Journal of Strategic Studies

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The currency of covert action: British special

political action in Latin America, 1961-64

Rory Cormac

To cite this article: Rory Cormac (2020): The currency of covert action: British
special political action in Latin America, 1961-64, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI:
10.1080/01402390.2020.1852937

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JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1852937

ARTICLE

The currency of covert action: British special political

action in Latin America, 1961-64
Rory Cormac
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

ABSTRACT
At the start of the 1960s, the UK embarked on a programme of covert action in
Latin America. This appears puzzling: the UK was overstretched; Latin America
fell outside its area of strategic interest; and UK covert action was dwarfed by
that of the US. After revealing this activity for the first time, this article argues
that the UK turned to covert action for reasons beyond orthodox explanations
of reducing threats in a plausibly deniable manner. Instead, policymakers
recognised the currency of covert action in the Anglo-American relationship
and in generating trade with emerging economies in Latin America.

KEYWORDS Covert action; intelligence; secrecy; foreign policy

Recently declassified documents reveal that, at the start of the 1960s, the UK
dramatically increased covert action in Latin America. This appears puzzling.
Britain was severely overstretched and, after the humiliation of the Suez
debacle in 1956, in obvious decline. Policymakers in Whitehall faced plenty
of challenges elsewhere, especially the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where
the rise of nationalism and communist subversion directly threatened British
interests.
Latin America was not traditionally an area of priority. UK influence, both
political and economic, had declined significantly since its nineteenth century
hegemonic heyday. By the Cold War, the UK had no vital strategic interests in
the region and recognised that the US took the lead.1 British governments, at
best, treated Latin America with benign neglect.2 Intelligence coverage
reflected this: In 1945, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had ten stations
in the region, but this dwindled to just three (in Mexico City, Buenos Aires and
Rio de Janeiro) a few years later.3 The Information Research Department,

CONTACT Rory Cormac Rory.Cormac@nottingham.ac.uk

1
Thomas Mills, ‘British Foreign Policy Towards Latin America in the Twenty-first Century: Assessing the
Canning Agenda’, International Affairs 94/6 (2018), 1391–408.
2
David Thomas, ‘The United States Factor in British Relations with Latin America’, in Victor Bulmer-
Thomas (ed.) Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), 68.
3
Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI6 (NY: Penguin Press, 2010), p.688.
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 R. CORMAC

Britain’s unattributable propaganda unit in the Foreign Office, had little direct
interest either. It had spent much of the 1950s countering Arab nationalism.4
Latin America instead fell into the United States’ sphere of influence, and
the CIA acted accordingly. The US undertook its own large covert action
programme in the early 1960s, dwarfing the increased activity conducted
by the British. CIA targets included Cuba; the Dominican Republic; British
Guiana; Chile; Haiti; Bolivia; and Brazil.5 Such sizeable US activity, up to and
including regime change, adds to the puzzle of British covert action which
was out of area and comparatively insignificant.
This article asks why the UK embarked upon this programme of covert
action. To achieve this, it begins by establishing, for the first time, that the UK
engaged in such activity, by setting out the methods, targets, and para­
meters. It then uses multi-archival historical method and process tracing to
explain the government’s decision.
In doing so, this article makes two arguments. First, the UK engaged in
a hitherto unknown programme of covert action targeting Latin America,
taking the form of what the British called special political action: unattribu­
table propaganda, forgeries, and influencing opinion in the church, trade
unions and political parties.
This argument contributes to scholarship on covert action in Latin
America, which is dominated by the CIA. This is unsurprising given that
American activity was most prolific and that details have long been public.
However, this narrative creates an unbalanced picture and risks mythologiz­
ing the CIA as an all-powerful bogeyman. Recent scholarship has rectified this
to an extent, by examining both local agency and Soviet covert action as
a counterweight to American meddling.6
Equally unsurprisingly, no literature exists on British covert action in the
region. Instead, and with the exception of British Guiana, where Britain had
obvious imperial interests,7 it focuses on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and
Southeast Asia. Much British covert action, especially that below the level of
secret wars in places like Yemen and Indonesia, fitted a broadly similar

4
Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–1953, (Abingdon: Routledge,
2004); James Vaughan, ‘Cloak Without Dagger’: How the Information Research Department Fought
Britain’s Cold War in the Middle East, 1948–56, Cold War History 4/3 (2004), 56–84.
5
Lindsey O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2018). pp.115, 117.
6
Scholars have challenged the orthodox view that CIA activity in Chile determined developments on the
ground. Recent works by Kristian Gustafson and James Lockhart assert that the CIA did not have the
impact people assume. See Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974 (Dulles:
Potomac Books, (2007) and Lockhart, ‘How Effective Are Covert Operations? The CIA’s Intervention in
Chile, 1964–73, MCU Journal 10/1 (2019), 21–49. For discussion see Zakia Shiraz, ‘CIA Intervention in
Chile and the Fall of the Allende Government in 1973 , Journal of American Studies, 45/3 (2011):
603–613. See also Kristian Gustafson and Christopher Andrew, ‘The Other Hidden Hand: Soviet and
Cuban Intelligence in Allende’s Chile’, Intelligence and National Security 33/3 (2018), 307–421.
7
Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London:
HarperPress, 2013).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 3

pattern. Successive governments integrated it into foreign policy to achieve

avowed goals. It was usually small-scale activity designed to disrupt adver­
saries and/or facilitate diplomacy: a force multiplier to help the impecunious
British to maintain a global role. As we shall see, the newly uncovered covert
operations in Latin America followed suit.8
The scant literature on British policy in Latin America more broadly focuses
on economic, political and cultural relations, making no mention of covert
action.9 This is problematic because ignoring Latin America gives a skewed
sense of British activity and interests, misses how the UK used covert action to
maintain a truly global role, and neglects an important dynamic of the role of
covert action in statecraft.
Second, this article argues that the UK embarked upon covert action for
reasons beyond orthodox explanations of reducing threats in a plausibly
deniable manner. Instead, policymakers recognised the currency of covert
action in the Anglo-American alliance. They also recognised its currency in
the region: leaders benefiting from British assistance to stave off communist
threats would be more likely invest in British exports as their economies grew.
Covert action formed a tool of international diplomacy.
This second argument contributes to ongoing debates about why states
employ covert action. In recent years, scholars have put forward a range of
explanations including to control escalation dynamics10; to signal policy
preferences using secret wars11; to maximise control over foreign policy at
a domestic level12; to avoid audience costs when violating norms13; or when
leaders lack a legal exemption from the principal of non-intervention.14
However, these have limitations here. UK activity was dwarfed by that of
the US, thereby reducing the risk of escalation given that a) the US would
likely have endured the most criticism and b) it took place within the US’s
sphere of influence. The covert action was not an expensive or risky para­
military operation thereby reducing credibility of UK signalling. There was
little domestic opposition to – or even interest in – the broader foreign policy

8
Rory Cormac, Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of Foreign Policy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018); Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (Fourth Estate,
2000), Gordon Corera, The Art of Betrayal: The Secret History of MI6 (London: Pegasus Books, 2013); Paul
Lashmar and John Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War: Foreign Office and the Cold War 1948–77
(London: Sutton, 1998).
9
For example see, Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.) Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
10
Austin Carson, ‘Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the
Korean War’, International Organization 70/1 (2016), 103–31.
11
Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of
Signaling in Secret’, Security Studies 26/1, (2017), 124–156.
12
David Gibbs, ‘Secrecy and International Relations’. Journal of Peace Research 32/2 (1995): 213–28;
Michael Poznansky, ‘Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace’, International
Studies Quarterly 59/4 (2015), 815–26.
13
O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change.
14
For discussion, see Michael Poznansky, ‘Feigning Compliance: Covert Action and International Law’,
International Studies Quarterly 63/1, (March 2019), 72–84.
4 R. CORMAC

and in many instances local leaders invited some form of assistance thereby
providing exemption from the legal principle of non-intervention.
This case study contributes in three ways. First, it demonstrates a state
using covert action, below the level of paramilitary operations or regime
change, to signal to allies. This, rather than trying to reduce a direct threat,
formed the driving force behind covert action. Achieving such objectives
requires partial exposure, already acknowledged by scholars,15 but here it
was for novel purposes of alliance building and generating trade.
Second, the UK intended the covert action to be credible not because it
demonstrated a willingness to invest resources or a tolerance of escalation
and domestic risks,16 but because it was integrated into a broader overt
foreign policy which local partners supported. If this failed, the UK insured
against a lack of credibility by simultaneously targeting those same local allies
with covert action to bring home the threat. As such, this article helps to
break down the overt/covert binary found in much of the literature.
Third, the state did not choose deniability in order to protect the executive
from domestic criticism. In this sense, secrecy was more harmonious with
democracy, but not necessarily because it operated at the state level of
plausible deniability either (although it did), in which the state rather than
the executive denies knowledge.17 Instead, the UK chose covert action to
complement a broader open foreign policy. Not all covert action is a large-
scale intervention operating in parallel to overt policy, and the literature
struggles to take account of this. By normalising covert action and integrating
it into a foreign policy, the UK bypassed some of the problems of managing
controversial secrets.

The case study: UK Covert action in Latin America

In 1961, a diplomat named Ronnie Burroughs toured Latin America on behalf
of the Foreign Office, the IRD, and SIS. He recommended an increase in
attention to the region generally and to special political action specifically.
The UK’s initial covert action priorities were to be Ecuador and Bolivia,
followed by Venezuela, and then Colombia and Peru.18 Shortly afterwards,
the UK increased the number of IRD personnel working in the region,
15
See for discussion Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in Secret Politics, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2018); Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible
Deniability’, International Affairs 94/3 (2018), 477–94; Thomas Eason, Oliver Daddow and Rory Cormac
‘From Secrecy to Accountability: The Politics of Exposure in the Belgrano Affair’, British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, (iFirst, 2020).
16
As argued by Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Covert Communication’, 138.
17
Michael Poznansky outlines two logics of plausible deniability. The first operates at the state level
(protecting the state) and the second operates at the executive level (protecting the president).
Poznansky ‘Revisiting Plausible Deniability’, Journal of Strategic Studies, (iFirst, 2020)
18
The National Archives (TNA): Burroughs, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 12/5/61 FCO168/272. (all archival
references are from TNA unless otherwise stated).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 5

including specialist officers in Lima, Rio de Janeiro and La Paz, as well as one
extra officer in regional information headquarters in both Mexico and
Caracas. The intensification in activity was immediately noticeable. In just
a few months, the IRD received a large increase in demand for its material
across the continent.19
By 1963, covert operations had ‘considerably increased recently in Latin
America’.20 The number of SIS stations rose to again include Santiago, Lima
(briefly), and Caracas21; by the middle of the decade, structural changes
within SIS reflected increased interest in Latin America.22 The IRD – which
had ‘capacity for special political action in the Information field’23 – con­
ducted much of this activity alongside SIS, although the line of demarcation
was not always as clear as it should have been.24
The UK used covert action to build resilience against communism. It
used a range of covert political means to promote these themes, includ­
ing through print media and radio, the church, trade unions, and political
parties. In short, field officers discreetly built up a range of contacts to
influence local thinking.

Print media and radio

IRD operations included placing books in the Bolivian Revolutionary
Nationalist Movement library; creating a new mass circulation magazine in
Bolivia25; highlighting the plight of Cuban refugees and dispossessed Cuban
farmers in Ecuador26; the mass circulation of pamphlets in Chile and Bolivia;27
a literacy campaign to encourage enrolment on the electoral register; and
exposing local activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth as
a communist front.28
Newspapers and radio proved the most obvious channels to distribute
these messages. In general, IRD material for Latin America was ‘hand-tailored
and translated in Mexico and Caracas, with IRD supplying the basic
19
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Brief: The Development of IRD’s Work in Latin America,’ October 1961, FCO168/
347.
20
Glass, ‘Latin American Tour’, 6/5/63, FO1110/1615.
21
Nigel West, Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, MI6 and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost (London:
Warner, 1998), 38.
22
By the end of the 1950s, SIS had a director of production (intelligence operations) for the Americas,
with a deputy director overseeing stations in Latin America. By 1966, Latin America had its own
production section, known as P8. Philip Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (Abingdon: Frank Cass,
2004), 265, 270
23
‘Information Research Department (IRD)’, attached to Reddaway to Johnson, ‘Information Inspection:
Future of Information Research Department’, 29/7/70, FCO79/182.
24
Glass, ‘tour of Latin America’, 8/3/63; Barclay to Boas, 13/9/63, FO1110/1615.
25
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Bolivia,’ September 1962, FCO168/678.
26
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Ecuador’, September 1962, FCO168/682.
27
McWilliam to Barclay, SPA in Bolivia’, 28/9/62, FCO 168/678; McWilliam ‘SPA in Chile’, 24/9/62, FCO168/
674.
28
McWilliam to Barclay, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
6 R. CORMAC

material.’29 Between 22 May and 29 June 1962, the Regional Servicing Centre
in Mexico translated, produced and distributed 63 articles, on topics ranging
from increasing food prices in Russia to the communist threat in Africa.30
Once the material was prepared, British officers were well connected to
distribute it. For example, Serrano Reyes, the personal field assistant of
Leslie Boas, the Regional Information Officer in Caracas, doubled up as foreign
correspondent for a number of Colombian, Ecuadorian and Brazilian news­
papers. He was also a Venezuelan correspondent for a new Latin American
news agency.31
The IRD distributed two main types of publication: ‘those without an
imprint or any other indication of their source, and those with a commercial
imprint.’ The former included ‘interpretative analyses of Communist policy in
action both within the bloc and abroad’; ‘basic research documents which
deal with communist policy and action in Latin America and certain other
areas;’ and ‘material for the Press and radio in the form of briefs, radio scripts,
feature articles, radio tapes for radio stations, cartoon, strip cartoons’. The IRD
sought to brief ‘leaders of opinion’ with ‘the facts and to leave them to project
these facts in their own fields in whatever way they think suitable.’32 The
latter, material with a publisher’s imprint, often a Mexican commercial pub­
lisher, included booklets and commercial books which either exposed or
explained communist policy.33 This, as we shall see, sought to bolster allies
inside Latin American governments.
The UK also relied on the radio – but ruled out covertly purchasing radio
stations. Doing so would have been too expensive and difficult to keep secret.
Instead, they agreed to bribe local producers and proprietors to buy airtime.34
One IRD officer boasted ‘that if he was given £100,000 to play with he could
buy virtually all the radio commentators in the Andean region!’35
From June 1961, the Regional Servicing Station in Mexico City started
producing tapes for distribution across the continent. A year after the opera­
tion began, officials in Mexico City reported that it had been a success.36 By
1963, tapes were ‘broadcast regularly in San Salvador, Managua, Tegucigalpa,
San Jose, Panama, Caracas, Bogota, Asuncion, and probably Montevideo and
Guatemala.’37

29
Drinknall, ‘Discussion of Information Work in Latin America’, 19/11/62, FO 1110/1561.
30
Regional Servicing Centre to IRD, 2/7/62, FO1110/1561.
31
Boas to McWilliam, 11/7/62, FCO168/604.
32
IRD, ‘IRD work in Latin America’, December 1963, FCO 168/997.
33
IRD, ‘IRD work in Latin America’, December 1963, FCO168/997.
34
Burroughs, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 12/5/61, FCO168/272.
35
Marett, untitled note, 13/7/61, FCO 168/272.
36
Bartlett, Regional Servicing Centre, Mexico City, to Tucker, 3/7/62, FCO168/844.
37
Bartlett to Tucker, 18/2/63, FCO168/844.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 7

The Church
The Church was a powerful institution in Latin America and formed another
channel for special political action. In early 1962, the IRD acknowledged that
Britain engaged in ‘extensive collaboration with the Catholic Church’, includ­
ing through Papal Nuncios in the region.38 British intelligence was in touch
with ‘several Catholic priests’ in Bolivia who were ‘carrying out various social
projects which provide outlets for IRD material.’ It appears that SIS offered
financial help to expand their activities in light of the volume of Soviet and
Cuban propaganda in circulation.39 Similar activity was afoot in Brazil where
the British supported the church in its efforts amongst ‘peasants and
students’.40
In Ecuador, the local representative disseminated IRD material through
a ‘militant church-man,’ Father Vela; through Father Palacio, ‘another impress­
ive priest who is doing first-class work in organising anti-Communist groups
in Manabí province;’41 and through the auxiliary bishop of Quito.42 British
intelligence believed that by coordinating anti-communists in Ecuador, they
could bring a ‘mob’ of at least 5000 people onto the streets of Quito. This
would consist largely of Catholic youth controlled by priests such as those
mentioned above. They hoped that such action would not need to be taken,
because the mere ‘fact that such a mob could be organised provides the right
wing groups with a useful counter weapon to impose a check on [President]
Arosemena who appears to be regarded as a thoroughly unprincipled and
undesirable character’.43
Here then, we see three ways in which the UK allied with the Catholic
Church in special political action, executed covertly so as to protect the
legitimacy of local partners. First, to disseminate propaganda; second, to
cooperate in anti-communist social projects, and third, to physically mobilise
anti-communist opposition if necessary.

Trades unions
Trades unions formed a key special political action battleground, again covert
to protect the legitimacy of local partners. As with the church, officials
assumed that overt intervention would provoke a counterproductive back­
lash undermining Britain’s aims.44 From 1962, the Foreign Office worked to
bolster relations between British and local trade unions in Ecuador, Peru, and

38
McWilliam, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 2/4/62, FO1110/1561.
39
McWilliam to Barclay, SPA in Bolivia’, 28/9/62, FCO168/678.
40
Unknown [illegible] ‘SPA in Brazil’ September 1962 FCO168/675.
41
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Ecuador’, September 1962, FCO168/682
42
McWilliam to Barclay, 10/10/61, FCO 168/682.
43
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Ecuador’, September 1962, FCO168/682
44
The same logic applies to covert electoral intervention. See reference 61 below.
8 R. CORMAC

Bolivia.45 In Ecuador and Peru, measures included sending trade unionists to

Britain for courses of up to one year; in Peru the British hoped to distribute
propaganda through Christian Democrat trade unions (although they did not
need financial support because they were ‘probably receiving support from
the West German Catholic Bishops’).46 In Bolivia, the Cubans had become
‘extremely active’ in inviting local trade unionists to Havana. Britain intended
to counter this but had to do so unattributably ‘in order to avoid too great an
appearance of official interest in developing labour relations.’ Accordingly,
diplomats considered ‘setting up a controlled body of Trade Union experts on
an independent and unattributable basis.’47 IRD approved the idea and
suggested bringing the British TUC on board,48 however, the TUC refused
to engage in ‘active collaboration’ with the government.49
In 1963, communists attempted to establish a new regional Latin American
trade union confederation, the Central Unica de Trabajadores de America
Latin (CUTAL). British special political action worked to ‘contain and discredit’
it. This failed: its constituent congress was scheduled for September but, after
initial difficulties, it had to be postponed until January 1964. British officials in
Rio then suggested a new approach of encouraging ‘non-Communist unions
to join the organisation and ensure a non-Communist majority in it.’50
Colleagues in La Paz agreed: through special political action, Britain could
‘swamp’ CUTAL, forcing communist members to withdraw. The British repre­
sentative cited a precedent of similar activity six or seven years earlier.51
In London, the IRD was sceptical. The chances of obtaining control seemed
slim and doing so would bring the UK into conflict with the free world trade
union movement, and, by extension, the United States.52 Back in Rio, infor­
mation officers suggested an alternative plan: narrow its base and impede its
work through unattributable propaganda in the press, television and radio.53
A ‘special operations’ meeting in London approved using ‘general publicity to
hammer home the communist nature and Cuban/WFTU backing to CUTAL’.
The aim was to delay, prevent, or disrupt the constituent congress.
Propaganda, insisting that CUTAL operated in the interest of international
communism rather than Latin American workers,54 would have to be used
carefully though, because attacks risked giving it unnecessary publicity.55

45
McWilliam to Barclay, 10/10/61, FCO168/682.
46
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Peru’, October 1962, FCO168/687.
47
Henderson, ‘SPA in Bolivia,’ September 1962, FCO168/678.
48
McWilliam to Barclay, SPA in Bolivia’, 28/9/62, FCO168/678
49
McWilliam to Barclay, 10/10/61, FCO168/682; McWilliam to Barclay, 16/10/62; Henderson minute, 28/3/
63, FCO 68/687.
50
Jackson, IRD circular, 10/10/63, FCO168/995.
51
Bullock to Jackson, 11/11/63, FCO168/996.
52
Jackson, IRD circular, 10/10/63, FCO 168/995; Wrigley to Jackson, 6/11/63, FCO168/996.
53
Burroughs to Jackson, 14/11/63, FCO168/996.
54 st
1 secretary (Chancery), Rio de Janeiro, to Burroughs, 29/11/63, FCO168/996.
55
Morris, ‘CUTAL’, 27/11/63, FCO 168/996; Jackson, untitled minute, 29/11/63, FCO168/996.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 9

Officials in Brazil hoped to go further. They argued that ‘the most effective
target’ would be the Brazilian president himself: ‘our objective would be to
make him fear that his own personal position with the Trade Unions move­
ment was being undermined. This could best be done by suggesting that the
movement was being taken over by the communists and the extreme left.’
One option involved forging ‘a “black” document which would seek to prove
this was the case’; however, the local station lacked intelligence to do it
convincingly.56 The IRD asked for more detailed proposals so that they
could discuss it with SIS.57
CUTAL failed to get off the ground. The congress faced local protests,
including from Catholic women’s groups. The local archbishop publicly
declared his ‘total dismay’ at the ‘clearly communist congress’. The local
mayor marched a mob from a church to the governor’s residence bearing
a manifesto with thousands of signatures denouncing the congress. Women
resolved to lie down on the airfield preventing delegates from arriving. Taxi
drivers refused to serve Soviet delegates. Under immense pressure, the
governor announced that the congress was moving from Belo Horizonte to
Brasilia.58 The meeting was clearly disrupted and CUTAL struggled to gain
momentum. It lost a number of national member unions during the start-up
period.59
Whatever hand the UK may have played in this, American plans rendered it
comparatively insignificant. IRD and SIS had contemplated a forgery targeting
the Brazilian president, yet, four months later, President Johnson gave the
green light to support a coup against him after US officials deemed him too
close to the Brazilian communists.60 He was overthrown in late March 1964.

Political parties
Special political action included attempts to influence elections. Much of this
occurred covertly because the UK lacked the resources and credibility to
intervene too overtly without provoking a backlash that would have harmed
the candidate’s immediate chances or future legitimacy.61 The biggest chal­
lenge on the horizon was Chile where a presidential election was due to be
held in September 1964. According to the local ambassador and British
56
Burroughs to Jackson, 14/11/63, FCO168/996.
57
Jackson to Burroughs, 5/12/63, FCO 168/996.
58
John Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises 1955–1964, (University of Texas reprint edition,
2012), 259–60.
59
G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 152–3
60
Digital National Security Archive: White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the
impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, (March 31/3/64) available at
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm#docs≥
61
For discussion of the costs and benefits of overt vs covert intervention see, Dov Levin, Meddling in the
Ballot Box: The Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions (New York: Oxford University Press,
2020), p.40.
10 R. CORMAC

intelligence, there was a ‘strong possibility’ that the socialist/communist

coalition, FRAP, would win and put Salvador Allende in charge. ‘Once in
power the chances are that Allende would be manoeuvred by the commu­
nists, either willingly or otherwise, and that the end-product might well be
a Government on the Cuban pattern.’62
This left the Foreign Office with a choice between devoting all efforts to
keep FRAP out of power or ‘accepting the inevitability of a left-wing govern­
ment, and instead trying to build up the moderate Socialist elements of the
FRAP [. . .] in the hope of keeping the Government from going too far to the
left.’ The best course of action, many agreed, was to ‘concentrate on build­
ing up a wide range of political contacts, particularly among Christian
Democrats and the left wing, so that we shall have points of influence
through which we might hope to make some impression on events when
the election draws near.’ In short, the UK preferred the Christian Democrats
but prudently backed both horses. It worked through actors such as the
Instituto Privado de Estudio Economisos y Sociales – ‘the main SPA instru­
ment available’ to the UK – and the Chilean Committee of the Congress for
Cultural Freedom, an anti-communist advocacy group covertly funded by
the CIA.63 The latter had ‘organised a number of successful counter-
subversive measures during the 1961 meeting of the Executive Committee
of WFDY’ in Santiago.64
To put this in perspective, a month earlier, the US had approved covertly
funnelling $180,000 to the Christian Democrats.65 Between 1962 and 1964,
the US spent around $3 million on propaganda and covert political action to
try to influence the 1964 election. More than half of the Christian Democratic
candidates’ campaign was funded by the US.66 Although British figures are
not available, UK spending would have been utterly dwarfed by the US effort.

The decision to intervene

UK covert action in Latin America was outside its area of interest, lacked
immediate security purpose, and was dwarfed by the US effort. Why then did
the UK do it? Closer analysis reveals the diplomatic role of covert action
integrated into broader overt foreign policy.

62
McWilliam ‘SPA in Chile’, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
63
McWilliam ‘SPA in Chile’, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
64
McWilliam to Barclay, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
65
Gerald Ford Library: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Staff Report, ‘Covert Action in
Chile: 1963–1973 , (1974) IV.2, available at <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/
pdf/2010-009-doc17.pdf≥
66
William Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Kentucky: University Press of
Kentucky, 2009), 156.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 11

Signalling to allies
In 1960, the Foreign Office predicted that ‘over the next ten years’, Latin
America would ‘grow more important.’ Its population was increasing rapidly,
and its economic possibilities were ‘enormous.’ Brazil, in particular, stood out
as a potential ‘great Power.’ At the same time, American influence, which had
safeguarded western interests since the war, was ‘waning and may continue
to do so.’ The ‘radical nationalism’ of Cuba, where a revolution had brought
Castro to power the year before, risked spreading elsewhere – and this
challenged American dominance. Five dictatorships had fallen since the
mid-1950s and, according to British assessments, ‘each time the United
States tended to be identified with the losing party.’67 The US humiliation
at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 would only have added weight to this view.
Perceived American decline created a problem for the UK. Diplomats
deemed Latin America ‘vulnerable to pressures likely to push it away from
the West,’ and countries were now beginning to ‘formulate international
policies of their own’. The situation, and potential vacuum, was ripe for
exploitation by the Soviets: ‘The Communists fish busily in these troubled
waters.’68 According to a former head of the KGB’s Latin American
Department, the region had been a low priority until the Cuban revolution,
but things then changed: ‘Latin America entered the Soviet political arena.’69
Anglo-American intelligence warned of communist subversion gathering
momentum, especially through front organisations, youth movements, edu­
cational institutions and trade unions. The World Federation of Trade Unions,
perceived as a communist front organisation, now had affiliations in Ecuador,
Uruguay, Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica. The CIA told its British counterparts
that it had identified over 100 publishing houses and book shops distributing
pro-communist publications, alongside hundreds of newspapers taking the
communist line. UK intelligence warned that this trend would only increase.70
Recent scholarship on Soviet intelligence confirms these assessments. The
Kremlin sought to thwart American influence in the region and urged allied
intelligence organisations to assist. The Czechoslovak rezidentura in Chile was
established at Soviet request in 1961. In the same year, the KGB began
systematic contact with Salvador Allende.71
At the same time, these apparently shifting power dynamics created an
opportunity for the UK to demonstrate its value to the so-called Anglo-
American ‘special relationship’. Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister,
had emphasised the importance of interdependence between the two

67
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, ‘Steering Committee: United Kingdom Policy in Latin
America’, SC(60)7(2nd Revise), 20/5/60, FO371/15212.
68
Ibid.
69
quoted in Andrew and Gustafson, ‘The Other Hidden Hand’, 409.
70
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
71
Gustafson and Andrew, ‘The Other Hidden Hand’, 409, 411.
12 R. CORMAC

countries since the beginning of his tenure in 1957. He had sought to

institutionalise the relationship through an Anglo-American working group
system covering politics, economics, defence and covert action. On the latter,
working groups, bringing together the CIA, State Department, SIS, and the
Foreign Office, had discussed economic warfare, Syria, Lebanon, Indonesia,
and Yemen.72 For various reasons however, not least lack of intelligence
sharing, working groups had petered out by 1960.73
Latin America, where the US was in perceived decline, provided an oppor­
tunity to reinvigorate interdependence. So often in places like Iran, Syria and
Egypt, the British had tried to persuade the US to join in their covert action
projects. The dynamics had shifted in Latin America, where the US was keen
to engage in covert action and launched a series of regime change attempts
in order to maintain its position of regional hegemony.74 Britain spotted an
opportunity to assist, even though its efforts would be comparatively small.
The west, according to the Foreign Office, ‘must be willing to take on the
jobs which the United States alone, for one reason or another, can no longer
manage.’75 Diplomats recognised that the ‘Americans already make
a considerable effort’ in countering communist influence in the region, ‘but
the tide appears to be setting against them’.76
This was not mere altruism. Diplomats continued: ‘If Western Europe
wishes to engage the United States more and more in its own affairs, then
it must be ready to come to the help of the United States when the latter are
in difficulties in their own backyard.’77 These feelings were not lost on the
Americans. President Kennedy expressed frustration that the British were
‘concentrating more and more on problems of Europe, especially as the
Common Market develops. This throws increasing weight on us, and it is no
wonder that we do not always succeed’ in places such as Latin America.78 He
urged Macmillan to ‘expand economic and technical assistance programs to
the underdeveloped world’ and to better ‘counter Soviet and Chinese influ­
ence in Africa, Asia and Latin America.’79

72
Nigel Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days” of Anglo-American Relations Revisited’,
Diplomatic History 9/4 (2005), 691–723. FOI: Brook, ‘Special Political Action’, 31/7/58.
73
Cormac, Disrupt and Deny, p.140.
74
O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change, pp.115, 117.
75
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, ‘Steering Committee: United Kingdom Policy in Latin
America’, SC(60)7(2nd Revise), 20/5/60, FO371/15212.
76
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
77
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, ‘Steering Committee: United Kingdom Policy in Latin
America’, SC(60)7(2nd Revise), 20/5/60, FO371/15212.
78
FRUS: ‘Summary of President Kennedy’s Remarks to the 496th Meeting of the National Security Council’,
18/1/62, doc.69, 1961–63, vol.VIII, National Security Policy. Available at <https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d69>
79
JFK library: ‘Macmillan Visit, Washington, April 4–9, Briefing Book: Background and Objectives of Visit’
1/4/61. United Kingdom: Security: Briefing book, Macmillan visit, April 1961 (2 of 3 folders). Emphasis
added.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 13

In the summer of 1960, British and American specialists met in Washington

for an Information Working Group meeting. The British had rated Anglo-
American cooperation in Latin America over the previous decade as ‘a pathe­
tically small-scale endeavour,’80 but things would now change. To add value
to the asymmetric relationship, the UK specifically targeted ‘those aspects of
SPA not yet adequately covered by the Americans or in which it would appear
that HMG might have a particular contribution to make.’81 The CIA suggested
certain areas, such as Northern Peru, where British assistance – especially in
intelligence gathering – would be most appreciated.82
Britain also thought it could help by working with non-communist bodies
which were ‘not tarred by the US brush.’83 This had been the driving factor
behind earlier, small scale, British covert operations in the region and clearly
still held weight at the start of the 1960s.84 Later in the decade, the UK
assessed that ‘the poor chaps in any case start under a severe handicap just
because they are Americans.’85 The UK could help simply by virtue of not
being the US.
One of the main areas where Britain thought it could assist was black
propaganda. Indeed, at the 1960 meeting, British propagandists offered to
take the lead on black propaganda in the region, leaving the Americans with
what the British saw as the easier grey – or unattributable – material. British
representatives ruled out creating black radio stations (too many ‘hideous
complications’ arose) but were willing to engage in whispering campaigns
and forgeries. The IRD had recent experience of this, including in Latin
America where three years earlier they had created a forged questionnaire
designed to discredit a trades union federation, the Confederación de los
Trabajadores de América Latina. This was difficult work, requiring ‘100%
correct and up-to-date intelligence’ alongside months of acquiring exact
replicas of style, paper, printing etc.86
They privately criticised American propaganda for being ‘somewhat unin­
spiring’ and hampered by the fact that it was ‘stamped as coming’ from the
United States Information Agency.87 The UK allowed the US to distribute IRD
material to their own contacts in the region, whilst Anglo-American coopera­
tion in the distribution of commercial imprint took place in Managua and San
Salvador.88

80
Quoted in Gregory Tomlin, Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration,
(Potomac Books, 2016) p.62.
81
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Bolivia,’ September 1962, FCO 168/678.
82
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Peru’, October 1962, FCO 168/687.
83
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO 168/19.
84
Cormac, Disrupt and Deny, 61.
85
UK embassy, ‘Quito’, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of IRD’s
tour of the region, FCO95/293.
86
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Brief: Techniques of Covert Propaganda’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
87
British embassy San Salvador to Barclay, 22/1/64, FCO168/997.
88
IRD, ‘IRD work in Latin America’, December 1963, FCO 168/997.
14 R. CORMAC

British representatives also agreed to ‘consider unattributable propaganda

against Castro outside Cuba,’ as well as ‘disruptive operations’ against the
Cuban government-sponsored news agency, Prensa Latina. By summer 1961,
the IRD reported that anti-Castro operations were ‘proceeding successfully’.
The ‘campaign against “el Nacional” had resulted in the proprietors trying to
sell this newspaper.’89 Britain changed its information policy in February 1962
to treat Cuba ‘more on a par with the satellite countries of the Sino-Soviet
bloc.’ This meant an increase in non-attributable material critical of the Castro
regime distributed freely across the continent.90
That was as far as the UK was willing to go – and the British also naively
hoped that they might influence or restrain the US to an extent. This, it should
be remembered, was at around the same time as the US was privately
discussing the assassination of both Castro and the president of the
Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo.91 British intelligence warned that
a more aggressive approach risked driving Castro into Soviet clutches and
making him a national hero.92 Indeed, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
debacle, the British ambassador informed Kennedy that SIS thought ‘the
Cuban people were still predominantly behind Castro and that there was
no likelihood at this point of mass defections or insurrections.’93
By 1963, the UK shared summaries of its special political activity with the
Americans and sent Washington lists of all officers handling IRD material.94
Importantly, this demonstrates an alliance dimension to British covert action:
they wanted the Americans to know they were doing it. The British engaged
in covert action to demonstrate commitment to the US, to inject leverage and
interdependence into an increasingly asymmetric partnership, and to influ­
ence the US. This, however, was only half of the story. The UK also wanted to
exploit emerging markets – at the expense of the US, thereby creating
tension and illustrating the pragmatism underpinning the supposedly special
relationship.

Bolstering trade
British policy towards Latin America, such that it existed at all since 1945, was
about commercial rather than political interests.95 The perceived decline of
89
Record of meeting in Mr Hopkins’s Room, 23/7/61, FCO168/315.
90
‘FO circular, ‘Cuba: Information Policy’, 14/2/62, FO 1110/1561.
91
Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 147.
92
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Brief: Propaganda Against Castro and Means of Countering Castro’s Activities’,
June 1960, FCO 168/19.
93
FRUS: ‘Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy’, 3/5/61,
doc.196, 1961–1963, Vol.X, Cuba, Jan61-Sept62, available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu
ments/frus1961-63v10/d196≥
94
Day circular from UK embassy in Washington DC to all officers in region handling IRD material, 6/12/63,
FCO168/997.
95
Thomas, ‘The United States Factor in British Relations with Latin America’.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 15

the US, combined with the growth of Latin America, created an excellent
opportunity for Britain to capture a new economic market. This was all the
more welcome given Britain’s own difficulties in the aftermath of Suez. Now,
as Latin American countries expanded, they required evermore international
credits and capital – and the UK was keen to step in. Diplomats agreed that ‘If
we are to remain rich and possess the resources necessary to support our role
then we must extend our trading interests and, above all, find new outlets for
our exports. In this vast and rapidly developing area markets are expanding
every day.’96
Britain was coming from a comparatively weak position; diplomats recog­
nised that there had been practically no British economic investment in Latin
America for thirty years and that British firms had lost out to American
competitors there during the Second World War. The time was now ripe to
change this.97 Moreover, the region was important in the context of ‘possible
future significance of free trade areas in both Western Europe and Latin
America.’ Britain had the opportunity to foster good relations between
them.98
Covert action deliberately complemented this overt foreign policy. This
formed a broader trend in Britain’s approach. From the late 1950s, officials
had increasingly looked to normalise such operations, make them more
routine, and better integrated into foreign policy. For the UK, covert action
became less about ambitious regime change, and more about supplement­
ing open forms of policy execution. The Foreign Office now oversaw funding
(alongside the Treasury) and seconded diplomats sat full time within the
special political action section of SIS in a deliberate attempt to integrate
operational planning into foreign policy. SIS maintained ‘continuous access
to the policy considerations and requirements of the departments con­
cerned,’ including IRD. Accordingly, the number of covert actions increased,
but in a less controversial manner.99
This approach, developed following failures before and after Suez,
included operations targeting the Middle East and Africa, and we now
know extended to Latin America. Covert action was integrated into the
strategic foreign policy. For example, one idea involved ‘unattributable
operations (e.g. a South American Investigating Committee Bulletin)’, which
‘might be mounted in support of the overt programme’.100 Sometimes the
link to trade objectives was direct and explicit. For example, one plan for an
unattributable mass-market magazine included ‘some elements of export

96
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, ‘Steering Committee: United Kingdom Policy in Latin
America’, SC(60)7(2nd Revise), 20/5/60, FO371/15212.
97
Ibid.
98
Holliday to Giffard, 26/2/60, FO371/152126.
99
FOI: Brook, ‘Special Political Action’, 31/7/58; Macpherson to Brook, 23/1/59; Brook to Hoyer Millar, 31/
7/58.
100
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
16 R. CORMAC

promotion.’101 Another plan, to ‘discreetly support’ a new Latin American

press had the benefit of promoting British economic goals. Officials worried
that US propaganda would compete with British commercial interests by
favouring ‘US goods to the exclusion of British industrial and economic
achievements.’102
More often, UK covert action, and the broader policy it supported, aimed
to bolster anti-communist resilience, enhance alliances with anti-communist
organisations and governments, and then to increase trade and influence. In
Colombia, British officials explicitly mentioned that the country was a ‘useful
UK market’ when considering the value of IRD activity.103 They similarly rated
Venezuela as ‘a major prize’: ‘she is a very rich country and her government is
a major source of investment capital’.104
UK policy was to expand Britain’s general standing in the area, generate
exports, and develop support for British foreign and colonial policies. It
cynically involved on ‘making the Latin Americans feel that they are being
taken seriously.’105 One way of doing this was, according to diplomats, to
‘bring the seriousness of the situation home to Governments of many of
these countries, which have in the past shown themselves to be lethargic and
unwilling to be impressed by the dangers of Communist penetration.’106
Special political action therefore targeted anti-communist governments,
security services, universities and business groups – but operated in a grey
area, partially exposed to some, hidden to others, and integrated into
a spectrum of broader foreign policy.
The IRD distributed 20,000 copies of pamphlets in its Anatomy of
Communism series to anti-communist organisations in the region explaining
the communist threat.107 On top of this, the UK also distributed black propa­
ganda that officials hoped would be picked up – and taken as real – by local
security authorities.108 This formed a calculated attempt to bring home the
seriousness of the situation, and, in turn, would bring governments closer to
the UK.109
Across the region, the UK built alliances with like-minded organisations,
departments, private groups, and institutions. The IRD maintained a list of
over 100 such groups, and asked representatives abroad for intelligence on

101
Burroughs, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 12/5/61, FCO168/272.
102
Speares to McWilliam, 15/6/62; Boas to McWilliam, 11/7/62, FCO168/604.
103
UK embassy, ‘Bogota’, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of IRD’s
tour of the region, FCO95/293.
104
‘UK embassy, ‘Caracas’, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of
IRD’s tour of the region, FCO95/293.
105
Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, ‘Steering Committee: United Kingdom Policy in Latin
America’, SC(60)7(2nd Revise), 20/5/60, FO371/15212.
106
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
107
Burroughs, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 12/5/61, FCO 168/272.
108
IRD, ‘United Kingdom Supplementary Brief: Latin America’, June 1960, FCO168/19.
109
Marrett, circular letter to ambassadors setting out IP, 16/10/61, FO1110/1561.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 17

which were active and which could be most effectively supported. They
sought to cooperate with them on a ‘confidential or covert basis, over
propaganda and training’ whilst also putting groups in touch with each
other.110
Special political action worked alongside friendly elements inside Latin
American governments in order to demonstrate support and commitment.
British officials in Quito, for example, gained the support of the ruling military
junta for a plan to subvert communist trade unions. They aimed to ‘winkle the
communists out of the key posts in the unions where, although they only
represent a small minority, they have managed to dig themselves in.’ Doing
so would have caused the Ecuadorian Confederation of Labour to break its
affiliation with the Soviet-sponsored WFTU and even align, as a consequence
of special political action, with the ICFTU.111 It is telling that, whilst it sought
to be deniable, the UK did not plan to do this behind the backs of the local
junta. Indeed, the IRD saw themselves as ‘a precision instrument shop for the
very few at the top.’112
In Peru, British officials decided to covertly support moderates inside
the ruling junta. ‘Dogmatic elements’ threatened to cause a split among
the leadership and hoped to provoke a struggle with the left in order ‘to
have the excuse to crack down more heavily upon them and impose
a rigid military dictatorship.’ The Foreign Office, IRD, and SIS agreed that
‘strengthening the moderate wing of the junta with advice and assis­
tance’ would be most productive, not least because they thought the
hardliners had little future. They then hoped to use it as a ‘point of
influence.’113 Importantly, the ambassador told the Peruvian government
about the IRD presence. The Peruvians knew that the officer ‘had secret
functions and worked for a secret department’ who was ‘entitled to take
up his own contacts and carry on practical work of general help in the
anti-Communist field.’114
In Brazil, officials sought to develop relations with politicians who would
be more willing to accept American aid. They identified, for example, the
governor of Goiás province, Mauro Borges, as a key political figure ‘whose
leftist tendencies are tinged with sufficient realism to allow him to accept
“Alliance for Progress” money’. By contrast, the leftist governor of Rio Grande
do Sul, in the south of Brazil, ‘refused to have a cent of it.’115 Alliance for
Progress was a diplomatic initiative by the Kennedy White House to promote
the growth of democratic institutions in Latin America. It also had a covert

110
Barclay, circular to stations overseas, 14/6/62, FO1110/1561.
111
Corley Smith to Jackson, 6/11/63, FCO168/996.
112
‘Head of Department’s Inspection: Latin America – IRD Material’, 1968, FCO95/293.
113
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Peru’, October 1962; McWilliam to Barclay, 16/10/62 FCO 168/687
114
UK embassy, ‘Peru’, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of IRD’s
tour of the region, FCO95/293.
115
Henderson to Barclay, ‘SPA in Brazil’, 14/9/62, FCO168/675.
18 R. CORMAC

element to it, and the US used funds to support certain political parties,
including the Christian Democrats in Chile.116
Meanwhile, in Santiago, the IRD tried ‘to influence the Chilean government
now.’117 It used the Chilean Committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom,
which had excellent contacts in universities and among political parties.118
For example, the UK pressured the government to undermine a Youth
Congress due to be held in Santiago in 1964. They sought to ‘stiffen the
Chilean Government’s privately-avowed opposition’, in the hope that the
congress would have to move to Havana. In the background, the UK planned
to ‘consider briefing one or two suitable groups or individuals to attend in
order to report on and/or disrupt proceedings’.119 Indeed, UK deniable pres­
suring of, and cooperation with, certain governments was a two track pro­
cess. On one level, interference needed the complicity of local actors,120 but,
beneath it, the IRD used black propaganda and disruption techniques to
promote British interests. This reveals a spectrum of covertness, from con­
fidential training to deniable propaganda targeting those same audiences.
Special political action involved training local security services in counter­
subversion, much like Britain was doing in the Middle East, again demonstrat­
ing similarities with the British approach elsewhere.121 Courses were geared
towards enhancing the intelligence and security capabilities of local autho­
rities, building trust in the UK, and warning them of the dangers of commun­
ism. It was particularly important given the relationship between ‘guerrillas
and urban terrorists and criminals’. Efficient criminal investigation could play
a countersubversion role in places like Chile, where the IRD officer had
developed contacts within the police. However, it brought the UK into
competition with the CIA who sought to monopolise any training that
involved intelligence or counterinsurgency.122
The Foreign Office assessed that the Brazilian Federal Information Service
for Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence was able to cope with the threat
posed by anti-democratic forces and the presence of communist missions.
Britain could therefore contribute simply by ‘keeping in the Brazilian MFA
a group of officers alive to the Sino-Soviet danger’. They could be ‘fed with UK
material designed to give them the benefit of our interpretation of Bloc
policies.’123 In Peru, the IRD officer was specifically tasked with supporting

116
Daugherty, Executive Secrets’, p.157.
117
McWilliam ‘SPA in Chile’, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
118
McWilliam to Barclay, 24/9/62, FCO168/674.
119
Allott, untitled, 15/1/64, FCO168/1087.
120
See Levin, Meddling in the Ballot Box.
121
Oliver to Giffard, 26/2/60, FO371/152126. For detailed discussion of similar activity in the Middle East,
see Chikara Hashimoto, The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and Countersubversion in
the Middle East, 1948–63 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), chapter 2.
122
UK embassy, ‘Santiago, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of
IRD’s tour of the region, FCO95/293.
123
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Brazil’ September 1962, FCO168/675.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 19

and advising the National Intelligence Service.124 All of this cooperation

required some exposure to a very limited audience. Credibility came from
the contacts and intermediaries used, the broader foreign policy which local
partners supported and benefited from, and sometimes simply the fact that
the UK was not the US. It also came from the simultaneous black propaganda
operation hammering home the threat.
The UK also increased covert action ‘in the university field’ (however, ‘since
the Americans were so deeply engaged in university activities’, any British
effort was discussed with Washington first).125 In Bolivia, the UK requirement
for SPA was ‘therapeutic measures,’ such as setting up exchange visits and
filling posts in universities with suitable candidates.126 In El Salvador, officials
agreed that ‘we could make a useful contribution if we could get a really
sterling character into the University, preferably a lecturer in the legal or
economic faculties. The idea would be some tough anti-Communist LSE
graduate (with good Spanish, this is an absolute essential) who could typify
the Socialist alternative to the existing choice between two extremes.’127
Indeed, IRD believed that across the region ‘students can best be tackled by
getting politically conscious British professors appointed to Latin American
universities’. This, alongside organising lecture tours, student exchanges, and
subsidising student pamphlets needed to be done in an unattributable
manner in order to avoid undermining the credibility of the message and
academic freedom more fundamentally.128
Given the overarching goals of promoting trade, it was important for
British intelligence to work with local business groups. For example, the
regional information officer in Ecuador was in touch with Carlos Tovar,
a former foreign minister and head of the Ecuador Businessmen’s anti-
Communist Organisation. One idea mooted was for Tovar to select moderate
trade unionists to attend an anti-Communist course in the UK.129 In Brazil, the
IRD supported local firms.130 Officials also planned to influence a regional
development council by ‘provision of selected experts’, encouraging British
firms to offer guidance to businessmen’s anti-communist groups, and sup­
porting the growth of European-type reformists in the Brazilian socialist
political and trade-union movements.131
In Peru, British intelligence discussed supporting the Instituto de Accion
Social, a body of wealthy businessmen and landowners, who apparently

124
UK embassy, ‘Peru’, n.d. spring 1968, response to request for information ahead of the head of IRD’s
tour of the region, FCO95/293.
125
Burroughs, ‘IRD Work in Latin America’, 12/5/61, FCO 168/272.
126
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Bolivia,’ September 1962, FCO 168/678.
127
Henderson, ‘SPA in El Salvador and Guatemala’, 4/10/62, FCO168/690.
128
Drinknall, ‘Discussion of Information Work in Latin America’, 19/11/62, FO1110/1561.
129
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Ecuador’, September 1962, FCO168/682.
130
Henderson to Barclay, ‘SPA in Brazil’ 14 September 1962, FCO 168/675.
131
Unknown [illegible], ‘SPA in Brazil’ September 1962, FCO168/675.
20 R. CORMAC

recognised the need for social reform. In addition to providing a conduit to

spread propaganda, they had the added bonus of exercising influence on
members of the ruling junta.132 All of this would put the UK in a solid position
to bolster trade.
Much of this activity had two aims: (i) to disrupt and discredit anti-Western
influences thereby creating space for pro-British actors to thrive, and; (ii) to
actively promote British influence through sponsoring exchanges, lecture­
ships, and through propaganda. This would develop the relationship
between Britain and local governments which, in turn, would give Britain
access to the emerging market.

Conclusions
UK covert action targeting Latin America was clearly more extensive than
assumed. It fitted into the broader pattern of UK activity of using covert
means to complement foreign policy. This did not always involve economics
or trade, but it did often involve force multiplication to mask decline and
maintain a global role on the cheap. More unusually, the covert action
targeting Latin America was conducted out of the UK’s traditional areas of
influence and was dwarfed by US activity. This article, having revealed and
distilled the covert action, sought to explain this decision. The UK used covert
action to signal partnership to the US. Covert action has a diplomatic as well
as security value. It allowed the UK to inject leverage into what was becoming
an increasingly one-sided relationship. It also allowed the UK to encourage US
commitment to European security by arguing that the UK had demonstrated
its own commitment to Latin American security.
As the decade progressed, the CIA increased its activity further.
Importantly though, the UK continued its own programme. From 1963, the
CIA engaged in a ‘continuous and massive’ programme of covert action in
Chile.133 In 1966, the US authorised a large covert action programme in
Bolivia to ‘ensure the orderly transfer of power via election to a civilian
constitutional government’.134 UK officials knew that their own activity was
being dwarfed by that of the US – but it clearly did not matter. As late as 1968,
the UK stated – unusually bluntly – that ‘because there is a very real danger
that the Communists might gain control of [Chile] by constitutional means,
we are concentrating on covert operations which we think could influence

132
Unknown [illegible] ‘SPA in Peru’, October 1962, FCO168/687.
133
Gerald Ford Library: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Staff Report, ‘Covert Action in
Chile: 1963–1973 , (1974) I.1, available at <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/
2010-009-doc17.pdf≥
134
FRUS: Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee’, 15/7/66, doc.161, 1964–68, Vol.XXXI, available
at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d161>
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 21

the result of the next election.’135 Any impact, compared to what the US was
doing, would have been negligible. But that was not the point.
Neither did UK involvement give the British much influence over American
covert action. These were not joint operations as had happened in the Middle
East during the 1950s. Whenever the UK raised concerns about lack of US
control over certain Cuban exile groups, for example, especially when these
groups started attacking UK trade, diplomats acknowledged that ‘the
Americans are hardly ever helpful’. In some cases, the CIA even warned
exile groups not to handle British propaganda material.136 At the same
time, the UK welcomed distance, assessing that IRD material in, for example,
Chile was successful simply because it was ‘so enormously unlike anything
emerging from the Americans.’137
In addition to the US angle, the UK sought to become more politically
active in Latin America in order to build alliances and increase trade.
Undermining communist subversion, using the full spectrum of secrecy,
provided a means of achieving this by developing partnerships with friendly
actors, from government factions to business groups. The UK hoped that the
covert action – complementing broader overt foreign policy – would make
the Latin Americans feel they were being taken seriously. Officials hoped that
the covert support would have credibility, not because it was particularly
expensive or risky, but because it formed part of a broader package of policy
in both sides’ interests. Insurance against a lack of credibility came in the form
of simultaneous special political action targeting those very same actors.
Policymakers chose to include covert aspects not to get around demo­
cratic constraints or international law but to bolster the overt policy in areas
where attribution would have undermined the effort. Even though open
intervention has a higher chance of success, the UK lacked the strength,
credibility and resources to intervene entirely openly by, for example, indicat­
ing that a potential trade deal hinged on the election of a favourable candi­
date. Officials therefore used covert action embedded in overt policy to
balance three things: the credibility of the message, backlash and the local
legitimacy of sponsored partners, and available resources.138
Tension existed here between the twin UK objectives: cooperating and
competing with the US. These goals did not operate harmoniously but
represent the pragmatism or functionalism underpinning the so-called
Special Relationship. This was not unique to Latin America. Both sides com­
peted as well as cooperated during the big ‘joint’ operations in Albania and
Iran in the early Cold War; the US was at best ambivalent towards larger UK

135
IRD, ‘Chile: IRD Annual Report – April 1968 , April 1968, FCO168/3069.
136
Brown, untitled note, 13/3/64; Dyer to Jackson, 5/4/64, FO110/1755.
137
‘Head of Department’s Inspection: Latin America – IRD Material’, 1968, FCO95/293.
138
The declassified documents do not reveal an explicit discussion about overt versus covert interven­
tionism. For a broader discussion see Levin, Meddling in the Ballot Box, pp.40–41.
22 R. CORMAC

covert actions in Yemen and Indonesia in the 1960s; and both sides covertly
competed for influence in post-imperial Africa and Asia.139 Neither was it
unique to covert action: the imperial historian Ronald Hyam has aptly
described the relationship as ‘ambivalent and intermittent.’140
In this case study, as elsewhere, the UK cooperated under a variety of
conditions. These included: when it had little choice otherwise (for example
regarding universities); when the US were paying (for example regarding
Alliance for Progress money in Brazil); when it felt it could influence the US;
or when it could add value (in coverage, for example in Northern Peru, or in
skills like black propaganda) for which it might be able to secure something in
return. On most other occasions, especially if there was a chance to bolster
trade at US expense, the British had few qualms about keeping secrets and
competed over things like counter-subversion training.
Most, if not all, British ambassadors claimed the IRD offered good value for
money in their respective Latin American country, indicating that covert
action was a cost-effective means of maintaining a global role. Despite this,
it is difficult to assess the success or impact of British attempts to use covert
action to signal to the US. The Anglo-American relationship weathered a host
of storms in the early 1960s, from disagreement over covert action in British
Guiana to renewing nuclear weapons. Perhaps British special political action
in Latin America played a part in its pragmatic endurance. If so, it would have
been small and intangible. Evidence of specific US gratitude is hard to come
by and Britain’s covert currency likely lacked credibility. The UK took on few
risks: US activity outweighed UK activity, the US would carry the blame for UK
activity if exposed, and UK activity stopped short of anything too dramatic or
controversial. Either way, it allowed British leaders to say they were step­
ping up.
The approach did not seem to enjoy much success in its other goal. UK
imports from Latin America as a percentage of UK total imports fell from 6.7%
in 1960 to just 3.7% in 1970. British exports also fell, from 4.5% in 1960 to 3.5%
in 1970. Covert action can hardly be blamed directly for this, but the broader
policy it supported failed perhaps because of sporadic ministerial attention
which undermined the credibility of commitments.141 Officials did praise the
covert effort overall, but criticised propaganda in places like Peru for sticking
to tired lines of communist failures and not emphasising the urgency of
reform enough.142

139
See Cormac Disrupt and Deny, p.276. For a survey of the literature and a similarly pragmatic account of
relations in the counterinsurgency realm see Andrew Mumford, Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-
American Alliance, (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp.6–8.
140
Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 27.
141
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, ‘British Trade with Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’,
University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Occasional Paper no.19 (1998).
142
‘Head of Department’s Inspection: Latin America – IRD Material’, 1968, FCO95/293.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 23

In 1966, the foreign secretary repeated, almost verbatim, the same policy
objectives from the start of the decade: ‘It was clear that there was much for
the United Kingdom to do in order to make up ground that have been lost
commercially over recent decades.’143 The UK needed to be more politically
active in the region in order to provide a balance to, and influence, the US
position. Likewise, it needed to be more active economically to capture this
emerging market.144 Despite half a decade of increased covert action, little
had changed.
Regardless of the impact, this case study offers important insight into why
the state turned to covert action. It reveals that the UK used such measures
not primarily to implement a short-term security goal in a plausibly deniable
manner. Instead, the UK integrated it into routine foreign policy and used it to
signal to different audiences, both in the US and across the region. The UK
recognised the currency of covert action.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the reviewers for their helpful comments. Any errors of fact or
interpretation are mine alone. I am also grateful to the AHRC for funding an earlier
project on British covert action. This article, based on papers declassified since it
ended, would not have been possible without it.

Notes on contributor
Rory Cormac is a professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham.
His research interests include covert action and secret intelligence. He has published
widely on the topic, including four books. His most recent book is Disrupt and Deny:
Spies, Special Forces and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy (Oxford University
Press, 2018).

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