YUJUICO vs. ATIENZA, JR.

FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation
or expropriation certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary
School. The property chosen is covered by TCT owned by the petitioner. However, failing to acquire the land
by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner of the property. The RTC
rendered a Decision in the expropriation case in favor of the City. The judgment became final and executory,
no appeal having been interposed by either party.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment which the trial court granted. There being no
opposition, the Land Bank is thereby directed to release the said amount to defendant Yujuico in partial
payment of the just compensation adjudged by the lower court and is given 30 days from receipt of the Order
for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Yujuico.

Not having been favored with a reply, petitioner sent a letter demanding compliance with the  Order. As there
was no action from the demand letter, petitioner filed a petition for contempt of court against respondents.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that petitioner took the Order as a writ of mandamus when in
fact it was a mere order in furtherance of the Writ of Execution. Respondents insisted that it should never be
allowed since petitioner merely wanted to escape the payment of docket fees in the filing of the petition for
mandamus. The trial court denied the petition for contempt of court.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel them to pass a resolution appropriating the
amount necessary to pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to petitioner in the expropriation
case.

The lower court granted the petition for mandamus. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a
resolution appropriating the necessary amount and the corresponding disbursement thereof for the full and
complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due petitioner.

However, respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment wherein they also prayed for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents invoked excusable negligence as a
ground for their failure to seasonably file an appeal. While it denied the application for TRO in view of its prior
order granting petitioner’s Motion for Execution, the court granted the Petition for Relief from Judgment in
an Order.

Finding the Order unacceptable, petitioner elevated it to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45. In her petition, petitioner asks that the order of the lower court giving due course to respondents’
appeal be reversed and set aside on a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment, an interlocutory order, resorted by the petitioner
is valid as it cannot be subject to an appeal.

RULING: Respondents have correctly pointed out that an interlocutory order cannot be made subject to an
appeal. However, the Court is convinced that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted respondents’ petition for relief from judgment. While the case
should have been elevated to this Court not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 but through a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in the exercise of sound discretion, the Supreme Court treated
the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. After all, it was filed within the reglementary period for the
filing of a Rule 65 petition.

Accordingly, facial allegations of reversible error in the petition will be treated, as they should be, as
contextual averments of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo. Appropriately, petitioner
impleaded the RTC Presiding Judge as party-respondent in the instant petition.

Anent the alleged breach of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. The rule
may be relaxed when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court’s primary
jurisdiction. In this case, the judgment sought to be satisfied has long attained finality and the expropriated
property has been utilized as a school site for five (5) years now; yet, the awarded just compensation has not
been fully paid. These circumstances, in the Court’s estimation, merit the relaxation of the technical rules of
procedure to ensure that substantial justice will be served.

Therefore, the petition is granted. The Order of the trial court granting respondents’ Petition for Relief from
Judgment is reversed and set aside, ordering respondents to immediately pass a resolution for the payment of
the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is reinstated.

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS: Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) granted three major multi-million US Dollar loans to
corporate borrowers which are foreign affiliates of respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC), a domestic
corporation. Due to the default in the payment of the loan, ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real
estate mortgages, over its parcels of land, located in Bulacan. The corporate borrowers still defaulted in the
payment of the restructured loans prompting BANTSA to file civil actions in foreign court which did not
impleader respondent ARC as party-defendant. BANTSA then filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan, an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. After due publication and notice,
the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

ARC filed before the RTC, an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter's act of foreclosing
extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the
collection of the principal loan. In its answer, petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from
foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not applicable in the present
case. Private respondent filed a motion for suspension of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot
exercise said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or contradicting its contentions in the case
that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."

RTC granted the private respondent's motion for suspension. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision  in
favor of private respondent ARC. Declaring that the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits
against the principal debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court prompting petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.

Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.

As to the issue of availability of remedies, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor
may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By  such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an
election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and
execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to
sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged
property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete,
his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are
purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action
against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and
obnoxious to law and equity, but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of
his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy
is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition
not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of
final judgment therein should concur, is untenable.

By the mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the
present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must
arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.

In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to
exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Therefore, petition is denied.

BARRIDO vs. NONATO

FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Nonato and petitioner Barrido, they were able to acquire a
property situated in Bacolod City consisting of a house and lot. However, their marriage was declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over
the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for
partition before the MTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed that the subject property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition
case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision adjudicating to defendant Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain.

Nonato appealed before the RTC. The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell
within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for
lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC has jurisdiction in cases such as partition or foreclosure of mortgage on real
property.

RULING: The petition lacks merit. The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed
the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

HUERTA ALBA RESORT INC. vs. CA

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 89-5424, a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage was filed before the RTC of Makati
City by private respondent which sought the foreclosure of 4 parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner to
Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. However, petitioner questioned the assignment by Intercon of its mortgage right
there over to the private respondent, on the ground that the same was ultra vires. The Supreme Court ruled
such case in favor of private respondents. Therefore, private respondent filed with the original RTC a motion
for execution, which was granted. Petitioner then filed motion to quash and set aside the writ of execution
contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and the case was still with CA, thus, the
writ was premature. RTC denied such allegation and contended that the execution was a matter of right and
such was its ministerial duty. Petitioner then appeal to the CA. While the case was pending in CA, petitioner
presented a motion for clarification whether the 12-month period of redemption would apply. The RTC ruled
that the period of redemption would have to follow the rule on judicially foreclosed property. The petitioner
appealed and filed a motion to set aside the order contending that the first decision is altered. The CA
dismissed the appeals and motion for reconsideration of the petitioner because the subject was already moot
and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lost its right of redemption by virtue of the assignment of its mortgage
debt by Intercon to plaintiff.

RULING: The court ruled in the negative. The right of redemption in this case is vested by law and is therefore
an absolute privilege which defendant may not lose even though plaintiff-assignee is not a bank or credit
institution. Indeed, a contrary ruling will lead to a possible circumvention of Section 78 because all that may be
needed to deprive a defaulting mortgagor of his right of redemption is to assign his mortgage debt from a
bank or credit institution to one which is not. Protection of defaulting mortgagors, which is the avowed policy
behind the provision, would not be achieved if the ruling were otherwise. Consequently, defendant still
possesses its right of redemption which it may exercise up to October 21, 1995 only, which is one year from
the date of registration of the certificate of sale of subject properties

Since the period to exercise defendant's right of redemption has not yet expired, the cancellation of
defendant's transfer certificates of title and the issuance of new ones in lieu thereof in favor of plaintiff are
therefore illegal for being premature, thereby necessitating reconveyance.

Therefore, the motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession is denied and plaintiff is directed to accept the
redemption on or before October 21, 1995 in an amount computed according to the terms stated in the Writ
of Execution.

BARRIDO vs. NONATO

FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Nonato and petitioner Barrido, they were able to acquire a
property situated in Bacolod City consisting of a house and lot. However, their marriage was declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over
the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for
partition before the MTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed that the subject property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition
case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision adjudicating to defendant Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain.

Nonato appealed before the RTC. The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell
within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for
lack of merit.

Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTCC has jurisdiction in the present case.
RULING: The petition lacks merit. The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of real
property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed
the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

LACBAYAN, vs. SAMOY

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent had an illicit relationship where their relationship developed until
petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son. They were able to establish a manpower services company.

Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways. Both agreed to
divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. When petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement,
respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said
properties.

Petitioner claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company
which she and respondent established. Respondent, on the other hand, testified that the properties
were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.

RTC rendered a decision giving considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the properties
were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of
one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the
issue on ownership in an action for partition.

Unimpressed with petitioner’s arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.

RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper and may be made by voluntary agreement
of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Indubitably, therefore, until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

LIM vs. LIGON

FACTS: Sometime in 1970, Tomas Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a parcel of land
situated in Batangas. After his death, his son Felicisimo pursued the application and the survey plan
was approved by the Bureau of Lands.

In 1985, the spouses Ronulo claim that a parcel of land which they have been occupying since the
1950s was included in the approved survey plan in the name of Tomas Fernandez. Regional Director
of DENR Provisional Region IV-A issued an Order in finding the protest of Spouses Isaac and
Concepcion Ronulo to be meritorious, the plan approved in the name of Tomas Fernandez is ordered
cancelled. The above order was appealed by Fernandez to the Office of the DENR Secretary.

In the meantime, plaintiffs Spouses Ligon purchased the subject property from Fernandez and
introduced improvements thereon, including a beach house. A TCT was issued in the name of the
spouses Ligon based on Free Patent No. and an analogous Original Certificate of Title both in the
name of Felicisimo Fernandez. Defendant Lim filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
petitioners with MTC involving the subject property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent and ordered petitioners to vacate the subject land.

Plaintiffs appealed the adverse decision to RTC but the same was affirmed in a decision. Plaintiffs
appealed the RTC decision with the CA alleging that the lower court erred in deciding the case based
on the ex-parte evidence presented by respondents, in ruling that Felicisimo was the original owner of
the questioned property. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for utter lack of merit. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration. The CA denied reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case serves as res judicata with
respect to the issue of prior possession of Spouses Ronules – the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner.

RULING: An ejectment suit is brought before the proper court to recover physical possession or
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases
is intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
the property and not to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered
to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of
possession. Its determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive.

Thus, under Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules on Civil Procedure:

SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or
ownership. – The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land
or building.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

SERDONCILLO vs. BENOLIRAO

FACTS: The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako located in Pasay City. The legal
heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which
subdivided the property into 14 lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for sale with
first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents and petitioner.

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako's wife. Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped
prompting petitioner to file before the MeTC of Pasay City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario
de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial court and was eventually
affirmed on appeal by the RTC of Pasay City.

After unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner, UCRTC instituted an action against
her for recovery of possession of the subject premises before the RTC of Pasay. The trial court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC. UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial
Court, hence, the same became final.

Serdoncillo filed a case for the Exercise of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and spouses
Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale sold to Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or
conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the said property and that the same
was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private
respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was
dismissed.

Private respondents made their final demand on petitioner reiterating their previous demands to vacate the
property. On December 13, 1990, private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the
subject premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Petitioner, in her Answer, put
up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in question since 1956.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent. Aggrieved by the trial court's decision,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the findings of
the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA committed grave abuse of jurisdiction in deciding as an accion publiciana
an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.

RULING: Petitioner's position is without merit.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear
on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

Under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely: (1)  accion interdictal,
which is the summary action for either forcible entry or detentacion, where the defendant's possession of the
property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer, where the defendant's possession was originally lawful
but ceased to be must be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within
one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry; and from the date of last demand,
in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, (3) accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus
possidendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

A complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction
upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that
he was deprived of such possession by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, "for if the dispossession did not take place by any of
these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction.

The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the owners of the property when
defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot without their permission. That despite formal demand
defendant failed to vacate and surrender possession of the property to them. Indeed, the averments in
plaintiffs' complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not illustrate plaintiffs' action as either an  action
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

Therefore, the petition for review is dismissed and the decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed.