Diplomacy & Statecraft

ISSN: 0959-2296 (Print) 1557-301x (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdps20

The United States and the Peruvian Challenge,

1968–1975

Hal Brands

To cite this article: Hal Brands (2010) The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975,
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 21:3, 471-490, DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2010.508418

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.508418

Published online: 15 Sep 2010.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 6077

View related articles

Citing articles: 3 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fdps20
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 21:471–490, 2010
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0959-2296 print/1557-301X online
DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2010.508418

The United States and the Peruvian

Challenge, 1968–1975

HAL BRANDS

This article explores United States–Peruvian relations during the

rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975). Velasco pur-
sued a sharply nationalistic foreign policy, leading to repeated
diplomatic dust-ups with the United States. Peruvian officials gen-
erally acquitted themselves quite well in these episodes, in part
because of their own diplomatic acumen, and in part because
broader geopolitical trends of the period undermined traditional
sources of United States leverage in Latin America. The United
States would ultimately have to wait for a change of government to
recoup some of the influence it had lost in Peru under Velasco.

On 2 October 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power in Peru,

ushering in a new era in Peruvian foreign policy. Between 1968 and 1975
(when Velasco was himself toppled in a coup), the military government took
numerous steps to assert Peru’s diplomatic and economic independence of
the United States, sought a leading role in Third World forums, and con-
sistently challenged United States hegemony in Latin America. This stance
earned Lima the enmity of American officials, and the United States–Peruvian
relationship under Velasco was frequently a rocky one.
Historians have often emphasized the antagonistic nature of United
States–Peruvian affairs under Velasco, particularly with respect to the junta’s
expropriation of the American-owned International Petroleum Company
(IPC).1 This being the case, what else is there to say about Velasco’s for-
eign policy and relations with the United States? Three things, I think.
First, United States–Peruvian affairs were more complex than most historians
have recognized. Whilst the IPC dispute has generally dominated analy-
ses of the relationship, this conflict was but one aspect of a multifaceted
association. The United States and Peru engaged one another in multiple are-
nas under Velasco, contesting—and occasionally cooperating on—military,
economic, diplomatic, and political issues. In the same vein, United States–
Peruvian affairs were more ambiguous than is often thought. Peruvian and

471
472 H. Brands

North American officials had fundamentally divergent preferences for United

States–Peruvian and United States–Latin American relations, and rarely hes-
itated to undermine each other’s policies. Even as they did so, however,
a degree of civility and caution prevailed. American officials put diplomatic
and economic pressure on Lima, but were careful not to force an open break
that might poison Washington’s relations with the rest of the hemisphere.
Their Peruvian counterparts waged a struggle against “Yankee imperialism,”
but kept the lines of communication to the White House open and at cru-
cial junctures moderated their hostility to United States policies. It was a
contentious relationship, but one that remained within bounds.
Second, Peruvian statecraft was more sophisticated and successful than
most writers have recognized. Though on paper Lima was badly outmatched
in any conceivable confrontation with Washington, Velasco and his diplo-
mats often frustrated American initiatives and forced the White House onto
the defensive. Matching its policies to the overall climate of inter-American
affairs, the junta repeatedly out-manoeuvred Washington on political and
economic issues, greatly increased Lima’s diplomatic flexibility, and made
Peru a prominent player in regional and Third World affairs. Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger never cracked the Peruvian riddle, and the United States
had to wait for a change of government in Lima to regain some of the
influence it had lost.
Third, United States–Peruvian relations must be seen against the backdrop
of a shifting inter-American system. The Peruvian revolution occurred amid a
broader regional alienation from American power, and neither Peruvian nor
North American officials were blind to this reality. As it turned out, Lima’s
initiatives proved compatible with the prevailing winds, while Washington
struggled to manage the Peruvian challenge without exacerbating the ongoing
crisis of American influence in the region. This dynamic increased Peru’s
freedom of action, undermined traditional sources of United States leverage,
and went far in determining the shape of United States–Peruvian relations.
The Peruvian revolution occurred at a time of ferment in both Latin
American politics and United States–Latin American relations. During the
early 1960s, American policy toward the region was dominated by the need
to avert “a second Cuba,” that is, to prevent additional Marxist guerrilla or
political movements from coming to power. Direct military intervention in
Panama and the Dominican Republic, covert meddling in British Guiana and
elsewhere, and counter-insurgency programs across the region were part of
a United States effort to weaken the radical Left. Support for economic devel-
opment and social reform—embodied in the Alliance for Progress—was
meant to inoculate the region against leftist upheaval. Most Latin American
governments accepted the need to contain a Cuban government that was
sponsoring insurgent groups throughout the region, and the result was the
anti-Cuba coalition that took shape in the Organization of American States
(OAS) beginning in 1962.
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 473

By mid-decade, however, this consensus had begun to fray. When

the Johnson administration took unilateral military action in the Panama
Canal Zone in 1964 and the Dominican Republic in 1965, mainstream
Latin American politicians found United States policy impossible to defend.
Colombian demonstrators invaded the American embassy and chanted
“Down with Yankee imperialism!” Chilean diplomat Radomiro Tomic noted
that Washington’s policy was “pregnant with the worst threats for the
Inter-American System.”2 By the latter part of the 1960s Washington was
diplomatically isolated within Latin America and seeking to deal with a rising
tide of anti-American sentiment.
United States intervention was not the only source of conflict in inter-
American affairs. As the Alliance for Progress failed to produce rapid eco-
nomic development, it discredited the intellectual paradigm—modernization
theory—that had inspired this ambitious project. The resulting ideological
vacuum opened the door to dependency theory, a body of ideas which
held that international economic relations were inherently unequal and that
Latin America’s ties to the United States were thus inherently exploitive.
Dependency theory swept Latin America in the mid-1960s, gaining promi-
nence in universities, reports issued by the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America, and broader popular discourse.3
The mid-1960s also saw a dimming of hopes for democratic reform.
In many cases, Alliance for Progress reforms were stymied by conserva-
tive elites and the sheer scale of Latin America’s poverty and inequality.
Amid the instability and insurgency that characterized this period, military
establishments in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Brazil, and
elsewhere decided that preventing radical change required strong, authori-
tarian leadership. This mindset was evident in the rise of National Security
Doctrine, a body of ideas centered on the need for a centralized, integrated
approach to fighting subversion. National Security Doctrine held that the
Cold War was a state of “permanent war” between Communism and the
West, and that Moscow and its allies sought to subvert their enemies through
insurgency and “ideological penetration.” In these circumstances, it was nec-
essary to act preventively to ensure that this penetration did not eat away
at the state, and to integrate all aspects of statecraft into the struggle for
internal security. National Security Doctrine figured prominently in the wave
of military takeovers that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s.4
National Security Doctrine is often treated as a monolithic influence
on Latin American politics, but the way these ideas played out was highly
dependent on the national context. Military regimes in Brazil and Argentina
took a conservative, highly repressive approach to internal security, and gen-
erally aligned with the United States. Elsewhere, National Security Doctrine
took on a more progressive, nationalistic tone. The Peruvian revolution
fit within this latter context. Until the mid-1960s, United States influ-
ence in Peru was pervasive. American officers oversaw counter-insurgency
474 H. Brands

operations in the countryside; United States–owned companies dominated

Peru’s extractive industries. Following Castro’s revolution, Peruvian govern-
ments followed Washington’s examples on issues like Cuba and hemispheric
security. In 1964, the United States embassy characterized Peru’s policy as
one of “close collaboration and warm friendship” with Washington.5
The outlook began to darken at mid-decade. President Fernando
Belaúnde Terry was unable to resolve a tax and land-rights dispute with
IPC, which led the White House to withhold development assistance to Peru
between 1964 and 1966. In 1967, the United States Congress refused to
sell Peru F-5 fighter jets to upgrade its dilapidated air force. The incident
annoyed Belaúnde and his generals (“You want us to keep a 1960 Cadillac
rather than get a 1967 Cadillac,” the president complained), who subse-
quently turned to a French supplier.6 Peruvian politics were also changing.
The end of the Odría dictatorship in 1956 set off considerable changes on
the country’s political scene. Victor Haya de la Torre’s American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) moved substantially to the right in exchange
for a return to legality, alienating many of Haya’s erstwhile supporters. Hugo
Blanco led an exodus of left-wing apristas, organizing more than 300,000
peasants into campesino leagues and leading a wave of land seizures.
Following the Cuban revolution, other ex-apristas constituted APRA-rebelde,
a splinter group that turned to guerrilla violence.
Though the military quickly dealt with the guerrillas, the insurgency
nonetheless had a transformative impact on Peruvian politics. Peru’s military
had long shown a proclivity for intervention in the political process. During
the 1950s and 1960s, though, the Cuban revolution and the emergence of
National Security Doctrine added new elements to military ideology. In the
Consejo de Altos Estudios Militares, Peruvian officers took courses not sim-
ply in military strategy, but also in geopolitics, economics, development,
and social issues. This broadened focus combined with the effect of the
Cuban revolution to make many officers aware of the incendiary poten-
tial of Peruvian underdevelopment. Yet unlike in most of Latin America,
where such fears produced highly repressive regimes, in Peru the lower-
and middle-class origins of many officers gave National Security Doctrine a
progressive feel. The idea that, as one officer put it, that “there is no defense
without development,” informed the decision to launch an agrarian reform
after the military seized power in 1962.7 When Haya and Peruvian conserva-
tives stymied the reform program of Belaúnde’s government at mid-decade,
many military observers resolved that a more forceful approach was needed
to keep the country’s social tensions from exploding. After the IPC dispute
and an economic crisis discredited Belaúnde in 1967–68, Velasco and his
supporters deposed the president.8
The United States embassy deplored this episode as an “old-fashioned
palace coup,” but the reality was different.9 Whilst Velasco jailed oppo-
nents and shut down the electoral system, the junta was hardly a “typical”
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 475

Latin American military regime. Velasco nationalized industries, expropriated

large estates, and pledged to overturn Peru’s “unjust social order.” One Ford
Foundation associate in Lima commented that the junta’s programs “repre-
sent many of the major promises which progressive politicians in Peru have
been unable to put into practice over the years.”10
The military government was also notable for its strongly nationalistic
diplomacy. Before taking power, Velasco said that Peru “must stop being a
colony of the United States.” Once in office, he quickly expropriated IPC’s
holdings. The junta promised the “definitive emancipation of our home-
land,” pledging to take a “nationalist” and “independent” attitude toward the
United States government and American organs in Peru.11 In some sense,
this stance reflected domestic political imperatives. Velasco’s tenure fea-
tured major disagreements amongst the various armed services, especially
the Army and Navy, over foreign policy and the pace of social and eco-
nomic reform. To protect his own position within this volatile situation, and
to win support amongst Peruvians more generally, Velasco turned to what he
saw as a sure political winner: a more nationalistic foreign policy. Twitting
the United States was broadly popular with Peruvians, especially amongst
key domestic groups, such as students and intellectuals, whose backing
Velasco cultivated.12 Just as important, the increased public backing that
Velasco garnered through these policies would help him solidify his stand-
ing amongst the armed services and push ahead with his reform program.
Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, who as foreign minister and later prime minister
under Velasco exerted considerable influence over Peruvian foreign policy,
later acknowledged that the junta’s anti-United States program had allowed
it to overcome what was initially a “very difficult” internal situation.13
Velasco’s policies also reflected deeply held convictions about interna-
tional and inter-American geopolitics. Velasco and Mercado took a dim view
of Peru’s traditional economic links to the United States. United States corpo-
rations, Velasco charged in 1969, repatriated profits reaped from exploiting
Peru’s natural resources, financing the “spectacular development” of the
industrialized countries whilst ensuring Peru’s continued impoverishment.
In the same manner, the United States had used its position at the head of the
Western bloc to maintain trade arrangements “notoriously disadvantageous”
to the poor countries. Washington demanded that the underdeveloped
nations lower tariffs to allow in United States goods, thereby preventing
these countries from developing the industrial and export sectors needed to
compete in the global economy. If Peru were to achieve greater prosperity,
it would have to loosen the ties that bound it to the United States.14
Mercado and Velasco also chafed at the strictures of United States–
Peruvian diplomatic relations. During the early Cold War, Mercado believed,
Washington had used the Soviet bogey to tighten its control over Latin
America. As early as 1962, he argued that the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban
policies insisted upon by the White House unduly restricted Peru’s political
476 H. Brands

and commercial intercourse with these countries, and therefore reflected

“subordination to the politics [of the United States]” rather than a true read-
ing of Lima’s interests. Mercado later issued a similar critique of the Rio
Pact, charging that the treaty was aimed at ensuring that “Latin America be
inflexibly associated with one of the great powers.”15
From Mercado’s perspective, a fundamental revision of Peruvian geopo-
litical strategy was therefore in order. Early in his tenure as foreign minister,
Mercado concluded that Peru could no longer accept that the Cold War
was the basic feature of world politics. The world was indeed “split in
two,” but the divide was along North–South rather than East–West lines.
To redress the inequities of the global economy, Peru must cast its lot with
those Third World nations “united in hunger, misery, colonialist exploitation,
[and] humiliation.” It was this confrontation between “the rich countries and
the periphery,” not Cold War concerns, that must move to the forefront of
Peruvian diplomacy.16
In the aftermath of the coup, Mercado and Velasco proclaimed their
intent to chart a new course in foreign relations. Velasco and several asso-
ciates privately referred to themselves as “Nasseristas,” and resolved to
open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. The gen-
eral also demanded that the United States reduce tariffs on Latin American
goods, announced plans to tighten Peruvian rules on foreign investment, and
declared that the “economic emancipation” of the country was at hand.17
These steps notwithstanding, the junta did not seek a total break with
the United States. Peru required some degree of foreign investment and for-
eign lending to sustain its industries, and the deeply anti-communist Velasco
had no plans to seek a military alliance with the Soviet Union. What the
junta intended, rather, was to reduce United States influence while avoid-
ing an outright rupture—as Mercado put it, to reach a “modus vivendi.”18
Even so, Peruvian policies entailed considerable risk. Washington would
presumably react unfavorably to the junta’s program, and might deploy a
number of countermeasures against Peru. The Hickenlooper Amendment
allowed the United States to terminate economic assistance to Peru and
block its access to World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans if Lima did not compensate
IPC within six months of the seizure. Washington could also reduce Peru’s
sugar quota or even seek to foster a counter-coup by cultivating disaffected
military elements.
During late 1968 and 1969, Velasco and Mercado devised a strategy
to guard against these dangers. To raise the economic costs of any hos-
tile action by the United States, they obliquely threatened to seize other
United States-owned companies if Nixon imposed sanctions.19 They also
implemented a “strategy of three concentric circles” aimed to strengthen
the junta’s diplomatic position. The first circle encompassed Peru’s neigh-
boring countries, the second comprised all of Latin America, and the third
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 477

represented the underdeveloped world as a whole. Within each of these

circles, Peru must build firm economic and political relations, so as to be
sure of international support in any crisis with the United States.20
Following the coup, the junta enacted its plan. Fearing CIA intrigues,
Velasco banished the United States military mission from the country.
In February, Mercado established diplomatic relations and signed a trade
pact with the Soviet Union.21 Lima also considered establishing relations
with Cuba, but held off after Fidel Castro warned that doing so would make
it easier for Washington to isolate Peru diplomatically.22 In mid-1969, the
regime joined Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia in forming the Andean
Pact, a trade bloc premised on the notion that only by combining their indus-
trial and agricultural resources could Latin American countries negotiate with
the United States on equal terms. The agreement, Velasco later explained,
was a tool for overcoming “Peru’s virtual subordination to the hegemonic
centers of foreign power.”23
Lima became active in broader international forums as well. Peruvian
efforts were integral to the shaping of the “consensus of Viña del Mar,”
a document signed by 21 Latin American foreign ministers in June 1969.
Later presented to Richard Nixon, the manifesto echoed Peruvian demands
for an overhaul of the inter-American economic system.24 Velasco was simi-
larly diligent in seeking the support of the non-aligned and underdeveloped
countries. Peruvian officials touted their “independent foreign policy” and
ascribed the plight of the underdeveloped states to the “structural disequi-
libria” of the world economy. Lima stepped up its participation in the Group
of 77 and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and would eventually assume
leading positions in both groups.25
These changes did not sit well with Washington. Richard Nixon and his
foreign policy team viewed Velasco with disdain, thinking him little more
than an anti-American rabble-rouser motivated by a “compulsive and not
particularly intelligent nationalism.”26 Other officials were suspicious of the
junta’s friendliness toward Moscow. “The Russians are starting to move in,”
warned Secretary of State William Rogers.27
The situation in Peru seemed all the more troubling because it looked to be
indicative of a broader challenge to United States interests in Latin America.
In the first months of Nixon’s presidency, the NSC was deeply concerned
with an apparent spike of “radical” nationalism in the region. Desires for
economic development, resentment at the power of American corporations
and the failure of the Alliance for Progress, and anger at the heavy-handed
interventionism of the 1960s had created a strong impetus for change, NSC
analysts reported. One study predicted growing “self assertiveness” and “bitter
anti-U.S. sentiment” amongst Latin Americans in the years to come. These
pressures would likely erode the United States-led isolation of Cuba and, one
adviser warned, “will almost surely create an environment hostile to American
influence and to any indications of American commercial dominance.” Perhaps
478 H. Brands

most troubling, a desire to break free of Washington’s orbit might cause

Latin American governments to turn to Moscow “as an alternative to Latin
dependence on the U.S.” In 1969, Nixon told advisers that nationalism was
the “main problem” in United States–Latin American affairs.28
Viewed from this angle, the Peruvian Revolution appeared an ominous
portent. Kissinger worried that, if Peru’s nationalist program proved suc-
cessful, other Latin American countries might follow Lima’s lead. “Peru or
Velasco-type governments,” he told advisers, would probably try to “secure
popular support through anti-American actions.”29 Nixon harbored the same
fears. He predicted that Peruvian practices might spill over into other Andean
countries, and instructed his advisers to consider the probability of a new
military regime in Bolivia “following the path of Peru.”30
Within this context, some administration officials desired to take a
hard line toward Peru. Kissinger and Nixon frankly acknowledged that
United States policy toward Latin America must be “anti-nationalist,” and
adviser J. Wesley Jones believed that the American response to the IPC
expropriation must be sufficiently resolute “to preserve [the] credibility and
integrity of U.S. position, not only in Peru but throughout Latin America.”31
Congressional sentiment also overwhelmingly favored making an example
of Velasco.32 Yet there were also arguments against a confrontational policy.
Chief amongst these was uncertainty as to the reaction that a hostile stance
might elicit. After all, while the situation in Peru had turned disadvantageous
to the United States, it could still get much worse. If Nixon pushed too
hard, he perhaps risked driving Peru into a Soviet embrace and provoking
additional seizures of United States companies. (Peruvian officials actively
exploited these fears, with Mercado declaring, “We all remember what hap-
pened in Cuba.33 ) Accordingly, the Cuban example was never out of mind
in Washington. “Maintaining credibility for the [United States] in Peru . . . is
not a gain if in the process we create a hostile anti-U.S., Castroist regime
where one does not now exist!” Kissinger told subordinates.34 Nixon also
cautioned American officials not to do anything that might force Velasco to
conclude that he had no alternative to an alliance with Moscow. “We cannot
succumb to the Aswan syndrome where Peru is concerned,” he said.35
Moreover, a confrontation with Peru might have fallout throughout Latin
America. As Velasco and Mercado had hoped, the junta’s emphasis on eco-
nomic development and its willingness to confront the United States played
well in a region where many countries still resented the interventionism of
the 1960s and were struggling with disappointing economic performance.
Kissinger feared that the United States could not win a public confrontation
with Velasco, and told Nixon that invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment
would “surely precipitate widespread and vehement criticism of the US
throughout Latin America.”36
Nixon tried to reconcile these divergent interests. He played for
time, delaying action on Peru until mid-1969. United States representatives
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 479

postponed an IDB vote on a $20 million road loan to Peru as long as they
could quietly do so, then approved the project when further stalling threat-
ened to cause controversy. When Nixon finally set his policy in July, he
combined elements of the hard-line and conciliatory positions. The admin-
istration decided upon the “discreet application of maximum economic
pressure against Peru,” resolving to delay IDB and World Bank loans until
the junta made restitution to IPC. After Peru seized several American tuna
boats alleged to be operating in Peruvian waters, Nixon also suspended mil-
itary sales to Lima. At the same time, the president decided not to invoke
Hickenlooper and thus avoided an immediate cut-off of existing aid projects.
So long as there was “any plausible basis” to claim that Peru was committed
to reaching an agreement on IPC, Nixon wrote, the United States would not
enact Hickenlooper or reduce Lima’s sugar quota. In essence, Nixon meant
to pressure Peru without doing anything that could be viewed, in Lima or
elsewhere in Latin America, as an undue provocation.37
The Peruvians reciprocated this ambivalent stance. The junta insisted
that it would not negotiate on IPC, but Velasco took care not to goad the
Nixon administration into more drastic action. He attributed United States–
Peruvian difficulties to a “problem with one company, nothing more,” and
held out the prospect of reconciliation, provided that Washington accepted
his domestic and international policies.38 Through mid-1970, United States–
Peruvian relations thus consisted of an odd mixture of politeness and
hostility. Each government had resolved to challenge the policies and power
of the other, but at the same time worked to keep the resulting confrontation
within limits.
This climate began to change in May 1970, when Peru suffered a dev-
astating earthquake. The National Security Council (NSC), though cognizant
that providing disaster relief would “cut across our policy of maintaining
non-overt economic pressures on Peru,” acknowledged that “it would be
indefensible to deny humanitarian aid in this tragic situation.” Washington
released several million dollars in relief funds and scored some gratitude
from Velasco.39 A harder shove toward better relations came in late 1970,
when socialist Salvador Allende triumphed in Chile’s presidential elections.
For Peru, Allende’s victory was a mixed blessing. On the plus side, it brought
to power a leader who sympathized with Peru’s revolution and offered
full-throated support for Lima’s struggle against the United States. Indeed,
with strong encouragement from Cuba and the Kremlin, Allende moved
to strengthen relations with Velasco.40 Chilean officials regularly praised
Peruvian policies and, as part of a strategy aimed at breaking what Foreign
Minister Clodomiro Almeyda termed “the doctrine . . . of ideological bor-
ders,” Lima and Santiago led an Andean Pact initiative that significantly
tightened restrictions on foreign investment.41
Yet Allende’s triumph also represented a threat to the Velasco regime.
Given the traditional antagonism between Peru and Chile, Allende’s efforts
480 H. Brands

to purchase Soviet arms could not fail to alarm Velasco and his generals.42
Velasco believed that the emergence of new communist governments in
Latin America posed a “serious danger” to hemispheric unity, as it would
allow Washington to resurrect the red menace and distract regional lead-
ers from the central task of challenging United States hegemony.43 Even
more important, Velasco and Mercado feared that the rise of a communist
regime in Chile might give encouragement to those who wished to push
the Peruvian Revolution further to the left. This worry was particularly rel-
evant in the early 1970s, as the disappointing pace of Velasco’s agrarian
reform prompted demands for a more radical approach to socio-economic
issues. If Allende’s program succeeded, Mercado remarked, it would have a
“powerful demonstration effect.”44
Velasco and his advisers therefore played a double game in 1971–72.
They cooperated with Allende on certain issues, but hedged their bets
by simultaneously seeking greater understanding with the United States.
Mercado called for United States–Peruvian cooperation “against the spread of
Marxism in Latin America.” Velasco did the same, labeling Chilean commu-
nism “our common foe.”45 Nixon and Kissinger were an attentive audience
for these overtures. As Nixon and Kissinger initiated various programs
to destabilize Allende’s government, they also reconsidered their policy
toward Velasco. While revolutionary nationalism had earlier appeared to
threaten United States interests, it now seemed a welcome alternative to
Latin American communism. Additionally, with a new threat emerging in
Chile, Nixon sought South American allies wherever he could find them.
The United States embassy saw “strong currents of mutual self-interest” in
Peruvian–United States relations, and called for “constructive and adaptive”
support for Velasco.46
In 1971–72, Peru and the United States took several cautious steps
toward one another. In April 1971, Nixon invited Velasco to visit the United
States and approved a $12 billion road-building loan to Peru. Velasco agreed
to begin secret negotiations on the IPC dispute and reached a settlement
with other expropriated companies. When Mercado came to Washington in
September 1971, he referred to the junta’s third-way policies as “a bulwark
against Peru’s going communist” and appealed for United States aid. “If we
fail,” he said, “it will only be worse for you.” Kissinger agreed, assuring
Mercado of “our interest in the success of the Peruvian experiment.” When
floods struck Peru in May 1972, the White House responded with $27.5 mil-
lion in disaster relief. By mid-1972, Nixon had directed the NSC to study
the possibility of a complete overhaul of United States policy toward Peru,
and aide Alexander Haig termed United States–Peruvian relations “extremely
satisfactory.”47
Yet this momentum toward rapprochement soon dissipated. In both
countries, domestic opposition impeded further cooperation. In the United
States, congressional and bureaucratic pressures constrained administration
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 481

policy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a broad upsurge
of economic nationalism in Latin America. A number of countries seized
American-owned companies or restricted foreign ownership of certain indus-
tries. Guyana nationalized its bauxite industry, Allende seized United States
copper and telecommunications companies, and even Mexico enacted
stricter rules on outside investment.48 In 1971, OAS secretary-general Galo
Plaza captured the general mood by demanding “the total exclusion of
foreign capital from those sectors of vital national interest.”49
This rise in economic nationalism led a number of congressmen and
United States officials to agitate for tougher policies against expropriating
countries. Treasury Secretary John Connally warned of “snowballing expro-
priations” and urged Nixon to impose sanctions on governments that failed
to make prompt and adequate compensation.50 Kissinger and the State
Department opposed this position, fearing that it would antagonize Latin
American governments and end any chance of a breakthrough with Peru.51
Faced with strong domestic support for Connally’s position, Nixon overruled
his foreign policy advisers, and in early 1972 he announced that the United
States would terminate aid and block loans to expropriating countries.52
Over the next several months, Connally and the Treasury Department made
a point of ensuring that this new policy hurt Peru, ordering United States
representatives to veto Export-Import Bank loans to Lima.53 This hard-line
stance produced a sharp backlash; Peruvian diplomats criticized Nixon’s
stance as an act of bad faith and rallied opposition in the OAS.54
In Peru, too, domestic problems complicated relations with the United
States. From a political standpoint, Velasco could not be too accommodating
toward Washington without jeopardizing his internal position. The revolu-
tion was predicated upon economic and political nationalism, after all, and
these sentiments were crucial to the popularity and cohesion of the mili-
tary government. One Peruvian diplomat admitted as much, lamenting that
“internal considerations” and the “need to retain an effective voice within the
government” often compelled strong responses to perceived slights. When
word leaked of the secret IPC negotiations in early 1972, Velasco was greatly
embarrassed and promptly disavowed the talks.55
The fact that United States–Peruvian relations remained so precarious
indicated a more fundamental issue between the two countries: that the
rise of Allende had merely obscured, rather than assuaged or reconciled,
their conflicting diplomatic aims. This much was clear from an essay that
Mercado published in 1973, in which he affirmed the junta’s foreign policy
goals. The most salient issue in international affairs, he averred, was the
“North–South conflict, between the rich countries and . . . the poor coun-
tries of the Third World.” Mercado advocated forming “a common economic
front” against Washington and called for an end to the “special relationship”
between Latin America and the United States. Events in Chile compelled
a degree of cooperation between Washington and Lima, but they did not
482 H. Brands

mean that Velasco and Mercado had abandoned their fiercely independent
worldview.56
The same essential skepticism also figured in United States policy. Peru’s
“third way” might be more appealing than Cuban or Chilean communism,
but it still worried Kissinger, who feared that Velasco’s anti-hegemonic exam-
ple might contribute to Latin America “sliding into the non-aligned bloc
and compounding our problems all over the world.”57 As the administration
made a concerted effort in 1973 to shore up the “special relationship” with
Latin America, its basic philosophical disagreements with Peru became all
the clearer. Haig put it best in late 1972. Try as Washington might to improve
relations with governments like Peru’s, he said, “the fundamental forces and
factors that have caused the basic problems for many years are still there.”58
This conflict was evident throughout the early 1970s. In late 1971, Lima
inked an economic-technological agreement with Moscow and requested
Soviet support for an irrigation project in the Olmos desert. The accord fur-
thered Velasco’s efforts to diversify Peruvian trade and helped compensate
for Lima’s lack of access to AID and IDB funds.59 Along the same lines,
in 1972 Velasco secured Japanese backing for expansion of the Peruvian
telecommunications industry and the construction of a new fertilizer plant.60
Policy toward Cuba was another area of confrontation. In April 1972,
Lima introduced an OAS resolution to lift the organization’s ban on diplo-
matic relations with Havana. In part, this decision reflected the relative
success of Cuban diplomacy over the past several years. Since Che Guevara’s
death in 1967, Castro had mended fences with a number of governments he
had previously derided as American lackeys. Castro warmly praised non-
communist reformers, calling Velasco “a man of the Left” and lauding the
“courage” and “integrity” of the Peruvian junta.61 This policy paid dividends
in the early 1970s, as a number of governments concluded that Cuba was
no longer the threat it had once been. One objective of Peru’s opening
was to put Lima at the head of this shift in opinion. In defending his Cuba
policy, Velasco explained that it was “obvious” that there was no longer a
“consensus in Latin America” in favor of shunning Castro.62
Peru’s Cuba policy also served as a means of asserting Lima’s ability to
pursue its interests regardless of United States opposition. In 1971 and 1972,
Nixon and Kissinger argued strongly against any relaxation of OAS policy
toward Cuba. By playing the contrarian, Velasco could enhance his national-
ist credentials. Peruvian diplomats admitted privately that there was a strong
domestic political component to the policy, and Velasco proudly proclaimed
that the endeavor was part and parcel of the junta’s determination to real-
ize the “full vindication of the exercise of our sovereignty.”63 Though Peru
failed to muster the votes necessary to overturn OAS isolation of Cuba in
early 1972, Velasco reestablished relations with Havana in June.
The Cuban question was only one of several on which Peru challenged
Washington in the OAS. During 1972–73, Peruvian diplomats spearheaded
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 483

efforts to reform the organization and make it less responsive to United

States demands. They lobbied to move the OAS seat from Washington to
a Latin American site. In response to Nixon’s expropriations initiative, they
led a campaign resulting in two OAS resolutions that criticized this policy of
“economic aggression.” To make hay of Washington’s continued ostracism
of Cuba, Velasco issued calls for “political pluralism” in the hemisphere.64
Aside from their efforts to isolate the United States within Latin America,
Peruvian officials continued to cultivate Third-World diplomatic alliances.
Velasco called his revolution “part of the vast insurgency of the poor nations
of the earth,” and Peru officially jointed the NAM and lent outspoken support
to Third-World initiatives such as the UN Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States and the New International Economic Order. In 1974, the
junta affirmed that it stood with the developing nations rather than the now-
crumbling inter-American community led by the United States, pledging to
“participate actively in the ‘Third World’ group.”65
The methods of Peruvian diplomacy were on full display in a dispute
over maritime rights and territorial waters in the early 1970s. Since 1969,
Peru had claimed a 200-mile limit for its territorial waters in an effort to
keep foreign fishing boats from exploiting fisheries off the Peruvian coast.
The United States supported a 12-mile rule. The dispute sharpened between
1971 and 1973, as the Peruvian navy seized American-owned boats operating
within the 200-mile zone. Velasco briefly called a halt to the seizures in early
1972, but resumed the practice in 1973. In the first few weeks of that year,
Peru seized 33 American tuna boats, producing an outcry in Congress.66
As the confrontation escalated, Velasco bolstered Peru’s position by
involving as many third parties as possible. Mercado and Miguel Angel de
la Flor (who became foreign minister in 1972) condemned United States
“violations” of the 200-mile zone as contrary to OAS principles, and quickly
lined up Latin American support for Peru’s position. Lima forged a diplo-
matic alliance with Ecuador, which also claimed a 200-mile limit, agreeing
not to negotiate the issue without one another. This posture, along with
the decision to go to the OAS, made the confrontation a multilateral one,
and significantly reduced United States leverage on either Peru or Ecuador.
Most Latin American governments supported the 200-mile claim, and even
those that did not could hardly back Washington without leaving themselves
vulnerable to charges of undermining Latin American solidarity. By August
1973, NSC adviser Jack Kubisch saw no way for the United States to defend
its position without risking a diplomatic backlash in Latin America, and he
admitted that the fisheries disputes “adversely affect our relations in the
Hemisphere.”67
Kubisch’s lament was a common one during the early 1970s. On sub-
jects ranging from maritime rights to expropriations policy to OAS reform,
Peruvian diplomats succeeded in isolating Washington from Latin American
opinion and rallying support for their own stance. The United States embassy
484 H. Brands

reported that Velasco had perfected the art of placing Washington in an

“unwinnable confrontation.” Only on the Cuban issue did Peru fail to win
broad Latin American backing, and even here the military government gar-
nered plaudits for its stance. (In fact, support for lifting the OAS ban soon
strengthened enough for a similar measure to pass in December 1974.)
By 1972, United States officials acknowledged that the junta had been
strikingly effective in keeping Washington off-balance. Velasco, wrote one
analyst, “has never engaged the United States in a dispute in which we
had a chance of winning or even of retaliating without damaging our own
interests.”68
As early as late 1972, it was obvious that Velasco was unlikely to change
course in his relations with Washington. There remained a number of basic
issues separating the two countries, and United States efforts to exert pressure
on Peru had largely come to naught. In early 1973, the American embassy
reported that Velasco not slackened his efforts to create an “anti-U.S. coalition”
in Latin America, and admitted that attempts to induce greater cooperation
from Peru had failed. “Rather than caving in,” the ambassador wrote, Peru
“seems to be looking for safe ways to put pressure on the United State”69
United States exasperation only increased in 1973. In December, word
leaked that Velasco had contracted to purchase two-dozen Soviet tanks.
The deal, which initiated a decade-long military relationship between Lima
and Moscow, reflected Peru’s perceived regional security needs more than
any desire for an alliance with the Kremlin. In September, a right-wing
coup had toppled the Allende government in Chile. The new regime made
clear its antipathy to the “Peruvian experiment,” and relations between the
two countries soon deteriorated into talk of war. As Nixon enthusiastically
backed Chile’s military rulers, Velasco looked to strengthen his own position.
Peru could not “wait with our hands in our pockets” as the Chilean threat
grew, he explained. After it became clear that the United States Congress
would not approve a tank sale to Lima, Velasco turned to the Kremlin.70
Though the tank deal had not originated as an anti-American maneuver,
the arrival of Soviet heavy weapons in Peru caused much consternation in
Washington. The United States embassy warned that Moscow “will have new
opportunities to influence Peruvian officers who will be trained in operating
and maintaining Soviet weaponry.” These concerns only increased when
Lima subsequently purchased advanced artillery and anti-aircraft systems
from Moscow.71
Relations with Peru improved slightly in 1974, but even here the waning
of United States influence was evident. The Peruvian economy had sputtered
badly in 1973, forcing Velasco to look to the IDB for help. This, of course,
required resolving outstanding expropriation disputes with the United States.
In August, Peruvian diplomats indicated that they would consider compen-
sating a number of expropriated United States companies. In Washington,
these events raised hopes that Velasco might finally make restitution to IPC.
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 485

These expectations were quickly dashed. The junta refused to include IPC
in any settlement, or even to discuss the matter.72
Velasco could afford to take a hard line, because by early 1974 the NSC
was desperate to reach any settlement on the expropriations issue. During
1972–73, opposition to Nixon’s expropriations policy grew to the point that
it posed a serious diplomatic problem for the United States. Kubisch warned
Kissinger that the “denial of economic benefits” to expropriating countries
had resulted in a widespread “alienation from U.S. leadership.” Many Latin
American governments considered expropriation “an act of sovereignty,”
and detested Nixon’s policy as a result. Added to rumors that the United
States had overthrown Allende in order to protect American corporations in
Chile, these feelings created strong resentment of Washington’s economic
policies in Latin America.73
United States negotiators therefore treated the IPC issue with great del-
icacy, and when the two countries reached an agreement in February 1974,
there was no mention of the company in the official text. Peru pledged to
pay $150 million to the United States government, which would then dis-
tribute the money to 11 expropriated firms. In return, Washington organized
$150 million in private loans to Peru and refrained from blocking future IDB
loans. IPC eventually received some compensation from the United States
government, but Velasco could and did claim that the junta had held firm.74
The same perception of isolation that produced the expropriations set-
tlement soon moved Nixon and Kissinger to liquidate the territorial waters
dispute. Through early 1974, the United States and Peru had been dead-
locked on this question, and the Nixon administration found itself under
heavy criticism in the OAS. In mid-1974, Kissinger gave up on reaching a
bilateral settlement with Peru, and offered to leave the issue to the ongoing
International Law of the Sea conference. Velasco’s negotiators agreed, calcu-
lating that Peru would receive a sympathetic hearing in a forum populated
with other underdeveloped countries.75
By the end of 1974, it had become clear that Velasco’s occasional coop-
eration with Washington represented tactical accommodations to difficult
circumstances rather than any substantive revision of his foreign policy.
The Peruvian regime continued to keep its distance from Washington, iden-
tify with the Third World, and seek ways of bounding United States influence
in Latin America. In December, the American ambassador reported that the
Peruvian challenge had not abated and predicted “continual strains” in the
relationship over the coming year.76
Ultimately, it was not diplomatic pressure but rather economic crisis
and regime change that altered Peru’s stance toward the United States. By
1975, the economic pillars of Velasco’s experiment were giving way. The
national debt had skyrocketed, fueled by rising oil prices and promiscuous
borrowing, and the economic situation had become quite dire. Velasco had
maneuvered out of such crises before, but this time his health failed him.
486 H. Brands

He had suffered an embolism and lost a leg in 1973, and his condition
worsened thereafter. By early 1975, he had begun to slur his speech at
public appearances. The perpetual fractiousness within the ruling clique
metastasized, and in August a group of officers deposed Velasco, unseating
him just as Peru hosted the conference of the NAM.
Velasco’s successors initially proclaimed their rule the “second phase” of
the Peruvian revolution, but economic realities soon forced them to modify
his policies. They continued to buy weapons from Moscow, but enter-
tained greater cooperation with Washington and the international financial
institutions. The junta pledged that there would be no additional expro-
priations, and it eventually agreed to roll back interventionist economic
policies in return for economic assistance from the United States and the
IMF. Though independence and autonomy were still keywords of Peruvian
political discourse, relations with the United States gradually improved.77
Recent scholarship on the Cold War has emphasized the degree to
which small and medium Powers exploited the dynamics of the United
States–Soviet contest to achieve a surprising degree of autonomy within the
bipolar context of postwar geopolitics.78 The case studied here indicates both
the strengths and the limitations of that analytical framework. As the poli-
cies of Velasco’s successors showed, Peru remained part of an international
economic system dominated by the West, and creative diplomacy could not
allow that country to escape the structural constraints of underdevelopment
and United States hegemony.
Yet what is also remarkable about this period is the fact that Lima acquit-
ted itself so well in Velasco’s numerous diplomatic endeavors. By 1975,
Peru had won recognition as a leader of the nationalist movement in Latin
America and gained a substantial voice in Third World gatherings, as evi-
denced by its hosting of the NAM conference in August 1975 (just as Velasco
was toppled, ironically). Velasco had established military, diplomatic, and
economic ties with the Soviet bloc and China, thereby achieving a modest
broadening of Peru’s economic opportunities and improving its diplomatic
flexibility. He had reduced foreign influence in Peru’s extractive industries
and driven a hard bargain in negotiating expropriation disputes. Not least of
all, the military government had several times outmaneuvered Kissinger and
Nixon, getting the best of Washington in various diplomatic tangles.
The United States, on the other hand, was constantly on the defensive in
dealing with Velasco. Nixon and Kissinger had inherited a difficult situation
in Peru, and actually did fairly well in minimizing a number of crises that
might have turned into full-scale blow-ups. But despite the fact that they
wielded economic and diplomatic power far greater than that of Peru, United
States officials never devised an effective policy for either pressuring or
enticing the Velasco government to change course.
In one sense, this outcome owed to astute Peruvian diplomacy. Velasco
and Mercado designed a workable program for isolating the United States
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 487

and depriving it of options for combating Peruvian nationalism. They picked

their battles well, and with few exceptions contested issues on which they
were sure to have substantial Latin American backing. Even as it confronted
Washington, however, the junta was careful not to go too far. During the
crucial period of 1970–72, the Peruvians made the right noises and thereby
capitalized on Washington’s hostility to Allende. In all, Peruvian foreign
policy during the Velasco years provides a clear example of how a compar-
atively weak nation can successfully navigate a confrontation with a vastly
more powerful opponent.
Skillful though Peruvian diplomacy was, however, the contours of Lima’s
relationship with the United States also reflected forces beyond Velasco’s con-
trol. During the late 1960s and 1970s, United States influence in Latin America
had come under fire. Washington was struggling to deal with ascendant
economic nationalism and the blowback from its own policies; the “special
relationship” was breaking down. While this deterioration of the American
position led Nixon to use harsh measures against Allende’s government, it
also made North American officials wary of doing anything to exacerbate this
predicament. The United States still possessed preponderant power in the
hemisphere, but the very use of that power threatened to be counterproduc-
tive. The caution this reality induced created leeway for countries like Peru,
allowing them to issue challenges that were difficult for the White House to
answer. As much as the successes of Peruvian diplomacy stemmed from the
skill of its practitioners, they also reflected this changing regional context.
With the United States in retreat, the door was open to the Peruvian challenge.

NOTES

1. The literature on the Peruvian Revolution is extensive. As introductions, see Cynthia McClintock
and Abraham Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (Princeton, 1983); George Philip,
The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals, 1968–1976 (London, 1978); Juan Martín Sánchez,
La Revolución Peruana: Ideología y Práctica Política de un Gobierno Militar, 1968–1975 (Sevilla, 2002).
On IPC and Peruvian diplomacy, see Ernest Preeg, The Evolution of a Revolution: Peru and its Relations
with the United States, 1968–1980 (Washington, DC, 1981); Lawrence Clayton, Peru and the United
States: The Condor and the Eagle (Athens, GA, 1999), pp. 210–250; Carlos Garcia Bedoya, Política Exterior
Peruana: Teoria y Práctica (Lima, 1981); Dirk Kruijt, Revolution by Decree: Peru, 1968–1975 (Amsterdam,
1994), pp. 100–107.
2. “Estudiantes Invaden la Embajada de los EE.UU.” El Tiempo, 8 May 1965; Tomić a MRE, 11 May
1965, EmbaChile EEUU, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile (MRECHILE).
3. The classic expression of dependency analysis is Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto,
Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina (Lima, 1967).
4. The preceding two paragraphs draw on Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA,
2010), chapter 3.
5. Lima to State, 15 January 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, [hereafter
FRUS] Volume XXXI (Washington, DC, 2004), Document #470.
6. Sol Linowitz Oral History, 22 November and 16 December 1968, 71, Oral Histories, Lyndon
Baines Johnson Library (LBJL).
7. Daniel Masterson, “Caudillismo and Institutional Change: Manuel Odría and the Peruvian Armed
Forces, 1948–1956,” The Americas, 40 (1984), p. 486.
488 H. Brands

8. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: An Account of the

Belaúnde Administration, 1963–1968 (Princeton, 1977), p. 48; Javier de Belaúnde Ruiz de Somocurcio,
Político por Vocación: Testimonio y Memorias (Lima, 1996), pp. 523–524.
9. Lima to State, 5 October 1968, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS).
10. Abraham Lowenthal, “Six Weeks in Peru: Some First Impressions,” 29 August 1969, Thompson
Collection, Latin American Library, Tulane University.
11. “Manifiesto del Gobierno Revolucionario,” Reel 1, Peruvian Political Party Documents
(Princeton, 1989); Enrique León Velarde, “El Chino y yo Jodimos al Perú? Confesiones de Enrique Leon
Velarde (Lima, 2000), p. 138.
12. Philip, Rise and Fall, pp. 77–91.
13. Maria del Pilar Tello, ed., Golpe o Revolución? Hablan los Militares del 68 (Lima, 1983), p. 292.
14. Juan Velasco Alvarado, La Revolución Peruana (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 27; El Comercio,
October 3, 1968; Mercado Jarrín, Ensayos (Lima, 1974), p. 91; García Bedoya, Política Exterior Peruana,
p. 138.
15. Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, Seguridad, Política, Estrategia (Lima, 1974), p. 5; Kruijt, Revolution by
Decree, p. 43.
16. Mercado, Ensayos, pp. 91, 217; Kruijt, Revolution by Decree, p. 103; “Es Caso Especial
Expropriación del Complejo IPC,” La Prensa, 1 February 1969; “What Peru Wants,” Christian Science
Monitor, 18 September 1969.
17. Velasco, Revolución Peruana, pp. 25–27; El Comercio, 3 October 1968; Belaúnde Ruiz de
Somocurcio, Político por vocación, p. 523.
18. Kruijt, Revolution by Decree, pp. 102–103; “Es Caso Especial”; H.J. Maidenberg, “Latins Calling
the Tune on Investments,” New York Times, 20 January 1969.
19. “Velasco Cree que los EU no Cortará la Ayuda al Perú,” La Prensa, 13 February 1969.
20. Kruijt, Revolution by Decree, 103; “Es Caso Especial.”
21. “Peruvians and Soviet Sign Their First Trade Accord,” New York Times, 18 February 1969;
Ruben Berrios and Cole Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet-Union (1969–1989): Distant Partners,” Journal of
Latin American Studies 23, 2 (May 1991), esp. pp. 365–375.
22. Castro to Augusto Zimmerman, 7 June 1970; and Zimmerman to Castro, 26 June 1970, reprinted
in Alfonso Baella Tuesta, El Poder Invisible: Los Primeros mil Días de la Revolución Peruana (Lima, 1976),
pp. 262–263, 268.
23. Juan Velasco Alvarado, La voz de la Revolución (Lima, 1972), pp. 320–322.
24. Alan McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945
(Washington, DC, 2006); p. 68.
25. “What Peru Wants”; Velasco, Revolución Peruana, pp. 26, 41.
26. Vaky to Kissinger, 2 May 1969, Box H-036, NSC Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Materials
(NPM).
27. NSC Meeting Minutes, 21 January 1969, Box H-120, NSC Institutional Files, NPM.
28. “A Study of U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” 5 July 1969, Box H-023, NSC Institutional File,
NPM: Robert Osgood to Kissinger, 20 April 1969, Box 397, NSC Files, NPM; “Analytical Summary and
Issues for Discussion,” 9 July 1969, Box H-023, NSC Institutional Files, NPM; Handwritten Notes of NSC
Meeting, 9 July 1969, Box H-121, NSC Institutional File, NPM.
29. NSC Review Group Meeting, 3 July 1969, Box H-111, NSC Institutional File, NPM.
30. Haig to Vaky, 16 October 1969, Box 397, NSC Files, NPM.
31. Handwritten Notes of NSC Meeting, 9 July 1969, Box H-121, NSC Institutional File, NPM; Jones
to Irwin, 3 April 1969, DDRS.
32. Ernest Conine, “Time to Call Peru’s Bluff,” Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1969; “Hickenlooper
Insists U.S. Halt Assistance to Peru,” New York Times, 5 April 1969.
33. Mercado quoted in Financial Times, 25 February 1969.
34. “HAK Talking Points,” undated, Box H-037, NSC Institutional File, NPM.
35. Nixon comment recalled in Lima to State, 28 September 1971, Box 2543, Subject Numeric File
(SNF), Record Group [RG] 59, [National Archives, Washington, DC].
36. NSC Summary of Memos Leading to NSDM 21, 11 April–22 July 1969, DDRS.
37. Ibid; NSC Review Study, “Peru and IPC: Review of U.S. Strategy,” 24 May 1969, Digital National
Security Archive [NSA]; NSDM 21, 22 July 1969, NSA.
38. “Dice el Canciller . . .” El Comercio, 19 December 1968; Lima to State, 22 May 1970, Box 2543,
SNF, RG 59, NA.
 The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975 489

39. Vaky to Kissinger, 4 June 1970, Box 339, NSC Files, NPM.
40. On the Soviet and Cuban perspectives, see “Conversación del Embajador N.B. Alekseev con
Volodia Teitelboim,” 14 October 1970, “Chile en los Archivos de la URSS (1959–1973),” Estudios Públicos,
72(1998), p. 412.
41. Memorandum Confidencial, 6 de enero de 1972, “Memorandums: Dirección de Relaciones
Internacionales, 1974–1978,” MRECHILE; Stens to Nixon, August 27, 1971, NSA.
42. See Moscow to State, 13 April 1971, Box 2545, SNF, RG 59.
43. Velasco, Revolución Peruana, p. 28; also Peru: Documentos Fundamentales del Proceso
Revolucionario (Buenos Aires, 1973), pp. 22–23; Velasco, Voz de la Revolución, p. 328.
44. MemCon between Kissinger and Mercado, 29 September 1971, Box 2544, SNF, RG 59.
45. Ibid; Lima to State, 30 April 1971, Box 2543, SNF, RG 59, NA; Memorandum for Kissinger,
21 January 1972, Box 2544, ibid.
46. Haig to Nachmanoff, 24 November 1970, Box 1002, Haig Special File, NPM; Country Analysis
and Strategy Paper, 28 January 1971, Box 2544, SNF, RG 59.
47. Memorandum for the Record, 20 April 1971, Box 1, Lot 74D164, RG 59; NSC Summary Memo,
“Peru: The IPC Case,” 15 July 1971, NSA; Lima to State, 28 September 1971, Box 2543, SNF, RG 59, NA;
MemCon between Rogers and Mercado, 29 September 1971, Box 2544, ibid.; MemCon between Kissinger
and Mercado, 29 September 1971, ibid.; Lima to State, 5 June 1972, ibid.; Haig to Nixon, 23 June 1972,
Box 854, NSC Files, NPM; NSSM 158, 13 August 1972, NSA.
48. Paul Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Expropriation (Madison, 1982),
pp. 37–38; CIA, “Trends and Implications of Prime Minister Burnham Nationalizing Guyana’s Bauxite
Industry,” 1 April 1971, DDRS.
49. OAS General Assembly, Actas y Documentos, Vol. I (Washington, DC, 1972), p. 36.
50. Connally to Nixon, 11 June 1971, FRUS 1969–1972, IV: Document #154.
51. Crimmins to Irwin, 4 August 1971, FRUS 1969–1972, IV: Document #159; Senior Review Group
Meeting, 4 August 1971, NSA.
52. U.S. Senate, Congressional Record, Volume 117, pt. 21: 27521; NSDM 136, 8 October 1971,
NSA; NSDM 148, 18 January 1972, FRUS 1969–1972, IV: Document #173.
53. Crimmins to Johnson, 14 August 1972, Box 3, Records of the Policy Planning Council, RG 59.
54. “LA Slams Nixonomics,” Buenos Aires Herald, 22 January 1972; OAS, Segundo Periodo
Ordinario de Sesiones: Actas y Documentos, Volume II (Washington, DC, 1972), pp. 44–46; “OAS Leader
Accuses U.S. of Lack of Policy,” Washington Post, 12 April 1972.
55. Memorandum of Conversation, 11 July 1973, Box 3157, SNF, RG 59.
56. Mercado, Ensayos, p. 217; idem, Seguridad, Política, Estrategia, p. 174.
57. Kubisch to Kissinger, undated, Box 8, White House Central File, NPM; Secretary’s Staff Meeting,
15 February 1974, NSA; Secretary’s Staff Meeting, 30 January 1974, NSA.
58. MemCon between Haig and Warnke, 29 September1972, Box 998, Haig Chron File, NPM.
59. “Texto del Protocolo Económico-técnico entre Rusia y el Perú,” El Comercio, 20 June 1972.
60. Velasco, Revolución Peruana, 230, 237; Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America, p. 199.
61. Jorge Edwards a MRE, 10 December 1970, “1970 Cuba,” MRECHILE; “Text of Castro Press
Conference in Lima,” 5 December 1971, Castro Speech Database, University of Texas.
62. INR Research Study, “Cuba,” Box 2222, SNF, RG 59; Velasco, Voz de la Revolución, p. 327;
Peru: Documentos Fundamentales, p. 53.
63. MemCon between Luís Alvarado and Joe Jova, 16 December 1971, Box 3163, SNF, RG 59;
Velasco, Voz de la Revolución, p. 327.
64. OAS, Segundo Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones: Actas y Documentos, Volume II, pp. 44–46; OAS,
Final Report: VIII Annual Meeting of CIES (Washington, DC, 1973), p. 10; Jova to Kubisch, 16 July 1973,
Box 3157, SNF, RG 59.
65. Velasco, Voz de la Revolución, 78; Mercado, Ensayos, pp. 196, 199, 201; Plan Inca (Lima, 1974),
p. 10.
66. Department of State Dispatch, 28 February 1972, 285; Lima to State, 5 June 1972, and MemCon
between Kubisch and Garcia Bedoya, 29 October 1973, both in Box 2544, SNF, RG 59.
67. “Texto del Discurso del Canciller de la Flor Pronunciado en la OEA,” El Comercio, 13 April
1972; Kubisch to the Acting Secretary, 28 August 1973, Box 2545, SNF, RG 59.
68. Lima to State, 19 June 1972, Box 2544, SNF, RG 59.
69. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper, 9 April 1973, Box 2544, SNF, RG 59.
70. “Declaraciones del Presidente,” El Comercio, 23 December 1973.
490 H. Brands

71. De la Flor in Pilar Tello, ed., Hablan los militares, 61; Lima to State, 5 December 1973, NARA
Archival Database (http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073).
72. Lima to State, 11 January 1974, NARA Archival Database.
73. Kubisch to Kissinger, undated, Box 8, White House Central Files, NPM.
74. Lima to State, 11 January 1974, NARA Archival Database; “Peru y EU Firma hoy Convenio Sobre
Situación de Inversions de ese Pais,” El Comercio, 19 February 1974.
75. MemCon between Kubisch and Bedoya, 29 October 1973, Box 2544, SNF, RG 59; State to San
Salvador, 23 April 1974, NARA Archival Database.
76. Lima to State, 11 December 1974, NARA Archival Database.
77. Stephen Gorman, “The Peruvian Revolution in Historical Perspective,” in Gorman, ed., Post-
Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation (Boulder, CO, 1982), pp. 24–29.
78. Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold
War,” Diplomatic History 24(2000), pp. 567–591.