Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUMMARY: The Labor Arbiter refused to exercise jurisdiction over Del Monte's cross-claim HELD: NO.
(for restitution by ALU should the company be held financially liable for dismissals). The CA
agreed with the LA. The SC held that the law precludes the LA from enforcing money claims The law precludes the Labor Arbiter from enforcing money claims arising from the
arising from the implementation of the CBA. Moreover, there is a provision in the CBA that implementation of the CBA. Del Monte and ALU expressly recognized the jurisdiction of
states that Voluntary Arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction. Voluntary Arbitrators in the CBA.
Article 217 of the Labor Code sets forth the original jurisdiction of the Labor
FACTS: Arbiters. In contrast, Article 261 of the Labor Code indubitably vests on the
Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation workers of Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators the "original and exclusive
petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon. Respondent Nena Timbal jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
was a rank-and-file employee of Del Monte and also a member of ALU. Del Monte and ALU interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Among
entered into a CBA those areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
o Section 5 of the CBA stipulated that "ALU assumes full responsibility of are contract-interpretation and contract-implementation, the questions precisely
any such termination of any member of the bargaining unit who loses his involved in Del Monte’s claim.
membership in ALU and agrees to hold Del Monte free from any liability
by judgment of a competent authority for claims arising out of dismissals In reconciling the grants of jurisdiction vested under Articles 261 and 217 of the Labor Code,
made upon demand of ALU, and latter shall reimburse the former of such the Court has pronounced that "the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
sums as it shall have paid therefore.1 under Article 217(c) for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or
Timbal, along with four other employees (collectively, co- contracts other than a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel
employees), were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
(for encouraging defections to a rival union, NFL). They 'arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
allegedly attended seminars. and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies',
Disloyalty Board >>> Affidavit of Artajo (turns out there is bad under Article 261.
blood between Artajo and Timbal) >>> Disloyalty Board
nonetheless recommended the expulsion of Timbal from VELOSO VS. CHINA AIRLINES
membership in ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del
Monte in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the FACTS:
existing CBA >>> ALU Regional VP adopted recommendations Jose Pagsibigan purchased a plane ticket for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from
>>> ALU President affirmed the expulsion the Transaire Travel Agency.The said agency contacted Philippine Airlines (PAL) which at
Del Monte terminated Timbal and her co-employees, noting that that time was a sales and ticketing agent of China Airlines (CAL).PAL, through its ticketing
the termination was "upon demand of ALU agent Roberto Espiritu, issued to Pagsibigan the plane ticket which showed that the latter had
been booked at the June 10, 1968 5:20 PM flight of China Airlines, departing from Manila for
Timbal and her co-employees filed separate complaints against Del Monte and/or its Personnel Taipei.When Pagisibigan showed up at the airport an hour before the supposed scheduled time
Manager Warfredo C. Balandra and ALU with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the of departure, he was informed that the CAL plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had left
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and at 10:20 AM that day.The PAL employees then made appropriate arrangements so that he
damages. could take the PAL’s flight toTaipei the following day. Pagsibigan took the re-scheduled
o The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally dismissed and flight.A few months after, he filed a complaint for moral damagesand attorney’s fees against
ordered Del Monte to reinstate complainants, to their former positions and PAL. He alleged that Espiritu had been grossly negligent in his duties.In its defense, PAL
to pay their full backwages and other allowances >>> NLRC: all validly alleged that: (1) the departure time indicated on Pagsibigan’s plane ticket was furnished and
dismissed >>> CA: all, except Timbal, validly dismissed confirmed by CAL; and (2) CAL did not inform the issuing PAL branch of the revised
timetable of CAL flights. Hence, PAL asserted a cross-claim against CAL.CAL, for its part,
Before the Labor Arbiter, Del Monte presented its cross-claim against ALU for reimbursement averred that: (1) all airlines, including PAL, were informed of the revised schedule of flights;
should it be made liable for illegal dismissal or unfair labor practice pursuant to the union (2) notices of these revised schedule were furnished to all sales agent; and (3) the issuing PAL
security clause. LA ruled that it cannot validly entertain the cross-claims of respondent DMPI branch had in fact been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time schedule. Thus,
and Tabusuares against the respondent ALU-TUCP because of the absence of employer- CAL also asserted a cross claim against PAL.
1
The trial court found PAL and Roberto Espiritu jointly and severally liable by way of
exemplary damages. It did not award moral damages. CAL was exonerated.CA ruled out the
claim for moral and exemplary damages, and instead awarded nominal damages.
ISSUE:
Who should be held liable?
HELD:
The SC noted that Pagsibigan has opted to seek redress by pursuing two remedies at the same
time, that is, to enforce the civil liability of CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to
recover from PAL and Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana.A perusal of the complaint
of Pagisbigan will disclose that the allegations therein make out a case for a quasi-delict. Had
Pagisibigan intended to maintain an action based on breach of contract, he could have sued
CAL alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the contractIt is thus evident that when
Pagsibigan sensed that he cannot hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, he made a detour on
appeal, by claiming that his action against CAL is based on breach of contract of carriage.SC
did not allow Pagsibigan to change his theory at this stage because it would be unfair for CAL
as it would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory.But
there is no basis to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, hence its exoneration from any liability
for fault or negligence.
With respect to PAL and Espiritu, PAL’s main defense is that is only an agent. As a general
proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable to third persons. However,
there are admitted exceptions, as in this case where the agent is being sued for damages arising
from a tort committed by his employee. In an action premised on the employee’s negligence,
whereby Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the damages from both PAL and Espiritu without
qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an
employer. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer. This presumption,
however, may be rebutted by clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. PAL failed to overcome such presumption. As found by CA, PAL was duly
informed of CAL’s revised schedule, and in fact, PAL had been issuing and selling ticket
based on said revised time schedule. For his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable
to Pagisbigan under Article 2176 of the CC. For the failure of PAL to rebut the legal
presumption of negligence, it is also primarily liable under Article 2180 of CC. Under Article
2180, all that is required is that the employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi-delict
which caused damage to another, and this suffices to hold the employer primarily and
solidarily liable for the tortious act of the employee. PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu
reimbursement of the amount which it will have to pay the offended party’s claim.