G.R. No. 147145 - TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, ET AL. v. ALIPIO ABAJA, ET AL.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147145 : January 31, 2005]
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the
Resolution3 of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting to probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition, 5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-
8668), for the probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario
Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it,
should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel,
Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et
al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray.
Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the
probate of Toray's will became final and executory.8
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.9
Caponong-Noble moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had
already submitted the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through
his testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been
issued in his favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause
as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly
admitted to probate the will of Abada.
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;13
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure14 which
governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,15 governs the form
of the attestation clause of Abada's will.16 Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. - No will, except as provided in the preceding section,17 shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be
written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not
acknowledged before a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of
an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New
Civil Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses
who are acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator
has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution
of any will.23 Therefore, Abada's will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance
of the will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with
Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings.24 In addition, the language used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble's contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.25
This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or
understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language.27 This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
The Attestation Clause of Abada's Will
A scrutiny of Abada's will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abada's will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el
margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este
documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y
"DOS' en la parte superior de la carrilla.28
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the
will is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each
and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be
gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then
faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code.29
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo
tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the
testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the
same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in
applying the rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the
will shows that three witnesses signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that
there are two divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v.
Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the
respondent, contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the
parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of
record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been
executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its
admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves
the purpose of the law. x x x 33 ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada's will. Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to
conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they
draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will
itself.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This
clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada
subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence
of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.35
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness,
every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each
witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.

G.R. No. L-7188             August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident
of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2,
1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the
estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three
folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in
the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in
his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the
time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already
in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the
testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic
wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and
signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two
folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the
left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three
pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance
with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the
will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were
invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to
be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at
the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes
a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in
order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should
not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process
clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared
as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as
to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With costs.

G.R. No. L-14074             November 7, 1918

In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator,
controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in
accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section
618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator,
and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of
each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by
the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by some other
person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the
absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested
by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions
of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will
executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The
instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a change in the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the
execution of a will, when such change is made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and
Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and that
a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute are
the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the law in
force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned
for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes
subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs.
Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's death, is regarded."
It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the
Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered.
In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a
will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a
rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law
would affect his past act, and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made
by it does not actually take effect until then. General words apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he
lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when
they increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be
construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr.
N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on
technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the
courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory.
In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be
resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs American
Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein
otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona
vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be
disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the
general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645,
but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose
Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower
court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-5064. February 27, 1953.]

BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESPERANZA, M. PO, Defendant-Appellee.

Quirico del Mar for Appellant.

Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; TRANSMISSION TO HEIRS, FROM MOMENT OF DEATH; SALE MADE BY WIDOW OF DECEDENT’S PROPERTY. — The moment of death
is the determining factor when the children of a decedent acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. No formal or judicial declaration is
needed to confirm the children’s title. Sale made by the widow of the decedent’s property after his death is null and void so far as it included the children’s share.

2. ID.; SALE OF DECEDENT’S PROPERTY, WITH COURT’S AUTHORITY; NECESSITY OF REGISTRATION OF SALE. — Sale made of decedent’s property with authority of the
competent court is legal and effective even if not registered.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of a parcel of
land which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff’s grantors. Judgment was against the plaintiff.

The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1st. — That Leonard J. Winstantley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving as heir the surviving spouse and some minor
children;

"2nd. — That upon the death of L. J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu;

"3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;

"4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy, alleging
among other things, that she needed money for the support of her children;

"5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. Ebarle;

"6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered up to date;

"7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special Proceeding No.
212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses."cralaw
virtua1aw library

As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends upon the validity of
the prior sale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.

Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." In a slightly different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.

Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or
long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death." (5 Manresa, 317.)

The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller’s children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children’s title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children’s share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of
no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of the right of the plaintiff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4)
the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of
Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so
much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish
laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in
the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must
be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in
the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected
the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national
law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as
one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy
E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause
of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law
must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national
of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of
Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in
testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14,
1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years
ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx     xxx     xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until
the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx     xxx     xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed,
of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this
appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here
the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for
the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney";
Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at
his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears
never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he
might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the
particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention
as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand,
relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary
provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the
law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi
would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too
rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both
courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases
the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal
law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law
of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is
to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court
would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the
matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol.
31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of
laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27,
1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.

xxx     xxx     xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict
of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of
the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the
owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in
comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while
the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130;
and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each
case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

POLLY CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA
CAMPOS PAGUIA, Respondents.

Ermelo P. Guzman for Petitioner.

Armando Z. Gonzales for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; GRANT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW OPPOSITION TO PROBATE OF WILL IN
CASE AT BAR, NOT A CASE OF. — We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge when he allowed withdrawal of petitioner’s opposition to the probate
of the will. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his
counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss
Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at
the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the
same.

2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE OF WILL; PROBATE COURT, SCOPE OF AUTHORITY. — As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Maninang, v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

3. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILLS GOVERNED BY THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — It is a settled rule that
as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Articles 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. In the case at
bar, although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion Campos was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.. Therefore, the
law governing Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Under the Pennsylvania law, no legitimes are provided for, and
all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE PROVINCE WHERE THE ESTATE IS LOCATED HAS
JURISDICTION. — The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING JURISDICTION OF COURT IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed
the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein private Respondent.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and
Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of
Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the
United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix’ death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question
is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch
as they would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has
been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence
for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D); that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b); that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property
both in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan’s
Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin, all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.

"WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount
of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same
was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of
Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the
opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this
motion, the notice of hearing provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this
Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor’s motion to set aside previously filed."cralaw virtua1aw library

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to
vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in
support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its
face patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the
estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the ex-parte hearing of the petition for the probate of decedent will.

"2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a motion
presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate — the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.

"3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of Law of Succession.

"4) He denied petitioner’s petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to
prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

"5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja v. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the
petitioner’s opposition to the reprobate of the will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in
hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.chanrobles law library : red

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Art. 16 par. (2).

x           x          x

"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found."cralaw virtua1aw library

Art. 1039.

"Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.

x           x          x
"The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis."cralaw virtua1aw library

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until
June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
the Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America an not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. v.
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, Et Al., G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984).chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
PCIB V. ESCOLIN

Short Summary:

Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and
alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who
predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges’ estate, the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summary…case is long…)

Facts

-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in their respective wills that

 bequeath remainder of estate to spouse…during lifetime

 remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving spouse
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR
  in Financial Statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is 1/2 of conjugal estate
 that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax declaration in US
 for 5 years before his death, he failed to make accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication of wife's estate

-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles' estate

WON Action is prescribed?

NO. 33 appeals were timely made

-Court did not pass upon its timeliness

WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?

YES. Appeal insufficient remedy

-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits

WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES' HEIRS?

YES.

1. WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS. HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED, BASED ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER
ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR? NO

….no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate

2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):

…after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed ready for FINAL CLOSURE:

1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled

2. Debts

 Funeral expenses
 Expenses of administration
 Widow allowance
 Taxes
 Etc.
…should be paid already
3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio) Would include distribution of residue of estate

-Here:

a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate

b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
c. Merely allowed advance or partial payments/implementation of will before final liquidation
d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB needed to file a motion to declare that Charles is indeed the sole heir?

3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES

PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na special

proceeding)

BUT SC:

1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights:
 In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate belonged to Estate of Linney
 In Petition for will's probate, he listed the bros and sis as heirs
 Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of Charles when latter was still executor of Linney's estate – so may know what Charles' intended
 Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney
 He even allegedly renounced his share of the estate (but was not proven)
 Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of trustee of wife's estate so had to act in GF

4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue, can't close SP yet

>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY,
OVER W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER H:

NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer

a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate yet

b. Admin should both be
 impartial
 extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's) Can't administer estate of decedent (Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in either spouse's probate proceedings - R73.2

SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None

1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)

 no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated heir
 ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
 no obligation on Charles to preserve the estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of Charles' death
 Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
 but he can't dispose of property mortis causa (because it's already subject to the will made by his wife, which he agreed in the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full ownership

PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?

No answer yet. Remanded

Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality

If we apply Texas PRIL law:

 Personal property: law of domicile

 Real property: law of situs (both in RP)

IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law provides no legitime

So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,

gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets
1/4 of the whole conjugal property.

Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven as…

 Courts can't take JN

 should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have custody over said law
o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as there's a time difference between this case and that case, thus the Texas law might have changed in
between the rulings

BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having argued that it is so.

NOTES:

1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma

 2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no executor - so administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
 Should be proved as a fact
 R132 on Public documents
 SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
 Prove in accordance w/RP law

PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and transmit it to a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily void;
it may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To
see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:

It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with
Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and
(2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the
record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for
further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand
at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or
caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs.
Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as
explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article
16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into
account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000

NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, Petitioner, v. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS
MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and
MABAY GANAP MALANG, Respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, P.D. 1083 or Muslim
Code). The question is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband.

Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and
Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a
parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji
Abdula divorced her.

In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula
engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named
Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.

Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They
established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products.
Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as
United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.

On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia
District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.

Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng
Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up jeepney.

On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition. [1 After such publication[2 or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang
(Hadji Mohammad, for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as
follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse;
(e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son, (g) Fatima
Malang, also known as Kueng Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that
since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate. 3

On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to
the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad. [4

On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator of his fathers properties outside Cotabato City. The same order
named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang asint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required to post a bond in the amount
of P100,000.00.5 On April 13, 1994, letters of administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the required bond. He took his oath on the same day. [6
The following day, Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were allowed to take their oath as administrators. [7

On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks. [8 Petitioner
prayed that the managers of each of those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula. 9 The Sharia District Court having
granted the motions,[10 Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding
deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48).[11 The Senior Manager of
the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993, Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang had on savings deposit the balance of three
hundred seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos (P378,493.32). [12 PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a
balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994. [13

During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion praying
that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance
share in the estate of Hadji Abdula.[14 After due hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P250,000.00).[15

On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael asint administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of all properties of Hadji
Abdula.[16 In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with assessed value
ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential
building.[17 All these properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdulas name.

For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula married to Neng Malang had seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed value of
P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at P30,000.00 and bank deposits. [18

In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank
deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located outside of Cotabato City
were exclusive properties of the decedent.[19

On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various reasons.
First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the
Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law
relationship. Second, the decedent adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital relations; while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and
Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties.
Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent
was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent
married to Neng Malang because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified
petition that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in
nature just because some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties,
then these should have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent. [20
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than
one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship. The court further found that the
decedent was the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo
and Mabay. The description married to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the description of the relationship between petitioner and
the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:

In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in question. To sustain the contention of the petitioner that the properties are her
conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent,
there were already three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the property regime between them will be
governed by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is against the law, public policy, public order, good moral(s) and
customs.

Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements
or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the properties
in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent. [21

Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:

1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of
P2,040.80;

2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and
adjudicated as follows:

a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate

b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do -

e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -

f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do -

g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -

h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

Total------------------------ 64/64

3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the
excess; and

4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED.

On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22 Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[23 However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing
the notice of appeal on the strength of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083:

Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained
shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.

Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action of certiorari with the Supreme Court.[24

On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She contends that the Sharia District Court
gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay
Ganap Malang and therefore the properties acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said properties are not conjugal
because under Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any
other contract.[25

As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code, under which all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which
is permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083.

Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression --- this is a singular situation where the issue on what law governs
the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for the Courts resolution --- the
Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Puno[26 and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura[27. The Court extends its warmest
thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memoranda[28 and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.

Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the record.
This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status. [29 It also explains why the evidence in the instant case
consisted substantially of oral testimonies.

What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated
during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai ---
all divorces of which took place before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took
effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one with Mabay. It is also clear that the
following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394
(R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family
Code, effective August 3, 1988.

Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of
the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us could result in grave injustice to the
parties in this case, as well as cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a
remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words, missing links, that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly,
allow respondent court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation
and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.

It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the
Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the
enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go
beyond the issue squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman
Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the watershed of collateral
issues that this case presents.[30

The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1) What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated
under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the
Courts pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity
of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the
succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the
cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim
divorces effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?

The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of respondent
court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:

First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages.
Article 78 of the Civil Code[31 recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that ---

Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No
marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.

However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the expiration
of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.

Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the
Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code
which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.

Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo

Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages. 32 It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force
governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.

The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification [33 of Muslim personal laws,[34 also provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and
nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied;[35 accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws. [36 Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.

Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. Bigamous
or polygamous marriages are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. [37 The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on
marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void. 38 These
provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with
others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.

Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the
perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time.

In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since ---

(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time.
Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law [39, which
merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of
parricide.

In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro
Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as
Mora Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage
otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.

The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy
would have prospered. 40

Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code,
we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the
marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch
as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property
acquired from and after August 3, 1988.

Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the
subject properties were acquired.

Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established
in this Code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.

Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.

The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the man and woman living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. [41 Situating these rulings to the instant case,
therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing
marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving
that property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively.[42 Absent such proof, however, the presumption is that
property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal
property of such subsisting marriage. 43

With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are pertinent:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by theirint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributedintly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actualint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply toint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties live together as husband and wife the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows
for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actualint contribution of
money, property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102
Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to
the property regime of such existing marriage.

Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes

Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession
and the respective shares of the heirs.

Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in
force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.

The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born
during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear
to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on
December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:

Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the
conception of the child.

Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---

(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.

(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of
the child.

Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born
within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the
latter.

Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days
from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to
prevent a simulation of birth.

Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under
Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:

(a) The husband, the wife;

(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;

(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;

(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.

When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants,
she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate.[44 The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of
P.D. 1083.

Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code

R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18,
1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.[45 Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.

From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance
of the lower court. Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and
legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce
or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time.

Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is
valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 46

2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving
children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate.
The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.

3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:

a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided
between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.

b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and
should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary
issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.

c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules
on co-ownership.

d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive
properties.

4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under
the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas
death, will govern the determination of their respective shares.

As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand
to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance
with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices,
thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary
issue; (3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation (common life under a common roof) of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the
identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition,
indicatingint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or
illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status
as lawful heirs.

Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on the issue of
marriage settlement, 47 but espouses that customs or established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law to the instant case. [48
Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be
interpreted, particularly the interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims 49 and the impracticability of a strict application of the Civil Code to plural marriages
recognized under Muslim law.[50 Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the
pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a
perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death. 51

WHEREFORE , the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant
petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent
Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court,
Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

51
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the
United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and
Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego
found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the
personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons,
but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the
order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R.
Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s
surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching
on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.
Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as
void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third
of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge
all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the
court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or
otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may
have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
"American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for
or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the
will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he
was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules
of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088             July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Sison and Aruego for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November
1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left
by the deceased is more than P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China,
leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the
late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the
second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay
was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This
petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence
to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the
probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63
Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an
attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files,
records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that
the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).

There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the
probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B.
Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to
Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings
which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly
executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or
before the expiration of ten years.

As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved
to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in
the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the
court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who
was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was
one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page
thereof in the presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed and each
of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence .R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.

CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They
have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard,
who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named
James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District,
Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the
following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued
at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James
N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7
Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed
on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares
in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an
Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to
transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97
to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and
Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in
the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the
ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects
the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary
duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now
pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession.
Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND
THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a
final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in
all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing
of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he
already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to
respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand
because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of
the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-
888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be
corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final
decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the
applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129
may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The
CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute
Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the
terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that
she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed
the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another
counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the
fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather,
it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to
have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the
project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into
finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly,
the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile
imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial,
or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the
manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to
exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability
exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No.
9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last
Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly
authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the
law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate
Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner,
as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption
that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally
disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner
honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore
that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm,
with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his
functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the
project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the
distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The
CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law
of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade
Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight
of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile
of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s
concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is
tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to
discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus
is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s
omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she
realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty
to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as
follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a
decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal
title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy
passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the
other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable
under the circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash
amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon
Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of
course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in
the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial
notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the
same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion
of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law
was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before
Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the
above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can
be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding
No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or
any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati
property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before
the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in
Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines,
although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural
resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v.
Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in
the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not
include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the
1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was
made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession
or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had
already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is
now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.of the testator and of the other witnesses
(answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th
interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd
interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the
time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents
thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office
of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed
the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that
"after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-
18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the
67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-
interrogatories, Id.).

Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of
the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of
our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay
read the document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his
children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that
"after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she
testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she
testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).

Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948), before the last postponement of the hearing
granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32,
t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33,
t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by the latter to the former because they could not
agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought
him to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw
and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the
whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel
Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent
with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528,
t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his
testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after
checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for
correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been
inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit
it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay,
because he came to know or he learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B)
into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the
share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to
oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the
estate of her deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just the
copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all the share, participation and interest of the surviving
widow and of the only child by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the
surviving widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro.
According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and
the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of,
and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will
must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts
from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request,
the rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up
the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp.
392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to
draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it
to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p.
420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft
of the first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months after Suntay and Lopez had called on
him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay,
Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where
the following words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was placed inside the
envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and
the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part
of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went
to his law office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for
probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.);
that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).

The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for
the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B.
Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh
testified before the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his
own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to bring that document to court or to
anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the
executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed
and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance
of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent
evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General
of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that
the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the
same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to
trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of
two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof
that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were
so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s.
n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of
such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:

ORDER:

SEE BELOW

The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that there are no errors, after said minutes
were loudly read and announced actually in the court.

Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the Republic of China in the Civil Section of the
Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
 HUANG KUANG CHENG
Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge
(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted
as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

As a preliminary statement we may well refer to the case of Maria Natividad Lim Billian, petitioner and appellant, vs. Apolonio Suntay, Angel Suntay,
Manuel Suntay, and Jose Suntay, oppositors and appellees, 63 Phil., 793-797, in which the following decision was rendered by this Court on
November 25, 1936, holding that the will executed by Jose B. Suntay who died in the City of Amoy, China, on May 14, 1934, was lost under the
circumstances pointed out therein, and ordering the return of the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for further proceedings:

On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, China. He married twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz with whom he
had several children now residing in the Philippines, and the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.

On the same date, May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first marriage, filed the latter's intestate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 4892).

On October 15, 1934, and in the same court, Maria Natividad Lim Billian also instituted the present proceedings for the probate of a
will allegedly left by the deceased.

According to the petitioner, before the deceased died in China he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A) containing his will and,
also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a true copy of the original contained in the envelope. The will in the
envelope was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go Toh, Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. On
August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in-fact of the petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its copy
Exhibit B. While Go Toh was showing this envelope to Apolonio Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the
deceased, they snatched and opened it and, after getting its contents and throwing away the envelope, they fled.

Upon this allegation, the petitioner asks in this case that the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, children by the first
 marriage of the deceased, who allegedly have the document contained in the envelope which is the will of the deceased, be ordered
to present it in court, that a day be set for the reception of evidence on the will, and that the petitioner be appointed executrix
pursuant to the designation made by the deceased in the will.

In answer to the court's order to present the alleged will, the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay stated that they did
not have the said will and denied having snatched it from Go Toh.

In view of the allegations of the petition and the answer of the brothers Apolonio, Angel, Manuel and Jose Suntay, the questions
raised herein are: The loss of the alleged will of the deceased, whether Exhibit B accompanying the petition is an authentic copy
thereof, and whether it has been executed with all the essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.

At the trial of the case on March 26, 1934, the petitioner put two witnesses upon the stand, Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong, who
corroborated the allegation that the brothers Apolonio and Angel appropriated the envelope in the circumstances above-mentioned.
The oppositors have not adduced any evidence counter to the testimony of these two witnesses. The court, while making no express
finding on this fact, took it for granted in its decision; but it dismissed the petition believing that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that the envelope seized from Go Toh contained the will of the deceased, and that the said will was executed with all the
essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.

In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the envelope. Oppositors' answer admits
that, according to Barretto, he prepared a will of the deceased to which he later become a witness together with Go Toh and Manuel
Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court
there was presented and attached to the case an open and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto, Go Toh and
Manuel Lopez. It is thus undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the deceased-
drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. These tokens sufficiently point to the loss
of the will of the deceased, a circumstance justifying the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of whether it was
executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities.

The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and from what has taken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's
intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, the other points involved herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated,
whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether the latter was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate.
The testimony of Alberto Barretto bears importantly in this connection.

Wherefore, the loss of the will executed by the deceased having been sufficiently established, it is ordered that this case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in obedience to this decision, without any pronouncement as to the costs. So
ordered

On June 18, 1947, Silvino Suntay, the herein petitioner, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan praying "that an order be issued (a)
either directing the continuation of the proceedings in the case remanded by the Supreme Court by virtue of its decision in G. R. No. 44276 and fixing
a date for the reception of evidence of the contents of the will declared lost, or the allowance, filing and recording of the will of the deceased which had
been duly probated in China, upon the presentation of the certificates and authentications required by Section 41, Rule 123 (Yu Chengco vs. Tiaoqui
supra), or both proceedings concurrently and simultaneously; (b) that letters of administration be issued to herein petitioner as co-administrator of the
estate of the deceased together with Federico Suntay; and (c) that such other necessary and proper orders be issued which this Honorable Court
deems appropriate in the premises." While this petition was opposed by Federico C. Suntay, son of the deceased Jose B. Suntay with his first wife,
Manuela T. Cruz, the other children of the first marriage, namely, Ana Suntay, Aurora Suntay, Concepcion Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay,
Manuel Suntay and Emiliano Suntay, filed the following answer stating that they had no opposition thereto; "Come now the heirs Concepcion Suntay,
Ana Suntay, Aurora Suntay, Lourdes Guevara Vda. de Suntay, Manuel Suntay, and Emiliano Suntay, through their undersigned attorney, and, in
answer to the alternative petition filed in these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through counsel, dated June 18, 1947, to this Honorable Court
respectfully state that, since said alternative petition seeks only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late father, they have
no opposition thereto."

After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered on April 19, 1948, the following decision:

This action is for the legalization of the alleged will of Jose B. Suntay, deceased.

In order to have a comprehensive understanding of this case, it is necessary to state the background on which the alternative
petition of the herein petitioner Silvino Suntay has been based.

The decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O), in re will of the deceased Jose B. Suntay, 63 Phil., 793-797, is hereunder produced:

(As quoted above)

The above quoted decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated on November 25, 1936 (Exhibit O).

The Clerk of the Court of Court of First Instance of Bulacan notified the parties of the decision on December 15, 1936; and the case
was set for hearing on February 12, 1937, but it was transferred to March 29, 1937 (Exhibit O), on motion of the then petitioner Maria
Natividad Lim Billian (Exhibit F). Again, it was postponed until "further setting" in the order of court dated March 18, 1937, upon
motion of the petitioner (Exhibit H).

In the meantime, the deposition of Go Toh was being sought (Exhibit H).

The hearing of the case was again set for February 7, 1936, by order of the court dated January 5, 1938, upon motion of Emiliano
Suntay and Jose Suntay, Jr. On the same day of the hearing which had been set, the petitioner, then, Maria Natividad Lim Billian,
sent a telegram from Amoy, China, addressed to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan moving for the postponement of the hearing
on the ground that Atty. Eriberto de Silva who was representing her died (Exhibit K). The court, instead of granting the telegraphic
motion for postponement, dismissed the case in the order dated February 7, 1938 (Exhibit L).

On July 3, 1947, the petitioner Silvino Suntay filed a motion for the consolidation of the intestate Estate of the deceased Jose B.
Suntay, Special Proceeding No. 4892 and the Testate Estate of Jose B. Suntay, Special Proceeding No. 4952, which latter case is
the subject of the said alternative petition. The motion for the merger and consolidation of the two cases was granted on July 3,
1947.

That oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, in the Testate Proceeding filed a motion to dismiss the alternative petition on November 14,
1947, which was denied by the court in its resolution of November 22, 1947. The said oppositor not being satisfied with the ruling of
this court denying the motion to dismiss, filed before the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction,
which was dismissed for lack of merit on January 27, 1948.

In obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court (Exhibit O) and upon the alternative petition of Silvino Suntay, and, further, upon
the dismissal of the petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction, the court was constrained to proceed with the hearing of
the probate of the lost will, the draft of which is Exhibit B, or the admission and recording of the will which had been probated in
Amoy, China.

The evidence for the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, shows that Jose B. Suntay married twice; first to Manuela T. Cruz who died on June
15, 1920 and had begotten with her Apolonio, now deceased, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano and
Jose, Jr., all surnamed Suntay, and second, to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had as the only child Silvino Suntay, the
petitioner herein.

Some time in November 1929, Jose B. Suntay executed his last will and testament in the office of Atty. Alberto Barretto in Manila,
which was witnessed by Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go Toh. The will was prepared by said Alberto Barretto upon the
instance of Jose B. Suntay, and it was written in the Spanish language which was understood and spoken by said testator. After the
due execution of the will, that is signing every page and the attestation clause by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of
each other, the will was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A), sealed and on the said envelope the testator and the three
subscribing witnesses also signed, after which it was delivered to Jose B. Suntay.

A year or so after the execution of the will, Jose B. Suntay together with his second wife Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino
Suntay who was then of tender age went to reside in Amoy, Fookien, China, where he died on May 14, 1934. The will was entrusted
to the widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian.

Upon the death of Jose B. Suntay on May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, the oldest son now deceased, instituted the Intestate
Proceedings No. 4892, upon the presumption that no will existed. Maria Natividad Lim Billian who remained in Amoy, China, had
with her the will and she engaged the services of the law firm of Barretto and Teodoro for the probate of the will. Upon the request of
the said attorneys the will was brought to the Philippines by Go Toh who was one of the attesting witnesses, and it was taken to the
law office of Barretto and Teodoro. The law firm of Barretto and Teodoro was composed of Atty. Alberto Barretto and Judge
Anastacio Teodoro. The probate of the will was entrusted to the junior partner Judge Anastacio Teodoro; and, upon the presentation
of the sealed envelope to him, he opened it and examined the said will preparatory to the filing of the petition for probate. There was
a disagreement as to the fees to be paid by Maria Natividad Lim Billian, and as she (through Go Toh) could not agree to pay,
P20,000 as fees, the will was returned to Go Toh by Judge Anastacio Teodoro after the latter had kept it in his safe, in his office, for
three days.

Subsequently, the will inside the envelope was snatched from Go Toh by Manuel Suntay and Jose, Jr., which fact has been
established in the decision of the Supreme Court at the beginning of this decision. Go Toh could recover the envelope (Exhibit A)
and the piece of cloth with which the envelope was wrapped (Exhibit C).

The Testate Proceeding was filed nevertheless and in lien of the lost will a draft of the will (Exhibit B) was presented as secondary
evidence for probate. It was disallowed by this court through Judge Buenaventura Ocampo, but on appeal the Supreme Court
remanded the case to this court for further proceeding (Exhibit C).

In the meantime, a Chinese will which was executed in Amoy Fookien, China, on January 4, 1931, by Jose B. Suntay, written in
Chinese characters (Exhibit P) was discovered in Amoy, China, among the papers left by Jose B. Suntay, and said will had been
allowed to probate in the Amoy District Court, China, which is being also presented by Silvino Suntay for allowance and recording in
this court.

The said petition is opposed by Federico C. Suntay on the main ground that Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino Suntay have no
more interest in the properties left by Jose B. Suntay, because they have already sold their respective shares, interests and
participations. But such a ground of opposition is not of moment in the instant case, because the proposition involved herein in the
legalization of the lost will or the allowance and recording of the will which had been probated in Amoy, China.

It is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the evidence whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased, left a will (the draft of which
is Exhibit B) and another will which was executed and another will which was executed and probated in Amoy, China.

There is no longer any doubt that Jose B. Suntay while he was still residing in the Philippines, had executed a will; such is the
conclusion of the Supreme Court in its decision (Exhibit O). That the will was snatched and it has never been produced in court by
those who snatched it, and consequently considered lost, is also an established fact.

The contention of the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay, is that the will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay in the Philippines contained
provisions which provided for equal distribution of the properties among the heirs; hence, the draft (Exhibit B) cannot be considered
as secondary evidence, because it does not provide for equal distribution, but if favors Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino
Suntay. He relies on the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto who declared that the first will which he drafted and reduced into a plain
copy was the will that was executed by Jose B. Suntay and placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A).

Granting that the first will which Atty. Alberto Barretto had drafted became the will of Jose B. Suntay and it was snatched by, and,
therefore, it had fallen into the hands of, Manuel Suntay and the brothers of the first marriage, it stands to reason that said Manuel
Suntay and brothers would have been primarily interested in the production of said will in court, for obvious reasons, namely, that
they would have been favored. But it was suppressed and "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" (Section 69
(e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court). The contention, therefore, that the first will which was drafted by Atty. Barretto was the one
placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) is untenable.

It might be said in this connection that the draft of the will (Exhibit B) has been admitted by Atty. Alberto Barretto as identical in
substance and form to the second draft which he prepared in typewriting; it differs only, according to him, in style. He denied that the
insertions in long hand in the said draft are in his own handwriting; however, Judge Anastacio Teodoro averred that the said
insertions are the handwriting of Atty. Alberto Barretto. But when Atty. Alberto Barretto was asked to show any manuscript of his for
purposes of comparison, he declined to do so alleging that he did not have any document in his possession showing his handwriting
notwithstanding the fact that he was testifying in his own house at 188 Sta. Mesa Boulevard, Manila. He further testified that the first
will be drafted contained four or five pages, but the second draft contained twenty-three pages; that he declared in one breath that
he did not read the will any more when it was signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses because it would take up much time,
and in the same breath he declared that he checked it before it was signed; and that he destroyed the draft of the first will which was
in his own handwriting, but he delivered the draft of the second will which he prepared to Jose B. Suntay in the presence of Manuel
Lopez, now deceased.

Whether or not the final plain copy of the draft of the will (Exhibit B) was executed by the testator, Jose B. Suntay, and attested by
the subscribing witnesses, Atty. Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and Go Toh, is the pivotal point in this instant case. Judge Anastacio
Teodoro testified that he opened the sealed envelope when it was given to him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation of the
petition for the probate of the said will. As the lawyer entrusted with that task, he had to examine the will and have it copied to be
reproduced or appended to the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth salt as a good lawyer; he could not perform the
stunt of "blind flying" in the judicial firmament. Every step must be taken with certainty and precision under any circumstances. He
could not have talked about the attorney's fees with Go Toh, unless he has not examined the will beforehand. And, declaring that it
was the exact draft of the will that was inside the envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto to the contrary
notwithstanding.

The testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is corroborated by Go Toh, one of the attesting witnesses, in his deposition (Exhibit D-1).

Ana Suntay, one of the heirs and who would be affected adversely by the legalization of the will in question, also testified on rebuttal
that she saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay, immediately after the snatching. She read it and she particularly
remembers the manner in which the properties were to be distributed. Exhibit B was shown to her on the witness stand and she
declared that the provision regarding the distribution of the properties in said Exhibit B is the same as that contained in the original
will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto.

With respect to the proof of lost or destroyed will, Section 6 of Rule 77 provides as follows:

"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or it is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under
the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded."

Section 8 of the same Rule provides as follows:

"If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them resides in the
Philippines the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will;
and as evidence of the due execution of the will, it may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing
witnesses, or any of them."

Manuel Lopez as one of the subscribing witnesses is dead. Atty. Alberto Barretto and Go Toh are still living. The former testified
during the hearing, while Go Toh's deposition was introduced in evidence which was admitted. In the absence of the testimony of
Manuel Lopez, deceased, the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay was received.

It is an established fact that the will, draft of which is Exhibit B, was lost or destroyed; that it was executed and valid and that it
existed at the time of the death of Jose B. Suntay. These circumstances also apply to the will (Exhibit P) which was executed in
Amoy, China.

The contents of the Chinese will is substantially the same as the draft (Exhibit B). Granting that the will executed in the Philippines is
non-existent as contended by the oppositor, although the findings of this court is otherwise, the will executed and probated in China
should be allowed and recorded in this court. All the formalities of the law in China had been followed in its execution, on account of
which it was duly probated in the Amoy District Court. There is no cogent reason, therefore, why it should not be admitted and
recorded in this jurisdiction.

The said will (Exhibit P) in Chinese characters is presented as an alternate in case the will executed in the Philippines would not be
allowed to probate, or as a corroborative evidence that the will, the draft of which is Exhibit B, has been duly executed in the
Philippines by Jose B. Suntay.

Rule 78 of the Rules of Court covers the allowance of will proved outside of the Philippines and administration of estate thereunder.

Section 1 of said rule provides:

"Wills proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or territory thereof, or in foreign country, according to the laws of such
state, territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines."

Section 2 of the same rule provides:

"When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by
the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and
cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance."

This court has delved deep into the evidence adduced during the hearing with that penetrating scrutiny in order to discovery the real
facts; it had used unsparingly the judicial scapel; and it has winnowed the evidenced to separate the grain from the chaff. All the
facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that Jose B. Suntay, in his sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress or undue
 influence, executed the will which is lost, the draft of which is Exhibit B, with all the necessary formalities prescribed by law. He,
likewise, executed the second will (Exhibit P) in Amoy, China, which has been duly probated in Amoy District Court,-a corroborative
evidence that the testator really executed the will. Copies of the said wills duly certified and under the seal of the court are appended
hereto, marked Exhibits B and P, and they form part of this decision.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the court is of the opinion and so declares that the draft of the will (Exhibit B) is, to all legal
intents and purposes, and testament of the deceased Jose B. Suntay. With costs against the oppositor, Federico C. Suntay.

Oppositor Federico C. Suntay filed on May 20, 1948, a motion for new trial and to set aside the decision rendered on April 19, 1948, to which the
petitioner filed an opposition, followed by a reply filed by the oppositor and an answer on the part of the petitioner. Without reopening the case and
receiving any new or additional evidence, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, on September 29, 1948, promulgated the following resolution setting
aside his first decision and disallowing the wills sought to be probated by the petitioner in his alternative petition filed on June 18, 1947:

This is a motion for new trial and to set aside the decision legalizing the will of Jose B. Suntay and allowing and recording another
will executed by him in Amoy, China.

By virtue of this motion, this court is constrained to go over the evidence and the law applicable thereto with the view of ascertaining
whether or not the motion is well founded. Both parties have presented extensive memoranda in support of their respective
contentions.

This court has gone over the evidence conscientiously, and it reiterates its findings of the same facts in this resolution, whether or
not the facts established by the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant the legalization of the lost will and the allowance and recording of
the will that was executed in Amoy, China, is therefore, the subject of this instant motion.

A. As to the legalization of the Lost Will. — There is no question in the mind of this court that the original will which Jose B. Suntay,
deceased executed in the Philippines in the year 1929 was lost (Exhibit O, Decision of the Supreme Court). The evidence adduced
by the petitioner during the hearing has established through the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and that of Go Toh (an
attesting witness) that the will was executed by Jose B. Suntay, deceased, with all the formalities required by law. For the purpose of
legalizing an original and existing will, the evidence on record is sufficient as to the execution and attesting in the manner required
by law.

Section 8 of Rule 77 provides as follows:

"SEC. 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or do not reside in the Philippines. — If it appears at the time fixed for the hearing
that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them resides in the Philippines, the court may admit the testimony
of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of the execution of the will,
may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses, or any of them."

Section 11 of said rule also provides as follows:

"SEC. 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where contest. — If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must
be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of the subscribing witnesses are present in the Philippines, but outside the
province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If all or some of the subscribing witnesses produced and
examined testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law."
The three attesting witnesses were Manuel Lopez, deceased Alberto Barretto and Go Toh. The last two witnesses are still living; the
former testified against and the latter in favor. In other words, the attesting witness, Go Toh, only, testified in his deposition in favor
of the due execution of the will. Hence, the petitioner presented another witness, Judge Anastacio Teodoro, to establish and prove
the due execution of the said will. Ana Suntay was also presented as a witness in rebuttal evidence. The testimony of Go Toh in his
deposition as an attesting witness, coupled with the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro who was able to examine the original will
that was executed by Jose B. Suntay, deceased, when it was given to him by Go Toh for the purpose of filing the petition in court for
its legalization, and could recognize the signatures of the testator as well as of the three attesting witnesses on the said original will
is sufficient to convince the court that the original will was executed by the deceased Jose B. Suntay with all the formalities required
by law. The original will, therefore, if it was presented in court to probate would be allowed to all legal intents and purposes. But it
was not the original will that was presented, because it was lost, but an alleged draft (Exhibit B) of the said original will which does
not bear the signature of the testator and any of the attesting witness. The original will was duly executed with all the formalities
required by law, but it was unfortunately lost; and the curtain falls for the next setting.

The Court is now confronted with the legalization of the lost will — whether or not the draft (Exhibit B) should be admitted as
secondary evidence in lieu of the lost will and allowed to probate.

Section 6. Rule 77 provides as follows:

"SEC. 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will — Certificate thereupon. — No will shall be proved as a lost will or destroyed will unless the
execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions
thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the Judge, under the seal of the court and the certificate must be filed and recorded
as other wills are filed and recorded." (Emphasis Court's)

From the above quoted provision of the law, it is clear that the petitioner should not only establish the execution and validity of the
will, its existence at the time of the death of the testator or its fraudulent and accidental destruction in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, but also must prove its provisions clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses. The exact
language of the clause in the above quoted provision of the law is "nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses." The legalization of a lost will is not so easy, therefore, as that of an original will. The question,
therefore, is boiled down to, and projected on the screen, in a very sharp focus; namely, the execution and validity must be
established and the provisions must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least credible witnesses.

Granting that the execution and validity of the lost will have been established through the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro and
Go Toh, and perhaps superficially by the rebuttal witness, Ana Suntay, does it follow that the provisions of the lost will have been
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses? A careful review of the evidence has revealed that at most the only
credible witness who testified as to the provisions of the will was Judge Anastacio Teodoro, and yet he testified on the provisions of
the lost will with the draft (Exhibit B) in his hands while testifying. It may be granted, however, that with or without the draft of the will
(Exhibit B) in his hands, he could have testified clearly and distinctly on the provisions of the said lost will, because he had kept the
will in his safe, in his office, for three days, after opening it, and he is well versed in Spanish language in which the will as written. But
did the attesting witness Go Toh, testify in his deposition and prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the lost will? He did not,
and he could not have done so even if he tried because the original will was not read to him nor by him before or at the signing of
the same. It was written in Spanish and he did not and does not understand the Spanish language. Neither was there any occasion
for him to have the contents of the said will, after its execution and sealing inside the envelope (Exhibit A), read to him because it
was opened only when Judge Teodoro had examined it and then subsequently snatched from Go Toh. Ana Suntay on rebuttal did
not, likewise, prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost will because she has not had enough schooling and she does
possess adequate knowledge of the Spanish language as shown by the fact that she had to testify in Tagalog on the witness
standing.
It is evident, therefore, that although the petitioner has established the execution and validity of the lost will, yet he had not proved
clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will by at least two credible witnesses.

B. As to the Allowance and Recording of the will Executed in Amoy, China. — Jose B. Suntay, while he was residing in China during
the remaining years of his life, executed also a will, written in Chinese characters, the translation of which is marked Exhibit P. It was
allowed to probate in the District Court of Amoy, China. The question is whether or not the said will should be allowed and recorded
in this jurisdiction.

Section 1 of Rule 78 provides as follows:

"SEC. 1. Will proved outside Philippines any be allowed here. — Will proved and allowed in the United States, or any state or
territory thereof, or in a foreign country, according to the laws of such state, territory, or country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded
by the proper court of First Instance in the Philippines."

Section 2 of the same Rule also provides:

"SEC. 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. — When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a
petition for allowance in the Philippines by the executor or other persons interested, in the Court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance."

Sections 41 and 42 of Rule 123 provides as follows:

"SEC. 41. Proof of Public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is within the United States or its territory, the certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the
district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer
having a seal of the office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by
the seal of his office. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United
States stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."

F. "SEC. 42. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of writing is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court."

In the case of Yu Changco vs. Tiaoqui, 11 Phil. 598, 599, 600, our Supreme Court said:

"Section 637 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that will proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the testator has real or personal
estate on which such will may operate; but section 638 requires that the proof of the authenticity of a will executed in a foreign
country must be duly "authenticated". Such authentication, considered as a foreign judicial record, is prescribed by section 304,
which requires the attestation of the clerk or of the legal keeper of the records with the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal,
together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate that the signature of either of the functionaries attesting the will is
genuine, and, finally, the certification of the authenticity of the signature of such judge or presiding magistrate, by the ambassador,
minister, consul, vice consul or consular agent of the United States in such foreign country. And, should the will be considered, from
an administrative point of view, as a mere official document 'of a foreign country', it may be proved, 'by the original, or by a copy
certified by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate, under the seal of the country or sovereign, that the document is a valid and
subsisting document of such country, and that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal custody of the original. (Sec.
313, par. 8)."

In the case of Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, 611, 612, and 613, our Supreme Court said:

"It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., Vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the
Director of the National Library. But this was far from compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson (1918), 39 Phil., 156.) Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was not showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original under the seal of the State of West Virginia,
as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

"It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands.
The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner.

"While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the
court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper
writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on June 8, 1929,
to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Vansley and Joseph
L. Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that in
vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed Claude E. Maxwell as administrator, cum
testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased ... However this may be no attempt has been made to comply
with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a
will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. ... ."

Granting that the will of Jose B. Suntay which was executed in Amoy, China, was validly done in accordance with the law of the
Republic of China on the matter, is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in China as a prerequisite to the
allowance and recording of said will? The answer is in the affirmative as enunciated in Fluemer vs. Hix, supra, and in Yanez de
Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606. In the latter case, the Supreme Court said:

"A foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having in charge of the original, under the seal of the state or country. It
may also be proved by an official copy of the same published under the authority of the particular state and purporting to contain
such law. (Secs. 300 and 301, Act No. 190.), (Syllabus.)

The provisions of section 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) are as follows:

"SEC. 300. Printed laws of the State or Country. — Books printed or published under the authority of the United States, or one of the
States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or
country or proved to be commonly admitted in the tribunals of such State or country an evidence of the written law thereof, are
admissible in the Philippine Islands are evidence of such law."
"SEC. 301. Attested copy of foreign laws. — A copy of the written law or other public writing of any state or country, attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the state or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or
writing."

The petitioner has presented in evidence the certification of the Chinese Consul General, Tsutseng T. Shen, of the existence of the
law in China (Exhibit B-3), relative to the execution and probate of the will executed by Jose B. Suntay in Amoy, China (Exhibit P). Is
that evidence admissible, in view of the provisions of Sections 41 and 42 of the Rules of the Rules of Court. Is the said certification
of the Chinese Consul General in the Philippines a substantial compliance with the provisions of the above mentioned section 41
and 42 of our Rules of Court?

This court has its doubts as to the admissibility in evidence of the Chinese Consul General in the Philippines of the existence of the
laws of Republic of China relative to the execution and probate of a will executed in China. Such law may exist in China, but —

"An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidence by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. ... If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office." (Sec. 41 of Rule 123.)

The law of the Republic of China is a public or official record and it must be proved in this jurisdiction through the means prescribed
by our Rules of Court. It is, therefore, obvious that the Chinese Counsel General in the Philippines who certified as to the existence
of such law is not the officer having the legal custody of the record, nor is he a deputy of such officer. And, if the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

It is clear, therefore, that the above provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 123, sec. 41) not having been complied with, the doubt of
this court has been dissipated, and it is of the opinion and so holds that the certification of the Chinese Consul General alone is not
admissible as evidence in the jurisdiction.

The evidence of record is not clear as to whether Jose B. Suntay, who was born in China, but resided in the Philippines for a long
time, has become a Filipino citizen by naturalization, or he remained a citizen of the Republic of China. The record does not,
likewise, show with certainty whether or not he had changed his permanent domicile from the Philippines to Amoy, China. His
change of permanent domicile could only be inferred. But the question of his permanent domicile pales into insignificance in view of
the overtowering fact that the law of China pertinent to the allowance and recording of the said will in this jurisdiction has been
satisfactorily established by the petitioner.

Both the petitioner and the oppositor have extensively urged in their respective memorandum and in the oral argument in behalf of
the oppositor the question of estoppel. The consideration of the points raised by them would open the door to the appreciation of the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will which is not of moment at the present stage of the proceeding. While the probate of a will
is conclusive as to the compliance with all formal requisites necessary to the lawful execution of the will, such probate does not
affect the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will. With respect to the latter the will in governed by the substantive law relative to
descent and distribution. (In re Johnson, 39 Phil., 157).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and upon reconsideration, the previous decision rendered in this case allowing the will (Exhibit B)
and allowing and recording the foreign will (Exhibit P) is set aside; and this court is of the opinion and so holds that the said two wills
 should be, as they are hereby disallowed. Without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is very significant that in the foregoing resolution, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan "reiterates its finding of the same facts in this resolution," and
merely proceeds to pose the sole question "whether or not the facts established by the petitioner, Silvino Suntay, warrant the legalization of the lost will
and allowance and recording of the will that was executed in Amoy, China." The somersault executed by the trial court is premised on the ground that
"although the petitioner has established the execution and validity of the lost will, yet he has not proved clearly and distinctly the provisions of the will
by the least two credible witnesses"; and that, assuming that the will of Jose B. Suntay executed in Amoy, China, was in accordance with the law of
the Republic of China, the certification of the Chinese Consul General in the Philippines as the existence of such law is not admissible evidence in this
jurisdiction. In effect the resolution on the motion for reconsideration promulgated by the trial court, and the decision of the majority herein, adopt the
position that the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro as to the provisions of the lost will, while credible and perhaps sufficient in extent, is not
corroborated by the witnesses Go Toh and Ana Suntay and, therefore, falls short of the requirement in section 6, Rule 77, of the Rules of Court that
the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two witnesses." That this requirement was obviously construed, to mean
that the exact provisions are to be established, may be deduced from the following dialogue between his Honor, Judge Potenciano Pecson, and
attorney Teofilo Sison, new counsel for oppositor Federico C. Suntay, who appeared for the first time at the ex parte hearing of the oppositor's motion
for new trial on September 1, 1949:

COURT: However, Rule 77, Section 6, provides in proving a lost will, the provisions of the lost will must be distinctly stated and
certified by the Judge.

ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: That presupposes that the judge could only certify to the exact provisions of the will from the evidence presented.

ATTY. TEOFILO SISON: That is our contention, provided that provision is clearly established by two credible witnesses so that the
Court could state that in the decision, we agree, that is the very point.

(t. s. n. 75, Session of Sept. 1, 1948)

The sound rule, however, as we have found it to be, as to the degree of proof required to establish the contents of a lost or destroyed will, is that there
is sufficient compliance if two witnesses have substantiated the provisions affecting the disposition of the testator's properties; and this is especially
necessary to prevent the "perpetration of fraud by permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof," to keep a wrong-doer from utilizing the
rule as his "most effective weapon," or to avoid the enjoyment of a "premium from the rascality of one whose interests might suggest the destruction of
a will."

Section 1865 of the Code requires that the provisions of a lost will must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses before it can be admitted to probate; but this section must receive a liberal construction (Hook vs. Pratt, 8 Hun. 102-109)
and its spirit is complied with by holding that it applies only to those provisions which affect the disposition of the testator's property
and which are of the substance of the will.

The allegations of the contents of the will are general, and under ordinary circumstances, would be in sufficient; but the fact alleged,
if proven as alleged, would certainly authorize the establishment of the will so far as its bequests are concerned. To require that a
copy of the will or the language of the bequests, in detail, should be pleaded, where no copy has been preserved, and where the
memory of the witnesses does not hold the exact words, would not only deny the substance for mere form, but would offer a
premium upon the rascality of one whose interests might suggest the destruction of a will. As said in Anderson vs. Irwin, 101 Ill. 411:
"The instrument in controversy having been destroyed without the fault of the defendant in error ... and there not appearing to be any
copy of it in existence, it would be equivalent to denying the complainant relief altogether to require her to prove the very terms in
which it was conceived. All that could reasonably be required of her under the circumstances could be to show in general terms the
 disposition which the testator made of his property by the instruments; that it purported to be his will and was duly attested by the
requisite number of witnesses." In Allison vs. Allison, 7 Dana 91, it was said in speaking of the character and extent of proof required
in such a case:" nor is there any just ground to object to the proof because the witnesses have not given the language of the will or
the substance thereof. They have given the substance of the different devises as to the property or interest devised, and to whom
devised and we would not stop, in the case of a destroyed will, to scan with rigid scrutiny the form of the proof, provided we are
satisfied of the substance of its provisions." (Jose vs. Casler 139 Ind. 392, 38 N. E. 812).

The evidence in the case falls short of establishing the existence of such a writing, except as it may be presumed, under the maxim
Omnia preasumuntur in odium spoliateris." There was evidence tending to show that the second will of Anne Lambie was in the
possession of Francis Lambie, and that it came to the hands of the proponents, warranting the inference that it has been suppressed
or destroyed. If from this evidence the jury found such paper destroyed the law permits the presumption that it was legally drawn and
executed, notwithstanding the terms of the statute, which requires the revoking instrument to be formally executed. If a will be lost,
secondary evidence may be given of its contents; if suppressed or destroyed, the same is true; and, if necessary the law will prevent
the perpetration of a fraud by permitting a presumption to supply the suppressed proof. We cannot assent to the proposition that the
statute is so right as to be the wrongdoer's most effective weapons. The misconduct once established to the satisfaction of the jury,
it is no hardship to the wrongdoer to say. "Produce the evidence in your possession, or we will presume that your opponent's
contention is true." When one deliberately destroys, or purposely induces another to destroy, a written instrument subsequently
become a matter of judicial inquiry between the spoliator and an innocent party, the latter will not be required to make strict proof of
the contents of such instrument in order to establish a right founded thereon. Brook, Leg. Max. 576, Preston vs. Preston, 132, Atl.
55, 61. (Re Lambie's Estate, 97 Mich, 55,56 N. W. 225)

Judged from the standard set forth in the foregoing authorities, and bearing in mind that the circumstances of this case lead to the only conclusion that
the loss of the will in question is of course imputable to those whose interests are adverse to the petitioner and the widow Lim Billian, we have no
hesitancy in holding the view that the dispositions of the properties left by the deceased Jose B. Suntay is provided in his will which was lost or
snatched in the manner recited in the decision of this Court in the case of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, 63 Phil., 798-797, had been more than sufficiently
proved by the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro, Go Toh, and Ana Suntay, supported conclusively by the draft of the lost will presented in
evidence as Exhibit "B", and even by the testimony of oppositor Federico C. Suntay himself.

It is to be recalled that the trial Judge, in his first decision of April 19, 1948, made the following express findings with respect to the testimony of Judge
Teodoro: "Judge Anastacio Teodoro testified that he opened the sealed envelope when it was given to him by Go Toh preparatory to the presentation
of the petition for the probate of the said will. As the lawyer entrusted with that task, he had to examine the will and have it copied to be reproduced or
appended to the petition. He could not do otherwise if he is worth his salt as a good lawyer. He could not perform the stunt of "blind flying" in the
judicial firmament. Every step must be taken with certainty and precision under any circumstances. He could not have talked about the attorney's fees
with Go Toh, unless he has not examined the will beforehand. And, when he was shown Exhibit B, he did not hesitate in declaring that it was the exact
draft of the will that was inside the envelope (Exhibit A), the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto to the contrary notwithstanding."

We should not forget, in this connection, that in the resolution on the motion for reconsideration the trial Judge reiterated the findings in his decision,
although as regards the testimony of Judge Teodoro admittedly "the only credible witness who testified as to the provisions of the will," he observed
that Judge Teodoro had the draft Exhibit "B" in his hands while testifying. We cannot see any justifying for the observation, assuming that Judge
Teodoro consulted the draft, since even the trial Judge granted that he "could have testified clearly and distinctly on the provisions of the said lost will,
because he had kept the will in his safe, in his office, for three days, after opening it, and he is well versed in Spanish language in which the will was
written." As a matter of fact, however, it is not true that Judge Teodoro had the draft in question before him while testifying as may be seen from the
following passages of the transcript:

Q. And, have you read that will which was inside this envelope, Exhibit A? — "A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember more or less the contents of the will?

ATTY. FERRIN: With our objection, the best evidence is original will itself, Your Honor.

ATTY. RECTO: We are precisely proving by means of secondary evidence, the contents of the will, because according to the
Supreme Court, and that is a fact already decided, that the will of Jose B. Suntay was lost and that is res adjudicata.

COURT: Witness may answer.

WITNESS: I remember the main features of the will because as I said I was the one fighting for the postponement of the hearing of
the intestate case because I was asked by Don Alberto Barretto to secure the postponement until the will that was executed by the
deceased is sent here by the widow from China, with whom we communicated with several letters, and when the will arrived. I had to
check the facts as appearing in the will, and examined fully in connection with the facts alleged in the intestate, and there was a
striking fact in the intestate that Apolonio Suntay has..

ATTY. FERRIN: (Interrupting) May we ask that the witness answer categorically the questions of Atty. Recto, it seems that the
answers of the witness are kilometric ...

ATTY. RECTO: Sometimes the question cannot be answered fully unless the witness would relate and give all the facts.

COURT: The Attorney for the Administrator may move for the striking out of any testimony that is not responsive to the question.

ATTY. FERRIN: That is why, our objection, the answer is out of the question.

COURT: Atty. Recto may propound another question.

ATTY. RECTO: I heard the witness was saying something and he has not finished the sentence, and I want to ask the Court just to
allow the witness to finish his sentence.

COURT: You may finish.

WITNESS: "A. There was a sentence, the point I was trying to check first was whether the value of the estate left by the deceased
was SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) as Apolonio Suntay made it appear in his petition, and when I looked at the original
will, I found out that it was several hundred thousand pesos, several thousands of pesos, hundreds of pesos, that was very striking
fact to me because the petition for intestate was for SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00), and I came to know that it was worth
more than SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P700,000.00) PESOS.

Q. Do you remember, Judge, the disposition of the will, the main disposition of the will? — "A. Yes, because our client were the
widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian, and his son, Silvino, the only son in the second marriage, that was very important for me to
know.

Q. How were the properties distributed according to that will?- "A. The properties were distributed into three (3) parts, one part which
we call legitima corta, were equally distributed to the ten (10) children, nine (9) in the first marriage, and one (1) in the second
marriage with Maria Natividad Lim Billian. The other third, the betterment was given to four (4) children, Concepcion, and Apolonio
getting a quiet substantial share in the betterment, around SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) for Concepcion, Apolonio the amount of
SEVENTY THOUSAND (70,000,00) PESOS or little over, and then about ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS of
the betterment in favor of Silvino, the minor of the second marriage, and to Jose equal to Concepcion.
 Q. So the betterment, as I understand from you went to four (4) children?-"A. Yes.

Q. Silvino in the second marriage, Concepcion, Apolonio and Jose in the first marriage? — " A. Yes.

Q. What about the free disposal?-" A. The free disposal was disposed in favor of the widow, Maria Natividad Lim Billian and Silvino,
his minor son in equal parts..

Q. What about, if you remember, if there was something in the will in connection with that particular of the usufruct of the widow? —
"A. It was somewhat incorporated into the assets of the estate left by the deceased.

Q. Do you remember the number of pages of which that will consisted? — "A. Twenty-three (23) pages.

Q. Do you remember if the pages were signed by the testator? — "A. Yes, sir, it was signed.

Q. And the foot of the testament or the end of the testament, was it signed by the testator? — "A. Yes, sir, and the attestation clause
was the last page signed by the three instrumental witnesses, Alberto Barretto, one Chinaman Go Toh, and Manuel Lopez, my
former Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy.

Q. Do you remember if there witnesses signed on the different pages of the will? — "A. Yes, sir, they signed with their name
signatures.

Q. Showing you this document consisting of twenty-three (23) pages in Spanish and which document appears already attached to
this same testamentary proceedings and already marked as EXHIBIT B, will you please tell the Court if and for instance on page
eight (8) of this document, pagina octavo, it says, there are handwritings in pencil, some of which read as follows: "Los cinco-
octavos (5/8) partes corresponds a mi hijo Emiliano", can you recognize whose handwriting is that? — "A. From my best estimate it
is the handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto.

Q. About the end of the same page eight (8) pagina octavo, of the same document Exhibit B, there is also the handwriting in pencil
which reads: "La otra sexta parte (6.a) corresponde a Bonifacio Lopez", can you recognize that handwriting? — "A. Yes, sir, this is
the handwriting of Don Alberto Barretto, and I wish to call the attention of the Court to compare letter "B" which is in capital letter with
the signature of Don Alberto Barretto in the envelope, "Alberto Barretto" and stroke identifies one hand as having written those
words.

Q. Will you please go over cursorily this document, Exhibit B composed of twenty-three (23) pages and please tell the Court if this
document had anything to do with the will which according to you was contained in the envelope, Exhibit A? — "A. This is exactly the
contents of the original will which I received and kept in my office inside the safe for three (3) days, and I precisely took special case
in the credits left by the deceased, and I remember among them, were the De Leon family, and Sandiko, well known to me, and then
the disposition of the estate, divided into three (3) equal parts, and I noticed that they are the contents of the will read.

His Honor, Judge Pecson, was positive in his first decision that "the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro is corroborated by Go Toh, one of the
attesting witnesses, in his deposition (Exhibit D-1)." Yet in setting aside his first decision, he remarked that Go Toh's testimony did not prove clearly
and distinctly the provision of the lost will, because: "He did not, and he could not have done so even if he tried because the original will was not read
to him nor by him before or at the signing of the same. It was written in Spanish and he did not and does not understand the Spanish language.
Neither was there any occasion for him to have the contents of the said will, after its execution and sealing inside the envelope (Exhibit A), read to him,
because it was opened only when Judge Teodoro had examined it and then subsequently snatched from Go Toh."
The later position thus taken by Judge Pecson is palpably inconsistent with the following unequivocal statements of Go Toh contained in hid
disposition taken in Amoy, China, on April 17, 1938, and in oppositor's Exhibit "6":

26. State what you know of the contents of that will.

. . . . Regarding (1) expenditures (2) Philippine citizenship; (3) Distribution of estates among children (4) Taking care of grave lot; (5)
guardianship of Silvino Suntay and (6) after paying his debts he will have approximately 720,000 pesos left. This amount will be
divided into three equal parts of 240,000 pesos each. The first part is to be divided equally among the ten children born by the first
and second wives and the second part among the three sons Silvino Suntay, 75,000 approximately; Apolonio Suntay, 50,000 pesos
approximately; Jose Suntay and Concepcion Suntay, 36,000 each approximately. The third part is to be divided between Maria Lim
Billian and Silvino Suntay; each will get approximately 110,000 pesos. Silvino Suntay will get a total of 210,000 pesos approximately,
Maria Natividad Lim Billian a total of 290,000 approximately, and Apolonio Suntay a total of 80,000 approximately, Concepcion
Suntay and Jose Suntay will get 60,000 pesos each approximately. The rest of the children will get approximately 29,000 each. The
way of distribution of the property of Jose B. Suntay, movable and immovable, and the outstanding debts to be collected was
arranged by Jose B. Suntay.

xxx     xxx     xxx

78. On the occasion of the execution of the testament of Jose B. Suntay, state whether or not you say Exhibit B — ... Yes.

79. In the affirmative case, state if you know who had the possession of Exhibit B and the testament the first time you saw them on
that occasion. — ... Yes, I know who had possession of them.

80. Can you say whether or not Jose B. Suntay happened to get those documents later on, on that same occasion? — ... He got
them after the execution.

81. Please name the person who gave those documents to Mr. Suntay. — ... Alberto Barretto gave the documents to Jose B.
Suntay.

82. Did the person who gave those documents to Suntay say anything to him (Suntay) at the time of giving them? — ... Yes.

83. If so what was it that he said, if he said any? — ... He said, "You had better see if you want any correction."

84. What did Mr. Suntay do after those documents were given to him? — ... Jose B. Suntay looked at them and then gave one copy
to Manuel Lopez for checking.

85. State whether or not Mr. Suntay gave one of those documents to another man. — ... Yes.

86. In the affirmative case, can you say which of the two documents was given and who the man was? — ... Yes he gave Exhibit B
to Manuel Lopez.

87. State whether or not Mr. Suntay said something to the man to whom he gave one of those documents. — ... Yes.

88. In the affirmative case can you repeat more or less what Mr. Suntay said to that man? — ... He told him to read it for checking.
 89. State if you know what did the man do with one of those documents given to him. — ... He took it and read it for checking.

90. What did in turn Mr. Suntay do with the other one left with him? — ... Jose B. Suntay looked at the original and checked them.

91. What was done with those documents later on if there was anything done with them? — ... After checking, Jose B. Suntay put
Exhibit B in his pocket and had the original signed and executed.

92. What was done with the testament of Jose B. Suntay after it was signed by the testator and its witnesses? — ... It was taken
away by Jose B. Suntay. (Exhibit D, D-1.)

Q. Did you know the contents of this envelope? — "A. I knew that it was a will.

Q. But did you know the provisions of the will? — "A. It is about the distribution of the property to the heirs.

Q. Did you know how the property was distributed according to the will? — "A. I know that more than P500,000 was for the widow
and her son, more than P100,000 for the heirs that are in the family. (Exhibit "6", p. 28).

Q. You stated that you were one of the witnesses to the will and that the will was written in Spanish. Was it written in typewriting or in
handwriting of somebody? — "A. That will was written in typewriting.

Q. Did you read the contents of that will, or do you know the contents of that will? — A. No, sir, because I do not know Spanish.

Q. How do you know that it was the will of Jose B. Suntay ? — "A. Because I was one of the signers and I saw it." (Exhibit "6", p.
19.)

22. Do you understand the language in which that will was written? — ... I know a little Spanish.

23. Do you talk or write that language? I can write and talk a little Spanish. (Exhibits D, D-1.)

As to Ana Suntay's corroborating testimony, Judge Pecson aptly made the following findings: "Ana Suntay, one of the heirs and who would be affected
adversely by the legalization of the will in question, also testified on rebuttal that she saw the original will in the possession of Manuel Suntay
immediately after the snatching. She read it and she particularly remembers the manner in which the properties were to be distributed. Exhibit B was
shown to her on the witness stand and she declared that the provision regarding the distribution of the properties in said Exhibit B is the same as that
contained in the original will. Said testimony of Ana Suntay, therefore, belies the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto." And yet in the resolution on the
motion for new trial, the trial Judge had to state that "Ana Suntay on rebuttal did not, likewise, prove clearly and distinctly the provisions of the said lost
will, because she has not had enough schooling and she does not possess adequate knowledge of the Spanish language as shown by the fact that
she had to testify in Tagalog on the witness stand." The potent error committed by Judge Pecson in reversing his views as regards Ana's testimony, is
revealed readily in the following portions of the transcript:

P. Cuantas paginas tenia aquel documento a que usted se refiere? — "R. Probablemente seria mas de veinte (20) paginas.

P. No serian treinta (30) paginas? — "Abogado Recto: La testigo ha contestado ya que mas de veinte (20).

Juzgado: Se estima
Abogado Mejia:

P. Usted personalmente leyo el documento" — "R. Yo leyo mi hermano en presencia mia.

P. La pregunta es, si usted personalmente ha leido el documento? — " R. Si, lo he visto.

P. No solamente le pregunto a usted si Vd. ha visto el testamento sino si usted ha leido personalmente el testamento? — "R. Si la
parte de la adjudicacion lo he leido para asegurarme a que porcion corresponde a cada uno de nosotros.

P. Puede usted repetir poco mas o menos esa porcion a que se hacia la distribucion del alegado testamento? — "R. Como ya he
declarado, que las propiedades de mi difunto padre se habian dividido en tres partes, una tercera parte se nos adjudica a nosotros
diez (1) hijos en primeros nupcias y segunda nupcia, la segunda tercera parte los adjudica a la viuda y a Silvino, y la otra tercera
parte se lo adjudica a sus hijos como mejora a Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion y Jose.

P. Eso, tal como usted personalmente lo leyo en el documento? — "R. Si Señor.

P. Quiere usted tener la bondad, señora, de repetir poco mas o menos las palabras en ese documento que se distribuia las
propiedades del defundo padre usted como usted relata aqui? "Abogado Recto: Objetamos a la pregunta por falta de base, porque
elle solamente se fijo en la parte como se distribuian las propiedades pero no ha dicho la testigo que ella lo ha puesto de memoria,
ni Vd. ha preguntado en que lenguaje estaba escrito el testamento ...

Juzgado: Se estima.

Abogado Mejia:

P. Sabe usted en que lenguaje estaba redactado el documento que usted leyo personalmente? — "R. En Castellano.

P. Puede usted repetirnos ahora en Castellano algunas frases o palabras como se hizo la distribucion en aquel supuesto
testamento? —

Abogado Recto: Objecion, por falta de base, uno puede entender el español y sin embargo no podra repetir lo que ha leido, y no se
sabe todavia si ha estudiado el español bastante hasta el punto de poder hablarlo.

Juzgado: Se estima.

Abogado Mejia

P. Usted dijo que estaba puesto en castellano el supuesto testamento que Vda. leyo, usted poso el castellano? — "R. Yo entiendo
el castellano, pero no puedo hablar bien.

P. Usted estudio el castellano en algun colegio? — "Rj. Si, señor, En Sta. Catalina.

P. Cuantos años? — "R. Nuestros estudios no han sido continuous porque mi padre nos ingresaba en el colegio y despues nos
 sacaba para estar afuera, y no era continuo nuestro estudio.

P. Pero en total, como cuantos meses o años estaba usted en el colegio aprendiendo el castelano? — "R. Unos cuatro o cinco
años.

P. Entonces usted puede leer el castellano con facilidad, señora? — "R. Si, castellano sencillo puedo entender y lo puedo leer.

P. Usted entiende las preguntas que se le dirigian aqui en castellano sin interpretacion o sin el interprete? — "R. Si, Señor.

P. Puede usted contestar en castellano? — "R. Bueno, pero como de contestar, por eso quiero que la pregunta se me traduzca
antes. asi puedo contestar debidamente. (t.s.n. pp. 533-534.)

We are really at a loss to understand why, without any change whatsoever in the evidence, the trial Judge reversed his first decision, particularly when
he announced therein that "it is now incumbent upon this court to delve into the evidence whether or not Jose B. Suntay, deceased, left a will (the draft
of which is Exhibit B) and another will which was executed and probated in Amoy, China." His action is indeed surprising when we take into account
the various circumstancial features presently to be stated, that clearly confirm the testimony of Judge Anastacio Teodoro, G. Toh and Ana Suntay, or
otherwise constitute visible indicia of oppositor's desire to frustrate the wishes of his father, Jose B. Suntay.

In our opinion the most important piece of evidence in favor of the petitioner's case is the draft of the lost will, Exhibit "B." Its authenticity cannot be
seriously questioned, because according to the trial Judge himself, oppositor's own witness, Atty. Alberto Barretto, admitted it to be "identical in
substance and form to the second draft which he prepared in typewriting." Indeed, all the "A's" and "B's" in the handwritten insertions of the draft are
very similar to those in Barretto's admittedly genuine signature on the envelope, Exhibit "A." The finding of Judge Pecson on the point in his first
decision (reiterated expressly in the resolution on the motion for new trial), should control, not only because it is in accordance with the evidence but
because the oppositor had failed and did not even attempt to have the trial Judge reconsider or reverse his factual conclusions. The draft, Exhibit "B,"
having been positively identified by the witnesses for the petitioner to be an exact copy of the lost will of Jose B. Suntay, is therefore conclusive.
Oppositor's effort to show that said draft was never signed in final form, and was thought of merely to deceive petitioner's mother, Lim Billian, and that
the will actually executed and put in the envelope, Exhibit "A", provided that the testator's estate would be divided equally among his heirs, as in the
case of intestacy, was necessarily futile because, if this allegation is true, the will would not have been "snatched" from Go Toh — and the loss
certainly cannot be imputed to the widow Lim Billian or the petitioner; the snatched will would have been produced to put an end to petitioner's and his
mother's claim for greater inheritance or participation under the lost will; and the envelope containing the first will providing for equal shares, would not
have been entrusted to the care and custody of the widow Lim Billian.

It is very noteworthy that out of the nine children of the first marriage, only Angel, Jose and Federico Suntay had opposed the probate of the will in
question; the rest, namely, Ana, Aurora, Concepcion, Lourdes, Manuel and Emiliano Suntay, having expressly manifested in their answer that they
had no opposition thereto, since the petitioner's alternative petition "seeks only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late
father." This attitude is significantly an indication of the justness of petitioner's claim, because it would have been to their greater advantage if they had
sided with oppositor Federico Suntay in his theory of equal inheritance for all the children of Jose B. Suntay. Under the lost will or its draft Exhibit "B",
each of the Suntay children would receive only some P 25,000.00, whereas in case of intestacy or under the alleged will providing for equal shares,
each of them would receive some P100,000.00. And yet the Suntay children other than Angel, Jose and Federico had chosen to give their conformity
to the alternative petition in this case.

Another unequivocal confirmation of the lost will is the will which Jose B. Suntay executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on January 4, 1931, and probated
in Amoy District Court, China, containing virtually the same provisions as those in the draft Exhibit "B". What better evidence is there of an man's
desire or insistence to express his last wishes than the execution of a will reiterating the same provisions contained in an earlier will. Assuming that the
Chinese will cannot be probated in the jurisdiction, its probative value as corroborating evidence cannot be ignored.

Oppositor himself had admitted having read the will in question under which the widow Lim Billian was favored; and this again in a way goes to
corroborate the evidence for the petitioner as to the contents of the will sought to be probated.

COURT:

Q. Have you read the supposed will or the alleged will of your father? — "A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q. Can you tell the court the share or participation in the inheritance of Maria Natividad Lim Billian according to the will? —

A. Yes sir, she will inherit, I think, two-thirds (2/3) of the estate, in other words she is the most favored in the will, so when they sold
that, they sold everything, they are selling everything even the conjugal property. (t. s. n. 228-229.)

The decision of the majority leans heavily on the testimony of Atty. Alberto Barretto, forgetful perhaps of the fact that the trial Judge gave no credence
to said witness. It should be repeated that Judge Pecson reiterated in the resolution on the motion for new trial all his findings in the first decision. If as
Atty. Barretto testified, Lim Billian was entitled under the will actually signed by Jose Suntay only to P10,000.00, in addition to properties in China value
at P15,000.00, the fees of P25,000.00 admittedly asked by him would absorb her entire inheritance; and this would normally not be done by any law
practitioner. Upon the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that Atty. Barretto might have become hostile to the petitioner and his mother Lim
Billian in view of the latter's refusal to agree to the amount of P25,000.00 and her offer to pay only P100.00. There is also evidence tending to show
that as early as 1942, Atty. Barretto was paid by oppositor Federico Suntay the sum of P16,000.00 which, although allegedly for services in the testate
proceedings, was paid out of the personal funds of said oppositors to supply Atty. Barretto's needs. This circumstances perhaps further explains why
the latter had to support the side of Federico Suntay.

We have quoted in full the decision of this court in the "snatching" case and the first decision of Judge Pecson in this case, both in the hope and in the
belief (1) that the first would reveal the manner by which those adversely affected had planned to prevent the last wishes of the deceased Jose B.
Suntay from being carried on, and (2) that the second, by the facts correctly recited therein and by the force and accuracy of its logic would amply
show the weakness and utter lack of foundation of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration. We have set forth at length pertinent portions of
the testimony of various witnesses to demonstrate more plainly the plausibility of the original decision of Judge Pecson, and the latter's consequent
bad judgment in having forced himself to accomplish a somersault, a feat which the majority, in my opinion, have mistakenly commended. We have
found this to be one of the cases of this court in which we have had occasion to participate, where there can be absolutely no doubt as to the result —
outright reversal — for which, with due respect to the majority opinion, we vote without hesitancy.

Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

5 November 1954
PADILLA, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on 31 July 1954, affirming the decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which
disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China,
on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay, without pronouncement as to costs, on grounds that will presently be taken up and discussed.

Appellant points to an alleged error in the decision where it states that —

. . . This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof, . . .

because according to him the "will was lost before not after (the) filing of the petition." This slight error, if it is an error at all, does not, and cannot, after
the conclusions and pronouncements made in the judgment rendered in the case. In his alternative petition the appellant alleges:

4. That on October 15, 1934, Marian Natividad Lim Billian, the mother of herein petitioner filed a petition in this court for the
allowance and probate of a last will and testament executed, and signed in the Philippines in the year 1929 by said deceased Jose
B. Suntay. (P. 3, amended record on appeal.)

If such will and testament was already lost or destroyed at the time of the filing of the petition by Maria Natividad Lim Billian (15 October 1934), the
appellant would have so stated and alleged. If Anastacio Teodoro, a witness for the appellant, is to be believed when he testified —

. . . that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948), ... Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De Los
Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 19470 . . .

and —

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro and returned by the latter to the former because
they could not agree on the amount of fees, . . .

then on 15 October 1934, the date of the filing of the petition, the will was not yet lost. And if the facts alleged in paragraph 5 of the appellant's
alternative petition which states:

That this Honorable Court, after hearing, denied the aforesaid petition for probate filed by Maria Natividad Lim Billian in view of the
loss and/or destruction of said will subsequent to the filing of said petition and prior to the hearing thereof, and the alleged
insufficiency of the evidence adduced to established the loss and/or destruction of the said will, (Emphasis supplied, P. 3, amended
record on appeal.)

may be relied upon, then the alleged error pointed out by the appellant, if it is an error, is due to the allegation in said paragraph of his alternative
petition. Did the appellant allege the facts in said paragraph with reckless abandon? Or, did the appellant make the allegation as erroneously as that
which he made in paragraph 10 of the alternative petition that "his will which was lost and ordered probated by our Supreme Court in G. R. No. 44276,
above referred to?" (P. 7, amended record on appeal.) This Court did not order the probate of the will in said case because if it did, there would have
been no further and subsequent proceedings in the case after the decision of this Court referred to had been rendered and had become final. Be that
as it may, whether the loss of the will was before or subsequent to the filing of the petition, as already stated, the fact would not affect in the slightest
degree the conclusions and pronouncements made by this Court.

The appellant advances the postulate that the decision of this Court in the case of Lim Billian vs. Suntay, G. R. No. 44276, 63 Phil., 793, constitutes
res judicata on these points: (a) that only one will was prepared by attorney Barretto, and (b) that the issue to be resolved by the trial court was
whether the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or draft of the snatched will, and contends that these points already adjudged were overlooked in the
majority opinion. The decision of this Court in the case referred to does not constitute res judicata on the points adverted to by the appellant. The only
point decided in that case is that "the evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the envelope." In the opinion of this
Court, this circumstance justified "the presentation of secondary evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all the essential and
necessary legal formalities." That is all that was decided. This Court further said:

The trial of this case was limited to the proof of loss of the will, and from what has taken place we deduce that it was not petitioner's
intention to raise, upon the evidence adduced by her, and other points involved herein, namely, as we have heretofore indicated,
whether Exhibit B is a true copy of the will and whether the latter was executed with all the formalities required by law for its probate.
The testimony of Alberto Barretto bears importantly in this connection. (P. 796, supra.)

Appellant's contention that the question before the probate court was whether the draft (Exhibit B) is a true copy or draft of the snatched will is a
mistaken interpretation and view of the decision of this Court in the case referred to, for if this Court did make that pronouncement, which, of course, it
did not, such pronouncement would be contrary to law and would have been a grievous and irreparable mistake, because what the Court passed upon
and decided in that case, as already stated, is that there was sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the of the will and that the next step was to prove
by secondary evidence its due execution in accordance with the formalities of the law and its contents, clearly and districtly, by the testimony of at least
two credible witnesses.1

The appellant invokes Rule 133 to argue that Rule 77 should not have been applied to the case but the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190), for the reason that this case had been commenced before the Rules of Court took effect. But Rule 133 cited by the appellant
provides:

These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1940. They shall govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all further
proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)

So, Rule 77 applies to this case because it was a further proceedings in a case then pending. But even if section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure
were to be applied, still the evidence to prove the contents and due execution of the will and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration must be established "by full evidence to the satisfaction of the Court." This requirement may even be more strict and exacting than the two-
witness rule provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The underlying reason for the exacting provisions found in section 623 of Act No. 190 and section 6,
Rule 77, the product of experience and wisdom, is to prevent imposters from foisting, or at least to make for them difficult to foist, upon probate courts
alleged last wills or testaments that were never executed.

In commenting unfavorably upon the decree disallowing the lost will, both the appellant and the dissenting opinion suffer from an infirmity born of a
mistaken premise that all the conclusions and pronouncements made by the probate court in the first decree which allowed the probate of the lost will
of the late Jose B. Suntay must be accepted by this Court. This is an error. It must be borne in mind that this is not a petition for a writ of certiorari to
review a judgment of the Court of Appeals on questions of law where the findings of fact by said Court are binding upon this Court. This is an appeal
from the probate court, because the amount involved in the controversy exceeds P50,000, and this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
must review the evidence and the findings of fact and legal pronouncements made by the probate court. If such conclusions and pronouncements are
unjustified and erroneous this Court is in duty bound to correct them. Not long after entering the first decree the probate court was convinced that it
had committed a mistake, so it set aside the decree and entered another. This Court affirmed the last decree not precisely upon the facts found by the
probate court but upon facts found by it after a careful review and scrutiny of the evidence, parole and documentary. After such review this Court has
found that the provisions of the will had not been established clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses and that conclusion is
unassailable because it is solidly based on the established facts and in accordance with law.

The appellant and the dissent try to make much out of a pleading filed by five (5) children and the widow of Apolonio Suntay, another child of the
deceased by the first marriage, wherein they state that —

. . . in answer to the alternative petition filed in these proceedings by Silvino Suntay, through counsel, dated June 18, 1947, to this
Honorable Court respectfully state that, since said alternative petition seeks only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and
 wishes of their late father, they have no opposition thereto. (Pp. 71-72, amended record on appeal.)

Does that mean that they were consenting to the probate of the lost will? Of course not. If the lost will sought to be probated in the alternative petition
was really the will of their late father, they, as good children, naturally had, could have, no objection to its probate. That is all that their answer implies
and means. But such lack of objection to the probate of the lost will does not relieve the proponent thereof or the party interested in its probate from
establishing its due execution and proving clearly and distinctly the provisions thereof at least two credible witnesses. It does not mean that they
accept the draft Exhibit B as an exact and true copy of the lost will and consent to its probate. Far from it. In the pleading copied in the dissent, which
the appellant has owned and used as argument in the motion for reconsideration, there is nothing that may bolster up his contention. Even if all the
children were agreeable to the probate of said lost will, still the due execution of the lost will must be established and the provisions thereof proved
clearly and distinctly by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in section 6, Rule 77. The appellant's effort failed to prove what is required by
the rule. Even if the children of the deceased by the first marriage, out of generosity, were willing to donate their shares in the estate of their deceased
father or parts thereof to their step mother and her only child, the herein appellant, still the donation, if validly made, would not dispense with the
proceedings for the probate of the will in accordance with section 6, Rule 77, because the former may convey by way of donation their shares in the
state of their deceased father or parts thereof to the latter only after the decree disallowing the will shall have been rendered and shall have become
final. If the lost will is allowed to probate there would be no room for such donation except of their respective shares in the probated will.

The part of the deposition of Go Toh quoted in the motion for reconsideration which appellant underscores does not refer to Go Toh but to Manuel
Lopez. Even if Go Toh heard Manuel Lopez read the draft (Exhibit B) for the purpose of checking it up with the original held and read by Jose B.
Suntay, Go Toh should not have understood the provisions of the will because he knew very little of the Spanish language in which the will was written
(answer to 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory). In fact, he testifies in his deposition that all he knows about the contents of
the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-
interrogatories); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft [Exhibit B] (answers to 33rd interrogatory and
to X-8 cross-interrogatory); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answer to the 67th
interrogatory); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft [Exhibit B] (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-
interrogatories). We repeat that —

. . . all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he
learned of them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.

This finding cannot be contested and assailed.

The appellant does not understand how the Court came to the conclusion that Ana Suntay, a witness for the appellant could not have read the part of
the will on adjudication. According to her testimony "she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication," which, this Court found, "is inconsistent
with her testimony in chief (to the effect) that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document of Manuel, and he went away." (P.
528, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948.) And appellant asks the question: "Who went away? Was it Manuel or Apolonio?" In answer to his own
question the appellant says: "The more obvious inference is that it was Apolonio and not Manuel who went away." This inference made by the
appellant not only is not obvious but it is also illogical, if it be borne in mind that Manuel came to the house of Apolonio and it happened that Ana was
there, according to her testimony. So the sentence "he went away" in Ana's testimony must logically and reasonably refer to Manuel, who was a caller
or visitor in the house of his brother Apolonio and not to the latter who was in his house. If it was Apolonio who "went away," counsel for the appellant
could have brought that out by a single question. As the evidence stands could it be said that the one who went away was Apolonio and not Manuel?
The obvious answer is that it was Manuel. That inference is the result of a straight process of reasoning and clear thinking.

There is a veiled insinuation in the dissent that Alberto Barretto testified as he did because he had been paid by Federico C. Suntay the sum of
P16,000. Federico C. Suntay testifies on the point thus —

Q. You mentioned in your direct testimony that you paid certain amount to Atty. Alberto Barretto for services rendered, how much did
you pay? — A. Around SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00).
 Q. When did you make the payment? — A. During the Japanese time.

Q. Did you state that fact in any accounts you presented to the Court? — A. I do not quite remember that.

. . . (P. 180, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947.)

Q. When you made that payment, was (it) your intention to charge it to the state or to collect it later from the estate? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. More or less when was such payment made, during the Japanese time, what particular month and year, do you remember? — A.
I think in 1942.

Q. And you said you paid him because of services he rendered? — A. Upon the order to the Court.

Q. And those services were precisely because he made a will and he made a will which was lost, the will of Jose B. Suntay? ... (P.
181, t. s. n., supra.) — A. I think I remember correctly according to ex-Representative Vera who is the administrator whom I followed
at that time, that was paid according to the services rendered by Don Alberto Barretto with regard to our case in the testamentaria
but he also rendered services to my father.

Q. At least your Counsel said that there was an order of the Court ordering you to pay that, do you have that copy of the order? — A.
Yes, sir, I have, but I think that was burned. (P. 184, t. s. n., supra.).

So the sum of P16,000 was paid upon recommendation of the former administrator and order of the probate court for services rendered by Alberto
Barretto not only in the probate proceedings that also for services rendered to his father. But if this sum of P16,000 paid to Alberto Barretto upon
recommendation of the previous administrator and order of the probate court for professional services rendered in the probate proceedings and to the
deceased in his lifetime be taken against his truthfulness and veracity as to affect adversely his testimony, what about the professional services of
Anastacio Teodoro who appeared in this case as one of the attorneys for the petitioner-appellant? (P. 2, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947.)Would
that not likewise or by the same token affect his credibility? It is the latter's interest more compelling than the former's?

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, A. and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Paras, C.J., dissenting:

For the same reasons and considerations set forth in detail in my dissent promulgated on July 31, 1954, I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

[

[2

3.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who
was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation
of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of
Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue,
Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in
Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N.
Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any
member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on
July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and
Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares
in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided
interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to
the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names
of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his
entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then
his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in
accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to
respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he
had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged
that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as
they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are
already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED
and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey; and
 (b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF
THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA,
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG
BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND
CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT

COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S
ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS. 20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and
in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and
the same has already been executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of
the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms
of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the
will and how the estate will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the
express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand
because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant
laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because
she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her
estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888
for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v.
Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based
on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that
petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith,
amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law
of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute
Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard
Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in
1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and
it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing
her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her
interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of
the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is
petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse
into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the
ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances
but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has
not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the
Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to
fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases
which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a
new and fair hearing.34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good
faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a
person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the
standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of
her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During
the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time
of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last
Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of
Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s
Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State
of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16
of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded
the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before
the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot
accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when
as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore
that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent,
petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He
had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his
functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on
him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project
of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the
rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by
his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The
CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law
(Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade
Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle,
however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary
administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the
plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the
law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon
petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is
clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault
or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have
the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of
the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents
law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title
for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary
intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator
in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other
hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty
to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate
of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently
died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the
proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the
entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven
in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the
ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as
her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44,
Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and
admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge
Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of
the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the
CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law,
by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands
of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court
clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and
business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippine .R. No. 139868            
June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who
was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation
of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As administrator of
Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue,
Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in
Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N.
Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any
member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on
July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and
Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares
in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided
interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to
the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names
of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his
entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then
his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in
accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to
respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he
had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged
that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as
they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are
already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED
and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the
issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE
DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR",
ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT

COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and
in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and
the same has already been executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of
the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms
of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the
will and how the estate will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the
express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand
because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant
laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because
she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her
estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888
for the settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v.
Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based
on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that
petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith,
amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law
of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in
accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute
Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard
Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in
1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and
it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing
her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her
interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of
the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is
petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse
into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the
ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances
but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has
not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the
Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to
fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases
which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a
new and fair hearing.34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good
faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the
estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a
person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the
standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of
her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During
the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time
of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last
Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of
Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s
Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State
of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16
of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded
the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before
the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot
accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when
as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore
that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent,
petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He
had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his
functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on
him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project
of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the
rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by
his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The
CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law
(Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade
Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle,
however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary
administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his
actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the
plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in
sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the
law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon
petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is
clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault
or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have
the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of
the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents
law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title
for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary
intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator
in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other
hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty
to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate
of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently
died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the
proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the
entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven
in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the
ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as
her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in
evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44,
Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and
admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge
Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of
the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the
CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law,
by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands
of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court
clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and
business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the
acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private
lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the
exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a
former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII,
Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding
title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed
on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the
Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of

the court.

s, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against
acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV,
Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer
was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands,
Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring
or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession
or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed
on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the
Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of

the court.

[4

5
[

[7

[8

[10

[11

[12

[13

[14

[15

[16

[17

[18

[21

[22

[23

[25

[27

32

[34

[35
[36

[37

38

40

[41

43

[45

46

47

[48

49

[50