

Introduction

The Malvinas March

Behind their mist mantle,

We won't forget them!
'Las Malvinas, Argentinas!'
Cries out the wind and roars the sea
Not even from those horizons
They will pull our flag out,
So its white is in the mountains
And its blue colours the sea.
For absence, for defeated,
Under a foreign pavilion,
No dearer soil
Of the Motherland than its extension

Klaus Dodds and Lara Manóvil, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University
of London, UK.

Geopolitics, Vol.6, No.2 (Autumn 2001) pp.99-126

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
 100 GEOPOLITICS
Who is talking about oblivion,
About resignation, about forgiveness?
No dearer soil
Of the Motherland than its extension!
Break the mist mantle,
As a sun, our ideal;
'Las Malvinas, Argentinas,
in an already immortal dominion!'
And before the sun of our emblem,
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Pure, clear and triumphal,

Should - Oh, Motherland! - in your diadem
The lost austral pearl shine!

Chorus:

For the honour of our emblem,

For the national pride,
Should - Oh, Motherland! in your diadem
The lost austral pearl shine!2

On 2 April 2000, the new president of Argentina, Fernando de la Riia,

surrounded by members of the Argentine cabinet and armed forces,
attended a memorial service in Buenos Aires for those who died in the 1982
South Atlantic conflict. Located in the appropriately named Plaza San
Martin (the so-called founding father of the Argentine Republic), the
Cenotacio a los Caidos en Malvinas remains an important site for collective
Argentine commemoration since its official opening in April 1991.3 The
service began with an address by the General Juan Carlos Mugnolo, Jefe
Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas (FFAA) who noted
that the purpose of the memorial service was, 'To honour those who know
how to live by their ideals and how to die to defend them'.4 Afterwards the
distinguished party including President de la Riia laid flowers at the
memorial which, like the Vietnam memorial in Washington DC, lists the
names of all those Argentine soldiers who died between April and June
1982 (see Figure 1). The memorial service concluded with the National
Anthem and the 'Malvinas March' sung enthusiastically by young members
of the Argentine armed forces. Later that year, President de la Riia declared
that henceforth 2 April would be the new national holiday and as such
would replace 10 June, which was previously celebrated as 'Sovereignty
Day'.5
 FIGURE 1
CENOTACIO A LOS CAIDOS EN MALVINAS, BUENOS AIRES
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Photograph taken by Lara Manovil.

 102 GEOPOLITICS

FIGURE 2
LIBERATION MONUMENT, STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS
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Photograph taken by Klaus Dodds.

 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 103

Every year since the 1982 Argentine occupation, 'Liberation Day' on 14

June marked a major date in the commemorative calendar of the Falkland
Islands. The Governor of the Falkland Islands, accompanied by senior
members of the British armed forces and Falkland Islands Councillors,
attended this act of commemoration first held in April 1985. From Stanley's
protestant cathedral the congregation then moved along Ross Road past
Victory Green and Government House to Liberation Monument, the major
focal point for Falkland Islands and British remembrance of the 1982
conflict (see Figure 2). After dignitaries laid commemorative wreaths, the
ceremonial guard stood around the monument as further prayers and songs
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were offered in the name of the fallen. At the rear of the monument the
names of the 252 casualties of the British armed forces are listed on a
commemorative wall together with a mural depicting various fighting
scenes from the 1982 conflict. In recognition of the then British prime
minister, the monument stands in front of Thatcher Drive and the Falkland
Islands Government's Secretariat.6 As with the ceremony held in Argentina
every April, it is a solemn and deeply moving occasion, and this event
coincides with another service at the small British war cemetery in San
Carlos Bay on the western side of East Falkland.
As critical geopolitical writers and others have recognised, formal acts
of commemoration are important sources of reflection about geopolitical
visions' and national identity.8 In the case of Anglo-Argentine relations after
the 1982 conflict, they primarily serve their domestic constituencies as one
community (Argentina) seeks to remind its citizens of the need to recover
these disputed islands and another (the Falkland Islands and Britain)
celebrates deliverance from the Argentine occupation. These geographical
sites of commemoration are as important as the actual nature of the
remembrance and each is designed to exclude the unwelcome presence of
the other.9 As border performances they help to reproduce exclusive
identities and the creation of memorial landscapes is also an intensely moral
project; each side mourns its own loss yet at the expense of recognising the
profound sense of grief felt by the other.10 Many relatives of the fallen and
former veterans on both sides would not wish for such a joint recognition,
professing it to be culturally inappropriate. Many members of the Malvinas
War Veterans Federation would not, for instance, wish to travel to the
Argentine cemetery in East Falkland because under current regulations their
Argentine passports would be stamped by the immigration authorities of the
Falkland Islands Government (FIG)." For a period in the aftermath of the
1982 Argentine occupation, Falkland Islanders were reluctant to allow
visiting Argentine relatives and/or veterans to visit any other place bar the
 104 GEOPOLITICS
Argentine cemetery in Darwin, even though many wanted to see where the
dead had fallen. Diplomatic relations under Prime Minister Thatcher
(1979-90) and President Alfonsin (1983-89) contributed to this
geographical and political impasse. Each side was unwilling to
acknowledge the presence of the other and until quite recently, this
perpetuated a view of the Falklands/Malvinas as a one-dimensional
disputed space.
While these memorial services undoubtedly serve as powerful reminders
of the outstanding sovereignty dispute, much has changed since the 1982
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South Atlantic conflict. From an administrative point of view, the Labour

government reclassified the Falkland Islands from a 'dependent territory' to
an 'overseas territory' of the United Kingdom in 1998.12 In keeping with the
last Conservative administration, they have also committed the UK to
uphold the rights of the Falkland Island population to exercise self-
determination, despite the presence of UN Resolution 2065 urging
negotiations with Argentina over the future sovereignty of the disputed
islands.13 Former Prime Minister Thatcher's personal determination to
ensure that the Falkland Islanders were able to decide their own political
future without the fear of any sovereignty transfer to Argentina has been
instrumental in consolidating a cross-party consensus on the British
political position. Even before the recent reclassification by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Falkland Islands have been transformed after a
decade of new sources of revenue, such as fishing licensing, and the clear
commitment to defend the Falklands from any future Argentine incursion.
Within Argentina, the democratically elected Alfonsin (1983-89) and
Menem governments (1989-99) sought to restart negotiations over the
disputed sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. While the 1982
conflict did not resolve this dispute, Argentine foreign ministers have
continued to pursue the issue via bilateral negotiations and with the United
Nations C24 Decolonisation Committee.14 As the then Argentine
ambassador in London noted, 'The South Atlantic question has been the
object of long and frustrating negotiations, called for by the United Nations,
and the cause of an unfortunate and mistaken military conflict'.15 Despite
the diplomatic contact, there has been no breakthrough in terms of a final
territorial solution, as both parties remain wedded to their fundamental legal
positions. For the last decade, the British and Argentine governments have
nonetheless carried out negotiations under a so-called sovereignty umbrella,
which means that any agreements over fishing, communications, resource
development and tourism can occur without prejudicing the parties' rights
regarding exclusive sovereignty of the Islands and the South West Atlantic.
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 105

While this diplomatic accord has been helpful in normalising post-war

relations, parties are, therefore, not explicitly obliged to address the
condition and rationale for their sovereignty claims.
The first part of this paper considers in more detail how the
Falklands/Malvinas has been located within the Argentine and British
(Falkland Island) geopolitical imagination in the recent era. While critical
geopolitics and cultural geography have played an important part in
exploring how particular places are constructed within political and cultural
discourse, most of the political discussion on the Falklands/Malvinas has
neglected to explore the connections between place and identity.16 The
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second part briefly considers the Falklands/Malvinas and the geographical

imaginations of Argentina and the Falkland Islands with emphasis on the
Falklands community rather than Britain because the development of a new
sense of place in this small community has received little prior attention.
Thereafter, a recent accord between Britain, Argentina (and indirectly the
Falkland Islands Government) called the 14 July Joint Statement (1999) is
investigated owing to its potential to transform relations between the three
major parties.17 However, the success of this agreement will depend upon all
parties developing a more 'progressive sense of place'.18 Finally, we argue
that any form of cultural and political reconciliation between the Falkland
Islanders and Argentina will require the development of a more plural sense
of cultural and geographical identity. Ironically, an attachment to place and
tradition does not have to be conceptualised as a reactionary stance against
the sovereignty of the Islands. In a context of cultural antagonism and or
ethnic conflict, it is unlikely that any community or people would abandon
their attachments to place and particular traditions.

Searching for a Progressive Sense of Place: The Falkland Islands

(Malvinas) within the Argentine and British (Falkland Island)
Geopolitical Imagination
Critical geopolitics has devoted much time and attention to exploring the
geographical dimensions to popular and elite representations of national
identity. Under the label of 'popular geopolitics', it has been argued that the
media and school education influence the ideological and geographical
reproduction of the state.19 The construction of territories and boundaries is
frequently played out in national stories of a state or nation. In the case of
Argentine territorial nationalism, for example, the 'loss of the Malvinas' to
the British in 1833 has strongly contributed to a view of Argentina as an
'incomplete' or even 'violated' nation state.20 Successive political leaders,
 106 GEOPOLITICS
especially President Juan Domingo Peron, have argued that Argentina
would never enjoy full political and economic development until these
South West Atlantic islands reverted to Argentine sovereignty.21 The British
occupation of the Falkland Islands was an affront to the national
imagination and a persistent symbol of British imperialism despite the
longstanding economic, political and cultural relationship between the two
states.22 As one former Argentine diplomat, Roberto Guyer noted, 'going
back in history, the Malvinas were Argentina's, are Argentina's. So for us it
is a question of national honour and national dignity'.23 Public education
contributes to this 'national project' as Argentine children from primary
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school onwards are taught that the Islas Malvinas (also called 'Las
Hermanitas Perdidas', The Little Lost Sisters) remain Argentine and they
learn patriotic songs detailing the historical and geographical development
of the Argentine Republic.24 As Carlos Escude has concluded:
Among many examples is the corny, sentimental song popularised
during the Falklands/Malvinas War, 'Las Hermanitas Perdidas'. In
terms of fallacious discourse, the Falklands/Malvinas, are 'sisters' of
the 'great Argentine family'. This metaphor helps to consolidate a
culture in which very few people think seriously and honestly about
the people who inhabit the islands at least as a priority issue. And the
human rights or the right to self-determination of the Falkland
Islanders become a laughable consideration when what is at stake is
the amputation of one of the nation's hands or feet. One does not
abandon a little sister who has been abducted and raped by perfidious
Albion.25
Moreover, every day the Argentine flag is raised and lowered in a ceremony
which replicates the experience of banal nationalism throughout Argentine
schools.26 By the time Argentine children leave primary school, they will be
able to draw an outline of the Falklands/Malvinas and recite the total
geographical area of the Republic including the disputed South Atlantic
islands and the Argentine Antarctic sector.27 Geography as an academic
discipline contributes not only to the general education of the schoolchild
but also to the consolidation of national citizenship.28
The Argentine political scientist, Carlos Escude, yet again draws
attention to the fact that these forms of 'patriotic education' perpetuate a
territorial public culture, which explains why many people cheered the
Argentine invasion of April 1982, despite the massive unpopularity of the
military regime.29 The British annexation of the Falklands in 1833 is not
only judged to have been an illegal act but also represented as a moral and
spatial transgression.30 This view of the Islas Malvinas as a sacred space is
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 107

further underlined by Argentine geopolitical education at secondary school,

which concentrates on informing students of the geographical and
geological linkages with South America.31 Older students are taught that the
Islands are, therefore, a natural part of the Argentine Republic and that the
Falklands are fundamentally connected to the South American continent.32
This form of geographical education permeates Argentine geopolitical
discourse and successive governments (both military and civilian) reiterate
the fact that the Falkland Islands are only 300 miles from the coast of
Argentina but 8,000 miles away from the UK.33 Ironically, while most
Argentine students, unlike their British counterparts, are able to draw an
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outline of the Malvinas, they nonetheless often remain ignorant of the

cultural qualities of the Falkland Islands community. Falkland Islanders
who witnessed the 1982 invasion and occupation frequently recalled how
Argentine conscripts could not believe that this was a predominantly
English-speaking community and that many of the Argentine soldiers
expressed surprise that the Falkland Islanders were not 'grateful' for being
freed from British imperialism. As one young Argentine soldier noted after
the 1982 Malvinas campaign:

We'd been lectured a lot about the Malvinas, the importance of their
recovery ... they talked a lot about the English as invaders of
something that is ours. We felt that we were going to the Malvinas to
defend something that was ours.34
Within the Falkland Islands, this small community has been invested with a
British identity, in large part owing to the ethnic origins of the inhabitants
who settled there after the 1833 annexation, while Argentina remains (more
in community folklore rather than formal education) an unwelcome or
threatening presence. The annual memorial service around Liberation
Monument in Stanley coexists in a public culture still sustained by the
ritualised dramas of flag waving, support of English football teams and
annual celebrations of the Queen's Official Birthday.35 This hardening of
attitude towards a near neighbour reflects longstanding Anglo-Argentine
negotiations over the future of the Falklands/Malvinas and a fear that both
parties are, despite reassurances, ultimately prepared to impose a solution
without the consent of the small Falklands community. A United Nations
Resolution 2065 passed in December 1965 was instrumental in
consolidating those fears as it declared the Falkland Islands part of a
'colonial situation' and called on Britain and Argentina to negotiate a
settlement which took due regard of the 'interests' of the Falkland
Islanders.36 The most controversial element of the resolution was how the
 108 GEOPOLITICS
'interests' of the Islanders would be taken into account in any form of
sovereignty settlement. Despite a signed Memorandum of Understanding
between the two parties in 1968 detailing the conditions for a sovereignty
transfer in favour of Argentina, successive British governments have argued
that the Islands would only be transferred if the Islanders 'wished' such a
post-colonial transformation.37 Assisted by a powerful 'Falklands lobby' in
London, Falkland Islands Councillors were able to represent the Islands as
a British (read white as well) space which was unwilling to join the
culturally and geographically alien state of Argentina.38 It was recognised by
British and Argentine policy makers that this hostility and suspicion of
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Argentina was to a large extent due to a lack of contact with the South
American mainland. Apart from celebrated incidents involving Argentine
aircraft in the 1960s, the sea was seen as providing a natural defence against
unwanted contact with Argentina.39 Until the 1971 Joint Communications
Agreement with Argentina, the Falkland Islands community was
remarkably isolated from South America in the post-1945 period.40 The only
mode of regular contact with the wider world was the monthly voyage of
the RMS Darwin between Stanley and Montevideo in Uruguay. Once an air
link was created with Argentina, it was hoped by the British Foreign Office
that Falkland Islander views would change in favour of an Argentine
transfer of sovereignty. Under the so-called leaseback proposal, Britain
would transfer formal sovereignty to Argentina and then secure a lease for
a further 50 to 75 years. It was argued that by the time the lease expired, no
one in the Falkland Islands would object to becoming formally incorporated
into the Argentine Republic given various economic, political and cultural
assurances. It was noted within Argentina that there was a large Anglo-
Argentine community who had successfully integrated into the Republic.
After the creation of the air link, increased contact with Argentineans
changed some Falkland Islanders' views towards leaseback and deeper
relations with South America. According to Clive Ellerby, the Islanders
were actually divided on the question of leaseback in the late 1970s, with
some sections of the community such as the West Falkland Islanders and
farm managers in favour, owing to the parlous condition of the local wool-
dominated economy.41 Closer co-operation with Argentina was held to be
the key to a possible economic transformation until, so it has been argued,
local opinion changed dramatically on hearing the radio speech of one
Falkland Island Councillor. As Adrian Monk noted in his December 1980
broadcast, 'I think the whole campaign stinks ... We are "British". Our
country will remain British' ,42 Shortly afterwards, the Legislative Council
became more hostile to all forms of South American overtures including
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 109

negotiations over a possible sovereignty transfer. While some Falkland

Islanders travelled to Argentina for educational and health reasons, most of
the traffic between the two places was via Argentine cruise ships calling on
the Islands for short recreational visits. According to Islanders who
remember the visits, Argentine passengers were more interested in
purchasing cheap goods than symbolically restoring the Falklands to
Argentine ownership.43 Supported by the well-connected Falklands Lobby
in London, however, Falkland Islanders became progressively hostile to
Argentina after Monk's broadcast and this view was undoubtedly assisted
by the fact that the Republic continued to be governed by a series of military
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regimes in the late 1970s. Ironically, the determination to maintain strong

links with the UK coincided with the reluctance of the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to implement the large-scale proposals of the 1976
Shackleton Report, for the long-term economic development of the
Falkland Islands. Hepple rightly argued that the Report, rather than a sign
of renewed imperial commitment, was 'an attempt to help the Islanders find
a future, not a desire to retain the Falklands for Britain for their resource or
geopolitical value'.44 However, by the time the Report had appeared
speculation was intense in Argentina that the waters surrounding the
Falklands were awash with oil and other resources following a highly
speculative report by the US Geological Survey in 1974.45 Ironically while
the 1976 Report recommended a programme of investment such as a new
runway, neither the then Labour government nor the subsequent Thatcher
administration proved willing to make the necessary political and financial
commitment because they feared Argentina might take military action
against the Islands.46
In the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict, geographical and
political views hardened still further, as Britain and Argentina reached an
impasse on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. Mrs Thatcher's personal
determination to hold on to the Falklands at all costs demolished
Argentina's belief that a sovereignty transfer was still feasible subject to
agreement on the status of the Islands within the pre-1994 Republic's
Constitution. While British officials had been eager to execute such a
transfer in the 1970s, ministers and civil servants alike were now
overwhelmed by political pressure mounted by the Falklands Lobby to
resist such a move. As David Owen, the former foreign secretary under
James Callaghan (1976-79) recalled to one of the authors, 'Gibraltar and
the Falkland Islands always excited the passions of the House of Commons.
These places always encouraged the "Union Jack and Daily Express"
brigade and of course it made a difference that they were filled with white
 110 GEOPOLITICS
47
people'. For the rest of the 1980s, it was a moot point as to whether some
form of rapprochement might have been possible in the face of such
positions. Prime Minister Thatcher refused to talk about the formal
sovereignty of the Falklands and President Alfonsfn of Argentina refused to
renew dialogue with the UK unless the subject of the Malvinas featured in
these exchanges. The Berne meeting of July 1984 illustrated only too
clearly how each side was wedded to the belief that its own sense of history
and geography was paramount. Several fruitless meetings organised under
the auspices of the Swiss Foreign Ministry left both parties disappointed and
neither side was prepared to waive their preconditions.48
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For the remainder of the 1980s, discussions over the Falklands/Malvinas

were painfully slow, with both sides maintaining their positions over
sovereignty which were thus non-negotiable. Military training in the South
Atlantic by British armed forces further provoked the Argentines to press
for United Nations support for a complete removal of military forces in the
region.49 By 1989-90, however, a change of political leaders in Britain
(Major for Thatcher) and Argentina (Menem for Alfonsfn) led to a more co-
operative phase of negotiations resulting in the diplomatic implementation
of the 'sovereignty umbrella' whereby rapprochement and co-operation in
areas of mutual concern could be secured without legal prejudice.50 As
Carlos Escude and Andres Cisneros have noted, 'Menem's government ...
adopted from the beginning a more pragmatic focus, and re-established full
diplomatic relations with Great Britain, under the formula of the
"umbrella", whose formation had been agreed under the Radicals'
government'.51 The implementation of the 'sovereignty umbrella' in 1989
followed a meeting of British and Argentine representatives in Madrid and
heralded a new phase in post-conflict relations. The first steps were now
being taken to promote greater co-operation between Britain and Argentina
in the disputed South Atlantic sector. First, under the auspices of the Red
Cross, relatives of the Argentine war dead were allowed to visit the
Argentine cemetery in Darwin in 1991 after initial attempts in 1983 failed
to secure political support for such visits in Argentina.52 To appease the
Falkland Islanders, Argentine visitors were not permitted to venture into
Stanley or visit any other place on the Falklands. Second, the Argentine
authorities stated publicly that any resolution to the dispute required that the
presence of the Falklands community be acknowledged in terms of separate
language and cultural traditions. In other words, the Argentine Constitution
of 1994 recognised that the Falklands was not simply an abstract territorial
space devoid of community and cultural traditions even if it committed
Argentina to the eventual recovery of the Islands. Third, the Falkland
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 111

Islands community was to be more actively involved in negotiations over

future contact and relations with South America. While Argentine political
leaders had always declared that the Falklands/Malvinas was an exclusive
matter for the British and Argentine governments, a grudging
acknowledgement emerged that the Falklands community was culturally
distinct (as opposed to legally distinct, which would be denied by
Argentina) from Argentine communities. The new Argentine foreign
minister, Guido Di Telia, was decisive in promoting new forms of contact
with the Falkland Islanders and in some cases he even telephoned Islanders
directly in order to talk about the territorial dispute. Fourth, new bodies such
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as the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission (1990) and later the South West
Atlantic Hydrocarbons Commission (1996) initiated a new round of Anglo-
Argentine dialogue in the South Atlantic. Argentina has agreed to the
presence of Falkland Island Government representatives at those meetings,
reassured by the knowledge that the 'sovereignty umbrella' protects their
legal position. Fifth, the new Argentine government officially ended the
state of hostility between itself and the UK.
By the late 1990s, a basic paradox existed within an improving Anglo-
Argentine relationship. On the one hand, a series of developments relating
to co-operative structures over fishing and communications had returned the
Falklands to a situation somewhat familiar to Islanders in the 1970s. The
Falklands was being embedded in a series of regional relations centred on
its South American neighbours Argentina and Chile. Unlike in the 1970s,
Chile rather than Argentina was helping to sustain new air services
(although Argentina gave permission for those flights to cross its airspace)
and Argentina was offering limited co-operation over fishing and
hydrocarbon exploration. All parties involved in the dispute over ownership
were pursuing co-operative arrangements despite their differences over
territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the annual meeting of the C24
(the so-called Decolonisation Committee) hosted by the United Nations
witnessed a largely sterile debate in terms of resolving the dispute. The
Argentine delegation continued to press for their claim to the Malvinas to
be respected and the UK-Falkland Islands delegation rehearsed familiar
themes such as the post-1833 history of the English-speaking community
and the right to self-determine their collective fate. Moreover, the Falkland
Island representatives reminded all states of the inherent danger of larger
states overwhelming smaller states without due regard to international law
and the right of self-determination.53 Each year these debates become
increasingly fossilised as the rival delegations release well-rehearsed
outbursts over territorial sovereignty and effective occupation. Recent
 112 GEOPOLITICS
events demonstrated how these ritualised dramas in the United Nations
neither deal with the complexity of the Falklands/Malvinas nor address the
object of dispute.

The 14 July 1999 Joint Statement and the Falklands/Malvinas as a

'South Atlantic Space'
The detention in London by the British authorities of the former Chilean
president, Augusto Pinochet, in October 1998, precipitated a change of
events that was to be keenly felt within the Falkland Islands. After a Spanish
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petition for his arrest was presented to the British government, Pinochet was
detained in order to face possible extradition to Spain for the purpose of
facing charges relating to human rights abuses in Chile between 1973 and
1989.54 While the former prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, reminded
audiences that Pinochet's Chile had aided Britain during the Falklands
campaign, prominent Chilean critics such as Isabel Allende and Ariel
Dorfman pointed to Pinochet's record of grave human rights abuses. In
retaliation for Pinochet's detention, the Chilean government ordered the
cessation of the air link in March 1999 between the southern Chilean town
of Punta Arenas and the Falkland Islands, leaving the Falklands community
dependent upon the Royal Air Force (RAF) air link with the UK. After
considerable diplomatic pressure from Argentina, MERCOSUR (Mercado
Comiin del Sur) partners Brazil and Uruguay announced that they would no
longer be able to offer the RAF flights to and from the UK emergency
diversion facilities. The effect of this decision jeopardised the entire RAF
air link with the Falklands, as no flight can operate in the unpredictable
South Atlantic weather conditions without such facilities. Argentina also
ensured that Uruguay and Brazil would not support an alternative air route
to the Falklands unless it went via Argentina. By March 1999, the Falklands
community was facing the prospect of near isolation as attempts to pursue
a link with South Africa failed to materialise too.
Faced with these stark realities, the community realised that it not only
benefited from closer co-operation with Argentina and Chile but also
remained vulnerable to external pressure from South American states. The
link with the Chilean town of Punta Arenas unquestionably expanded the
tourist and hotel trade and the joint management of fishing with Argentina
helped to increase revenues. With declining income from both ventures in
1999, the FIG requested the UK government to instigate talks with
Argentina.55 It was widely felt within the Falklands that Chile would only
restore the air link with Punta Arenas (and that Brazil and Uruguay would
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 113

also renew emergency diversion facilities) if and only if Argentina

approved such a restoration. In the past, the Falklands community had
relied on good relations with Chile to insulate them from official
Argentine displeasure at the lack of progress regarding the sovereignty
dispute. In April 1999, Falkland Island Councillors held their first meeting
with Argentine representatives, and this dialogue continued
simultaneously with the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation
(C24) meeting held in July 1999. The then British foreign secretary, Robin
Cook, reportedly advised the Councillors to pursue talks with some vigour
given the uncertainties over the result of the forthcoming presidential
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elections in Argentina in October 1999. The main areas of discussion were

the proposed restoration of flights, a living resources agreement for the
South Atlantic and the lifting of the ban on all Argentine passport holders
from entering the Falklands. The FIG placed fishing on top of their
political agenda, not only because of a recent decline in licensing revenue
but also owing to a widespread fear that illegal fishing was severely
depleting the living resources of the South Atlantic.56 The Argentine
delegation welcomed the opportunity to pursue the lifting of the FIG ban
preventing Argentine passport holders from entering the Falklands and to
emphasise to the Councillors that Argentina's South American
MERCOSUR partners were sympathetic to their claims over the disputed
Malvinas.
The eventual agreement negotiated in the aftermath of the C24 meeting
in New York (called the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement) contained six major
components. First, for the first time since the conflict, it allowed all
Argentine passport holders to enter the Falklands. Previously, Argentine
citizens had to enter on second passports or be part of an official visit of the
relatives of the Argentine war dead. Second, provision was made for a
fisheries agreement between Argentina and Britain for the purpose of
combating illegal fishing in the South Atlantic. Third, it was confirmed that
a new memorial could be constructed at the Argentine cemetery in Darwin
subject to local planning approval. Fourth, flights between the Falkland
Islands and Punta Arenas were to be resumed from October 1999; this air
link would include a monthly stopover in the Argentine city of Rio
Gallegos. Fifth, the Argentine government agreed to review the matter of
place-names such as Puerto Argentino (Stanley) which were imposed by the
Argentine junta in the early 1980s. Finally, the two governments agreed to
work on the feasibility of de-mining the Falkland Islands as part of fulfilling
their obligations to the 1996 Ottawa Convention on landmines. All these
elements of the Agreement were buttressed once again by the so-called
 114 GEOPOLITICS
sovereignty umbrella which acknowledges that none of the above will
prejudice either side's claim to sovereignty.
There was, unsurprisingly, a mixed reaction to the Joint Statement in the
Falklands and Argentina. Within the Islands, there was a widespread
misgiving that the Councillors had failed to consult as fully as they should
have done with the local electorate. Many Islanders recalled in interviews
carried out in December 1999 that Councillors had reneged on their
promises to contact the community before implementing radical changes in
policy such as the lifting of the ban on Argentine passport holders." Other
Islanders noted, however, that the circumstances facing the Falklands were
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so serious in nature that the Councillors had no choice but to agree to this
wide-ranging agreement. In Argentina the foreign minister, Guido Di Telia,
defended the Joint Statement as an important step in the gradual
normalisation of relations between Argentina and Britain. Other groups
such as the Malvinas War Veterans Federation were critical of the Joint
Statement because it not only failed to address the disputed sovereignty of
the Malvinas but also permitted two representatives from the Falkland
Islands Government to attend the signing of the Joint Statement.58
Furthermore, the ending of the ban on Argentine passport holders entering
the Falklands was irrelevant because the Menem government had not
challenged the right of the FIG authorities to stamp the documents of
Argentine passport holders. The Veterans argued that this gave symbolic
validity to the authority of the Falkland Islands Government itself. At the
time, the mayor of Buenos Aires, Fernando de la Rua, supported the
negotiations even if other political figures such as Garcia Del Solar warned
that they set a dangerous precedent and could benefit the Islanders'
demands for recognition and self-determination. Within Britain, there was
widespread consensus that the Joint Statement was the best possible
outcome for the Falkland Islanders in the light of the 'sovereignty umbrella'
and the threat of isolation from South America. Given that the right to self-
determination had not been compromised, the lifting of the ban on
Argentine passport holders was not considered to have compromised
Britain's legal position vis-a-vis the Falkland Islands.
The 14 July 1999 Joint Statement is a landmark in the recent history of
Anglo-Argentine relations over the Falklands/Malvinas although the
implementation and implication of the Agreement still have to be fully
assessed. Despite the fear of some Islanders that the admission of Argentine
passport holders entering the Falklands undermined their de facto authority,
the Islands have not been inundated by Argentines mainly because of the
cost and length of stay (one week minimum owing to flight schedules)
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 115

required. With the 1991-99 imposed restrictions revised, visits to Stanley,

Darwin and Goose Green are now permitted and while reminiscent of the
1970s, Argentine visitors do require a passport (rather than an immigration
card called the 'white card') to enter the Islands. While the Falklands
Councillors could withdraw access rights to Argentine passport holders, it
is extremely unlikely, unless there was no progress with Argentina on a
robust fisheries agreement for the South Atlantic.
The resumption of the flights from Chile in August 1999 (followed by
Argentina in October 1999) provoked some public demonstrations in
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Stanley, particularly as some Islanders protested against the initial influx of

new Argentine passport holders entering the Islands. This prompted four
Falkland Islands business people to organise a survey of Falkland Island
opinion in order to determine whether there was broad support for the Joint
Statement.59 With 916 completed replies, the survey offered some of the
most detailed evidence (gathered thus far) on the reaction of the 2,200-
strong community. A striking feature of the replies was the belief that the
Falkland Island Councillors did not exhaust all possibilities for an
alternative air link (South Africa was a favoured suggestion) before
agreeing to the lifting of the ban on Argentine passport holders. However,
most respondents also acknowledged that Brazil's decision to withdraw
diversion facilities for the RAF flights was indicative of isolating the
Islands. Overall, 51 per cent of the replies were against the lifting of the ban
with 47 per cent in favour, provided the numbers of Argentine passport
holders entering the Islands were controlled. Most respondents were against
the resumption of the South American air link if it included an Argentine
transit airport.
Prior to the signing of the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement, the construction
of the memorial at the Argentine cemetery in Darwin had been formally
sanctioned by the British government subject to approval by the Building
and Planning Committee of the FIG. It is widely believed that approval will
be forthcoming only if the Argentine authorities in turn agree to remove so-
called artificial place-names such as Puerto Argentino from the official
Argentine maps of the Malvinas. Much to the irritation of the Malvinas War
Veterans Federation, the role of the Building and Planning Committee in
providing the final approval for the monument has again highlighted the de
facto authority of the FIG. The Committee had already rejected earlier
proposals for a memorial to include a large cross, an Argentine flag and/or
chapel.60 In July 1999, former Peronist MP Fernando Maurette began
preparations for the repeal of Galtieri's decree on place-names and it has
been suggested that the Instituto Geografico Militar (IGM) will prepare an
 116 GEOPOLITICS
official submission to the Parliament concerning the future of place-names.
However, there has been no suggestion that future Argentine maps will not
continue to produce maps showing the Falkland Islands as the Malvinas as
most people in the Falkland Islands accept that there are two names,
depending on whether the Islands are being referred to by the English- or
the Spanish-speaking community.
Regionally, the events leading up to the Joint Statement demonstrated
that the then Argentine government had successfully persuaded its
MERCOSUR partners, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay to support the request
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that air access to the Falklands be severely restricted. This unprecedented

degree of South American co-operation should serve as a basic reminder
that the Falklands are located only 300 miles off the Argentine mainland
and that notwithstanding a strong emotional attachment to the UK it will not
reduce the importance of developing regional relations with other South
Atlantic parties. With the British armed forces heavily committed in
humanitarian operations in Europe and elsewhere, the long-term future of
the RAF flights from Oxfordshire via Ascension Island to the Falklands will
no doubt be under review. Likewise, the demands from the FIG for a
tougher fisheries agreement in the South Atlantic ignores the Falklands'
community dependency upon Argentine co-operation as well as distant
water fishing nations such as Taiwan and South Korea to combat illegal
fishing which threaten their licensing revenues.

The Falklands/Malvinas and a New View of Place?

Despite the wide-ranging nature of the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement, the
fundamental dispute over the sovereignty of the Falklands remains
unresolved. The persistence of the 'sovereignty umbrella' in Anglo-
Argentine negotiations is a powerful reminder that the nation and
accompanying territorial boundaries remain central to our understandings of
political community, identity and place. When it comes to explaining
differences, the 'nationalising eye' remains central to our explanations of
world events let alone the contested politics of the Falklands. Any
resolution to the dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas will involve not only
endless negotiations over formal sovereignty but also a concerted effort to
re-imagine the South Atlantic and South America. In conflict resolution it is
difficult to move to a different future unless the past is put in its place. In
order to illustrate these points further, the issue of place-names and the
commemoration of the 1982 South Atlantic conflict are deployed.
An important, if poorly recognised, element in the 14 July 1999 Joint
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 117

Statement is the eventual fate of place-names such as Puerto Argentino

which were imposed by General Galtieri on the Falklands/Malvinas in the
early 1980s. There can be few places more geographically contested than
the Falklands in the sense that cartography has played a central role in
Argentine representations of the Malvinas.61 For much of the past century,
public education in alliance with institutions such as the IGM have
produced countless maps portraying the Malvinas as a 'territorial loss' to
the Argentine Republic.62 The familiar tri-continental image of Argentina
has bolstered this perception, and geography textbooks, memorials and
postage stamps have cemented this view of loss and helped to construct an
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active citizenship supportive of the Argentine recovery of the Islands.63

Rather than offer yet another interpretation on the events leading to the
annexation by the British of the Falklands in 1833, the fate of these place-
names could be used to stimulate a more wide-ranging debate over the
complex geographies of the Falkland Islands. All place-names are
artificial in the sense that they were proposed by particular groups of
people and then subsequently incorporated into the official maps produced
by states and their cartographic agents. While it may be understandable
that sections of the Falkland Islands community wish to see particular
Argentine names de-legitimised, it does not begin to address how the
varied place-names of the Falklands actively reflect the past episodes of
Argentine, British, Spanish and French settlements and exploration. As
Richard Munro notes, 'the history and culture of the Islands are
inextricably linked to the names of its topographical features, settlements,
streets and houses'. M
In that sense, there can be no substantial claims to an exclusive identity
for the Falklands. Spanish topographical names such as arroyo (stream),
rincon (corner) and roca (rock) are freely acknowledged in the British and
Argentine maps of the Falklands/Malvinas. Past episodes of French
settlement in the eighteenth century are commemorated in settlements such
as Port Louis and Cassard Point named after a French sailing ship wrecked
in the Falklands in 1906.65 The contribution of the English-speaking
community is also richly acknowledged ranging from names of past settlers
(Chartres River), British naval vessels (Ajax Bay) and former monarchs
(George Island). After the 1982 conflict, the FIG approved the naming of
Thatcher Drive, H Jones Road and Jeremy Moore Avenue in Stanley. All
denote influential individuals party to the British Falklands campaign of
April-June 1982. As the author of a recent pamphlet on place-names in the
Falklands acknowledged, 'the study of place-names is dynamic' rather than
fixed for time immemorial. The diverse origins of place-names might form
 118 GEOPOLITICS
the basis for a rather different geographical and cultural view of the
Falklands/Malvinas.
While the acts of mapping and naming have been significant forces in
the construction of national identities and territorial limits of the state, the
physical and symbolic geography of the Falklands can provide an obstacle
to acknowledging these varied historical and multilingual origins of place-
names. As with all islands, the apparent simple distinction between land and
water can undermine claims to complicated and mutual historical
interdependence. As a consequence, uncertainty and ambiguity are not
tolerated as opposing geographies and histories of the Falklands/Malvinas
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accumulate. If place-names are to provide material for the development of

a more sustaining sense of place, then discussion of place-names will have
to be conducted in a context where co-operation and trust are the norm in
Argentine-Anglo-Falkland relations. This not only takes time but it also has
to be predicated on the recognition that the power-geometry of place is
skewed in favour of a large continental neighbour. When a small
community is still struggling to deal with the legacies of war and territorial
counter-claims, the call to develop a progressive identity can make little
political or cultural sense as in this case when the UK continues to offer the
promise of military protection. Moreover, unlike the Unionist community in
Northern Ireland, the Falklands are neither incorporated into the UK's
formal government nor are they located about an hour's plane flight away
from London's major airports.
As improvements in Anglo-Argentine relations have gathered pace in
the last five years so bilateral negotiations over fishing, oil licensing,
transport and tourism have progressed. Cordiality has led to the gradual
recognition of a shared loss resulting from the 1982 South Atlantic conflict.
The decision to allow Argentine relatives of the war dead to visit the
Falklands in 1991 was a courageous gesture by the FIG given the enduring
bitterness of the 74-day Argentine occupation in 1982. The establishment of
the annual Liberation Day has helped to consolidate a widespread desire to
honour those British soldiers who gave their lives for the recapture of the
Falklands. Indeed many Islanders feel quite strongly that any gestures of
goodwill towards Argentina might be wrongly interpreted as a sign of
diminishing gratitude.
In the last few years, representatives from the Malvinas War Veterans
Federation and the British-based South Atlantic Medal Association (SAMA
82) have held high-profile reunions in an attempt to promote a view of the
conflict that acknowledges a shared loss. These kinds of gestures,
sometimes on a small and informal scale, are significant in terms of
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 119

releasing all interested parties from slavish devotion to the assumed

memories of the war dead. This active recognition of shared loss and
responsibility was epitomised most clearly when the then Argentine
president, Carlos Menem, laid a wreath in St Paul's Cathedral in London in
October 1998 and Prince Charles reciprocated at the memorial to the
Malvinas dead in Buenos Aires in March 1999. SAM A 82 under the
leadership of two veterans, Dr Rick Jolly and Denzil Connick, has been at
the forefront of promoting reconciliation and understanding. This
organisation (with over 1,000 UK veteran members) has advised the
Foreign Office and the Royal Family over contact with Argentine veterans
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and visits to Argentina.66 In 2002, SAMA 82 will be organising reunion

visits of British veterans and the FIG has also pledged to host a series of
memorial services and visits by dignitaries on the 20th anniversary of the
conflict. It remains to be seen whether there will be a joint Anglo-Argentine
act of commemoration on the Falkland Islands.
The controversies surrounding the Falklands/Malvinas have
considerable relevance for both Falkland and British audiences seeking to
come to terms with the fact that the 'British Isles' do not have (and never
had) a singular identity and or history. For much of the post-1968 period,
the 'Falklands Lobby' and more recently the Falkland Islands Government
have continued to insist that the Falkland Islanders are 'British' as if such a
category is self-evident and stable. Apart from such arguments being utterly
demolished by cultural writers such as Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall,
devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales will alter not only the
constitutional status of the United Kingdom but also disrupt claims to stable
national identities.67 Any future analysis of the Falklands problem will have
to engage actively in the deconstruction of the 'island', as former Argentine
foreign minister, Guido Di Telia, noted: 'Now, the problem with islands in
general is that they have sex appeal. We lose our minds, but you also lose
your mind ... And you love to collect islands of all sorts around the world' .68
Gillian Beer noted that the idea of the island is associated with values such
as 'defensive, secure, compact, even paradisal [sic] - a safe place too from
which to launch the building of an empire. Even now remote islands - the
Falklands or Fiji - are claimed as peculiarly part of empire history'.69 Given
the existence of a substantial literature in the humanities on islands, this task
is not as opaque as it might initially appear. Hence, scholars should actively
contest discourses and practices invoking defensive responses to cultural
change and exclusive forms of national identity. Any new model of place for
the Falklands/Malvinas should involve an active recognition that these
islands have been shaped by a range of cultural, economic and political
 120 GEOPOLITICS
flows and interconnections. This does not mean, therefore, that a firmly held
commitment to place is tantamount to a form of reactionary politics.
Falkland Islanders are, for example, often eager to acknowledge that the
community's rural existence had many similarities with nineteenth-century
Patagonian sheep fanners and gauchos, including the use of Spanish words
to describe farming life and riding gear.™ More recently, Argentine writers
have also acknowledged that the Falklands is not devoid of an Anglophone
culture or community." Yet it does imply that attempts to promote either a
sentimental heritage based on a few favoured anniversaries and/or selective
cultural influences are unlikely to be able to deal with the aftermath of
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conflict and competing territorial claims.72

Conclusions
The disputed ownership of the Falklands/Malvinas has been used to
demonstrate how a series of remote islands in the South Atlantic can
provoke broader questions about place and identity in contemporary times.
For much of the last decade, Anglo-Argentine negotiators have been
moving slowly towards a more relational view of place. In part, this reflects
the changing economic and political circumstances of the Falkland Islands.
It is no longer reasonable to assume (and maybe it never was) that the future
of these Islands will be determined by the two claimant states with no
political and diplomatic input from the Falklands Islands community.
Moreover, there is a growing recognition that the future of the Falklands
will be shaped as much by transboundary and super-territorial relations as
they will by bilateral negotiations. The events that followed the arrest of
former president Pinochet in London (in October 1998) had a profound and
unexpected influence on the geopolitics of the South Atlantic. The 14 July
1999 Joint Statement too, will have a considerable impact on the Anglo-
Argentine-Falkland relations regardless of whether particular parts of the
agreement are implemented as fully as some of the parties might have
anticipated.
In theoretical terms, the development of a new model of place for these
Islands will depend on developing a more relational view of place that is not
rooted to singular identities based on violent exclusions of another. Such a
view would entail, as Doreen Massey has argued, 'a radical commitment to
the openness of the future, a recognition of multiplicities [sic] and
difference, and a general alertness to the dangers of essentialist modes of
conceptualisation'.73 Any improvement in Anglo-Argentine-Falkland
Islands relations will depend upon acknowledging that a progressive view
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 121

of place is no easy task. A post-colonial vision for the Falklands, if it exists,

would recognise the impact and significance of the discourses and practices
associated with colonialism, nationalism and war. It would also recognise a
shared sense of interconnection, interdependence and bodily loss resulting
from the 1982 South Atlantic conflict. Generating a new sense of place and
belonging remains a tentative project even if it recognises that a
commitment to place and tradition does not have to lead to a retrogressive
and defensive politics. As with other insular communities, free-flowing
transformations and new economic opportunities in fishing, commerce and
tourism have raised concerns over the future profile of the population.
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Communities can negotiate these cross-boundary flows and then articulate

a more relational view of place and location. However, a strong attachment
to place does not have to be conceptualised as a problem. In the aftermath
of a war, it would be very surprising if local populations such as the
Falklands community were not wedded to particular place-based identities.
The widespread appeal to a collective British identity and a continual
history of settlement is a direct response to the uncertainties of their political
future. Rather than condemn this response as reactionary and place-bound,
political geographers should explore how it might be possible to promote a
view of place and identity which acknowledges these points but also points
to how settlement history, cultural ties and political relations are shaped by
complex interdependence. The first decade of the new century holds out the
promise of greatly improved geographical and political relations between
Britain, Argentina and the Falklands even if the territorial dispute, for the
time being, remains unresolved.74

NOTES

1. This research has been supported by a generous grant from the Leverhulme Trust
(1999-2001). Klaus Dodds presented a version of this paper at the Boundary Regions in
Transition V Conference at the University of Tartu in June 2001 and thanks Eiki Berg and
the other participants for their comments. Klaus Dodds also acknowledges the support of the
British Academy in funding his attendance at the aforementioned conference. Thanks also
to James Dunkeley for his advice and support.
2. This is an unofficial translation of 'The Malvinas March'.
3. A point made by P. Calvert, 'The Malvinas as a Factor in Argentine Politics', in A. Danchev
(ed.), International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict (New York: St Martins Press
1992) pp.47-64.
4. Lara Manóvil who recorded the speech by the Head of the Malvinas War Veterans also
attended the 2 April 2000 ceremony.
5. Under Law Number 25.370 which was implemented on 15 December 2000. In Spanish the
national holiday is called 'Día del Veterano de Guerra y de los Caídos en la Guerra de las
Malvinas'.
6. The vast majority of Falkland Islanders continue to hold Lady Thatcher in very high regard,
 122 GEOPOLITICS
as the British prime minister responsible for the despatch of the British task force in April
1982. See M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins 1993) for her
reflections on the period.
7. G. Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions (London: Routledge 1996).
8. G. 6 Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1996); G. 6 Tuathail and S. Dalby
(eds.), Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998); and the recent review by K.
Dodds, 'Political Geography III: Critical Geopolitics after Ten Years', Progress in Human
Geography 25 (2001) pp.469-84. On popular geopolitics see J. Sharp, Condensing the Cold
War: The Reader's Digest and the Cold War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
2001) and with specific reference to the importance of monuments see A. Crampton, 'The
Voortrekker Monument, the Birth of Apartheid and Beyond', Political Geography 20 (2001)
pp.221-46. On monuments and their cultural geographical importance see N. Johnson,
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'Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography and Nationalism', Society and Space 13 (1995)
pp.51-65.
9. D. Smith, Moral Geographies: Ethics in a World of Difference (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press 2000) pp.45-7.
10. On border performances and associated identities, see D. Newman and A. Paasi, 'Fences
and Neighbours in a Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography',
Progress in Human Geography 22 (1998) pp.186-207. The essays in H. Donnan and T.
Wilson (eds.), Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and the State (Oxford: Berg 1999) are
also invaluable here.
11. Therefore it would act as a painful and semi-permanent reminder in their passports of de
facto British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.
12. White Paper on Partnership for Progress and Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas
Territories (London: HMSO 1999).
13. However, it is important to note that this commitment to uphold the right of self-
determination for the Falkland Islanders reversed Labour Party policy in the 1980s. In 1985,
the then Labour party leader Neil Kinnock travelled to Buenos Aires and committed his
party to negotiating on the sovereignty of the Islands with Argentina. Unsurprisingly, many
Falkland Islanders remain suspicious of the present Labour government under Prime
Minister Blair despite public assurances. See G. Drower, Britain's Dependent Territories: A
Fistful of Islands (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1992) for a review.
14. United Nations Resolution 2065 (XX) calls on the UK and Argentina to address the dispute
and to seek an agreement in 'the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands
(Malvinas)'. One major area of dispute has been over the word 'interests' as British
governments have argued that the 'interests' of the Falkland Islands can only be judged
through the 'wishes' of Islanders. Argentine governments, however, have argued that the
'wishes' of the Islanders are not relevant as it is a bilateral dispute between Britain and
Argentina.
15. H.E. Ambassador Mario Cámpora, 'A Stable Relationship and the Challenge of the South
Atlantic question', opening address presented to the Club Argentine London on 15 June
1993.
16. Given the outstanding legal dispute this is perhaps not surprising see, for example, D.
Gibran, The Falklands War: The Past in the South Atlantic (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and
Company 1998). Older studies include J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1982, original in 1927) and L. Gustafson, The
Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1988).
17. For a more detailed analysis of the 14 July 1999 Joint Statement, see K. Dodds and L.
Manóvil, 'Back to the Future? Implementing the Anglo-Argentine 14 July 1999 Joint
Statement', Journal of Latin American Studies 33/4 (2001) pp.777-806.
18. For a more wide-ranging discussion of a 'progressive sense of place', see D. Massey,
'Spaces of Politics', in D. Massey, J. Allen and P. Sarre (eds.), Human Geography Today
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 123

(Cambridge: Polity Press 1999) pp.279-91.

19. See, for example, K. Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World (Harlow: Longman 2000) and
Sharp (note 8).
20. K. Dodds, 'Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination of Argentina', in K. Dodds and
D. Atkinson (eds.), Geopolitical Traditions (London: Routledge 2000) pp. 150-84.
21. J. Tulchin, 'Continuity and Change in Argentine Foreign Policy', in J. Tulchin and A.
Garland (eds.), Argentina: The Challenges of Modernisation (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998)
pp. 163-200. The classic study of Argentine foreign policy remains E. Milensky, Argentina's
Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview 1978).
22. There is a large literature on the question of whether Argentina was part of Britain's so-
called informal empire. For an overview of this issue, see the essays in A. Hennessy and J.
King (eds.), The Land that England Lost: Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship
(London: British Academic Press 1992).
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23. Roberto Guyer quoted in M. Charlton, The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands
Dispute (Oxford: Blackwell 1989) p.103.
24. P. Beck, 'The Policy Relevance of the Falklands/Malvinas Past', in Danchev (note 3)
pp. 10-45.
25. C. Escude, Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina (Gainsville: University of Florida
Press 1997) p.45.
26. On banal nationalism, see M. Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage 1995).
27. Argentina is not unique in this elite and popular concern for the geographical boundaries of
the nation state, and other disputed areas included the Andes and the Beagle Channel
involving Chile. See D. Campbell, Writing Security (Manchester: Manchester University
Press 1992) and S. Krishna, 'Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politics in India', in
M. Shapiro and H. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries, Global Flows (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press 1996) pp.193-214.
28. M. Escolar, S. Quintero and C. Reboratti, 'Geographical Identity and Patriotic
Representation in Argentina', in D. Hooson (ed.), Geography and National Identity
(Oxford: Blackwell 1994) pp.346-66. For an earlier study of Argentine education, see H.
Vogel, 'New Citizens for a New Nation: Naturalisation in Early Independence Argentina',
Hispanic American Research Review 71 (1991) pp.107-31.
29. See, for example, C. Escudé, Argentina: Paria Internacional? (Buenos Aires: Editorial del
Belgrano 1984) and his 'Education, Public Culture and Foreign Policy: The Case of
Argentina', Working Paper series of Duke-UNC Program of Latin American Studies (1992).
There are parallels with other post-colonial states such as Finland- see A. Paasi, Territories,
Boundaries and Consciousness (Chichester: John Wiley 1996), and Thailand - see W.
Thongchai, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press 1994).
30. On the act of transgression see T. Cresswell, In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology
and Transgression (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996). On the geopolitics
of exclusion, see D. Sibley, Geographies of Exclusion (London: Routledge 1995).
31. See J. Child, Quarrels Among Neighbours: Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New
York: Praeger 1985) and P. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South
America (Austin: University of Texas 1997).
32. On the role of naturalised geopolitical reasoning and the organic metaphor of the state, see
L. Hepple, 'Metaphor, Discourse and the Military in South America', in T. Barnes and J.
Duncan (eds.), Writing Worlds (London: Routledge 1992) pp.136-54.
33. On the discursive importance of geographical proximity see K. Dodds, Geopolitics in
Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim (London: John Wiley 1997).
34. Quoted in D. Kon, Los Chicos de la Guerra (London: NEL 1983) pp.46-7.
35. See more generally Billig (note 26).
36. United Nations Resolution 2065 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1965.
 124 GEOPOLITICS
37. See P. Beck, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (London: Routledge 1988).
38. See C. Ellerby, 'The Role of the Falklands Lobby, 1968-1990', in A. Danchev (ed.),
International Perspectives on the Falklands Crisis (London: Macmillan 1992) pp.85-108
and G. Drower, Britain's Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands (Aldershot: Dartmouth
1992).
39. One example was the so-called Condor incident in 1966 involving a group who hijacked an
Argentine aircraft bound for the south of the Republic when it was diverted and forced to
land at Stanley racecourse. After a tense stand-off, the hijackers and passengers were
eventually transferred back to Argentina. In the same year, the Argentine newspaper
Crdnica sponsored another Argentine incursion in response to Argentine unhappiness that
the 1966 World Cup game between Britain and Argentina had resulted in the latter being
'robbed' of their chance to win the trophy. Their famous headline ran 'First they [i.e. the
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English] stole the Malvinas from us, and now the World Cup'. See T. Mason, Passion of the
People? Football in South America (London: Verso 1995) p.70.
40. See Dodds and Manóvil (note 17).
41. Ellerby (note 38).
42. Cited in Ellerby (note 38) p.100.
43. Interviews carried out by Klaus Dodds with Falkland Islanders in Stanley during April 2000
and July 2000.
44. L. Hepple 'The Geopolitics of the Falklands/Malvinas and the South Atlantic: British and
Argentine Perceptions, Misperceptions and Rivalries', in P. Kelly and J. Child (eds.),
Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1988) p.228.
45. Argentine geopolitical writers were particularly concerned that Argentina should ensure that
these resources in the Falklands and Antarctica were not claimed and exploited by the UK.
They also argued that it was the promises of resources that ultimately motivated the British
to reclaim the Falklands. However, with the commercial exploitation of North Sea oil,
official British interest was slight and it has now been accepted that the US Geological
Survey report was highly speculative. Recently released files from the Public Records
Office relating to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office seem to confirm that there was
little interest in the oil resources of the region. Hydrocarbon exploration around the Falkland
Islands did not begin until the mid-1990s and was only possible because of an Anglo-
Argentine rapprochement. For an example of Argentine geopolitical thinking vis-à-vis oil
resources see A. Casellas, El Territorio Olvidado (Buenos Aires: Centrol Naval,Institutode
Publicaciones Navales 1974).
46. A point later acknowledged by various British political figures such as D. Owen, Time to
Declare (London: Michael Joseph 1991) and M. Thatcher (note 6).
47. Interview with Lord Owen by Klaus Dodds on 15 May 2001.
48. Interview with a retired Foreign and Commonwealth Office official with Klaus Dodds on
15 February 2001. Despite the best efforts of the Swiss Foreign Ministry, the two parties
were under very strict instructions from the highest level not to deviate from their pre-stated
political positions.
49. M. Bartolome, 'Conflictos en el Atlantico Sur en la década del 90', Geopolitica 53 (1991)
pp.56-7. The Argentine government in close co-operation with Brazil declared with United
Nations approval the South Atlantic to be a zone of peace and co-operation in October 1986.
See F. Albuquerque, 'Zona de paz y cooperacion en el Atlantico Sur', Geopolitica 38 (1989)
pp. 16-23.
50. See 'Argentine Visit for Falklands', Guardian, 7 January 1993.
51. C. Escudé' and A. Cisneros, Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo Latinamericano Part III Tomo XII 1999) p. 139. The extract
has been translated by the authors.
52. See 'Argentine Bereaved Lay their Grief to Rest Nine Years On', Guardian, 19 March 1991.
53. Unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Falkland Islands is not an independent state
recognised by the United Nations and thus this parallel is problematic to put it mildly.
 A COMMON SPACE: THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 125

54. He was later released from British custody on humanitarian grounds and returned to
Santiago de Chile. On his return, domestic proceedings were taken against him but after
months of legal debate the Chilean Supreme Court in July 2001 decided that the former
General will not stand trial because of poor physical and mental health.
55. This might have suited the British government because the ban on Argentine passport
holders entering the Falkland Islands was seen as an obstacle to better relations with
Argentina. In other words, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were in a position to put
pressure on the Falkland Islanders to compromise rather than respond to their repeated
reservations concerning the lifting of the ban on movement.
56. See K. Dodds, 'Geopolitics, Patagonian Toothfish and Living Resource Regulation in the
Southern Ocean', Third World Quarterly 21 (2000) pp.229-46.
57. Research carried out by Klaus Dodds during December 1999. The Shackleton Trust Fund
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generously funded this period of research. Detailed analysis of the interview material is
being undertaken at present by the authors.
58. For many Argentine nationalists, the Falkland Islands Government is a contradiction in
terms because the dispute over the Malvinas is considered to be a bilateral dispute.
Therefore, any formal or even informal recognition of the FIG is to be strongly resisted.
59. Four business people in the Falkland Islands carried out the survey during July 1999 largely
following concerns that the ending of the air link with Chile would have a severe effect on
local businesses. Our thanks to Mike Rendall of the Malvina House Hotel for allowing us
access to the results of the survey.
60. There remains some confusion over the exact status of the memorial design as some Argentine
commentators claim that the final plans have been approved while the Falkland Islands
Government claim that they have no received no such proposal. In June 2001, final plans were
received and they are currently on display in the Falkland Islands while the Building and
Planning Committee seek local opinion on the design plans. According to news reports,
however, the plans for the memorial were rejected in July 2001 on the grounds that the
proposed wall surrounding the memorial was too high. The Argentine architects have been
asked to resubmit a new smaller proposal and to ensure that it is presented in English rather
than Spanish. See 'Plans for Argentine Memorial Deferred', Mercosur News, 19 July 2001.
61. K. Dodds, 'Geography, Identity and the Creation of the Argentine State', Bulletin of Latin
American Research 12 (1993) pp.361-81.
62. On this well-established Argentine culture of territorial loss and empty spaces, see C.
Reboratti, Nueva Capital, Viejos Mitos (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana Planeta 1986).
63. Other Argentine authors apart from Carlos Escudé, Carlos Reboratti and Marcelo Escolar
often neglect the role of geographical education in informing Argentine attitudes towards
the disputed South Atlantic islands in order to concentrate on exposing perfidious British
imperialism. While this maybe understandable, it does not help address the enduring culture
of territorial obsession within Argentina. See, for example, C. Bullrich, Falklands or
Malvinas? (Buenos Aires: Nuevohacer Grupo Editor Latinamerciano 2000).
64. R. Munro, Place Names of the Falkland Islands (London: Shackleton Scholarship Fund
1998) p.3. For a more theoretical approach to this subject, see C. Nash, 'Irish Place Names:
Postcolonial Locations?', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24 (1999)
pp.457-80.
65. R. Munro (note 64) p. 16.
66. Telephone interview with Denzil Connick of SAMA 82 on 1 Feb. 2000.
67. See, for example, P. Gilroy, There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack (London: Allen and
Unwin 1978).
68. This intellectual process should not be seen as a task for British and Falkland Island
commentators alone. It is striking that few Argentine scholars have actively sought to
explore the cultural and ideological significance of islands not only within the British
cultural imagination but also to think about how it relates to Argentina's continental
development.
 126 GEOPOLITICS

69. G. Beer, 'The Island and the Aeroplane: The Case of Virginia Woolf, in H. Bhabha (ed.),
Nation and Narration (London: Routledge 1991) p.269.
70. There is also some evidence for a distinctive Falkland Islands English which includes some
unique words such as 'smoko' to describe a tea and smoking break.
71. Bullrich (note 63).
72. One example was the celebration of '1992' as a major year of 'Falkland Islands heritage'
because it coincided among other things with the 100th anniversary of the creation of
Stanley Cathedral and the 10th anniversary of the Falklands campaign. The purpose of the
celebration was to bolster the British identity of the Falklands but little reflection was
apparent as to how this process was contributing to the 'invention of tradition'. See E.
Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1983).
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73. Massey (note 18) p.279.

74. The authors would like to thank David Newman and the referees for Geopolitics for their
helpful comments. We also thank Peter Beck and James Dunkerley for their support for this
project. Klaus Dodds also acknowledges the support of sections of the Falkland Islands
community in agreeing to participate in interview research. None of the aforementioned
bears any responsibility for the above analysis.