JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO,"

represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. RONALD PAUL S.

GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent
[G.R. NO. 177728 : July 31, 2009]
FACTS:
The petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz cohabited with her partner Christian Dominique
Tomas Aquino for several months until the latter’s death. Two months after her common law
partner’s death, petitioner gave birth to their child, Christian.
Petitioner was denied the registration of her child’s birth using her deceased partner’s
surname, Aquino on the ground that the child was considered to be born out of wedlock and
Aquino has no capacity to acknowledge paternity of the child or provide the documents required
following his death.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the decision and argued that Aquino's written
acknowledgement of paternity prior to his death, was also supported and verified by his brother,
falls within the documents required under the law. The trial court dismissed Petitioner’s
complaint as Aquino's written acknowledgement was not signed and held that even if it was
signed, did not contain an express acknowledgement and therefore did not meet the legal
requirements. Petitioner appealed and argued that the law did not require an acknowledgement to
be signed and that the trial court had erred in not recognizing a clear and unmistakable
acknowledgement of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father can be
considered a recognition of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the meaning of
Article 176 of the Family Code. 

RULING:

Yes, it is considered a recognition of paternity. Although there is no express requirement in the

law stating that a written instrument acknowledging paternity needs to be signed, the requirement
for due execution is implied. However, in the case at bar, special circumstances exist to hold that
Aquino’s acknowledgement of paternity though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the
requirement of the law. Further, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Aquino’s
written acknowledgement of paternity have been made and written by him. Taken together with
the other relevant facts of the case – they establish that the child of petitioner is Aquino’s.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Morales declared that it is the policy of the Family
Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
Based on these reasons, the petition is GRANTED.
 BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS B. ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77 | May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte. The
complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in
business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by
proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the
districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by
chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce
in a determinate territory
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge violated said provisions.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makasair, declared that the aforestated
provisions incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the
Philippines, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with
the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922…. Specifically,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to
engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign