Political Studies (1984), XXXII, 296-310

The Falklands Affair: A Review of the

Literature
WALTER LITTLE
University of Liverpool

The war with Argentina over the Falklands has generated a large literature.
This falls into four general categories: autobiographical accounts (Mendez);I
overviews of the background to and course of the conflict (Hastings and
Jenkins,2 C a l ~ e r t ,Cardoso
~ ef the Insight Team5 and Latin American
Bureau);6 ‘technical’ appraisals of various aspects of the problem (Shackle-
ton,’ Goebe1,g Defence Committeeg); and official enquiries into the conduct of
British policy (Franks10 and Foreign Affairs Committee1I ) . The main themes
which emerge from this literature are the parts played by the British, American
and Argentine governments, the dispute over sovereignty, the nature of the
islands and their inhabitants, and the failure of peacemaking.

British Policy Making

The best single source for understanding the extent to which the British
contributed t o the Falklands debacle is the Franks Report. Though it was
widely dismissed as a whitewash job when it appeared this is unfair. It is true
that it was published only hours before it was due to be debated and its final
paragraph, ‘we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any
criticism or blame to the present government’, is absurd. But one is entitled to
wonder whether Lord Franks did not have his tongue firmly in his cheek when
the draft was agreed. For the main body of the report is a devastatingly
I C. M. Turolo (ed.), Malvinas. Testimonro de su Gobernador (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana,
1983) (Memoirs of Costa Mendez, in the form of interviews by a journalist).
2 M. Hastings and S. Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London, Michael Joseph, 1983).
3 P . Calvert, The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and Wrongs (London, Frances Pinter, 1982).
4 0. Cardoso, R. Kirschbaum and E. Van der Koov, Malvinas: La Trama Secreta (Buenos
Aires, Sudamericana, 1983).
5 The Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: the Full Story (London, Sphere, 1982).
6 Latin American Bureau (LAB), Falklands, Malvinas: Whose Crisis? (London, LAB, 1982).
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (Shackleton), Falklands Islands: Economic Study 1982
(London, HMSO, 1982).
* J. Goebel, The Struggle f o r the Falklands Islands (re-issue) (New Haven, Conn., Yale
University Press, 1982).
9 Third Report from the Defence Committee, The Future Defence of the Fdklands Islands
(London, HMSO, 1983).
l o Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors (Lord Franks Committee), Falkland Islands
Review (London, HMSO, 1983).
1 1 Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Proceedings (London, HMSO, 1983).

0032-3217/84/02/0296-15/%03.00 0 1984 Political Studies

 Review Articles 291

detailed critique of the policy errors that had been compounded over the years
by a series of governments.
In one sense these errors stemmed from the contradiction that arose between
the long-term trend of foreign and defence policy on the one hand and the
need on the other to be seen to behave honourably. In an analogous case
(Diego Garcia) the question of honour never arose because the victims of the
process had no voice in British politics. But in the case of the Falklands, they
were well served by a vociferous Parliamentary lobby and by the more
chauvinist Press which repeatedly frustrated the attempts of officials to make
progress in the talks with Argentina. Time and again schemes were put
forward which might have helped resolve the conflict but on each occasion the
political price which ‘the kelpers’ were able to demand of government proved
too high to be worth paying. As one islander crudely explained their special
position, ‘It’s a good job we’re not black’.
The errors also arose from a more practical consideration. Lord Carrington
is supposed t o have remarked to an Argentine representative in New York that
the Falklands ranked number 242 in the Foreign Office list of priorities. No
careers were going to be made by becoming an expert on them and the conduct
of talks could safely be left to junior ministers. Behind this attitude lay the
now disproved assumption that while the Argentines might rant and rave they
were not likely to do anything drastic. The fact that the islands were in the top
two or three of Argentina’s list of priorities was accepted but it seems to have
been pigeonholed as an example of Latin excitability and not something to be
taken too seriously.
The lack of any urgency explains why decisions were either made and then
not implemented or were ducked altogether. For example, the decolonization
of local government, the implementation of Lord Shackleton’s 1975 proposals
for economic development, reform of the landholding and marketing
structures of the islands, and the ‘hearts and minds’ programme were all
implicit in the general approach. Had more been done Britain’s bargaining
position, both bilateral and in the UN, would have benefited accordingly. But
little was done. It may also explain why so few new ideas and approaches (UN
trusteeship, third party guarantees, compensation, associated statehood,
mediation, etc.) were explored at a time when they might have been useful. By
the time they were brought up it was all too late.
Though the dispute had rumbled on intermittently since 1833, it was only in
the mid 1960s that it began to take its present form. In the days of coal-fired
fleets, the islands had had some value but the re-orientation of the post-war
years of defence policy towards Europe and the North Atlantic meant that
their usefulness had dwindled. Indeed, by the time the Argentines raised the
matter formally in the UN in 1964, their continued possession had become
something of an embarrassment. Though Britain initially disputed Argentine
claims to sovereignty, by 1967 it had already conceded the principle of
transfer, always providing that the islanders gave their assent. It was precisely
this concession which mobilized the islanders and their friends into organizing
the lobby which they subsequently used time and again to veto initiatives from
the Foreign Office. And the more they did so the more they began to see the
Foreign Office as their enemies. As a recent parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Committee put it, ‘the United Kingdom government, although ostensibly an
298 Review Arricles

independent party in the negotiations, was increasingly forced to play the role
of honest broker between Argentina and the Falkland (islanders). On almost
all matters it proved unable to deliver anything of substance to either side.’
Franks goes into considerable detail in its account of the ups and downs of
negotiations over the years and for those who are interested in why leaseback
rather than a freeze, condominium or some other approach came to be
preferred, it is essential reading. But in some respects it is more interesting in
its account of how the foreign policy apparatus worked. Its descriptions of the
interactions of departments, of officials and ministers, and of government and
parliament make for quite compelling reading. The points that emerge are not
new but the clarity with which they are revealed is exceptional.
The first is the extent t o which departmentalism can vitiate policy-making.
No doubt on major matters co-ordination is organized by the Cabinet Office
or directly by the Ministers concerned, but in lesser affairs (such as this was)
the mechanisms for policy integration seem to be inadequate. This is well
illustrated by the case of HMS Endurance, Britain’s naval presence in the
South Atlantic. As a result of the 1981 Defence Review, the decision was taken
to withdraw this ageing ship from service. Rightly fearful that this would be
misread in Buenos Aires as a signal of British reluctance to stand by the
Falklands, Lord Carrington protested to John Nott on three occasions in the
months that followed and his arguments were endorsed by the Islands Council
and in both Houses. But the protest was to no avail. As Mrs Thatcher made
clear, the decision was Nott’s to make and he made it on cost grounds with
little or no thought for its foreign policy implications.
The second concerns the hoary old question of the relationship between
ministers and officials. Whatever may be the case elsewhere in Whitehall, in
the field of foreign policy, ministers seem to be firmly in command. The
intelligibility of the broad arguments, the fact that the Foreign Office has no
significant domestic constituency, and the constraints upon leaking by
dissatisfied officials combine, if Franks is a true guide, to ensure textbook
political control.’*
It is not surprising then that the decisions made should be highly political
and that the principles of ‘least fuss’ and ‘only when necessary’ should apply.
This was clearly the case with the ‘hearts and minds’ programme. It had long
been appreciated by officials that sovereignty could not be transferred unless
the islanders (or at least their representatives) and their allies in Britain had a
change of attitude and it was evident that this would not come about of its own
accord. it had been hoped that the 1971 Communications Agreement with
Argentina would lead to a softening of opinions but this had not happened.
Accordingly, in September of 1981 they urged Lord Carrington to address this
problem at a political level. He, no doubt mindful of the roasting that
Nicholas Ridley had received when he brought up leaseback to an unprepared
House, replied that it would cause ‘difficulties’ and that in any case there did
not seem to be any great need for haste. The contrast with Rhodesia, where the

12 It is interesting that the Foreign Ministries in Argentina, Britain, and the United States had a
similar experience with the hardliners. The junta described their officials on one occasion as
‘queers’ (rnaricones) while their counterparts were ‘wets’ and ‘wimps’. Perhaps this language tells
us something about the similarity in style of the three regimes.
 Review Articles 299
problem was unavoidable and so invoked all of the political authority of
government is instructive.
Franks is implicitly highly critical of the part played by Parliament in the
repeated frustrating of negotiations. The part which it played between 2 April
and 15 June is well summarized in The Falklands Campaign.13 The principle of
debate may be worth something but the debates themselves, beyond their
political utility for the government, make for depressing reading. Some
Members (notably Healey and Owen) were creative and responsible, but far
too many proved to be jingoistic, ill-informed, and uncritical of the executive.
Though this is a bad example, the idea of a readily accessible digest of debates
is a good one which, if it is followed up in other areas of policy, could be of
great value, particularly to the non-specialist.
Lastly, there is the question of intelligence failure. It is clear that while the
language of reporting could have been a lot blunter, there was no failure as
such. If Argentine sources are to be believed, the decision to recover the
islands in the near future was taken in early December and while the South
Georgia incident was not entirely coincidental the final ‘go’ decision was not
taken until late in the day. Given the high secrecy with which it was done, the
failure to get hard intelligence is understandable. But even from public and
semi-public sources, the Embassy in Buenos Aires was able to send a series of
extremely percipient reports. The fact that London was not able to react
adequately, for fear of provoking the very invasion they wished to avoid, was
a reflection of 17 years of sterile policy, or rather, intelligence in the everyday
sense of the word.
I t is difficult not to have some sympathy for the frustration felt by the
Argentine negotiators. Two decades of talking had got them nowhere at all,
and for this, successive British governments must take their share of the
blame.

The United States and the Falklands

Officials in Washington and London now say that the issue of American
neutrality was never in doubt. The only question, it is claimed, was not
whether the United States would side with Britain, but when it would be most
convenient for it to do so. The argument here is that the balance of Britain’s
contribution to American security in the North Atlantic and Europe and the
historic link between the two countries respectively, far outweighed anything
Argentina could offer in the policing of Central America and the rhetoric of
inter-American solidarity. Structurally, this is convincing but it ignores the
fact that American diplomatic efforts in the first few weeks amounted to a
frantic effort to avoid having to make this kind of choice. It also ignores the
fact that equal efforts were made by Britain and Argentina to restrict
American freedom of action. That Britain was finally favoured had less to do
with American desires than with the mutual intransigence of Thatcher and
Galtieri, which rendered diplomacy useless. For it was only when the issue
became one of comparative threats to national security that the policy of

13 K . S . Morgan (ed.), The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of

Commons 2 April to 15 June 1982 (London, HMSO, 1982).
300 Review Articles
evenhandedness was abandoned.
This point was grasped more readily in some parts of Washington than
others. Though there was never any question of the direct involvement of
American personnel, the provision of logistics and weapons support to Britain
was immediate and unstinting. So far as the equally important field of
intelligence was concerned, the picture is less clear. British sources deny that
much useful information was received whilst Argentina argues that it was a
major element in Britain’s battlefield superiority. But neither offers any
evidence and it is unlikely that they will ever do so. This ready co-operation in
the military sphere is in sharp contrast to the diplomatic strategy of the United
States (it seems to have been the result of the personal initiative of Weinberger
and the Defence Department) and it underlines the public divisions which
existed within the Washington foreign policy apparatus. Jenkins and Hastings,
the Insight Team, and Cardoso el al., make much of these. Being good
journalists they focus on the personal hostility that developed between Haig at
the State Department and Kirkpatrick at the UN. Neither of these was a
professional diplomat, both had healthy egos, and their abrasive styles were
given free reign by an apparently lax President and lacklustre National
Security Adviser. At times this led to outright insults, with Kirkpatrick calling
the State Department ‘Brits in American Clothes’ and Haig responding that
Kirkpatrick’s ‘emotionalism’ prevented her from thinking coherently about
the national interest. On other occasions it led to parallel diplomacy which
only further confused Argentine understanding of American intentions. And
on the famous occasion when Kirkpatrick announced that the United States
had voted incorrectly in the Security Council it reached opera buffa propor-
tions. But too much has probably been made of all this ‘peacelordism’ in
Washington. After all, Haig’s policy of evenhandedness, with the single
option of support for Britain in the event of its failure, was not only
inescapable, given the limited logic of the crisis, but it was also pursued with a
fair degree of coherence throughout.
Haig’s opponents claim that his marathon peacemaking efforts had more to
d o with personal vanity than any sensible calculation of the difficulties he
would be likely to encounter. Indeed the Insight Team go so far as to suggest
that his rivals may have encouraged him in these ambitions in the hope (since
realized) that failure might lead to his ousting. True or not, Haig comes across
as a surprisingly sympathetic character-tireless, well-meaning, and a faithful
interlocutor. His various schemes (mutual withdrawal, interim neutralized
administration, subsequent negotiation) might not have been very original, but
no one could think of anything better. Even the famous Peruvian plan that
was torpedoed afong with the Belgrano was, as Cardoso et a/. put it, nothing
more than ‘Haig with a poncho’. They failed for the straightforward reason
that strategic constraints meant that disengagement could not be implemented
on equal terms and that for either government to accept iess than equal terms
would have led to its fall.
Of the part played by Reagan we know very little, though the fact that he
went on vacation in the Caribbean during the shuttle diplomacy phase says
much for his powers of delegation. However, he did talk on two occasions to
Galtieri: on 2 April (when Argentine forces were within an hour of landing on
the islands) and on 15 April. Cardoso et al. have succeeded in getting detailed
 Review Articles 301
versions of the Argentine transcripts of these conversations. In the first
Reagan hinted strongly that a war could seriously damage the friendly
relations enjoyed by their two countries and stated clearly that Mrs Thatcher
(‘my friend’) would not flinch from meeting force with force. Galtieri did not
respond to the threat and the warning had come too late. Reagan accepted this
rather lamely concluding, ‘I can only say that I am sorry that I have not been
able to get my concern across to you’. In the second talk, presumably in an
attempt to buttress Haig’s efforts, he did not even go this far, contenting
himself with reiterating American desires for peace and its commitment to an
evenhanded and neutral position. Assuming that Cardoso et al. have not
succumbed to a piece of black propaganda, it is hard to avoid concluding that
Reagan’s intervention was first unhelpful and later, misleading.
Having failed to win the peace, the United States has since been charged by
Argentine politicians of every shade with having helped start the war in the
first place. Their argument runs thus. Under Carter, when the issue of human
rights loomed large, relations between the United States and the recently-
installed regime in Buenos Aires became openly hostile. As a result and
notwithstanding their authoritarian, free-market beliefs, the junta turned
politically towards the non-aligned camp and economically towards the Soviet
bloc. Alarmed by these developments, and even more so by the apparent
Soviet advance in Central America, the Reagan hardliners (was it not
Kirkpatrick who became famous for making the distinction between ‘friendly
authoritarianism’ and ‘unfriendly totalitarianism’ intelligible to Reagan?)
proposed a deal. Argentina was to help lead the struggle in Central America
and tone down its relations with the eastern bloc. In return its human rights
record would be forgotten, certification as a suitable recipient for American
arms granted, and its claims to regional power status in some way recognized.
This new rapprochement, the critics claim, led the junta to believe that the
United States could not risk siding with Britain in the event of a dispute over
the Falklands.
This is a crude piece of history but it is probably not too far wide of the
mark. Galtieri visited the United States twice in late 1981 where he was roundly
fcted (cafe gossip in Buenos Aires at the time said he had gone to get
permission for his December coup against Viola) and was told that Argentine
friendship was of the highest importance to the United States. Kirkpatrick,
General Vernon Walters (ex-CIA, old friend of the Argentine military and
roving emissary of Reagan) and Enders of the State Department, along with a
host of lesser figures, repeated the message in Buenos Aires during the months
that followed. By the time of the Falklands crisis, the link between the junta’s
internal security doctrine and the new Inter-American system proposed by the
United States (was not the fight against communism indivisible?) appeared to
have been forged. In practical terms it meant that Argentina had over 500
‘advisers’ operating in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala and arms
certification was on the way. In short, it was a thoroughly dirty business which
at the time seemed to make very good sense.
Officials in Washington insist that no-one ever suggested to the junta that
they could count on American neutrality in the event of war with Britain. This
is probably true though according to Cardoso et ai., Vernon Walters was fond
of speculating about the issue in his trips to Buenos Aires. Be that as it may, as
302 Review Articles
far as the junta was concerned, it was not necessary for the message to be
spelled out in any detail. The United States had never made any secret of the
fact that they regarded the Falklands as an irritant in inter-American affairs.
Surely they would not risk jeopardizing their new-found and apparently vital
friendship with Argentina over so trivial an issue? It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that had Mrs Thatcher not been the woman that she is, then the
junta’s calculation would have been proved correct.
The effect of American policy on its allies was predictable. In the even-
handed stage it was welcomed in Buenos Aires but in Britain it raised dark
suspicions (principally from the normally pro-American right) of another
Suez. Indeed the murmurings were sufficiently loud for Mrs Thatcher to
condemn them publicly as well as privately. Once America came off the fence
on 30 April, criticism in Britain subsided but the junta, stunned at first, were
quick to denounce it as a piece of treachery.
The damage done to American-Argentine relations has been significant.
Historically, these have never been especially amicable, as Argentine aspira-
tions for a regional role have clashed with American desires for continental
hegemony. The fact that in recent decades the United States has sought to use
Argentina’s rival Brazil as a surrogate power has not helped. Yet relations are
now at an all-time low. The United States not only lost a friend in the junta,
but helped bring to power civilian forces which are deeply and publicly anti-
American. The rhetoric will be a lot harsher than the deeds but even so, the
civilians are bound to take a much harder line on the foreign debt (of which
almost a quarter is owed to the United States), work more closely with the
Non-Aligned Movement, and do all they can to frustrate American policy in
Central America and the Caribbean.
In an attempt to forestall this chill, the United States, currently trying to
mend fences, has encouraged the IMF to treat Argentina kindly, has supported
Argentina in the UN, and has declared its willingness to grant arms certifica-
tion to the new government. This in turn is ruffling feathers in London.
Argentina’s war losses in terms of ships and aircraft have either been made
good or are about to be made good but she is also in the market for new
systems. The fear that these may include reconnaissance and air-refuelling
capability is a real point of friction in the otherwise close Anglo-American
defence relationship. In this sense, the contradictions of the pre-war era are
again very much in evidence.
Though it is doubtless being written, the full American story of the
Falklands has yet to appear. In its absence any one of the general accounts will
serve to illustrate the acute dilemma in which the Americans found themselves.
Sympathy for their plight should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it was
of their own making.

Argentina
Why Argentina should want the Falklands at all is a bit of a mystery to some
British observers. After all, Argentina has more land than it knows what to do
with and the Falklands, by common consent, are hardly an attractive piece of
real estate. Only two of these books (those by LAB and Calvert) make any
efforts to explain this, though it is significant that neither Cardoso ef al., nor
 Review Articles 303
Mendez, on the assumption that everyone knows, even bothers to address the
question.
Calvert’s explanation (which takes up a quarter of the book) is that since
nationalism looms large in Argentine politics and since the junta at the time
were in deep trouble at home then repossession of the islands could be
expected to give them the breathing space they needed. Though not the whole
of the matter, these are fair points. Unfortunately, they get lost in what turns
out to be a summary history of modern Argentina. The LAB team make the
same points but do so with more relevant detail and immediacy. Their account
is valuable in that it stresses two particular dimensions: the anti-English
component of Argentine nationalism and the fact that the junta were not
simply trying to buy time but were also hoping to restructure Argentine politics
so as to give themselves a permanent yet legitimate power of veto.
Argentine nationalism is not hard to understand. Until 1930, Argentina’s
rate of growth had been spectacular. With the collapse of the international
trading system it was forced to rethink its development strategy. In the short-
term, necessity forced it to accept humiliating trade terms from the British, but
increasingly the economy moved away from a stress upon the export of
primary goods towards industrial growth on the basis of important substitu-
tion and the fiscal promotion of local demand. This policy not only generated
an incipient national bourgeoisie but also an industrial proletariat, neither of
which could be catered for by the classic formations of anarcho-syndicalism,
socialism and liberalism which had, up to that point, dominated Argentine
politics. Peron’s great achievement was to give expression to these new social
forces and it is not coincidental that serious Argentine pressure on the islands
should have begun with his government. By the time of his fall in 1955,
economic and political nationalism were close to becoming one and, aided by a
mass propaganda campaign, the Falklands had become a major reference
point for it.
As the LAB team note there was also a specifically anti-English dimension
to all this. Though xenophobia today is mainly directed at the United States,
memories of the once-close British connection die hard. Not only had Britain
twice invaded Buenos Aires (being roundly beaten on both occasions) in part
to open up the markets of Spanish America, but Argentina’s subsequent entry
into the international economy was largely the work of British capital. When
the bottom fell out of exports (of British-bred cattle, via British railways,
packing plants, and ships to British markets) Argentines felt understandably
aggrieved. To the increasingly influential nationalist groups of left as well as
right, the subsequent failure of the protectionist model of development could
be attributed directly to the distorted economy that the British had left behind.
Much of their reasoning is spurious and self-serving but the belief goes very
deep.
But there were other factors involved: notably, the stress which some groups
in Argentina put on the strategic importance of the Falklands, the misreading
of British intentions, and the specific political circumstances of the day.
Foreign policy making in Argentina is heavily conditioned by geopolitical
considerations and these are not a preserve merely of the military. To
nationalists across the political spectrum who attribute economic and political
decline to the workings of imperialism, access to strategic resources is central
304 Review Articles
to independent development. These include not only hydro-electric develop-
ments on the border with Paraguay and an ambitious national energy
(including nuclear energy) programme but also offshore oil, gas and marine
resources. The Falklands and their Dependencies are not only important in
themselves, but are seen as critical t o Southern Ocean and Antarctic claims
and the suspicion remains widespread in Buenos Aires that the real reason
Britain would not negotiate sovereignty had to do with oil rather than self-
determination.
It also seems that by 1982 Argentina had come to believe that Britain would
not respond militarily t o an invasion. Having spent some time in Oxford, the
Anglophile yet nationalistic Costa Mendez ought to have known better (St.
Antony’s Latin Americanists please note) but he chose to put the most
optimistic possible of glosses on what were, in reality, a series of only loosely
connected events. The uncontested Argentine occupation of Southern Thule in
1976, the announced cuts in the surface fleet, the planned withdrawal of HMS
Endurance, a nationality bill which deprived many kelpers of full British
citizenship, and the new friendship with the United States were taken as clear
evidence that, though Britain would protest diplomatically, it would accept a
fair accompli. The fact that this was inconsistent with their view that Britain
had a geopolitical interest in the islands did not worry them.
Finally, as both Calvert and the LAB team point out, the decision to invade
was the result of circumstantial developments within the Armed Forces and in
their relations with civil society. The idea of invasion had, according to
Cardoso et al. been seriously mooted in 1977 but had not been taken up. In
1982 things were different, not least because Galtieri had only been able to
seize power from the more moderate Viola with Navy support, the price of
which was a reoccupation of the islands in time for the one hundred and
fiftieth anniversary of their loss to Britain. This date was advanced to July and
then after the failure of the New York talks in February to agree sovereignty
transfer, it was advanced further to April. Moreover, in their relations with
civil society it was not simply that they had become unpopular because of free
market policies that had failed to promote growth or conquer inflation. As a
result of their murderous repression after 1976 there was a real risk that an
uncontrolled return to civilian rule might lead to their elimination altogether.
Victory in the Falklands would restore their lost legitimacy and permit them to
organize the inevitable handover t o civilians in such a way as to ensure their
own survival.
So far as public opinion was concerned, the junta’s immediate calculations
seemed to have been proved correct. War with Chile (which had seemed
possible in 1978) is a serious matter for Argentina and finds few advocates but
the Falklands were different. Popular sentiment was overwhelmingly behind
the invasion, which was endorsed, with only one exception, by all of the major
political parties. But while this novel sensation of popularity was exhilarating
for the military, it also meant that their freedom subsequently to negotiate was
tightly constrained. They were uneasily aware that just as the crowds had
cheered on success, so they would turn on failure. Indeed, despite the
government’s attempts to maintain war euphoria through control of the
media, the public mood soon turned glum with the British approach and with
defeat it became openly hostile. Throughout, the Argentine people made it
 Review Articles 305

clear that the islands were one thing, but continued rule by the military was
quite another.

The Sovereignty Dispute

Though the sovereignty issue may not be the whole of the dispute it has
determined its language and form. Argentina maintains that its sovereignty
derives from: discovery, the Treaty of Tordesillas (1497) between Spain and
Portugal; recognition by Britain in the eighteenth century of Spanish title
under the Nootka Sound Convention; inheritance from Spain; effective
occupation between 1820 and 1833; the illegal nature of their expulsion by the
British in 1833; subsequent protest; and the principle of territorial integrity.
Britain argues that its title derives from discovery; settlement between 1766
and 1774; the terra nullius character of the islands between 1811 and 1833;
effective occupation between 1833 and 1982; and the principle of the self-
determination of peoples.
Not all of these claims are taken seriously by the two sides. For example,
each tacitly admits that early voyagers, Papal Bulls, the leaving behind of
plaques and so on are irrelevant though neither is willing formally to discard
even such weak arguments. As things stand, the critical issue is the conflict
between the principles of territorial integrity and the self-determination of
peoples. Under normal circumstances no problem arises as a result of the wish
of the peoples concerned that their territory should be independent. In the case
of the Falklands, however, they have no such wish and the principles become
irreconcilable. Britain argues that the kelpers are a people whose wishes are
paramount and that the principle of territorial integrity cannot be applied
retrospectively to this case. Argentina maintains that they are a temporary
population of illegal origin whose interests alone should not be taken into
account.
For those interested in the historical record, Goebel is essential reading. In
broad terms he is not sympathetic to British claims and since most of the book
is to do with events prior to 1811 this is a fair position to take. Britain may
have a marginal claim to West Falkland as a result of its activities in these
years but it is no more than that. Certainly its claims do not compare to those
of Spain in this period. Unfortunately, from the British perspective, the
historical events which are most relevant today date from after this period to
which Goebel devotes little attention. Hence the tendency in official circles to
dismiss Goebel’s contribution is as understandable as the use made of it by
Argentina. These shortcomings aside, the account does bring out the way in
which the history of the islands has always been determined by conflicts and
ambitions elsewhere in the world, a point that remains valid to this day.
So far as the modern context of the sovereignty dispute is concerned, only
Calvert gives it much attention. He takes the view that sovereignty is a
function of will and capacity and that recent norms concerning self-determina-
tion or territorial integrity, while they may be part of the language of
sovereignty, have little to do with its reality. This is a coherent position to take
-that is, sovereignty would have transferred to Argentina had the Task Force
failed-but it is marred by the use of selective legal arguments and historical
untruths. It is, for example, untrue that Britain did not use force in 1833 or
306 Review Articles
that no treaty was ever signed between Britain and Spain. And the relevance of
protest (British between 1829 and 1833 and Argentine thereafter) and the
doctrine of inter-temporal law (can retrospective judgements concerning
legality apply in the absence of a treaty signalling acquiescence?) are not
discussed at all. Most important, this view of sovereignty tends to foreclose
discussion of the wisdom of exercising it and it also ignores the many cases
elsewhere in the world where sovereignty is also ambiguous and where there is
also a potential for violence.
Yet Calvert is undoubtedly right when he says that international law is
largely irrelevant to this dispute. It cannot easily determine whether the
doctrine of utipossidetis applies, whether or not the islands were terra nullius
in 1811 and 1833, what constitutes effective protest and so on. Above all, in
this case it cannot reconcile self-determination and territorial integrity. The
dispute, in short, is a political one which has been fought firstly in legal and
latterly in military terms.

The Failure of Mediation

Right up to the battles in Port Stanley, some of those involved in attempts to
mediate felt that outright war could be avoided. Though Haig had long since
given up the struggle, others remained optimistic. It is possible that, like Haig
earlier, the idea of being hailed as peacemakers was irresistible to Perez de
Cuellar, Belaunde and the rest. But it also seems to have arisen from their view
that the islands were so utterly inconsequential that no sensible government
would go to war over them. This ignores the fact that after 2 April the issue
was not the islands as such, but which government was going to survive.
Though they may have been wrong, both the junta and the War Cabinet
believed that public opinion would be ruthless if it felt that it had been misled.
In the weeks that followed a whole variety of compromises were advanced
by Peru, the United States and the UN, as well as by many private inter-
mediaries but, significantly, by neither government. The details of these
varies, but all involved three basic elements: the mutual withdrawal of troops,
the establishment of some interim administration on a trilateral or third party
basis, and agreement to negotiate a settlement in the fairly near future. At
different times the mix of lesser elements (the flying of flags, the participation
of islanders, peacekeeping forces, and the question of the Dependencies)
varied, but the substantive package remained much the same throughout.
Why did these attempts fail? There was a degree of compromise in the
discussions about the possible character of an interim administration, but the
other two elements proved intractable. So far as the mutual withdrawal of
forces was concerned this was because it could not be done on equal terms. For
Argentina, withdrawal would be embarrassing at home but could be sold
provided that the principle of conceding sovereignty had been agreed. I f
negotiations then failed, reoccupation would not only be possible, but might
be more acceptable internationally. For Britain the idea that a peaceful
settlement had to include sovereignty and had to be achieved rapidly was, after
the April invasion, unacceptable. Moreover, there was a limit as to how long
the Task Force could be kept doing nothing in the South Atlantic; once
withdrawn, it would have been extremely difficult to repeat the exercise.
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The junta was also far from united. Though there were tensions within the
War Cabinet (particularly between Pym and Thatcher and, within the Task
Force, between Woodward and the military) these were as nothing compared
to the divisions in Argentina. Anaya, whose scheme it had been in the first
place, took a consistently hard line, Lami Dozo of the Air Force argued, it
seems, for the need to think about implementing UN Resolution 502 while
Galtieri, far from being the Patton-like figure beloved of the press, vacillated
but in the end came down consistently on Anaya’s side. This had a serious
effect upon the negotiations, for as Haig and others found out it was extremely
difficult to get a quick and coherent response from the junta and this in turn
affected Costa Mendez’ credibility as a negotiator. It also meant that when
the fighting started, the three services went their own way and showed none of
the co-ordination of the Task Force.
They were also very badly advised by Costa Mendez. Time and again his
predictions of international support for Argentina and isolation for Britain (in
the Security Council, the United States, the EEC, and even the OAS) proved to
be quite wrong. Only in the meeting of the Non-Aligned, the least relevant
forum of all, did he obtain much support and even this was less than whole-
hearted. The contrast in diplomatic professionalism with British efforts in
New York, Washington, and Brussels could hardly have been sharper. It seems
that little prior calculation had been made of the likely effect on world opinion
of the aggression, the unsavoury nature of the junta and the lack of economic
and military leverage. And the need for secrecy seems to have prevented much
being done by way of preparatory work. Indeed, even Argentina’s most
vociferous supporters (Panama and Venezuela in particular) were careful not
to become materially involved.
So far as the fighting is concerned, the sinking of the Belgrano remains the
most sensitive issue, to Mrs Thatcher’s opponents, indeed, a smoking gun.
Argentine views are much like those of Tam Dalyell’4-that the Belgrano was
torpedoed in order to sink the Peruvian peace plan. The argument here is that
the junta were about to accept the plan and the British were going to find it
hard to say no. This may be true but even if it is, the military logic of the
situation was clearly more pressing than any international embarrassment that
rejection of the Peruvian plan might have caused. If one accepts that by the
time the Task Force had reached the islands the time for negotiation was over,
then the sinking makes brutal sense. Certainly, it succeeded in its basic
objectives which was to drive the Argentine surface fleet into port and ensure
that it stayed there.
Costa Mendez has recently argued that Argentina had all along intended
to implement UN Resolution 502 and withdraw unilaterally from the islands
but that the rapid dispatch of the Task Force prevented this. Withdrawal
would have looked like a backdown and would have therefore caused serious
difficulties in the junta’s relations with the officer corps as well as civil society.
It would also weaken Argentina’s claim to sovereignty. Pace Mandy Rice-
Davies, he would say that. In fact the junta had ample opportunity to
implement 502 and some elements within the General Staff were apparently
in favour of doing so. But the hard liners won the day, in part because

14 T. Dalyell, One Man’s Falklands (London, Cecil Woolf, 1982).

308 Review Articles
unaccustomed to the workings of democracy, they could not believe that Mrs
Thatcher had little alternative but to fight if she wished to stay in office. For
this misunderstanding Costa Mendez must bear some of the blame.
Yet the fact that they never expected to have to fight does bear upon
evaluation of the war itself. There seems to be broad agreement in Argentina
as well as Britain that the two air forces fought well, that the British navy,
though deficient in early warning and missile defence systems, outmanoeuvred
its opponent,ls and that the Argentine army-its morale weakened by brutal
and incompetent officership-was no match for the elite British forces. But
while it was clear to the British from the outset that it might come to a fight
this is not true for Argentina. In his Memoirs, Mendez tells how he spent his
time prior to 2 April worrying not about garrison troops or defensive
positions, but about electricity supply, bilingual education and other civil
matters. He was appointed as a military governor not as a field commander.
Once things began to look serious he pressed the junta time and again for
better troops and better logistics but to no avail for by that time the necessary
co-ordination on the mainland had gone. The performance of the Argentine
army has to be seen in this light.

‘The Kelpers’ and Paramountcy

Though Argentines find it hard to believe the views of ‘the kelpers’ matter very
much, the official British line is that while their wishes are not paramount
(only those of parliament are) they must be ‘respected’. How much they must
be respected is not clear but for the moment there appears to be no problem.
The islands have been returned to British rule, the military safety of the
islanders is assured, and they are beginning to receive development aid to the
tune of f18,000 per inhabitant. It would be odd if there were any discontent.
But it is another question when the long-term future is considered. The
kelpers know that Argentina will not abandon its claim and they fear that the
readiness of Parliament t o continue meeting the costs of their defence will
diminish with the passage of time. Even the hardest of hardliners (see the
evidence submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee) will confess to worry
about the long-term. In an agricultural community where return on invest-
ment is measured in decades rather than years, this lack of confidence is
likely to continue contributing to the stagnation of the local economy. Their
first preferred solution to this problem would be integration with the UK
perhaps on lines similar to the Isle of Man but most recognize that this is not
possible. Their next preferred option is for the islands to be converted into a
NATO-like base with an American military presence which they feel would be
enough to guarantee them against any Argentine aggression. In support of this
approach they are fond of citing the resource base of the area and its potential
strategic importance in the event of a closure of the Panama Canal.
They have little enthusiasm for any other approaches. In particular they
I s So much for Anaya’s earlier braggadocio. Cardoso et at. tell the story of Anaya saying to
Haig, ‘My son is serving in the Malvinas and I would be proud to offer up his life for the
fatherland’. This was not required for his son was captured at Port Stanley upon which Anaya
apparently approached Vernon Walters asking him to intercede with the British for his son’s
preferential release.
 Review Articles 309
share Mrs Thatcher’s lack of enthusiasm for third party involvement and they
are opposed to any role being accorded to the UN. If neither of their preferred
options is possible then the uncertain status quo will have to do.
These are the views of the hardliners who have traditionally dominated local
politics. There is no reason to suppose that the views of the islanders as a
whole are markedly different, but they have never been properly assessed. The
wishes of the islanders upon which such stress has been laid are the wishes of a
local oligarchy of farm owners and managers (and their allies within the petty
bourgeois service and administrative groups in Port Stanley) who have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo. Yet as Lord Shackleton points out, they
are far from being the whole of Falklands society. Other groups include the
retired, farm and general labourers, expatriates, and small family farmers.
They too seem to have a distaste for the Argentines and a wish to remain
‘British’ but there is evidence that on one critical occasion their willingness to
negotiate with the Argentines was quashed by the hardliners in the Legislative
Council. When Ridley visited the islands advocating leaseback this was
rejected in favour of a freeze, but in West Falkland at least it seems that a large
majority of the electorate were reluctantly prepared to talk about it.
The power of the oligarchy stems from their economic control over the lives
of the ordinary ‘kelpers’. Farm labourers, for example, live in tied houses
(which they have to vacate upon retirement), are paid in kind as well as in cash,
and in many cases they even entrust the management of their savings to their
employers. Their reluctance to express their views is understandable given this
extreme dependence. The tradition of reticence is also compounded by the fact
that most inter-settlement communication is by short wave radio and is readily
eavesdropped and by the oppressive memory of the sacrifices that were made
in the recovery of the islands. Given these realities the lock which the
hardliners have over island opinion and with it, British policy, is under-
standable.
The Falklands Islands Company, of course, is everyone’s bugbear. The
LAB team are representative of majority opinion when they describe it as a
profit-maximizing monopoly which is resolutely opposed to any change.
Indeed the Argentines believe it to be behind the speculation about oil (its
parent company is in the energy field) and to be the paymaster of the Falklands
lobby in London. There is some evidence for this (particularly for the 1960s
and ~ O S ) , but rather less than the critics would like to believe. The FIC
monopoly extends to almost every area of island life and it is naturally
opposed to reform of the sheep-raising, wool-marketing and retailing and
transport systems from which its profits come. But in comparison with some
of the large private owners its re-investment record and its willingness to
innovate are notable. The problem of economic reform thus involves the FIC
but only as one element in a more broadly uncompetitive system.
To date the British government, whilst grasping the defence nettle firmly,
has shown little enthusiasm for major economic and social reform of the
islands. It has accepted Lord Shackleton’s proposals for infrastructural
investment (though few of them seem to make any economic sense) but has
rejected the proposals for a democratization of landholding, the key to the
local social and political structure. The government argues that, unlike the
garrison, rapid change in the fabric of society cannot be absorbed quickly and
310 Review Articles
that time is needed for the emergence of the entrepreneurial and management
skills that reform would require. Its critics are more likely to argue that it is in
the pocket of the large landowners who have no interest in reform. But there is
another consideration. Short of collectivizing the economy, reform will not
lead to a real democratization of island society, but rather to the broadening of
its oligarchic apex and the possibility exists that this would merely serve to
increase the present intransigence.
This is serious enough as it is. While the Defence Committee takes as its
starting point the need to defend the islands it is clearly unhappy about the cost
involved. Not only are the direct costs extremely high but the implications in
terms of the diversion of resources (especially naval ones) from the North
Atlantic is worrying. To this must be added the concerns voiced by its counter-
part Foreign Affairs Committee: the diplomatic difficulties encountered in the
UN and elsewhere, the strain placed on relations with the United States, the
loss of trade, and the threat posed to the regional power system (and
eventually Antarctica) by the present situation.
The definitive story of the whole affair has yet to be written but of the
literature produced so far three accounts stand out: Lord Franks for the
insight which he gives us into the workings of British government, Hastings
and Jenkins for the comprehensiveness of their account, and the LAB for their
willingness to apportion responsibility.